<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rizky Bayuputra (BP) on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rizky Bayuputra (BP) on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@rbayuputra?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 02:29:52 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@rbayuputra/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On The Roman Succession of Power]]></title>
            <link>https://rbayuputra.medium.com/on-the-roman-succession-of-power-18125241b227?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/18125241b227</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ancient-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ancient-rome]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2025 03:20:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-10T04:33:08.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/1*nlemKcF3mkp0ijVJkX4Fhw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Cicero denounces Catiline in the Senate (painting)</figcaption></figure><p>Power is a fickle thing, they say. It invites the best and worst of us; those drawn to responsibility, virtue, and the greater good, but also those who are invited by the pillars of authority through its potence in avarice and extravagance.</p><p>Power and authority eventually are but ends to a reflection of human nature. A craving for safety and order, of structure — those that set us apart from lesser beasts — have authority, laws, and government as its manifestation. Thus was reflected in Rousseau’s social contract, a theory of power still used today.</p><p>A system of government eventually lends itself to a series of officials of whom authority (<em>imperium</em>) is vested upon, and a system of authority — written in code and practiced by convention — is no less than a reflection of those governed. What becomes concerning is when one government or administration shifts to the next — an era of change, tumult, and uncertainty as the new government does everything to take hold… and opposition, motivated by the momentum of change, does anything to counter.</p><p>An interesting case is that of the Romans.</p><p>The Roman experience of succession, in the end, mirrors the broader struggle of mankind in balancing the virtues and vices of power. The Republic saw the rule of law and merit as the pillars of continuity; the early Empire, under the Five Good Emperors, upheld these ideals through discipline and deliberate choice. Yet, as history shows, such virtue is fleeting when men bend institutions to their own desires. Rome’s legacy reminds us that its greatness was never the work of one man, but of a system—born of convention, tested by time, and ultimately undone when ambition outweighed the public good.</p><h3>Succession of Power through Different Historical Periods: Kingdom, Republic, Principate, Dominate</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HiiRHrvjmnGzo_nRzNpGsg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Caesar, proconsul (governor) of the Gallic front, receives the surrender of Vercingetorix, leader of the Gallic alliance…</figcaption></figure><h4>The Republican Period</h4><p>The Romans existed in several historical periods. During the age of the kings (up to c. 510 BC), it was much more traditional, agnatic. A son or relative would succeed the previous king based on seniority. After seven kings, the abuses of King Tarquinius Superbus forced the Roman elite -- who later became the Senators of the fledgeling city state -- into a Republic.</p><p>The Roman Republic (<em>Senatus Populus Que Romanus</em>) evolved for hundreds of years a system of elections, checks and balances, and regulations on the use of force — primarily the levy/conscripted military otherwise known as the Camillan-Polybian citizen legions.</p><p>In the Republic, no <em>one</em> man shall rule Rome: government was done by committee. Two consuls, who held executive power over the government and armies, were elected every year. There were two as one man with so much power would threaten Republican institutions — something we would see time and again during Imperial times. A set of more junior officials — censors, praetors, aediles, and quaestors — were similarly elected, and became a career ladder (<em>cursus honorum</em>) to the consulship.</p><p>The logistics and politicking of annual elections created incentive for politicians — of whom military service was customary and expected — to go far and wide. Some did so by conquest and sacrifice; the captains of history, Camilius, Dentatus, Fabius Maximus, Scipio (Africanus and Aemilianus), Pompey, and Caesar rose to prominence from their ambitious roles in defending or expanding Rome’s territory influence, and riches by subduing or subverting other civilizations. Even their civilizational &#39;forefathers’, the Greeks and Alexander’s successor states, were eventually conquered and in fact became Rome’s bread basket.</p><p>There existed a spirit of capitalistic intent, in the sense that successful actions such as public works, foreign works, and trade deals, would be repaid in votes from the collegia. Regardless of their actual intent, the public good was, by impact, the priority of Roman statesmen. While nuances of power dynamics exist — bribery, clashes between the senatorial and plebeian classes — power was also distributed and succeeded under established customs and under the rule of law.</p><h4>Princeps and Principate</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/783/1*Br4pMGVRgxzqTCvJCI2JrA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Five Good Emperors; the closest we have seen to the ideal of Plato’s ‘philosopher-king’ ideal…</figcaption></figure><p>What was later known as the Principate (early Empire, from 27 BC to ~270 AD) period showed succession deviate from the rule of law as was in the Republic. Constitutionally, Rome remained the same: a republic, but with a princeps (prince), who had wide executive powers similar to the Dictator in the Republican period, that became first among the Senate.</p><p>However how the Princeps or First Citizen — otherwise today known as &#39;Emperor’ — was selected varied. Some drew claims from blood relations to Augustus (as was the Julio-Claudians). Some claimed the throne through force, which happened in times of crisis — particularly in the year of the Four Emperors.</p><p>One series of Emperors who stood out and its laurels continued to be sung in history were that of the Five Good Emperors. These were a series of selected, meritocratically adopted autocrats who had respect for the rule of law and stern principles of governance. These Emperors, who came to prominence in the early 2nd century AD, saw Roman civilization at its apex. Roman borders, trade, and commerce stretched from Britain to the mouth of the deserts of Arabia.</p><p>What made these five emperors unique was how succession was conducted. The Five Good Emperors—Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius—were connected not by blood but through a deliberate chain of adoptions, each emperor choosing a capable successor rather than relying on hereditary descent. Very little familial relation existed between the Emperors. In fact, each Emperor adopted the following as a son to succeed them, as to ensure smooth succession.</p><p>This is suffice to say very rare for one man who wields so much power as the Roman emperors deflect biological ego, being to put their families as priority, and defer to the public good (<em>Res Publica</em>) when electing a successor. In the meantime, Republican governance continued -- elections were held and public officials conducted business as usual.</p><h4>Commodus and fall of Republican institutions of power</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V1IFfRFKshwD89ig72TWMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Commodus masquerading as gladiator.</figcaption></figure><p>All came at an unfortunate end when Marcus Aurelius had his son, Commodus, as successor. This went against custom; . Driven by &#39;extravagance&#39; and &#39;avarice’ — two terms used by Edward Gibbon in the storied <em>Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire</em> to describe the worst qualities of Roman emperors in power — Commodus set the cornerstone of selfishness, hedonism, and unguided incompetence that governed the rest of the classical Roman Empire. Many examples marked the corruption of his reign.</p><p>Commodus, consumed by vanity and delusion, went so far as to declare himself a living god. Instead of governance, his days were lived as a gladiator, indulging in cruelty and excess that symbolized the moral and political decay of imperial Rome.</p><p>His reign ushered in a period of political fracture, as the empire descended into cycles of competing emperors, civil wars, financial turmoil, and disunity against external threats, ultimately eroding the stability that had defined the <em>Pax Romana</em>.</p><p>In the long run, the corruption of Commodus brought to power the Severan dynasty; and while able in its first Emperor, Septimius Severus the African, his offspring brought absurdity and malice back to the Imperial Court. The absurdity of Elagabalus and Domitian weakened Imperial institutions — something we may go into detail on another occasion.</p><p>But Commodus, followed by the Severans, eventually took the Imperium to its ruin, introducing it to a level of impotence and greed that caused the apocalyptic &#39;Crisis of the Third Century&#39; that followed, a string of events that eventually led to the weakening of Roman civil, legal, and financial institutions... And became the very start of the fall of Rome in the West.</p><h4>Rome’s slow descent into despotic, pragmatic rule shows importance of institutions and rule of law— often taken for granted</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IxmCDPBfdNp-iAJuUGaSOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Visigoths in the sack of Rome, led by the Romanized Goth Alaric…</figcaption></figure><p>The case of the advantages and shortcomings of the Roman system of succession marked a staggering example of the differing worldview of leaders. Men are of natural tendency to the Seven Sins, and prone to corruption. Thus is such the cause for the existence of rules, the separation and distribution of power, and safeguards against despotic rule.</p><p>During the Republic, succession was by democratic and lawful means. Under Augustus and the Five Good Emperors, the regime of succession was governed for the most part by merit displayed by Rome’s most promising public servants. Rome’s greatness was thus not ever backed by a single person; it was a collection of experiences and conventions that, upon bearing fruit, created strong institutions.</p><p>Folly came to terms with time when ambitious men chose to corrupt these institutions to preserve and strengthen their own power.</p><p><em>More essays on ancient Rome to come…</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=18125241b227" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Between Integration and Independence]]></title>
