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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Raymond Russell on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Raymond Russell on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Raymond Russell on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Big Dig in the skies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/plain-text/a-big-dig-in-the-skies-bb9371726b1e?source=rss-d5bc3cf0f14f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[aviation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[faa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raymond Russell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2016 15:19:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-25T15:21:47.706Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The FAA often fails to keep up with technology. When it does succeed, modernization is halting at best.</h4><p>It’s 1999, and workers in the tower at Toronto Pearson International Airport have just upgraded to state-of-the-art electronic flight tracking software. For decades, air traffic controllers everywhere had been scrawling information on small strips of paper and moving them around on a large board to reflect changes in aircraft altitude, position, and speed. Instead of paying attention to radar and the outside, workers strained to read the small text describing flight data on a large board of flight strips. By 2004, the rest of Canada had <a href="http://www.itbusiness.ca/news/nav-canada-retools-industrys-air-traffic-control-systems/4132">made the switch</a> to computerized tracking.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/665/1*z3cuuXsH51PbCPccGp15xw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tower tech. <a href="http://www.navcanatm.ca/en/portfolio/nav-canada-project.aspx">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>Nav Canada, the country’s air navigation service provider (ANSP) went digital seventeen years ago. Since then, many other global air systems have adopted “<a href="http://www.navcanatm.ca/en/navcansuite/navcanstrips.aspx">NAVCANstrips</a>” technology. Licensing fees alone provided over <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-12/paper-pushing-flight-controllers-see-future-in-canada-s-system">$20 million</a> in revenue to the Canadian not-for-profit corporation last year.</p><p>It’s now 2016, and workers in US civil air traffic control towers are still scrawling information on small strips of paper.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/432/1*etIbsWQQLa699kWGnT1tLQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The past — in most places. <a href="http://www.cecildaily.com/news/article_8404b738-a73a-11e0-bed7-001cc4c002e0.html">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) consistently trails nimbler global peers by a few decades. Nav Canada began using electronic flight strips in 1999. The FAA awarded Lockheed Martin a $344 million development contract for a similar system <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2016/july/awarded-faa-contract-improve-airport-terminal-and-runway-efficiency.html">just this month</a>. All while Nav Canada has an established licensing system to export its technology to those who want it.</p><p>Flight progress strips are but one area in which the FAA lags behind other ANSPs. Many have replaced tower-to-cockpit voice communication with text-based systems, reducing the potential for misinterpretation by either party. The FAA, averse to adaptation, was years late in implementing new aircraft tracking technologies.</p><p>Canada was a leader in developing Automatic Dependent Surveillance — Broadcast (ADS-B) technology, an alternative to radar that can transmit flight data from aircraft to controllers. Because the system gives frequent, accurate updates on aircraft position, less precautionary separation is required between planes to ensure safety. With ADS-B, airlines can plan denser, more fuel-efficient routes.</p><p>In 2009, Canada mandated that ADS-B be installed to service Hudson’s Bay and other northern regions that are sparsely covered by radar but see significant transatlantic flight traffic. Saab <a href="http://saab.com/globalassets/commercial/security/air-traffic-management-and-airport-security/air-traffic-management-solutions/ads-b/nav-canada-ads-b_downloads_case-study.pdf">estimates</a> that each year, its ADS-B coverage over northern Canada saves airlines nearly $10 million in fuel costs and offsets 50,000 tons of carbon dioxide emissions.</p><p>More recently, Nav Canada has partnered with several other ANSPs and Iridium Communications to form Aireon, a joint venture aiming to establish a global GPS aircraft tracking system. The first satellite launch will occur in September, and Aireon’s worldwide ADS-B coverage should be operational by 2018. The joint venture’s CEO estimates that annual fuel savings just on North Atlantic flightpaths will amount to <a href="http://business.financialpost.com/news/transportation/canada-takes-key-role-in-effort-to-shine-light-on-global-aircraft-surveillance-blind-spots">$125 million</a>.</p><p>An estimated <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2204838/Rush-hour-skies-Real-time-map-shows-plane-air-right-now.html">5,000</a> commercial aircraft are in the skies during “rush hour” periods of peak traffic. Aireon’s ADS-B hardware is capable of tracking <a href="http://aireon.com/resources/its-just-ads-b/">10,000</a> aircraft simultaneously, exceeding international standards and allowing ample space for continued growth in air travel.