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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by quasimatt on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by quasimatt on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Flipside Governance Recap | 6 Jan 2023]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/flipside-governance/flipside-governance-recap-jan-6-eaeb69f7169e?source=rss-5efe8d798dd5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[recaps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[quasimatt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2023 16:57:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-06T16:59:08.268Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JjoGD2IpHXBxN0DE.png" /></figure><p>Happy New Year! Welcome to the Flipside Governance Team Recap. Here you’ll get a full view of what we‘re up to each week, from penning proposals to publishing research to our all important voting activity &amp; rationales. Enjoy!</p><h3>🚨 Team Highlights</h3><ul><li>In case you missed it, <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/flipside-governance-year-in-review-2022-weekly-recap-7d41835326ea">the last edition of the Flipside Governance Recap</a> included a summary of all our votes in 2022! We documented a total of <em>562 votes</em>. The team voted most on Osmosis &amp; MakerDAO governance proposals, but participated across <em>20 different DAOs</em> in 2022.</li><li>In the New Year, a few team members shared their hopes and goals for the upcoming year. <a href="https://twitter.com/raphbaph/status/1609500874606264320">Raph</a> hopes the space comes closer to goals of trustlessness and transparency, and is excited to work toward transparency by pumping out more in-depth research. <a href="https://twitter.com/web3_analyst/status/1610374527460200448?s=20&amp;t=fUH8oO5J4NYV4Hgo8NHKKA">Jess</a> plans to lean into providing the best IBC and governance data in the space.</li></ul><h3>📰 Across the Industry: Governance News of the Week</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2022/12/27/the-psychological-differences-between-bitcoin-and-ethereum-governance/"><strong>The Psychological Differences Between Bitcoin and Ethereum Governance</strong></a><strong>: </strong>Bill Ottman, CEO of minds.com and freedom of information advocate, reviewed some key differences between Ethereum and Bitcoin governance and users’ attitude toward change. He concludes that Bitcoin maximalists typically prioritize predictability and security, while Ethereans value innovation and composability. In the end, the differences in governance of Bitcoin and Ethereum may be primarily psychological.</li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/FantomFDN/status/1610713403215036443"><strong>Fantom Votes to bring gas monetization to successful dApps</strong></a>: The Fantom community recently voted ‘Yes’ on a governance proposal that introduces a new revenue stream for builders by allowing high-transaction dApps older than 3 months to apply for a gas cash-back. The community aligned on this proposal, with over 99% of voters supporting it. Many hope it will incentivize builders and creators to use Fantom.</li></ul><h3>📊 Flipside Governance | Analysis of the Week</h3><p>This week’s analysis highlights data from outside the governance space. The video below displays changes in the distribution of BONK from 12/24/22 to 1/3/23. BONK (Bonk Inu) is a meme coin on Solana. Fifty percent of the supply was airdropped to community members who held certain NFTs.</p><p>The data visualization video tells a story of the airdrop becoming available, with the majority of claimers getting their hands on BONK right away and others following soon after. BONK is then allocated the DAO, marketing team, and core team.</p><p>Liquidity moves in and out of DEXs, but the majority of BONK airdrop recipients hold their tokens. The majority of the supply held by users remains in wallets of airdrop recipients rather than other market buyers.</p><h3>flippyflip.🧮🌲 on Twitter: &quot;having fun with the bubbles and they look good on @bonk_inu look how many airdrop recipients have held on for a minutedata: @flipsidecrypto + @solana every 12 hours since 12/24🎧music: &quot;bonk&quot; by TheDivisionGroup pic.twitter.com/x7j87KZxNj / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>having fun with the bubbles and they look good on @bonk_inu look how many airdrop recipients have held on for a minutedata: @flipsidecrypto + @solana every 12 hours since 12/24🎧music: &quot;bonk&quot; by TheDivisionGroup pic.twitter.com/x7j87KZxNj</p><p>The BONK airdrop was a godsend for development teams in the Solana ecosystem. Five percent of the supply was dropped to developers, with some selling their airdrops for over $50,000, extending their runway by months at a time when building on Solana is not as profitable and secure as it once was.</p><h3>📜 Flipside Governance Activity</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/144/1*t1gvO9855NqGDf0sTodnIQ.