            <link>https://rbayuputra.medium.com/between-integration-and-independence-3f5fdaf68005?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f5fdaf68005</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[timor-leste]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 02:44:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-20T02:44:26.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong><em>Revisiting Ali Alatas’ Account on East Timor.</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Sca4msCIDkzcO9oPkokWCg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Picture of my personal copy.</figcaption></figure><p>The nature of foreign affairs have always seemed ungrounded. Literature overwhelmingly presents itself in a helicopter or elite view, often from the perspective of countries with, for better or worse, ‘<em>a</em> <em>big enough bat to swing</em>.’</p><p>One may get this idea from reading the likes of Kissinger or Mearsheimer–while theorists of the highest degree, they rarely capture gruelling diplomatic struggles, lacking the toolbox of more powerful polities, from an emerging power such as Indonesia.</p><p>Rarely do they also cover deeply personal, grounded perspectives from the people conducting foreign affairs: the diplomats themselves.</p><p>Few provide an in-depth, thematic perspective of a man in service than Ali Alatas’ <em>Pebble in the Shoe: the Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*GBrUKXSGV7uY_idLx-LibQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>US Secretary of State Warren Christopher talking with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas during the post-ministerial conference with the United States of America at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held at Raffles City Convention Centre. (US Department of State)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Ali Alatas and the Timor Issue</strong></p><p>Ali Alatas had a long and illustrious career as a foreign service officer in Indonesia’s Department (now Ministry) of Foreign Affairs. Prior to joining the service, he was trained as a lawyer at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, while concurrently doing coursework at the Foreign Service Academy (ADLN). He also spent a stint as a journalist before joining the Service.</p><p>Pak Ali joined the Indonesian Foreign Service in 1954. Following years in junior and middle-grade roles in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Washington, D.C., he was appointed as Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, and subsequently, was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1988 under President Soeharto.</p><p>A significant portion of his time in the senior ranks of the diplomatic service was devoted to the most pressing issue of East Timor. At the time, East Timor was an Indonesian province, following its accession to Indonesia. But armed conflict persisted between integrationists, supported by the Indonesian military, and independence fighters, advocated internationally for the most part by Portugal, and led by revolutionary Xanana Gusmao.</p><p>The book goes into painstaking detail on the Timor issue: From dealing with disapproval from other countries at the General Assembly over Indonesia’s perceived occupation of East Timor, to human rights controversies by the Indonesian military leading to clashes with Australia, down to the eventual international acceptance of Timor’s status as an Indonesian province.</p><p>Specific attention was given to Pak Ali’s personal dealings with Portuguese and Australian officials, as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Special Ambassador Jamsheed Marker. The UN Secretariat General played a key role in mediating negotiations between Indonesia and the Portuguese–who previously held power in Timor until a request for integration by pro-Indonesian party APODETI in 1975.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ut-eBig3sObtbxOso3mB-Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>The book significantly explored Ali Alatas’ personal dealings with world leaders and UN officials, highlighting the importance of a personal rapport.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Change of winds: economic crisis-turn-political upheaval</strong></p><p>The long struggle for sympathy and approval, while successful in turning the world’s opinions favorably towards Indonesia, was cut short in 1998. The Asian Financial Crisis impacted Indonesia deeply, and what had begun as an economic crisis progressively spiralled into a political one. In turn, political upheaval caused the fall of Soeharto’s military-backed New Order government. While opening a chance for a popular reform government (Reformasi), the stable political order most Indonesians grew up under was shattered.</p><p>With Soeharto gone, so did Indonesia’s efforts to integrate East Timor.</p><p>Under the succeeding Habibie administration, where Pak Ali again served as foreign minister, a Cabinet and later Parliamentary decision was made–to let Timor go.</p><p>But most people already know how the story went. There was a referendum, and the majority of Timorese wanted out. What became a very interesting subject Pak Ali’s book covered was how the referendum was arranged.</p><p>Initially, the question posed for Timorese voters during UN-mediated negotiations between Indonesia and the Portuguese was whether Timor should attain special status as a special autonomous province (Otsus). This is an option we would see not much later with both Aceh and West Papua in the 2000s.</p><p>However, a significant turn in political will from the cabinet, international pressure, and monetary concerns forced the Habibie Administration to consider a different course of action.</p><p>The question on the referendum thus became ‘whether Timor should be independent from Indonesia.’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZLl6hPg9uDRBrq-NV1dfDA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Picture section of the book</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Main Agreement, an agreement on modalities, and an agreement on security for the Timorese Popular Consultation</strong></p><p>The new line of questioning led to the negotiations of a few key arrangements relating to the referendum, including an agreement on security during the referendum (where Indonesian security forces were withdrawn), an agreement on modalities regulating how the vote would be carried out, and a main agreement which regulated what happened if the vote went either way.</p><p>A stipulation as a part of these ‘deal packages’ include the establishment of UNAMET–The UN Mission in East Timor–which also formally allowed armed foreign troops on Indonesian soil for the first time since 1949, albeit as peacekeepers.</p><p>The negotiation of these three key agreements paved the way to the relatively peaceful democratic referendum that saw Timor secede from Indonesia.</p><p><strong>After Timor</strong></p><p>Once-touted to be a UN Secretary-General, the Timor affair created a reputation for Pak Ali as ‘the man who lost East Timor’ — not dissimilar from a title given to Louis Mountbatten, who was the last British Governor-General of India before its independence. However, the controversies associated with Timor were superseded by other achievements — including his crucial role in brokering peace in Cambodia, as well as a key role behind the creation of the ASEAN Charter.</p><p>Pak Ali served out his term as foreign minister until the end of the Habibie Administration in 2001, eventually handing the reins over to career politician and academic Alwi Shihab, who, a few years later, returned the baton of Foreign Minister to a career diplomat, Hassan Wirajuda.</p><p>Following the end of his formal service in the Corps Diplomatique, Ali continued to serve his country as chairman of the Advisory Council to the President during the first term of the Yudhoyono administration (2004–2009), up to his untimely demise in 2008.</p><p><strong>Pebble in the Shoe is a nuanced and detailed view behind the scenes of major negotiations and power-plays from the Indonesian side</strong></p><p>Pak Ali’s account on Indonesia’s diplomatic struggle for East Timor gives us both depth and nuance to Indonesia’s foreign affairs. Until today, few works on diplomacy go into such excruciating detail over one issue over the course of decades. Pak Ali’s book allows diplomatic officers-in-training such as myself to really weed through the headlines to see the true context of the work of our predecessors, as well as the course of long-term bilateral/multilateral negotiations and campaigning by Indonesia.</p><p>All in all, anyone who would seek a deeper look into how major agreements over the issue of sovereignty are done should definitely read this book. It serves both as an excellent, in-depth historical account, as well as reference for today’s foreign service officers on the complexities and nuance of international politics of interest–from the ground-level and from a country like Indonesia, and less of pieces on a chessboard, <em>a la</em> Kissinger.</p><p>Written 19 August 2025 — R. Bayuputra</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f5fdaf68005" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Return to Clausewitz]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/a-return-to-clausewitz-7dcef9e55603?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7dcef9e55603</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 02:07:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-23T02:07:05.648Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The Wide-Reaching Legal Consequences of the US Bombing Operations over Iran</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JS7ipK8PujLgtXBUfsPosw.jpeg" /><figcaption>WASHINGTON, DC — JUNE 21: U.S. President Donald Trump delivers an address to the nation from the White House on June 21, 2025 in Washington, D.C. <em>Carlos Barria/Getty Images</em></figcaption></figure><p>In the early hours of June 22, 2025, the United States launched precision airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, joining Israel in its aerial campaign against Tehran. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/6/22/live-us-joins-israels-attacks-on-iran-bombs-three-nuclear-sites">While achieving its military objectives</a>, direct U.S. involvement marks a fatal blow to the good order in which states live by.</p><p><strong><em>US involvement may create wide political, economic, and security Consequences</em></strong><em>. </em>US involvement opens a path to extreme consequences: sustained aerial operations over Iranian and Israeli territory, and in turn, the high likelihood of closure of the Hormuz Straits — <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2025/06/22/the-strait-of-consequences-world-braces-for-potential-energy-shock/">where 20% of the global oil and 50% of much-needed Chinese oil supply passes through</a>. Meanwhile, potential Iranian retaliation may see increased US boots on the ground in the Middle East, potentially escalating the conflict to a ground and naval war either between the US and Iran directly, or through its many proxies and allies. US Federal agencies have issues circulars warning of a potential attacks on the mainland United States — with the war potentially reaching an already heavily-polarized and frustrated American public.</p><p><strong><em>A return to Clausewitz’s outlook on war — use of force as a legitimate means of policy?</em></strong><em> </em>American involvement has also wrought profound consequences on something more fundamental. The legal doctrine governing the use of force — determining when, why, and how states may resort to violence — now rests on increasingly precarious foundations. This is especially true having seen recent state practices — Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, Israel’s indiscriminate assault into Gaza and foray into Lebanon, and now the US bombing of Iran, have become stark examples.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/188/1*7TD45jKsEEM2xrqo-CH1Xw.jpeg" /><figcaption>19th Century Prussian military and political theorist Maj. Gen. Carl von Clausewitz, who concluded, in his treatise ‘On War’, <em>that war is merely the continuation of policy by other means — a primary tool of governments to reach their policy objectives.