<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Reynolds Taylor on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Reynolds Taylor on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@reynoldstaylor?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:56:08 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@reynoldstaylor/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Prisoner’s Dilemma Doesn’t Do Well With Chaos.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/the-prisoners-dilemma-doesn-t-do-well-with-chaos-c953882ed70e?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c953882ed70e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[globalization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prisoners-dilemma]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 14:50:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-24T14:50:53.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Prisoner’s Dilemma Doesn’t Do Well With Chaos. Global Coordination Efforts May Need a New Game Theory.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PJ03--efBRtzlQEirj-nGA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Is there an answer in merging game theory with chaos theory? Photo by Wrongtog on Unsplash.</figcaption></figure><p><em>A quick note to readers: If you’ve been enjoying this content, </em><strong><em>please consider joining my </em></strong><a href="https://irrationalreview.substack.com/"><strong><em>Substack newsletter by the same name</em></strong></a><strong><em>. I’m in the process of migrating this community over. </em></strong><em>No hard feelings, Medium!… SS just works best for me at this time. (Don’t worry, the Substack is free and will remain that way for the foreseeable future.) Huge thanks!</em></p><p>I’m a student of international cooperation. I’ve always idealized it and — to at least some extent — believed it was both possible and a mechanism for net-positive progress. (It’s worth noting that most mechanisms suited for progress are equally capable of producing net-negative effects as they are net-positive; I’ve never assumed anything different here.)</p><p>Pining for cooperation at the global scale has become taboo, even (and sometimes especially) in the most progressive circles. Historically, global cooperation has required participation by all actors, but not <em>equitable </em>or <em>just </em>participation. Existing power dynamics — those centuries old and newly emerging, those indiscernible and openly violent — are re-created and deepened each time the world tries to act together, making it all the more impossible for it to act together the next time around.</p><p>I don’t pretend to have a solution to this, not a fresh one anyway. But, acting together, we <em>have </em>achieved transformative results — and there’s a level of unreality to any argument, regardless of its roots, that we shouldn’t try to do so again. We don’t have much of an option: We live on the same planet, with its finite resources. Cooperation may not look like harmony, but it <em>will </em>look like our species managing to graduate from this particular epoch still alive and capable of striving for reasonably dignified lives.</p><p>So how do we do it? Or — perhaps a more timely question — why do we seem to be unraveling the success we’ve already had? One reason is this: <strong>Global collective action is a giant prisoner’s dilemma, and we have madmen at the negotiating table.</strong></p><h4>Case Study: That Time We Fixed The Atmosphere… and Then 40 Years Later Quit the Fix</h4><p>Given the cruelty and strangeness of this moment, this case study is admittedly quaint. But it’s a useful example that can be extrapolated, so bear with me.</p><p>The Earth is constantly pummeled by UV radiation from the Sun. Our atmosphere — specifically its thin “ozone layer” — protects us from huge amounts of this radiation. This quirk of planetary evolution, in conjunction with other lucky breaks — the exact tilt of the Earth’s axis, the rate at which we spin on that axis, our distance from the Sun, etc. — is the reason we exist. We receive enough UV light to stay warm, but our atmospheric defense system protects us from too much excess. The importance of the ozone’s exact, delicate composition is nearly impossible to overstate: Mars has virtually no atmosphere and it’s a cold, dead rock; Venus has far too much, and it’s a hellish sphere of lava and crushing pressure.</p><p>In the mid 1980s, it became clear the world’s use of chemicals commonly used in refrigerants, hairsprays, and other aerosols had ripped a hole the size of Antarctica in the ozone layer. In response, dozens of nations ratified the Montreal Protocol, a treaty to dramatically reduce (and eventually, eliminate) the production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals. Today, the Montreal Protocol is the <a href="https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/international-actions-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer">only universally ratified treaty</a>, with 197 recognized nations agreeing to implement its targets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/914/1*oCWKxxjRsNMShuw7rFkyqw.jpeg" /><figcaption>NASA visualization of the ozone hole over the South Pole, using data from NASA Aqua Spacecraft.