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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ravi Prakash Mishra on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ravi Prakash Mishra on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ravi Prakash Mishra on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[DireWolf Ransomware — Threat Intelligence Report]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@raviprakashmishra_26632/direwolf-ransomware-threat-intelligence-report-ca63512fecf5?source=rss-9e6eb50ef00b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca63512fecf5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ravi Prakash Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 09:21:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-11T09:21:02.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>DireWolf </strong>Ransomware -Threat Intelligence Report</h3><h3>Summary</h3><p>The sophisticated double-extortion ransomware known as DireWolf was discovered in May 2025. It propagates using phishing emails and well-known vulnerabilities in software and was created in the Go programming language for cross-platform compatibility. It goes after individuals and organizations. If ransom demands are not fulfilled, the ransomware threatens to release the stolen data.</p><h4>Technical summary (stage’s how its work)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*wJsBxSDILMYlQ8Xk8IUwpg.png" /></figure><h3>Behavioral Summary</h3><p>Each encrypted file may have the “.DireWolf” suffix added by the DireWolf ransomware. A ransom letter called “HowToRecoveryFiles.txt” will be generated in each of the encrypted folders aside from that. A live chat room link and Tox ID address are included in the ransom note along with additional instructions on how to unlock the files and pay the ransom.</p><p>Figure 1 below shows some of the material from the ransom note (HowToRecoveryFiles.txt):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*q7qKq4C5zT4hPGrYc2pm5w.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1. Ransom note of Dire Wolf ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><p>According to our analysis of the sample, the creator of the DireWolf ransomware employed UPX packages to avoid security product detection and specifically created the ransomware in the Go programming language for cross-platform compatibility. <br> <br>When it is successfully executed, it will generate a mutex called “direwolfAppMutex” to guarantee that there is only one instance of ransomware active at once.</p><p>The following commands would be carried out by the DireWolf ransomware variants just before encryption to stop processes and services.</p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM Defwatch.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM RAgui.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM Sqlservr.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM agntsvc.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM dbeng50.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM dbsnmp.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM dbsrv12.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM encsvc.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM excel.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM firefox.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM httpd.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM memtas.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM sqlbrowser.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM sqlmangr.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM supervise.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM synctime.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM tomcat6.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM vxmon.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM wxServerView.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM Culture.exe</em></p><p>● <em>taskkill /F /IM wsa_service.exe</em></p><p>The ransomware can prevent victims from restoring files from backups by deleting shadow copies before the encryption by executing the below commands:</p><p>● <em>cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet</em></p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet”</em></p><p>● cmd -Command “/c start wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -keepVersions:0 -quiet”</p><p>● cmd -Command “/c start wbadmin delete backup -keepVersions:0 -quiet”</p><p>● cmd -Command “/c start wbadmin delete catalog -quiet”</p><p>● cmd -Command “/c start wbadmin disable backup -quiet”</p><p>● cmd -Command “/c start wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive”</p><p>It also stops a currently running Windows Server Backup job with the command below:</p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start wbadmin stop job -quiet”</em></p><p>It clears the Windows event logs with the following commands:</p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start wevtutil cl Application”</em></p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start wevtutil cl security”</em></p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start wevtutil cl setup”</em></p><p>● <em>cmd -Command “/c start wevtutil cl system”</em></p><p>It disables automatic recovery with the following commands:</p><p>● <em>bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</em></p><p>● <em>bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures</em></p><p>The Windows Event Log service’s Process ID (PID) can be determined by ransomware with the following PowerShell command:</p><p>● powershell -Command “Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service -Filter \”name = ‘eventlog’\” | select -exp ProcessId”</p><p>The list of file extensions excluded from encryption by Dire Wolf ransomware versions are shown in Table 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/390/1*2b9J2QLoGsTCpQVXPj-eeg.