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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Qusayfarid on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Qusayfarid on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Qusayfarid on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefenders Lab Write-up: PsExec Hunt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qusayfarid03/cyberdefenders-lab-write-up-psexec-hunt-b93812196818?source=rss-7759432f040e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b93812196818</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wireshark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Qusayfarid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 01:56:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T01:56:35.460Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/0*iVxBQFwlQ1G8sMHE" /></figure><h3>Investigating SMB-Based Lateral Movement with Wireshark</h3><p><strong>Platform:</strong> CyberDefenders<br><strong>Category:</strong> Network Forensics<br><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Easy<br><strong>Tool:</strong> Wireshark<br><strong>Focus:</strong> PsExec, SMB, NTLM Authentication, Windows Administrative Shares, Lateral Movement</p><h3>1. Introduction</h3><p>In this lab, I investigated a simulated network security incident involving suspicious lateral movement activity detected by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).</p><p>The alert indicated potential abuse of PsExec, a legitimate Windows administration utility commonly used to execute commands remotely. However, attackers can also exploit this tool to move laterally across compromised networks.</p><p>PsExec relies on SMB (Server Message Block) to authenticate to remote systems, transfer its service executable, and establish communication with the remote service.</p><p>The objective of this investigation was to analyze the provided PCAP file using Wireshark, identify the attacker’s initial foothold, determine the compromised machines, examine the authentication activity, and reconstruct how PsExec was used to perform lateral movement.</p><h3>2. Investigation Objectives</h3><p>The investigation focused on identifying:</p><ul><li>The IP address of the machine associated with the attacker’s initial access.</li><li>The hostname of the first machine targeted during lateral movement.</li><li>The username used for authentication.</li><li>The service executable deployed on the target machine.</li><li>The administrative network share used to install the service.</li><li>The network share used for communication with the remote service.</li><li>The hostname of the second machine targeted by the attacker.</li></ul><h3>3. Technical Investigation</h3><h3>3.1 Identifying the Initial Access IP Address</h3><p>I started the investigation by examining the overall network communication to identify suspicious connections between internal hosts.</p><p>In Wireshark, I navigated to:</p><p>Statistics → Conversations → IPv4</p><p>I sorted the conversations based on packet count and transferred bytes to identify hosts with unusually high network activity.</p><p>The analysis revealed that one internal machine generated significant SMB traffic toward two separate hosts.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>10.0.0.130</p><p>This IP address was identified as the machine associated with the attacker’s initial access and subsequent lateral movement activity.</p><p>The unusually high volume of communication made this host a primary point of investigation.</p><h3>3.2 Identifying the First Pivoted Hostname</h3><p>After identifying the initial access IP, I investigated the SMB authentication traffic to determine the hostname of the first target machine.</p><p>I applied the following Wireshark display filter:</p><pre>ntlmssp.challenge.target_name</pre><p>This filter helped identify NTLMSSP challenge packets containing target information.</p><p>I expanded the NTLMSSP details and examined the Target Name field to identify the remote computer involved in the authentication exchange.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>SALES-PC</p><p>This identified the first machine targeted by the attacker during the lateral movement activity.</p><h3>3.3 Identifying the Authentication Username</h3><p>Next, I examined the NTLM authentication process to identify the account used by the attacker.</p><p>I applied the following display filter:</p><pre>ntlmssp.auth.username</pre><p>The filter displayed authentication packets containing the username associated with the NTLMSSP exchange.</p><p>After inspecting the relevant authentication packet, I identified the account used during the SMB session.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>ssales</p><p>This indicates that the attacker used the ssales account to authenticate to the remote system.</p><h3>3.4 Identifying the Service Executable</h3><p>After identifying the authentication activity, I investigated how PsExec established remote execution on the target machine.</p><p>PsExec typically uploads its service executable to the remote Windows system before creating and starting the service.</p><p>I examined SMB traffic and searched for file transfer activity associated with the PsExec service.</p><p>One useful method in Wireshark is:</p><p>File → Export Objects → SMB</p><p>This allows the analyst to inspect files transferred through SMB sessions.</p><p>I identified the executable associated with the PsExec service installation.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>PSEXESVC.exe</p><p>This executable is the service component used by PsExec to facilitate remote command execution.</p><p>Its presence in SMB file transfer activity is an important indicator of possible PsExec-based lateral movement.