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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0xcy on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0xcy on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by 0xcy on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:20:18 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[KnightCTF2026 — Web Challenge Write-up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/knightctf2026-web-challenge-write-up-0da4e07c9c5d?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[web-ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-exploitation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Jan 2026 18:11:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-22T18:11:41.547Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>KnightCTF2026 — Web Challenge Write-up</h3><h3>Challenge Overview</h3><p>After reading the challenge description, it became clear that the goal was to obtain a <strong>Premium subscription tier</strong> in order to unlock restricted features and retrieve the <strong>flag</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/712/1*4LNcW4fZuO4j4vc9hcOXwQ.png" /></figure><h3>Application Reconnaissance</h3><p>The web application provides:</p><ul><li>A <strong>Register</strong> page</li><li>A <strong>Login</strong> page</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PNK7Qt_PlVkPlMISeDc66w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TM65icGKSDOncCxPqpjw9g.png" /></figure><p>To understand how the application works internally, I started by intercepting the HTTP requests sent during registration and login using <strong>Burp Suite</strong>.</p><h3>Analyzing Authentication Requests</h3><p>After intercepting the requests, I observed that:</p><ul><li>The application uses <strong>API-based authentication</strong></li><li>Both <strong>register</strong> and <strong>login</strong> endpoints accept <strong>JSON bodies</strong></li><li>No obvious vulnerability was found initially</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*jTwvFAGpuD-rMQTwEmYlCg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/747/1*8cO0e8SpOwc1OhrzeBWiLw.png" /></figure><p>After sending the register and login requests, the server returned a JSON response containing sensitive information:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*95Oeip0kRRiiwhHRHYK-QQ.png" /></figure><p>The response included:</p><ul><li>uid – unique user identifier</li><li>subscriptionTier – the user’s current tier</li><li>token – authentication token</li></ul><p>This immediately looked interesting.</p><h3>JWT Token Analysis</h3><p>The token returned by the server is a <strong>JWT (JSON Web Token)</strong>.<br> It is used in the Authorization header to access authenticated endpoints.</p><p>However:</p><ul><li>The JWT is signed with a <strong>secret key</strong></li><li>Without the secret key, modifying or forging the token is not feasible</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/634/1*3730vLN7nIq1QnBgWzI1Hw.png" /></figure><h3>What We Know So Far</h3><p>At this point, we have:</p><ol><li>A JSON response containing:</li></ol><ul><li>uid</li><li>subscriptionTier</li></ul><ol><li>A valid JWT token for authentication</li></ol><h3>Our Goal</h3><p>Upgrade our account from <strong>basic</strong> to <strong>premium</strong>.</p><h3>Failed Attempts</h3><p>I first tried a simple approach:</p><ul><li>Adding &quot;subscriptionTier&quot;: &quot;premium&quot; directly to the JSON body of the <strong>register API</strong></li></ul><p>However, this did <strong>not</strong> work, as the server-side logic ignores or validates this value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*AlNDYX-WPUVwmcclQEA1Rg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/771/1*q66iRALIs8Lz_Darfct2Bw.png" /></figure><p>After multiple failed attempts and further testing, I decided to analyze the client-side code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/309/1*K7VphfamPxqUlbFrug6upA.png" /></figure><h3>Client-Side JavaScript Analysis</h3><p>While inspecting the application assets, I discovered a JavaScript file named <strong>index.js</strong>.</p><p>I searched through the file for API calls and found something very interesting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DpFrMs9EwYaUWJqkqc8b2A.png" /></figure><h3>Hidden API Endpoint Discovered</h3><p>While digging through the application assets, I started reading the index.js file… and <strong>woooooow 😳</strong></p><p>I suddenly noticed a <strong>POST API endpoint</strong> that was <strong>not exposed anywhere in the UI</strong>.</p><p>Even more surprising, the endpoint accepts a very simple JSON body:</p><ul><li>u – user ID</li><li>t – subscription tier</li></ul><p>At this moment, everything clicked.</p><p>This endpoint was clearly responsible for <strong>changing the user’s subscription tier</strong>.<br> So if I could send a request to this API with my own uid and set t to premium… that would be <strong>game over</strong></p><h3>Exploitation</h3><p>Using Burp Suite, I sent a <strong>POST request</strong> to the discovered endpoint with:</p><ul><li>My own uid</li><li>t = premium</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*uuYlixckCcprj5diY_cBug.