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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rabee Tourky on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rabee Tourky on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Rabee Tourky on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australian universities set to profit from proposed caps on international student numbers]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/australian-universities-set-to-profit-from-proposed-caps-on-international-student-numbers-27c8b349ed59?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-student]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jun 2024 23:20:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-02T06:45:54.195Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*yPua_uPRAsf_ZBDRS0bZzA.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Rohan Pitchford and Rabee Tourky</p><p>There is some weeping and gnashing of teeth by Australian Vice Chancellors about the ALP’s plan to cap international student numbers. The idea is that the government will limit the number of international students studying in Australia and that it will do so via government fiat, order or directive — instead of imposing a high enough GST-style levy on international student fees to achieve the same reduction in international student numbers.</p><p>To understand the consequences of the proposed cap, let’s look at how the same outcome of reducing international student numbers would have worked had the government imposed a tax on incoming students. It is, as described by us in earlier pieces, likely that international student demand for study in Australia is highly inelastic. That is, a marginal coordinated international student fee increase by all Australian universities will increase total revenue received by the sector from international students. This is the case, we argue, because students from China choose to study in Australia for a number of reasons that don’t have much to do with the education product provided by Australia. For example, similar time zone and potential immigration. So if universities coordinate on fees they charge international students, then, as a whole, the revenue of the sector would increase. Collusion between universities on fees is, however, difficult to implement without the help of government. This is where government policy steps in … and who receives the increased profits from coordination depends on the details of the policy intervening in the market for international students.</p><p>The proposed government levy, or tax, on international students was a sort of collusion mechanism for the sector as a whole, as under such a levy all international students would face a fee rise simultaneously across all the sector. However, such a levy would ensure that any increase in revenue from this coordinated fee rise goes to government rather than the colluding universities, and the government then may allocate these returns to whatever projects they wish to fund, such as research in physics or electric vehicle infrastructure.</p><p>The government has chosen to cap student numbers by fiat decree instead of through a fee levy. What do we anticipate to happen now? The government is not going to make any money from the policy, but the sector may profit from it. Importantly the rationing of student entry into programs is ultimately left to universities, the universities will need to meet the caps. Even if the government limits the number of student visas over the next years, universities will need to affect policies that reduce their own international student numbers. Of course, the universities have many ways to ration international student numbers, with two reasonable rationing mechanisms: the first is to increase entry requirements into programs. For example, increase GPA requirements or require higher test scores in English language tests. The other reasonable way to impliment the required rationing of international student numbers is for universities to increase international student fees to meet the caps.</p><p>We anticipate that universities will quickly realise that rationing international student numbers to meet caps through fee increases will dramatically increase their revenue. That, basically, the caps are a coordination mechanism for uniform increases of fees across the sector. The loser in the proposed caps is the Australian tax payer to whom this increased revenue would have accumulated had the government reduced international student numbers through a tax similar to GST.</p><p><em>Rabee Tourky, is the Director of the Research School of Economics at the Australian National University and The Trevor Swan Distinguished Professor of Economics. His interest has been the operations of markets and market incompleteness.</em></p><p><em>Rohan Pitchford, is a Professor of Economics in the Research School of Economics, currently working on securitisation and financial stability. He has published papers on the economics of contracts, default and sovereign debt in the leading journals in Economics. He is a graduate from MIT.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=27c8b349ed59" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Elasticities in International Student Market]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/elasticities-in-international-student-market-ef09716e8dfb?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef09716e8dfb</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Dec 2023 04:04:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-17T04:04:17.612Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*ofoezlAteHFrmPONCztxog.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>By BRUCE CHAPMAN , ROHAN PITCHFORD and RABEE TOURKY</li></ul><p>The debate continues with respect to the desirability or not of a levy on Australian universities for the extraordinary revenue streams generated by international students. This conversation is of great importance to the sector because the number of students (typically across the past few years of about 350,000) and the money raised of about $10bn a year are both astonishing.</p><p>We can’t imagine the dire consequences for the sector — particularly for research activities — if misguided government policy led to significant disruption of this market. Thus the importance of getting the economic arguments right.</p><p>There are two critical aspects of this debate; one is theoretical and the other is empirical. What does economics have to say about these? There are several conceptual arguments that help us here. But, to set the scene, we note there are significant profits associated with international students revenue — returns to the universities above the costs of providing the teaching services to international students.</p><p>We all know there are major subsidies to non-teaching activities from this, and we call these outcomes “rents” to the system.</p><p>A major conceptual point is that economists have long argued that a tax on pure rent is the ideal tax: such a tax does not generally alter economic decisions, just like the effects of a profits tax.</p><p>But if there is a levy this might lead to higher fees and this is very important.</p><p>The further point in concept is that Australia’s most elite universities have had the benefit over the other universities of a very large number of years of major taxpayer subsidies that have endowed the former group with considerable research reputational power, and all institutions enjoy the largesse associated with them generally having free access to some of the best real estate in their cities, essentially at taxpayer implicit expense.</p><p>Both points imply a strong case for a levy since this will provide returns to taxpayer investments. On the empirical side, what real­ly matters concerns what economists term the price elasticity of demand, jargon that can cause confusion for the general public, but the basic idea is simple.</p><p>The elasticity is the responsiveness of demand to a small rise in prices, such as would likely come from a levy on international student fees. Two very extreme cases are illustrative of the importance of this concept.