</p><h3>3.5 Identifying the Installation Network Share</h3><p>After identifying the service executable, I investigated the SMB network share used to transfer it to the compromised machine.</p><p>I applied the following display filter:</p><pre>smb2.tree</pre><p>This filter helped identify SMB2 Tree Connect operations and the network shares accessed during the session.</p><p>By examining the Tree Connect Request packets immediately preceding the service executable transfer, I identified the administrative share used for installation.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>ADMIN$</p><p>The ADMIN$ share is a hidden Windows administrative share that provides access to the Windows directory on a remote machine.</p><p>PsExec uses this share to transfer its service executable to the target system.</p><h3>3.6 Identifying the Communication Network Share</h3><p>After the service was installed, I continued examining the SMB session to identify the share used for communication between the attacker and the remote service.</p><p>I inspected subsequent SMB2 Tree Connect Request packets using:</p><pre>smb2.tree</pre><p>The network traffic revealed another connection to a special Windows administrative share.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>IPC$</p><p>The IPC$ share is used for inter-process communication through named pipes.</p><p>In the PsExec workflow, this share facilitates communication with the remote service and supports the exchange of commands and output.</p><p>The use of both ADMIN$ and IPC$ provides a recognizable pattern of PsExec activity over SMB.</p><h3>3.7 Identifying the Second Targeted Machine</h3><p>Finally, I investigated whether the attacker attempted to move laterally to another workstation.</p><p>I examined subsequent NTLMSSP authentication exchanges and inspected the Target Name information.</p><p>I used the following display filter:</p><pre>ntlmssp.challenge.target_name</pre><p>By comparing the target information from the subsequent authentication exchange with the first pivot, I identified another hostname targeted by the attacker.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>MARKETING-PC</p><p>This demonstrated that the suspicious activity involved more than one target machine.</p><p>The investigation indicated a further lateral movement attempt toward this workstation.</p><h3>4. Investigation Findings</h3><p>The investigation produced the following results:</p><p><strong>Initial Access IP:</strong> 10.0.0.130</p><p><strong>First Pivot Hostname:</strong> SALES-PC</p><p><strong>Authentication Username:</strong> ssales</p><p><strong>Service Executable:</strong> PSEXESVC.exe</p><p><strong>Installation Network Share:</strong> ADMIN$</p><p><strong>Communication Network Share:</strong> IPC$</p><p><strong>Second Targeted Hostname:</strong> MARKETING-PC</p><h3>5. Attack Chain Reconstruction</h3><p>Based on the network traffic analysis, the attack can be reconstructed as follows:</p><ol><li>The attacker operated from the initial access machine at 10.0.0.130.</li><li>The attacker initiated SMB communication with the first target, identified as SALES-PC.</li><li>The attacker authenticated using the account ssales through NTLM authentication.</li><li>PsExec transferred its service executable, PSEXESVC.exe, to the remote machine through the ADMIN$ administrative share.</li><li>The remote service was installed to facilitate remote command execution.</li><li>PsExec used the IPC$ share to establish communication with the remote service through named pipes.</li><li>The attacker subsequently targeted another workstation identified as MARKETING-PC, indicating an attempt to expand access within the network.</li></ol><p>This sequence demonstrates how a legitimate Windows administration utility can be abused to perform lateral movement across an internal network.</p><h3>6. Security Recommendations</h3><p>Based on the investigation, several defensive measures should be considered:</p><p><strong>1. Monitor SMB Administrative Share Activity</strong></p><p>Monitor unexpected access to ADMIN$ and IPC$, particularly when initiated by workstations that do not normally perform administrative operations.</p><p><strong>2. Monitor Remote Service Creation</strong></p><p>Implement monitoring for suspicious Windows service installations. Relevant Windows Event IDs include:</p><ul><li>Event ID 7045: A new service was installed.</li><li>Event ID 4697: A service was installed in the system.</li></ul><p><strong>3. Restrict NTLM Authentication</strong></p><p>Audit NTLM authentication usage and implement appropriate restrictions to reduce the risk of credential abuse.</p><p><strong>4. Enforce SMB Security Controls</strong></p><p>Require SMB signing where appropriate and disable SMBv1 to reduce exposure to legacy SMB-related attacks.</p><p><strong>5. Apply Least Privilege</strong></p><p>Limit administrative privileges and avoid using privileged accounts for routine workstation activities.</p><p><strong>6. Implement Network Segmentation</strong></p><p>Restrict unnecessary SMB communication between workstations and sensitive systems to reduce lateral movement opportunities.</p><p><strong>7. Monitor PsExec Execution</strong></p><p>Use endpoint detection and response tools to monitor suspicious PsExec execution, unexpected service creation, and remote administrative activity.</p><h3>7. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping</h3><p>The observed behavior can be associated with the following MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques:</p><p><strong>T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares</strong></p><p>Adversaries may use SMB and Windows administrative shares to access remote systems and move laterally.