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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ramanathan RV on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ramanathan RV on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ramanathan RV on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[UPI and the potential comeback of Digital Wallets]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/upi-and-the-potential-comeback-of-digital-wallets-793fbd8423a5?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/793fbd8423a5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Jun 2023 09:53:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-11T09:53:59.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am going to excuse myself from talking about the incredibly high UPI transaction numbers. But let me reinforce the reality which is — UPI is now a common phenomenon. It is the locomotive of payments — the engine that propels digital payments in India.</p><p>Enough said about the glory of UPI. Let’s talk about a less talked about phenomenon which is the humble savings bank account that enables UPI. For UPI payments to work, there must be a store of value which is your humble savings bank account. But I would like to recount a small back story before I venture into a difficult topic.</p><p><strong>A little personal story about Savings Bank Accounts</strong></p><p>It was the year 2005. SBI was just implementing a core banking system. Only a few branches in the country have been enabled with the core banking system. Prior to the introduction of core banking, a customer had to walk into their home branch for most of the critical operations with the bank account. I was a software engineering intern at Amazon Bangalore which had about 40-odd employees at that time. Amazon India had their banking relationship only with Deutsche Bank (much less has changed since then). But we poor interns only had a zero balance student account with SBI (college branch NIT, Trichy). To pay us our stipend, Amazon gave us two choices (a) open an account with Deutsche Bank and they would remit our stipend into that account digitally (b) take a cheque. The problem was — Deutsche Bank required an AMB of INR 25,000 which was impossible for us at that time. So, we took the option of the cheque. Amazon gave us all our stipend cheques issued by Deutsche Bank. We went to the CBS-enabled Bangalore branch of SBI to process the cheque. The staff there refused to accept the cheque and advised us to process the cheque with our home branch.</p><p>Ultimately, we had to courier the cheque to one of the parents in Trichy. One of our parents then went to our college branch, deposited the cheque and finally, we got access to the money, after a week’s time. Phew!</p><h4><strong>Tech — the advantages and the limitations</strong></h4><p>I know this must be feeling so ancient to most of you. It was such a big deal back then to network all the branches, centralize the systems and provide access to every customer across all branches. And today, we don’t think twice to whip up our phone to pay 10 rupees for a chai at a roadside shop using UPI which makes a ledger entry into the core banking system after being routed via 4 different institutions (if not more).</p><p>And therein lies the problem. You see, for the banks, it is non-trivial to process a transaction. There is a lot of system overhead involved since they have to evaluate several rules before allowing the transaction. All this costs effort and money. The core banking system is not designed for high-velocity-low-value transactions, although it very much is capable of supporting them. Just that, this increases the technology costs for the bank. But the core USP of UPI is that it costs the customers &amp; merchants nothing to transact. That’s a tricky problem to solve.</p><p>So, the banks are stuck between a rock and a hard place.</p><h4><strong>The near-death of Digital Wallets</strong></h4><p>UPI embraced bank accounts as the only supported store of value on the protocol. It wasn’t a surprise given the structure of NPCI. And QR as a form factor for merchant payments was wildly successful. The regulator ensured that only interoperable QRs existed so as to avoid any confusion among customers. This led to the disappearance of all other proprietary QRs. As UPI provided for both P2P and P2M transactions, it was superior to digital wallets in the most important ways that mattered to customers — ease of use and universal acceptance. Digital Wallets were technically dead except for a few fringe usecases. Only Paytm has remained significant due to its two-sided presence (merchants &amp; customers).</p><h4><strong>UPI interoperability — the resurgence of Wallets?</strong></h4><p>In the recent past, the regulator permitted digital wallets as a store of value to be interoperable on the UPI platform. Let’s unpack this with an example. If you are a customer using one of these digital wallets, you can now do a QR transaction at an outlet having any UPI QR, paying with your Digital Wallet. I believe this has great significance for digital wallets. It creates a level playing field on the two dimensions that we spoke earlier — ease of use &amp; universal acceptance. Digital Wallets have some intrinsic structural advantages over savings bank accounts. I believe this will create a resurgence of Digital Wallets. Let me explain why.</p><h4><strong>Easy KYC and higher limits</strong></h4><p>Opening a wallet account remains easy with just a mobile number verification (small KYC). A full KYC wallet account is almost equivalent to a bank account itself. Wallets with a small KYC enjoy a limit of INR 10,000 per month. This is sufficient for most users of UPI for their P2M payments. Accounts can be opened instantly with Small KYC and operated in realtime. Once an account is opened via Small KYC, the wallet provider can then slowly nudge the customer to signup for a full KYC which enables the customer to use wallet for higher value transactions and extended limits.</p><h4><strong>Wallets reduce the Risk of exposure</strong></h4><p>Using the salary account for day-to-day payments exposes the primary bank account of users to risk from fraudsters. An intelligent way to reduce this risk is to open a different account for conducting day-to-day transactions. As wallets now have higher limits, customers can easily choose a wallet account over a bank account. Even if a wallet is compromised, victims merely lose a few thousand rather than compromising a month’s salary or life’s savings which is held in the primary bank account.</p><h4><strong>Wallets are a lot faster</strong></h4><p>As wallets don’t have the system overhead of a typical bank account, the transaction times tend to be much faster. They also tend to have higher uptimes since maintenance is a lot easier.</p><h4><strong>Better customer support</strong></h4><p>Digital Wallet companies tend to be extremely tech-savvy in a bid to offer a much better CX. But there is also another reason for such passion — reduce the cost of customer support by ensuring customers don’t call. To that end, they offer much better support tools to their customers than traditional banks. Digital Wallets are much more sensitive to NPS or Play store reviews. They work very hard to ensure that their customers don’t publish negative reviews.</p><h4><strong>Easy Income Tax Reporting</strong></h4><p>I am going to assume that you, my reader, are an honest to god citizen that cares about paying the taxes correctly. If not, you can skip this section, but remember that you have to live in fear of a tax audit. While filing the tax, a citizen has to declare all the bank accounts that they have, and also ensure that they pay tax on the interest received from all their bank accounts. This is a real hassle for those having multiple bank accounts and reams of transactions. With Digital Wallets, there is no such obligation.</p><h4><strong>Wallets will be more innovative</strong></h4><p>Digital Wallets will offer a fundamentally more innovative product — split with friends, loyalty programs, better security, better merchant offers, etc. They will try to differentiate themselves using product features. Users will find more value in using a Wallet app.</p><h4><strong>Disinterest of Banks</strong></h4><p>As UPI gears up to 1 billion transactions per day, Banks will feel the stress on their core systems. Not just the direct cost, but costs of the downstream systems such as financial reporting, analytics, etc will increase due to the exponential increase in data volume. Banks will have a strong incentive to reduce UPI transactions. Ultimately, this will lead to one or more of these — (a) charge customers an additional fee for UPI transactions (b) Limit the usage to a few transactions per day (c) Promote their own wallets. All roads lead to digital wallets. Banks are already doing (c) — HDFC Payzapp, ICICI Pockets, Axis Freecharge, etc.</p><h4><strong>Closing thoughts</strong></h4><p>UPI has had exponential growth. There are several forces shaping UPI and its evolution. It is still Day 1 and I believe that Wallets that were once considered killed by UPI will make a comeback and ironically, it will all be thanks to UPI.</p><p>What do you think?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=793fbd8423a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The problem with Secured Credit Cards]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-problem-with-secured-credit-cards-9ad79ff6380c?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ad79ff6380c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-cards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-builder]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-score]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[secured-credit-card]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2022 02:37:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-10T02:37:16.912Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secured credit cards are interesting offerings that have cropped up in large numbers recently. These cards are targeted at people who either don’t have much of a presence in the credit bureaus or have defaulted previously. The proposition to the user is that they can build their credit profile and enhance their credit score which can eventually qualify them for unsecured credit.</p><p>A secured credit card is typically issued against a Fixed Deposit that acts as collateral. In case the customer defaults, the Fixed Deposit is liquidated. Secured cards may also be issued against gold or lien marked Mutual Funds, although the latter is rarely seen in India.</p><p>A secured credit card is preferred under the following circumstances:</p><ol><li>The user doesn’t have a credit history or has a very thin credit provide, and their income profile cannot be ascertained</li><li>The user has defaulted in the past</li><li>The issuer is not confident about the data that is available to them or voluntarily shared by the customer</li></ol><p>Some of the cards that you will find in the Indian market:</p><ul><li>Kotak Dream Different</li><li>Bank of Baroda Assure</li><li>Paisabazaar Step Up card (SBM Bank)</li><li>OneCard (SBM Bank)</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UlmGAs5SD5tZtf6X2Z1cAg.png" /><figcaption>Secured cards in India</figcaption></figure><p>Secured cards are a global phenomenon. Even in a mature market like the US which has &gt;650 million credit cards, there are secured cards.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WbjXBCkZ0XO5rtEH1TQtoA.png" /><figcaption>Secured cards in the US</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Does it serve the purpose of democratising credit?</strong></p><p>On the surface, secured credit cards seem like a fantastic proposition for everyone involved.</p><p><strong>The customer: </strong>The customer isn’t denied a card, achieves the goal of improving the credit score, and also gets decent returns on their FD.