</em></figcaption></figure><p>These practices could reinforce a trend where it is acceptable for powerful countries to use violence as a solution whenever possible, instead of being guided by necessity and proportionality. The sustained devaluation<em> </em>of these principles may lead to further justification for armed conflict — such as the China-Taiwan complication much closer to home.</p><p>As a result, the issue of the use of force may no longer be a question of law (<em>whether it is justifiable?</em>), but a question of feasibility (<em>whether it can be done?</em>).</p><p>The continuation of heavy-handed state practices, could ultimately result in a return to Clausewitz’ principle of war as a legitimate extension of policy (“<em>war is merely the continuation of policy by other means</em>”).</p><p>The ongoing trend of the securitization of world affairs lends a hand to that premise.</p><p><strong><em>Is goodwill a thing of the past? The securitization of world affairs, nations gearing up for war.</em></strong><em> </em>Up until recently, closer economic cooperation — an effort led by Chinese, European, and Gulf State-backed infrastructure projects — had been the highlight of international politics. This liberalistic approach of supporting industry, trade, and investment, now seems to be superseded by a distinct, Draconian, security-first approach.</p><p>It comes to no surprise that, having witnessed the unfortunate events in the Ukraine, Palestine, and now Iran, countries have now taken defense and security as a priority. History has shown that war is infectious after all–even moreso in the globalized system we have today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*qLsIN45fvHKpdhM1BQLQ1Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Elected earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) has vowed to build Europe’s strongest army. A lift on defense spending laws sets one of the most ‘pacifist’ Postwar European powers into militarization. EPA</figcaption></figure><p>EU Members, for example, have radically shifted its approach in light of the War in Ukraine. Rules are broken to ensure survival — <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62z6gljv2yo">as is the case of Germany’s changes in its longstanding rule on defense spending</a>. In our immediate vicinity, France and the UK’s increased outreach into the Indo-Pacific and China’s security deals with many Pacific Island nations. In parallel, we are witnessing the continued shift of sectors like energy, food, and logistics being geared up for armed conflict.</p><p>It may be the unfortunate truth, that while nations want peace, its value as a method has, progressively, decayed into <em>deterrence</em>.</p><p>International law is fundamentally an institutionalized reflection of shared values among nations. However, the balance of powers, and as a result, the overall worldview on what is valued in the international community, is liquid in nature. It may be that we now live in a time so desperate — politically and economically — that in turn, desperate measures may have to be taken.</p><p><strong>R. Bayuputra</strong></p><p><em>The author is an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views represented here are his own, and do not represent the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7dcef9e55603" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/a-return-to-clausewitz-7dcef9e55603">A Return to Clausewitz</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reservists, Sailors, Airmen, and Logistics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/reservists-sailors-airmen-and-logistics-cd79ef4075f2?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd79ef4075f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Apr 2025 05:14:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-12T05:14:42.813Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Key defense issues beyond the minimum essential force in Indonesia</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xNCpibHMrv_I5MWFyzeSxA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In 2024, then-presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto pledged to quadruple <a href="https://indonesiadefense.com/menanti-gebrakan-prabowo-di-sektor-pertahanan/">Indonesia’s defense spending, from 0.5% to 2% of GDP</a>. This sharp increase signals Indonesia’s recognition of growing global instability — what were once distant strategic risks are fast becoming urgent realities.</p><p>Indonesia’s planned increase in defense spending marks a slight adjustment from the current focus on the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) toward a more comprehensive posture. While the MEF plans has provided a foundation for modernization and operational readiness, evolving regional and global security dynamics shed light on other areas essential to invest in.</p><p>This next phase requires serious investment in building stronger air and naval power to enhance force projection and maritime security, while also developing robust logistical infrastructure to sustain operations across the archipelago and beyond.</p><p>Complementing these material improvements is the need for a professionalized reserve force, ensuring that Indonesia can mobilize trained, specialized citizen-soldiers at scale, bolstering both deterrence and national resilience in times of crisis.</p><h3><strong>Risk-Mapping</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hFijlRJXsKnDGAgOxPP0Jg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Around the world, risks are fast becoming realities. For Indonesia, five critical areas stand out:</p><p><strong>Middle East Turmoil.</strong> The collapse of the Abraham Accords and the Gaza war have shifted the region in Iran’s favor. As the largest OIC member and a key partner to many Middle Eastern nations, Indonesia can use its neutral stance and diplomatic weight to help restore stability.</p><p><strong>Escalation in Europe.</strong> Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced Europe to rebuild its defenses and cut reliance on U.S. support. Indonesia, impacted by disrupted trade with both countries, must recalibrate and could play a role in future diplomacy and reconstruction.</p><p><strong>Threats to Global Trade and Maritime Security.</strong> Attacks by Houthis and Somali pirates continue to endanger global shipping lanes. Indonesia, an emerging maritime power, must take a more active role in escorting friendly vessels and contributing to maritime security, building on past missions in Somalia, Gaza, and the Philippines.</p><p><strong>Tensions in East Asia and Taiwan.</strong> Friction over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and beyond has escalated. China’s assertiveness has spurred Japan to rearm. While South Korea, Japan, and China are currently in talks to enact a coordinated response to Trump’s tariff measures, little can be said of what comes of it, and whether it changes anything.</p><p><strong>China’s Pacific Push.</strong> China’s outreach to Pacific nations, including the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, challenges Australia’s influence and may pressure Indonesia particularly over West Papua — especially that <a href="https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/msg-china/">Melanesian Spearhead Group members are close to come into China’s security sphere of influence</a>. Jakarta must balance regional diplomacy with protecting its territorial integrity.</p><h3><strong>Gearing up for a new age: potentially overlooked points in military spending</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6Uo8tqaDCxgi9jQbjjjzbQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The parallels to Europe’s current defense recalibration are stark. NATO’s 2.5% GDP target for military spending has gained urgency, and Indonesia’s planned increase mirrors this trend. But how can Indonesia ensure that this expanded budget delivers real capability?</p><p>Since the Jokowi Administration, Indonesian defense has undergone significant modernization, professionalization, and building domestic defense industrial capabilities under the Minimum Essential Force plan. However, the planned expansion of the current budget may see other essential areas be touched upon — something that could improve not only Indonesia’s ‘material’ defense capabilities and build upon the ‘defense-in-depth’ approach of the existing SISHANKAMRATA (universal defense system) but also project a meaningful deterrent externally.</p><p>Beyond MEF, developing a professional reserve force to increase the number of trained citizens, continuous defense industry capacity building through international partnerships, and shifting priorities to naval, air, and logistical capabilities could further bolster Indonesia’s deterrent capabilities.</p><h4><strong>Building a Professional Reserve Force</strong></h4><p>Indonesia’s reserve system, revamped in 2021, offers an opportunity to create a large “citizen soldier” force that could be mobilised and retrained at short notice. However, under the present system, training remains generalist and lacks specialization. Specialized tracks — engineering, logistics, infantry, communications, civil affairs — are vital to make the reserve truly functional.</p><p>Learning from historical units like the University Regiments (whose personnel have been deployed to operations in Timor and Aceh in the past) and global models such as the UK’s reorganized Army Reserve, Indonesia can further build upon the present system by integrating skilled civilians (technicians, doctors, lawyers, etc.) into the reserve structure.</p><p>The question of integrating paramilitary groups like BANSER and Pancasila Youth also exists — and must be considered with care. With proper training and leadership, these organizations could provide valuable manpower and enhance Indonesia’s total defense posture.</p><h4><strong>Downstreaming the defense industry through arms sales and international partnerships</strong></h4><p>Indonesia has made commendable strides in domestic defense production, with indigenous armored vehicles, naval vessels from PT PAL, and domestically-produced small arms for its own military. However, the defense industry may consider diversifying its customer base beyond the domestic market. In a world unfortunately riddled with conflict, our defense industry could aggressively pursue arms exports to arms trade-treaty compliant Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and African nations. A strong customer base could assist in solidifying Indonesia’s defense industry, aligning with its broader strategy of downstream industrialization.</p><h4><strong>Prioritizing naval and air capabilities</strong></h4><p>Historically, the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD) has dominated defense spending, but as a maritime archipelago, a refocusing to naval and air power — key to rapid response forces and force projection — is in the works. President Prabowo’s term as defense minister (2019–2024) has seen a progressive refocusing to naval and air capabilities. Indonesia is on a course to own a sizable fleet of French Rafale and U.S. F-15EX strike fighters, on top of continuous delivery of <a href="https://www.pal.co.id/inovasi-kapal-perang-pt-pal-indonesia-penuhi-kebutuhan-alpalhankam-matra-laut-nasional-hingga-global/">locally-produced naval vessels by state-owned PT PAL</a> as well as corvette and frigate purchases from Italian shipyard <a href="https://www.fincantieri.com/en/media/press-releases/2024/fincantieri-contract-signed-for-the-supply-of-two-ppas-to-indonesia/">Fincantieri.