</p><p><strong>T1569.002 — Service Execution</strong></p><p>Adversaries may abuse Windows services to execute commands or payloads on remote systems.</p><p><strong>T1078 — Valid Accounts</strong></p><p>Adversaries may use legitimate account credentials to access systems and perform malicious activities.</p><h3>8. Conclusion</h3><p>The PsExec Hunt lab provided practical experience in investigating SMB-based lateral movement through network traffic analysis.</p><p>Using Wireshark, I identified the machine associated with the attacker’s initial access, traced the first and second targeted workstations, and examined NTLM authentication activity to identify the account used during the attack.</p><p>I also investigated SMB file transfers and identified PSEXESVC.exe, along with the use of ADMIN$ for service installation and IPC$ for remote communication.</p><p>One important lesson from this investigation is that legitimate administrative tools can become powerful attack mechanisms when compromised credentials and excessive administrative privileges are involved.</p><p>This lab strengthened my understanding of SMB traffic analysis, NTLM authentication, Windows administrative shares, and lateral movement detection.</p><p><strong>Skills Practiced:</strong></p><ul><li>Network Traffic Analysis</li><li>Wireshark Display Filters</li><li>SMB/SMB2 Investigation</li><li>NTLMSSP Authentication Analysis</li><li>PsExec Detection</li><li>Windows Administrative Share Analysis</li><li>Lateral Movement Investigation</li><li>Network Incident Reconstruction</li></ul><p><strong>Lab:</strong> CyberDefenders — PsExec Hunt</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b93812196818" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefenders Lab Write-up: PoisonedCredentials]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qusayfarid03/cyberdefenders-lab-write-up-poisonedcredentials-55ebce589be0?source=rss-7759432f040e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/55ebce589be0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Qusayfarid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 01:37:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T01:37:59.726Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/0*KKwraw24trahR9pM" /></figure><h3>Investigating LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Credential Theft with Wireshark</h3><p><strong>Platform:</strong> CyberDefenders<br><strong>Category:</strong> Network Forensics<br><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Easy<br><strong>Tool:</strong> Wireshark<br><strong>Focus:</strong> LLMNR Poisoning, NBT-NS Poisoning, SMB, NTLM Authentication</p><h3>1. Introduction</h3><p>In this lab, I investigated a simulated network security incident involving suspicious LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution) and NBT-NS (NetBIOS Name Service) activity.</p><p>These protocols are commonly used by Windows systems to resolve hostnames within local networks when DNS resolution fails. However, attackers can exploit these protocols to impersonate legitimate network resources and potentially intercept authentication traffic.</p><p>The objective was to analyze the provided network capture using Wireshark, identify the rogue machine, determine affected systems, and investigate potential credential exposure through SMB and NTLM authentication.</p><h3>2. Investigation Objectives</h3><p>The investigation focused on identifying:</p><ul><li>The mistyped hostname query that triggered the attack.</li><li>The IP address of the rogue machine performing the poisoning.</li><li>The second affected machine.</li><li>The username associated with the intercepted authentication.</li><li>The hostname identified through SMB traffic.</li></ul><h3>3. Technical Investigation</h3><h3>3.1 Identifying the Mistyped Query</h3><p>I started by examining network traffic generated by the suspected victim machine.</p><p><strong>Suspected Victim IP:</strong><br>192.168.232.162</p><p>I applied the following Wireshark display filter:</p><pre>ip.addr == 192.168.232.162</pre><p>I then narrowed the investigation to LLMNR traffic:</p><pre>llmnr &amp;&amp; ip.addr == 192.168.232.162</pre><p>By examining the name resolution requests, I discovered a suspicious hostname that appeared to be a misspelled file-sharing resource.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>fileshaare</p><p>This typo triggered a name resolution request because the requested resource could not be resolved normally.</p><p>A simple hostname typo can create an opportunity for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning. An attacker monitoring the local network may respond to the request and impersonate the requested resource.</p><h3>3.2 Identifying the Rogue Machine</h3><p>After identifying the suspicious query, I examined the corresponding name resolution responses.</p><p>I inspected the source and destination IP addresses to determine which machine responded to the victim’s request.</p><p>The analysis revealed an unexpected host responding to the suspicious name resolution traffic.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>192.168.232.215</p><p>This machine was identified as the rogue responder associated with the poisoning activity.</p><p>An unauthorized host responding to name resolution requests for resources it does not legitimately own is a strong indicator of LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning.</p><h3>3.3 Identifying the Second Affected Machine</h3><p>Next, I investigated whether the rogue machine had interacted with other systems within the network.