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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Raphaël Vinot on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Raphaël Vinot on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Raphaël Vinot on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Diversify your conference!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t/diversify-your-conference-8d3d1b0c5c0e?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sexism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conference]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphaël Vinot]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Sep 2019 20:46:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-22T20:46:46.692Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UUdIBArsN8cWLxyn9ZwUvw.jpeg" /><figcaption>looking for more diversity (by <a href="https://medium.com/u/f7b49040f032">Alexandre Dulaunoy</a> — <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/adulau/30887789487/in/photolist-8JwWux-P4rZGB-GxKv5-5Ytu2A">https://www.flickr.com/photos/adulau/30887789487</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4>Ideas for conference organisers</h4><p>Organising a conference is not an easy task; there are a lot of moving parts. Making sure attendees, speakers, sponsors, hotel staff, and other organisers have a good time is difficult. Over the last 6 years I have been involved in the organisation of <a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a>, a technical information security conference during the 3rd week of October every year. Over the last few years, we have learned a lot, especially about making the conference more welcoming for underrepresented communities (aka anyone who is not a wealthy white man). To give you an idea of where we started from, our main initiative at the beginning was to say “<em>the CFP was open to everyone, and you’re all welcome to submit a proposal</em>”.</p><p>… yeah, that didn’t exactly work.</p><p>Not because there are no woman doing great technical work and able to give a talk, but because if there are virtually no women on stage giving a talk, any woman proposing a talk may be the only one, and that is a shitty position to be in. The attendees will, consciously or not, see the talk as “<em>the talk of the person from that underrepresented community</em>”, no matter how good the content.</p><p>That’s a vicious cycle the conference had to break out of. In the past few years, we changed quite a few things to make the conference more welcoming to a broader set of people, and I want to share that experience with other conference organisers, and also get more ideas.</p><p>Before going into more details, it is important to give you a bit more context regarding the conference, because lots of the ideas may not apply in other contexts. <a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a> is the biggest (~400 attendees) and longest running information security conference in Luxembourg. The 15th edition will take place from the 22nd until the 24th of October 2019.</p><p><a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a> is a non-profit conference, which means that it’s the attendees buying tickets that covers our costs, such as booking conference rooms, lunches, and travel and hotel expenses of the speakers. We do not pay our speakers, but try to make sure they don’t lose (too much) money by coming to Luxembourg.</p><p>The first aspect of a conference you can have an impact on as an organiser is the one you have the most control over: the speakers.</p><p>The most important thing, especially at the beginning, was to find people from underrepresented communities. As I am a white dude in a community full of white dudes, I had no automatic access to the right people. At that point, <a href="https://medium.com/u/ea3e87d12f62">Quinn Norton</a> helped me a lot because she’s involved with a wide range of groups, and that was of great help to bootstrap connections. Around the same time, I got to know <a href="https://twitter.com/pinkflawd">Marion Marschalek</a>, who then started <a href="https://www.blackhoodie.re/">Blackhoodie</a>, a free, women only reverse engineering workshop.</p><p>I can only strongly recommend that you find your own Quinn and Marion, because sadly enough, I’ve been informed that they don’t scale… 😕</p><p>The first two important things I learned are:</p><ol><li>When you start asking if people would be interested in giving a talk to your conference, and the answer is no, try to figure out why. A “<em>no</em>” one year may turn in a “<em>yes</em>” the next one, especially if you solve the problems in the meantime.</li><li>Don’t ever say “<em>Hey, you’re a woman/person of colour/sexual orientation, wanna give a talk?</em>”. First of all because that’s a terrible thing to say, and you’re not asking them for that reason, you’re asking them because you like their work, and you went out of your white-dude-sphere to find it. Also, doing this won’t work, because if you reach out to someone on, for instance, Twitter, you should assume they have a crazy agenda and get similar requests multiple times a week. So you have to do your homework, and come with a reason they would consider saying yes. Which means that you at least come with a topic for the talk that demonstrates you have done your homework.</li></ol><blockquote>TL;DR: Do your homework.</blockquote><p>As soon as you’re in touch with communities you want to see more present at your events, it is a lot easier to ask directly if they would be up for proposing a paper. It is a lot less work for everyone else involved:</p><ol><li>You don’t have to reach out to specific people.</li><li>As some people in these communities know you, they can also confirm you’re not a creep.</li></ol><p>I love the <a href="https://www.blackhoodie.re/">Blackhoodie</a> initiative, they do amazing work in changing the face of the information security community at large (and the dynamic of their sessions is a thing I’ve never seen anywhere else, ❤). And I’m not going to lie: from the beginning it was clear to me that supporting it would help us, at <a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a>, to get more diverse speakers and attendees. This year will be the second time we have the chance to host a <a href="https://www.blackhoodie.re/">Blackhoodie</a> event the same week as the main conference, and we hope to be able to do it again in the future.<br>Last year, we were able to offer all <a href="https://www.blackhoodie.re/">Blackhoodie</a> attendees a diversity scholarship (more on that later). We hope to get sponsoring again this year to cover it again (<strong>wink</strong> <strong>wink</strong>).