</p><p>Suppose demand does not respond at all to a price increase from the levy — for example, a 5 or 10 per cent tax leads to no change in overseas student demand. A levy in this situation is equivalent to a pure rent tax because nothing is altered with its introduction beyond extra revenue accruing to the government.</p><p>On the other hand, if demand falls to zero with such a tax then the market for international students is obliterated, which would be a profound problem for the sector. Therefore, we need to have a pretty good idea what the price elasticity actually is.</p><p>Before examining the evidence on this issue, two points need to be made. One is that Australia is a highly desirable place to study, being safe, with a good climate, and offering international students a route to permanent residency. These factors imply, but do not prove, that student responsiveness to a small change in prices would be small.</p><p>Critically what matters is the effect of a price increase for the whole system, not for an individual university. This is why the broad benefits of studying in Australia are so important; they accrue to all our universities.</p><p>Having evidence on the sector-wide elasticities is thus important but hard to find. We have two points to offer. One is that we have looked at the relationship between changes in the exchange rate (which directly affect the price paid to the universities in Australian dollars) and one-year and two-year lags in new international student enrolments, finding that it is small. But this can be suggestive only without peer review.</p><p>Much more important, we have uncovered <a href="https://londoneconomics.co.uk/blog/publication/estimating-the-potential-impact-of-policy-changes-on-international-student-demand-for-uk-higher-education/">a paper reporting the results for </a>Britain on the issue we are concerned about, published by London Economics in 2021. The research reveals compelling evidence that for that country the elasticities are very small, and similar to the ones we uncovered with respect to Australia with our preliminary exchange rate analysis.</p><p>Consequently, we have some confidence that a small levy, even if it results in some price increases, will lead to higher total revenues than before. But of course some of this gain will accrue to the government, which then has to decide how to use it.</p><p>Some might suggest that part of the revenue could be used to direc­tly supplement university non-teaching activities; Keith Hough­ton,<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/an-international-student-levy-could-ease-the-research-funding-squeeze/news-story/16abac0e4ad9e3fdcefaff509f2f6c4b"> recently writing in The Australian</a>, has illustrated that such an approach could benefit just about all Australian universi­ties.</p><p>Our bottom line is that a levy will be equitable and need not result in penalties on the high-reputation institutions that benefit considerably from taxpayer subsidies. Australian universities have reaped gains that are not due only to their efforts, they come also from reputational excellence that can be traced importantly to significant support from the Australian people.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef09716e8dfb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Economics of a Levy on International Student Fee Revenue Professors Bruce Chapman and Rabee…]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/the-economics-of-a-levy-on-international-student-fee-revenue-professors-bruce-chapman-and-rabee-9193a9e0612a?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Nov 2023 22:22:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-18T22:34:47.410Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*qTrcyMpj4ZQ0aE10hhM0iw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Economics of a Levy on International Student Fee Revenue</h3><h3>Bruce Chapman and Rabee Tourky</h3><p>The debate is hotting up on the topic of a government levy on Australian universities’ interna­tional student fee revenue (ISFR). This is critical for current policy, given the sums of money involved and the high proportion of the sector’s running costs from this source.</p><p>The data on international students enrolled in Australia universities is startling. In 2023 there are more than 360,000, generating around $10 billion pa, being around 25 per cent of the sec­tor’s total budget and, for the most established institutions, this proportion can be as high as 40 per cent. Without these funds the system would be in dire straits. This topic requires modesty given that economics does not deal easily with the quixotic com­plexities associated with institutions which are both public and free market.</p><p>We will have a go at putting some basic economic thinking into this space, concluding that the levy has a strong basis. As background we have to introduce two critical concepts: the extent and longevity of taxpayer assistance (subsidies) to our elite institutions; and the “price elasticity of demand” for the in­ternational student market. On the first, here are some data: the age of the top 5 (in terms of numbers of international students) Australian public universities is 119 years, compared with the bottom 5, which is 41 years. This means that the former have enjoyed about 80 extra years on average of major tax­payer support.</p><p>This results in something unsurprising: these universities have the best research reputations and thus the greatest potential to attract and charge high prices to international stu­dents. The other aspect of taxpayer subsidies to the most highly ranked universities, not immediately visible, is location. For example, the Universities of Sydney, Melbourne, Queensland and Adelaide all benefit from not paying rent for some of the best located properties in large inter­nationally famous cities.</p><p>Through the major financial benefit of rent-free wonderful location, these universities are gifted a considerable advantage in the international student market. So for reasons of both history and geography it has been, and remains, the case that Australian taxpayers are the important contributors to our top ranking universities’ success internationally. Isn’t it then apposite that taxpayers should share some of this revenue via a small levy? Basic social welfare and economics tells us that the case is incontestable.</p><p>The other major consideration is the price elasticity of demand (PED) for the international student market. What is this and why does it matter? The PED reflects the extent to which demand responds to price changes, and it matters for public policy. In the ISFR space the PED is a key issue because knowing the PED allows us to sort out what the implications would be for university revenues from a price increase resulting from a levy.</p><p>If the PED is very large then the IFSR will significantly impact on university revenue streams, but if it is very small this impact will be inconsequential at the same time that a major revenue stream is generated for the government.</p><p>So how big is it? Our major contribution on the PED is to highlight that the IFSR levy would apply to all Aus­tralian universities simultaneously, meaning that the concept has to be understood at a national and not an individual university level.</p><p>We anticipate, with caution, that Australia, as whole, has market power that mitigates against a high PED in this market. One reason for this is time zones - Asian students studying in Australia have uncomplicated communication with family, which is not the case if they choose to study in Europe or North America.</p><p>There are additional national attractions: a vibrant and generally fair labour market; the weather; public safety; and our focus on equality and fairness. The other, maybe the biggest, attraction of studying here is the prospect of permanent residency with accompanying major benefits (including high incomes and top-notch health care) because domestic university qual­ifications will significantly promote immigration prospects; it is notable that up to 15-20% of former international students come here for life through the immigration program, and presum­ably others are enrolling in this hope.