</a></p><h4><strong>Investment in sustainment and logistics</strong></h4><p>US General John Pershing, the historic commander of the American Expeditionary Force during World War I, stated “infantry wins battles, logistics wins wars.”</p><p>Most analysts enjoy commenting on our strike capabilities, but our capabilities to <em>sustain</em> sophisticated military operations is just as important. Indonesia’s infrastructure — ports, supply chains, roads, and transport networks — must be battle-ready, especially given the risk of conflict in the South China Sea. <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/mcgrath_op23.pdf">It goes without saying that ordnance and supplies must go from tail — the factories, the supply bases — to the tooth — the hands of the fighting man.</a></p><p>The World War II-era lesson of the failure of the defense of the Dutch East Indies is instructive: without robust logistical support and unity with Allies, even the best-trained troops falter. <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/at-their-mercy-a4b3e39b0667">We have discussed this years ago on a separate article.</a></p><p>Food security, a priority policy under Prabowo Subianto, has now deserved attention and should perpetually be considered a security issue — in this case as part of a holistic defense ecosystem (an army can only fight on its stomach, after all). Self-sufficiency will ensure Indonesia can sustain prolonged operations if Allied supply chains are compromised.</p><h4><strong>Conclusions</strong></h4><p>Indonesia faces five major geopolitical risks that demand urgent attention: (i) rising instability in the Middle East, (ii) the ongoing war in Europe, (iii) threats to global trade routes and supply chains, (iv) escalating tensions in East Asia, and (v) China’s growing influence in the Pacific that reverberates toward Papua. To navigate these challenges, Indonesia must ensure that its expanded defense budget delivers real capability — by building a professional reserve force, strengthening its domestic defense industry and export potential, and prioritizing naval, air, and logistical capabilities.</p><p><strong>R. Bayuputra for Le Citoyen</strong><br>April 2025</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wrupHkRPgtm1oBgvypkvpQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Rizky Bayuputra is a foreign service officer-in-training at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously working as a lawyer and journalist before entering public service, he is a lover of history and ardent enthusiast of defense and security issues and world affairs. He is currently assigned for duties at the Political &amp; Security Affairs Directorate under the Directorate-General of International Law and Treaties in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd79ef4075f2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/reservists-sailors-airmen-and-logistics-cd79ef4075f2">Reservists, Sailors, Airmen, and Logistics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[United We Stand]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/united-we-stand-b9cd0c9ba4c6?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b9cd0c9ba4c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asean]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Apr 2025 04:17:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-06T04:17:33.976Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How Southeast Asia Can Turn the Tariff Crisis Into Opportunity</h4><blockquote>“To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff, and it’s my favorite word,”<br> — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-15/in-trump-s-economic-plan-tariff-is-the-most-beautiful-word">Donald Trump in a Bloomberg Interview, 2024.</a></blockquote><p><em>Content relevant as of April 5 2025.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gJ4oxyWeRyzPSre5OztA9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>ASEAN leaders at the 2017 ASEAN summit. Much has changed since then. (<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/asean-summit-exercise-omission">Source: Lowy Institute</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>US President Donald Trump via <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/">executive order</a>,<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> has enacted reciprocal tariffs against, effectively, the world — and Southeast Asia exists as a region that seems to be highly targeted. Southeast Asian countries present significant trade deficits with the US — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/04/04/upshot/trump-tariffs-reciprocal.html">which is where the tariff rates have, somehow, been based on.</a></p><p>President Trump’s ‘America First’ will attempt to cut down imports — predominantly from China— and apply a progressive investment plan to rejuvenate American jobs by turning ‘importers to investors’ for the US.</p><p>The ultimate goal of these measures is to kickstart and reshore global manufacturing in the US from relatively low-cost countries such as China, Vietnam, and Mexico, among others.</p><p>It seems like the odds are stacked against our young, dear community of developing nations in ASEAN.</p><h4>Tariff Crisis a Unifying Field for ASEAN</h4><p><em>Fig. 1. New US Tariffs for European, East Asian, and Southeast Asian countries</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/649/1*DLlJZ1kiN-6kedfJSVJu_Q.png" /><figcaption>Source: CNN ; SEA countries highlighted in table: <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/03/business/trumps-reciprocal-tariffs-countries-list-dg/index.html">https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/03/business/trumps-reciprocal-tariffs-countries-list-dg/index.html</a> compiled by Fortis Stonewall.</figcaption></figure><p>The latest U.S. tariff landscape reflects a deepening of the “America First” doctrine, with higher tariffs not only on traditional rivals like China but now extending sharply to Southeast Asia.</p><p>Countries such as Vietnam (46%), Cambodia (49%), Thailand (36%), and Indonesia (32%) are facing steep tariffs, even as they play crucial roles in U.S. supply chains. Major American firms like Apple, which have shifted significant manufacturing to Vietnam to diversify away from China, are directly impacted.</p><p>Even Singapore, long considered <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta">a neutral trading hub with a free trade deal with the US since 2004</a>, now faces a 10% tariff — a clear signal that the U.S. is broadening its protectionist stance to cover all of Southeast Asia, regardless of past strategic alignments.</p><p>Behind these tariffs are commodities key to US industry, even day-to-day life. SEA-US imports provide the US with steel and aluminum, electronics, agricultural products (including palm oil, food, and coffee), and energy resources such as oil and gas. These tariffs would have serious effects to the US economy, already embattled with inflation and price hikes.</p><p>ASEAN unity has become more important than ever. Individually, Southeast Asian nations have limited leverage, but as a bloc, ASEAN represents a significant economic force capable of negotiating from a position of strength.</p><p>A unified ASEAN voice could push for more favorable trade terms and resist being played off against each other in bilateral negotiations. As Trump signals his intent to renegotiate trade deals, Southeast Asia’s best path forward lies in coordinated diplomacy, presenting itself as an indispensable partner for US industry while advocating for lower tariffs and more balanced trade relations.</p><h4><strong>Moving Forward: ASEAN centrality now more important than ever</strong></h4><p>One thing we often forget as Southeast Asian countries <em>and</em> members of ASEAN is that, we, more often than not, share a common history and therefore share a common predicament. After the Second World War, Southeast Asia had risen from profitable and convenient cash-crop colonies to an activist — to say the least— group of emerging nations.</p><p>When ASEAN was created, then refreshed in 2007 following the ASEAN Charter, all member states came to a realisation that Southeast Asia could not stand ‘for each their own’ in a continuously shifting world.</p><p>Southeast Asia could face these tariffs in a united manner to address our ‘common but differentiated’ needs. In his recent publication <em>Does ASEAN Matter?</em> former Indonesian Foreign Minister R.M. Marty Natalegawa introduced our own standard of ‘the common good’ and ‘shared regional fate’ calling it ‘ASEAN centrality’.</p><p>Aligning national and regional goals, ASEAN centrality could be the key to what we’ve been seeking all along. Today, centrality is no longer a tagline, but backed by hard numbers. The Southeast Asia Six, a moniker representing Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, has a combined GDP of USD 3.6 trillion–making it 5th largest in the world (not accounting for the European Union) and 3rd largest in Asia. This is significant weight in boxing terms. While the devil is in the details, these overarching numbers, once strategically used, could push ASEAN into the heavyweights of the world in a few decades’ time.</p><p>Apart from Singapore, SEA 6 countries have similar key demands: more jobs, more productivity, more investment, a push for industrialisation with export-oriented goals. However, the most pressing condition we can work together come the near future are better trade deals.</p><p>The reorientation of tariffs brought by the Trump Administration could unknowingly become a catalyst for ASEAN to work together — both in its dealings with the US as a market for goods and services, as well as the protection of our small businesses and regressing local sectors, unable to compete with imported low-cost goods from China.</p><p>Unity in action is key for ASEAN to overcome our challenges. Quoting Indonesia’s former trade minister and current deputy director at the National Economic Council, Mari Elka Pangestu, over a seminar hosted by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia last year, ‘the answer to protectionism is never more protectionism.’</p><p>ASEAN cooperation and centrality, where we could find common interest, common goals, and as a result, enact common measures against extra-ASEAN challenges is key in the coming years. More favorable deals with China and the US may just be the outcome — but the process would certainly develop ASEAN into an even stronger multilateral institution to drive regional interests globally.</p><p>For ASEAN, these uniformly abrasive tariffs by the United States exists not only as a challenge, but as common ground to move forward. ‘United We Stand’ should be our headline for 2025 and beyond.</p><p>It is not so much a <em>vivere periculoso</em> (a year of living dangerously) but instead a time of opportunity, for our governments to do our local and small businesses right — giving them a fighting, living chance in a world trailed by so much uncertainty.</p><p>Rizky Bayuputra</p><p>Foreign Service Officer Candidate</p><p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs RI</p><p><strong>Footnotes</strong></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Argued to be justified legally under Trump’s authorities as president per the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9cd0c9ba4c6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/united-we-stand-b9cd0c9ba4c6">United We Stand</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Bear in Action: Russia’s ‘military adventures’ since 2008]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/the-bear-in-action-russias-military-adventures-since-2008-291f11fcbcb4?