</p><p>Next step, after you managed to invite a few speakers (in a non-creepy way), your CFP is over, and you need to choose the talks.</p><p>The most important thing to keep in mind: it is your conference, you’re the one throwing it, you accept whomever you want to accept, and you’re going to shape your schedule to reflect your goals. For example, if you have two talks on a similar topic or similarly reviewed, you may prefer the less represented speaker (and often less popular and well known, because of a history of exclusion). It might mean that you will reject a known good speaker, or a friend, and give a chance to someone you don’t know yet. Doing otherwise amounts to recapitulating the gate-keeping that got us conferences full of white men and little else. It doesn’t mean your friend or that well known speaker isn’t awesome, it just means seeing a little less of them on the stage.</p><p>Regarding the way you handle the travel for speakers, the most important thing is to listen. If you make it clear that you’re listening, your speakers will tell you things you forgot or didn’t know about. The earlier they explain their situation, the less stress you, and they, will have. If you suspect that one of your speakers is struggling, ask them what would make their life easier so they can come and give their talk in the best possible condition.</p><p>Which leads to the next point: you need a good travel agent. Someone able to find cheap, multi-city, reasonable, and weird flights. Someone that works fast, and follows your specs. Because a new speaker doesn’t travel as often as you probably do, as the kind of person organising a conference. Don’t give them the 6am flight with a 30 min connection in CDG, especially if they ask for it because that’s the cheapest option and they’re trying to be nice. (And one thing about getting diverse speakers, they’re almost always really nice! Sometimes too nice!)</p><p>There are a few things regarding the way we handle the expenses of our speakers. The default approach is to let them book and pay for their travel, and reimburse after the conference. The reason is simple: covering the travel costs for all the speakers before the attendees buy their tickets is a lot and we simply cannot afford to do that. But if the speaker doesn’t have a couple thousand euros pocket money to spend upfront, it will go on the credit card, and they will lose money on the trip — or they cannot afford the trip at all. In order to limit this problem, we do our best to reimburse the speakers within a month after the conference at the latest. It means that we have a form ready for all the speakers so they can fill it out and give us all the information we need to reimburse them, and then we process it quickly.</p><p>One thing that can reduce travel cost, and is always appreciated, is to be flexible on the dates of the trip, and the amount of nights you cover at the hotel. It is especially useful if you get a good deal with the hotel your speakers stay at, or if they have local friends to stay with.</p><p>You can, for example, suggest that you will cover a couple extra nights if they come from far away so they don’t speak with too much jet-lag. You can also offer an extra night if a flight the day after the expected one is cheaper. Everyone likes a holiday, and Luxembourg is fun to visit.</p><figure><img alt="View of the Neumünster Abbey from up town." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jj3bCT3gcPbYPcuF3N2CwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Look, pretty. (Picture by <a href="https://medium.com/u/ea3e87d12f62">Quinn Norton</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Give them the last call tho: that cool looking flight with a somewhat tight connection on the way back you considered as a potential extra day holiday on the airline expenses but collides with the exams on the other side of the planet the week after will not happen.</p><p>If you can, you should offer (on a case by case basis) to cover the travel expenses directly, because you cannot expect a speaker without access to cash to be even more broke after they give a talk for free to your conference.</p><p>Last year, we decided to work on the other (and more tricky) problem with tech conference diversity: the attendees.</p><p>As we cover the expenses of our speakers, but don’t want to rely heavily on sponsors, still provide food for everyone, and have quite a few other expenses, <a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a> is a paid conference. We are working hard on keeping the early bird tickets below 500€ but we’re conscious that even if it is a price someone working in the infosec industry won’t find particularly high, it is a definitive no-go for lots of people.</p><p>The main option we had for a long time was to allow students or people without industry-standard income to attend the conference with student tickets, for about half the price of the standard ticket. It helps, but still requires them to be able to afford 4 days off, the travel, and the lodging in Luxembourg. That will be around 800€ for the week if you come from western Europe.</p><p>Definitely not an option for a lot of people.</p><p>(Note that the student ticket doesn’t cover our costs. We lose money on them, and try to make sure they’re not overused by people who could afford the normal price.)</p><p>We also try to accept requests from a few people telling us they cannot afford the ticket at all and are ready to help us with the logistics at the event itself. That week will still cost them at least 500€ for travel and hotel, and we have no way to help.</p><p>Last year, we decided to try diversity scholarships. The scholarships include the stay at the hotel and a conference ticket. Exceptionally, we also covered the travel.</p><p>We asked sponsors for help and got 17 packages covered. That was a first and we were very excited about it. We also learned a lot in the process.</p><p>If you want to do something similar, the first question you need to ask yourself is: What can you cover with scholarships?</p><ul><li>If you can only cover the conference ticket, you will only have locals.</li><li>If you only cover conference ticket and hotel, you will mainly have people at train/bus distance.</li><li>If you cover the travel, it can get very expensive.</li></ul><p>We ball-parked the price of the package of the conference and the hotel stay, and added 30%. We didn’t cover the travel by default because it would have been too expensive. But we also explained that we would consider it on a case by case basis, and made it clear that if everyone asked for it, it would reduce the number of people we could support.