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F8I9Vo%2F1%2F&amp;display_name=Datawrapper&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F8I9Vo%2F1%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F8I9Vo%2Fplain-s.png%3Fv%3D1&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="600" height="608" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b99284937382c990d4e514abd8631e60/href">https://medium.com/media/b99284937382c990d4e514abd8631e60/href</a></iframe><p>For more all-round governance content, be sure to follow us on<strong> </strong><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov"><strong>Twitter</strong></a><strong> </strong>or here on <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance"><strong>Medium</strong></a>. We’ll keep you updated.</p><p><strong>Hear, hear!</strong> If you dig the work we’re doing for our partner DAOs and want to delegate to us, click the links below to get to the delegation page:</p><ul><li><a href="https://app.aave.com/governance/">Aave</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/HopProtocol/status/1534963617916932105?s=20&amp;t=YA_82oVL093Y1CSfbwvn6w">Hop</a></li><li><a href="https://vote.makerdao.com/address/0x84b05b0a30b6ae620f393d1037f217e607ad1b96#delegate-credentials">MakerDAO</a></li><li><a href="https://app.optimism.io/delegates">Optimism</a></li><li><a href="https://gnosis-safe.io/app/share/safe-app?appUrl=https://apps.gnosis-safe.io/safe-claiming-app&amp;chainId=1">Safe</a></li><li><a href="https://wallet.keplr.app/chains/cosmos-hub?modal=validator&amp;chain=cosmoshub-4&amp;validator_address=cosmosvaloper1hpgj9ncum96xp4llwkgl5a9as0nyzmxnp7fxgv&amp;referral=true">Cosmos</a></li></ul><p>If you are interested in joining the Flipside Governance team, we are always listening — DM <a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov">@flipsidegov</a> on Twitter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eaeb69f7169e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/flipside-governance-recap-jan-6-eaeb69f7169e">Flipside Governance Recap | 6 Jan 2023</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance">Flipside Governance</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Flipside Governance | Year in Review 2022 & Weekly Recap]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/flipside-governance/flipside-governance-year-in-review-2022-weekly-recap-7d41835326ea?source=rss-5efe8d798dd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d41835326ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[recaps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[quasimatt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 17:18:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-04T03:26:55.699Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*VqtmemjP-h8-Weic.png" /></figure><h3>2022 Year in Review</h3><p>It has been an exciting and formative year for our team, and we want to thank all of you for following and supporting us along this journey. We’ve learned so much over the last 12 months and can’t wait to keep building for our DAO partners in 2023! Have an amazing holiday &amp; New Year!</p><p>And now, let’s take a look back at some highlights from the last year:</p><h4>✅ Voting &amp; Participation</h4><p>With the end of 2022 approaching, the Govy team took some time to reflect on our voting over the past year. The scope of our team’s work has expanded dramatically this year to include many protocols across Ethereum, Cosmos, Solana, and more. Included below is a table of all our votes, but first, here are some year-end stats.</p><p>The Govy team documented <strong><em>562 </em></strong>submitted votes for the year, which are split by protocol in the table below. We participated most in Osmosis, MakerDAO, Optimism, and Aave. Combined, those four protocols made up 74.6% of our total votes.</p><p>Some key stats:</p><ul><li>Total votes: <strong>562</strong></li><li>Most votes in a single protocol: <strong>133,</strong> Osmosis (24% of all votes)</li><li>Different protocols / DAOs: <strong>20</strong></li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F7EQcw%2F5%2F&amp;display_name=Datawrapper&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F7EQcw%2F5%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2F7EQcw%2Fplain-s.png%3Fv%3D5&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="600" height="864" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cf17bb356b87192d370cbdfa57373d87/href">https://medium.com/media/cf17bb356b87192d370cbdfa57373d87/href</a></iframe><p>We voted ‘Yes’ on 394 proposals and ‘No’ on 115. We abstained from 24 votes, and another 24 of our votes were too complex to use the standard Yes/No/Abstain options. See all our 2022 votes in this table:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fckmin%2F3%2F&amp;display_name=Datawrapper&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fckmin%2F3%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fckmin%2Fplain-s.png%3Fv%3D3&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="600" height="1350" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fee50d9cfe50922149c6253fec4513c9/href">https://medium.com/media/fee50d9cfe50922149c6253fec4513c9/href</a></iframe><p>Voting participation generally increased throughout the year, with the biggest week being this one! This week’s votes and rationales are at the end of this post.