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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ramzi Assi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ramzi Assi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ramzi Assi on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lebanon’s Proposed Banking Gap Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/lebanons-proposed-banking-gap-law-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-9366df165b85?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9366df165b85</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bankruptcy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 11:32:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-24T11:32:30.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After more than five years of paralysis, Lebanon has finally put forward a proposed “gap law” aimed at addressing the financial losses in the banking system. While the initiative is a necessary step toward restoring some order, the substance of the proposal reveals a deeply uneven allocation of losses and risks. Framed as a technical solution, the law ultimately raises fundamental questions about fairness, accountability, and the true meaning of reform.</p><p>This article breaks the proposal down into the good, the bad, and the ugly, before examining what it really means for depositors in practical, financial terms.</p><h3>The Good: A Long-Overdue Acknowledgment of Past Abuses</h3><p>To its credit, the draft law finally acknowledges that part of the financial collapse resulted from unjust enrichment and distortive practices rather than fate or macroeconomic misfortune alone.</p><p>Three elements stand out positively:</p><p>First, the law introduces a clawback mechanism on transfers abroad executed during the crisis years. This implicitly recognizes that certain capital outflows were abusive, selective, and detrimental to the collective interest, particularly when ordinary depositors were trapped behind informal capital controls.</p><p>Second, it proposes taxation or corrective measures on loans repaid in Lebanese pounds at artificially low exchange rates. Many borrowers were able to extinguish dollar-denominated debts at a fraction of their real value, generating a massive and inequitable wealth transfer. Addressing this imbalance is essential to restoring basic economic justice.</p><p>Third, the law targets exorbitant interest income earned during the pre-crisis period, particularly from high-yield deposits and financial engineering schemes. The idea that extraordinary gains should help absorb extraordinary losses is both economically sound and socially necessary.</p><p>These measures, while imperfect, signal a shift away from total denial and toward partial accountability.</p><h3>The Bad: Missing Numbers and One-Sided Risk Allocation</h3><p>Where the proposal begins to unravel is in what it fails to specify.</p><p>The law remains alarmingly vague on the most critical elements:</p><ul><li>The exact size of the losses</li><li>The precise amounts subject to clawback</li><li>The identity of the bond issuer (state, central bank, or a special vehicle)</li><li>The legal ranking and enforceability of the instruments to be issued</li></ul><p>Without these details, the proposal reads less like a law and more like a framework awaiting future political compromise.</p><p>More importantly, the law explicitly avoids a bail-in of bank shareholders. Depositors will take haircuts, yet bank owners retain their institutions. This creates a profound asymmetry:</p><ul><li>Bank shareholders preserve their upside if Lebanon recovers</li><li>Depositors permanently lose capital with no participation in future recovery</li></ul><p>In any genuine resolution, equity holders should absorb losses before creditors. Here, the opposite effectively occurs.</p><h3>The Ugly: Immunizing Bank Shareholders from Personal Liability</h3><p>The most troubling aspect of the draft lies in a clause limiting loss absorption strictly to bank equity.</p><p>Under existing Lebanese law, shareholders can be pursued beyond their capital in cases of mismanagement, fraud, or abuse. The proposed text effectively neutralizes this possibility, shielding shareholders’ personal assets from legal action.</p><p>In plain terms, this provision rewrites the rules retroactively, granting bank owners a level of protection they never legally had. It transforms what should be a reckoning into a controlled write-off — at the expense of depositors.</p><p>This is not merely a financial choice; it is a legal and moral one.</p><h3>What the Law Means for Depositors in Practice</h3><p>The second pillar of the proposal concerns how deposits will actually be repaid. Depositors are divided into tiers based on size, with repayment stretched over long horizons and partially converted into financial instruments.</p><h3>Deposits up to USD 100,000</h3><p>Depositors would receive USD 25,000 per year over four years.</p><p>On paper, this looks like a full recovery. In reality, receiving funds over five years with no interest implies a present-value haircut of roughly 10–15% from today’s standpoint.</p><p>Once we account for the six years already lost since 2019, the effective haircut is materially larger.</p><h3>Deposits up to USD 1 million</h3><ul><li>USD 100,000 paid in cash over four years</li><li>The remainder converted into bonds:</li><li>Amortizing at 2% annually</li><li>Residual principal repaid in year 10</li></ul><p>The value of these bonds depends entirely on how markets price them.