</p><p>No one should find it surprising that the FAA has been sluggish in cooperating with four-year-old Aireon. Earlier this year, Iridium CEO Matt Desch gently asked the FAA to make its decision by the end of 2016 in preparation for Aireon’s deployment. The venture has already secured <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/iridium-commun-faa-idUSL1N16G1QP">commitments</a> from countries that control, in total, half the world’s airspace. Desch worries about interfacing his system with an FAA that, due to funding uncertainty and bureaucratic inertia, can’t come to a decision in fewer than 18 months.</p><p>What else should we expect from an agency that reliably resists reform efforts? During a previous bipartisan push for changes to the ATO, both <a href="http://www.speeches-usa.com/Transcripts/newt_gingrich-address.html">Newt Gingrich</a> and <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/clinton.htm">Bill Clinton</a> held vacuum tubes in their hands as they decried an agency that still relied on century-old technology to power its communications and computers. Clinton complained that the government was forced to procure vacuum tubes from the <a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/80094.pdf">former Communist Bloc</a> — by the time of Clinton’s 1995 speech, few manufacturers in the world still fabricated the component.</p><p>Decades earlier, the world had switched to smaller, cheaper, more reliable transistors in most applications, but the FAA struggled to phase out its vacuum tube-based communications and computing systems (some ANSPs, including the FAA, still rely on vacuum tube-based radar for performance reasons. Others, like Nav Canada, have switched to <a href="http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/ccc/srch/nvgt.do?prtl=1&amp;estblmntNo=105726910000&amp;profile=cmpltPrfl&amp;profileId=1422&amp;app=sold&amp;lang=eng">Raytheon’s</a> solid-state devices).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*9RTnMZRlltb9IipeK8p8kA.jpeg" /><figcaption>At left: how your smartphone gets you across town. At right: how the FAA gets you across the country. <a href="http://images.inmagine.com/400nwm/corbis/crbs081/crbs081681.jpg">Source</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Conservative in the wrong ways</h4><p>Alaska Congressman Don Young and Mike Gold, chairman of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, <a href="https://youtu.be/1bqGC70PZTg?t=54m15s">joked</a> in a recent hearing that had the FAA been around to “ensure the safety” of 15th-century explorers, Columbus would <a href="https://youtu.be/1bqGC70PZTg?t=57m26s">still be</a> in Europe.</p><p>The administration’s failure to anticipate and adapt to new innovations extends much further than paper strips and aircraft tracking. When services firm PwC <a href="http://economia.icaew.com/news/may-2016/pwc-opens-global-drone-centre-in-poland">opened</a> its first commercial drone research center, it did so not near Washington but near Warsaw. In 2013, Poland became the first country to establish a straightforward, innovation-friendly legal framework for drone operation and commercialization. At long last, this June the FAA released its final rule on drones. Entrepreneurs, and hobbyists everywhere muttered, “<a href="https://www.emergingprairie.com/time-faa-releases-new-regulations-commercial-drones/">it’s about time</a>.”</p><p>Vice President Al Gore cited the FAA’s funding structure as a significant obstacle to modernization efforts in his 1994 <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/redtpe93/2126.html">National Performance Review</a>. Reliance on Congressional appropriations restrains the organization, which continually faces budget uncertainty during fiscal fights on Capitol Hill. On July 11 of this year, the House passed a <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/636">fourteen-month reauthorization bill</a> just four days before funding was to run dry.</p><p>In ANSP models guided and funded by users, all stakeholders have an incentive to run a lean, forward-looking system. But the FAA, on the other hand, gains political capital from <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/us/politics/faa-chief-michael-huerta-comes-under-fire-on-capitol-hill.html?_r=0">warning</a> the public about the short-term logistical headaches they would face should funding fall. It is much easier to justify reducing congestion by increasing employment than to build support for somewhat intangible modernization efforts. The former only treats the symptoms of archaic infrastructure, but the latter would treat the cause.</p><p>As a result, the FAA <a href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Master%20Statement%2011-17-14_final_508.pdf">day-to-day budget grows as productivity decreases</a>, and the agency becomes entrenched in a shortsighted mindset that prioritizes safety today over efficiency and safety in the long run. An innovation-stifling, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” philosophy permeates the entire agency, restraining advancements in airspace management, aircraft development, and space exploration. Recent innovations in computerized flight have improved efficiency in the skies while reducing chances for human error, the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_08/human_textonly.html">chief cause</a> of aviation-related incidents. The FAA sees a tradeoff between efficiency and safety. But more flexible, innovation-friendly ANSPs around the world have proven that this is a false dichotomy; new developments in flight automation could both improve system efficiency and prevent future tragedy. After all, human fallibility has been to blame for many high-profile fatalities over the years (think <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9Cberlingen_mid-air_collision">Überlingen</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_airport_disaster">Tenerife</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593">Kemerovo</a>).