</p><h4><a href="https://emojipedia.org/emoji/%F0%9F%8F%86/">🏆</a> <strong>Top Articles | Research &amp; Content</strong></h4><p>The Govy team has been hard at work, thinking, and writing about our different experiences within and around DAOs.</p><p>We’re grateful for a growing audience, and are excited to highlight some of our favorite articles from the year here:</p><ul><li><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/dao-decentralization-a-bell-curve-a544f7445f19">DAO Decentralization: A Bell Curve</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/why-decentralization-matters-a-legal-perspective-326c1323c478">Why decentralization matters — A legal perspective</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/dao-governance-contributor-toolkit-5eae83ab7953">DAO Governance Contributor Toolkit</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/think-10x-bigger-dydx-enters-the-cosmos-2fc8883eeb92">Think 10X Bigger — dYdX Enters the Cosmos</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/why-delegate-to-flipside-governance-1d4b511acf7f">Why Delegate to Flipside Governance?</a></li></ul><p>Give these a read and let us know your favorite!</p><h4>📊 Our Favorite Data &amp; Dashboards</h4><p>After all, Flipside is a data company — see below some our favorite dashboards delivering Governance insights to our top DAOs and partners.</p><ul><li><a href="https://op-governance.vercel.app/">Optimism Governance Data | Flipside Crypto</a></li><li><a href="https://flipsidegov-snapshot.vercel.app/">Snapshot Analytics</a></li><li><a href="https://flipsidegov-mnde.vercel.app/">Governance Analytics</a></li></ul><p>We are excited to continue to invest in our partners via curated data tables and dashboards, revealing valuable Governance insights.</p><p>Take a look at your favorite ecosystem above!</p><p><em>Now back to regular programing…</em></p><h3>Recap for the Week of 12.23.22</h3><h4>🚨 Team Highlights</h4><ul><li><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidecrypto/status/1604926149523427328?s=20&amp;t=dUqHpNDPXA44PL5rTQi5Hw"><strong><em>A Year In Review: Govy Show #15</em></strong></a><em> <br></em>This week’s Govy Show was a bit nostalgic. Reflecting on our favorite guests, controversial votes, and governance learnings, the team closed out a great start of our weekly Twitter spaces. Whether you were a guest or listener in this year, thank you so much for your support and we can’t way to have you back in 2023!</li></ul><figure><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidecrypto/status/1604926149523427328?s=20&amp;t=dUqHpNDPXA44PL5rTQi5Hw"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h5BA_xxDIl7r2gbR5ERJWw.png" /></a></figure><ul><li><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov/status/1605649794344529921?s=20&amp;t=dUqHpNDPXA44PL5rTQi5Hw"><strong>Fig is elected a Badgeholder! </strong></a><strong><br></strong>Ethereum Governance Contributor Fig Gowen was elected as one of 10 “badgeholders” and will be a Token House delegate for Optimism 🎉. Badgeholders earn a voting badge and work alongside the Citizen House to help decide the recipients of the RetroPGF #2 — to learn more about this program and Fig’s responsibility, read here:</li></ul><p><a href="https://optimism.mirror.xyz/wqk1Yeyn2OhV9paDzbRXvQ0m0JYDu2npbSkMClwk1rY">Introducing the Citizens&#39; House: 10m OP to Public Goods</a></p><h4>✏️ Our Research and Content</h4><p>Our resident philosopher — <a href="https://medium.com/u/33d4e7ced753">Raphael Spannocchi</a> — postulates the merits of on-chain voting and argues there may be a better way to reach consensus.</p><p>Check out his latest article, <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/emerging-consensus-a-way-to-accelerate-decision-making-in-daos-c75aee6be87"><strong><em>Emerging Consensus | A Way to Accelerate Decision Making in DAOs</em></strong></a><em> — </em>where he explores “holacracy” and its key principles:</p><blockquote>Holacracy is a system of organizational governance that aims to distribute authority and decision-making throughout an organization.</blockquote><p>This article features colorful displays of AI while challenging the status quo for decision-making in crypto. Improving this model is a long and windy road — but we hope this article is a start!</p><p>Give it a read above.☝️</p><h4>📰 Across the Industry: Governance News of the Week</h4><ul><li><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/web3/2022/12/21/uniswap-dao-community-members-vote-in-favor-of-new-governance-process/">Uniswap adopts a new governance process.</a> UNI token-holders have opted to change the governance process, most notably by reducing the amount of Snapshot votes and instead hosting most governance activity on-chain. The change is expected to decrease operational overhead and make Uniswap more effective.</li><li><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2022/12/21/defis-difficult-governance-decisions-lie-ahead/">Kevin Mehrabi shares an opinion on DeFi governance decisions in the near future.