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/291f11fcbcb4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wagner]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 11:46:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-10T11:46:27.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Citoyen Explainer</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gAdydZt5WqRHdKsT" /><figcaption>Ukrainian servicemen walk by a damaged vehicle, at the site of fighting with Russian troops, in Kyiv, February 26, 2022. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko</figcaption></figure><p>The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin is often portrayed by Western media as the typical geopolitical boogeyman–expansionist, corrupt, and oligarchic, on top of having an abysmal record of human rights abuses.</p><p>Russia’s actions have invited criticism and economic sanctions from the West, yet even so, it has maintained strong ties with countries of the Global South and our time’s emergent power of China.</p><p>While it is not absolved of criticism, an interesting fact to pinpoint is that in a time of trade deals and multilateral cooperation, Russia is one of the few proponents (along with the United States) of the use of force on the global stage: it has never shied down in providing direct military support (or through its proxies) or conduct military intervention in regions it has interests in.</p><p>History has shown that some states gravitate towards the usage of military forces as part of their policy toolbox–Russia does not shy away from that.</p><p>Russia’s military ‘adventures’ in the 21st century battlefield consists of military actions in the Caucasus, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and now in Africa.</p><p>In today’s Citoyen Explainer–where we explain past and developing issues–we will dive into Russia’s many military actions since 2008. This year was chosen as Russia’s internal security issues had stabilised following the bloody Second Chechen War–where, after ten years of conflict, Chechnya was incorporated as a republic under the Russian Federation.</p><p><strong>Russia’s Military Campaigns Since 2008</strong></p><p><strong>Georgian War (2008)</strong></p><p>After an uprising by pro-Russian separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia invaded both regions. Within 16 days, the territories fell under Moscow’s sphere of influence.</p><p>Russia later used the presence of pro-Russian political elements within a country as justification for another invasion — in Ukraine.</p><h4><strong>Syrian Intervention (2011–present)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wG0phwOm_KfFuU8vq9IVjQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Russia intervened in the Syrian Civil War to support the Assad government and defend its only Mediterranean port in Tartus.</p><p>Russian backing played a key role in Assad’s survival, with Russian personnel engaged in ground combat — primarily through the Wagner Group — and providing air support to government forces.</p><p>Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, Russian military resources — including both the armed forces and Wagner Group — were divided, easing pressure on the Syrian conflict.</p><p>The effectiveness of Russian forces in Syria may have been a decisive factor in the eventual fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of the current administration — initially Islamist and now seemingly Western-aligned.</p><h4><strong>Crimea Annexation and Secession of Donetsk and Luhansk (2014)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uXoIkH56LKhTf_PkZW-15g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Russia backed the independence of the pro-Russian Donetsk and Luhansk regions, opposing Ukraine’s move toward the European Union.</p><p>The secession led to Crimea’s eventual annexation into the Russian Federation following a referendum.</p><p>This created de facto borders between Donetsk, Luhansk, Russia, and Ukraine, while also securing a direct supply line from Russia to the key warm-water port of Sevastopol on the Black Sea.</p><p><strong>‘Special Military Operation’ and War in Ukraine (2022–present)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kAeRg1bPlBS5f9njdni3Qw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In February 2022, Russian forces launched an offensive targeting Kyiv, Odesa, and other major economic and military strongholds in Ukraine.</p><p>The failure of the initial assault allowed Ukraine’s military to fortify its defenses and sustain itself with military and economic aid from Europe and the United States.</p><p>Outnumbering and outweighing the Ukrainian armed forces, Russia has attempted to maintain momentum for most parts of the conflict. But crucial battles such as the one at Bakhmut and Kursk has managed to stem Russian advances into what remains of Ukrainian territory.</p><p>The conflict heightened geopolitical tensions with non-Russian-aligned states, including Poland, Finland, and the Baltic nations. The war also disrupted the Nord Stream gas supply, affecting Germany and broader European energy markets.</p><p>Supply chain disruptions contributed to economic downturns in several countries, including Indonesia–reliant on Ukraine’s grain supply.</p><p>The Black Sea Grain Initiative provided a temporary solution, allowing Ukraine to export vital grain supplies, though full economic recovery remains elusive.</p><p>While peace negotiations are ongoing, Ukraine’s future remains uncertain.</p><p><strong>Wagner Group Operations in Africa (ongoing)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*24tH_U0Zmc1u9MEb6ocaBA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Africa presents an opportunity for emerging powers seeking strategic partnerships in resource-rich and demographically dynamic nations. Stability remains crucial for development.</p><p>Despite a lack of official Russian government sponsorship, Wagner Group contracts have strengthened Moscow’s geopolitical influence on the continent.</p><p><a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">Reports indicate ties between the Kremlin and Wagner</a>, though Wagner may continue to maintain that it is a business serving any client it sees fit.</p><p>Since 2017, the Wagner Group has operated in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mozambique, among other African nations. In 2024,<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/21/what-next-for-russia-in-africa-after-wagner-moscow-influence"> it was integrated into a new Africa Corps under Russia’s Ministry of Defense.</a></p><p>Currently, following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66632924">controversial death of the infamous leader of the Wagner Group, </a>the organization’s influence has declined. In its place, Redut — a private military company with opaque funding and operations — has emerged as a potential successor.</p><p>Some analysts suggest a similar model may exist with South African private military outfit Executive Outcomes and British oil executive Tony Buckingham [even today this remains unconfirmed], with speculation of contracts exchanged for fees and oil concessions.</p><p><strong>Le Citoyen Team<br></strong>March 2025</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=291f11fcbcb4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/the-bear-in-action-russias-military-adventures-since-2008-291f11fcbcb4">The Bear in Action: Russia’s ‘military adventures’ since 2008</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dibalik ‘Defeatisme’ Gen Z]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/dibalik-defeatisme-gen-z-cf6e4314f25b?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf6e4314f25b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[generation-z]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 May 2024 11:02:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-29T11:01:19.054Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Pesimisme &amp; Aspirasi Tak Sampai Generasi Penentu</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yZ7hjRRfvZMBujszCFonjA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Media dan siaran pers sering menobatkan Generasi ‘Z’, generasi yang lahir di penghujung dan awal millenia, sebagai ujung tombak kemajuan Indonesia. Gen Z di Indonesia dicirikan dengan ‘serba melek’: teknologi, sosial-politik, kesadaran kewarganegaraan yang tinggi, serta lebih melek finansial secara relatif dibanding generasi sebelumnya.</p><p>Namun, Gen Z juga sering mengekspresikan ketidakpuasan terhadap kehidupan, terutama dari aspek ekonomi, politik, dan bahkan aspek pribadi, walau Indonesia di tengah ‘high watermark’ secara pembangunan.</p><p>Masa depan bangsa Indonesia kerap ‘dibebankan’ kepada generasi muda. Untuk Gen Z, the <em>future is now — and it’s not looking so good.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FJu8xccclgDaTE_W" /></figure><h4><strong>Gen Z merupakan generasi dengan populasi terbesar saat ini</strong></h4><p>Saat ini pun, Gen Z, yang menurut Psikolog Jean Twenge merupakan generasi yang lahir antara 1995 dan 2012, berjumlah 75 juta jiwa, sekitar 27% penduduk Indonesia dan memiliki proporsi terbesar antara generasi lainnya. Bersama dengan generasi milenial (69 juta jiwa) merekalah yang digadang-gadang sebagai perwujudan ‘surplus demografi’ oleh pemerintah.</p><p><strong>Tema ‘surplus penduduk’ pula adalah sebuah pedang ekonomi berbilah dua</strong>. Gabungan Gen Z dan Milenial memiliki prospek besar dari segi potensi ekonomi, baik sebagai angkatan kerja maupun sebagai konsumen. Di sisi lain, potensi ini juga dapat menciptakan risiko besar apabila <em>tidak</em> dipelihara dengan baik dengan kebijakan kependudukan dan ketenagakerjaan yang mumpuni.</p><p><strong>Ekspresionisme Gen Z juga patut disanjung,</strong> yang tidak hanya terbatas pada partisipasinya dalam <em>pop culture</em>, melainkan juga ke bidang politik. Hal ini sangat tampak dalam pemilihan umum 2024 lalu.</p><p>Namun, terdapat suatu hal yang cukup menyayangkan untuk Gen Z. Penelusuran singkat di platform media sosial populer seperti Twitter (‘X’) dan Instagram membuahkan sebuah <em>insight </em>terhadap <em>personal outlook </em><strong>yang tidak kunjung positif terhadap masa depan.</strong></p><p>Kecemasan terhadap kemampuan ekonomi pribadi, <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20240124175359-4-508723/gen-z-ternyata-pilih-ngontrak-ketimbang-beli-rumah-ini-sebabnya">terutama kesulitan memiliki tempat tinggal</a> karena harganya yang relatif mahal apabila dibandingkan terhadap tingkat pendapatan, merupakan satu aspek besar.</p><p>Di sisi lain, perdebatan sengit di Twitter dan aktivisme dunia nyata mengenai isu sosial politik pun berisi tren pendapat tidak optimis dalam dimensi kehidupan bernegara. Praktik KKN dalam pemerintahan, ketakutan akan negara otoriter, serta sikap pesimis terhadap institusi hukum dan pemerintah adalah hal yang lumrah kita dengar (atau baca).</p><h4><strong>Apakah generasi muda Indonesia semakin hari semakin ‘keok’?</strong></h4><p>Fenomena ekonomi dan politik ini seakan-akan menghasilkan mental ‘<em>defeatism</em>’ dari kalangan pemuda Indonesia, yang notabene secara historis menjadi motor perubahan bangsa dan perjuangan generasional. Ganjilnya, <em>outlook </em>yang<em> defeatist</em> para Gen Z muncul pada masa di mana Indonesia bisa dikatakan sedang makmur-makmurnya.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LohGYFuMvVsXreYS" /></figure><p><strong>Indonesia sekarang tergolong ‘High-Income Country’ — World Bank.</strong> Pada tahun 2022, Indonesia mencatat Pendapatan Nasional Bruto (<em>Gross National Income</em>) per capita Indonesia di angka USD 14,250 per tahun (~IDR 168.5 juta per tahun), hal yang membuat Indonesia untuk pertama kalinya dalam sejarah akhir-akhir ini dianggap sebagai <em>middle income country</em>.