</figcaption></figure><p>This unprecedented response to a collective problem has been, by almost any metric, wildly successful. Individuals born between 1980 and 2100 — possibly you, definitely your kids, your grandkids, your great-grandkids — will avoid nearly 450 million cases of skin cancer, more than 2 million skin cancer deaths, and roughly 60 million cases of cataracts because of the treaty’s existence and implementation. Not initially dubbed a climate treaty, it certainly is one: By the middle of this century the ozone hole is expected to close completely, and through that achievement alone we will have avoided a global temperature increase of 2.5 degrees C. The Carbon Containment Lab <a href="https://carboncontainmentlab.org/updates/posts/building-upon-the-montreal-protocol">described the climate impact succinctly</a>: “Without the Montreal Protocol, the climate impacts projected for 2050 would have already arrived by 2000.”</p><p>Nearly 40 years later, the treaty is hailed as a victory for the planet <em>and </em>for business. In 2020, during Trump 1.0, the United States enacted legislation to further bring domestic industry into compliance with the treaty. The Chamber of Commerce advocated for the legislation, <a href="https://www.eenews.net/articles/5-things-to-know-about-trumps-attacks-on-the-montreal-protocol/">commenting</a> that “it’s going to benefit the economy, it’s going to open up access to markets, [and] level the playing field for U.S. participation in those markets.” A bipartisan group of senators likewise celebrated the new industry mandates as a way to <a href="https://www.eenews.net/articles/5-things-to-know-about-trumps-attacks-on-the-montreal-protocol/">“secure America’s place as a global leader”</a> in manufacturing.</p><p>Despite all this, Trump 2.0 recently <a href="https://www.theenergymix.com/u-s-pulls-funding-from-treaty-that-fixed-the-ozone-layer/">announced its decision to effectively exit</a> (or, at least, drastically reduce the United States’ participation in) the Montreal Protocol. Why? We know this administration is hostile to any positive environmental action, and we know there’s seemingly no level of bought corporate influence the White House won’t tolerate. But the consensus — <a href="https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-signing-montreal-protocol-ozone-depleting-substances">cited by President Reagan</a> when he announced the United States’ ratification in 1988 — among government and business that this treaty is good and productive hasn’t changed. The gears were set in motion decades ago and industries — mostly adapted — aren’t clamoring to go in reverse.</p><h4>The Prisoner’s Dilemma Assumes Prisoners Want Out</h4><p>Another word for cooperation is coordination. Coordination is the bedrock of all relationships. The relationship between government and citizens. Between brand and consumer. Between employer and employee. Between friends. Between spouses. Between me and my puppy.</p><p>Coordination frequently fails. A classic example of coordination failure is known as the “prisoner’s dilemma,” when individuals or nations act in their own perceived best interest and, as a result, cause the collective (ultimately including themselves) to be worse off. Imagine one pond that is fished by dozens of fishermen, each relying on their catch for sustenance. The more fish you catch, the better off you are. The incentive is to find a way — getting up early, building in-pond perimeters, changing your bait — to catch as many fish as possible. Each fisherman does this and the pond stock is soon depleted. No more fish; everyone is worse off.</p><p>The prisoner’s dilemma is most easily solved through coercion, often in the form of government regulation — like a cap on the number of fish each individual can catch per day. Nobel-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz illustrates the power and prevalence of well-designed coercive tactics by describing what would happen without rules mandating which side of the road to drive on:</p><blockquote>“Some would drive on the left, others on the right. There would be chaos and gridlock… [but this] chaos can be resolved with a one-time intervention: a law requiring everyone to drive on the right-hand side… This law entails minimal coercion and relatively little cost to either the government or to drivers, but it has the enormous benefit of avoiding, or at least reducing, gridlock and accidents. To be clear, [it’s] coercive. And yet everyone benefits.”