</p><p>But the FAA’s debilitating preoccupation with near-term safety thwarts the timely implementation of new ideas and inventions. Deeply concerned with short-run accident prevention, the agency does not employ forward-looking planning philosophies that could improve the system’s safety and efficiency on a more distant horizon. A conservative safety culture and ignorance of opportunity cost, claims a 2015 National Research Council <a href="http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21721/a-review-of-the-next-generation-air-transportation-system-implications">report</a>, has seriously obstructed progress and reform at the FAA. Partial responsibility for the FAA’s archaic, aging infrastructure falls on this mindset.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*McGNSDU1rqoabIIVxnM5Tg.jpeg" /><figcaption>At the FAA’s Washington headquarters. <a href="https://www.cartoonstock.com/directory/a/avoiding_risk.asp">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>Opponents of FAA reform often cite the FAA’s commendable safety record. Some warn that a departure from the government-run status quo could put both <a href="http://democrats.transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/defazio-larsen-question-republican-plan-privatize-critical-air-traffic-control">our lives and our wallets in grave danger</a>. Planes are not falling out of Canadian skies, but they are getting from gate to gate more quickly and cheaply thanks to the enthusiastic technologists at Nav Canada. Safety has not deteriorated in countries with reformed ANSPs; Canada successfully <a href="https://www.navcanada.ca/EN/media/Publications/Test%20of%20Time-EN.pdf">provides</a> safety-maximizing incentives to airspace managers.</p><p>When the FAA does manage to muster the will to self-update, it generally proceeds without a coherent plan or realistic estimation of anticipated costs. The administration has spent roughly a decade and a half meandering through its modernization program, NextGen. Short for “Next Generation Air Transportation System,” the program seeks to bring US airspace management into the 21st century — including things that Canada was implementing years before NextGen plans took off. But by the time the program comes to a close, <a href="http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/topstories/FAA-to-Release-NextGen-Implementation-Roadmap_82792.html#.V5D-_ZOAOko">one quarter</a> of the new century will have gone by.</p><h4>Is NextGen working?</h4><p>NextGen apologists argue that the saga’s successes are something of an “inconvenient truth” to critics calling for organizational reform. While some sections of the undertaking have helped streamline the US air system, many NextGen subprojects rival Boston’s Big Dig in cost overruns and delays.</p><p>Attempting to shore up public confidence in its initiatives, the FAA even launched a “<a href="https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1259">Fact: NextGen is Working</a>” campaign. This has paid off in one way — the public can rest assured that those who control the skies have a sense of humor while doing so.</p><p>In January 2016, just one month before the FAA released its sunny publicity video, the DoT’s Inspector General (OIG) published a broad, trenchant <a href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Organizational%20Structure_Final%20Report%5E1-15-16.pdf">critique</a> of NextGen implementation strategies. The OIG tends not to pull any punches in its criticism of the FAA. Whether the administration chooses to heed OIG advice is another matter. The January 2016 report details a series of opportunities that the FAA has ignored during NextGen rollout.</p><p>As of this year, NextGen’s predicaments have added $3.8 billion in overruns to the taxpayer. Over half of NextGen’s programs are delayed an average of four years. The most egregious of these setbacks is no less than thirteen years. The OIG’s findings wouldn’t have been so incriminating if the FAA had defined and adhered to well-defined goals. But its programs have undergone update after update and revision after revision. The current incarnation of NextGen is amorphous, protracted, and dear.</p><p>A <a href="http://www.nap.edu/download/21721#">National Research Council report</a> published last year indicts the FAA along similar lines.</p><blockquote>NextGen, as currently executed, is not, however, broadly transformational. That is, it does not set out a series of planned steps toward a fundamentally transformed end-state. Moreover, the system has not been significantly changed to take advantage of available information and communications technologies or to enable major improvements in how the airspace can be organized and managed.</blockquote><p>An observer looking at the present from 2003 would not find much of the original plans in today’s NextGen. A better title for FAA’s video campaign may well be “Fact: The few sections of the original NextGen that have survived countless changes on the potholed road to implementation are delivering benefits that might, someday, exceed the costs of the project.”