</p><p><strong>The issuer: </strong>Issuers face zero risk as they can execute the lien against this FD if the customer defaults on the card.</p><p><strong>The regulator: </strong>The regulator gets to improve overall credit inclusion metrics.</p><p>So, it’s a win-win for all the parties involved!</p><p><strong>But does it actually serve the purpose of ‘credit’?</strong></p><p>When we look carefully, we will find that the repayment data from a secured credit card is not very useful in assessing the creditworthiness of a customer. This is due to (a) the lender may not have done any detailed assessment of the borrower and (b) the lender did not give the customer a choice in the matter of repayment.</p><p>Let’s dig a little deeper into the matter.</p><p><strong>CREDIT — An exchange of trust</strong></p><p>Every time a person borrows, they are putting their trustworthiness on the line. When they repay in full and on time, then they have earned the trust of the lender. In a secured card setting, however, there is very little trust in the entire equation. Both the lenders and borrowers are fearful of each other. The lender is scared because they don’t know if the borrower is credit-worthy (ability to repay) and trust-worthy (intent to repay) enough to lend to. They mostly do very little research on the customer beyond the identity of the customer. The collateral from the customer in the form of cash (FD or mutual fund or gold) essentially becomes a proxy to judge intent and ability to repay. The borrower is scared because they won’t be able to recover their asset/collateral if they don’t repay in full and on time.</p><p>This difference in the setting influences the behaviour on both the sides significantly. The repayment data of a secured loan is highly biased and offers very little concrete insight into customer behaviour. The data would be very useful when the customers are given full freedom. It would help collect natural and independent consumer behavioural patterns thus contributing to a healthier credit system.</p><p>One may argue that the current system also uses fear through the threat of loss of credit score to enforce repayment. This argument doesn’t cut much ice since it is a common denominator across the entire credit system. This cannot be equated to the threat of actual loss of value (cash or gold) and the loss of credit score as well.</p><p><strong>A systemic problem?</strong></p><p>Issuing secured cards in large numbers can potentially lead to a systemic problem if the data is not labeled correctly and discounted adequately. This cohort of customers whom the system does not understand fully but onboarded via a secured credit card facility will eventually be issued credit in an unsecured fashion by unsuspecting lenders. And, I can say with reasonable certainty that the performance of this cohort will be different from the rest and it will certainly be poorer. This could eventually translate to higher NPAs and have further adverse effects.</p><p>Obviously, I hope that secured credit cards wouldn’t end up causing a systemic problem and that I will be proven wrong here. I will be the happiest if secured credit cards program serves the broader societal requirement of credit inclusion.</p><p><strong>Alternatives to secured credit to solve cold start?</strong></p><p>If we take a step back and observe this problem for what it is, we will see that it is a cold start problem. There isn’t any doubt in my mind that we should price the risk higher for those with no/bad credit history. Perhaps, there are other ways to address this problem without meddling with the core equation in the lender borrower relationship.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ad79ff6380c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Loans vs Credit Line Cards vs Credit Cards]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/loans-vs-credit-line-cards-vs-credit-cards-951d318acec3?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/951d318acec3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lending]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bnpl]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Mar 2022 23:51:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-29T04:08:06.651Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fintech companies that wish to venture into lending have a few choices in front of them:</p><p>(a) Offer personal loans<br>(b) Offer credit line cards<br>(c) Offer credit cards</p><h4><strong>When loans aren’t sufficient</strong></h4><p>Loans by their very nature are merely transactional. The user avails of such a loan only a few times a year. While it is true that when they do so, there is enough money on the table, it is only short-term. Loans by their very nature are low loyalty products. When a customer avails of a loan, the most important deciding factor is the cost of the loan. There is a great tendency to choose the one with the least amount of rate of interest, whenever an individual is applying for the loan. Across most of these institutions application process and collection mechanics are very similar in nature. Thus this makes it very hard to differentiate.</p><h4><strong>Enter Credit Line Cards</strong></h4><p>It wouldn’t be far-fetched to say that Slice pioneered the model of a credit line card — which is essentially an overdraft account with a card form factor and a monthly billing cadence. The product looks and feels like a credit card and has facilities such as converting the outstanding amount into EMI. The key difference between such a product when compared to a simple app based lending product is that <strong>customer retention is very high</strong>. The card product by virtue of universal acceptance finds daily usage from the customer. Whenever the customer feels the need to convert to EMI, they may do so. This tackles both convenience and credit.</p><h4><strong>Working mechanism of Credit Line Cards</strong></h4><p>The first step is providing a sanctioned line of credit to the customer (post your underwriting checks and KYC). The second step is to link this line of credit with a prepaid card. Instead of loading the prepaid card with the sanctioned amount, we use something called just-in-time funding. Whenever the customer makes a transaction, the amount is funded in realtime into the prepaid account and the transaction is then authorized. Such a mechanism is setup using a combination of escrow + pool accounts.</p><h4>Credit Line Cards vs Credit Cards</h4><p>Even though this solution may seem great at first glance, scaling a credit line offering requires significant ability to raise capital by the fintech/NBFC. Since credit line cards are essentially unsecured personal loans, mainstream banks have very little interest in participating. On the other hand, banks are very comfortable scaling their credit card business. For the year FY21, SBI cards had receivables of worth INR 25,114 crores on their books. However, this is not without any issues: approval rates across the wider population is still very low. Why credit cards also struggle to scale is a matter for discussion some other time.</p><p>The following are the key differences between credit cards and credit line cards.</p><h4><strong>(a) Underwriting</strong></h4><p><strong>Credit Cards</strong> —<strong> </strong>Very difficult to influence a bank’s existing underwriting policy and hence approval rates will be only as good as the bank’s existing approval rates<br><strong>Credit Line Cards</strong> — Relatively easier to work with an NBFC to show the value of alternative data and hence increase the approval rates significantly. Along with an FLDG arrangement, it would be easier to take the approval rates to much higher levels.</p><h4>(b) Credit Limit</h4><p><strong>Credit Cards</strong> — The base credit limit will be as high as INR 50,000. It is also possible to significantly increase the credit limit for an individual account as long as it is within the band for the card program<br><strong>Credit Line Cards </strong>— There is immense flexibility on the approved credit limit. You can start from as little as INR 2,000 and take it up to several lakhs depending on the borrower profile. Fintechs can also work with their NBFC partner to modify the credit limit as required.</p><h4>(c) Revolve facility</h4><p><strong>Credit Cards</strong> — Automatically provided to credit card holders<br><strong>Credit Line Cards</strong> — Per RBI regulations, this cannot be provided to borrowers. Hence, the borrowers need to convert their outstanding to EMI to continue using the product.</p><h4>(d) Capital (money)</h4><p><strong>Credit Cards<br></strong>Bank will bring the capital themselves. Fintech companies are not expected to contribute anything towards this. Very few banks like State Bank of Mauritius are agreeable to fintechs bringing in capital. Ever since RBI took a not-so-friendly view on FLDG, banks have become more reluctant to sign up under this model. <br><strong>Credit Line Cards<br></strong>Different arrangements are possible. The general expectation is that Fintechs bring in reasonable capital before the lending partner commits capital to the portfolio. Much of this is driven by your arrangement on underwriting.</p><h4>(e) Collections</h4><p><strong>Credit Cards</strong> — Owned by you the issuing bank. Very hard to carve out collections. <br><strong>Credit Line Cards</strong> — Mostly owned by the fintech partner as NBFCs are happy to delegate the digital leg of collections to fintechs.</p><h4>(f) Forex Transactions</h4><p><strong>Credit Cards </strong>— Card is by default eligible for use across the globe. <br><strong>Credit Line Cards</strong> — This depends on the bank that you partner with. Banks with a specific license to operate in forex can provide this facility, but will not always be available readily.</p><h4>A final word on Revenue challenges</h4><p>In the lending business, fintechs are either originators or lenders themselves. The former has a reasonable margin but when the fintechs participate in the creation of the book, they stand to make much more money. Companies like Slice, Moneytap and Onecard participate in the book while Ola SBI credit card and Amazon ICICI credit card portfolios are fully owned by the banks. Paytm has steadfastly maintained that they are merely originating loans to the banks.</p><p><strong>Risk ownership in Credit Cards </strong>—<strong> </strong>When it comes to a credit card, it is difficult to convince most of the banks to transfer significant product ownership to fintechs. This is due to a variety of reasons which we will explore in a different blog post.</p><p>And thus, while it is easy to scale the program due to the capital depth of banks, a fintechs’ ability to generate revenues through such a partnership is stunted. On the other hand, a credit line card has much better unit economics due to prevailing interchange rates. If the portfolio is well stitched, then the EMIs accruing should help generate a very attractive return on capital. However, assuming the risk of non-payment is not everyone’s cup of tea! And that is the big dilemma for any fintech startup.</p><p>Hope you were able to understand the fundamental differences between credit cards and credit line cards. There is so much more to unpack.</p><p><strong>Disclaimer and plug:</strong> I am the founder of <a href="http://hyperface.co/">hyperface.co</a>. We have built India’s #1 credit line card stack to power the next generation of fintech companies and banks intending to launch this product. You will find cards that are powered by Hyperface in the market very soon!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=951d318acec3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The economics of card led BNPL]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-economics-of-card-led-bnpl-1050c4509847?