</blockquote><p>I would have more agency if I was allowed to drive on the left side of the road. I could get in my car, turn the ignition, and drive on any piece of pavement I wanted. But because I’m regulated by law not to do this — and because I live in a society where I can reasonably assume that, given enough time and enough violations, I’d be punished for breaking the law — I don’t. I also don’t do it because it would put me and others in danger. But — and <strong>here’s the point</strong> — you don’t have to take my word on that. I’ve been coerced to behave in a certain way whether I give a damn about your safety or not. And the result is that I’m a little less free than I would otherwise be, but far, far better off. We all are.</p><p>But the prisoner’s dilemma assumes that, at each corner of the negotiating table, there’s an individual — or a nation of individuals — with the capacity to make decisions based on a delicate balance of their perceived best interests and the coercive tools designed to re-direct that interest. What happens when that assumption doesn’t hold? Countries with leaders untethered to the nation’s collective best interest can’t be negotiated with. They can’t be coerced. They’re just as likely to drive on the right side of the road (claiming that of course they do this, it’s the law) as they are to drive on the left side of the road (claiming that of course they do this, damn the law).</p><p><strong>In other words, the prisoner’s dilemma, when applied to nations, doesn’t account for authoritarianism. </strong>Or narcissism. Or an attention-based power. It doesn’t account for a “prisoner” optimizing for disruption and defiance.</p><p>Global coordination has always been about game theory — about engineering incentives to push players to set themselves and others free. But Trump and other bad actors — like Netanyahu, Putin, Orbán, and Bolsonaro — aren’t playing to win as much as they’re playing to stay in the game. The goal is perpetual motion rather than resolution. It’s not about interests; it’s about what’s <em>more interesting </em>to particular, deeply irrational men.</p><h4>Game Theory Meets Chaos Theory: Designing for Madmen</h4><p>Game theory exists in a vacuum of rational thinking which is unrealistic by any human standard. But still, it’s long served as a decent predictor of behavior. Generally, while individuals frequently behave irrationally, they can be counted on — most of the time — to move toward their own perceived best interest. There’s an underlying logic, even if misguided, to most behavior. (Indeed, researchers seeking to explain game theory’s response to irrational conduct argue that sometimes people <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/how-game-theory-explains-irrational-behavior">“are not consciously optimizing.”</a> If they <em>were </em>optimizing, they’d behave in roughly the way we’d expect them to.)</p><p>But what if they’re <strong>optimizing for <em>chaos</em></strong>? I won’t pretend to propose anything resembling an actionable strategy, but I wonder if there’s an answer to be found in merging game theory and chaos theory. There’s some accidental poetry to this idea, given our case study: Chaos theory gained prominence in an early-1960s experiment, when a minuscule rounding error on a single variable spiraled the experiment’s simulated atmosphere out of control. If game theory <a href="https://medium.com/@erikasplit/game-theory-meets-chaos-theory-50cf534f2775">“[masters] <em>why</em> people choose the moves they do,” then chaos theory explains “<em>how</em> those moves ripple through an interconnected, sensitive world.”</a></p><p>Advocates of merging these two theories <a href="https://medium.com/@erikasplit/game-theory-meets-chaos-theory-50cf534f2775">suggest</a> “design[ing] for resilience” by building real-time feedback into formerly static systems and “leverag[ing] nonlinearity” by deliberately making small policy changes to “tip a complex system into desired equilibrium — essentially harnessing the butterfly effect on purpose.”</p><p><strong>If madmen are what we have, then how might we design for them on purpose? </strong>Imagine a global coordination effort engineered — at least aesthetically — to give Trump the narrative chaos he wants, while actually creating alignment for the common good.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading! </em><strong><em>(Ir)rational </em></strong><em>offers deep dive analysis of the legal, policy, and market features (the good and the bad) that make up our current system, and explores the shifts necessary to reimagine and reinvent global economic relationships.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c953882ed70e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/the-prisoners-dilemma-doesn-t-do-well-with-chaos-c953882ed70e">The Prisoner’s Dilemma Doesn’t Do Well With Chaos.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How the U.S. Uses Red Tape to Break Things and Break People.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/how-the-u-s-uses-red-tape-to-break-things-and-break-people-6ccef9c72e87?