</p><p>If they are credibly backed by gold and perceived as risk-free, they would likely trade at 4–5% yields, close to investment-grade sovereign benchmarks.</p><p>If uncertainty persists, yields could approach 7%, roughly in line with countries such as Jordan.</p><p>Under those assumptions, 10-year bonds would trade at roughly 50–70 cents on the dollar.</p><p>This translates into an overall recovery of about 30–35% for a USD 1 million depositor.</p><h3>Larger Deposits</h3><ul><li>Deposits up to USD 5 million: repayment stretched over 15 years</li><li>Deposits above USD 5 million: repayment extended to 20 years</li></ul><p>Expected market prices:</p><ul><li>15-year bonds: ~40–60 cents</li><li>20-year bonds: ~30–50 cents</li></ul><p>Once discounted, total recoveries for large deposits likely fall into the 15–25% range, depending on bond pricing and credibility.</p><h3>The Time Factor: The Hidden Haircut</h3><p>Any analysis that ignores time severely understates the losses.</p><p>Six years have already passed with no interest and no access. Adjusted for inflation and opportunity cost — and especially when benchmarked to gold — one dollar received today is worth roughly half of a 2019 dollar.</p><p>In other words, even “full” nominal repayment masks a substantial real loss hence the real recovery for every bucket is much lower than the price of the Bonds.</p><h3>A Concrete Example</h3><p>Consider a depositor with USD 160,000 in 2019 who managed to withdraw USD 10,000 per year at real value since the crisis and will now receive USD 100,000 over the next four years.</p><p>On paper, this depositor recovers almost everything. In reality, when adjusted for time and forgone interest, the effective haircut is still around 20%.</p><p>This illustrates the broader truth: even the “winners” of this plan are losing.</p><p>It remains to be seen whether this proposed law will ultimately pass both the Cabinet and Parliament. However, one reality is now unavoidable: the losses exist, and there is no win-win solution.</p><p>After six years of negotiations, committees, plans, counterplans, and political maneuvering, it has become abundantly clear that a consensual solution is unattainable. Every stakeholder seeks full recovery, and no one is willing to formally recognize or absorb losses. The result is paralysis — and paralysis itself is a choice.</p><p>In the absence of a comprehensive resolution, Lebanon has effectively defaulted to the “no-solution” scenario. Depositors continue to withdraw small monthly amounts — often the equivalent of USD 1,000 or less — while time does the rest of the damage. Under this path, deposits may eventually be repaid nominally in full, but only once real assets such as gold have appreciated dramatically — say to USD 20,000 per ounce. At that point, a dollar returned would be worth only 5–10% of its 2019 purchasing power, rendering the notion of “full repayment” largely meaningless.</p><p>The alternative is theoretically clear and legally grounded: applying existing laws governing bankruptcy and liquidation, forcing the sale of bank assets, and pursuing recourse against shareholders’ personal wealth to maximize depositor recovery. This is how losses are allocated in functioning legal systems. Yet in Lebanon’s political reality, such an outcome is effectively impossible — barring a coup d’état, systemic collapse, or direct external intervention.</p><p>Between these two extremes lies the proposed gap law: imperfect, unequal, and deeply controversial, but nonetheless an attempt to formalize loss recognition rather than allowing inflation and time to silently confiscate deposits. Whether Lebanon chooses an explicit solution or continues drifting toward an implicit one, the outcome is the same in substance — only different in transparency.</p><p>The real question, then, is not whether losses will be borne, but who bears them, how honestly they are acknowledged, and how much longer the country is willing to pretend otherwise.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9366df165b85" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lebanon’s Financial Crossroads: Unwind the Past or Build the Future?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/lebanons-financial-crossroads-unwind-the-past-or-build-the-future-c2b366932472?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2b366932472</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2025 12:22:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-22T12:22:13.052Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Lebanon’s Financial Crossroads: Unwind the Past or Build the Future?</p><p>As the race for the next governor of the Lebanese Central Bank intensifies, so does the debate over deposit recovery. In this piece, I don’t aim to offer a solution but rather to shed light on the philosophical question at the heart of this issue.</p><p>The Facts<br>Currently, around $90 billion in deposits remain trapped in Lebanese banks. The majority of these banks&#39; assets are held by the Central Bank, which, in turn, possesses approximately $10 billion in liquid assets and $30 billion in gold.</p><p>Two Extreme Approaches<br>There are two fundamentally opposing ways to approach this crisis:</p><p>The &quot;Unwinding&quot; Approach – Declaring the Experiment a Failure<br>This perspective assumes that Lebanon, as a financial and economic experiment, has failed. The solution? Liquidate all assets—sell off the banks&#39; and Central Bank&#39;s holdings—which could generate around $50 billion. Depositors would receive this amount in cash, while the remaining $40 billion would be issued as government bonds.