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*Rx4hieZfilrDmZIFgwrGsQ.png" /></figure><p>✅ The request succeeded, and my account was successfully upgraded to <strong>Premium</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*ieiVtdZ10LGGGNNdJmZZEg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/917/1*DBWfVRzhOGuf4M9Ino6mDg.png" /></figure><h3>Retrieving the Flag</h3><p>After upgrading the subscription tier:</p><ul><li>The locked feature became accessible</li><li>Navigating to the unlocked endpoint revealed the <strong>flag</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*ik4EyB3A2UfD0quFUHdDAg.png" /></figure><h3>Key Benefits of This Challenge</h3><ul><li><strong>Teaches real-world logic flaws</strong> in subscription and role management</li><li>Emphasizes the importance of <strong>client-side JavaScript analysis</strong></li><li>Demonstrates how <strong>hidden API endpoints</strong> can lead to privilege escalation</li><li>Improves skills in <strong>Burp Suite</strong>, API testing, and JWT-based authentication</li><li>Reflects common mistakes found in <strong>real-world web applications</strong></li></ul><p><strong>by Ahmad Alsokhni <br>LinkedIn: </strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/"><strong>https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0da4e07c9c5d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[KNIGHTCTF2026]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/knightctf2026-520640364dce?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/520640364dce</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:00:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-21T20:00:32.780Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Web Challenge</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*e99iWxVF_M6e3bkZaDSn3w.png" /></figure><p>First, I visited the link and found a <strong>login page</strong>.<br> The first thing that came to my mind was <strong>SQL Injection</strong>.</p><p>I tried injecting a <strong>single quote (&#39;)</strong>, but the server response was:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*CPuzJSpdbShp3rArbIJZbA.png" /></figure><p>Okay, let’s try another way to check if there is an SQLi vulnerability or not.<br> This time, I used a <strong>backslash (\)</strong> instead of a single quote, and it worked — the database returned an error.</p><p>So, I tried to sign in <strong>without valid credentials</strong> and injected something like:</p><pre>\OR 1=1 #</pre><p>And what happened?</p><p>I logged in as admin 😎</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zVPUjFleC-hnmtyVAos9nw.png" /></figure><p>Unfortunately… <strong>no flag here</strong> 😡<br> I was angry for a moment, but in CTFs we need to stay <strong>calm and patient</strong>.</p><p>Since I already found an SQLi, the next step was to <strong>leak / retrieve data from the database</strong>.</p><h3>Step 1: Number of Columns</h3><p>First, I tried to find the number of columns using <strong>ORDER BY injection</strong>, and based on the database error, I found that there are <strong>2 columns</strong>.</p><h3>Step 2: UNION Injection</h3><p>Next, I moved to a <strong>UNION-based SQL Injection</strong> to get useful data.</p><p>I tried something like:</p><pre><br>\UNION SELECT flag, flag #</pre><p>But there was <strong>no column called </strong><strong>flag</strong> in the current table.</p><p>So, I needed to find the <strong>table name</strong> that contains the flag.</p><h3>Step 3: Database &amp; Tables Enumeration</h3><p>First, I extracted the database name:</p><pre>\UNION SELECT database(), null #</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/817/1*oUvDsMp2eoGMeZmvBpywbg.png" /></figure><p>Then, I tried to get all table names from information_schema.tables:</p><pre>UNION SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema = ‘chall’ #<br></pre><p>Andddddddddd…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/777/1*Dg10k-rE-MC8uEo-w_5fTA.png" /></figure><p>Bro… what is this 💀<br> I tried many things like <strong>encoding</strong> and <strong>WAF bypass techniques</strong>, but nothing worked.</p><p>Then I sat down and thought:<br> <em>This is a CTF. The table name is probably simple… maybe it’s called </em><em>flag.</em></p><p>So I tried this query:</p><pre>UNION SELECT * FROM flag JOIN (SELECT 1)a #</pre><p>Why did I use this query?</p><ol><li>To dump everything from the <strong>flag table</strong> (as I expected)</li><li>To <strong>balance the UNION query</strong></li></ol><p>Anddddddddddddddddddddddd<br> <strong>THIS IS THE FLAGGGGGGGGGGG</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c7JUDeu1wQ4mK4HOWN6SRw.png" /></figure><p>by ahmad alsokhni,</p><p><strong>linkedin:</strong><a href="http://linkedin/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=520640364dce" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OrbitCTF — Web writeups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/orbitctf-web-writeups-dbd9ffde09db?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dbd9ffde09db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:16:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-29T21:20:10.