</p><p>Last year, all the funding for scholarships came from sponsors. It worked very well, and everyone who asked for one was able to come. This year, we barely managed to get any. They’re starting to come in, but it is extremely limited.</p><p>So we’re trying something new: asking the attendees too. Because at the end, a more diverse crowd makes for better and more interesting and challenging conversations in the hallway track as well as the main room. It is now possible for the people buying a ticket to make an extra donation, but it wasn’t clear enough and very few did so until now. We will try to do better this year if we can, but more probably, next year we’ll ask more vehemently for attendees to support the initiative.</p><p>A few other important things to consider regarding the attendees you will invite with the scholarships: the scholarships come with a whole other set of constraints you definitely want to be aware of.</p><p>For example, most of them will be inexperienced travellers and have no idea how visa processes work (borders are the worst). That’s why you want to figure out as early as possible where the scholarship attendees are coming from, and lookup the potential visa requirements yourself, especially if they’re not available in English. Involving a non-western person from the organisation team would be a good idea if possible.<br>The embassy delivering the visa will often call you and ask questions about the reasons you gave an invitation letter, what your conference is, and what you’re covering from the costs. Make sure to inform the attendee about these points, so your answers are the same as theirs.</p><p>If you cover and book the travel, figure out which countries are okay to connect through (US and UK are never okay, requiring a difficult transit visa). That good travel agent you already found for your speakers comes in handy here, the requests will be weird, last minute and change 3 times, and it won’t be anyone’s fault — borders are the worst.</p><p>The time difference is your enemy when you book travel last minute for someone on a very different timezone: make sure you have a copy of their passport and visa as early as possible so you can answer the questions your travel agent will have without loosing a day each time. Your budget will probably be even more tight than for the speakers, but it is even more important that you do not book the same super short connections you might for yourself: inexperienced travellers cannot make an international connection in FRA in 40 min, especially if they have an interesting visa situation.</p><p>If the connection is very long, make sure the attendee has a place to stay, possibly at a local friend’s place. (Often people have networks you can tap, and there’s no harm in asking.)</p><p>There will be last minute booking problems, and you can only handle them if you have the 30% extra funding ready to throw at the problem. Don’t cut the corners on the funding you ask for from your sponsors, it will end badly.</p><p>You need to make sure everyone has a place to stay, have some flexibility in the amount of nights you say you cover at the hotel: no surprise invoice for the attendees is acceptable. If the conference takes place in a country where costs of life are expensive, you need to have a rough idea of the financial situation of the country where the attendee comes from, and figure out if they need help to cover cabs or food, for example.</p><p>You should assume that everyone coming from outside of the Schengen Area, or the US, needs an invitation letter. Or more generally, almost anyone who isn’t white. Yes, it’s racism, and you may find that you need to advocate for your attendee before and during your conference. It is good to have an invitation letter template ready, and you may need to speak to a border agent when they enter the Schengen area — make sure they’ve got phone numbers and addresses with them when they’re travelling.</p><p>One last very important point: if you’ve starting to change the culture in your community, and the team you’re organising the conference with, you cannot expect to get everything right immediately. It will never go fast enough for your taste, and it can be frustrating, but you need to work with what you got. Changing culture is playing a long game. Point out the good outcomes to your colleagues, show what worked, accept what doesn’t work, improve over time.</p><p>And then, within a few iterations, you will have more people from underrepresented communities proposing talks because you will get a good reputation, and people talk about that. Slowly but surely, choosing new speakers will be the default. Getting to know new people is fun, bringing new ideas. One of the selfish reasons to throw a conference is to be able to talk and exchange ideas. Doing so with the same people all the time is boring.</p><p>Over multiple years, it will turn out to be a lot easier to have a diverse lineup, and you will barely have to reach out. We are slowly getting there at <a href="https://hack.lu/">Hack.lu</a>, at least on the gender diversity front. We are still struggling to have people of colour, and people from non-western cultures. And a more diverse organisation team. And a more diverse review committee. These are problems we’re aware of, and we’re now working on them. As I said, you won’t get everything right at once!</p><p><em>This piece is kind of a follow-up on “</em><a href="https://medium.com/@rafi0t/on-trying-to-be-better-men-227d2aad6670"><em>On trying to be better men</em></a><em>”, if you read all the way down here, you might be interested.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d3d1b0c5c0e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Trying to be Better Men]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t/on-trying-to-be-better-men-227d2aad6670?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/227d2aad6670</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[white-privilege]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sexism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[men]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphaël Vinot]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2017 16:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-08T14:25:03.649Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qbzjs85i5xoUMbHs76bksw.jpeg" /><figcaption>White men, White men everywhere. (<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/22351482072/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/22351482072/</a> — CC BY NC)</figcaption></figure><p>I am a middle class, straight, white, European, 30 year-old man with a steady job in information security. I tick all the boxes on the privilege list. I studied in an almost all male environment, and never asked myself why. Women were always the exception, and I never thought I had anything to do with that. I was wrong. Duh. I am part of the problem. Re-duh.