</p><p>The ever-mutating NextGen does resemble other infrastructure megaprojects. In a <a href="https://medium.com/@r.russell/big-digs-and-soft-budget-constraints-67d33bf1c30b#.9cnf5uvpg">previous piece</a>, I examined why large-scale public works undertakings consistently exceed initial projections of time and cost. Government managers <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/a-risk-management-approach-to-a-successful-infrastructure-project">rarely</a> employ sound forecasting techniques, and the public-sector financing process creates disincentives to lean planning. Large, publicly funded projects like NextGen enjoy <a href="http://eml.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/understanding.pdf">soft budget constraints</a>. Planners in the public sector understand that mounting costs and delays are unlikely to cost them their jobs, and it is even less likely that a disappointed Uncle Sam will scrap their projects or liquidate their agencies. This institutionalized sense of security discourages bureaucrats from providing clear cost-minimizing plans and schedules.</p><p>The scope of drone operations, commercial spaceflights, and air traffic grows with each quarterly report. It is crucial that airspace management institutions evolve with the world they oversee — there is no question that modernization is badly needed at the ATO. FAA facilities are ill-equipped to adapt to change, and so are FAA managers. There has been much <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/bill-shuster-faa-air-traffic-controllers-218633">debate</a> over the past few years over how best to deliver a continually updated air system. Many countries have benefitted from separating airspace regulators from the operations they oversee — something that is <a href="http://www.icao.int/Meetings/ceans/Documents/Ceans_Wp_037_en.pdf">recommended</a> by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an organ of the United Nations.</p><h4>Liberating the skies</h4><p>Today’s FAA both makes and enforces the rules of the sky. Beholden to a budget-minded Congress and accountable to safety-minded users, the sequester-hobbled ATO had to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000002190098/faa-chief-testifies.html">sacrifice</a> efficiency to ensure safety a few years ago. But what if the nation’s air traffic control system were able to raise its own revenues on input from passengers, carriers, and industry workers? A more autonomous, fiscally independent, user-governed ANSP would not face perverse incentives to keep Congress happy while neglecting the traveling public. An independent air traffic management entity could better respond to the needs of Americans who rely on air travel for business and pleasure.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb9371726b1e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/plain-text/a-big-dig-in-the-skies-bb9371726b1e">A Big Dig in the skies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/plain-text">Plain Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Big Digs and Soft Budget Constraints]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@r.russell/big-digs-and-soft-budget-constraints-67d33bf1c30b?source=rss-d5bc3cf0f14f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raymond Russell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2016 20:58:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-10T16:14:40.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why do large, government-sponsored projects rarely go according to plan?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l7fxlqYJhf6aZypzoppQQA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bertha, Seattle’s delay-plagued tunnel boring machine. Photo: WSDOT</figcaption></figure><p>Boston’s Big Dig turned the phrase “plagued by cost overruns” into a tired cliché. Initial 1982 estimates put the project at $2.8 billion (about $6.9 billion in today’s dollars). But on completion, the total cost to federal, state, and local governments including future interest payments was a 2016-adjusted <a href="http://archive.boston.com/metrodesk/2012/07/10/true-cost-big-dig-exceeds-billion-with-interest-officials-determine/AtR5AakwfEyORFSeSpBn1K/story.html">$22 billion</a> — over three times the planned outlays. The last Big Dig bond comes due in 2038 — fifty-six years after the project began. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority endures the nation’s highest annual debt servicing bill, with <a href="http://commonwealthmagazine.org/transportation/tackling-mbtas-debt-problem/">$425 million</a> — nearly a quarter of its 2015 operating budget — going to bond interest. The ultimate victim of this planning disaster is, of course, the taxpayer.</p><p>In Massachusetts, the financial burden is passed on to the public through higher gas taxes— a regressive tax on low-income Bay Staters whose bottom lines suffer a higher proportional impact from gas price hikes than do those of higher-income citizens.</p><p>It’s not hard to find other projects facing similar plights. Plans for an ongoing extension of Washington, D.C.’s Silver Line have been revised <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2015/04/30/silver-line-phase-2-now-arriving-in-2020/">150 times</a> during construction. These changes, admits the program’s former manager, have contributed to substantial delays and added costs. In Manhattan, a Long Island Rail Road expansion that began in 1998 was expected to cost $3 billion over twelve years. Now, the bill amounts to over <a href="http://www.city-journal.org/html/fifteen-stories-under-14105.html">$10 billion</a>, and construction won’t take fewer than twenty-four years. And Bertha, the machine boring Seattle’s Highway 99 tunnel, <a href="http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/transportation/bertha-restarts-after-two-years-of-delays/">stood still</a> for two years after hitting a steel pipe carelessly left in its path by DOT surveyors.