</p><p>The result? Depositors, particularly large ones, would be made whole. However, Lebanon would be left with zero financial assets and $40 billion in sovereign debt, pushing the debt-to-GDP ratio to a staggering 200%. This would necessitate heavy taxation on future generations to sustain the economy.</p><p>Who benefits?</p><p>Large depositors, especially those planning to leave Lebanon or with little real estate exposure.</p><p>The &quot;Recovery&quot; Approach – Protecting the Sovereign’s Future<br>Under this approach, depositors would receive only the $20 billion in cash still available at the Central Bank and private banks—about 20% of their money. The remaining losses? Depositors could seek compensation through legal claims against bank owners and politicians, but the state itself would take no further responsibility.</p><p>The result? Lebanon would retain its gold reserves and assets, remain debt-free, and have the potential for economic growth with low taxes and a stable financial foundation.</p><p>Who benefits?</p><p>Small or non-existent depositors.</p><p>Those who plan to stay in Lebanon long-term.</p><p>Large real estate owners or asset-rich individuals.</p><p>The Crossroads<br>The policies implemented in the coming months will determine which path Lebanon takes a failed financial institution or a nation rebuilding on new foundations!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2b366932472" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Will it be Trump or Harris?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/will-it-be-trump-or-harris-35f356f8fff9?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/35f356f8fff9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 09:50:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-28T09:50:29.853Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Next Tuesday marks the time, every four years, when the world watches the U.S. Presidential Election. In this piece, we explain the basic mathematics behind it and assess who might emerge victorious this time around.</strong></p><p><strong>How does it work?</strong><br>Voters cast their ballots in 56 “States”, each allocated a certain number of points, or “electors,” in the Electoral College, totaling 538 points. The candidate who wins the majority of votes in each state typically claims all that state’s electoral points. To win the election, a candidate must secure at least 270 points.</p><p><strong>What are “swing states”?</strong><br>Since its inception, the Electoral College has seen many states consistently favor one party by a strong majority. These states, where the results are relatively predictable, contribute their points to one candidate irrelevant of the vote split, say 55/45 or 70/30. In contrast, “swing states” attract most of the attention because their results are highly competitive, with votes often split close to 50/50. The candidate who can sway these states in their favor by even a slim margin — like 51/49 — wins all the points from that state, which can swing the overall election result.</p><p><strong>Which are the swing states this time?</strong><br>Based on the 2020 election results and 2024 polling, 49 states show a clear trend, with a vote margin exceeding 3% between the candidates. This accounts for 22 states (226 electoral votes) for Harris and 27 states (219 electoral votes) for Trump. This leaves 7 key swing states in this election: Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Nevada.</p><p><strong>What do the polls indicate?</strong><br>In these swing states, the polls are tight, often showing a lead of less than 2% for one candidate only to shift the next week. However, recent trends indicate a slight lead for Trump in 3 of the 7 states (Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina), totaling 43 points and bringing his count to 262.</p><p><strong>What to watch for on Tuesday, November 5th?</strong><br>The remaining 4 swing states currently favor one candidate or the other by about a 0.5% margin. Michigan (15 points) and Wisconsin (10 points) slightly favor Harris, while Pennsylvania (19 points) and Nevada (6 points) lean toward Trump. If the polls hold true, Trump would win with a total of 287 points to Harris’s 251.</p><p><strong>Is Pennsylvania the key?</strong><br>If Harris can maintain her lead in Michigan and Wisconsin and secure Pennsylvania, she would reach the critical 270 points (or 276 with Nevada), while Trump would have 268 (or 262). This would create the tightest election in 150 years.</p><p><strong>What do the betting markets say?</strong><br>Harris gained momentum following her nomination, raising her odds from 30% to a high of 55%, though they’ve since receded back to around 30%. In short, Trump’s likely tally stands at 262, requiring only one of the three major 50/50 states (Michigan, Wisconsin, or Pennsylvania) to win, while Harris needs all three. If I were a betting man I would place my chips on a 287 vs 251 Trump win and a Harris 270 vs 268 would be the outsider pick!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=35f356f8fff9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Shall we change this electoral law?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/shall-we-change-this-electoral-law-23ff09249054?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/23ff09249054</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 May 2022 19:32:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-22T19:32:23.185Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One week after the Lebanese Parliamentary elections were held and the dust finally settled, all parties claimed victory “tout le monde a gagne”. Separately, some voices started criticizing the electoral law and calling for changes. In this blog, we shall analyze the merits and flaws of this law and propose some tweaks to address them.