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1050c4509847</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[credit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-cards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neobanks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bnpl]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Sep 2021 07:18:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-13T07:18:21.810Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-profitability-challenge-of-upi-based-bnpl-c86177d16a98">previous blog post</a> decoded the economics of UPI led BNPL. If you haven’t already read that, please do so now, as it provides the necessary context for this post.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/0*jnaqokNRoW85Kozn.png" /><figcaption>BNPL companies gaining ground</figcaption></figure><p>However, UPI is not the only form factor to offer BNPL. If anything, NPCI has taken a view that UPI cannot be used to offer BNPL without an underlying bank account (an overdraft account). On the other hand, the regulator has restricted the issuance of credit cards to only the banks (there are exceptions to this rule. RBI has permitted two non-bank entities, to issue cards: BOB Cards and SBI Cards). Thus, fintech companies such as Slice, Moneytap, and Uni have issued what they call “credit line cards” to their customers that are nothing but prepaid cards with clever fund management mechanisms. This works almost like a credit card from the user’s point of view. They don’t use the term “credit card” because the regulator has expressly barred such usage to avoid any confusion for the customers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*1ttKR42P66ECCN7c.jpg" /><figcaption>Uni (representational image, no affiliation)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xnA8vkAy7qsqT_yI.jpg" /><figcaption>Slice (representational image, no affiliation)</figcaption></figure><p>The fundamental reasons why companies are increasingly preferring this route:</p><p>a) Flexibility on billing cycle definition (weekly, biweekly, fortnightly, monthly)</p><p>b) Total control on the approval rate</p><p>c) Faster GTM (getting a prepaid card program approval takes just a day or two)</p><p>The economics of this is not very different from that of the UPI-led BNPL model that we had explored <a href="https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-profitability-challenge-of-upi-based-bnpl-c86177d16a98">earlier</a>. There are few additional factors to keep in mind here:</p><ol><li>Printing &amp; shipping a card involves cost</li><li>Every time someone uses the card at a merchant store, there is revenue to be made from interchange</li><li>KYC (read the <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=12156">new regulations here</a>). Specifically, full KYC as per banks would mean a bigger commitment on your part.</li></ol><p>Let’s understand these and then take a look at the total cost.</p><p><strong>Card Printing &amp; shipping cost</strong></p><p>This actually depends on the type of card. A typical card with an NFC chip costs about 120 rupees. If you want a fancy metal card like what Onecard has, then it could easily go to a few thousands of rupees. Let’s leave that out of our consideration. A conservative estimate of Rs.110/- per card is more realistic. Let’s add another 20 rupees for packaging and another 30 rupees for shipping (blended rate across pincodes).</p><p>This creates a fixed cost of Rs.160/- for every customer that you onboard.</p><p>Given that the cards expire and taking into consideration of customer churn, let’s suppose that an average customer stays for 2 years. This would work out to ~80 rupees per customer per year.</p><p><strong>Revenue from Interchange</strong></p><p>The blended interchange revenue that can be availed in the market is about ~0.7%. Let’s make a generous assumption of 0.8% (as we can assume that you will receive the GST paid as input credits and can offset it against other GST payments). In the previous post, we assumed an average spend of 3000 rupees per cycle.</p><p>Utilised value = 3000 rupees</p><p>Interchange share from bank = 0.8%</p><p>Revenue from interchange per month = 24 rupees</p><p><strong>Total Revenue and Cost</strong></p><p>Basis the above and the numbers from <a href="https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-profitability-challenge-of-upi-based-bnpl-c86177d16a98">my earlier blog post</a> (15-day billing cycle, 5 days grace period, spend of 3000 rupees spend per cycle) below is the new calculation. The numbers:</p><p><strong>Revenue items</strong></p><p>Balance conversion to EMI revenue / customer / year = <strong>180 rupees</strong></p><p>Late payment revenue per customer p.a = 65 x 2 = <strong>130 rupees</strong></p><p>Transactional EMI revenue = <strong>240 rupees</strong></p><p>Interchange share revenue p.a. = <strong>300 rupees</strong></p><p><strong>Cost items</strong></p><p>Card cost / customer / year = <strong>80 rupees</strong></p><p>Cost of capital / customer / year = 15 x 26 cycles = <strong>390 rupees</strong></p><p>Revenue earned per customer p.a. = 180 + 130 + 240 + 300 — (390 + 80) = 380 rupees</p><p>At 12% cost of capital (and you choose not to pass on the benefit of lower cost of capital to the customer), the cost of capital reduces to 260 rupees. Accordingly, the revenue per customer increases:</p><p>Statement EMI revenue = 240 rupees</p><p>Late payment revenue = 160 rupees</p><p>Transactional EMI revenue = 360 rupees</p><p>Interchange share revenue p.a = 300 rupees (no change)</p><p>Revenue earned per customer p.a. @ 12% CoC = 240 + 160 + 360 + 300 — (260 + 80) = 720 rupees</p><p>With card as a form factor, we see that the profitability at a customer level increases quite a bit without adding any significant risk item. However, please keep in mind that our calculation is based on a fully engaged user. In reality, there is a significant non-usage of cards that are shipped to customers. Industry average activation rates are 70%. Any significant reduction in utilization % or increased customer churn can result in an increased fixed cost burden thereby rendering the margins low.</p><p><strong>Things to be careful about</strong></p><p>a) Designing your own card also requires you to make a commitment to the printer by way of minimum order quantity. If you are just getting started, a safer number to go with could be 5000 cards. Even though you will be paying a higher cost, it is a much better option than committing to some large number only to find out that user response is muted.</p><p>b) Scheme (Visa, Mastercard, Rupay) transaction costs are different with Rupay being the cheapest. These costs are fixed in nature and impact the revenue that you make from the interchange. Sometimes, you may end up paying the scheme than the other way around.</p><p>c) Cards tend to get damaged / lost / natural expiry. Replacements would have to be offered free of cost.</p><p>d) Card systems have elaborate dispute resolution mechanisms and you will incur charges.</p><p>e) Engineering cost involved in making the tech investments and achieving PCI DSS compliance (as required).</p><p>There is no single solution for credit. So we continue to see growth in Credit Cards, BNPL, and Prepaid cards (as lending form factor).</p><p>PS: Our company Hyperface is a card issuance platform that will help you to focus on the things that matter: better activation rate, better card designs, better customer UX, score cards, underwriting, collections and customer support.</p><p>To know more about our offering, head to hyperface.co or write to us here: business@hyperface.co.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1050c4509847" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Decoding the profitability of UPI based BNPL]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-profitability-challenge-of-upi-based-bnpl-c86177d16a98?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c86177d16a98</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-cards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bnpl]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[buy-now-pay-later]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jun 2021 10:05:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-10T04:39:26.727Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Credit based payment instruments such as credit card, BNPL can be useful in exactly one of the two ways. (1) convenience of a tab (2) borrowing money to fund the transaction. When a person is purchasing something, there are only two distinct possibilities: (a) the person has enough and more money to fund the purchase themselves (b) the person doesn’t have enough money or is facing is a crunch scenario now or in the near term.</p><p>In scenario (a), the person uses one of the normal payment methods they often use: credit card / debit card / UPI. The exact payment method used for the transaction will be determined by a number of factors such as habit, a feeling of safety with a particular payment method, cashbacks, etc. In scenario (b), if the person has credit card it is the ideal way to fund these purchases. In a country like India that has severe under penetration of credit cards, people turn to options such as Bajaj Finance EMI card or IDFC Easybuy card.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*x0Inoe4I3g6n-RXk.jpg" /></figure><h4><strong>High value BNPL</strong></h4><p>With instruments such as Bajaj Finance EMI card, it is actually a personal loan that is packaged into a payment option. In most of the places where such EMI cards are accepted, the shopkeeper pays the lender a good sum of money for every transaction approved by them. This is called <strong>subvention</strong>. It can range from 3–7% depending on the amount, tenure and nature of the product being purchased. The customers may be required to pay interest if they opt for a longer tenure (longer than 3 months).</p><p><strong>Illustration:</strong></p><p>Product value = 9000 rupees<br>Subvention rate = 5%<br>Lender fee paid by merchant = 450 rupees<br>Tenure = 3 months<br>Landing interest rate of capital = 12% p.a.**<br>Cost of capital= 9000 * 1% + 6000 * 1% + 3000 * 1% = 180 rupees<br>Profit on the transaction = 270 rupees<br>RoI (@ 270/6000) = 4.5%<br>Yearly RoI = 18%</p><p>The above is a highly simplified model. In reality, there would be additional things to consider (a) down payment required from the customer (b) processing fee paid by the customer. These help increase the overall margin to a more handsome number.</p><ul><li>*Bajaj Finance cost of funds stands at about <strong>8.3%</strong> (<a href="https://www.bajajfinserv.in/bajaj-finserv-investor-presentation-%E2%80%93-q3-fy20.pdf">https://www.bajajfinserv.in/bajaj-finserv-investor-presentation-%E2%80%93-q3-fy20.pdf</a>), a tall order for smaller companies with small loan book.</li></ul><p>It is profitable to be in the high value BNPL business. Not much thought has to be given to other elements of loan book such as missed payments (leading to interest on interest) or additional interest on longer tenures.</p><h4><strong>Low value BNPL</strong></h4><p>In the above section, we saw how high value BNPL has healthy profit margin for lenders. Companies like Bajaj Finance are wildly successful since they tend to make money on every transaction. However, they also carry quite a bit of risk, since this user segment is inherently a high risk one. The most well-to-do and highly credit worthy customers tend to use credit cards. Companies like Bajaj Finance hedge this (sub prime) risk by diversifying their loan book into other products such as auto loans and home loans.</p><p>Low value BNPL cards look a lot like credit cards albeit a much simpler one to understand for the users. EMI cards are not user friendly for small value purchases that are day-to-day in nature. Whether low value BNPL is useful for customers is a debate for another day. Let us focus on the economics of this, try to understand if and how this can be made to work profitably.