</p><p>The Federal government fares no better than state and local authorities at avoiding overruns, and affected projects aren’t limited to roads and tunnels. Construction of the new Department of Homeland Security headquarters is now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-headquarters-project-faces-more-cost-overruns-missed-deadlines-report-says/2014/09/19/1cab7ddc-4035-11e4-9587-5dafd96295f0_story.html">$1.5 billion</a> over budget and 11 years behind schedule. The Department of Defense spent $5 billion developing and procuring a wear-anywhere <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-hero-project/articles/2013/10/14/the-army-s-5-billion-new-uniform-already-being-replaced.html">Universal Combat Pattern</a> before determining that the redesigned uniform performed poorly everywhere.</p><p>The F-35, whose lifetime cost stands at over <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/03/25/f-35-acquisition-costs-drops-but-overall-operating-costs-increase/82248008/">$1 trillion</a>, has suffered from inadequately defined, unrealistic goals. The Department of Defense did not provide industry partners with clear objectives and has <a href="http://www.law360.com/articles/476771/dod-needs-better-oversight-for-f-35-program-oig-says">failed</a> to provide sufficient oversight to ensure accountability among contracting firms.</p><p>But a lack of sound project analysis does give us one gift: the opportunity for creative headlines. The F-35’s overambitious designers, according to <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/the-f-35-a-weapon-that-costs-more-than-australia/72454/">The Atlantic</a>, succeeded in creating “A Weapon that Costs More than Australia.”</p><p>The only reliability to be found in large, government-led projects is their consistent underestimation of time and cost. This is not new; by 1825 the <a href="https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9979.pdf">Erie Canal</a> had gone 46% over budget, and subsequent expansions would cost over twice what was expected at the time. On-budget and on-time public works projects are exceptions to the norm.</p><p>In a world where project cost overruns were randomly distributed around a central value close to estimated cost, those with statistical inclinations would expect about half of all projects to come in under budget and the other half to require additional spending. But in our world, over <a href="http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/07/why-mega-projects-end-costing-way-more-expected/6364/">90%</a> of publicly run infrastructure ventures exceed cost and time projections.</p><p>Oxford’s Bent Flyvbjerg attributes these misapprehensions to “<a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278415">strategic misrepresentation</a>” by public officials eager to secure funding for their own projects. Cost underestimations result from <a href="http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=389082074026095000113105099008088087049011003078061021028122004100004065112102096025033007120040011005124116003125088071102105012091022050034007091096094124012069127068081076078031114089075001084082125098001118115005001114024114101093022083022097067078&amp;EXT=pdf">deliberate efforts</a> to secure funding from policymakers who would hesitate to support more involved undertakings.</p><p>Other research connects bad estimation with less sinister but nonetheless subpar reasoning. Project experts tend to see their work as unique and neglect what <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a047747.pdf">Kahneman and Tversky</a> called “distributional data,” the different outcomes that can result from varying external conditions. Planners therefore fail to look for parallels between their projects and similar undertakings that encountered, for instance, labor, weather, or procurement delays. Another danger is irrational optimism — a planner very much wants to see his project realized and may become deluded as to its feasibility within given constraints. Why should committed exceptionalists expect their programs to any trend but the ideal?</p><p>Even if misrepresentation is more inadvertent than strategic, the taxpayer still suffers. A frequent argument during and after over-budget projects is that new roads and defense technologies will improve peoples’ lives and safety — that these undertakings are worth every unforeseen penny that must be spent. But where does the logic of this attempted salvage lead?</p><p>Building a better stealth fighter can improve the safety of the American public. Revitalizing aging transportation infrastructure can alleviate urban congestion and mitigate associated economic inefficiency. Surely, a value can be placed on the benefits of these programs. This number is likely finite, so it follows that a maximum viable cost function could be calculated for a given proposal. Governments should seek to maximize the net benefit of their spending, but the very nature of public sector action (or inaction) often precludes optimization. Well-intentioned policymakers should recognize that public sector undertakings are not necessarily the best way to execute such projects. In many cases, shifting some or all responsibility away from<em> </em>bureaucratic administrations can <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6R92AgAAQBAJ&amp;lpg=PA62">dramatically improve</a> on-time and on-budget performance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*-2DzQBZancvfuel9jxewZw.png" /><figcaption>Public vs. private road projects in the UK. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6R92AgAAQBAJ&amp;lpg=PA62"><em>Source</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Inasmuch as strategic or inadvertent cost misrepresentation indicts government project planners, it also shows that sponsoring government agencies share the blame. The ballooning bureaucracy that characterizes many public organizations similarly hinders the delivery of on-time, on-budget services and large-scale projects.</p><p>The Federal Aviation Administration’s ongoing NextGen program, an effort to modernize the dreadfully archaic American airspace management system, suffers from these ailments. Air traffic controllers in US towers still spend their days tracking aircraft by moving <a href="http://gpsworld.com/faa-awards-nextgen-contract-to-lockheed-martin/">paper strips</a> around on a large board; FAA has only very recently awarded Lockheed Martin a <a href="http://LOL some people at my work paid $.99 to set up a Pokestop attractor across the street, and they’re just standing at the 4th-story window laughing at all the people running up to the sign they picked for it. It’s a historical sign commemorating someone’s funeral procession">contract</a> to computerize this process for $344 million. Meanwhile, Canada’s non-governmental air navigation service provider began the digital transition nearly two decades ago and now earns over <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-12/paper-pushing-flight-controllers-see-future-in-canada-s-system">$20 million</a> a year licensing the technology to other nations.</p><p>Poor input projections coupled with poorly defined goals have led to a long, expensive slog that scarcely resembles FAA’s initial vision for NextGen. While the administration is authorized to partly self-finance through aircraft user fees, it is forced to continually approach Congress for reauthorization. This uncertainty nurtures a <a href="http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2014/02/11/expiring-budgets-and-spending-sprees-the-cost-of-use-it-or-lose-it-budgeting/">use-it-or-lose-it</a> budget mentality and <a href="http://mercatus.org/publication/curbing-wasteful-year-end-federal-government-spending-reforming-use-it-or-lose-it-rules">contributes</a> to administrative inefficiency.</p><h4>Parkinson, Niskanen, and Kornai</h4><p>What do American infrastructure administrators and Soviet factory managers have in common? <a href="http://eml.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/understanding.pdf">Soft budget constraints</a>. <a href="http://www.institut-entreprise.fr/sites/default/files/article_de_revue/docs/documents_internes/societal-59-24-fejto-livres.pdf">János Kornai</a>, the the economist who first proposed this concept, was once fired from the Hungarian Communist Party’s newspaper after becoming disillusioned with the Party. Entities that enjoy state support make decisions according to an entirely different framework than that employed by their private sector counterparts. Managers in the former class of institutions know that their failures will always be remediated by increased public spending. Why should planners spend time and energy crafting economically efficient projects when they know that the public will ultimately pay any amount?</p><p>Government service providers often adhere to Parkinson’s law, propounded in a marvelous satirical piece that <em>The Economist</em> ran in 1955:</p><p><a href="http://www.economist.com/node/14116121">Parkinson&#39;s Law</a></p><blockquote>An elderly lady of leisure can spend the entire day in writing and despatching a postcard to her niece at Bognor Regis. An hour will be spent in finding the postcard, another in hunting for spectacles, half-an-hour in a search for the address, an hour and a quarter in composition, and twenty minutes in deciding whether or not to take an umbrella when going to the pillar-box in the next street.</blockquote><p>Unconstrained bureaucratic budgets and workforces, he argued, follow a similar pattern and grow unstoppably until hard constraints are imposed.</p><blockquote>There need be little or no relationship between the work to be done and the size of the staff to which it may be assigned.</blockquote><p>Parkinsonian bureaucratic expansion is multiplicative — when a civil servant feels overworked, he can do one of the following: resign, ask a coworker for help, or transfer work to several subordinates. Parkinson proposes that workers will find the latter most desirable. Resigning could jeopardize the employee’s retirement benefits, and working with a colleague would introduce competition into the market for promotions. He must therefore accumulate more than one helper; delegating to just one would be akin to the promotion-risking scenario.</p><p>As the workforce of a given department grows, so does the share of time and energy spent managing and coordinating.</p><p>In the 1970s, William Niskanen began to sound the empirical alarm on unconstrained bureaucratic bloat. His budget-maximizing model posits that government administrators seek to increase their Congressional appropriations until reaching a cost-benefit constraint. Niskanen therefore predicts that the equilibrium output of a bureau under this decision-making framework is monotonically higher than that of an efficient, perfectly competitive firm.