</a> The world of finance can learn from the structure of DeFi. Recent partnerships that have allowed people to invest in DeFi through traditional finance have had sometimes disastrous financial impact. Many see these negative impacts as a direct result of a lack of transparency, which truly decentralized finance attempts to solve, so creating truly decentralized governance processes is crucial to the success of DeFi.</li></ul><h4>📜 Flipside Governance Activity</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*B5aLVAgm8Df27wcu.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fq7UXI%2F1%2F&amp;display_name=Datawrapper&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fq7UXI%2F1%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fq7UXI%2Fplain-s.png%3Fv%3D1&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="600" height="4380" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8df5a9d61ed9ee36ee05ab509f32516c/href">https://medium.com/media/8df5a9d61ed9ee36ee05ab509f32516c/href</a></iframe><p>For more all-round governance content, be sure to follow us on<strong> </strong><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov"><strong>Twitter</strong></a><strong> </strong>or here on <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance"><strong>Medium</strong></a>. We’ll keep you updated.</p><p><strong>Hear, hear!</strong> If you dig the work we’re doing for our partner DAOs and want to delegate to us, click the links below to get to the delegation page:</p><ul><li><a href="https://app.aave.com/governance/">Aave</a></li><li><a href="https://twitter.com/HopProtocol/status/1534963617916932105?s=20&amp;t=YA_82oVL093Y1CSfbwvn6w">Hop</a></li><li><a href="https://vote.makerdao.com/address/0x84b05b0a30b6ae620f393d1037f217e607ad1b96#delegate-credentials">MakerDAO</a></li><li><a href="https://app.optimism.io/delegates">Optimism</a></li><li><a href="https://gnosis-safe.io/app/share/safe-app?appUrl=https://apps.gnosis-safe.io/safe-claiming-app&amp;chainId=1">Safe</a></li><li><a href="https://wallet.keplr.app/chains/cosmos-hub?modal=validator&amp;chain=cosmoshub-4&amp;validator_address=cosmosvaloper1hpgj9ncum96xp4llwkgl5a9as0nyzmxnp7fxgv&amp;referral=true">Cosmos</a></li></ul><p>If you are interested in joining the Flipside Governance team, we are always listening — DM <a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov">@flipsidegov</a> on Twitter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d41835326ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/flipside-governance-year-in-review-2022-weekly-recap-7d41835326ea">Flipside Governance | Year in Review 2022 &amp; Weekly Recap</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance">Flipside Governance</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Examining Exploits | Beanstalk, Build, and Better Governance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/flipside-governance/examining-exploits-beanstalk-build-and-better-governance-458cf8b2ad90?source=rss-5efe8d798dd5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/458cf8b2ad90</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[flipside-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploitation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[quasimatt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2022 18:14:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-01T18:14:33.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Iu-m8RBwN_Hz5PWx8GB9eQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Since the inception of decentralized finance (DeFi), protocols with imperfect code, insufficient economics, or faulty governance structures have been hacked and exploited. Exploits most commonly take advantage of vulnerable code or poor economic design. A smaller portion of exploits, two of which I review here, occur by manipulating protocol governance.</p><p>Decentralized governance promises to allow groups of people to change software without relying on a central authoritative party to decide to implement new code. However, it’s sometimes possible for bad actors to use decentralized governance to accumulate enough voting power to make governance decisions on their own. The exploitation of Beanstalk and Build Finance may reveal which governance changes can prevent exploitation in the future.</p><p>Truly decentralized governance can work at a large scale, but many problems in governance are a direct result of low participation or low capital requirements for vote buying. Resolving governance problems at early stages may involve temporarily implementing mechanisms that do not maximize decentralization.</p><h3><strong>Beanstalk — $77 million</strong></h3><p><strong>April 17, 2022</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Y8Oit3aF25EDkDXF.png" /></figure><p>Beanstalk is a stablecoin protocol that issues credit in order to oscillate the price of the native stablecoin, Bean, across its $1 peg. It’s also the subject of <a href="https://rekt.news/leaderboard/">the largest governance exploit in DeFi</a> to date. Prior to the exploit, users could deposit ETH, 3CRV or LUSD into the various Bean liquidity pools in return for a distribution of Bean seigniorage. The LP tokens for BEAN:ETH, BEAN:3CRV and BEAN:LUSD were held in the Beanstalk contract, which could be arbitrarily changed via the governance mechanism.