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>OrbitCTF — Web writeups</h3><p>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/955/1*sQJKI8T0FYXy2jajMsGswg.png" /></figure><h3>1- AABU</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*0AplI-KtXWsduWhEpNz9Gg.png" /></figure><p>This challenge consists of three pages, and the most important one is our college page. I visited it to search for any useful information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nU4xifMx7lCJks78NM3mmg.png" /></figure><p>When I visited the college page I found a clickable button. Clicking the button did nothing, but there was a description above it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uh0-4Ck-phFJlrI1yqsBfQ.png" /></figure><p>The college also listed two networks available on campus:</p><ol><li>aabu-wifi — requires a specific identity for each student.</li><li>student — shared network; all students know the password (aabu@2017).</li></ol><p>Since this is a CTF scenario (not real life), I tried to simulate access by manipulating cookies. I created a cookie named student with the value aabu@2017, refreshed the page, and clicked the button again — the page returned the flag.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/201/1*aHamqk2rZIDMqnKGdi5L7Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/332/1*XRtBr1vAt1z4uwlguuXqpQ.png" /></figure><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3>2- path</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/626/1*y1wsQR44u4Y2yu7kW3jh6A.png" /></figure><p>ok this very easy challenge<br> we visited this challenge and opened the page</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-bf0z7AvPMVvDiVGnCFR9A.png" /></figure><p>so what should we do now?<br> the challenge name is <strong>path</strong><br> we need the flag and the challenge name is <strong>path</strong><br> so the flag is in the path<br> you can use any tools to find the path (for example gobuster)<br> and you can Expect it easily<br> the path is: flag/flag.txt<br> just</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/871/1*nS3EeA45rnTsZBaOpr0ASw.png" /></figure><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3>3-approve if you can</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*YDs4JyFB_DxVVHNgfOPnww.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5doGir-f1P6OBPGuElylIg.png" /></figure><p>The challenge revolves around HTTP request headers (hinted by the page title). Send the following headers with your request:</p><p>Age: 19<br>Accept-Language: es<br>X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1</p><p>curl -s -H “Age: 19” -H “Accept-Language: es” -H “X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1” <a href="https://approve-if-you-can-production.up.railway.app/">https://approve-if-you-can-production.up.railway.app/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dfOpHH7xSYRAqyAH40fssg.png" /></figure><p>Alternatively, you can use Burp Suite to intercept and edit the HTTP request.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3>4-speed typed</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/491/1*B74p4S7x5YK_XZtXxfh6pg.png" /></figure><p>In this challenge, submitting the text into the parameter returns a flag — however, it’s not the real flag. How do we obtain the real flag? Let’s examine the source code to find out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1003/1*TvhshwbJYRSx2o75NeZVVA.png" /></figure><p>I found this function. Maybe if I can call this function I can get something interesting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*68aL7dyaGy_9s9yiOnqYDg.png" /></figure><p>This function has a parameter; you must send an argument to call it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/244/1*g_IO3XRfW_DksB5A5YGAkA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*-Cjy2adqHO9T_XCkvkJQwg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/407/1*CMPTvwkLoqTE5Efy-KPE1g.png" /></figure><p>The keyword <strong>winner</strong> appears everywhere. Let&#39;s try it as the argument to call the function.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YQ4vYHadEmYCX9Gwm7wLdg.png" /></figure><p>nice, we get the correct flag.</p><p>That’s all! Thanks for participating, and stay tuned for our future events!”</p><p>Ahmad Al-Sokhni</p><p>linkedin:<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dbd9ffde09db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OrbitCTf]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/orbitctf-3046674027fe?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3046674027fe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 18:16:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-27T18:16:18.576Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Challenge:</strong> <em>CATI</em> (Web)</p><p><strong>Author:</strong> Ahmad Alsokhni</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/653/1*VhgP531y_nXUva4adw_yag.png" /></figure><p>I wrote this challenge to demonstrate an SQL injection vulnerability. Below is a cleaned, clearer version of my write-up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aRNY6vfoBAR8PWgN99SC-w.png" /></figure><h3>Description</h3><p>The target is a login page with <strong>no registration</strong> option, so our goal is to find a way to log in. The first thing that comes to mind is SQL injection for two reasons:</p><ol><li>Try SQLi in any login parameter.