</p><h4><strong>Mode of payment</strong></h4><p>Day-to-day digital payments of users are mostly conducted via UPI. Hence the most compelling way to deliver BNPL credit is via UPI. Today, you would see apps such as Lazypay and Bullet providing UPI payment mode on their BNPL app. Prepaid card is another route being used by apps such Slice and EarlySalary to enable customers to utilise the line of credit. In this post, we will focus on UPI based BNPL.</p><h4><strong>UPI based BNPL</strong></h4><p>UPI is the most popular payment method among the young users in the country and its dominance is beyond any question at this point. With the government sticking to its guns on Zero MDR (<a href="https://medium.com/91-labs/zero-mdr-policy-digital-payments-643d48b5c31">however misplaced it might be</a>), the merchants favour UPI. Another reason why the merchants also favour UPI is its simplicity — easy to handle QR sticker, familiar interface of smart phones for account &amp; transaction management, zero setup cost and zero monthly rental (unlike POS terminals).</p><h4><strong>Cost of lending</strong></h4><p>Let us look at the cost structure for the lenders. Suppose the landing cost of capital is 18%. This is higher than high value BNPL because of the lack of scale. Most low value BNPL operators haven’t attained the maturity to enable them to avail low cost of capital.</p><p>Typical BNPL credit line =5000 rupees<br>Average utilisation = 3000 rupees<br>Billing cycle =15 days<br>Typical grace period for repayment = 5 days<br>Total credit days =20 days<br>Average credit days =10 (this is approximate)</p><p>Cost of funds = 3000 x 10 x 18% / 365 = 15 rupees <br>Total cost of fund / customer / year = 15 x 26 cycles = <strong>390 rupees</strong></p><h4><strong>Revenue opportunities</strong></h4><p>Since MDR is zero in UPI, there is no interchange based revenue. There is a good chance that MDR shall be revised soon but let’s not hold our breath! As the Zen philosophy says, clinging to anything is the path to suffering!</p><h4><strong>a. Convert balance into EMI</strong></h4><p>Allow the customers to convert the repayment into EMI at a given rate of interest and a fee.</p><p>EMI processing fee = 60 rupees (2% of balance)<br>EMI rate = 24%<br>Revenue from EMI = 1000 x 2% + 1000 x 4% + 1000 x 6% = 120 rupees<br>Cost of capital for EMI = 2000 x 1.5% x 3 = 90 rupees<br>Total profit = 90 rupees (processing fee + EMI revenue — Cost of capital)<br>Average number of times a typical user avails this facility = 2 <br><strong>Balance conversion to EMI revenue / customer / year = 180 rupees</strong></p><h4><strong>b. Late fees</strong></h4><p>Sometimes the user may run into cash crunch and hence unable to make timely payments resulting in penalties. In such scenarios, typically a flat late payment fee and interest is charged to the customer. Suppose the late payment fee is fixed at 50 rupees and the interest rate is 24%. Since the user makes the payment within a week or two in most scenarios, the interest earned is low (0.5%).</p><p>Fixed late payment fee = 50 rupees<br>Net Interest on outstanding balance — 0.5% x 3000 = 15 rupees<br>Total = 65 rupees<br>Average number of times a typical user pays this penalty = 2<br>Late payment revenue per customer p.a = 65 x 2 = 130 rupees</p><h4><strong>c. Transactional EMI (pay in parts)</strong></h4><p>Allow the user to transact for select categories / shops (mobile phone purchases for example) for value higher than what they are eligible for. As an example, a user who is only approved for 5000 rupees can be allowed to purchase an item worth 10000 rupees which can be paid across 6 billing cycles (3 months).</p><p>Purchase value = 12000 rupees<br>Tenure = 6 billing cycles (3 months)<br>Rate of interest = 24% per annum<br>Cost of capital = 8000 rupees x 1.5% x 3 months = 360 rupees<br>Interest earned = 8000 rupees x 2.0% x 3 months = 480 rupees<br>Processing fee = 120 rupees<br>Total Revenue = Processing Fee + Interest Earned — Cost of capital = 240 rupees<br>Average number of times a typical user avails this facility = 1<br><strong>Transactional EMI revenue = 240 rupees</strong></p><h4><strong>Total Revenue and Cost</strong></h4><p>Basis the above, you can see that the book can actually be made profitable at a transaction level when built carefully with the userbase showing the right characteristics. The numbers:</p><p>Revenue earned per customer p.a. = 180 + 130 + 240–390 = 160 rupees</p><p>Supposing the business hits scale and consistently shows that NPAs are low and the book is profitable, just like Bajaj Finance does, then the cost of capital can come down drastically.</p><p>At 12% cost of capital (and you choose not to pass on the benefit of lower cost of capital to customer), <br>Statement EMI revenue = 240 rupees<br>Late payment revenue = 160 rupees<br>Transactional EMI = 360 rupees<br>Cost of capital = (260 rupees)<br>Annual revenue per customer = 240 + 160 + 360–260 = 500 rupees</p><p>If you have a million active customers, then the direct profit on the lending book at scale is 50 crores per annum. The total outstanding will be 300 crores or thereabouts which yields a handsome ROCE of 15%.</p><p>Should a bank like HDFC or ICICI or Kotak decide to pursue BNPL revolving credit, then given their lower cost of capital, they can aim for an ROCE of 30%. However, the execution structure of these institutions aren’t conducive for the mass market of low value, high velocity transactions. Their best bet is to forge partnerships with larger fintechs that have mastered the art of execution of such a model (similar to how Bajaj Finance has tied up with Mobikwik).</p><h4><strong>Other revenue streams</strong></h4><p>A business having such large active userbase can think of many other ways of monetisation such as ad campaigns inside the app for other businesses, cross sell high margin products such as insurance or loans, direct merchandise sales (esp digital ones). Anyone that builds a million strong customer franchisee is definitely smarter (than me for sure!) and will be able to develop many other revenue streams to generate better RoI.</p><h4><strong>Risks</strong></h4><p>At the core of it, lending is all about risk management. UPI based delivery of lending makes it more complicated as there is no transactional revenue unlike a credit card. Skew more towards prime users and the profitability will suffer while risk will remain largely under control. Skew more towards sub-prime and the risk will spiral out of control. And hence, businesses should take abundance caution while building their lending book.</p><h4>A final word of caution</h4><p>The consequence of relying on users to make mistakes like not paying dues on time has drastic impact on how customers perceive your product. It is easy to focus too much on these revenue levers but remember that too much of late payments and it is actually an early warning sign that your book is turning toxic.</p><p>More importantly, the firm would come across as being exploitative of users’ lack of discipline. The general perception of credit cards are that they are extractive since the incentives are misaligned. Even the BNPL companies of the west such as Klarna are now being accused of pushing customers in debt traps by fuelling reckless spending. If you are the leader of a lending company, do not optimize on the numbers at the cost of losing your brand value.</p><p>If you are looking to build a revolving credit product, do take a look at our stack — <a href="http://hyperface.co/">hyperface.co</a>. We make it extremely simple for you to embed credit card or BNPL into your app.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c86177d16a98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Payments is inevitable.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/india-digital-payments/digital-payments-is-inevitable-4ee5b6a95278?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ee5b6a95278</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-payment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[upi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[qr-code]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rbi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2020 09:46:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-30T09:46:14.020Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is not a question of if but when.</p><p>In this series, I will explore the various causes that will inevitably push India towards the world of digital payments.</p><h4><strong>Digital Payment methods for Consumers</strong></h4><p>Broadly speaking, there are two different channels: online and offline. In the online world, the payments are digital by default. Barring commerce goods where cash on delivery is still accepted, one cannot transact online without making the payment upfront. In the offline world, there are only 2 major payment methods available for the customers: cards and UPI. For a variety of reasons, the usage of cards did not grow significantly. Offline became extremely interesting with the advent of QR codes: no more having to deploy an expensive POS device at a cost of 10000 rupees but just take a sticker of QR code that would just cost 10 rupees and paste it at the counter.</p><p>And that story has so far unfolded as this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*8mrR9YTxYyQgLL7C" /></figure><p>UPI is clocking about 1.5 billion transactions per month. That’s 50 million digital payments per day. 34722 transactions per minute. 578 transactions every second.</p><p>This is no mean feat. NPCI should hold its head very high.</p><h4>Interventions</h4><p>Govt of India decreed 0% fees on all UPI payments (and Rupay debit cards) in a bid to bring about more acceptance from merchants. Some of the steps taken by RBI (1) Recurring payments are allowed in UPI for transactions upto 2000 rupees (2) Biller category approvals for automatic on BBPS (3) NEFT availability is now 24x7 and its pricing has been reduced to zero (4) Wallet accounts exclusively for P2M using min KYC for 24 months.</p><h4>Cause and Effect</h4><p>RBI seems to believe that its campaign for digital payments has worked its charm on people and that hard work is paying off now. They are estimating that we can continue to grow digital payments at the rate of 60% every year for the next 5 years. At that rate, we are looking at close to 10x growth by 2025 from the current level. Govt of India seems to believe that its policies are yielding results. But are these the real reasons behind such tremendous success of digital payments and specifically UPI?</p><blockquote>Planck’s principle: A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.</blockquote><h4>#1 Digital Native tribes of India</h4><p>It is the younger generation which is lapping up digital payments so enthusiastically. Smart phones are an essential part of their lives and they just can’t seem to get away from their mobile phones. They are fascinated by the idea of purchasing everything from Flipkart/Amazon, ordering food from Swiggy/Zomato, calling Ola/Uber for transportation, watching moves on Netflix/Hotstar. These have become an integral part of their lives. Online commerce depends on digital payments. And hence, digital payments have become slowly but surely become a way of life.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mw8SWkGMkXLB5HH8.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/91-labs/4-som-millenial-banking-99ab6212f17">https://medium.com/91-labs/4-som-millenial-banking-99ab6212f17</a></figcaption></figure><p>In complete contrast to this, the previous generation is comfortable doing things their own way. Paying electricity bill at the electricity board offices, paying in cash to the neighbourhood grocer, cable charges paid in cash to the service provider, walking to the auto rickshaw stand for commute and paying the driver in cash. These are habits that will not change anytime soon for the previous generation.