</p><p>While several challenges to Niskanen’s original framework have revealed its deficiencies, the model remains useful in assessing the behavior of many public-sector organizations. There are certainly groups with nobler intentions than budget and workforce expansion, but Niskanen is not wrong in lamenting bureaucratic self-interest. Too often, the government prioritizes self-perpetuation over responsible use of its people’s resources.</p><h4>What can be done?</h4><p>Opponents of removing full authority from the hands of the government often cite similar failings in the private sector. Yes, the substantial unforeseen <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.662.9460&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">expenses</a> incurred during Boeing’s 787 rollout are an example of a megascale private-sector project gone awry. But incentive-based analysis shows that this should be far from the norm.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*m5bvhma1oZ-wWJ5i-GgSxg.jpeg" /><figcaption>We all make mistakes. <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/travel/flights/2013/01/17/problems-ground-boeing-787/1841859/">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>From time to time, private sector enterprises face sink-or-swim plights. If a construction firm fails to deliver on building a house, it faces at best a lost customer and at worst an existential lawsuit. But an offending public agency can simply plead for more government funding — only possible to entities enjoying softer budget constraints. Public sector organizations therefore see fewer incentives to employ best-practice risk assessment and market forecasting methods. From this accountability gap ensues a gap in the integrity of estimation.</p><p>Compromises like public-private partnerships encourage capitalistic decision making while imposing checks on rent seeking in public goods markets. Uncertainty is distributed between participants; the government sponsor bears responsibility for regulatory obstructions, while the private partner assumes liability for risks associated with the construction process. While unforeseen costs in public works projects are offloaded onto the taxpayer, public-private undertakings shift the burden of payment onto private firms. A profit-maximizing private firm sees incentives to minimize program costs.</p><p>For these partnerships to succeed, planners must take care to clearly define desired outcomes. The Federal Chief Information Officer advocates for <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/guidance/modular-approaches-for-information-technology.pdf">incremental contracting</a>, but agencies do not always heed this advice. The Department of Transportation Inspector General has criticized FAA NextGen implementation, citing <a href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/29098">frequent use</a> of large, protracted contracts that do not provide adequate portholes for oversight. By introducing intermediate points of accountability into the development process, project managers can more easily measure progress and mitigate potential failures.</p><p>Put concisely by a 2013 McKinsey <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/a-risk-management-approach-to-a-successful-infrastructure-project">report</a>,</p><blockquote>It is striking to see that — in the absence of private-sector management techniques and private-sector risk takers — public-infrastructure sponsors seldom apply state-of-the-art risk- and project-management tools and techniques, despite the knock-on consequences of being seen to “lose” public money during a time of increasingly constrained public budgets.</blockquote><p>Another remedy for cost overruns comes through changing funding structures. Granting partnerships independence from the government appropriations process and allowing self-financing in capital markets can deliver <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/17-infrastructure-public-private-partnerships-sabol-puentes">better value</a> and more efficient projects.</p><p>Niskanen is fundamentally correct about key elements of the common bureaucratic mindset: indiscriminately throwing money at a problem and hoping that it will go away is rarely the best method. The question policymakers ask the agencies they oversee shouldn’t be “how much more money do you need?” Rather, they must require the public sector to take greater care in where, when, and how they spend their appropriations. The question becomes one of aim, not scope.</p><p>Decision makers and planners should pay attention to private sector practices. Since private firms face a much harder budget constraint (bankruptcy), inappropriate spending is curtailed by necessity and survival instinct. In many cases, projects can be delivered more quickly and at lower cost via public-private partnerships or fuller commercialization. Policymakers must realize that they too will benefit from these gains in efficiency; they will enjoy less public outcry over failed timelines and ballooning tax burdens.</p><p><em>Follow </em><a href="https://twitter.com/raymondopolis?lang=en"><em>@raymondopolis</em></a><em> on Twitter.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67d33bf1c30b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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