</p><p>In 2018 when the law was adopted the primary objective was to increase representativity. This objective was partially met as 63% of voters(72% in 2018) elected a winning MP and 84% (89% in 2018) a winning list, however, both 2018 and 2022 elections witnessed MPs getting elected with less than 100 votes, MPs winning seats despite a direct rival losing with more votes. Below are some suggestions to address some of the flaws of this law:</p><ul><li>Threshold: The threshold used in each district varies wildly from 7% in some districts to 20% in others, it would make sense to use a flat 7% in all regions which would make the threshold for representativity more easily attainable in many areas.</li><li>Seats distribution per list: Imagine a 6 seat district Party A won 55% of votes, 23% for Party B and 22 % for Party C which equates to 3.3 seats for A, 1.4 for B and 1.3 for C. In the current system, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_remainder_method">largest remainder method</a> is used which results in 3 Seats for A, 2 for B, and 1 for C. An alternative way of distributing the seats would be to use the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%27Hondt_method">D’Hondt Method</a> which would result in 4 for A, 1 for B and 1 for C.</li><li>Candidates ranking: In the current system, candidates are ranked by dividing the number of votes obtained by the number of seats in the sub-region which mathematically is complete nonsense! So assuming there are 50,000 voters for 5 seats (or 10,000/seat) in Region A and 30,000 voters for 2 seats in Region B (15,000/seat), then to harmonize the ranking between candidates in Regions A and B votes won by candidates in region A need to be divided by 10,000 and those in B by 15,000 and then ranked.</li></ul><p>The above are minor tweaks to address some of the anomalies in the current law however the below 2 suggestions are more fundamental toward a true proportional representation system:</p><ul><li>Districts: The current law divided 128 seats into 15 districts with an average of 8–9 seats per district meaning parties scattered around the country with less than 10% presence in any one area do not get represented. Moving towards 6 districts of ~21 seats in each shall change voter behavior towards parties and programs rather than clientelism and personal relationships.</li><li>Redistribution of seats: The current 128 seats are distributed based on the fictitious world of 1932 when the last census was held. As a result, people are asked to elect MPs where their great grandfather lived as opposed to where they actually live! As a consequence, the voter turnout has never been above 55 % (49% in the last 2 elections). In Beirut, the city where more than 1m people live less than 200,000 actually voted (less than 50,000 in Achrafieh). The example of towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants and less than 100 people on the electorate are many the funniest being Monte Verde with thousands of inhabitants and 0 Voters as the town didn’t exist in 1932! My proposal is simple people ask to vote where they actually live and seats are redistributed as such!</li></ul><p>It has been fun blogging about the elections the last few weeks, the focus shall now turn to alchemy and how to recreate $100 bn deposits. Stay tuned…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23ff09249054" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[So who won the most seats?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/so-who-won-the-most-seats-ad406c743b20?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ad406c743b20</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 21:01:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-18T18:37:08.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ever since the results started popping out on Sunday afternoon each party started looking for ways to celebrate some win in the Lebanese parliamentary elections. Given parties run for the elections with random alliances that sometimes it becomes tricky to interpret the votes of the various players. Here are my main observations as to how things panned out:</p><ul><li>Nobody inherited the 270.000 votes of the Future Movement as some of them opted to support ex-Hariri candidates while others voted for the Revolution however a large portion abstained from voting!</li><li>150.000 of the 250.000 foreign-registered voters went to the ballots and an estimated 40% share went for the Revolution!</li><li>Despite a high expat turnout the participation rate dropped vs 2018!</li><li>The Revolution was not able to form 1 opposition list throughout with multiple lists running in some areas leading to a tally of 280.000 votes!</li></ul><p>In terms of seats, the variance alliances managed the below results:</p><ul><li>Hezballah-Amal alliance won 40 seats with 650.000 votes</li><li>LF &amp; allies won 22 seats with 250.000 votes up from 15/170.000</li><li>FPM &amp; allies won 21 seats with 200.000 votes down from 29/300.000</li><li>Revolution candidates won 16 seats with 280.000 votes up from 1/70.000</li><li>The opposition/Kataeb alliance won 10 seats with 110.000 votes</li><li>PSP &amp; allies won 8 seats with 80.000 votes down from 9/90.000</li><li>10 seats were picked up by the Ex-Hariri lads and some independants</li></ul><p>Delving further into the Tayyar vs Ouwet matchup the below numbers shed some light on the battle:</p><ul><li>Ouwet won 18 pure seats with 200.000 votes or 11.000 votes/Seat</li><li>Tayyar won 17 pure seats with 140.000 votes or 8.000 votes/Seat</li></ul><p>The main difference is explained by the fact that Ouwet only won 3 “cheap” seats in Tripoli and Jezzine whereas Tayyar had 5 such seats in Beirut 2, Chouf, Aley and Bekaa-West.