</p><p>In the end the size of the PED is an empirical issue, so we have consulted the experts. The most knowledgeable of all researchers in this area is without doubt Professor Simon Marginson (Ox­ford) who has written as follows:</p><blockquote>“There is no systematic study of PED but based on 25-years of observations, inter­actions and trend data I’m confident in saying that PEDs are very small in Anglophile universities and countries, except perhaps in lower demand institutions” (private cor­respondence).</blockquote><p>Thus in the view of the world’s foremost expert and others we consulted, the likely overall effects on ISFR from a moderate levy and higher prices will be very small; however, there will be significant benefits as a return to taxpayers’ investments. To illustrate, a 5 or 10% levy on $10 billion delivers around $500 mil to $1 billion per annum, which could be used to help all public universities support non-teaching activities if the government so decided.</p><p>This is a very big deal in terms of equity for taxpayers but should not divert attention from broad higher education funding issues, including for access and research. In a well-designed funding system there is a real possibility of making all our institutions better off via a levy on international student revenue.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9193a9e0612a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia should preemptively introduce tariffs on carbon-content of its own exports]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/australia-should-preemptively-introduce-tariffs-on-carbon-content-of-its-own-exports-db2862b34931?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[exports-and-imports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tariffs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Oct 2021 04:21:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-27T04:37:44.179Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Rohan Pitchford and Rabee Tourky</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FuMsT47PAonsCF3myy7mQA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Morrison government has committed Australia to a net zero carbon future. At present, it is less of a plan than a hope that technology will rapidly change so that we don’t need to do much to achieve our 2050 targets. A main international trade policy fear is that perceived substantive inaction by Australia will lead to retaliatory tariffs by Europe on the carbon content of our exports.</p><p>Having in mind classic literature on strategic trade policy and tariff wars (see <a href="http://blogs.ubc.ca/jbrander/files/2016/01/Strategic-Trade-Policy.pdf">here</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1057%2F978-1-349-95121-5_2264-1">here</a>, for surveys), in this blog post we propose that Australia <em>preemptively</em> introduce a tariff on carbon content of its exports (emphasising, coal, gas, iron ore etc., where emitted carbon is easier to measure and where Australia has international market power).</p><p>We argue that this may well have the following consequences:</p><ol><li>Make Australia better off by transferring foreign consumer surplus to Australia without greatly affecting Australian exporters</li><li>Provide incentives to producers outside Australia to innovate their way out of reliance on fossil fuels; and thus provide an opportunity to “free ride” on these innovations helping achieve our 2050 net-zero goals at little cost</li><li>Enhance Australia’s diplomatic standing in the world, by decisively establishing how seriously we take climate change mitigation policy</li></ol><p><strong>Incidence of these tariffs in sectors where Australia has market power</strong></p><p>Preemptive tariffs on carbon content of our exports has the advantage of shifting cost of climate change mitigation to foreign buyers in sectors with inelastic demand, such as coal and energy. In sectors with inelastic demand, our proposed policy of preemptive tariffs, dominates waiting for Europe and other foreign countries to impose tariffs on our exports; because the latter transfers foreign consumer surplus to foreign governments, while our proposal involves transfers of foreign consumer surplus to Australia.</p><p><strong>Foreign retaliation to proposed carbon content tariffs on own exports</strong></p><p>The political economy in foreign countries makes standard retaliatory action difficult. Imposing import carbon tariffs on Australian products in sectors with inelastic demand such as energy doubles the negative incidence of the trade war on their consumers. Of course, sectors such as food exports where Australia has limited market power are vulnerable to retaliatory novel import tariffs, but Europe already greatly regulates food imports and we don’t anticipate that any further harm to our food exporters is probable, though this needs deeper analysis than this blog post.</p><p><strong>Foreign innovation response to proposed carbon content tariffs on own exports</strong></p><p>In the medium term, a carbon tariff on Australian exports in sectors with inelastic demand, adds to the incentive for foreign innovations aimed at mitigating the incidence of our tariffs. These innovations will take various forms, and will certainly be both costly for the innovator and importantly readily adopted by Australia, when mature, at low cost. In short, Australia can adopt technological innovation induced by our tariffs without having to participate in costly research investment.</p><p><strong>Are the proposed tariffs on own exports allowed under international trade agreement?</strong></p><p>In normal times, imposing strategic tariffs on own exports in sectors with inelastic demand and in which Australia has market power; will likely run foul of a number of our free trade agreements and international commitments to free trade. However, the proposal is not for a normal tariff, it is a tariff on carbon content of mainly energy exports. It can be argued that the exceptional need for the world to reduce carbon emissions, requires such exceptional tariffs and that Australia benefiting from these is incidental to the pressing need for global coordination on climate change mitigation.</p><p><strong>The issue of diplomatic optics</strong></p><p>Climate change mitigation has emerged as a politically pivotal issue of our times. It is an issue that affects elections in democratic countries and an issue that affects diplomatic relations between countries. Elected governments need to be seen to be implementing effective policy to address carbon emissions. We anticipate that our proposed tariffs on the carbon content by Australia imposed on own exports will be well received diplomatically. It is an innovative policy that combines strategic trade policy with the need for a grand narrative on how Australia is doing its bit for the environment.</p><p><em>Rohan Pitchford and Rabee Tourky are Professors of Economics at the Australian National University</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db2862b34931" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When probabilities don’t matter for proper individual choices but matter for public health policy]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/when-probabilities-dont-matter-for-individual-choices-but-matter-for-public-health-policy-8c3dd773ef33?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2021 02:43:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-22T00:49:32.869Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*MGpN06Aej4qVyWvGf70Iyg.png" /></figure><p>Australian health policy has an interesting choice. Vaccinate the population with with a combination of the AstraZeneca and Pfizer vaccine or wait until the supply of Pfizer vaccine is shipped and inoculate everyone with the Pfizer vaccine. The former choice may well make sense from a public health policy point of view.</p><p>The issues I want to address here has to do with the difference between what policy makers want and individual choices; and whether we can induce a change in behaviour by simply calculating and publicising the low probabilities of adverse effects of the AstraZeneca vaccine, and calculating and publicising the probabilities of the spread of the disease in Australia.