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 1. List of extensions excluded from encryption</em></figcaption></figure><p>The ransomware then finds the available disks, loads each file one at a time, encrypts it, makes a ransom note called “HowToRecoveryFiles.txt” and adds unique extensions like “.DireWolf” to the encrypted file, as shown in Figure 2 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*gGumGO3pH49Sd1e6_sg8yw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2: Encrypted files and ransom note</em></figcaption></figure><p>We can see the process chart of the Dire Wolf ransomware as shown in Figure 3 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*ZQPgRmiXTMHq1TqveaCJhw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 3: Process Chart of Dire Wolf ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><h3>MITRE ATT&amp;CK TIDs</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*dHlm1l5ZtrrnY4dksGvPQA.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)</strong></h3><p>4b27fac1ac0894ddfe39d25595bb5f3c99c7ae3b509b8c46379b3f0bf94732f9</p><p>8fdee53152ec985ffeeeda3d7a85852eb5c9902d2d480449421b4939b1904aad</p><h3><strong>About Detection/Hunting Query</strong></h3><p>Please visit the particular<a href="https://github.com/mishra0230/Ransomware-Research-Grade"> place</a> to figure out more about hunting query and detection approach that can assist in identifying and avoiding these new threats.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca63512fecf5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BlackSnake Ransomware -Threat Intelligence Report]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@raviprakashmishra_26632/blacksnake-ransomware-threat-intelligence-report-4d81541c0f2e?source=rss-9e6eb50ef00b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d81541c0f2e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ravi Prakash Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 11:26:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-08T11:26:54.161Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Summary</h3><p>A ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that was recently discovered in the wild is BlackSnake Ransomware. It is a variation of Chaos Ransomware, another name for Yashma. The “Yashma” ransomware creator, formerly known as “Chaos Builder v5.0,” was used to create the malware.Clipper activities targeted at cryptocurrency users can be carried out by this variation. <br> <br>Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, the Threat Actors asserted that they would receive 15% of the revenue generated by the affiliation process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iQaQnFSXu_Xre4m5QlfDog.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1 –Details Present at Cyber Crime Forum</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Behavioral Summary</h3><p>Every encrypted file may have the “.pay2unlock” suffix added by BlackSnake Ransomware. In addition, it will leave a ransom note in each of the encrypted folders with the filename “UNLOCK_MY_FILES.txt.” An email address for additional instructions on how to pay the ransom and decrypt the files is included in the ransom note. <br>The ransom note’s contents are displayed in Figures 2 and 3 below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/971/1*nDfhmCX7qnBgEyHCZtINSw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2. Desktop wallpaper set by BlackSnake Ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/944/1*gyaz4_ZSG4urWTFG5oPWCg.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 3. Ransom Notes of BlackSnake Ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><p>Upon successful execution, it will copy itself to the %AppData% folder and could rename and masquerade as “svchost.exe”. It will also create a shortcut file in the Startup folder and create the below registry key to execute the payload during Start up as persistence:</p><pre>SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\UpdateTask</pre><p>It could disable Windows task manager by altering below registry key.</p><pre>Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System “DisableTaskMgr&quot;, &quot;1&quot;</pre><p>it could prevent itself from execution based on the input language set on the victim’s machine. In this variant, they were set to following, which refer to Azeri Latin and Turkish</p><pre>az-Latn-AZ<br>tr-TR</pre><p>Figure 4 below demonstrates how BlackSnake encrypts files with the “.pay2unlock” extension and generates a ransom letter called “UNLOCK_MY_FILES.txt.