</li><li>The challenge name is <strong>CATI</strong> — which hints at <strong>injection</strong>.</li></ol><p>That sounds easy, so let’s try a simple SQL injection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/180/1*DQFr6CqbI04lHb7zimXlww.png" /></figure><p>Using this, we bypass authentication and get in</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iZNsfjgIIigakBL6bOSzJw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zgDnC5uI4PDG8qKA3wzd5g.png" /></figure><p>After logging in, a <strong>Users</strong> button appears — let’s visit it.</p><h3>Database layout (reconstruction)</h3><p>The displayed table contains several columns. After observing the output I normalized the columns as:</p><ol><li>id</li><li>username</li><li>password (not directly visible to the public)</li><li>admin</li></ol><p>So the users table likely looks like:</p><p>SELECT id, username, password, admin FROM users;<br>ok lets try it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WjZ5U01dVHaogqEL_QBekA.png" /></figure><p>Unfortunately this field was fine because I was familiar with this type of these challenge.<br> An idea came to mind: why not make myself an admin (or turn any user into an admin) directly in the query? If the admin column accepts a boolean-like value (e.g. 0/1 or no/yes), we can try returning 1 for that column:<br>SELECT id, username, password, 1 FROM users WHERE username=’ahmad’ —</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K34leU5dKpx0rW_cglHflA.png" /></figure><p>It still didn’t work. Why? Possible reasons:</p><ol><li>The function that receives the query is protected against SELECT injection (e.g., prepared statements or input filtering).</li><li>The application expects a specific SQL query shape and doesn’t accept replacing the original SELECT with a different SELECT (for example, you can’t inject a full SELECT … WHERE … in that parameter).</li></ol><p>If the second reason is true, we should try something that might work: a <strong>UNION-based</strong> injection. For example (adjust quoting to the target):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/815/1*E_dA2s7zYaXo1o1ymbL61g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xwv4Qngn3LSWTIDP7szSpA.png" /></figure><p>Using a UNION-based injection solved the issue. After the injection we obtained admin privileges and an <strong>Admin</strong> button became visible; clicking it reveals the admin panel where the flag is located.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bpdAl7ABn5V0wCMDxhQEiQ.png" /></figure><p>Wow — that was easier than it looked.<br> This is the flag.</p><p>Thanks for participating in our competition, and thanks to everyone who joined.</p><p>— Ahmad Alsokhni</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a><br><a href="https://www.instagram.com/">https://www.instagram.com/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3046674027fe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Skyline-METACTF]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/skyline-metactf-000d4600072a?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/000d4600072a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[otp-verification]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2025 12:15:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-03T12:15:08.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*lHzV1Jtc07sV2SHPo5uYlQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*qe3RhLAgJZvSx8pzNAGsXg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>I found this challenge familiar from other CTFs, so I jumped straight into it.</strong></h3><p><strong>Recon / initial steps</strong></p><ul><li>There is a login page and a registration page. I created a new account to sign in.</li><li>I tried setting the <em>full name</em> to admin and signing in, but that didn’t give me the flag.</li><li>I realized the exploit was related to the <strong>username</strong>, not the full name.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YLYLJX85uqx8LGBTlff3ww.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jzh6T4VBc76goBDiMXdsTg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Exploitation</strong></h3><p>I used Burp Suite to intercept requests and responses.</p><p>First, I logged in as the admin account. The login succeeded and the application sent a verification code to the admin email.</p><p>The login response also returned cookies. I copied those cookies and attempted to sign in as my account (ahmad) while using the admin cookies — this did not work immediately.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kBciwisf-rGmzA1QDB9iIg.png" /></figure><p>I followed the full sequence of requests. After entering the verification code, the application made the API request:</p><p>POST /api/set-authorizedz</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*RjTe9MQdAVhf-cPM65sBug.png" /></figure><ul><li>I modified that request by replacing my cookies with the admin cookies and forwarded the request.