</p><p><strong><em>Can we induce the publicly “desirable” choice by clarifying simple probabilities of adverse events? Or does the nudge need more than educating people about the smallness of the probabilities of adverse events?</em></strong></p><p>Let’s bring some sort of structure to the way we understand choices made by individuals. We envisage a person making a choice between two uncertain lotteries:</p><ol><li>Take AstraZeneca vaccine now, which is represented by a random variable A (whose values are real) of outcomes, with a probability <em>cumulative</em> distribution FA over outcomes.</li><li>Wait T months, take the Pfizer jab, represented by a random variable P (whose values are real) of outcomes, with probability <em>cumulative</em> distribution FP over outcomes.</li></ol><p>We make two assumption here and explain them afterward:</p><p>a. A and P have non-positive support.</p><p>b. FP(z) ≤ FA(z) for all z</p><p>Assumption (a) simply says that if you are not infected, then all possible outcome are negative. Assumption (b) says that taking Pfizer first order stochastically dominates taking AstraZeneca. That is, all individuals with monotone preferences over outcomes, would prefer P over A. Realistically, we may well be able to get away with a second order stochastic dominance assumption; meaning that risk averse individuals prefer P over A. The analysis and message is not affected.</p><p>We go to the first obvious and trivial result written loosely.</p><p><em>L1 A decision maker prefers P over A for all T≥0, regardless of the functional form of the probability distribution A or how low the probabilities of adverse outcomes of A are.</em></p><p>Of course, you would want to delay. This is the basis of vaccine hesitancy, if you think that you wont get the disease and are forced to choose between P and A, you will choose to wait for P as it causes less harm. We make a simple <em>guiding</em> remark arising from the independence axiom in decision theory.</p><p><em>Remark a (technical reminder): P will be preferred to A even when mixing the lotteries with any third lottery if utilities are expected utilities.</em></p><p>Thus, discussion of third alternatives (like flip a coin before making a the choice and on heads choose not to be vaccinated) will generally not be altogether useful.</p><p>We now model the <em>community spread</em> of the disease. Our choice of modelling this is in the form of ambient noise represented a latent unobserved random vector X with values in some space, that is statistically independent of the randomness generating P and A:</p><p>c. the states of the world generating X are independent of the states of the world generating the outcomes of P and A.</p><p>I cannot envisage a situation where <em>community spread </em>is correlated with the adverse effects of the vaccines. Note importantly that this X is latent and unobserved thus you cant condition your choice of which vaccine to take based on information about X. This assumption is hidden and not entirely realistic, for example it is reported that demand for P (and presumably A) went up in Melbourne, Victoria, with reports of community transmission. The assumption however does not greatly affect the narrative here.</p><p>We move to utilities and suppose that the individual is faced with two utilities over lotteries:</p><p>U(FA,X) and U(FP,X)</p><p>these are random utilities and the randomness depends on the state of <em>community spread </em>and on the distributions of the adverse effects of the vaccines<em>. </em>What is a reasonable assumption on this random utility function?</p><p>We adopts a version of the properness assumption of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911160">Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)</a> Proper Risk Aversion, Econometrica Vol. 55, №1 (Jan., 1987), pp. 143–154 (12 pages). We argue that the sign of</p><p>U(FA,X) — U(FP,X)</p><p>does not depend on the independent ambient noise. That is,</p><p>sign U(FA,g(X)) — U(FP,g(X)) = sign U(FA,X) — U(FP,X)</p><p>for any (measurable) transformation g of the ambient noise X. Noting that g(X) remains independent of P and A for any transformation g. The transformation g may be thought of as describing the individual’s attitude to the risky ambient noise. We get the following trivial result.</p><p><em>L2 A decision maker prefers P over A for all T≥0, regardless of the functional form of the probability distribution A or how low the probabilities of adverse outcomes of A are, and regardless of the transformation g.</em></p><p>This assumption on decision making with independent ambient noise is occasionally called <em>properness. </em>It is closely related to the usual independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. If it doesn’t hold, then observed attitudes to risk will have parameters with measurement errors that are dependent of non-observed ambient noise, and thus falsely display risk aversion or risk seeking. Examples of where the properness assumption doesn’t hold are provided <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5619393/">here</a>.</p><p>This <em>properness</em> assumption may well be a strong assumption. But in my view <em>properness </em>is a reasonable assumption to make. It is the natural assumption to make when the mechanisms are complicated. The hidden and strong assumption here is the <strong><em>independence</em></strong> of X from the outcome of choosing P after time T or choosing A at time T. Advocacy for switching choices from P over to A must go well beyond explaining probabilities. The nudge needs something else, for example, a sausage sizzle or ability to <strong><em>win a new Toyota V8 Landcriuser Sahara</em></strong> if you choose <strong><em>AstraZeneca</em></strong>. That is, advocacy needs to be adding uncertainty that is statistically dependent on the choices, probabilities in their own right do not speak to this.</p><p>We conclude with the point of the post. Consider the policy maker. Their social welfare function is a function of the aggregate choices C made by all individuals and the background ambient noise:</p><p>S(C,X)</p><p>Though, the ambient noise is statistically independent from the outcomes of the choices of individuals. It will generally be highly dependent on the aggregate choices. This may seem odd, but it generally is not if the number of individuals is very large!.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c3dd773ef33" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An interview with Kailing Shen an ANU Labour Economist]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/an-interview-with-kailing-shen-an-anu-labour-economist-1afa5a4a9d77?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1afa5a4a9d77</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 09:33:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T09:33:08.667Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/1*9hU7obhsJ1raaW_5qee8gg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Q: How does this recession differ from others?</em></p><p>The origin of the current surge of unemployment is very different in nature from any of previous recession/depression. It is not driven by economic factors/inefficiencies, etc. It is initiated by governments as a response to a public health event, thus, to a large extent, the current recession is “exogenously” driven.</p><p>Q:<em> What labour market scenarios do you anticipate? Unemployment typically rises faster than it falls.</em></p><p>We do have two extreme scenarios. Scenario one, or H0, the economic system will revert back to the original steady state on the other side. Scenario two; H1, the economic system will transit to a new steady state on the other side, hypothetically more remote-access friendly, less physical contact intense. Of course, the reality might not be as extreme as the above two scenarios. Rather, it is more likely to lie somewhere in the middle.</p><p>At this point, it is much more sensible to focus on scenario one, H0. Since unemployment is not a “natural” consequence of labor market fundamentals, the unemployed workers will still be productive and demanded once the shutdown interventions are lifted.