</p><p>The revolution was another winner quadrupling their votes tally per below:</p><ul><li>80K in Mount Lebanon up from 30K leading to 3 seats all coming in Chouf-Aley with a narrow miss in Metn for Jad Ghosn, a tactical mistake in Baabda (18K split between 2 lists), and a disappointing 3K in Kesrwen-Jbeil</li><li>45K in Beirut up from 15K turning 1 seat into 5</li><li>50K in the North up from 10K with 2 seats won</li><li>30K in the Bekaa up from only 5K and surprisingly 1 seat in Bekaa-West</li><li>75K in the South up from 15K leading to 5 seats won</li></ul><p>While 16 seats (1/8th of parliament) doesn’t tell the full story 280.000 votes make the Revolution the 2nd largest bloc with ~1/6th of votes!</p><p>Some further interesting stats on the next blog, stay tuned …</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad406c743b20" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[And the winner lost big …]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/and-the-winner-lost-big-e12ad0d887d1?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e12ad0d887d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 May 2022 19:44:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-16T19:44:44.404Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>And the winner lost big …</h3><p>May 15th shall be remembered as the day when the Lebanese elections delivered a surprising result and a new turn in Lebanese politics! While the final results are not out yet the main conclusions are below:</p><ul><li>The Tayyar — Hezb coalition won only ~ 60 seats and lost the majority</li><li>Ouwet won the biggest parliamentary bloc of ~20 seats and ~40 seats once the anti-Hezb lads (PSP — ex Hariri) are added</li><li>The “thawra” won ~13 seats and ~ 25 seats counting all “opposition” MPs</li></ul><p>While the “thawra” was expected to win a few seats following the October 17th the incursion went deeper than people expected and spread from Achrafieh in 2018 to all the regions leading to Thawra seats throughout (North, South, Beirut, Bekaa, and Mount Lebanon). The bulk of these seats came at the expense of the Hariri and Tayyar Blocs mostly but also at the expense of some of the “fixtures” of the parliament such as Arslan or Ferzli to name a few.</p><p>The victory of the Hezb in all 27 “Chi3a” seats tasted more like a defeat as they failed to reach the targetted 70 or bare minimum 64 seat majority they were expecting. Most of their allies suffered a crushing defeat with Tayyar losing ~10 seats throughout and the heavily symbolic loss of old Dinosaurs such as Arslan, Ferzli or Wahab. To add insult to injury the Hezb lost at least 6 seats in the South particularly in Marjeyoun for the first time in 30 years.</p><p>It is clear from the results that people have held the Hezb accountable for what’s been happening since 2019 and more specifically for them appearing as an obstacle to the removal of the corrupt political elite the revolution was aiming to remove. While for a number of reasons the Hezb maintained the stronghold on the Chi3a electorate, all other sects have swung significantly away from the Hezb allies. Wherever the revolution was seen as having material chances of winning people voted massively for them, elsewhere people opted for Ouwet making them the largest winner in these elections.</p><p>While the political parties are still digesting the results and unsure as to how this fragmented parliament shall work and what temptations might sway the new opposition, the drop in the currency today reminded them of the pressing economic issues that need immediate attention!</p><p>In the meantime, we shall be assessing how each party fared in these elections and their share of the electorate, stay tuned …</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e12ad0d887d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who will win in Beirut, the Bekaa, and the South at the next Lebanese Parliamentary Elections?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/who-will-win-in-beirut-the-bekaa-and-the-south-at-the-next-lebanese-parliamentary-elections-87e0234c7506?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87e0234c7506</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 May 2022 04:31:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-08T04:31:59.837Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following the last <a href="https://medium.com/@ramziassi/who-will-win-in-mount-lebanon-and-the-north-at-the-lebanese-parliamentary-elections-be40a995e67f">blog </a>about the North and Mount Lebanon, we assess in this blog the seats in play in each region and the chances of each list in Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and South Lebanon. We will base our assumptions on the previous elections and the current alliances to imply the decided and undecided seats that ultimately will be decided by the swing voters.</p><p>Beirut 1: There are 6 lists running for 8 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Yacoubian list is likely to get 2 seats, the Tashnaq-Tayyar list 2 seats, the Kataeb-Sahnaoui list 2 seats, and the Ouwet list 1 seat leaving 1 seat in play. There are 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Beirut Madinati) trying to win the 8th seat by capturing the 7,000 votes of Achkar &amp; Pharaon.