</p><p><strong>Indikator ekonomi menunjukkan Indonesia mengalami pertumbuhan yang kuat yang dibarengi naiknya kualitas hidup.</strong> Pertumbuhan ekonomi Indonesia pun berkembang pesat dan konsisten. Antara tahun 2013 s.d. 2023, Indonesia mencatat rentang pertumbuhan ekonomi sebanyak 4–5% per tahun (minus 2020). Adapun <em>unemployment rate</em> sedang ada di titik terendah sejak 1993 (notabene adalah zenit Orde Baru), yakni di 3.3% (World Bank). Kuatnya pertumbuhan ekonomi juga dibarengi terus naiknya Indonesia dalam <a href="https://databoks.katadata.co.id/infografik/2024/03/22/indeks-pembangunan-manusia-asean-2022-indonesia-tak-menonjol">Indeks Pembangunan Manusia (<em>Human Development Index</em>) yang tergolong ‘Tinggi’ (Skor 0.713).</a></p><p>Nampaknya, keadaan masa kini memperlihatkan perkembangan yang luar biasa untuk Indonesia. Alhasil, apakah kecemasan Gen Z di atas sesungguhnya tidak berdasar? Apakah gerakan ‘Revolusi Mental’ yang digadang-gadangkan sejak tahun 2016 tidak berhasil membangkitkan gairah Gen Z sebagai pilar menuju Indonesia emas?</p><p><strong>Standar Tinggi Gen Z — datang dari <em>entitlement </em>atau motor penggerak perubahan yang lebih baik?</strong></p><p>Sebuah hipotesis dari kami adalah <strong>Gen Z memegang standar yang lebih tinggi terhadap<em> quality of life</em> serta akuntabilitas pada pemerintahan dibanding generasi-generasi sebelumnya.</strong></p><p><strong>Pengaruh media sosial dan internet kepada harapan kehidupan.</strong> Barangkali hal ini terjadi sebab eksposur terhadap kehidupan bernegara yang lebih baik yang didapatkan melalui media sosial serta ‘berbagi asa dan bahagia’ di platform seperti Twitter dan Instagram. Kedua platform ini kerap menjadi penyambung lidah rakyat, bahkan, bisa dikatakan lebih hebat dibandingkan anggota dewan perwakilan manapun. Menelisik dari segi politik dan ekonomi, ternyata banyak gerakan (seperti What is Up Indonesia/bijakmemilih) maupun brand (alias <em>new age brand</em>) juga hidup dan mati melalui media sosial ini.</p><p><strong>Adapun praktik semacam <em>benchmarking</em> dengan negara lain</strong> membuat sejumlah Gen Z yang vokal berekspektasi tinggi terhadap kualitas kehidupan. Hal ini jangan di-<em>confuse</em> dengan rasa ‘<em>entitlement</em>.’ Narasi yang populer mencerminkan aspirasi banyak ‘kaula muda’ ingin hidup di negara semacam Korea Selatan, Jepang, Swedia, atau Inggris yang memiliki <em>public service</em> yang baik, kualitas hidup terjamin, serta ‘sejahtera walau tak kaya.’ Sedangkan realitas di Indonesia belum sejengkalpun mendekati demikian. Barangkali rekan-rekan Gen Z juga belum sadar bahwa di negara-negara tersebut, sebenarnya, orang juga sulit membeli rumah, dengan alasan yang hampir mirip.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*B0Osd1oXa8j9xCqg" /></figure><p>Keinginan memiliki rumah dan hidup sejahtera masih menjadi cita-cita para Gen Z. Mengutip <a href="https://cdn.idntimes.com/content-documents/indonesia-gen-z-report-2024.pdf">Indonesia Gen Z Report 2024 oleh IDN Research</a>, tak jauh berbeda dari generasi sebelumnya, kepemilikan rumah merupakan salah satu pemenuhan <em>financial goals</em> dari Gen Z.</p><p>Namun, tingkat pendapatan dengan harga rumah tidak sejajar dengan pendapatan Gen Z. Menurut IDN Times per 2023 rata-rata pendapatan Gen Z di Indonesia hanya mencapai angka IDR 2.5 juta per bulan, sedangkan harga rumah dengan tipe paling kecil di daerah Jabodetabek rata-rata memiliki cicilan IDR 7 juta per bulan, belum lagi apabila terdapat kenaikan rasio bunga pada tahun-tahun berikutnya.</p><h4><strong>Defeatisme atau Aspirasi Kolektif yang menjadi motor penggerak arah bangsa kedepan: ‘Anak Abah’ yang dimotori Gen Z dan komunitas K-Pop</strong></h4><p>Tempo hari kami tengah membaca karya bunga rampai esai mendiang Sabam Siagian, seorang diplomat dan di antara lain pencapaian hidupnya seorang <em>founding member</em> Jakarta Post. Menyadur mantan Wakil Presiden Jusuf Kalla, ‘Generasi muda yang bersemangat akan dapat memajukan negeri,’ — memang generasi muda lah yang memasang standar untuk ke depannya, sebelum diganti oleh generasi yang lebih baru lagi.</p><p>Almarhum Sabam yang cukup legendaris di lingkaran jurnalis dan pemerintahan ini barangkali dapat tersenyum melihat kampanye Anies Baswedan kemarin, yang mana disokong oleh ramainya dukungan Gen Z dan Milenial muda. Tim Anies sendiri dengan akun Twitter populer @aniesbubble mampu menjadi sarana penyampaian aspirasi masyarakat luas.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/0*DD0uZI3bD1RPs8Br" /><figcaption>Gambar: Media Indonesia</figcaption></figure><p>Populernya gerakan ‘Abah Anies’ yang tumbuh secara <em>considerably</em> organik juga ditandai gerbong fans K-Pop, suatu komunitas yang dibangun berdasarkan hubungan parasocial dengan <em>idols</em>.</p><p><strong>K-Pop sebagai fenomena secara mengejutkan ternyata juga menjadi jaringan aspirasi sendirinya yang sangat terorganisir dan <em>surprisingly action-oriented</em>.</strong> Fraksi K-Pop Abah Anies ini justru berhasil menggerakkan pendukung Anies yang kerap disebut ‘Anak Abah’ hingga membuat fans project berupa videotron di sekian banyak penjuru Indonesia dengan sedikit<em> gimmick</em> ke-Koreaan untuk mendukung calon 01 itu.</p><p>Tingginya popularitas calon 01 di kalangan milenial muda dan Gen Z dilatarbelakangi oleh kesenangan mereka terhadap visi dan misi mantan Gubernur DKI itu, yang merupakan seorang ekonom secara pendidikan dengan poin-poin tajam dan konkret untuk men-<em>tackle</em> banyak masalah Gen Z. Tak luput ide-ide itu disampaikannya dalam kampanye dengan cara penyampaian yang intelektual namun mudah diterima.</p><p>Uniknya, tren mendukung paslon dengan teknik membuat akun, website hingga fan merch dengan dalih-dalih “Stan” baru muncul pada pemilu 2024 ini. Siapa sangka ternyata ide yang amat kreatif ini ternyata diprakarsai oleh para milenial muda dan Gen Z!</p><h4><strong>Changing the Playing Fields: Concern Generasi Z Menjadi Tolak Posisi Kunci Kontestasi Politik di Masa Depan</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XPpIvRCqPeLNGxqK" /></figure><p>Sejatinya semua generasi pasti memiliki harapan akan masa depan Indonesia yang lebih baik. Akan tetapi, hal itu akan menjadi sia-sia apabila tidak diikutsertakan dengan aksi yang nyata seperti keikutsertaan dalam pemilu.</p><p><strong>Sebagaimana Milenial menjadi fokus kebijakan pada pemerintahan Jokowi (2014–2024), Gen Z dengan segala warna dan polemiknya harus menjadi fokus pemangku kepentingan ke depannya.</strong> Walau Milenial masih menjadi angka mayoritas dari peserta Pemilu 2024, Gen Z dan isu-isu yang mereka prioritaskan justru menjadi konsiderasi besar pembuat kebijakan pada pemilu yang akan datang.</p><p><strong>Isu Kunci untuk Gen Z dan beragam <em>policy pitfalls</em>.</strong> Karena erat dengan keberhidupan Gen Z, kepemilikan rumah, biaya pendidikan, akuntabilitas pemerintah, dan reformasi birokrasi yang anti-KKN akan menjadi isu-isu kunci ke depannya. <em>On top of </em>isu-isu ini, muncul juga beragam isu khusus Gen Z yang perlu masuk dalam posisi partai politik dan <em>policymakers </em>ke depan, seperti kesadaran kultural, rasisme, dan keterbukaan diskusi ideologis. Tentunya cara-cara <em>bespoke </em>perlu dipertimbangkan untuk menjaring aspirasi dan mengakomodasi kepentingan Gen Z ini.</p><p>Walau Gen Z seringkali komplain dan terus bergebu-gebu mengenai kehidupan ideal, ini bukanlah pertanda bahwa generasi muda bangsa Indonesia adalah ‘anak mami’. Justru, ini bisa kita lihat sebagai suatu semangat generasional yang memiliki aspirasi untuk berjuang demi Indonesia yang lebih baik, anti-KKN, memiliki pemerintahan yang akuntabel, intelek, serta perekonomian yang mendukung kualitas hidup secara kolektif.</p><p>Doa dan harap kami adalah semoga kami tidak melakukan mis-analisis terhadap tren-tren ini — dan rekan-rekan Gen Z (kami juga Gen Z, <em>by the way</em>) terus berjuang dan bergerak dengan cara masing-masing. Lebih hebat lagi kalau terus berani berjuang secara politik dan advokasi kebijakan, dengan banyaknya instrumen yang kita miliki sekarang. Dan tak kalah penting, atau justru lebih penting, semoga tatkala suatu hari kita semua dapat membeli rumah yang nyaman.</p><p>Nantikan catatan, laporan, dan analisis lainnya dari Le Citoyen (back in business).</p><p>RB MS, Mei 2024</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RD_4Wd-Sxfsbn4WMMv04Wg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf6e4314f25b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/dibalik-defeatisme-gen-z-cf6e4314f25b">Dibalik ‘Defeatisme’ Gen Z</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Runtuhnya front oposisi terakhir]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/runtuhnya-front-oposisi-terakhir-def49b58b894?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/def49b58b894</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prabowo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politik]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pdip]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Apr 2024 11:14:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-21T11:14:42.450Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>potensi koalisi 91% DPR RI di depan mata</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*9m93iB-srWo5RbXW4kcpvw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Foto Puan dan Prabowo saat kunjungan tahun 2022 lalu.</figcaption></figure><p>Pertengahan April 2024 ini kita telah mendengar info mengenai rencana pertemuan antara Ketua PDI Perjuangan dan Presiden RI ke-5, Megawati Soekarnoputri dengan sang Presiden-terpilih Prabowo Subianto. Tujuan kunjungan ini masih berupa misteri sampai saat ini. Alhasil, khalayak umum mulai ramai dengan komentar dan prediksinya masing-masing di pusaran opini massa dan media sosial.</p><p>Barangkali rencana kunjungan ini adalah pertanda bahwa PDI Perjuangan akan menentukan posisinya sebagai bagian dari koalisi pemerintah. Atau, ini hanyalah kunjungan belaka yang tidak berarti.</p><p>Walau berbagai partai-partai politik secara berbondong-bondong jalan mem<em>-backing</em> calon pasangan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden pilihannya pada Pemilu 2024 lalu, kini mereka nampak <em>scrambling</em> (kocar-kacir) untuk mengamankan masa depannya. Baik karena hasil perolehan suara di Pileg DPR ataupun murni pragmatisme partai untuk ‘ikut’ andil dalam Administrasi Prabowo ke depan (yang sampai sekarang masih <em>disputed</em> di MK, di antara forum lain). Parpol di Indonesia sekarang ramai <em>‘swinging the bat’</em> (mengayun tongkat bisbol) atau menegosiasikan masa depannya.</p><p>Selain pembagian kursi menteri kabinet dan jabatan kunci lainnya, konstelasi arah pengaturan dan kebijakan nasional ke depan dapat kita kira-kira melalui: (i) perolehan suara tiap partai di DPR RI, yang menjadi alat tukar dalam lini ideologis maupun pragmatis partai dan (ii) kemungkinan susunan koalisi berdasarkan perolehan suara.</p><p>Sebagai suatu <em>exercise</em> kami membuat proyeksi kecil-kecilan untuk kedua hal tersebut, dengan catatan tanpa membagi parlemen berdasarkan isu, tetapi sebagai koalisi secara umum:</p><p><strong>Skenario 1: Seluruh Partai Kubu 01 &amp; 03 menjadi oposisi, yang memegang mayoritas DPR RI</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eRjParcVP82rBN2h" /></figure><p>Konfigurasi partai-partai politik pengusung calon-calon Presiden-Wakil Presiden pada Pemilu 2024 telah membentuk tiga front koalisi partai, yakni:</p><ul><li><strong>Kubu 01</strong>, yang berisi partai-partai pendukung pasangan calon Anies Baswedan — Muhaimin Iskandar yang berisikan partai-partai berhaluan perubahan dan berbasis islam seperti Partai Nasional Demokrat, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, dan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.