</p><p><em>Q: If they remain productive, why don’t they simply switch industries?</em></p><p>The unemployed workers might well be better off by working in other industries for the duration of the shutdown. But that will require that</p><p>1) workers incur substantial training costs, search costs;</p><p>2) firms incur training and search costs as well.</p><p>Given the demand is suppressed in most other industries in this short run, it is unclear whether or not these investments 1) and 2) will pay themselves off. Also, it is not obvious these temporary job matches will be efficient.</p><p>I think it is much more efficient in the long run if governments can provide some safety net during this temporary period, to keep the human capital and maintain the bonding between firms and workers. After all, it will be very costly for firms to locate qualified workers if they lose them now. Also, if workers are forced into long term unemployment, it will also cost the government, the workers, their families hugely in the long run. These costs will be especially significant if firm-specific/industry-specific human capital is important.</p><p><em>Q: The Australian government thinks that the surge in unemployment will induce workers to acquire and learn new skills or train in new areas. What do you think?</em></p><p>Given I don’t think the current surge in unemployment is a signal of inefficiency in the economy or the matches between firms and workers, I would consider any artificial transition to new industries economically inefficient in the long run. But if there are substantial technology changes made by the firms, they might demand workers with an updated set of skills. This is largely what is happening after GFC in the US. Empirical evidence found that firms that were hit hardest by the recession tend to adopt more automation (Hershbein and Kahn, 2018). In such endogenous downturns, workers might need to be incentivised to update their skills, maybe funded by the firms and government to some extent.</p><p><em>Q: Should we be focusing on opportunities for up-skill amongst the lower income workers?</em></p><p>For workers in the developed economies, the return of up-skilling is mostly in terms of employment, rather than wages. This is examined in detail in Beaudry, Green and Sand (2016) both empirically and theoretically.</p><p>At this stage I am more worried about the current livelihood of low income workers. I worry about their psychological well being and about their families/children.</p><p>In the long run, I think there is still substantial return of up-skilling for workers. The return of up-skilling is both in terms of employment and wages. The problem is probably more about liquidity constraints.</p><p><em>References:</em></p><p><em>Beaudry, Paul, David Green and Ben Sand, 2016, “The Great Reversal in the Demand for Skills and Cognitive Tasks”. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S1), 2016, 201–245.</em></p><p><em>Hershbein, Brad, and Lisa B. Kahn. 2018. “Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change? Evidence from Vacancy Postings.” American Economic Review, 108 (7): 1737–72.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1afa5a4a9d77" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[State of our ports during the COVID-19 crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/state-of-our-ports-during-the-covid-19-crisis-86868c5c6f01?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86868c5c6f01</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2020 02:58:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-16T02:58:50.510Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kfsk8XyaSxLmPw65tpMLMw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>June Ma, Rohan Pitchford, and Rabee Tourky</em></p><p><strong>Internationally traded goods in Australia</strong></p><p>In FY 2018–19, Australia exported $372.4 billion worth of goods and imported $306.7 billion. As an island nation, internationally traded goods in Australia must enter or exit via seaports or airports. International trade has historically been <a href="https://infrastructure.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-International-Airfreight-Indicator-digital.pdf">dominated by shipping</a>, accounting for around three-quarters of trade by value in FY2017–18. While the share of goods arriving or departing airports by value has trended downwards over the past few decades, the volume of traded goods transported by air remains negligible at 0.3 per cent.</p><p>In a recent note, “<a href="https://medium.com/@rabeetourky/trade-our-way-out-of-the-covid-19-economic-downturn-c68cb670c83">Trading our way out of the COVID-19 economic downturn</a>”, we suggest that the economic slowdown in economies during the COVID-19 crisis “has arisen from deliberately introduced frictions in human interaction at local, regional and international levels” and that “the only real exit strategy available to us is based on a fundamental principle of economics: we trade our way out.”</p><p>This article summarises the major trading ports in Australia and proposals to boost their capacity or otherwise improve their infrastructure to assist with trade.</p><p><strong>Seaports</strong></p><p>The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development is responsible for the regulation of shipping accessing Australia’s ports, but not of port precincts, which are regulated at the state level. Australia’s sea freight trade is dominated by exports, which according to the <a href="https://www.bitre.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/asf_2016_17.pdf">Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics</a> accounted for 98 per cent of international trade through Australian ports by volume in FY 2016–17. However, the export share of sea freight for the same period by value was only 57 per cent, reflecting the large share of resources that are exported. The table below summarises some of the key ports by state or territory and their plans to meet forecasted growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/622/1*VSbZ3Sg-NVxNEp-R9VZLQg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/622/1*6H28KKno1d0KN5m4DvEtXg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Airports</strong></p><p>The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development is responsible for the regulation of ownership and control of airports formerly owned by the Commonwealth. A <a href="https://infrastructure.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-International-Airfreight-Indicator-digital.pdf">report</a> commissioned by the Department indicated that Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth airports accounted for 96 per cent of international trade by volume in FY 2018/19.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/622/1*8k_HlY6IfKVIYS36o1wmIw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86868c5c6f01" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trade our way out of the COVID-19 economic downturn]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/trade-our-way-out-of-the-covid-19-economic-downturn-c68cb670c83?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c68cb670c83</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2020 23:27:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-14T23:27:08.392Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*dqlliWCjp877nZAjRkJ9OA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>June Ma, Rohan Pitchford, and Rabee Tourky</em></p><p><em>Abridged version was published </em><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trading-our-way-out-covid-19-lockdown"><em>here</em></a><em>. The Interpreter Lowy Institute</em></p><p>Public health authorities around the world have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by requiring people to isolate. This policy is based on models in epidemiological statistics in which the rate of new infections is reduced by limiting close contact between people. In many countries, the intervention appears to be quite effective at limiting human-to-human transmission of the virus. However, neither public health nor epidemiological experts have the tools to help us emerge from the economic crisis that has arisen from government lockdowns.