</li><li>That request forwarded me to the admin page, and I was able to retrieve the flag.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QTMFFqTp73_n4gmEJU9M_g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><ul><li>The bypass relied on swapping cookies in the /api/set-authorizedz request after verification.</li></ul><h3>by ahmad alsokhni</h3><p>linked in:<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=000d4600072a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The last dance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/the-last-dance-8ea004b909a4?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ea004b909a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint-investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 13:40:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-26T13:47:59.604Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/469/1*Co3pPRu_SQCvqhKsERgibw.png" /></figure><h3>The Last Dance — OSINT CTF Write-up</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>While I was exploring Facebook, I came across a post about the <em>crisis of confidence</em> among many players — and it mentioned <strong>Lance Vance</strong>.<br> That gave me an idea: this could be a great OSINT challenge from our competition.</p><p>So, let’s walk through how I managed to find the flag using the description provided.</p><h3>Step 1: Identifying the character</h3><p>First of all, Lance Vance is a famous character in <strong>GTA: Vice City</strong>. He is known as Tommy’s friend.<br> With that in mind, I started digging further.</p><h3>Step 2: Initial Google search</h3><p>When you search for <strong>“Lance GTA”</strong> in Google, you get plenty of results.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dp1tofTNW1v1ELDkOsWUtA.png" /></figure><p>Among these results, one in particular stood out: a <strong>YouTube video in 4K quality</strong>. That immediately caught my attention, so I decided to click on it and see what might be hidden inside..</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TkQU2KfRYhX_PyDGVE8CFg.png" /></figure><h3>Step 3: Clue in the YouTube video</h3><p>Inside the video, I noticed the phrase:</p><blockquote>“This is the last dance for Lance Vance.”</blockquote><p>This looked suspicious, so I decided to search for that exact phrase in Google.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1021/1*P0hKztk1-YItTVluHgdmlw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 4: Moving to Reddit</h3><p>The first thing that appeared was a <strong>Reddit post</strong> containing the same phrase I saw on YouTube. Naturally, I decided to visit it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e_Xc-dkpxqwXDG7wwb4z1Q.png" /></figure><p>I found the post, but there was nothing interesting in the comments. So, I went on to explore <strong>r/GTA</strong> a little more to see if I could find something useful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/1*wxoNvcyGuwcPZvFmT0zYfA.png" /></figure><p>And sure enough — I discovered another post that was talking about the <strong>same phrase</strong> we saw on YouTube.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/991/1*Lt9IdTEjo_ccklm5t3hdKg.png" /></figure><h3>Step 5: Finding the flag</h3><p>That’s when I finally came across the key clue: the post mentioned that <em>“the flag is somewhere here.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gvd40Wtc1KeNqUZjn8jSxQ.png" /></figure><p>As expected, after checking further, I found the flag — it was hidden on the <strong>profile page of the user who wrote the comment</strong>.<br> Mission accomplished. ✅</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/503/1*8U4WhkyKA8PX_kBuj2u7LQ.png" /></figure><h3>Step 6: An easier method (Google Dorking)</h3><p>Now, the way above was the “long path” to reach the flag. But there’s also a faster method using Google dorks.</p><p>For example, this query:</p><p>site:reddit.com intext:”4hats{“</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CB1Lv4rrb5D_XUDXsEcTJg.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>That’s it! Thank you for reading this write-up and for participating in our competition.</p><p>Follow me (:)</p><ul><li>Instagram:<a href="https://www.instagram.com/ahmad.alsokhni.7/">https://www.instagram.com/ahmad.alsokhni.7/</a></li><li>LinkedIn:<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a></li></ul><p>by ahmad_alsokhni.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ea004b909a4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Encrypted Shells with Socat]]></title>