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*YMQ9kG-eUN0I-TQl6IHqNw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4. Encrypted files and ransom note</em></figcaption></figure><p>We can see the process tree of ransomware as shown in below Figure 5.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*InALdczqbMoZEa9_T-MN6Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 5. Process chart of BlackSnake Ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><p>BlackSnake will encrypt files with below extension by using AES algorithm:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/516/1*xDiGLKfhsUUsA9nR6-U2LQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 1. File extensions for encryption</em></figcaption></figure><p>it will stop the services that are hardcoded in the binary as listed in the below table 2:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/749/1*oC1h0XAR8-tlunALfJM9MQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 2. List of services to be stop</em></figcaption></figure><p>It will avoid encrypting files and folder on directories as listed in the below table 3 and table 4:</p><p>List of directories:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/555/1*m3LD60WZEImEqaIpRNc-Aw.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 3: list Directories to Exclude</em></figcaption></figure><p>List of Files:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/415/1*bJ8iBh-uNGocz4EaQqYhvw.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 4: list of files to Exclude.</em></figcaption></figure><p>BlackSnake ransomware is designed to avoid infecting a system more than once. It does this by detecting if its process is already running or if there is a file named “UNLOCK_MY_FILES.txt” in the %AppData% directory.</p><p>The malware’s validation code is displayed in the Figure 6 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/839/1*HSPe7wxxaxF5hc4NauX4lw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 6. File Path Validation</em></figcaption></figure><p>Additionally, the BlackSnake malware uses a hardcoded regular expression pattern to check for the presence of any bitcoin addresses. A hardcoded Bitcoin wallet address belonging to the attacker is substituted by the malware using the SetText() method if a matching wallet address is discovered copied to the Windows clipboard.</p><p>Hardcoded regular expression pattern code is displayed in the Figure 7 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1021/1*hOVqBY4jvO73rp5_0TXovQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 7. R</em>egular expression pattern</figcaption></figure><p>We discovered during behavioral study that this sample failed to do some tasks in our system, such using the following commands to “stop Windows Shadow Copies” and disable boot recovery mode:</p><p><em>vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet <br>wmic shadowcopy delete <br>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet<br>bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures<br>bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</em></p><p>Since the “BlackSnake Ransomware” is a version of Yashma/Chaos Ransomware and that variant frequently uses the aforementioned command to perform the aforementioned functionality, we expected “BlackSnake Ransomware” to behave similarly, but for some reason, it didn’t perform functionality in our environment.</p><h3>MITRE ATT&amp;CK TIDs</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/1*wccbd2ykHHoNTs_pQk0Uxw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)</strong></h3><p>e4c2e0af462ebf12b716b52c681648d465f6245ec0ac12d92d909ca59662477b</p><h3><strong>About Detection/Hunting Query</strong></h3><p>Please visit the particular<a href="https://github.com/mishra0230/Ransomware-Research-Grade"> place</a> to figure out more about hunting query and detection approach that can assist in identifying and avoiding these new threats.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d81541c0f2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ransomware Threat Intelligence Report -AvosLocker]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@raviprakashmishra_26632/ransomware-threat-intelligence-report-avoslocker-a3a7693f5a82?source=rss-9e6eb50ef00b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3a7693f5a82</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ravi Prakash Mishra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Feb 2026 18:13:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-07T18:13:25.836Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Summary</h3><p>Since its original discovery in July 2021, the AvosLocker malware has developed several versions that have been made public. Most recently, we have seen a newer version of the ransomware that is being distributed using the genuine application AnyDesk. Through the use of evasion techniques, ransomware has configured specific drivers to guarantee that AnyDesk operates even in safe mode. Additionally, ransomware carries out double extortion assaults, encrypting files and demanding a ransom payment after stealing confidential data from the target organizations. If the victim does not give the attacker the requested ransom, it threatens to release their data.