</p><blockquote>Habit is stronger than reason. — George Santayana</blockquote><p>A simple truth is that change is hard as we grow old. This is how we are built by nature. And so, the older generation is left behind.</p><h4>#2 India’s demographic advantage</h4><p>Given India’s population of ~140 crores and life expectancy of 70 years, that’s 2 crore people moving through the age spectrum every year, on average. Assuming 50% of this population (which is 1 crore) embraces digital payments into their way of life, and an average person makes about 30 digital payments in a month, that’s additional 300 million new monthly digital transactions added every year.</p><p>India has about 50% of its population below 25. Thats about 70 crores of under 25 people. So, people moving through this age spectrum is about 3 crores per annum, for the next two and a half decades. Assuming our model remains the same, this means an upward revision to 450 million monthly transactions.</p><p>(50% of 30 million) x (30 txns per month) =&gt; 450 million monthly txns</p><p>Increasing any of the above numbers while is definitely possible will be hard and will require substantial investments in infrastructure. [I will cover this in detail on a different day.]</p><h4>#3 Increasing Acceptance in Urban areas via QR codes</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9mfh_C2B4Fyu6V6ebUx_TA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This sight is now very common in Bangalore. When asked, the vegetable seller nonchalantly replied that customers are asking for it. Neither does he understand smartphones and apps nor does he feel comfortable going to ATM for withdrawing cash. His 15 year old son helps him cash out the collections everyday.</p><p>Personally, my own purchases in Amazon and Flipkart are carefully planned. But this is not the case with the casual purchases at the neighbourhood stores. I commonly see young people using QR scan and pay for their regular purchases such as vegetables, milk, chai, sutta, etc..</p><p>Before you think that my claims are anecdotal, let me bring to bear the report from RBI. In the <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&amp;ID=1142">recent report on QR code</a>, the authors have mentioned that 20 million QR codes are deployed across the country. I guess all that money raised by firms such as Paytm, PhonePe, BharatPe have resulted in such explosive growth. In just over 3 years, these companies have together deployed QR codes in such massive numbers. In comparison, even after two decades, we still have only 5 million POS devices in the country.</p><h4><strong>The way forward</strong></h4><p>For any two sided system to thrive, both supply and demand will have to grow hand in hand. We seem to have struck a nice balance and this is only going grow in the coming years.</p><p>Important questions to ponder over:</p><ol><li>In the absence of UPI, would we have seen such explosive growth in digital payments? Where does this leave the payment networks such as Visa and Mastercard?</li><li>When the transaction fee is re-introduced (and it seems like it sure will be), will the urban sellers go back to their old ways? Or is this an enduring change?</li></ol><p>Until next time!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ee5b6a95278" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/india-digital-payments/digital-payments-is-inevitable-4ee5b6a95278">Digital Payments is inevitable.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/india-digital-payments">India Digital Payments</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Art of Dealing with Failures in Organisations]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/the-art-of-dealing-with-failures-in-organisations-de51fce40b26?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/de51fce40b26</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organisational-failures]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jan 2020 08:31:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-30T08:31:09.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the year 1958, Mao Zedong launched the campaign Great Leap Forward. The central aim of the campaign was to finance industrialization by introducing radical &amp; controversial changes to agriculture. Collective farming was at the core of this ideology. The orders came down from the top and the results were communicated from the ground to the Politburo.</p><p>Agriculture had become Govt’s business now, and the Govt was eager to show great results. Everyone in the administration were eager to please. The initiative was a failure due to a myriad of reasons. Despite dwindling figures, local officials, in an attempt to escape the wrath of their superiors fabricated numbers, announcing a dramatic increase in grain harvest. The numbers were inflated at every level in the chain of command.</p><p>Based on these figures, the government pledged assistance, aid and export orders, assuming that enough grain remained for domestic demand. As a result of this unavailability of food, an estimated 45 million Chinese died of hunger in the worst famine the world has ever seen. While collective farming was a bad idea to start with, the administrative hierarchy could have salvaged the situation simply by speaking truth.</p><p>Unfortunately, plenty of organizations around the world operate in a similar manner. Leaders in the middle of the hierarchy actively avoid sending bad news to the top automatically, since it implies either bad planning on part of the senior management or bad execution on part of the middle management. Either scenario is infuriating for their bosses and entails negative consequences. Hence, there’s a tendency to suppress bad news or brush it under the rug.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/626/1*xtg-WC0zr-Y7a64_H2YX7w.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>How to fix this?</strong></p><p>Alan Mullaly, the former CEO of Ford Motors, turned around such a toxic culture or ethical fading and brought the company back to profitability through a cultural change. After taking over from Bill Ford, his first question to senior leaders was ‘Tell me — where are we going wrong?’ He requested everyone to give him color-coded weekly reports with green for good, yellow for moderate and red for bad.</p><p>Since a culture of distrust was then prevalent, he barely saw any reds. Each executive, for the fear of losing his job, was presenting reds as greens. But through conversations, Alan built the trust, pointing out that if all was green, why the company was still losing money. Gradually, senior leaders shared the real figures and armed with the right information, Alan turned the situation around.</p><p>Time and again, I see that even in the companies that are managed by smart leaders, there is a great aversion to bringing the bad news to the leader. Without the knowledge of these issues, the leader is deceived into believing that all is well when it is not the case. This deprives the organisation from being able to address the issue in its infancy with the inevitable result of this snowballing into a major issue. But there are ways to change this and inculcate a culture of trust that encourages speaking truth to power:</p><p><strong>Set the tone from the top:</strong> It is imperative that the top leader sets the tone for the rest of the leadership. They have to recognize, acknowledge and communicate authentically that failure is part of life. This sends a signal to the rest of the team to implement more ideas without the backlash of punishment.</p><p><strong>Creating a culture of tolerance:</strong> Even the largest businesses are susceptible to externalities; there will always be variables outside the business outside our control. When the leader learns to separate bad results from bad planning/execution, we will stop punishing people for bad results. Although we shouldn’t necessarily have an appetite for bad news, we should have the strength to digest it.</p><p><strong>Get unbiased data:</strong> The good thing about data is that it tells the truth. Unfortunately, when data is tortured long enough, it confesses to anything. When dealing with tangible, measurable aspects of business, it is best to first choose parameters to be evaluated and get an unbiased opinion on the same, perhaps through vetting. Changes in metrics should be subjected to third party vetting too.</p><p><strong>Anticipate failures:</strong> Keeping in mind the reality, organizations must adopt a pragmatic approach to classify every attempt based on the chances of failure into very low, low, high or very high. The leaders throughout the hierarchy must monitor data, especially as one reaches the execution stage to retain/modify the classification category. Prior information reduces the frustration and disappointment of failures when they inevitably occur.</p><p><strong>Keep the metrics simple:</strong> Unless you are building rockets, ships to launch satellites, or the quantum world of nuclear physics, keep your metrics very simple. The glamour of intellect and jargon often seduces managers (especially the product guys with fancy degrees) to unnecessarily complicate things. But it is the essential duty of the leader to simplify it. Simplifying is easier said than done.</p><p><strong>Don’t ever forget the big picture:</strong> Organizations are larger than a single product/project. Although it is all too easy to get consumed with the results or pull the levers to feel like you are in control; organizations, by definition, have an indefinite existence. Minor setbacks and slips have to be contained, but they are annoyances at best. Failure provides an opportunity to identify honest leaders, teaching them humility and optimism. If they learn to visualize the organization outliving them, they will go on to be great leaders.</p><p>It is easy to get sucked into the adrenaline of high growth, valuations, launches, and expansion plans. Sustainable organizations design products that add value and build robust systems to safeguard against tragedies. Both only happen through a culture of positivity and the will to endure through failure.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de51fce40b26" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[RBI stance on Recurring Payments: Boon or Bane?]]></title>