</p><p>I used the following display filter:</p><pre>ip.src == 192.168.232.215</pre><p>By examining the resulting traffic, I identified communication involving another workstation.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>192.168.232.176</p><p>This indicated that the suspicious activity was not limited to a single workstation.</p><h3>3.4 Identifying the Username Through NTLMSSP</h3><p>After identifying the rogue machine and affected hosts, I moved on to the authentication traffic.</p><p>The objective was to determine which user account was associated with the intercepted authentication exchange.</p><p>I applied the following Wireshark display filter:</p><pre>ntlmssp.auth.username</pre><p>This filter helped locate packets containing NTLMSSP authentication information.</p><p>I inspected the relevant SMB session setup packets and examined the NTLMSSP authentication fields.</p><p><strong>Findings:</strong></p><ul><li>Username: janesmith</li><li>Domain: CYBERCACTUS.local</li></ul><p>The captured NTLMSSP exchange contained authentication information associated with this account.</p><p>NTLM authentication can expose challenge-response material when a victim is tricked into authenticating against a rogue system. The captured challenge-response is not the user’s plaintext password.</p><h3>3.5 Identifying the Accessed Hostname Through SMB</h3><p>The final stage of the investigation focused on identifying the hostname associated with the SMB authentication exchange.</p><p>I examined SMB2 traffic and investigated the NTLMSSP challenge and target information fields.</p><p>The following display filter helped locate relevant packets:</p><pre>ntlmssp.challenge.target_info</pre><p>I inspected the packet details through the following protocol structure:</p><p>SMB2 → Session Setup → Security Blob → GSS-API → NTLM Secure Service Provider → Target Info</p><p>Within the Target Info section, I examined the computer name attributes.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>AccountingPC</p><p>This identified the hostname associated with the SMB authentication activity.</p><h3>4. Investigation Findings</h3><p>The investigation produced the following results:</p><p><strong>Mistyped Query:</strong> fileshaare</p><p><strong>First Victim IP:</strong> 192.168.232.162</p><p><strong>Rogue Machine IP:</strong> 192.168.232.215</p><p><strong>Second Affected Machine:</strong> 192.168.232.176</p><p><strong>Username:</strong> janesmith</p><p><strong>Domain:</strong> CYBERCACTUS.local</p><p><strong>Hostname:</strong> AccountingPC</p><h3>5. Attack Chain Reconstruction</h3><p>Based on the network traffic analysis, the incident can be reconstructed as follows:</p><ol><li>A workstation at 192.168.232.162 attempted to resolve a mistyped resource name, fileshaare.</li><li>The failed name resolution created an opportunity for a rogue machine to respond.</li><li>The rogue machine at 192.168.232.215 responded to the suspicious name resolution traffic.</li><li>Another affected workstation at 192.168.232.176 was identified during the investigation.</li><li>Subsequent SMB and NTLMSSP traffic exposed authentication information associated with the account janesmith.</li><li>Further inspection of the SMB authentication exchange revealed the hostname AccountingPC.</li></ol><p>This sequence demonstrates how weak local name resolution mechanisms can be abused to intercept authentication traffic.</p><h3>6. Security Recommendations</h3><p>Based on the findings, several defensive measures should be considered:</p><p><strong>1. Disable LLMNR</strong></p><p>Disable LLMNR through Windows Group Policy where it is not required. This reduces the risk of unauthorized name resolution responses.</p><p><strong>2. Disable NBT-NS Where Possible</strong></p><p>Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP in environments where legacy compatibility does not require it.</p><p><strong>3. Enforce SMB Signing</strong></p><p>Require SMB signing to help prevent unauthorized SMB relay attacks. SMB signing is a mitigation against relay attacks, not a complete solution to NTLM credential capture.</p><p><strong>4. Restrict NTLM Authentication</strong></p><p>Audit NTLM usage and implement appropriate restrictions to reduce exposure to NTLM-based attacks.</p><p><strong>5. Monitor Suspicious Name Resolution Activity</strong></p><p>Monitor unexpected LLMNR responses on UDP port 5355 and NBNS activity on UDP port 137.</p><p><strong>6. Improve Network Segmentation</strong></p><p>Limit unnecessary communication between workstations and sensitive systems to reduce opportunities for lateral movement.</p><h3>7. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping</h3><p><strong>T1557.001 — LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay</strong></p><p>This technique describes how adversaries can exploit local name resolution protocols to intercept network traffic and capture or relay authentication material.</p><h3>8. Conclusion</h3><p>The PoisonedCredentials lab provided practical experience in investigating LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning attacks through network traffic analysis.</p><p>Using Wireshark, I identified the suspicious hostname query, traced the rogue machine, determined additional affected systems, and inspected SMB/NTLMSSP authentication traffic to identify exposed account information and the associated hostname.</p><p>One important lesson from this investigation is that seemingly harmless user mistakes can become an entry point for credential theft when legacy network protocols are left enabled.</p><p>This lab strengthened my understanding of network forensics, Windows name resolution protocols, SMB communication, and NTLM authentication analysis.