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ccef9c72e87</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 20:52:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-17T20:52:48.118Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f02ebBE9VCt4T9Hwtcxb9A.png" /></figure><p><em>A quick note to readers: If you’ve been enjoying this content, </em><strong><em>please consider joining my </em></strong><a href="https://irrationalreview.substack.com/"><strong><em>Substack newsletter by the same name</em></strong></a><strong><em>. I’m in the process of migrating this community over. </em></strong><em>No hard feelings, Medium!… SS just works best for me at this time. (Don’t worry, the Substack is free and will remain that way for the foreseeable future.) Huge thanks!</em></p><p>I’ve been reflecting on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/americas-lawyers-vs-chinas-engineers/id1081584611?i=1000723410248">an interview</a> with Dan Wang, conducted by <em>Vox’s </em>Sean Illing, on his new book, <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/465161/breakneck-by-wang-dan/9780241729175"><em>Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future</em></a>. (I’ve only read <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Breakneck/yMFEEQAAQBAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1">excerpts</a>, but after listening to the interview it’s definitely on my TBR list.) Wang’s thesis — as a Canadian who has lived most of his life alternating between China and the United States — is that <strong>“China is an <em>engineering state</em>, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’s <em>lawyerly society</em>, blocking everything it can, good and bad.”</strong></p><p>Whereas China’s Political Bureau is dominated by engineers (who have a bias toward building), the U.S. political class is dominated by lawyers (who have a bias toward erecting barriers — or at the least toward process, which tends to be slow).</p><p>In Wang’s estimation, U.S. lawyers — beginning in earnest in the 1960s and 70s — embarked on a “mission [] to stop as many things as possible.” (He grants that this mission was a “necessary corrective” to the “frightful” place the United States had become in those decades.) Contrast this with China, which Wang describes as “moving quickly to achieve rapid physical improvements.”</p><p>Early in the book and interview, he provides two — rather startling — examples of the juxtaposition:</p><ol><li>In the United States, the “housing crisis” refers to a staggering under-supply of housing units, as well as the increasing consensus among progressives and some conservatives that this is due to near-endless layers of administrative hurdles erected to achieve progressive-coded goals (union labor, environmental protection, civic participation by vulnerable communities, etc.). In China, the “housing crisis” refers to a collapse of home prices due to a staggering <strong><em>over</em>-supply </strong>of housing units.</li><li>In 2008, both California and China began work to construct a high-speed rail link between major cities (San Francisco and Los Angeles, and Beijing and Shanghai). Three years later, in 2011, China unveiled its finished line at a cost of $36 billion. Seventeen years later, in 2025, there is no high-speed rail in California. The ambitious SF-LA line has been downgraded to a Bakersfield (pop. &lt;500,000)-Merced (pop. &lt;100,000) line, expected to open in the early-to-mid 2030s at a cost of nearly $130 billion.</li></ol><p>The left’s new <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/10/abundance-ezra-klein-derek-thompson-book-review">“abundance framework”</a> — discussed at length all over the internet, as well as by me <a href="https://irrationalreview.substack.com/p/a-primer-on-the-lefts-abundance-vs">here</a> — says that the reason the United States can’t get anything done is because we’ve created institutions that deliberately slow transformation in order to protect us from tyrannies of both majority and minority rule. <em>On top of those institutions</em>, we’ve hoarded processes — meant to further protect the most vulnerable communities, as well as further entrench the most special interests — that ground transformation to a halt.</p><p>But Wang’s argument goes further, ultimately asking whether process and barrier-building is the <strong>necessary cost of plurality</strong>. He explains that while China — with its state-imposed control over the material and, to a large extent, social and intellectual landscape of the nation — has the capacity to “move[] fast and break[] things,” it also “moves fast and breaks people.” He labels this <strong>“social engineering”</strong> and positions it opposite plurality:</p><blockquote>“[China’s] leaders aren’t only civil or electrical engineers. They are, fundamentally, social engineers… [They are] engineers of the soul — a phrase from Joseph Stalin repeated by Xi Jinping.”