            <link>https://ramanathanrv.medium.com/rbi-stance-on-recurring-payments-boon-or-bane-4ece89b80d54?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ece89b80d54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[recurring-payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[subscription]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rbi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reserve-bank-of-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Sep 2019 07:30:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-16T11:15:48.490Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9Wg3JnWBsleJS8qb" /></figure><p>Regulations can make or break companies and sometimes even industries. Take the example of auto sector in our country which is in a lot of distress due to evolving policies. In the payments industry, a regulation from RBI has the power to change the dynamics overnight. We have seen this happen time and again with a host of regulations pertaining to 2FA, UPI, Wallets, etc..</p><p>RBI’s recent circular on Recurring Payments has almost everyone in the payments industry wonder if this unshackles the market for recurring payments. At an immediate glance, it seems so: (1) opening up for all sectors (2) opening up for all types of cards: credit, debit, and prepaid (3) no limits except for per transaction limit of 2000 rupees. But it does come with a string of conditions to prevent abuse. Taken together, is it a silver lining or the beginning of yet another winter?</p><p>The circular can be availed here: <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11668&amp;Mode=0">https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11668&amp;Mode=0</a></p><h4><strong>Background</strong></h4><p>The business of recurring payments has always been caught in the middle of two competing priorities: <strong>convenience</strong> vs <strong>safety</strong>. In 2009, RBI decided that every transaction has to be mandatorily authenticated by the customer. The only accepted authentication schemes are the ones approved by the Issuer of the said card. RBI did not explicitly endorse 3D Secure technology (the one adopted by the Banks). But since the card networks (and the card Issuers) already had this in place, it was convenient to simply enable this. And hence, the widespread adoption of <a href="https://usa.visa.com/pay-with-visa/featured-technologies/verified-by-visa.html">Verified by Visa</a> and <a href="https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/consumers/payment-technologies/securecode.html">MasterCard SecureCode</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*gjYfcdykJZvtETev" /></figure><h4><strong>Did the RBI achieve its goal?</strong></h4><p>Absolutely. RBI intended this to be the best way to protect the interests of the consumers. In a way, this is how our society organizes on most occasions. We lack trust with our institutions and hence defer to the principle of Prevention is better than cure. Unfortunately, it is the same with this particular decision as well. We will come to this at a later point in time. It suffices to say that RBI wanted to prevent fraud in the first place rather than letting the system address the same after it has happened.</p><p>Payment Fraud is a real and persistent problem across the globe with card payments. With this RBI move, Payment Fraud was reduced to near zero in India in a short span of time. But, it did come with a cost.</p><h4><strong>Collateral Damage</strong></h4><p>Online businesses were collateral damage due to the introduction of 3D secure. This is an indirect cost that we pay for a system where there is a pervasive lack of Trust. Success rates plummeted for almost all online businesses, thereby affecting their topline. When 2FA was mandated for IVR transactions too, Hrush Bhatt of Cleartrip penned an extremely harsh take condemning 3D Secure:</p><p><a href="https://www.medianama.com/2011/02/223-how-indias-banks-killed-the-future-of-commerce-hrush-bhatt-cleartrip/">https://www.medianama.com/2011/02/223-how-indias-banks-killed-the-future-of-commerce-hrush-bhatt-cleartrip/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/0*80NQVMw2WjfKHjHx" /></figure><p>From the point of a Merchant, it is completely understandable. Their topline would have fallen by as much as the reduction in the Payment Success Rate.</p><p><strong>Recurring Payments: the other casualty</strong></p><p>The regulation automatically disqualifies any and all recurring payments. Since the user is not present in the renewal flow, payments cannot happen. There are a host of usecases that desperately need Recurring Payments such as SIP investments, Bill Payments, and Content Subscriptions.</p><h4><strong>Making amends; Dream of a summer</strong></h4><p>Mobile revolution has created tremendous opportunities for Indian businesses. Particularly for the content based apps, this is the golden period. Apps such as Hotstar &amp; Amazon Prime are setting records. Subscription programs are the new battlefronts for large companies like Amazon, Flipkart, Swiggy, Zomato, Paytm. Not only can they boost e-commerce, but they also can fuel Mutual Fund investments, Lending businesses which will help grow the country’s financial health.</p><p>For RBI to bring back recurring payments, there can’t be any other reason but that regulation is suffocating such businesses. To put it in better words, it is perhaps time RBI worked towards enabling and supporting such businesses.</p><h4><strong>Devil is in the Detail; Always</strong></h4><p>While the intention is appreciable, the actions need to be equally glorious. From the notification, it is clear that RBI is unable to fully come out of the 2FA hangover. The following points, taken from the notification, could not mean anything but that:</p><blockquote>8. As a risk mitigant and customer facilitation measure, the issuer shall send a pre-transaction notification to the cardholder, at least 24 hours prior to the actual charge / debit to the card.</blockquote><blockquote>10. On receipt of the pre-transaction notification, the cardholder shall have the facility to opt-out of that particular transaction or the e-mandate. Any such opt-out shall entail AFA validation by the issuer.</blockquote><blockquote>15. The issuer shall provide the cardholder an online facility to withdraw any e-mandate at any point of time following which no further recurring transactions shall be allowed for the withdrawn e-mandate.</blockquote><p>From the above, we see that the onus for a safe implementation (safety here is actually debatable!) is with the card issuing banks. There are major problems here:</p><p><strong>Card issuers have to develop &amp; maintain additional software infrastructure</strong></p><p>This capability for providing the customer safety net is not readily available in their system. And hence, they have to invest in development, testing, deployment &amp; maintenance. In my opinion, it would take Issuers more than 6 months to exactly implement the requirements put forth by the RBI.</p><p><strong>Fragmented UI and UX</strong></p><p>Since the guidelines don’t spell out the exact requirements for UI/UX, expect a fragmented experience across the banks. Banks cannot be faulted for sub par UI/UX. Everyone (Customers, Merchants and Banks) loses here.</p><p><strong>Periodicity is non-negotiable here</strong></p><p>The start and end date of a subscription typically involves billing for partial month &amp; hence varying amount. Since the transaction window is Issuer’s prerogative, Merchants will struggle to deal with this scenario.</p><p><strong>Plan upgrades</strong></p><p>While I may register for a Netflix mobile only subscription now, I would like to upgrade to a full HD plan later. That thought process would be absent for most Customers at the time of subscription. Upgrading later will involve recreation of Mandate which is quite cumbersome.</p><p><strong>Max amount (for variable amounts) problem</strong></p><p>This field doesn’t exist in most Card Acquiring systems. Even if it exists, it needs to be figured out how this information can flow in the card networks to reach the Issuers.</p><p><strong>Different flows for India vs non-India issued cards</strong></p><p>Merchants have to identify the country of issuance &amp; accordingly present the users with different flows as non-India issued cards will not have the mandate flow implemented.</p><p><strong>Card issuer is forced to be a party in the Buyer Seller relationship</strong></p><p>The contract is between the Buyer and the Seller. At best, the card issuing bank is only incidentally related to this contract. At least, the acquiring Bank is an enabler to this Contract. When the customer wishes to switch the payment method, the journey is now almost that of creating a new Contract.</p><h4><strong>Why not enforce via Acquirers and Merchants?</strong></h4><p>Among all the options available to them, RBI went with the Issuer first approach. This would be the hardest to implement as all the Banks have to make amends to their system now.</p><p>Payment Fraud notwithstanding, subscription businesses are powered by contracts between the Merchant and the Customer. Merchants are empowered by Acquirers to collect online payments. Acquirers are directly accountable to RBI and operate as governed by the Payment Systems and Settlements Act.</p><blockquote>21. It shall be the responsibility of acquirers to ensure compliance by merchants on-boarded by them in respect of all aspects of these instructions.</blockquote><p>And yet, RBI places little trust on Acquirers to abide by their instructions in spirit and letter. It is the same old principle of “Prevention is better than Cure” which is again in play here. And this perhaps is going to cost us again. There is no clarity on when Issuers will be ready with the changes. This would inevitably delay the rollout. And hence a lost opportunity for the businesses.</p><h4><strong>My Wishlist for RBI to strengthen Digital Payments</strong></h4><p>Online commerce is registering exponential growth in the country. We are no longer what we used to be a decade ago. Any drastic measure by RBI will have far reaching implications for us. With this realisation, it would bode well for us if RBI strengthens all constituent parts of the payments ecosystem:</p><p><strong>#1 Improve Customer support by Banks:</strong> This leaves a lot to be desired. RBI should monitor the NPS of various Banks and make them invest in Customer Support. Define SLAs for resolving various customer issues. Appreciate the good ones and heavily penalise the bad ones.</p><p><strong>#2 Work more closely with Acquirers and Aggregators:</strong> The current scenario is that RBI is way too comfortable dealing with the Banks. They should open direct channels with all the Acquirers and Aggregators, discuss key issues and welcome creative ideas.</p><p><strong>#3 Take more risks:</strong> With the increasing confidence in the payments ecosystem players, more calculated risks can be taken. For instance, take the current limit of 2000 rupees. Why not 5000 rupees?</p><p><strong>#4 Be more data driven:</strong> Aggressively source Data and Inferences from ecosystem players. Use this as the basis for arriving at decisions.</p><p><strong>#5 Prefer Penalty to Ban:</strong> In case of contract breaches, use Penalty as a tool to bring institutions in line rather than Ban. Use the Penalty proceeds to fund the safety net for Customers.</p><p><strong>#6 Focus on UX:</strong> Last but the most important thing is to balance customer protection with customer experience. To save 1% of users from abuse, we cannot sacrifice good UX for 99% of the users.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>RBI’s concerns are well placed and are definitely understandable. But at some point, one should let the child walk and overcome the fear of the child falling down, otherwise, the child may never learn to walk.</p><p><em>Disclaimer: The above are my personal views and do not represent that of any organization that I am associated with.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ece89b80d54" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zero MDR: Impact on small businesses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/91-labs/zero-mdr-policy-digital-payments-643d48b5c31?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/643d48b5c31</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-payment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[d91-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debit-card]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2019 06:02:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-16T14:16:08.049Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KjZrw-9ySPGRC7wkra98yw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Ahmedabad is an interesting city for many reasons. But on that day, I was destined to be at the prestigious Indian Institute of Management for interaction with the students perhaps for encouraging them to take up entrepreneurship. The hall was named after the founders of TaxiForSure (acquired by Ola) “Raghunandan and Aprameya”. Fabulous!</p><p>It was on the 5th of July. The Finance Minister was presenting the budget in the Parliament. While we know that Digital Payments is an agenda that is very close to this Government, what did come out of the budget was quite a surprise.</p><p>During my conversation with the students, someone pointed out the announcement of Zero MDR and asked what I thought of it.