</p><p>Beirut 2: There are 9 lists running for 11 seats. Based on the 2018 results the ex-Future list is likely to get 4 seats, the Tayyar-Hezb list 3 seats, the Makhzoumi list 1 seat, the Macharih list 1 seat, leaving 2 seats in play. There are 2 independent lists sponsored by Bahaa Hariri and Siniora as well as 3 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Beirut al Taghyir, Naam) trying to convert the 0.7 seats of 2018 into actual seats.</p><p>Zahle: There are 8 lists running for 7 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar-Hezb list is likely to get 2 seats, the Ouwet list 2 seats, the Daher-Kataeb list 1 seat, and the Skaff list just short of 1 seat leaving 2 seats up for grabs. There are 4 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Zahle Tantafed, Al-Taghyir, Kawl Wal Fehl) trying to convert the 0.2 seats of 2018 into 1 actual seat.</p><p>Bekaa West: There are 6 lists running for 6 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar-Hezb-Mrad list is likely to get 3 seats, and the Karaoui-Jumblatt list 2 seats, leaving 1 empty seat. There are 2 party lists for the Ouwet and the Kataeb as well as 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Sahluna wal jabal) trying to convert the 0.2 seats of 2018 into 1 actual seat or else likely to keep Ferzli in parliament.</p><p>Baalbeck: There are 6 lists running for 10 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar-Hezb list is likely to get 8 seats, the Ouwet-Siniora list 1 seat leaving 1 seat that 4 “thawra” lists (MMFD, aacheyer, dodd fassad, Taghyir) are trying to win which is a large step from the 0.3 seats in 2018.</p><p>Jezzine-Saida: There are 7 lists running for 5 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar list is likely to get 1 seat, the Azar-Amal-Hezb list 1 seat, and Saad-Bizri list 1 seat leaving 2 seats up for grabs. That leaves 1 Ouwet-Siniora list and 3 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Nahn Taghyir, Sawt Taghyir) trying to win a seat or two. It will be interesting to gauge the support for the thawra in this district given their absence in 2018.</p><p>Sour-Zahrani: There are 4 lists running for 7 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Hezb list is expected to win 6 seats leaving 3 lists fighting for the remaining seat. There is 1 Ouwet list and 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Dawla Hadina) trying to break the Hezb stronghold on the area. Once again it will be interesting to gauge the support for the thawra in this district following the October 17th movements.</p><p>Marjeyoun-Nabatyeh-Bint Jbeil: There are 3 lists running for 11 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Hezb list is expected to win 9 seats leaving 2 thawra lists fighting for the remaining 2 seats. The 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD coalition, Sawt Janoub) will have realistic hopes of converting 0.5 seats in 2018 into real seats.</p><p>In summary, if 2018 results are to be believed then 100 or so seats are already nailed and about 25 or so seats are up for grabs. This is however omitting the mood swing in the electorate following the events of the past 4 years …</p><p>In the next blog, we shall discuss the seats decided with 100 votes … stay tuned!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87e0234c7506" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who will win in Mount Lebanon and the North at the Lebanese Parliamentary Elections?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/who-will-win-in-mount-lebanon-and-the-north-at-the-lebanese-parliamentary-elections-be40a995e67f?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/be40a995e67f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2022 21:21:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-06T21:21:37.035Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We assess the seats in play in each region and the chances of each list. We will base our assumptions on the previous elections and the current alliances to imply the decided and undecided seats that ultimately will be decided by the swing voters. We shall start this blog with the North and Mount Lebanon.</p><p>Akkar: There are 8 lists running for 7 seats. Based on the 2018 results the ex-Future list is likely to get 3 seats, the Tayyar-Yehya list 2 seats and the Ouwet-Rifi list 1 seat leaving 1 seat in play. There are 4 “thawra” lists in addition to “nahwa al muwatana” which is part of the MMFD coalition that is running under the slogan “turning a crisis into an opportunity” throughout Lebanon. The odds of the Thawra lists rest on turning the 0.2 seats into 1 actual seat.</p><p>Tripoli: There are 10 lists running for 11 seats. Based on the 2018 results the ex-Future list is likely to get 3 seats, the Mikati list 3 seats, the Karami-Samad list 2 seats and the Ouwet-Rifi list 1 seat leaving 2 seats in play. There are 6 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Sabaa, Harfoush, Jame3a, Chabeb, Istikrar) trying to turn the 0.9 seats gathered in 2018 into actual seats.</p><p>North 3: There are 7 lists running for 10 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Ouwet list is likely to get 3 seats the Marada-Saadeh list 3 seats, the Moawad-Harb list 2 seats and the Tayyar list 1 seat leaving 1 seat in play. There are 3 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Chamalouna, Sawtak) trying to win the 10th seat through turning the 0.3 seats of 2018 into 1 actual seat. It is expected that the 10th seat is likely to be in Zgharta or Koura.