            <link>https://systemweakness.com/encrypted-shells-with-socat-8105f1295b24?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8105f1295b24</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tools]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 14:34:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-08T10:10:25.335Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m currently learning about Socat and how to encrypt the connection between attacker and victim shells. In this article, I’ll share what I’ve learned — including how to set up encrypted shells using Socat and why encryption matters.</p><p>#What is Socat?</p><p><strong>Socat</strong> (short for <strong>SOcket CAT</strong>) is a powerful networking tool often described as <strong>“netcat on steroids”</strong>.<br> It allows you to create two data streams and link them together — for example, connecting a TCP port to a shell, linking two sockets, or even tunneling encrypted connections.</p><p>While netcat is great for simple shells, <strong>socat provides more flexibility</strong>:</p><ul><li>Supports many protocols (TCP, UDP, SSL/TLS, pipes, files, PTY).</li><li>Allows for encryption out of the box.</li><li>Can create fully interactive shells (not just basic reverse shells).</li></ul><p>How we can get BIND shell??</p><p>Example: Plain Bind Shell</p><p>Here’s the simplest way to open a bind shell using socat:</p><p>NOTE:# On the target (victim):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/952/1*IkWYhumOM1CYl_2oy1BDWQ.png" /></figure><p>This starts a listener on port 4444 and spawns /bin/bash whenever someone connects.</p><p>Then, on the attacker machine:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*LxLOSx3pKdP3XBJ6TOB76Q.png" /></figure><p>This gives you a basic shell.<br> However, <strong>the connection is completely unencrypted</strong>, meaning anyone sniffing the network can read your commands and responses in cleartext.</p><h3><strong><em>Capturing the Traffic in Wireshark</em></strong></h3><p>To see what this looks like on the network, I captured the traffic on port 4444 with Wireshark. <br>Notice how my commands and their outputs are visible in cleartext:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dltv50WDqlv07XIqxDhLsw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Securing the Connection with TLS (Socat + Cert)</strong></h3><p>Now that we’ve seen how the traffic looks in cleartext, let’s fix that by using <strong>TLS encryption</strong> with Socat.</p><p>First, generate a self-signed certificate and key on the machine that will act as the listener. <br>This combines both the private key and certificate into a single `.pem` file:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/807/1*V1YU2wTaXyZqSqDIuTaoKA.png" /></figure><p>bash<br><strong>openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout key.pem -x509 -days 365 -out cert.pem</strong><br><strong>cat key.pem cert.pem &gt; server.pem</strong></p><p><strong>Encrypted Bind Shell (Victim as Listener):</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uGj0w_pncYBpaGSCVDPyXA.png" /></figure><p>Then, on the <strong>attacker machine</strong>, connect using:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*GGgEGSYyF1KdT4GKFN9I4g.png" /></figure><p>This time, the connection is fully encrypted — even if someone is sniffing the traffic, they’ll only see TLS handshake and encrypted packets, not your commands.</p><p>Wireshark Result</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*InS3yzAkA_ozjSsnFErO8Q.png" /></figure><h3>Key Takeaways</h3><p>- The listener is responsible for encryption — if you are using a bind shell, the victim must provide the certificate; if you are using a reverse shell, the attacker must do it. <br>- Socat is powerful — it’s more than just netcat and supports TLS out of the box. <br>- Wireshark is your friend— it’s the best way to verify if your shell is encrypted and to understand how the network traffic looks.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Playing with Socat taught me how easy it is to secure a shell connection with TLS. <br>By capturing packets in Wireshark, I could clearly see the difference between plaintext and encrypted traffic. <br>If you’re learning cybersecurity, I highly recommend trying this yourself — it’s a simple exercise that will deepen your understanding of network security and post-exploitation techniques.</p><p>by ahmad alsokhni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8105f1295b24" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://systemweakness.com/encrypted-shells-with-socat-8105f1295b24">Encrypted Shells with Socat</a> was originally published in <a href="https://systemweakness.com/">System Weakness</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[4hats CTF — OSINT Challenge Write-Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/4hats-ctf-osint-challenge-write-up-6ff3f0341a08?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ff3f0341a08</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2025 19:04:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-06T10:37:37.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>4hats CTF — OSINT Challenge Write-Up</h3><h3>This challenge is called <strong>4hatsTeam</strong>.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/510/1*ja6I9xjYPStcLXu-E0TC1g.png" /></figure><p>When we read the description, we notice that the challenge is about the 4hats team from our university. The author mentions that 4hats participated in the NCSC competition.</p><p>The interesting part is that it says: <em>“search about us, we have social network platforms.”</em><br> Sounds easy — we just need to look up 4hats on social media platforms.</p><p>Since Instagram is one of the most popular platforms for sharing daily events and team achievements, I expected the flag to be hidden there.