</p><p>To emerge in the best way possible requires us to understand the nature of the economic crisis. Our slowdown has arisen from deliberately-introduced frictions in human interaction at local, regional and international levels. While people remain able to trade in many kinds of goods, commodities, and some services (e.g. delivery), they are impeded from trading in things that require physical closeness to others or to objects and surfaces that others have touched.</p><p>In many countries businesses that involve physical proximity — such as pubs and galleries — are shut down by edict, and their workers are asked to isolate in their homes. Introduced frictions, additionally, go well beyond shuttering business. We can sell our houses and buy classic cars with the proceeds, but inspecting homes or cars in person is now difficult; losing us the crucial added value of salesmanship. We are able to give online lectures, but face-to-face lectures and tutorials are generally banned — suppressing the value added of live performance by charismatic speakers. Access to public transport is restricted making workers’ journey from home to job more expensive. In some cities, authorities allow robots to deliver goods and ban delivery by humans. Public auctions are banned, but online auctions are not, shutting down specific labour of highly talented auctioneers who have mastered the art of selling. Executives are no longer able to travel internationally to strike the “deal of the century,” which requires sustained proximate interaction with counterparts (and coffee or alcohol). Successful managers who have honed their interpersonal skills are unable to manage large teams in open work space in person.</p><p>At the international level, most human mobility has been essentially halted. In some countries this has occurred at a regional level. This has occurred even while the ability to trade in most goods and commodities has been retained locally and internationally. Restrictions on human mobility and interaction will be tightened and eased by medical authorities as time goes by, depending on infection data. While this happens, there will be goods, commodities and services that can be traded without hindrance by health restrictions.</p><p>The only real exit strategy available to us is based on a fundamental principle of economics: we trade our way out. We should remove all barriers to trade in the goods and services that are not affected by the cycles of health restrictions. Free trade in unrestricted activities and goods at local, regional and international levels is essential.</p><p>Now is the worst time possible for trade wars and protectionism, either within or between countries. This is no time for trade barriers or preferential subsidies for local producers. It is time for governments around the world to take a hard look at industry that can export despite health restrictions, and remove all barriers to such activity. If people are unable to travel from one city to another, even in the same country, then governments should encourage free trade between the cities by providing cheap trade infrastructure. Countries such as Australia should encourage the export of food e.g. to Germany and other places and in return they can import ventilators and trucks. Now is the worst time for failed notions of self sufficiency, food security and import substitution by means of subsidies for local producers. Trade barriers are a sure way of achieving a prolonged recession due to the pandemic.</p><p>In short, governments who are spending trillions of dollars fighting the economic effects of the public health lockdowns should be building trade infrastructure between their cities and connecting them to the rest of the world. Improve ports and airports, even though they may presently be empty. Improve rail for the transport of goods. Improve roads between major cities, widen them to allow heavy traffic by trucks.</p><p>And finally, be aware that trade protectionists will sabotage our economic recovery using any excuse they can, including false claims about health effects and the public interest. They will see the pandemic as an opportunity to distort trade to their advantage.</p><p><em>Rabee Tourky is the Director of the Research School of Economics at the Australian National University and The Trevor Swan Distinguished Professor of Economics. His interest has been the operations of markets and market incompleteness.</em></p><p><em>Rohan Pitchford is a Professor of Economics in the Research School of Economics, currently working on securitisation and financial stability. He has published papers on the economics of contracts, default and sovereign debt in the leading journals in Economics. He is a graduate from MIT.</em></p><p><em>June Ma, is a pre-doctoral researcher at the Australian National University</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c68cb670c83" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Plan for unlocking the Australian economy during the COVID-19 mobility lockdowns]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/plan-for-unlocking-the-australian-economy-during-the-covid-19-mobility-lockdowns-9566af616564?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9566af616564</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2020 02:44:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-13T07:58:21.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/559/1*V-GRp8ZoqIm3ffnpAnGreA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Plan for unlocking the Australian economy during the COVID-19 mobility lockdowns</strong></p><p>Steven Roberts and Rabee Tourky</p><p>We provide our thoughts on a plan for unlocking productivity within the Australian economy during the COVID-19 lockdown.</p><p>Given the remoteness of any treatment for infections, Australia will need a strategy for ratcheting up economic activity once COVID-19 transmissions have been initially controlled. The plan we present anticipates a prolonged response to the pandemic that extends until treatments are found, possibly 18 months or more. We also assume that Australia will shortly, if not already, have the COVID-19 outbreak under control, and that this provides an opportunity to unlock the economy in a controlled manner with levers that can be readily applied. Our plan aims to restart the economy while providing levers for health authorities to keep the outbreak controlled — keeping the infection rate in check, reducing death rates, and achieving any other objectives that may arise during the health crisis.</p><p>In another recent informal note, “Trading our way out of the COVID-19 economic downturn”, June Ma, Rohan Pitchford and Rabee Tourky suggest that the economic slowdown in economies during the COVID-19 crisis “has arisen from deliberately introduced frictions in human interaction at local, regional and international levels” and that “the only real exit strategy available to us is based on a fundamental principle of economics: we trade our way out.”</p><p>The main insight that we draw on here is that there are situations where restrictions on human mobility do not matter for economic outcomes. To understand this — and the motivation for our plan — consider a thought experiment. There are two population centres in the same country. If labour can move from one to another, then one expects that wages for the same kind of job will be equal between the two. This is because workers will have an incentive to migrate from a centre that has lower wages to a centre that has higher wages. What happens when the government restricts this migration between the two population centres? Will the wages be different between the two regions? Basically, the answer depends on whether a highway and railway connect the two population centres, allowing for low-cost, unimpeded trade between the regions. Indeed, the answer to these questions hinges on the ability of the regions to trade with each other in goods and whether the two regions have access to the same technologies. Theoretically, the Lerner-Samuelson factor price equalization theorem tells us that even if humans are unable to move between the two regions, free trade in goods between the regions equalises wages (and equalises the rent from capital). The economic outcome is unchanged from a situation with full human mobility. A more sophisticated theoretical models, which take into account geography, multiple population centres, and amenities, can be found in many recent papers on internal migration and trade (see, for example, <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151507">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151507</a>). Though there are important exceptions to the factor price equalisation theorem, the spirit of the theorem is maintained in many settings: <em>trade ameliorates the negative economic consequences of restrictions on human mobility between economic centres and can theoretically eliminate all its negative economic effects.