</li><li><strong>Kubu 02</strong>, yang terdiri dari partai-partai politik berbasis nasionalis yang mendukung pasangan calon Prabowo Subianto — Gibran Rakabuming Raka, dan kesemuanya juga merupakan partai-partai politik Pemerintahan Jokowi seperti Partai Golkar, Partai Gerindra, Partai Amanat Nasional, dan Partai Demokrat.</li><li><strong>Kubu 03</strong> yang merupakan koalisi partai-partai politik pendukung pasangan calon Ganjar Pranowo — Mahfud MD, terdiri atas PDI Perjuangan dan Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. Namun, ketidaklolosan PPP melewati <em>parliamentary threshold</em>, maka PDI Perjuangan menjadi satu-satu representasi Kubu 03 di parlemen mendatang.</li></ul><p>Pasca-14 Februari, konfigurasi politik dalam skenario seperti ini awalnya terlihat sejak capres Ganjar Pranowo–yang <em>notabene</em> merupakan kader PDI Perjuangan–mengusulkan agar DPR segera mengajukan hak angket atas adanya dugaan kecurangan Pemilu 2024. Sebagaimana dilansir <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1836715/nasdem-pkb-dan-pks-nyatakan-siap-dukung-hak-angket-usut-kecurangan-pemilu-2024">Tempo</a>, usulan ini sendiri sempat mendapatkan tanggapan positif dari masing-masing partai-partai politik Kubu 01. Bahkan dalam pembukaan Rapat Paripurna ke-13 Masa Persidangan IV Tahun Sidang 2023–2024 ini, sejumlah anggota DPR dari fraksi PDI Perjuangan, PKB, dan PKS sempat menyiratkan secara terbuka digulirkannya hak angket.</p><p>Namun demikian, skenario ini nampaknya kurang memungkinkan sejak Presiden Joko Widodo, c.s., terus ‘menggoda’ para oposan untuk menggagalkan hak angket.</p><p>Sebagaimana terlihat Jokowi menjamu Ketua Umum Partai Nasdem Surya Paloh di Istana Merdeka–yang mana menurut kompatriot sesama 01-nya di PKB dan PKS tidak dikoordinasikan terlebih dahulu dengan partai-partai politik Kubu 01 lainnya. Belum lagi semakin rapuhnya Kubu 03 setelah KPU mengumumkan bahwa PPP tidak lolos ke DPR RI untuk periode selanjutnya.</p><p><strong>Skenario 2: Perpindahan krusial Partai Nasdem berakibat mayoritas Kubu 02</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hrijZZriZXtxSDo2" /></figure><p>Pada 18 Februari lalu, Surya Paloh dipanggil menghadap Presiden Joko Widodo secara mendadak. “Ini baru <em>awal-awal</em>. Nanti kalau sudah final nanti kami sampaikan. Tapi itu sebetulnya saya itu hanya menjadi ‘<em>jembatan</em>’; yang paling penting <em>kan</em> nanti-nanti partai-partai <em>lah</em>,” <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3970935/jokowi-sebut-pertemuan-dengan-surya-paloh-untuk-jadi-jembatan">tutur Presiden Jokowi</a>.</p><p>Menariknya, pascapertemuan tersebut, Partai Nasdem tampak seolah berubah sikap. Setelah KPU menetapkan hasil Pemilu 2024, Partai Nasdem malah <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4020498/nasdem-terima-hasil-pemilu-2024-ucapkan-selamat-untuk-prabowo-gibran">mengucapkan selamat atas kemenangan Prabowo Subianto sebagai Presiden RI terpilih</a>. Hal ini dinilai seakan-akan pengibaran bendera putih dalam kontestasi nasional saat ini.</p><p>Di sisi lain, Anies Baswedan maupun Muhaimin Iskandar dan partai-partai politik Kubu 01 lainnya seperti PKB dan PKS lebih cenderung mengeluarkan pernyataan penolakan. Perlawanan mereka pun terus berlarut di persidangan Mahkamah Konstitusi yang terus bergulir.</p><p>Pendekatan Partai Nasdem ke Presiden Jokowi seolah berusaha mengamankan legitimasi perolehan 69 kursinya di DPR RI di hadapan ‘Kubu Jokowi’ yang dianggap memenangkan Pemilu kali ini. Sejak mendeklarasikan Anies Baswedan sebagai Capres, pemerintah nampak melihat Partai Nasdem secara sebelah mata. Ada anggapan bahwa Nasdem telah berseberangan secara fundamental dengan pemerintahan. ‘Anak Tiri’ Jokowi ini pun bernasib, secara relatif, malang. Dalam dua tahun terakhir, Menkominfo Johnny G. Plate dan Mentan Yasin Limpo–dua dari tiga menteri Partai Nasdem–terjerat kasus pidana korupsi yang mengharuskan mereka di-<em>reshuffle</em>; menyisakan Menteri LHK Siti Nurbaya Bahar sebagai satu-satunya menteri Nasdem dalam Administrasi Jokowi.</p><p>Dengan perubahan gaya komunikasi semacam ini, besar kemungkinan bahwa Partai Nasdem malah akan banting <em>stir</em> dan masuk ke dalam salah satu jajaran Kubu 02, meninggalkan PDI Perjuangan, PKB, dan PKS di kubu seberang sebagai minoritas sebagaimana terlihat pada ilustrasi skenario di atas.</p><p><strong>Skenario 3: PKS dipojokkan dan ditinggalkan, koalisi terbesar dalam Sejarah DPR RI</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2N6QkS6MZzF76N7S" /></figure><p>Skenario di atas belakangan mulai menjadi salah satu <em>mogelijkheden </em>di periode pemerintahan selanjutnya. Sebab apabila mempertimbangkan kepentingan masing-masing partai politik oposan dalam Skenario ke-2 (khususnya PDI Perjuangan dan PKB), mereka masih memiliki kepentingan yang perlu dipastikan–yakni mendapatkan kepastian atas jabatan pimpinan DPR. UU №17/2014 tentang MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD saat ini mengatur bahwa kursi pimpinan seperti Ketua DPR dan Wakil-Wakil Ketua DPR diberikan kepada partai-partai dengan perolehan suara terbesar ke-1 bagi Ketua DPR dan 4 Wakil Ketua DPR bagi partai politik peringkat ke-2 s.d. peringkat ke-5. Tentunya PDI Perjuangan sebagai juara 1 Pileg dengan penguasaan 18.7% kursi dan PKB selaku partai peringkat ke-5 dengan persentase 11.72% suara DPR dalam periode selanjutnya. Terlebih, trauma panjang telah dialami PDI Perjuangan selama ini; yang menjuarai Pileg sebanyak 3 kali pada era reformasi, namun hanya sekali berkesempatan menduduki posisi Ketua DPR melalui berbagai rekonfigurasi politik ‘dadakan’ dalam UU MD3.</p><p><strong>Munculnya mayoritas hampir total atau ‘super-mayoritas’ yang pro-Pemerintah tidaklah di luar alam kemungkinan</strong>. <em>Genesis</em> daripada koalisi super-mayoritas pada periode 2019–2024 telah menunjukkan bahwa partai politik Indonesia dapat–walaupun se-terpecah-belahnya dan beragamnya bangsa kita ini–tetap dapat disatukan dalam satu visi yang sama–setidaknya dari segi persentase koalisi. Kecilnya oposisi pada periode tersebut (sekitar 18% dari total kursi, terdiri dari PKS dan untuk waktu yang lama juga digandeng oleh Partai Demokrat) membuat segala usulan legislasi dari Pemerintah nampak <em>los</em> begitu saja.</p><p><strong>Tentunya super-mayoritas ini hadir sebagai risiko terhadap konstituen oposisi seandainya ada rancangan undang-undang yang bisa saja tidak mengakomodasi kepentingan atau golongan tertentu</strong> (atau sebaliknya, hanya mementingkan kepentingan dan golongan tertentu). Salah satu contohnya seperti pengundangan UU Cipta Kerja (UU №11/2020) untuk pertama kalinya; walau kemudian dinyatakan inkonstitusional bersyarat dan diperintahkan direvisi oleh MK–yang kemudian secara <em>shortcut</em> diganti dengan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (yang kemudian ditetapkan dengan UU №6/2023). Apabila kita telisik opini publik (misal, serikat buruh, kubu progresif, dan aktivis lingkungan), tidak sedikit yang merasa dan mengutarakan bahwa produk hukum yang bersifat ‘sapu jagat’ pengganti lusinan peraturan untuk kepentingan investasi ini tidak berkeadilan. Bahkan ada yang sejauh menganggap aturan ini <em>zalim</em>.</p><p><strong>Pertemuan Prabowo dan Megawati mendekatkan kita kepada kemungkinan super-mayoritas tersebut</strong>. Berasumsi bahwa semua partai kecuali PKS (yang secara historis menjadi oposisi dari partai lainnya) berbondong-bondong ‘lempar badan’ ke koalisi Pemerintah, maka secara kolektif mayoritas menguasai 91% dari suara yang mewakili rakyat. Kedahsyatan koalisi ini bisa jadi tidak konsisten berhubung setiap partai berhangat dalam ideologi dan memiliki posisi masing-masing terhadap isu tertentu, namun prospek adanya koalisi semacam adidaya ini merupakan hal yang cukup mengerikan. Apabila mayoritas besar ini benar terjadi, pengubahan konstitusi dalam imaji ‘Indonesia sempurna’ <em>à la</em> partai-partai ini menjadi prospek yang riil–<em>hal ini akan kami bahas dalam kesempatan lainnya.</em></p><p>Di sisi lain, koalisi 91% ini belum tentu juga ‘benar-benar’ koalisi atau hanya ‘koalisi <em>on paper</em>’. Dalam setiap fraksi ada sub-fraksi, yang mana menjawab kepada <em>interest group</em> masing-masing (baik mewakili kepentingan pengusaha, buruh, lini keagamaan, industri, dsb.) dan bisa jadi memiliki pemahaman ideologis yang berbeda-beda antara satu dan lainnya. Hal ini tentu mempengaruhi arah suara anggota dewan terutama apabila dalam menghadapi isu-isu khusus.</p><p>Pembahasan mengenai catur perpolitikan Nusantara adalah hal yang senantiasa menantang. Partai dan politisi beradu nasib dan berganti kepentingan; ada yang dipromosikan, ada yang terjebak korupsi, ada yang melobi proyek besar, ada juga yang di-<em>lobby </em>proyek besar–di antara lain episode beragam dalam proses politik demokratis penuh liku-liku. Barangkali Tuhan akan takjub melihat bagaimana sebuah badan beranggota 580 orang ini mengatur dan menegosiasikan negara dengan hampir 300 juta kepala dari beragam ras, etnis, dan suku yang <em>bahkan satu pulau saja tidak</em>. Pertemuan antara kelompok kepentingan membuat DPR RI sebagai panggung drama luar biasa yang mana perdebatan di depan terkadang terasa seperti sandiwara–dengan <em>backchannel</em> yang penuh serba serbi kisah detektif digabung epos sejarah yang kompleks.</p><p>Nantikan laporan dan analisis selanjutnya dari Le Citoyen.</p><p>Samuel Simanjuntak dan R. Bayuputra, 18 April 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HOzwJC6CCxTvVI-Ag78JgA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=def49b58b894" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/runtuhnya-front-oposisi-terakhir-def49b58b894">Runtuhnya front oposisi terakhir</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Eskalasi Timur Tengah di Tangan Netanyahu]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/eskalasi-timur-tengah-di-tangan-netanyahu-48e7e2fb36ba?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48e7e2fb36ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[militer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hubungan-internasional]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Apr 2024 10:41:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-14T11:02:05.871Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Analisis Pasca-Serangan Iran</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uii0uAevHB8SPv-YrsiB-Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>JAKARTA (14/04) -- Tidak beberapa jam lalu Republik Islam Iran (Iran) telah mengirimkan ~200 pesawat tidak berawak (<em>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</em>/UAV) dan peluru kendali jarak panjang untuk menyerang wilayah Israel. </strong>Iran menyerang sebagai retaliasi terhadap serangan Israel ke konsulat Iran di Damascus beberapa waktu lalu. Serangan udara Israel ini disebabkan dukungan Iran terhadap organisasi militan Hamas dan kelompok bersenjata Hezbollah — keduanya aktif <em>engaged</em> di perbatasan utara dan selatan Israel sejak Oktober 2023 lalu.</p><p>Serangan Iran yang terjadi semalam (13–14 April 2024) berhasil dibendung oleh sistem perlindungan misil ‘Iron Dome’ milik Israel, dengan intersepsi oleh kekuatan gabungan angkatan udara dan laut Amerika Serikat, Britania Raya, dan Kerajaan Yordania; Yordania konon menghantam misil dan pesawat tak berawak yang masuk ke dalam <em>airspace</em> mereka sendiri.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X20OmOtIN5BoaLCpovn_jw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sistem Artileri Pertahanan Udara (Arhanud) Israel als. ‘Iron Dome’ mengintersepsi serangan Iran semalam. Sumber: AFP.