</p><p><strong>Skills Practiced:</strong></p><ul><li>Network Traffic Analysis</li><li>Wireshark Display Filters</li><li>LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Detection</li><li>NTLMSSP Authentication Analysis</li><li>SMB Traffic Investigation</li><li>Network Incident Reconstruction</li></ul><p><strong>Lab:</strong> <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/poisonedcredentials/">CyberDefenders — PoisonedCredentials</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55ebce589be0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AWSRaid — Cloud Security Investigation with Splunk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qusayfarid03/awsraid-cloud-security-investigation-with-splunk-208debfd3234?source=rss-7759432f040e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/208debfd3234</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aws]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Qusayfarid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 05:58:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T05:58:47.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I completed the AWSRaid Blue Team Lab on CyberDefenders, focusing on investigating suspicious AWS activities using AWS CloudTrail logs and Splunk.</p><h3>1. Lab Overview</h3><p>The objective was to investigate potential unauthorized access to AWS resources, suspicious S3 activity, and possible IAM privilege changes.</p><p><strong>Tools Used:</strong></p><ul><li>Splunk</li><li>AWS CloudTrail</li><li>Search Processing Language (SPL)</li></ul><h3>2. Investigation Walkthrough</h3><h3>Q1 — Identify the Compromised Username</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I started by reviewing AWS login and S3 access events to identify suspicious user activity.</p><pre>index=aws_cloudtrail<br>| spath<br>| search eventName=&quot;ConsoleLogin&quot; OR eventName=&quot;GetObject&quot;<br>| table _time eventName userIdentity.userName sourceIPAddress<br>| sort 0 _time</pre><p><strong>Finding:</strong> helpdesk.luke</p><p>The username appeared in suspicious AWS activities, making it the primary account of interest during the investigation.</p><h3>Q2 — Find the First S3 Object Access Timestamp</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I filtered S3 GetObject events associated with the compromised account and sorted them chronologically.</p><pre>index=aws_cloudtrail<br>| spath<br>| search eventName=&quot;GetObject&quot; userIdentity.userName=&quot;helpdesk.luke&quot;<br>| table _time sourceIPAddress requestParameters.bucketName requestParameters.key<br>| sort 0 _time</pre><p><strong>Finding:</strong> 2023-11-02 09:55:53</p><p>The earliest matching event showed access to an S3 object in the research project bucket.</p><h3>Q3 — Identify the Bucket Containing a DWG File</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I searched S3 object access events for files with the .dwg extension.</p><pre>index=aws_cloudtrail<br>| spath<br>| search eventName=&quot;GetObject&quot; requestParameters.key=&quot;*.dwg&quot;<br>| table _time userIdentity.userName requestParameters.bucketName requestParameters.key</pre><p><strong>Finding:</strong> product-designs-repository31183937</p><p>The event revealed a DWG design file named Product2_CAD_Designs.dwg.</p><h3>Q4 — Investigate the Bucket in the Public Access Investigation</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I examined S3 bucket-related events and investigated the bucket identified during the analysis.</p><pre>index=aws_cloudtrail<br>| spath<br>| search eventSource=&quot;s3.amazonaws.com&quot;<br>| search requestParameters.bucketName=&quot;backup-and-restore98825501&quot;<br>| table _time eventName userIdentity.userName sourceIPAddress requestParameters<br>| sort 0 _time</pre><p><strong>Finding:</strong> backup-and-restore98825501</p><p>This bucket was identified during the public-access investigation. The bucket-related events need to be distinguished carefully: GetBucketAcl is an ACL read operation and does not, by itself, prove that public access was enabled.</p><h3>Q5 — Identify the Newly Created IAM User</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I searched CloudTrail for IAM CreateUser events.</p><pre>Index=&quot;aws_cloudtrail&quot; &quot;userIdentity.userName&quot;=&quot;helpdesk.luke&quot; eventCategory=&quot;Management&quot; | search eventName=&quot;CreateUser&quot; OR eventName=&quot;CreateLoginProfile&quot;| table _time, eventName, requestParameters.userName</pre><p>The important field is requestParameters.userName, which represents the username being created.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong> marketing.mark</p><h3>Q6 — Identify the IAM Group</h3><p><strong>Approach:</strong></p><p>I searched for IAM AddUserToGroup events to identify which group received the newly created account.</p><pre>index=&quot;aws_cloudtrail&quot; eventName=&quot;AddUserToGroup&quot; | table _time, requestParameters.groupName, requestParameters.userName</pre><p>The important field is requestParameters.groupName.</p><p><strong>Finding: </strong>Admins</p><h3>3. Key Takeaways</h3><p>This lab provided practical experience in:</p><ul><li>Analyzing AWS CloudTrail events.</li><li>Identifying suspicious account activity.</li><li>Investigating S3 object access.</li><li>Reviewing bucket-related events.</li><li>Tracing IAM user creation and group membership changes.</li><li>Using Splunk SPL for security investigations.</li></ul><h3>4. Conclusion</h3><p>AWSRaid helped me understand how cloud audit logs can be used to investigate suspicious activities in an AWS environment.</p><p>It also improved my ability to analyze events, correlate timestamps, identify suspicious identities, and investigate potential cloud security incidents.