</em> Lack of mobility has other obvious impacts, but here we are focussing purely on economic consequences.</p><p>Our proposal is to put the insights of this thought experiment into practice:</p><ol><li>Locally within Australia, take a geographic rather than an industry- or state-wide approach to the lockdown strategy, allowing for extensive local commerce between economic regions.</li><li>Australia should also extensively promote international exports and invest in infrastructure for this while maintaining general international travel bans.</li></ol><p>We divide our plan into two sections: a sustainable local strategy, and a strategy for enhancing international trade.</p><p><strong>Free commerce and mobility restrictions within Australia</strong></p><p><em>Economic regions defined by combing electoral boundaries:</em></p><p><em>Status quo mobility across regions is maintained, soft lockdown regime implemented within regions (social distancing, bans on large gatherings, etc), and, importantly, facilitated free commerce between regions.</em></p><p>Our proposal is to partition Australia (or partition each of its states) into economic regions and impose two classes of lockdowns, one across regions and the other within regions:</p><ol><li>Strong mobility restrictions across regions: Lockdown across regions maintains the status quo on April 10 in Australia. The present strong restrictions on mobility between regions is maintained.</li><li>Weak restrictions on mobility within regions: Human mobility within each economic region will, by default, be weakly restricted — broadly akin to the Swedish style of soft lockdown model (e.g., <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-07/coronavirus-sweden-adopting-more-flexible-approach/12118422">https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-07/coronavirus-sweden-adopting-more-flexible-approach/12118422</a>) [We are not generally advocating a Swedish-like approach. We are, however, advocating a loose lockdown approach within regions where COVID-19 transmission has been eradicated or controlled to the satisfaction of health authorities.]</li><li>Free commerce, including delivery services, across all regions — and infrastructure investment aimed at encouraging this.</li></ol><p>The main planning task is the geographic partition of regions. How should an economic region be defined? We propose the use of electoral boundaries for this purpose. Up to five federal neighbouring electorates would be combined to form one economic region. For example,</p><ol><li>ACT, SA, NT, and TAS each form their own economic regions.</li><li>QLD is divided into six economic regions, separating the Gold Coast and the Sunshine Coast from Brisbane.</li><li>Victoria is divided into eight economic regions of contiguous units, greater Melbourne city comprising three of these.</li><li>NSW is partitioned into ten economic regions; and WA, four.</li></ol><p>Data regarding COVID-19 infections is regularly sampled in each economic region, and cross-region restrictions are eased or strengthened accordingly. Two neighbouring regions in which the virus has been eradicated or effectively controlled will have unrestricted mobility. If the infection growth in one region increases, then cross-region mobility is restricted. Individuals who would ordinarily leave their economic region for work, school, etc, would work from home and conduct schooling online, respectively, until the restrictions are eased.</p><p>This has the following advantage:</p><ol><li>Electoral rolls allow us to associate each adult Australian citizen with one electorate, thus making lockdown restriction enforceable. Enforcement involves fines for businesses allowing workers not registered to be on premises and police patrols of roads connecting economic regions.</li><li>Most people live and work in one or neighbouring electorates.</li><li>Most people’s supportive social networks are within one or two proximate electorates.</li><li>Political competition within Australia is such that most electorates have access to the same state and federal government services. Further, the retail arms of governments have a presence in every electorate or neighbouring electorate.</li><li>Any sampling of infection data can be easily done within each electorate, and hence each economic region. We are used to sampling all sorts of information within electorates, and there is a large industry of pollsters and surveyors who understand the demographics of these regions. The commercial polling infrastructure can be tasked with collecting infection data.</li></ol><p>For this plan to work, it is crucial that the government improves roads between economic regions for the purpose of transporting goods and commodities. Free, low-cost trade between neighbouring economic regions is a must. The plan hinges on free trade across economic regions without free mobility of humans.</p><p><strong>Strategies for enhancing international trade</strong></p><p>We anticipate that international travel will be impeded far longer than restrictions on local travel. This is because infection numbers and their growth in Australia have been small relative to our main trade partners’ and relative to the tourist destinations favoured by Australian tourists.</p><p>International trade is traditionally divided into two components: trade in goods and commodities ( e.g., iron ore exports and import of cars), and trade in services (e.g., education export, international tourists [tourism exports], and tourism imports [Australians holidaying overseas]).</p><p>The objective of our plan is to enhance unimpeded trade in commodities and goods, and to support the export industries in the service sector, anticipating a strong lockdown of the service import industry [a ban on Australians traveling overseas for a holiday]. We anticipate a prolonged ban on all short-term travel, including tourism, in either direction. Under our model, domestic tourism is allowed across economic regions when they are open.</p><p>However, Australia imports human capital by way of migration and work visas. We also export education. Both of these activities involve long stays in Australia. They have a persistent positive effect on the Australian economy, and we do not see a reason that they cannot be facilitated. International travel involving moving to Australia for more than a year can be viewed as no different from international trade in commodities. If managed well, it is sustainable.</p><p>Exporting of education (e.g., students travelling to Australia for study) and importing of human capital (e.g., workers on long-term visas) are allowed under strict protocols to stop imported cases of COVID-19. These exports and imports are extremely important to our economy and culture, and it is vital they are re-started in a controlled manner. Similar to what the Government has implemented for Australians returning home, people in these two groups could travel en-masse to Australia and then be subject to a period of quarantine. We propose that this export and import be only from countries that have COVID-19 controlled and strict protocols that incorporate medical tests pre- and post- travel would need to be developed by health experts. While we are not experts, we believe that the risk of this process would be small, certainly, and necessarily, less than the current quarantine process for Australian’s returning from abroad or from cruise ships.</p><p><em>Steven Roberts is a Professor of Statistics and Dean of the College of Business and Economics</em></p><p><em>Rabee Tourky is the Trevor Swan Distinguished Professor of Economics, and Director of the Research School of Economics</em></p><p><em>Australian National University</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9566af616564" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Economics of the war on Australian undergraduates [Sept 2015]]]></title>