</p><p>I don’t know how to fix anything. This piece is as much questions as answers, a request for suggestions as much as a call to action. This is where I am now in, trying to deal with the bigotry of my industry, as someone who has never directly experienced it.</p><p>Don’t be mistaken, I’ve been one of the people blaming women for not being more present. Why would it be any different? I didn’t meet more than half a dozen women in computer science before I was 22. It took me even longer to notice people of color weren’t present. To me, this seemed natural, because it was the way it always was.<br> <br>What changed? Hanging out with women speaking English, when I barely spoke it. That’s a good way to listen, and not say a word, even asking questions, which is good. The first questions you’re going to ask are stupid. Women in the field who are cool being visible, and talking in this crowd, have already answered your questions, or heard your comments, dozens of times. If you just let them finish their point, you will often realize you had nothing to contribute to the conversation.</p><p>This is probably the first thing we, white males, need to learn: to not hijack every space we’re in, and quietly listen.</p><p>The second one is to stop thinking everyone lives life like a white dude. For example: “<em>but she could simply propose a talk to my conference, we’re open to everyone</em>” may mean for her: “<em>I need to figure out if this conference I’ve never heard about is run by a creep who may try to grope me, and I’m on a deadline, who knows when I’ll have time to research that</em>”.</p><p>That’s not a thing most, if any, of us dudes have to figure out before submitting a paper.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ZZwcx6q-WNmk0bhuHuAqg.jpeg" /><figcaption>White men not really looking up. (<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/14240000515">https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/14240000515</a> — CC BY NC)</figcaption></figure><p>The same way we’re always saying things like “<em>think like the attacker</em>”, we need to think like the people left out of the room. Try to imagine what it’s like to be a person of color in an overwhelmingly white environment, or a woman walking up the center of a room with 3000 people, including over 2800+ men, looking on the whole time you’re walking up.</p><p>Over the last few years, I’ve seen many friends evolving from saying things like “<em>but we’re open to everyone</em>”, to quietly listening. The new trend I’ve seen this year is some men unironically asking out loud if they are assholes. (Spoiler: yeah.)</p><p>It only happens in small mostly male crowds, in environments they trust. It is an interesting thing to observe. Looking back at their behavior in the past 20 years, picking up moments where they’ve been inappropriate, and slowly understanding it.</p><p>At this point, they’re rightfully freaking out, and not defending their actions. They’re just having a meltdown.</p><p>Why am I not giving names? These men are having legit meltdowns, in rooms they trust, because they are sexist. They are realizing they’ve made women uncomfortable in the past, and maybe worse. That realization may be the best chance right now to make this environment less toxic. It is not a free pass. They don’t get a cookie, and they are still dicks. But it’s not just about them, or me, it’s about the future of the environment.</p><p>I believe, I hope, these moments are the most effective way to have a productive conversation. And they are best kept between the people who need to get the work done: The White Dudes. Because nobody else needs to hear that crap again. You’ve heard all of it, you’ve read it in the comments, you’ve seen it in the workplace, way too many times. This is literally our problem, and we need to fix it.</p><p>Those conversations are not the most pleasant ones, because depending on the context, the social position of the participants, and the amount of booze consumed (because of course there’s booze), the come-to-Jesus conversation can go many different ways. It can be anything from quietly listening to someone threatening to beat the shit out of you on the sidewalk in front of the bar if you’re not saying he’s a good guy after all. Or a man could try to get the only woman at the table to agree with him. That can be super awkward, when said woman is an employee or coworker.</p><p>This is why I don’t necessarily call out my sexist peers immediately when they are being obnoxious in open environments. Context matters. I don’t want to be in a position where a female employee has to pick a side between me confronting her boss, and her day job. I’m not the one at risk, she is. Those situations need to be diffused, and it’s not my place to decide when a woman should have to confront a sexist workplace.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ll2HvSgIj3ZnThvg2asw2w.jpeg" /><figcaption>The diversity of white men. (<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/15757286999/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/15757286999/</a> — CC BY NC)</figcaption></figure><p>Right now we’re not in a position where we can seriously imagine having a black woman, fresh out of school, joining a group of white infosec dudes at an after party (even though that’s where the most interesting conversations really happen). It would be a disaster, and I’m ashamed and angry about that. The only women who will come back are used to the environment, or often shielded by friends. Why would they come back? I’ll only feel comfortable inviting women to an after party if I make sure they realize what is going on, and that there will be sexism and/or racism. But that also means I struggle with leaving women out of where the real community is.</p><p>How do I invite more people I want to see in my community without endangering them? How do I take responsibility, when I can’t be sure they will be safe? I want to see my community become diverse, and we need it, because we need more people in the field, because cyber cyber is a shit show and we need more competent people building the infrastructure of security. Because diverse people have diverse answers to diverse problems, and we keep making the same mistakes over and over again. No matter how you cut it, excluding more than half of the workforce is just plain stupid.</p><p>But just putting them in contact with the community without any change in how we socialize will be a disaster.