</p><p>Before jumping in, let’s check the flag format. The flag is split into <strong>three missions</strong>:</p><ol><li><strong>Team table number</strong></li><li><strong>Name of the 3rd player</strong></li><li><strong>Brand of the water bottle</strong></li></ol><p>I went to Instagram and searched for anything related to the NCSC competition.</p><p>On the 4hats Instagram page, there is a highlight named <strong>NCSC4</strong> — perfect!<br> Clicking it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SlWlpOicDde1YNzlbuZVPA.png" /></figure><p>we can see the number <strong>4</strong> appearing everywhere.<br> So we can safely say:</p><p><strong>Team table number = 4 ✅</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*3g42ur7om_cL2HxPhTvSbQ.png" /></figure><h3>Mission 2: Name of the 3rd Player</h3><p>By zooming in on one of the stories in the NCSC highlight, we can find the team list for the competition.<br> There, we can clearly read the name of the third player:</p><p><strong>3rd player name = 2li ✅</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*rAeIpKqu61dpju_cq28M3A.png" /></figure><h3>Mission 3: Brand of the Water Bottle</h3><p>In the same story, after zooming in further, we can spot the water bottle brand.<br> It might be a bit hard to read — you’ll need your glasses for this one 😉 — but it says:</p><p><strong>Water bottle brand = Maha ✅</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/91/1*zRpUd7cba_D8wcUoc_v6PA.png" /></figure><h3>Final Flag</h3><p>Putting it all together, we get the complete flag:</p><pre>4hats{4_2li_maha}</pre><p>by ahmad alsokhni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ff3f0341a08" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[4or ever challenge(4hats-ctf)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/4hats-ctf-c586e5fafcd1?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c586e5fafcd1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 14:42:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-06T10:57:21.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/510/1*vNffYm9qqjmZgD1qHp9RDg.png" /></figure><p>The goal of this challenge is to test and improve your OSINT and searching skills to gather as much information as possible about your target.<br> The first step is to carefully read the challenge description so you know where to start.</p><h3>Step 1: Identifying the Team Leader</h3><p>The challenge states that the 4hats team consists of four members — just like us — but someone mentioned explicitly that <strong>you are the team leader</strong>.<br> Your first mission is to find all the team members on social media and determine who the leader is.</p><h3>Searching on Facebook</h3><p>I started by searching for the team members, especially the challenge author <strong>ahmad alsokhni</strong>, since he seemed important.<br> Because Facebook is the most popular platform in Jordan, I used it for the search.<br> I found Ahmad’s profile and an interesting cover image.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/1*MRznBMaDkWiQW2ZAg97HIQ.png" /></figure><p>In the image, I noticed some key clues:</p><ul><li>#ncsc</li><li>#4hats → this is their team name</li><li>#ctf</li><li>Comment: <strong>“we love 4, you love it?”</strong></li></ul><p>These hints seem important for the next steps.</p><p>Moving to Instagram</p><p>Since I knew that the whole team has an Instagram page, I searched for it.<br> In the bio, I found the same comment and a lot of number 4s.</p><p>And I see something very interesting.<br><strong>“once,something was here.”</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RtDlLVFH7OSBiZOUHU4ouQ.png" /></figure><h3>Confirming the Leader</h3><p>Before continuing, I confirmed Ahmad’s Instagram profile (I found it through the 4hats account’s followers list).<br> Here’s what I found:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*sGUcHWZ_qNOVpC8kX0MiOQ.png" /></figure><p>This bio was a very strong hint that <strong>Ahmad is the team leader</strong> (it even says “4hats leader”).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*1Pml3fHLxfsH6L3u76Mwfw.png" /></figure><p>Now we can go back to the bio and reflect on the idea that once, something was here</p><p><strong>Yes, the first thing that comes to my mind is the archive</strong></p><p>go to archive.md</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ztkoo4XrCAe7odzz6_Eamw.png" /></figure><p>Wow! Just as I said — I literally found something that had been archived. And it’s a GitHub link!</p><p>Exploring the GitHub Link</p><p>The GitHub account is <strong>ahmad0xcy</strong>, After clicking on the relevant repository and reading the README.md, I discovered an important clue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*JyXEQ26ZkT2mvzxgXDw2rg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eJy4hXQbIR0wdT8LVNkTCw.png" /></figure><h3>Searching on X (Twitter)</h3><p>I also noticed a username @0xcyyyyyyyy that appeared to belong to Ahmad on X (Twitter).<br> After searching, I found the <strong>first part of the flag</strong>: 4hats{4_hats_</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*5GMQogiFbOK6wBicodHQOA.png" /></figure><p>But this wasn’t the end of the challenge.