</figcaption></figure><h4>Analis: Serangan Iran untuk Me-Reset Deterrence</h4><p>Khalayak ramai menganggap bahwa ini adalah awal mula dari Perang Dunia yang digadang-gadang akan muncul dalam waktu dekat. Namun sejumlah analis ulung seperti <a href="https://x.com/ianbremmer/status/1779278651323826552">Ian Bremmer </a>berpendapat bahwa serangan Iran ini hanya untuk “me-reset kemampuan deteren untuk memaksa de-eskalasi” dan bahwa “Iran tidak mengincar peperangan skala besar.”</p><p>Di luar kancah peperangan timur tengah yang telah membludak sejak serangan Hamas dan balasan Israel di Gaza Oktober 2023 lalu, percaturan internasional masih berlanjut dari segi diplomatis.</p><p>Pernyataan resmi dari masing-masing pemerintah menyatakan bahwa eskalasi lebih lanjut bukanlah hal yang mereka preferensikan.</p><p>Pernyataan resmi dari perwakilan Iran di PBB menyatakan serangan ini dilakukan dalam pembelaan diri (<em>self-defense</em>) sebagai respons dari pemboman konsulat di Damaskus — dan merupakan aksi militer terakhir terkait balasan tersebut.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3X4W8uVsLyU1iQ3LgVkeEw.png" /><figcaption>Diplomasi era baru — pernyataan sikap melalui bentuk Tweet. Post asli: <a href="https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1779269993043022053">https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1779269993043022053</a></figcaption></figure><p>Namun seperti segala hal dalam politik timur tengah yang kita lihat sejauh ini, balas-membalas antara Israel dan Iran akan menjadi kunci daripada eskalasi ke depannya.</p><h4><strong>Serangan Balik Israel: Mungkin, Tetapi Terbatas</strong></h4><p>Kabar beredar bahwa Presiden AS Joe Biden telah berkorespondensi dengan PM Israel Benjamin Netanyahu bahwa AS tidak akan membantu tindakan ofensif (<em>military offensive</em>) ke Iran.</p><p>Kurangnya <em>political will</em> dari publik Amerika untuk mengadakan peperangan asing, kian mendekatnya kita ke pemilihan umum AS, serta jauhnya jarak tempuh antara Iran dan Israel, serta keengganan negara sekutu seperti Kuwait untuk membolehkan serangan AS ke Iran, juga <strong>membuat bantuan langsung apapun sangat mahal dan tidak praktis secara logistik.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X66IXdZ7hP7ZBvRCCeUqow.jpeg" /><figcaption>Informasi beredar bahwa Presiden Joe Biden (kiri) dan PM Netanyahu (kanan) telah berkorespondensi via telepon terkait enggannya AS membantu serangan balik Israel ke Iran (Foto: Antara News)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Di sisi lain, Israel juga tidak dalam posisi untuk melakukan serangan balik yang signifikan seperti ofensif darat.</strong> Tindakan Israel terbatas pada wujud defensif atau melalui kampanye udara terbatas (<em>limited air campaign</em>). Israel juga menengahi konflik bersenjata (<em>actively engaged</em>) dengan Hamas di Gaza dan Hezbollah di perbatasan utara dengan Lebanon.</p><p>Adapun jarak yang luar biasa jauh meletakkan angkatan udara Israel dan Iran ke dalam risiko intersepsi dan transgresi diplomatik yang besar dari negara tetangga seperti Iraq dan Yordania.</p><p><strong>Tanpa bantuan Amerika Serikat c.s. eskalasi besar-besaran konflik di Timur Tengah nampak <em>unlikely</em>.</strong> Kecuali adanya pengkonsolidasian pasukan (<em>troop build-up</em>) koalisi internasional di perbatasan Iran oleh pasukan sekutu semacam Perang Teluk (1990-1991/Operation Desert Shield dan Desert Storm) dan Perang Iraq (2003/Operation Iraqi Freedom), nampaknya perang berskala besar belum terlihat mungkin. Secara logistik, diplomatis, ekonomi, tiada negara yang mungkin atau dapat mengambil keuntungan dari eskalasi konflik besar seperti perang dunia yang telah kita lihat sebelumnya.</p><h4><strong>Kisah Fenomenal Proyeksi Kekuatan Israel: Pemboman Reaktor Osirak (1981)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/479/1*kQ7NYPwb21yj9HaRidHsDQ.gif" /><figcaption>Operasi ‘Opera’ — serangan udara presisi Israel terhadap reaktor nuklir Iraq masa Saddam Hussein di Osirak tahun 1981.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Namun, Israel yang historis terkenal nekat pernah melakukan operasi jarak jauh serupa pada tahun 1981. </strong>Ketakutan Israel akan munculnya Iraq sebagai <em>nuclear power </em>di Timur Tengah berujung pada eksekusi Operation Opera — serangan udara terhadap reaktor nuklir Iraq di Osirak. Dalam operasi ini, delapan pesawat pemburu F-16A ‘Netz’ dari Angkatan Udara Israel melakukan penerbangan sejauh ribuan kilometer untuk melakukan pemboman terhadap reaktor nuklir tersebut. Walau kontroversial, serangan semacam ini membuktikan kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan jarak jauh Israel melalui angkatan udaranya.</p><p>Serangan balasan bisa jadi tidak hanya ditujukan kepada Iran secara langsung; <em>most likely </em>serangan semacam Osirak ini terjadi kepada posisi militan pro-Iran di Suriah dan Iraq, di mana satuan semacam Korps Garda Revolusioner Iran (IGRC) sangat aktif.</p><p><strong>Pada ujungnya, eskalasi berikutnya — baik practicable maupun tidak — berada di tangan Benjamin Netanyahu.</strong></p><p>Pantau terus Le Citoyen untuk laporan dan analisis berikutnya.</p><p>Rick Bayuputra April 14 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qu8n10XiaHDGrP3C0ugm0g.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48e7e2fb36ba" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/eskalasi-timur-tengah-di-tangan-netanyahu-48e7e2fb36ba">Eskalasi Timur Tengah di Tangan Netanyahu</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bebas-Aktif, Realpolitik]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/le-citoyen/bebas-aktif-realpolitik-908ef31aef2c?source=rss-b8081126f4c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/908ef31aef2c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jokowi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prabowo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[luar-negeri]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizky Bayuputra (BP)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Apr 2024 12:32:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-07T12:32:58.029Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Kunjungan China Prabowo Refleksi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tgmfI9Zc0rSIIuBymtyGCw.png" /></figure><p>Beberapa waktu lalu kita telah melihat Presiden terpilih Republik Indonesia, Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Prabowo Subianto melakukan kunjungan luar negeri pertamanya purna-keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum 20 Maret lalu. Tujuan kunjungannya tak lain dari salah satu <em>rising power</em> di dunia dan kekuatan dominan di wilayah Asia, Republik Rakyat Tiongkok.</p><p>Agenda utama dari kunjungan ini adalah keberlanjutan hubungan dagang antara RRT dan Indonesia. Melansir <a href="https://insight.kontan.co.id/news/kunjungan-prabowo-subianto-ke-china-membawa-misi-dagang">Kontan</a>, Prabowo memimpin delegasi berisikan sejumlah pengusaha yang berurusan dengan China di saat hubungan dagang dan investasi antara Indonesia dan China sedang maju-majunya.</p><p><strong>Hubungan Dagang dan Investasi Tiongkok ke Indonesia Menjulang Masa Jokowi</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cgIgWQuivDf7U0tX" /></figure><p>China merupakan partner ekspor dan impor terbesar untuk Indonesia dan memakan 23.2% nilai ekspor luar negeri. Konglomerat Indonesia seperti anak karya Mochtar Riady, Lippo Group, juga memiliki pusat operasi di China seperti Lippo Ltd (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/226:HK">226:HK</a>). Tak heran apabila pemerintah melangsungkan kunjungan untuk terus menjaga hubungan baik yang krusial; kunjungan terakhir pun dilakukan Presiden Joko Widodo Oktober 2023 lalu.</p><p>Investasi besar-besaran China baik dari segi infrastruktur dan sektor otomotif terutama <em>electric vehicles</em> juga tengah dilangsungkan. Indonesia yang konon memiliki pasar terbesar di Asia Tenggara, sedang menggencarkan pembangunan infrastruktur, serta penyebarluasan daripada kendaraan listrik pun tak kunjung menutup diri terhadap negara tersebut. Adapun raksasa kendaraan listrik China, BYD (<a href="https://markets.ft.com/data/equities/tearsheet/summary?s=1211:HKG">1211:HKD</a>), sedang dalam proses membuka operasi di Indonesia dengan menggelontorkan <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/business/chinese-ev-manufacturer-byd-announces-13-billion-investment-in-indonesia">USD 1.3 miliar untuk membangun pabrik manufaktur dengan kapasitas 150,000 mobil</a> demi bertarung memperebutkan pangsa pasar nusantara melawan macam Tesla, Hyundai, dan Wuling (juga perusahaan asal Tiongkok).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5Bc3H8oxg_ekmwWz" /></figure><p>BYD hanya bagian kecil dari investasi China ke Indonesia. Data FDI menunjukan adanya penanaman modal asing China ke Indonesia sebesar USD 16 miliar sejak 2014–dengan kenaikan sebesar ~4x antara 2014–2021 yang notabene terjadi sejak masa Presiden Jokowi. Pembangunan dan pemeliharaan hubungan baik dengan China semasa pemerintahan Presiden Jokowi dirasa akan terus dilanjutkan oleh Prabowo–terlepas dari posisi pribadi dan histori pengadaan alutsistanya sebagai Menteri Pertahanan.</p><p><strong>Kritik dan Persepsi atas Lawatan Prabowo ke China</strong></p><p>Kunjungan Prabowo ini juga menuai kritik dari lawan. Kian komentar pedas datang dari Mardani Ali Sera, Ketua DPP PKS, salah satu parpol pengusung Anies-Muhaimin. “Akan tetapi, penyambutan dan suasana di luar negeri seperti presiden terpilih,” katanya. ”Apa juga urgensinya (lawatan) dilakukan sekarang. Lebih elok dan benar tunggu hingga [ke]putusan MK,” ujarnya.</p><p><em>State visit</em> ini juga menghasilkan sedikit banyak persepsi mengenai potensi kecondongan RI dalam berporos di panggung internasional. Dari segi geopolitik diplomasi, kunjungan Prabowo seakan-akan terlihat sebagai prioritas China untuk menggandeng Indonesia — terutama dari pelukan kawan lama Amerika Serikat.</p><p>Prabowo, yang selama menjadi Menteri Pertahanan nampak memasang postur pertahanan yang dapat dikatakan pro-Amerika, berada di posisi yang agak <em>nyaru</em>. Alih-alih selaras dengan kebijakan pertahanannya yang American-oriented, pada kenyataannya ketergantungan Indonesia dengan China tidak bisa diabaikan begitu saja, justru harus dijaga. Bisnis ada di China, modal ada di China, dan oleh karena itu, dapat dikatakan hubungan dengan negara macan Asia ini adalah bagian krusial dari kepentingan nasional.</p><p>Padahal, secara ideologis dan historis, paham komunis ialah macam haram di Indonesia. China pun sebagai negara yang menganut paham komunis (secara ideologis) baru membuka hubungan kembali dengan Indonesia pada tahun 1990an setelah runtuhnya diplomasi pasca-Gerstok. Kunjungan seperti ini bisa jadi sebuah refleksi atas praktik realpolitik Indonesia di panggung internasional: ‘Bebas-Aktif-Realpolitik.’ Pertanyaan menarik yang mungkin bisa kita kunjungi kembali di lain hari adalah sejauh mana Realpolitik mempengaruhi hubungan luar negeri Indonesia (<em>how far Realpolitik can swing the national interest)</em>.</p><p>Sedangkan, di Jakarta, hasil daripada pemilihan umum 2024 masih ditengahi perdebatan panas di Mahkamah Konstitusi, yang sedang memeriksa gugatan sengketa Pemilu. Walau banyak yang bisa setuju dengan komentar Mardani Ali Sera dari PKS, nampaknya <em>the business of governance</em> tetap harus berlanjut.</p><p>Nantikan laporan dan analisis selanjutnya dari Le Citoyen.</p><p>Rick Bayuputra, Apr 7 2024.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=908ef31aef2c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen/bebas-aktif-realpolitik-908ef31aef2c">Bebas-Aktif, Realpolitik</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/le-citoyen">Le Citoyen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>