</p><p>Yes, I am still hanging out with sexist dudes, including the unapologetic types. Why? Because they are a huge part of the community. They are a bad part, but they see me as one of them. I can stay in the room, and I’m not at risk. It is unpleasant, but not dangerous. Spotting the small fish, like a man a few years back who suggested to me that we organize a wet t-shirt contest because he found the speaker sexy. I made sure he wasn’t welcome at our conference anymore.</p><p>This is generally my approach: if I feel like the person won’t fix their behavior real fast, I will do my best to exclude them. They won’t speak at events I manage, I won’t send work their way, I won’t help them when they come to me with questions, I’ll warn other people to stay away from them, and I’ll keep an eye on events they participate in and people they work with. But I don’t know if that’s enough to fix the environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y0HM8NrUPK50Cg7tIbwDOQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>White men laptoping. (<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/14680795516/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/oreillyconf/14680795516/</a> — CC BY NC)</figcaption></figure><p>I’m cool being that white dude in the room getting the other white dudes to agree we have a problem with sexism and racism, calling them out. And I want to be able to stay in the loop enough to hear about abusers, and be able to help women in the future. But that means walking a knife’s edge. I don’t always know how to walk that edge. I’ve made mistakes, and will probably make more. If that happens, please tell me, be certain I won’t dismiss you.</p><p>I’m trying to find a balance that allows me to figure out who the abusers are, who is safe to introduce around, and who is not. I think this is an okay position to be in, but a hard position to keep. It sometimes seems like the more I try to help women, the less information I have to do it with.</p><p>I can publish this article without worrying about losing my job. I’m not worried about it damaging my career or reputation, or that I’ll be stalked or threatened. That is thanks to white male privilege, and I hope I am making decent use of it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=227d2aad6670" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[One’s  head in the lion’s mouth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t/ones-head-in-the-lions-mouth-ba48c2c82a8b?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba48c2c82a8b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphaël Vinot]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2014 10:20:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-02-03T19:14:45.767Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And finding the way out before he realizes.</h4><p>We are now reaching the last part of the trilogy aiming to help the journalists going to Sochi to understand <a href="https://medium.com/p/cf8f6a19eb77">what the network operators can do against them</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/p/85800cb9e848">how can a sports journalist cover the event without taking too much risks</a>.</p><p>This piece aims to help a journalist trying to cover the political situation and activities not supported by the Russian government.</p><p>First of all, let’s have a bit of context: you are a political journalist in your country, you cover the Russian democratur from the country you live in, you have sources in Russia and the Russian government knows you. You are on their lists, they want to know what you do, when, the peoples you speak with and the articles you want to publish. They might use those information to put people in jail, and to prepare press releases before you publish an article.</p><blockquote>I am not telling you anything new: it is going to be hard.</blockquote><p>I do not want to explain again what I already said in the previous pieces so here is a short list of recommendations that also apply to you:</p><ul><li>Assume your computer and all the system you connect to will be compromised at some point</li><li>If possible: use a dedicated hardware</li><li>Do not connect to critical systems, or use accounts with low privileges</li><li>Know your mobile phone is always a tracking device</li><li>Do not carry any unnecessary devices or data</li><li>Have a backup you have tried out and are sure you can restore from</li></ul><blockquote>But you know what you are doing, you know the people you want to speak with and you know which secure channels to use to communicate with them.</blockquote><p>What differentiates you from the sports journalist is that you can (or will have to) make a compromise between availability and security.</p><p>What you always have to keep in mind is that the information you want to protect will have different levels of security :</p><ul><li>Your location when you have a meeting with a source must not be known in real time (or within a few hours) by someone tracking you</li><li>The exact topic you are covering must not be public before the article is published or before you leave the country</li><li>The name of your source must never be known by anyone</li></ul><p>Then, depending on the story, as long as you manage to keep your secrets for the required time, you will be fine.</p><blockquote>It is all about your threat model: who is your attacker and what do you want to protect.</blockquote><p>I am going to cover the 3 threats I have mentioned and explain explains some of the issues they present. While not a complete discussion, I hope it will give a comprehensive list of counter measures you can use to be safer. If you have other ideas, or you think I forget something, please let me know.</p><h3>Position tracking</h3><p>The first rule is not to carry your phone, and there is sadly no alternative to that. As soon as you carry your phone with you, your position is known by the GMS network, this is the way mobile phone technology works. If you absolutely need your phone, remove the SIM card (airplane mode is not enough), and disable the WiFi. If possible, take out your battery when you don’t need it.</p><blockquote>The best solution is to give the phone to someone else, and tell them to do something very boring, like go to a cafe or store.</blockquote><p>If you need to use your computer and to connect it to a WiFi network, change your MAC address (<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldj_p7KyUts">Windows</a>/<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLPmYryQMhU">Mac</a>/<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzwA7tm6zi8">Linux</a>). I recommend you to do this as often as possible, all the time. And disable the broadcast of your computer name…</p><p>If you use a <a href="https://securityinabox.org/en/chapter_8_4">Virtual Private Network</a> (VPN) to connect to your newsroom, use it through Tor, or hide it in an other VPN connection (this one should be very common to make it harder to trace back to you). You can also use a few different VPN providers, or Tor. Tor will act as a poor man’s VPN.