</p><h3>LinkedIn Search</h3><p>The next step was to check Ahmad’s LinkedIn profile.<br> In his bio, I found the <strong>second part of the flag</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ELpVQNrHeEtjJZStOFPk5Q.png" /></figure><h3>Finding the Final Piece</h3><p>The X post contained a # hint, which suggested the last piece could be hidden behind a hashtag.<br> I searched Google for <strong>#online School</strong> and found a Medium article.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CeglWXZLMEtHXs_9_VFv5g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RUAuWtOTb13dtMeCWUKaqA.png" /></figure><p>Scrolling to the end of the article, I found the <strong>final part of the flag</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VyPspX1ZXowbw-RaMIDT7w.png" /></figure><p>3ver_d1d it!}</p><p>4hats{4_hats_t4am_for3ver_d1d it!}</p><p>by ahmad alsokhni</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c586e5fafcd1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NCSC CTF 2025 :WEB CALLENGE (AuthMePlease)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rdmfg3791/ncsc-ctf-2025-web-callenge-authmeplease-2a8b01ab7625?source=rss-32ba32cfee46------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a8b01ab7625</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xcy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2025 10:35:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-01T10:49:29.760Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>NCSC CTF 2025 :WEB CALLENGE (AuthMePlease)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/307/1*ELLWhoPXKDQKAKXLzE43Nw.png" /></figure><p>As part of my participation in the National Cybersecurity Center CTF 2025, I was fortunate enough to solve one web challenge titled <strong>“AuthMePlease”</strong>. Although it may seem like a small step, it was a great learning opportunity and a motivational push forward in my cybersecurity journey.</p><h3>Challenge Overview</h3><p>Upon visiting the challenge website, I was presented with a basic login page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/878/1*BmZzuFU28GMpwiqdeZYOTw.png" /></figure><p>I started by testing some default credentials:</p><pre>Username: user  <br>Password: password123</pre><p>After submitting these credentials, I was redirected to a page with limited access and no admin privileges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/1*-Ow1eMNXwmXTOIHXaQ-R_w.png" /></figure><h3>Initial Approach — Cookie Tampering (Failed)</h3><p>My first instinct was to check the browser cookies to see if there was anything related to the user’s role or admin status. Unfortunately, I found no such cookies indicating anything about admin privileges.</p><p>I tried manually adding the following cookies:</p><pre>Role: admin  <br>Admin_Status: true</pre><p>However, upon refreshing the page, I was met with a message: <strong>“You must log in first.”</strong></p><p>This attempt failed, so I moved to a different approach.</p><h3>Next Step — Intercepting Requests with Burp Suite</h3><p>I used <strong>Burp Suite</strong> to intercept and inspect the login request for the test credentials. The request looked normal and didn’t reveal anything suspicious.</p><p>So, I decided to <strong>think outside the box</strong>.</p><h3>Creative Attempt — Registering as Admin (Failed)</h3><p>I went to the registration page and tried to create an account with the username admin and any password, hoping to overwrite or hijack the admin account. However, the response said that the username admin already exists.</p><p>This confirmed that admin was already a valid account on the system.</p><h3>The Breakthrough — Privilege Escalation via Registration Parameters</h3><p>While analyzing the <strong>registration request</strong>, I noticed the following parameters being sent:</p><pre>username=&amp;password=&amp;email=</pre><p>This caught my attention — if these fields are processed on the backend without proper filtering or sanitization, maybe I could inject extra parameters during registration.</p><p>Previously, I had seen references to admin_status and role. Based on that, I crafted the following registration request:</p><pre>username=frs2&amp;password=frk2&amp;email=ff@ff&amp;admin=true&amp;admin_status=true</pre><p>To my surprise — <strong>it worked!</strong></p><p>I gained admin access and was redirected to the privileged admin page 🎉</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/893/1*pN1QmjuuNg27BSaQnQ-kmw.png" /></figure><h3>Final Notes</h3><p>Unfortunately, I didn’t capture screenshots of all the steps during the challenge, but I wanted to document the process and share the key ideas behind my approach.</p><p>Even though this was the only challenge I solved during the competition, it taught me a lot about creative</p><p><strong>Author:</strong> Ahmad Alsokhni<br> 🔗 <strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%D9%90ahmad-alsokhni-227307328/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/ِahmad-alsokhni-227307328/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a8b01ab7625" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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