</p><p>Kesrwen-Jbeil: There are 7 lists running for 8 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar-Hezb list is likely to get 3 seats, the Ouwet list 2 seats, the Frem-Kataeb list 1 seat, the Khazen-Roukoz list 1 seat and Bon-Souaid list 1 seat. There are 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Taghyir) trying to convert the 0.2 seats of 2018 into 1 actual seat or even Frem list getting an additional seat at the expense of Khazen and Bon that are dangerously close to the threshold.</p><p>Metn: There are 6 lists running for 8 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar list is likely to get 2 seats, the Morr-Tashnaq list 2 seats, the Kataeb list 2 seats, the Ouwet list 1 seat leaving 1 empty seat. There are 2 “thawra” lists (MMFD, Matnioun) trying to convert the 0.6 seats of 2018 into 1 actual seat or else likely to go to Ouwet or Tayyar. Likely that seat would be fought to the wire between Jad Ghosn, Razi el Hajj and Eddy Maalouf.</p><p>Baabda: There are 7 lists running for 6 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Tayyar-Hezb list is likely to get 3 seats, the Ouwet-Jumblatt list 2 seats leaving 1 seat that 4 “thawra” lists (MMFD, ex-Tayyar, Ketle, Taghyir) and 1 “Generators” list are trying to win. The 0.8 seats of 2018 are either turned into 1 actual seat or it would be a Tayyar vs Chamoun battle for that 6th spot.</p><p>Chouf-Aley: There are 7 lists running for 13 seats. Based on the 2018 results the Ouwet-Jumblatt list is likely to get 6 seats, the Tayyar-Arslan-Wahab list 4 seats and “Twahadna Lal Taghyir” 1 seat leaving 2 seats up for grabs. That leaves 4 other “thawra” lists (MMFD, Seyadat Watan, Sawtak Thawra, Jabal Yantafid) trying to win a seat. The 2 seats up for grabs are expected to be the Sunni and Maronite in the Chouf.</p><p>In the next blog, we will be breaking down the battlefield in Beirut, the Bekaa, and the South … stay tuned!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=be40a995e67f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How many seats will the Revolution win?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/how-many-seats-will-the-revolution-win-299c75d9bfd3?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/299c75d9bfd3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[revolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 May 2022 17:27:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-03T17:27:31.818Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2018 an attempt to change Lebanese Politics was initiated under the name “Kulluna Watani”. The attempt was to a large extent a failure winning only 1 seat and ~ 70,000 votes across the various lists. Most candidates aside from a handful got less than 1,000 votes. One year down the line the Revolution erupted and October 17th movements started with protesters calling repeatedly for elections to be held. The elections are now being held and we shall finally know after the cataclysmic collapse of the entire system if people will vote for change or once again challenge Einstein’s definition of insanity by doing the same thing and expecting a different result … In this blog, we will assess the chances of the anti-establishment civil society movements.</p><p>In 2018, the various civil society movements managed to win 1 seat in Beirut I, and 70,000 votes were split per below:</p><ul><li>30K in Mount Lebanon (10K in Baabda, 5K in Metn, 3K in Kesrwen-Jbeil, and 13K in Chouf-Aley districts)</li><li>15K in Beirut across the 2 Zones</li><li>10K in the North across the 3 Zones</li><li>5K in the Bekaa</li><li>15K in the South</li></ul><p>In 2022 the challenge is on two fronts, building momentum to gather popular support and building strong alliances between the various movements to form strong lists to avoid confusion for the voters between the various pro-October 17th Lists in the same region. Both objectives have not been met for a number of reasons but among the good reasons is the emergence of a number of economic and social programs that for once will elevate the debate to matters of relevance instead of the reigning cliches.</p><p>While the Kataeb or existing MPs such as Moawad or Frem have attracted some notorious figures of the civil society movements below we focus on the pure “Thawra” lists and break down the expectations in the various regions:</p><ul><li>In Kesrwen-Jbeil and Metn running in more than 1 list, they are targetting 8000–10000 respectively with a chance of winning a seat in Metn. In the Chouf-Aley 25K votes is a realistic target with 1 seat almost a certainty in Chouf and 2 a possibility. In Baabda 15K votes are possible and winning 1 seat is a possible yet difficult target. In Summary as a base case, 60K votes and 3 seats would be considered a win.</li><li>In the North, the uncertainty is still very high, particularly around the Hariri voters, and as such any predictions are purely speculative at this stage. 50K votes and 3 seats would be considered a big win particularly if seats are won in each district.</li><li>In Beirut 1, 10–15K votes are expected leading to a win of 2–3 seats. In “Beirut 2” similarly to the North a lot will depend on the ex-Hariri voters albeit a few seats won and 15–20,000 votes would represent a big result.</li><li>In the Bekaa, while an increase of support of 400% is needed to turn the votes into seats it is largely unlikely. A total votes tally of 10–15,000 however would represent a notable improvement when compared to 2018.</li><li>In the South, while the Jezzine-Saida district offers a very high Threshold for representation of 20% the picture is very different in each of Sour-Zahrani and MArjeyoun-Nabatyeh-Bint Jbeil where 30K votes are possible in each translating into 2 seats won.