</p><blockquote>Using <a href="https://tails.boum.org/index.en.html">Tails</a> is also a very good solution as it will change your MAC address, and your computer name, and put all your traffic into the Tor network.</blockquote><p>None of this works? Think again before you take your laptop: pen and paper might also do the job.</p><h3>Protecting the topic of the pieces</h3><p>You are now working on your articles, where you are is less important, but you do not want to make it public too early.</p><p>Think of the CCTVs, there might be even more than there are in London, and they have very high resolution these days…</p><p>You probably want to use a VPN when you are working on your articles, and make sure everything goes through it. Also the DNS requests to hide the websites you are actually browsing. It might be useful to have multiple VPNs to be able to switch VPNs if the one you are using is blocked. Do not use the backup VPNs before you need too, to avoid them all getting blocked at the same time. Or, again, use Tor.</p><p>Assume all the text messages you sent via your phone are intercepted and read. Use b<a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms&amp;hl=en">TextSecure</a> if you need to use your phone.</p><h3>Identification of sources</h3><p>If you have sources that should stay secret you will have to think about ways to keep them safe even if you are heavily targeted, which could lead to the compromise of your computer, or other devices.</p><blockquote>No magical solution here, except using your brain.</blockquote><p>I will not spend a lot of time on explaining you that you should not open attachments, plug untrusted USB keys into your computer, or click on weird links, because you already know that. But still, do not forget that even if it comes from a trusted source, it might be malicious (knowingly or not). If you receive a USB key, you probably want to have a look at it after it is sanitized in something like the <a href="http://circl.lu/projects/CIRCLean/">CIRCLean</a>/<a href="https://github.com/Rafiot/KittenGroomer">KittenGroomer</a> (<em>Disclaimer: I am the main developer</em>)</p><p>Keep your eyes open online just as you would on the street. Keep track of unusual things that might start to happen, such as SSL errors, weird redirections, or other unusual random other error messages.</p><p>The most important thing is that whatever you plan to use, make sure it works properly <strong>before</strong> you are in Russia. The worst security choices are made when you are unable to get your work done, and having to improvise without support in a stressful situation.</p><blockquote>Make sure your stuff works, understand your plans, and have fallback solutions.</blockquote><h3>Remote support</h3><p>Something else that could be useful is to make sure that someone in your newsroom keeps and eye on your activity on the network: you said that you are going to be offline for the night, and your username is attempting to login to the CMS? Your user is connected and is crawling all the shared directory of your office? That’s a bad sign.</p><p>Something else that a remote contact can achieve: providing a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad">one time pad</a>, a password that will never be reused again. Given over the phone just before use will be safe enough most of the times.</p><p>To go one step further, assume your devices might be compromised, do not keep nor carry information on them that can lead to identifying a source, most especially on your phone…</p><h3>Something went really bad</h3><p>If information that can only come from your computer leaked, you are compromised for sure. This is a stressful situation and you need to know what to do, if you don’t, you will make mistakes.</p><p>You still have to work, keep in touch with people, you cannot wait until you come back home. Read only devices (CD/DVDs) to reinstall a system from scratch will be critical: you cannot trust any of your devices anymore to get a safe live CD from the internet.</p><blockquote>Make sure you have a way to use a CD…</blockquote><p>It would also be nice to have a <a href="https://tails.boum.org/download/index.en.html#first_time">Tails installation</a>, to backup your data before a re-installation, or to go back online as soon as possible without using a compromised system. The even more tricky part is to have an up-to-date system, or you will be reinfected immediately. Make sure you have offline packages to apply the most critical security updates.</p><blockquote>Do not apply any non-critical updates from the internet while you are in Russia.</blockquote><p>You have to know all the things you need to go from nothing to a fully operational working environment without any physical access to any other device. For that, you will probably have to try out your procedures before the trip.</p><blockquote>Broadcast as much as you can that your accounts might have been compromised. And start using other accounts you prepared beforehand, that some other trusted people can confirm being you.</blockquote><p>You are probably the most IT savvy person in the crew of people you will stay with, so if they have issues, they will come to you. It may be a good thing to have a way to give them access to a backup device, that is not yours, in case they are stuck with a broken or unusable device.</p><blockquote>Another computer or just a Tails instance might save you from your colleague covering the finals of the 100m and an angry editor forcing you to allow him to connect his dirty and probably infected USB key to your safe computer.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba48c2c82a8b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Live from Sochi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t/live-from-sochi-85800cb9e848?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/85800cb9e848</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphaël Vinot]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2014 08:45:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-02-03T16:13:12.521Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And that’s the only reason you are here.</h4><p>This is the second piece of my trilogy on Sochi aiming to help the journalists covering the Olympics games, and maybe less conventional topics. In the <a href="https://medium.com/p/cf8f6a19eb77">first part</a>, I acted as a network operator in Sochi and tried to give a comprehensive view of how they could spy on you.