</p><p>For more than a year now, Govt has been subsidising MDR (Merchant Discount Rate — aggregate transaction fee paid by the merchant) for transactions less than 2000 rupees and paid with a Debit instrument such as Debit card or UPI. The new announcement extends this further and removes the MDR altogether for all band of transactions paid using debit instruments.</p><p>I couldn’t really wrap my head around this at that time. It took a while to think through the whole picture and the implications. It&#39;s a long one, so please bear with me and grab a cup of coffee!</p><p><strong>Subsidy economics</strong></p><p>The Law of Demand dictates that if the price of a product goes down, then the quantity demand of the product goes high. Mostly though!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/440/0*xOHjNM6a0gcvR2V4" /></figure><p>The twin forces that drive an economy are the supply and demand. But we are operating in a regulated area, so this is as complicated as it can get!</p><p>We can remove most of the other variables, and make the argument simple: since we are reducing the pricing of digital payments acceptance, quantity demand should automatically go up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*OVaupzWYl4aSs7Eh" /></figure><p>If only things were very simple, life would be so easy! Digital Payments ecosystem is anything but simple. There are several forces acting in this ecosystem and any pricing distortions will change the dynamics significantly. A friend of mine who was a veteran banker once said that Visa / Mastercard networks employ well qualified (PhD) economists to simulate experiments, measure various outcomes, before arriving at any pricing related decision.</p><p><strong>Understanding the market divisions</strong></p><p>A fair share of my transactions is conducted online. Seeing the market cap of companies like Amazon, and the valuation of companies like Flipkart, I am fairly convinced that a lot of people are like me. They like to buy stuff online. And of course, we go to restaurants, movies and do a lot of stuff offline as well!</p><p>So the market can be broadly segmented as online &amp; offline. Given the growth of the online economy such as e-commerce &amp; sharing economy, it has become an essential part of our life. The online economy relies heavily on the digital payments infrastructure to grow their business. This is akin to having electricity and water. Hence, for all our further discussion, we can safely say that the online economy will be an all-weather ally for digital payments.</p><p>In the offline economy, we can broadly segment into two categories: large format vs single store. Large format constitutes stores operated by big businesses such as BigBazaar, Domino’s, DMart, Hotel Saravana Bhavan, Lifestyle, Titan, etc.. Whereas the small ones are typically your Mom &amp; Pop stores operated in a single store format. All the neighbourhood convenience stores, medical shops, hardware shops, bakeries fall into this category.</p><p><strong>Acceptance Matrix</strong></p><p>It is almost impossible to find a DMart store or a BigBazaar store that doesn’t have a POS machine at the checkout counter. On the other hand, it is very difficult to find a neighbourhood convenience store that has a POS machine and accepts card transactions. This is very telling from the number of POS machines that are deployed in the country. And there are a variety of reasons as to why this is the situation today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/818/0*gyv25weJ-aVqz1CT" /></figure><p>Large-format stores attract a lot of credit card users. And it&#39;s proven (at least not yet unproven) that credit card users spend more than they actually intend to spend (due to various behavioural reasons). And also, credit card users will insist on paying with cards only. Hence, large format stores have no choice but to support digital payments. There is yet another compelling reason. Cash handling is very expensive and mismanagement of cash is a real issue. For these reasons, they have become ardent supporters of digital payments.</p><p>On the other hand, the dynamics of a small store is very different. Cash handling is not a problem and too few users expect credit cards. Since these are convenience stores, there is no scope of doing additional business with credit card acceptance. There could be many other reasons. What is very clear is that small stores don’t have POS machines and don’t seem to want POS machines. But we are quite adamant that we want them also to have POS machines (or QR codes) and accept digital payments.</p><p>Now that we have established where the majority of the problem is, let us try and understand the pricing aspects of digital payments acceptance. This is crucial for finding out the reasons why the small-format stores are reluctant to accept digital payments.</p><p><strong>Pricing aspects of digital payments acceptance</strong></p><p>There are two key pricing aspects to digital payments acceptance: (1) cost of a typical Point of Sale device (2) transaction charges. The capex charges are frequently converted to opex and are charged as a monthly rental on the device. The argument here is that of buying vs renting (we are not going to delve deeper into that). Since rental is the most prevalent, we will assume that as the market choice.</p><p>To know the other costs associated with the POS machines, please <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HMoNx4eDHZbfH9_mVy_MHblw1M3yfSSr/view">proceed here</a>. I am not singling out any bank here, most other banks have a similar schedule of charges. It is not a happy thought to imagine a small store owner trying to make sense of the schedule of charges. His experience will tell him that all the fine print is going to cost him a lot!</p><p>Banks make it incredibly difficult to understand the pricing. Also, charging for statements, dashboard, etc. are extremely annoying. These are expected to be free. Since Banks have the compulsion to make money (due to the org structure), they resort to such hidden charges. Market disruption will take care of these &amp; so I am going to discount them altogether. (If anything, the Govt could have mandated banks to simplify pricing.)</p><p>For the purpose of analysis, we are going to make some broad assumptions. Most of the numbers are close approximate rather than being entirely accurate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/938/0*zgQs0UJpBJV-DO9_" /><figcaption>Price economics of POS for different segments</figcaption></figure><p>The device rental cost is incidental, in that the Banks or Companies selling the POS machines usually don’t make it themselves. They get it from vendors like Verifone or Ingenico. Hence, a substantial part of the money from that goes to the manufacturer of these machines.</p><p>The column “Debit MDR @ 0.5%” is the one that the Govt is planning to subsidise. A related point is that who is going to subsidise this. There is no clarity on that as of today, so we will leave it for another day...</p><p>The other column that you need to pay attention to is the one labelled “Acquirer Margin on Debit”. This is the money that the company (or Bank) which is selling POS to the merchant outlet makes from Debit transactions. The rest of the money from the Debit MDR goes to the ecosystem (card issuing bank and network like Visa/Mastercard/Rupay).</p><p><strong>The sustainability question of serving Small MSME</strong></p><p>From the numbers, it is evident why no one is interested in selling POS machines to small merchants. At 60 to 100 rupees a month, it is impossible to run a sustainable organization without a great level of automation. The POS business hasn’t reached that level of automation. Rajeev from Innoviti put this aptly in one of the conversations: “People are very comfortable unboxing their mobile phones and figuring their way out with setting it up. But most are scared to touch the POS machines. Without expert help, merchants are unwilling to set up POS machines”. Thus making the whole exercise very expensive. Companies like Square tackled this with innovative design. But it has remained a challenge in India.</p><p><strong>Does Zero MDR really benefit small MSME</strong></p><p>MDR charges increase linearly with the size of the store. Thus, it is far more beneficial for large format stores with a high number and/or value of transactions. The difference is in fact more telling at 10x for Large Format stores compared to small MSMEs. But these stores already accept digital payments.</p><p>The real problem is with the rental charges rather than the MDR itself. That fixed cost is far more stinging for a small MSME than the MDR charges. With the rental cost, a small MSME is being asked to take a big leap without any guarantee of returns. Paying 500 rupees for POS machine every month, can they generate a tangible increase in sales which makes them, say 600 rupees? Isn’t that how a businessman thinks? Unless we answer that question, we simply cannot demand the Mom &amp; Pop stores to deploy POS machine.</p><p>Our excessive focus on cost &amp; pricing has diverted our energy from seeking value creation. Look no further than JustDial and Zomato to understand this. Small business establishments pay as much as 6000 rupees per month for listing in these platforms. But they do so because they see tremendous value in these platforms. Instead of treating this as an expense, they treat it as an investment, because it generates additional revenue.</p><p><strong>Subsidy as the cure for Market Failure?</strong></p><p>Stores can pay, if they see the value. No one can refute that. In the case of POS machines, there is no tangible proof that stores will see increased sales by deploying POS. If this had been the case, they themselves would have done it. When we cannot bring creativity to the market, the subsidy is the answer to drive behavioural change. To that limited extent, the Govt’s move is welcome. Let us then establish very clearly that POS companies have so far failed to provide value additions over &amp; beyond just acceptance.</p><p><strong>Can POS companies provide additional value?</strong></p><p>This is easier said than done. Hardware iterations take time &amp; need patient capital. We do have favourable conditions though. As Kunal Shah likes to say, “we have a CTO in every household, who knows how to use a smartphone”, I say “we have a waiting-to-be CTO in every small MSME”. As younger people take over their parents’ business, they will be far more willing to embrace technology. They will be more tech-savvy and would even start directing the market. So, I am optimistic about the future &amp; firmly believe that the market will itself move towards digital payments.</p><p>Companies like Square have given themselves tonnes of capital, manpower and time to solve the MSME POS problem. It is unrealistic to expect similar output with a very small fraction of the risk capital available with companies here. We try nonetheless.