</p><p>Voting power in Beanstalk governance is acquired by depositing Beans or whitelisted LP tokens into the Silo, which can be thought of as the Beanstalk bank. On April 17th, 2022, an exploiter used a flash loan to buy Beans and deposited them in the Silo. They acquired enough voting power to immediately pass a governance proposal as soon as it became possible to do so. They passed their own proposal, executing code that transferred all of the deposited assets from the Beanstalk contracts to an address they controlled.</p><p>Beanstalk’s governance mechanism was designed to maximize decentralization. The exploit revealed some problems with its ambitious design. There were two main enabling factors in the exploitation of Beanstalk:</p><ol><li>The governance structure allowed a proposal to execute immediately when it passed.</li><li>It was possible to immediately accumulate enough voting power to pass a governance proposal.</li></ol><p>In the case of Beanstalk, it’s possible but still unclear whether resolving the first issue would have prevented the exploit. The structure of the code used in the exploit was incredibly obfuscated and the main exploit code did not exist on-chain until immediately before it was executed. For technical details of the exploit, <a href="https://medium.com/@nvy_0x/the-beanstalk-bean-exploit-b038f4d324ea">see the methodology here</a>.</p><h4><strong><em>Public code is not public knowledge.</em></strong></h4><p>The portion of the code used in the Beanstalk exploit that was malicious was private until moments before it was called. The implications of its execution were not clear to governance participants before it was deployed. The potential for exploitation through the proposed code would likely have been identified if the code was audited and tested on-chain before it could be used. Ideally, members of the community could verify that the code accomplishes exactly what the written proposal says it will before they vote on the proposal.</p><p>This issue is part of a general trend in open-source decentralized protocols: although anyone can access smart contracts, the code is complex enough that information about how the technology works and the implications of its implementation are not widely understood. Governance decisions are made by users with varying degrees of familiarity with the relevant code and economic mechanisms. There are two main solutions to this problem: create systems where voting power is delegated to knowledgeable representatives, or translate code into actionable knowledge that can be easily understood by governance participants.</p><h4><strong><em>Accumulating voting power should take time.</em></strong></h4><p>The primary enabling factor of the Beanstalk exploit was that a supermajority of voting power could be accumulated immediately by buying Beans on the market. Enough potential voting power was held in liquidity pools that a single flash loan transaction allowed the exploiter to acquire over two-thirds of it.</p><p>The most straightforward answer to this problem is to incentivize illiquid voting power. However, the more general issue is that (regardless of how and when it’s accumulated) it was not difficult or expensive enough to immediately accumulate and use voting power. Many factors contribute to this difficulty: the ability of the exploiter to use a flash loan, the liquidity of voting power, the cost of voting power, quorum requirements, and more. Ensuring that voting power changes relatively slowly allows governance participants to anticipate and proactively prevent threats.</p><p>Token-weighted voting (sometimes called coin voting) is the standard in DeFi governance. When tokens are transferable, token-weighted voting means <em>votes can be bought.</em> In addition to creating vulnerabilities, vote buying is undemocratic and naturally tends toward plutocracy. Any token-weighted voting system that allows for voting power to be transferred is susceptible to the pitfalls of vote buying. For a robust criticism of coin voting governance, see <a href="https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html">Vitalik Buterin’s essay</a>.</p><p>A partial solution to the problems associated with token-weighted voting may come directly from Beanstalk’s governance system. Voting power on Beanstalk is accumulated by depositing whitelisted assets into the protocol and is a function of (1) the value of deposited assets and (2) the amount of time they have been deposited. The system by which voting power is distributed leads to power being less concentrated over time. In a more mature protocol, heavily weighting time as an input in the calculation of voting power makes it difficult to gain voting power through a flash loan or otherwise immediately acquire a significant portion of voting power.</p><p>If the voting power of participants increases over time and is non-transferable (the latter is not the case on Beanstalk), it’s possible that although total voting power is predicated on just $10 million of deposits, after some time, it will cost $10 billion to <em>immediately</em> acquire that level of power. This solution introduces new problems because it becomes almost impossible for new depositors to acquire a significant level of voting power once the protocol has been around for a long time.