</p><p>This was another valuable step in developing my Blue Team and SOC Analyst skills.</p><p>#CyberDefenders #AWS #CloudSecurity #Splunk #CloudTrail #BlueTeam #SOCAnalyst #CyberSecurity #DFIR</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=208debfd3234" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[RetailBreach Lab: Investigating a Web Application Attack with Wireshark]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qusayfarid03/retailbreach-lab-investigating-a-web-application-attack-with-wireshark-52b7b0609dac?source=rss-7759432f040e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52b7b0609dac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst-training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[retail-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Qusayfarid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 01:04:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T01:17:42.364Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DHzauq_duD4E_pnrQmjZ-A.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In this lab, I investigated a security incident involving ShopSphere, an online retail platform experiencing suspicious administrative logins and unusual customer account activity.</p><p>Using Wireshark, I analyzed the captured network traffic to identify the attacker, understand the exploitation techniques, and reconstruct the attack sequence.</p><h3>Tools Used</h3><ul><li>Wireshark</li><li>Network Traffic Capture (PCAP)</li></ul><h3>Investigation</h3><h3>1. Attacker Identification</h3><p>By analyzing IPv4 conversations and HTTP traffic, I identified the attacker’s IP address:</p><p>111.224.180.128</p><h3>2. Directory Brute-Forcing</h3><p>HTTP request headers revealed that the attacker used:</p><p>Gobuster 3.6</p><p>The tool was used to discover hidden directories and endpoints.</p><h3>3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)</h3><p>The attacker injected a malicious JavaScript payload through the review functionality.</p><p>The script attempted to collect browser cookies and send them to the attacker’s server.</p><p>This was identified as a Stored XSS attack.</p><h3>4. Admin Interaction</h3><p>The admin visited the infected page at:</p><p>2024-03-29 12:09:50.869688 UTC</p><p>This allowed the injected script to execute in the admin’s browser.</p><h3>5. Session Hijacking</h3><p>The attacker obtained the admin’s session token and reused it to access administrative resources.</p><p>For security reasons, the captured session token is not reproduced in this public writeup.</p><h3>6. Exploited Script</h3><p>The attacker accessed:</p><p>log_viewer.php</p><p>This script was used to interact with the application’s log-viewing functionality.</p><h3>7. Directory Traversal</h3><p>The attacker manipulated the file parameter in log_viewer.php to navigate outside the intended directory and attempt to access a sensitive Linux system file.</p><p>This demonstrated a potential directory traversal vulnerability caused by insufficient file path validation.</p><h3>Key Findings</h3><ul><li><strong>Attacker IP:</strong> 111.224.180.128</li><li><strong>Brute-Force Tool:</strong> Gobuster 3.6</li><li><strong>Attack Type:</strong> Stored XSS</li><li><strong>Admin Visit:</strong> 2024-03-29 12:09:50.869688 UTC</li><li><strong>Session Compromise:</strong> Admin session token stolen and reused</li><li><strong>Exploited Script:</strong> log_viewer.php</li><li><strong>Final Exploitation:</strong> Directory Traversal</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This investigation helped me understand how multiple web application vulnerabilities can be chained together, from directory enumeration and Stored XSS to session hijacking and directory traversal.</p><p>More importantly, I gained practical experience using Wireshark to analyze HTTP traffic, inspect request headers, identify suspicious behavior, and reconstruct an attack timeline.</p><p><strong>Key takeaway:</strong> Network traffic analysis is essential for understanding how an attack happens, identifying compromised sessions, and investigating security incidents.</p><p>#Cybersecurity #Wireshark #NetworkForensics #SOCAnalyst #CyberDefenders #BlueTeam</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52b7b0609dac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[From TeamCity Authentication Bypass to Docker Host Access]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@qusayfarid03/from-teamcity-authentication-bypass-to-docker-host-access-52359be02fb6?source=rss-7759432f040e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52359be02fb6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Qusayfarid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 10:47:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-12T14:01:23.449Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*NtW-kPW3s4QEcGXMS9pRUA.png" /></figure><h3>A Network Forensics &amp; DFIR Case Study</h3><p><strong>Lab:</strong> CyberDefenders — JetBrains<br><strong>Category:</strong> Network Forensics / Digital Forensics and Incident Response<br><strong>Incident Date:</strong> June 30, 2024<br><strong>Tools:</strong> Wireshark, NetworkMiner, CyberChef, Brim</p><h3>1. Executive Summary</h3><p>This investigation analyzes a PCAP containing malicious activity targeting a JetBrains TeamCity server.</p><p>The attacker exploited <strong>CVE-2024–27198</strong>, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability, to gain administrative access to the vulnerable TeamCity instance.</p><p>Following initial access, the attacker performed several activities:</p><ul><li>Accessed the TeamCity REST API.</li><li>Attempted to generate an authentication token.</li><li>Uploaded a malicious plugin named NSt8bHTg.zip.