</p><p>Now, I will discuss how a sports journalist can do her job, and be compromised by an state sponsored attacker with political motivation, without endangering anyone in Russia and later on, when back in her office.</p><blockquote>This is damage control, not really OPSEC.</blockquote><p>By OPSEC, Operations Security, I mean all the measures (human and technical) someone can take to secure communication and keep her contacts safe.</p><p><em>You should know that a place full of tourists is very convenient for a more classical attacker, but I will not be covering that situation in this piece, to keep it simple and short.</em></p><p>As a sports journalist, your goal is to cover the sporting events, live. You have texts, pictures, and videos to share as fast as possible. You may also speak live on the TV. Your devices have to work all the time, and you cannot be bothered by any issue related to degraded connectivity. You might use encrypted communication if and only if it does not change anything in your workflow.</p><blockquote>For a state sponsored attacker, you are mostly useless noise. But you are also an easy target. Will you be compromised? Yes, most probably. Does it matter? Let’s make sure it doesn&#39;t.</blockquote><p>The first thing we have to agree at this point is that everything (devices and remote systems) you touch from Russia cannot be trusted anymore and will have to be cleaned up, reinstalled, given for analysis to an expert or destroyed. Broadly speaking: not be used anymore in an environment where any compromised device can endanger someone, which mean that you can also give it to your old grand parents, or your kids and drive the people listening crazy.</p><p>So the main recommendation is the following:</p><blockquote>Do not use devices (computer, phone, USB sticks...) and remote systems (FTP server, shared directories...) you use normally when you are in a safer environment. Be the only one to use it, or make sure the other people using them are aware that you might be compromised and sharing malicious content.</blockquote><p>The first step now is to make a list of all the hardware containing memory and having the ability to connect to any network you need to get your work done. All the devices with memory you connect to your computer should also be in that list.</p><p>You are one of those lucky people with an IT team, and a bit of money? Get a travel version of all those devices, make sure with your IT people that they provide to you a dedicated space to share your work.</p><blockquote>Do not re-use passwords you use somewhere else to connect to internal systems, use accounts with limited privileges, make sure someone looks at the connection logs.</blockquote><p>Give all your devices back when you are in town again, suggest they forward them to someone able to look at them, maybe you will have an other article.</p><p>You are poor and freelance? This is going to be a bit trickier.</p><p>Do not take your shiny new smartphone with you. There is around 100% chances it will be successfully attacked and 0% chances anyone will find it out before it is too late. If you need a mobile, get a cheap one, throw it away when you leave the country.</p><p><em>Or be nasty and give it away to an unknown person in the street in an other country: confusing people spying on you can be considered as a win.</em></p><blockquote>A mobile phone is like the Schrodinger&#39;s cat: it might be compromised, or not. But opening it does not really help.</blockquote><p>Are you sure you cannot use an old laptop for 10 days? No? Well then, backup all your things, think about it twice. You will have to reinstall your computer when you will come back from Sochi.</p><blockquote>Protip: make your backups, put a brand new disk in the computer, reinstall your system and use it for work. You need to access to your old disk? Well, you know what you forgot, update your backup mechanism accordingly.</blockquote><p>Obviously, all the USB Keys, hard drives, SD cards have to be treated with extreme care, and they should be formatted afterward.</p><p>Beside that, you have a low priority on the list of a state sponsored attacker: you are doing what the Russian government expects a journalist to do.</p><p>But as you are not using (much) encryption and have no OPSEC, it is pretty easy to know exactly what you are doing, where, when, with whom.</p><blockquote>If &quot;whom&quot; is a journalist working on a political piece, felicitation, you are now a high value and easy target.</blockquote><p>From now on, you are a bridge between the state sponsored attacker and a journalist writing articles against the Russian regime. As you have to be reachable all the time, you will carry your phone with you. Make sure you are not following your colleague when she is going to meet a source… Leave your phone in the hotel, or give it to someone else.</p><p>It will also be critical you are both using different systems to upload your work: compromising the IT infrastructure of your newsroom to get access to an other reporter’s work is worth considering.</p><p>You think you might end up in this kind of situation? If yes, I recommend you to read the third part of this trilogy: I will give tips and tricks for a journalists who plans to publish critical pieces, and they have to be extremely careful.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85800cb9e848" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sochi, a "Safe" Place for Journalists]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rafi0t/sochi-a-safe-place-for-journalists-cf8f6a19eb77?source=rss-a19002622b9a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf8f6a19eb77</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphaël Vinot]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jan 2014 13:15:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-02-04T22:31:09.393Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Understanding what Russia can do on its own network </h4><p>This may be the the first part of a series of three articles (if I manage to find the time…) aiming to prepare journalists and others to work on the internet in Sochi as safely as possible.</p><h4>Here they are:</h4><ul><li><a href="https://medium.com/p/85800cb9e848">Live from Sochi</a>: For a sport journalist</li><li><a href="https://medium.com/p/ba48c2c82a8b">One’s head in the lion’s mouth</a>: For a journalist covering political topics</li></ul><p>It is not technical documentation (for that, speak with your nearby hackerspace, they will be happy to help). What I want to speak about now is what can and will happen if you go to Sochi unprepared.