</p><p>Massive and immediate voting power shifts can also be prevented by locking voting power when a proposal is submitted. By taking a snapshot of token-holders, DAOs can ensure power distribution does not change because people are interested in voting on a single proposal.</p><h3><strong>Build Finance — $470,000</strong></h3><p><strong>February 10, 2022</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/0*FcKEJ3k7FVI3MWaD.png" /></figure><p>Build Finance was a venture capital DAO that assisted new projects on Ethereum with funding and operations. At the time of its exploitation, Build Finance had both its own treasury and a BUILD token, both of which were managed through a decentralized governance process.</p><p>The attacker had a large holding of the governance token used to vote on proposals, but also took steps to ensure that the catastrophic governance proposal had as few eyes on it as possible. They made documentation unavailable and disabled a bot that publicized new governance proposals. The Build Finance exploit is a straightforward example of exploitation by controlling information flows.</p><p>The quorum required for the exploit was relatively low, and although the attacker did not own the majority of tokens in circulation, they were able to exploit a lack of oversight and participation in governance to implement code that gave them control of the token contract.</p><p>The attacker took control of the Build token contract, minted more tokens, and used those tokens to drain liquidity pools, collecting around $470,000.</p><h4><strong><em>Effective governance requires active participation.</em></strong></h4><p>The Build Finance exploit was enabled by both a lack of attention paid to a new governance proposal and a governance system that allowed proposals to pass despite low participation. While low participation criteria can prevent protocols from becoming stagnant when governance participants are inactive, it can also lead to changes being made without the knowledge of interested parties. The primary factor that led to the exploitation of Build Finance was a lack of awareness and information. The exploit could have been prevented by systems that ensured governance participants were aware of new proposals and their implications and gave them ample time to react.</p><h3><strong>Building Better Governance</strong></h3><p>Governance exploits reveal two key insights for decentralized governance:</p><ul><li>Exploitation of DeFi protocols can occur at the informational rather than technological level.</li><li>Significant changes in voting power should take time.</li></ul><p>The Beanstalk and Build Finance exploits both resulted directly from the ability of a single entity to propose and implement changes to a protocol. The exploits both involved an intentional obfuscation of information. In Beanstalk’s case, the exploit code was spread out across multiple contracts, one of which was not publicly available on Ethereum Mainnet. In the case of Build Finance, the attacker revoked access to timely information about governance proposals and processes.</p><p>A key piece of information that governance participants need is the distribution of governance power over a protocol. Equipping participants with knowledge about governance power dynamics involves making power shifts predictable. The most straightforward way to provide predictability is to design systems that distribute governance power over time.</p><p>Making decisions in a decentralized fashion requires that many parties with different sets of knowledge are adequately informed enough to make good decisions. Tools for democratizing information–especially by rendering technical information understandable and available–will become increasingly important for building robust governance systems. In cases where information cannot be adequately democratized, governance participants must identify delegates they can trust to act on their behalf.</p><p><em>If you’re interested in decentralized governance or are looking for experienced delegates to represent you, follow Flipside Governance on</em><strong><em> </em></strong><a href="https://twitter.com/flipsidegov"><strong><em>Twitter</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><em>and </em><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance"><strong><em>Medium</em></strong></a><em> to stay in the loop.</em></p><p><em>You can also find me on Twitter: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/quasimatt"><em>@quasimatt</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=458cf8b2ad90" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance/examining-exploits-beanstalk-build-and-better-governance-458cf8b2ad90">Examining Exploits | Beanstalk, Build, and Better Governance</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/flipside-governance">Flipside Governance</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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