</li><li>Deployed a JSP web shell named NSt8bHTg.jsp.</li><li>Executed operating system commands through HTTP requests.</li><li>Created a file containing manipulated credentials.</li><li>Executed a Docker command to access the host filesystem.</li></ul><p>This investigation demonstrates how a vulnerability in an internet-facing CI/CD application can lead to remote command execution and potential infrastructure-level compromise.</p><h3>2. Initial Identification</h3><p>The initial network investigation identified the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UCk0k--4tUXbszXU.png" /><figcaption>Attacker &amp; Victim IP</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Attacker IP:</strong> 23.158.56.196<br><strong>Victim IP:</strong> 172.17.0.2<br><strong>HTTP Host:</strong> 3.71.79.4:8111<br><strong>Web Server:</strong> JetBrains TeamCity<br><strong>Version:</strong> 2023.11.3<br><strong>Port:</strong> 8111<br><strong>Protocol:</strong> HTTP/1.1<br><strong>Total Packets:</strong> 33,279</p><p><strong>Capture Information:</strong></p><ul><li>First Packet: 2024-06-30 07:45:15</li><li>Last Packet: 2024-06-30 08:26:30</li><li>Duration: 00:41:15</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ze9ty21hyu4L2o8fV9uk1g.png" /><figcaption>First &amp; Last Packet time in scenario</figcaption></figure><p>The victim IP belongs to the private address range 172.16.0.0/12, commonly used in internal networks and Docker configurations.</p><p>The HTTP Host header differs from the destination IP, which may indicate NAT, reverse proxy, or internal address mapping. Further network evidence would be required to confirm the exact topology.</p><h3>3. Attack Timeline</h3><p>The following timeline was reconstructed from the observed HTTP traffic and challenge findings.</p><p><strong>08:01:36 — Initial HTTP Request</strong></p><pre>POST /loginsubmit.html HTTP/1.1</pre><p><strong>08:02:42 — Authentication Testing</strong></p><pre>GET /authenticationTest.html HTTP/1.1</pre><p><strong>08:02:42 — Authentication Bypass</strong></p><pre>GET /hax?jsp=/app/rest/server HTTP/1.1</pre><p>The attacker accessed the TeamCity REST API through an alternative URL path.</p><p><strong>08:02:49 — Token Operation</strong></p><pre>POST /hax?jsp=/app/rest/users/id:2/tokens/mD5r0yemB0;.jsp HTTP/1.1</pre><p>The request targeted the token endpoint for TeamCity user ID 2.</p><p><strong>08:03:06 — Malicious Plugin Upload</strong></p><pre>POST /admin/pluginUpload.html HTTP/1.1</pre><p>The attacker uploaded NSt8bHTg.zip.</p><p><strong>08:03 — Web Shell Execution</strong></p><p>The challenge identified the first web shell execution within this minute.</p><p><strong>Subsequent Activity</strong></p><ul><li>Credential manipulation through Creds.txt.</li><li>Docker command execution.</li><li>Attempted access to the host filesystem.</li></ul><p><em>Note: The first captured packet at 07:45:15 is not necessarily the first attacker activity. The first observed attacker HTTP request was at 08:01:36.</em></p><h3>4. Initial Access — CVE-2024–27198</h3><p>The victim server was running JetBrains TeamCity version 2023.11.3, which was vulnerable to CVE-2024-27198.</p><p>This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication through specially crafted URL paths.</p><p>The attacker accessed the TeamCity REST API using:</p><pre>GET /hax?jsp=/app/rest/server HTTP/1.1</pre><p>The investigation also identified an account with the SYSTEM_ADMIN role.</p><p><strong>Identified Account:</strong></p><ul><li>Username: c91oyemw</li><li>Password: [REDACTED]</li><li>Role: SYSTEM_ADMIN</li><li>Scope: Global</li></ul><p>A subsequent request targeted the user token endpoint.</p><p>This activity indicates an attempt to interact with TeamCity’s administrative token functionality. Successful token creation should be confirmed through the corresponding HTTP response.</p><h3>5. Malicious Plugin Upload</h3><p>At 08:03:06, the attacker uploaded a ZIP archive through the TeamCity plugin upload endpoint.</p><pre>POST /admin/pluginUpload.html HTTP/1.1<br>Content-Type: multipart/form-data</pre><p>The HTTP request body revealed:</p><pre>Filename: NSt8bHTg.zip<br>Content-Type: application/zip</pre><p>Inspection of the archive revealed the following structure:</p><pre>NSt8bHTg.zip<br>├── server/<br>│   └── NSt8bHTg.jar<br>├── buildServerResources/<br>│   └── NSt8bHTg.jsp<br>└── teamcity-plugin.xml</pre><p>The archive contained a Java component, a JSP file, and a TeamCity plugin descriptor.</p><p>The JSP file was identified as the most significant malicious component.</p><h3>6. Web Shell Analysis — NSt8bHTg.jsp</h3><p>The JSP source code contained:</p><pre>String query = request.getParameter(&quot;cmd&quot;);</pre><p>This statement retrieves commands through an HTTP parameter named cmd.</p><p>The web shell uses Java ProcessBuilder to execute operating system commands.</p><p><strong>Windows execution:</strong></p><pre>cmd /C &quot;&lt;command&gt;&quot;</pre><p><strong>Linux execution:</strong></p><pre>/bin/bash -c &quot;&lt;command&gt;&quot;</pre><p>The script also detects the operating system using the filesystem separator.</p><p>After execution, it reads the process’s standard output and returns the result through the HTTP response.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong></p><p>NSt8bHTg.jsp functions as a JSP-based web shell that provides remote command execution through HTTP requests.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK:</strong> T1505.003 — Web Shell.</p><h3>7. Credential Manipulation — Creds.txt</h3><p>During post-exploitation activity, the attacker created a text file containing manipulated credentials.