</p><p><em>In this piece, I will put myself in the role of a Russian official whose job is to surveil the journalists who may write negatively about the regime..</em></p><p>It is now early January, all the network infrastructure has been in place for months. It will be the same as what was in London, 4 years later. But with more computing power.</p><blockquote>And Russia, a slightly less democratic country ☺</blockquote><p>Everything has been tested and is working as expected. I know the infrastructure. I know what I can do, what I cannot do, and when. I have a captive audience: every single person who will be there will use the network at one point or another.</p><p>And I can decide what traffic will pass through.</p><p>In fact, I will tap and capture everything, but mostly for postmortem analysis, because it will be too much traffic to analyze in real time. And I have better ways to tell the difference between what is interesting or not: metadata.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R8HY3zX4bGk_mIQbYIAzcQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>Through a PRISM, Darkly —</strong><a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/Fahrplan/events/5255.html"><strong> </strong>Kurt Opsahl at 30C3</a></figcaption></figure><p>Metadata are great: thanks to them, I will know who is speaking with you, how often, how many times, and when. In real time. Even if the content is encrypted.</p><blockquote>What I need now is a way to find out who is who on this network.</blockquote><p>If I am lucky, I will manage to install malware on your computer at border control, or when you leave your computer unattended in your hotel room. That would be the easiest and most old school way.</p><p>I could also give you any kind of USB device as a gift (USB key, USB mouse, USB power plug for phone), and take control of any devices that will be connected to it (phone or computer).</p><p>And again, thanks to the metadata, I can track all the devices: I know which device is connected to which access point at which time. As I also know where the journalists I am interested in are staying, I will have a closer look at the traffic of those MAC addresses (the unique identifier assigned to your network card). Taking note of your MAC address in the airport would also save me some time. Bonus: if you use the Ethernet plug in your room, and I can associate it to you.</p><p>Just in case, I will also capture and index all the clear text communication, because it is an easy win.</p><p>At this point, I will have gathered information on you by looking at the network. I can get more intrusive.</p><blockquote>But I cannot do anything I want, because my country has to look good and not get caught messing around to much with freedom of speech.</blockquote><p>For example, I cannot shut down the Internet as a whole, or even block much Internet communication without a good reason. It is also not possible to track everyone, everywhere, in real time, and all the time. I have to choose carefully my targets.</p><p>I also cannot decrypt all the encrypted traffic in real time: it requires too much computing power for too few results.</p><p>That said, I can probably decrypt some devices, some of the time.</p><p>Let’s start with the network itself. What if I make sure that 20% of the packets sent to all the major VPN providers are dropped? You will blame your IT department, and switch back to unencrypted communication. I can also reset 10% of the VPN connections, shutting down your encrypted channel, and hope you will not notice.</p><blockquote>Especially when you really need connectivity, such as when a final event is happening, or while you are trying to publish an article.</blockquote><p>There are also a lot of interesting things to do with the domains, such as redirecting you to phishing websites by intercepting the DNS queries. Or having the network answer a request for a page by saying that a website does not exist. I obviously have to be very careful, but I can also make sure none of you see the phishing same website twice…</p><p>But anyway, why would I even spend time on developing accurate-looking phishing websites if I can simply present a legitimate SSL certificate? Your browser has a few root certificates under the control of my government. If I use one of those, and your browser does not have the right plugin, it will probably not complain.</p><p>Scary, isn&#39;t it ?</p><p>And I did not even mention unknown vulnerabilities that could let me take over your devices. Mostly because they are expensive, and if I’m ready to use one on you and risk having it discovered, you probably aren&#39;t in Russia, or are using OPSEC that’s making me unable to locate you.</p><p>All those scary ideas considered, I have one last thing to tell you:</p><blockquote>I am a lazy bastard.</blockquote><p>I would love you to think that I will follow you everywhere, all the time, that there is nothing you can do against me and that you are doomed anyway.</p><p>Because then you will give up, and go back to the category of people I will spend most of my resources tracking: the ones with no OPSEC, the low hanging fruits, the people as lazy as I am.</p><blockquote>Because I want to have a life, and honestly, I don’t really care about you. I just want to pay the bills. So you can beat me with some OPSEC, or at least make me concentrate on other journalists easier to control than you.</blockquote><h3>Update 2014-01-28 — Told You So</h3><p>An article has been published and confirms the surveillance state in place in Sochi. <a href="http://www.salon.com/2014/01/25/the_sochi_olympics_putins_shiny_new_surveillance_state/">You should read it.</a></p><blockquote>On Wednesday, I spoke to Andrei Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist who broke the biggest security story of the Sochi Olympics: SORM, the Russians’ virtual surveillance system. The Russian FSB (successor to the KGB) will <strong>monitor all communications</strong> between spectators, journalists, athletes and anyone else who visits (or lives in) Sochi. The U.S. State Department has warned business travelers to be careful with sensitive information, which “<strong>may be taken and shared with competitors, counterparts, and/or Russian regulatory and legal entities.</strong>” One security expert said SORM was like “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/06/russia-monitor-communications-sochi-winter-olympics">PRISM on steroids</a>.” — Henry Grabar</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf8f6a19eb77" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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