            <link>https://rabeetourky.medium.com/economics-of-the-war-on-australian-undergraduates-sept-2015-8c647fbb46a?source=rss-dfa1b1ad1be7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c647fbb46a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[che]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rabee Tourky]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2020 08:56:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-09T08:58:16.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>BY <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160227113114/http://economics.com.au/author/rabee-tourky/">RABEE TOURKY</a> ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 · <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160227113114/http://economics.com.au/2015/09/17/economics-of-the-war-on-australian-undergraduates/#wp-comments">24 COMMENTS</a></p><p><em>NOTES: This is a </em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160227113114/http://economics.com.au/2015/09/17/economics-of-the-war-on-australian-undergraduates/"><em>post</em></a><em> written following the 2014 federal budget announcement, we opposed the budgetary measure for the higher education sector, which was aimed at maintaining the income contingent loan scheme for student fees (paid by students and government) and at the same time have universities set the fees. We anticipated that this will incentivise universities in bad ways. Thankfully, the scheme proposed by the government and supported by universities was not implemented.</em></p><p>An issue that has perplexed me over the last few weeks is why do the top universities in Australia continue teaching Australian undergraduates when the fees they get from these undergraduates are far lower than foreign fees. Further, there is no doubt in my mind that given the intense competition for hugely expensive research prestige; top Australian universities will be focused on maximising profit in their undergraduate production activity.</p><p>Let’s look at some (simplifying) features of the market for undergraduate education:</p><ol><li>Australian universities are essentially price takers when it comes to the fees they charge international undergraduate students. So we are in a classical small open economy setting, which we may reasonably assume is perfectly competitive.</li><li>The international price for undergraduate degrees is higher than the equilibrium local price that would emerge in the counterfactual closed economy setting. So education is an export market.</li><li>All Australian undergraduate fees are channeled through the HECS income contingent scheme. This tells us that local demand for undergraduate degrees is not price sensitive and can in the (relevant region) be taken to be perfectly price inelastic. An important feature of income contingent schemes.</li><li>The supply curve for undergraduate education is strictly upward sloping. Indicating increasing marginal cost of educating undergraduates (basically this is not a capacity constraints model with perfectly elastic supply or perfectly inelastic supply). I’d venture the view that supply is presently in the inelastic region.</li></ol><p>I’ll look at three situations, two of which compete in my mind for models representing what we presently have (which of the two fits better is one of those rare empirical questions that embarrassingly rear their heads in economics because of indeterminacy of modelling).</p><p><strong>A. Deregulated HECS fees (Pyne May 2014)</strong></p><p>A world with deregulated fees can be described by the following demand-supply diagram that appears in various contexts in first year economics classes (outside the US I guess, because I don’t think that anyone there is interested in small open economies):</p><ul><li><em>In a setting where HECS fees are unregulated Australian students pay the same as international students for their degrees, and that price is set by international markets. All demand by Australian students is met, and the number of international students is determined by the marginal cost of educating them and world prices.</em></li></ul><p><strong>B. Demand driven system with capped fees (one version of the status-quo since 2012)</strong></p><p>Here the government caps fees charged to local students. The government imposes a price ceiling for domestic prices, which at present can be around one fourth of international prices. This is similar to the kinds of price ceilings in Venezuela on the domestic prices of exportable goods such as petrol and toilet paper. As in Venezuela the expectation is that local suppliers will want to shift all supply to the export market.</p><ul><li><em>One anticipates that Universities will want to reduce the number of low-fee paying domestic places and specialise exclusively in international student education. So like Venezuela we are likely to see acute shortage in undergraduate education for local students.</em></li></ul><p><strong>C. Demand driven system with capped fees and forced supply (second version of the status-quo since 2012)</strong></p><p>As mentioned above, there is no explicit minimum quota on the number of Australian undergraduates that a university must educate. So a university can, thinking hypothetically, reduce the number of Australian undergraduate place to zero (unlike the situation of a public hospital that may wish to specialise in providing care to private patients).</p><p>So imagine for now a move to force universities to educate Australian undergraduates. That is force universities to supply Australian undergraduate education at the same level as they would have had they been able to increase local fees to international levels. This is illustrated below in our diagram:</p><ul><li><em>With forced supply the university teaches the same number of local and international students as it would have in a deregulated market. Further, because the local demand curve is perfectly inelastic (due to HECS), forced supply results in a subsidy to local students (indicated by area A) and no deadweight loss (no efficiency loss).</em></li></ul><p>For an economist the most alluring feature of the income contingent loan system is precisely the price insensitivity of demand under HECS. This allows subsidies (as above) that are not associated with efficiency losses (yuck).</p><p><strong>A source of forced supply</strong></p><p>Unfortunately, there is no explicit minimum quota for the number of Australian undergraduate places in Australian universities. Thus, I am perplexed. What is the mechanism of forced supply in our system? The only indirect mechanism that I am aware of is the following rule, which appears to be a social contract between Universities and the Australian public:</p><ul><li><em>A University must admit an Australian undergraduate if their high school score is higher than the high school score (equivalent score) of an admitted international student.</em></li></ul><p>Thus, if a university prevents an Australian undergraduate from enrolling in a degree, it must prevent any less qualified international undergraduate from enrolling.</p><p>The obvious corollary is that a senior university administrator seeking to shift university education to more lucrative markets has one of two choices:</p><ol><li>Break the nexus between the quality of the marginal international undergraduate student and the marginal Australian undergraduate. That is, admit lower quality international students and demand higher quality Australian students.</li><li>Shift education at the University away from undergraduate degrees placing an emphasis on fee paying masters degrees. Thus undermining our decades old free education system.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c647fbb46a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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