</p><p>I wish the Govt had more faith in us, the scrappy entrepreneurs, to provide a market-based solution within the current parameters, instead of rushing in with their own brush strokes, the contours of which are now difficult to fathom. There are now ripples in the water and the picture is distorted. Hope, clarity returns quickly and we can all go back to business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=643d48b5c31" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/91-labs/zero-mdr-policy-digital-payments-643d48b5c31">Zero MDR: Impact on small businesses</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/91-labs">D91 Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UPI vs Netbanking: Game of the throne]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/91-labs/game-of-payments-upi-tsunami-crashing-the-netbanking-party-153982f0c313?source=rss-73ff491ca475------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/153982f0c313</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[upi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netbanking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[d91-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramanathan RV]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Jun 2019 06:44:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-11T13:00:41.038Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>UPI vs Netbanking: Game of the throne 👑</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fLVUa3ObY3hPv_QBlrDiuQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>It was the year 2008. I was working for BankBazaar.com then. We were ruffling through the Alexa pages to find the top sites of the country. For the uninitiated, this is how we used to figure out the internet traffic trend in the country: <a href="https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/IN">find it here</a>. The websites of the top banks such as HDFC Bank and ICICI Bank featured amongst the very top in the country then. It made sense for BankBazaar.com to partner with the Banks and grow the business by serving the customers who were landing in the Banks’ websites.</p><p>Fast forward to 2019, even today we could see HDFC &amp; ICICI figure in the top 100 websites. But the story is only partially complete. The smartphone is the next big growth frontier for all of us. The trends in the mobile world are quite contrary to what is in the Desktop world! Have Banks been able to conquer the mobile world? What is the performance of Banks’ properties, especially their mobile banking apps? In particular, how is this affecting the payments landscape? This is the topic I wish to explore here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EC-mO3ETKvCnvZMK" /><figcaption>Download stats and Ratings of Mobile Banking apps</figcaption></figure><h3>The Good Old Days (were they really?!)</h3><p>When we had just started Juspay in 2012, there were only 3 modes of payments: Credit Card, Debit Card and NetBanking. And unsurprisingly, NetBanking used to command <strong>35% of the transaction share</strong>. Remember that I was using a feature phone at that time. My partner-in-crime at Juspay though had a smartphone, one of the earliest models!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*cgYRQcAUomXqDTaH" /><figcaption>IRCTC Checkout page in the year 2011</figcaption></figure><h3>The Big Push</h3><p>Over the years, as though guided by some variation of Moore’s Law, digital payments in the country grew beyond anyone’s imagination. Our payment stories to the outside world changed every 18 months or so! We flowed in excitement from one story to another: Wallets, PayLater, UPI. Today, netBanking’s share of transactions has fallen to a historical low. It is teetering anywhere between 10% — 15%. I hear you asking, isn’t the market share of UPI also similar? Perhaps, but note that UPI is a new entrant with unstoppable growth. So, it is quite interesting to imagine how they are both going to trend from here.</p><p>Razorpay’s blog paints a more bleak picture for NetBanking transactions. They are seeing NetBanking and UPI market share at 12% and 34% respectively. That&#39;s a staggering difference in the market share! Read about it here: <a href="https://razorpay.com/blog/upi-20x-growth-april-2019/">https://razorpay.com/blog/upi-20x-growth-april-2019/</a>.</p><h3>Acceptance woes:</h3><p>Pay with NetBanking is fighting another battle on the acceptance front. E-commerce companies have begun to subtly and sometimes directly promote UPI all at the expense of NetBanking. Here is a map of the same: There is the growing tribe of apps that don’t support NetBanking (either fully or partially) as a payment method:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/0*YLUWjQBqFn687ChA" /><figcaption>Apps that are promoting UPI over NetBanking</figcaption></figure><p>On one hand there is reducing acceptance, and on the other hand, there is no single force pushing NetBanking ahead in the market. It is my firm belief that NetBanking will continue to see further decline in the coming years and e-commerce companies will suppress these options until eventually a day when they will completely remove them. Allow me to explain with 5 reasons as to why I believe so:</p><h3>#1 Bad UX, poor success rate</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8YlWDIhHR7mbE8jGrMVYYw.jpeg" /></figure><p>It takes about 50 touch inputs from the customer to complete a NetBanking transaction and average time taken to complete is 55 seconds. This is the most elaborate checkout method as of today. In comparison, a card transaction takes about 15 touch inputs from the customer and UPI takes about 6 touch inputs. This elaborate process causes significant dropouts and consequently, businesses see lower success rates compared to other popular modes of transaction. Our specific comparison here is cards &amp; UPI.</p><p>Banks have repurposed their NetBanking interface for e-commerce payments. Even today, many banks haven’t optimised the experience for mobile form factor leading to poor UX on mobile, which has become the primary device for many Indians.</p><p>On average, NetBanking transactions register 10% lower success rate than cards &amp; UPI.</p><h3>#2 Bad economics; higher cost per transaction</h3><p>NetBanking is the costliest debit method in the market now. Debit cards are capped at 0.9% and UPI is capped at 0.65%. Whereas, merchants pay anywhere between 1.2% to 2.0% for a NetBanking transaction. While the payment mode is different, all three of them NetBanking, Debit card, UPI ultimately debits the money from the bank account only. In other words, the underlying account remains the same for all three form factors.</p><p>This difference in pricing will have a trickle-down effect. Businesses will be seen promoting UPI subtly over NetBanking, as it makes economic sense to do so.</p><p>Note the Govt reimbursement of MDR for debit transactions less than 2000 rupees doesn’t extend to NetBanking transactions, only debit cards and UPI are covered. This creates even more of a disparity in the cost structure.</p><p>As I am writing this, there are talks in the corridors of Delhi and the RBI of further reduction of MDR charges for UPI and Debit cards!</p><h3>#3 Stuck Payments; Lost refunds; Lack of Safety Net</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*408jaeVoTEISX4GvQDTYLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Transactions timeout for various reasons during the payment process. In case of cards &amp; UPI, the system enforces the Banks to respond with proper status under an SLA (sans extended outage). However, this is not the case with NetBanking. Every bank has its own way of providing status. Some banks ask to query after 15 minutes; some don’t provide such facility at all. The settlement file which arrives the next day becomes the ultimate source of truth. This leads to frustration for both businesses and consumers. The same scenario repeats in Refunds as well. Due to such delays, businesses like Myntra have resorted to processing refunds via IMPS.</p><p>While these are problems for businesses, the biggest problem for customers is the lack of safety net. In the cards &amp; UPI world, a customer can raise a dispute on a transaction. There is a defined process, governed by an SLA to deal with the dispute. The disputes also flow through the networks (Visa / Mastercard) and they have defined the SLA that the Banks have agreed to.</p><p>However, none of this is available for a NetBanking transaction. The customer is at the mercy of the Bank to deal with the issue.</p><h4>#4 Rise of UPI &amp; further fall of Mobile Banking</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QsWvsIO4Nkt15zNSy2m8Aw.jpeg" /></figure><p>With the rise of UPI, mobile banking adoption becomes a further challenge. As UPI apps are driving P2P more, the utility value of Mobile Banking apps come down further. Mobile Banking adoption has always been lukewarm. This is evident from the numbers clocked by the apps of popular banks. Banks are losing the plot while companies like Google, PhonePe &amp; Paytm are scripting mega victories in user adoption.</p><p>Banks are hoping that the usage of UPI apps will reduce once UPI transaction charges are put in place. But I doubt if that will happen. Sure enough, some are gaming the system for attractive cashbacks. But I don’t believe that these numbers are huge. This was the window that UPI needed to grow and now there is no stopping this juggernaut.</p><p>It is easy for the banks to make UPI the scapegoat for their own shortcomings. HDFC Bank is the largest private bank in the country has struggled much with their Mobile Banking app strategy. They went through a <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/banking-finance/hdfc-to-restore-mobile-banking-apps-old-version-time-process-heres-all-you-need-to-know/1402320/">painful phase while trying to transition to a new app</a>. For a bank that has issued more than 2.7 crore debit cards, it has less than 10 lakh active users on its mobile banking app.</p><h4>#5 The rise of millennials</h4><p>This is my favourite! It is easy to stereotype a section people but it&#39;s a slippery slope, so I will tread with some caution. The next generation always seems to be impatient in the eyes of the previous generation. I was accused of the same by my parents. I still am! Guess, it is just the age factor! In my teens, I had to walk to the Bank to effect a fund transfer, typically by depositing cheque. Don’t ask me who trusted me with Cheques, somebody did back then and more people seem to trust me with nowadays! During my college days, I had to wait in the queue outside ATM for our turn to step into the air-conditioned (the saving grace, given the heat of Trichy!) facility to withdraw money.</p><p>My dad still goes to the Bank. I prefer going to the ATM for cash. I doubt if the next generation would fancy going to the ATMs too. Impatience just seems to be growing from generation to generation! The generation that grew up with smartphone will have different ideas of a smartphone. Anything that can be done with their smartphone, the millennials will do with their smartphone. The Banks won the Branch game and then the ATM game. However, they are not winning the smartphone game.</p><p>What do you think?</p><h3>The impending evolution of Banks</h3><p>While paying with NetBanking is inevitably hitting its expiry date, there is a silver lining. With technology evolving, we are seeing more power in the hands of the NBFCs (the growing number of new age lending companies is a testimony to this). We also have young &amp; ambitious entrepreneurs like Sachin Bansal who want to take a stab at implementing a Bank in their own imagination. Everything that a Bank does will eventually be unbundled and Banks may look very different a few decades from now. I can’t wait to enter this future!</p><h3>About D91 labs:</h3><p>D91 labs is an open source initiative by <a href="https://setu.co/">setu.co</a> to help Bharat build great fintech products. We organise and publish user research, insights and frameworks for fintech in India. Please follow us on medium for more exciting stories and insights on Bharat.</p><p>Psst! We are looking for collaborators and contributors to D91 labs. If you are interested, please drop your details here and we will reach out to you</p><h4><a href="https://forms.gle/gUc3tEQ35z8MaJcA6">Collaborate with D91 labs</a></h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=153982f0c313" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/91-labs/game-of-payments-upi-tsunami-crashing-the-netbanking-party-153982f0c313">UPI vs Netbanking: Game of the throne</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/91-labs">D91 Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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