</li></ul><p>Overall winning 15 seats would be a difficult yet achievable target for the various factions in particular when compared to an expected tally of 200,000 votes making them potentially the largest Bloc when measured in terms of Votes received.</p><p>While the polls suggested at some point a swing of 50% of the popular support towards the civil society/independents/revolutionary groups such a tally would represent ~ 15-20% of the voters up from ~5% in 2018.</p><p>Next blog we will discuss the game plan in each district and the seats at stake starting with Mount Lebanon, stay tuned …</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=299c75d9bfd3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Will Jumblatt keep his seats in the upcoming elections?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ramziassi/will-jumblatt-keep-his-seats-in-the-upcoming-elections-4e98055a9691?source=rss-78cc003fcb05------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e98055a9691</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebanon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ramzi Assi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Apr 2022 12:29:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-29T12:29:30.068Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jumblatt managed to maintain a stronghold on his electorate for the past 30 years. While the October 17th protests erupted following an incident involving the bodyguards of an MP in his bloc, he flirted with the protesters and tried to jump on the bandwagon to finally end up where he started in alliance with Ouwet, regretting the departure of Hariri and focusing on the anti-Hezb slogans.</p><p>With the departure of his ally Hariri and the weakening of his other ally Berri coupled with the increased popularity of the civil society movements in the Chouf region, he is facing a grand battle to keep his 9 MPs. The other major battle in his Chouf heartland is to make sure Wiam Wahab does not get ahead of his long-time protégé and close aid Marwan Hamade. In this blog, we aim to shed some light on these points …</p><p>In 2018, Jumblatt won 9 seats through 100,000 votes. In Chouf-Aley a delicate balancing of the votes resulted in 9 seats for the list (6 for his bloc) and benefitted from the fact many opposition lists failed to reach the Threshold. In Beirut and Hasbaya, he won a seat thanks to his alliance with Hariri. While his alliance with Ouwet is maintained in Mount Lebanon his need for a replacement of the Hariri votes is crucial in Beirut and the Bekaa-Ouest (Rachaya). In summary, he won in 2018:</p><p>· 7/35 in Mount Lebanon (1 in Baabda, 4 in Chouf, and 2 in Aley)</p><p>· 1/23 Seats in the Bekaa in Rachaya</p><p>· 1/19 in Beirut in Beirut II</p><p>· 0/23 in the South. While he participates in selecting the candidate the MP in Hasbaya is not really part of his Bloc.</p><p>In 2022 the region by region dissection may be seen below:</p><p>· In the Chouf-Aley while the alliance with Ouwet is maintained however the loss of Hariri will put some strain on the list seats given the importance of the Iqlim Kharroub voters. Furthermore, the list won last time 9 seats despite only being entitled to 7.5 seats, a repeat is going to be difficult with 7 seats being a more realistic target this time around (5 of which for Joumblatt and 2 for his Ouwet allies). While the seat loss is expected to be in Chouf however might be compensated for by preventing Wahab from succeeding and thus focusing on 3 candidates in Chouf as opposed to 4 per last time. In other terms, the 40,000 votes in Chouf will be divided between 3 candidates meaning Wahab would have to jump from 7000 to 12000 votes or so which is likely to be quite difficult to achieve. The alliance with Ouwet is unlikely to lead to less than 2 seats and as such keeping the seat in Baabda is almost a foregone conclusion. In summary 6/35 would be expected with a swing of +/-1.</p><p>· In the Bekaa-West the loss of the Hariri votes threatens the list to drop from 3 seats to only 1 in which case it might turn into a nasty battle between the allies on the same list for that unique spot however as a base case the odds are the list will be able to win the 2 seats and as such for Abou Faour to keep his spot.</p><p>· In Beirut II, the meager amount of preferential votes (~2000) the candidate got will be nowhere near enough to keep the seat and the odds of winning and losing are mostly decided by the turnout and behviour of the Hariri voters more than any other parameter. In summary, the seat seems to be lost.</p><p>In the south, the 6000 votes that went for the departing banker (Anwar el Khalil) are expected to be replaced by 9,000 votes for the incoming banker (Marwan Khaireldine) who is expected to enjoy the support of both Joumblatt and Arslan. What remains to be seen though is if the list shall maintain its stronghold on all 11 seats otherwise the spot is in danger. In all cases, the seat was not and won’t be part of the Joumblatt bloc however the battle has a huge symbolic significance as it tests people’s stance towards the banks and bankers after the events of the last 2 years …</p><p>Overall 7 seats are expected with a swing of 1 seat in either direction while maintaining the 9 seats would be an absolute success! The days when the bloc was 20 men strong are long gone.</p><p>Next blog we will discuss the “Civil Society” chances stay tuned …</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e98055a9691" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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