</p><p><strong>File:</strong> /tmp/Creds.txt</p><p><strong>Content:</strong></p><pre>username:a1l4m,password:youarecompromised</pre><p>The associated file-writing command was:</p><pre>echo &quot;username:a1l4m,password:youarecompromised&quot; &gt; /tmp/Creds.txt</pre><p>The &gt; operator redirects command output into a file, overwriting its previous contents if it already exists.</p><p><strong>Identified credentials:</strong></p><ul><li>Username: a1l4m</li><li>Password: youarecompromised</li></ul><p>This activity demonstrates the manipulation of stored information.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK:</strong> T1565.001 — Stored Data Manipulation.</p><h3>8. Docker Host Access</h3><p>The attacker executed a Docker command through the web shell.</p><p>The original HTTP parameter was URL-encoded:</p><pre>docker+run+--rm+-it+-v+%2F%3A%2Fhost+ubuntu+chroot+%2Fhost</pre><p>After URL decoding, the command becomes:</p><pre>docker run --rm -it -v /:/host ubuntu chroot /host</pre><p><strong>Command Breakdown:</strong></p><ul><li>docker run: Creates and starts a container.</li><li>--rm: Removes the container after it exits.</li><li>-it: Enables interactive terminal access.</li><li>-v /:/host: Mounts the host root filesystem into the container.</li><li>ubuntu: Uses the Ubuntu container image.</li><li>chroot /host: Changes the process root directory to the mounted host filesystem.</li></ul><p><strong>Security Impact:</strong></p><p>The bind mount exposes the host root filesystem inside the container.</p><p>Combined with chroot, this allows the process to operate within the mounted host filesystem, subject to available permissions and security restrictions.</p><p>This is a serious container security risk, particularly when the attacker has sufficient privileges over the Docker daemon.</p><p>The command demonstrates an attempt to obtain host-level access, although the exact success and extent of compromise require additional host-side evidence.</p><p><strong>MITRE ATT&amp;CK:</strong></p><ul><li>T1611 — Escape to Host.</li><li>T1059.013 — Container CLI/API.</li><li>T1059.004 — Unix Shell.</li></ul><h3>9. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)</h3><p>The following indicators were identified during the investigation:</p><ul><li>Attacker IP: 23.158.56.196</li><li>Victim IP: 172.17.0.2</li><li>Target Port: 8111</li><li>Vulnerability: CVE-2024-27198</li><li>Malicious Plugin: NSt8bHTg.zip</li><li>Web Shell: NSt8bHTg.jsp</li><li>Credential File: /tmp/Creds.txt</li><li>Docker Image: ubuntu</li><li>Upload Endpoint: /admin/pluginUpload.html</li></ul><p>Sensitive authentication tokens and CSRF values have been excluded from this report.</p><h3>10. MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping</h3><p>The following techniques are relevant to the observed attack chain:</p><ul><li><strong>T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application:</strong> Exploitation of the vulnerable TeamCity instance.</li><li><strong>T1505.003 — Web Shell:</strong> Deployment of NSt8bHTg.jsp.</li><li><strong>T1059.004 — Unix Shell:</strong> Execution of commands through Bash.</li><li><strong>T1059.013 — Container CLI/API:</strong> Use of Docker commands.</li><li><strong>T1565.001 — Stored Data Manipulation:</strong> Creation of manipulated credential data.</li><li><strong>T1611 — Escape to Host:</strong> Attempted access to the host environment through Docker.</li></ul><h3>11. Recommended Mitigations</h3><ol><li>Upgrade TeamCity to a supported release containing fixes for CVE-2024–27198.</li><li>Restrict administrative access to trusted networks or VPN.</li><li>Monitor unexpected plugin uploads and JSP file creation.</li><li>Detect suspicious processes launched by TeamCity, especially Bash, Docker, and chroot.</li><li>Restrict access to Docker daemon and docker.sock.</li><li>Avoid mounting the host root filesystem into containers.</li><li>Rotate potentially exposed credentials and authentication tokens.</li><li>Preserve application, system, and Docker logs for forensic analysis.</li></ol><h3>12. Conclusion</h3><p>The investigation identified a compromise of JetBrains TeamCity through CVE-2024–27198.</p><p>The attacker exploited the authentication bypass, uploaded a malicious plugin, and deployed a JSP web shell capable of executing operating system commands.</p><p>Subsequent activities included writing manipulated credentials to Creds.txt and executing a Docker command that mounted the host root filesystem.</p><p>This incident demonstrates how a vulnerability in a CI/CD platform can escalate into remote command execution, data manipulation, and potential host-level compromise.</p><p><strong>Key Takeaway:</strong></p><p>A compromised CI/CD server should never be treated as an isolated web application incident. Its credentials, build infrastructure, connected agents, containers, and underlying host must all be considered part of the incident scope.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/additional-critical-security-issues-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-update-to-2023-11-4-now/">JetBrains Security Advisory — CVE-2024–27198</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-27198">CVE-2024–27198 — CVE.org</a></li><li><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/">MITRE ATT&amp;CK — Web Shell</a></li><li><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/">MITRE ATT&amp;CK — Stored Data Manipulation</a></li><li><a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/">MITRE ATT&amp;CK — Escape to Host</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.docker.com/engine/storage/bind-mounts/">Docker Documentation — Bind Mounts</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52359be02fb6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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