</p><h3>Behavioral Summary</h3><p>Every encrypted file may have the “.avos2” extension added by the AvosLocker ransomware. A ransom message named “get_your_files_back.txt” will be generated in each of the encrypted folders aside from that. A Tox ID address is included in the ransom note for additional guidance on how to decrypt the data and pay the ransom. <br> Figure 1 shows the contents of the ransom note (get_your_files_back.txt) as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/973/1*cDub6Zi67du5D-6k49a-Og.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1. Ransom note of AvosLocker ransomware</em></figcaption></figure><p>In order to make sure that only one instance of ransomware is active at a time, it will create a <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.threading.mutex.-ctor?view=net-10.0#system-threading-mutex-ctor">mutex </a>named “Zheic0WaWie6zeiy” upon successful execution.</p><p>Just before they started encryption, the AvosLocker ransomware variants terminated the following processes:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/674/1*iH_etK_N8yYA9exup80IpQ.png" /><figcaption>Table 1. List of processes to be terminated</figcaption></figure><p>Directories, files, and file extensions are listed. Tables 2, 3, and 4 list the versions of the AvosLocker ransomware that are not encrypted. Additionally, it contains “.avos,” “.avos2,” and “.avos2j” with the intention of preventing the same file from being encrypted again.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/785/1*lWjODAj_IED35a8KTZ7v_g.png" /><figcaption>Table 2. List of extensions excluded from encryption</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*KTsPavidiFPn2AwXaCgLBw.png" /><figcaption>Table 3. List of files excluded from encryption</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*E9jw0raUZk_EJ8ww1BN9aQ.png" /><figcaption>Table 4. List of directories excluded from encryption</figcaption></figure><p>AvosLocker ransomware deletes the shadow copies, backup catalog and clear eventlog by executing the below commands.</p><p>● wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive</p><p>● vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet</p><p>● bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No</p><p>● bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures</p><p>● cmd /c powershell -command “Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }”</p><p>AvosLocker ransomware runs WMI queries to get Shadow copy details</p><p>● “IWbemServices::ExecQuery — ROOT\CIMV2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_ShadowCopy”</p><p>We can see the process chart of the AvosLocker ransomware as shown in Figure 2 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*kE5yzuGNHCmT8suH3pdjTQ.png" /></figure><p>Ransomware players can manipulate the ransomware’s execution as necessary because it offers a number of command line arguments. Figure 3&#39;d command line options provide information on ransomware’s capabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/761/1*nrNlwEVlDRr63l3dr5CC-Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Command line Arguments of AvosLocker Ransomware</figcaption></figure><p>Information about errors encountered during the module’s stages, such as which functionality to enable or disable during execution, deleting VSS, the encryption phase with debug messages, and confirming that the encryption process is complete, will all be produced on the command line for additional details about the current action.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/808/1*DcQ6VbBZXzgv-9aqh3mfYw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5. Details display by AvosLocker</figcaption></figure><h4>MITRE ATT&amp;CK TIDs</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/584/1*w5yk9u-ZS1pIMZiW9EVqEg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)</strong></p><p>f8e99bbacc62b0f72aa12f5f92e35607fa0382a881fe4a4b9476fc6b87a03c78<br>43b7a60c0ef8b4af001f45a0c57410b7374b1d75a6811e0dfc86e4d60f503856<br>fb544e1f74ce02937c3a3657be8d125d5953996115f65697b7d39e237020706f<br>0b1f19ba8740b10ed017671aab023228756a6864fb008bf23f3c606189bdcd98<br>aaec3c74e68b003cb7a99c2a75bd0578d552a60200c1e070d0fe1ee40577c1a2<br>e7949028dcf4e3408dc27faa6d7712a51ab460d8e0f23aa561260ca765f6d6c2<br>89ea64aa9ca796ebfb623184a7da95433833fa6338cf883422ab380f0b5cc185<br>bff12a83b1fc2e0ad0000ad9b68abc8eada559bb1094caaf5b9f52887df23705<br>30670fbc6b9953aed232af5fd2e35e4a3b42a692cf7fe49cff8f198105b1a090<br>0f22ae8e435cfeb4e527199c9083e7093c79892656eff686d55909e8528493db</p><p><strong>About Detection/Hunting Query</strong></p><p>Please visit the particular<a href="https://github.com/mishra0230/Ransomware-Research-Grade"> place</a> to figure out more about hunting query and detection approach that can assist in identifying and avoiding these new threats.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3a7693f5a82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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