</blockquote><p>Essentially, the dichotomy Wang sets up is this:</p><ul><li>Commitment to a <em>pluralistic society</em> and to the values inherent to individualism leads inevitably to accumulated and exaggerated — even if typically well-intentioned — processes that eventually function as enormous barriers to progress and to ensuring the rights, liberties, and material prosperity that pluralism promised.</li><li>Commitment to an <em>engineered state</em>, on the other hand, more easily and more rapidly leads to the creation of new tech, infrastructure, and other material developments, but also invariably removes from each individual some or all agency over their destinies and, often, bodies.</li></ul><p>This seems correct to me, but I wouldn’t draw such a stark line between the two worlds. Plurality may be correlated with red tape, and social engineering correlated with action, but red tape — those processes borne of the United States’ commitment, however fraught and imperfect, to individual rights — can also be used to engineer outcomes and strip people of control over their own futures.</p><p>I’ll offer two cases-in-point:</p><h4><strong>1. We’ve already started on the bodies.</strong></h4><p>In the three years since <em>Dobbs </em>undid reproductive protections in the United States, conservative leaders at the local and state levels have been <a href="https://reproductiverights.org/maps/abortion-laws-by-state/">working to achieve all-out abortion bans</a> — some with horrifying success. But alas, a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/">majority</a> of the nation values a woman’s right to govern her own body, her own pregnancy, and her own health; so while these bans continue to go into effect in many parts of the country, a federal statutory ban remains — for the time being — political kryptonite.</p><p>But there’s so many other ways — other processes in place — for lawyers and political leaders (and, sometimes, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/11/1107741175/texas-abortion-bounty-law">ordinary constituents</a>) to target, demonize, and harm women whom they suspect of having abortions. These prosecutions aren’t typically based on legal loopholes recently established, creative litigation strategies freshly hatched, or new laws just handed down. Rather, based on existing statutes and common law — such as obscure and outdated regulations on what to do with fetal tissue, broad interpretations on child abuse and negligence precedents, abuse of corpse laws, and prohibitions on abandoning bodies — women are being criminalized for miscarriages. Sometimes decades after they occur.</p><p>While the aim is different and the methods certainly far less coordinated, this systematic undoing of an individual right previously believed fundamental harkens back to China’ s infamous One Child policy. During that policy’s nearly four-decade reign, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/3/16/336-million-chinese-abortions-in-40-years">as many abortions — many of them forced — were performed as there are people in the United States</a>. The government made a decision about individual and collective futures, and engineered a brutal, but effective, pathway to get there.</p><p>In a socially engineered state, people — their destinies, their bodies — are as constructable as steel. In the United States, people are not quite so easily manipulated… but even the most process-heavy, regulation-laden, litigiously-inclined society will eventually build something. It may take three decades, but California will eventually open a high-speed rail.</p><p>I worry that, while it may take three decades (or three years, until the end of Trump 2.0), the United States will engineer a path to the kind of total control — at least over women’s bodies, and in turn, their livelihoods and countless other points of individual agency — that China practiced in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.</p><h4><strong>2. Red tape is routinely used to entrench special interests.</strong></h4><p>For years, environmental advocacy groups have repeatedly found themselves fighting <em>against </em>climate justice and green energy projects and policies. Wally Nowinski <a href="https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/americas-top-environmental-groups">explained</a> in 2021:</p><blockquote>“America’s biggest green groups are over and over again lining up on the wrong side of decarbonization. The Audubon Society is suing to block California wind farms. The Natural Resources Defense Council supported closing nuclear power plants in New York and California. The Sunrise Movement is supporting a moratorium on large solar projects in Amherst, MA. And the Sierra Club has organized opposition to solar projects in Florida, California, Maryland and elsewhere.</blockquote><blockquote>In Nevada, the Sierra Club and groups like it were the primary challenger to a 14-square-mile solar project. The reason? Affection for the plot of land, which also shelters endangered tortoises… What’s going on here?”</blockquote><p>He concluded that these groups are “vulnerable to NIMBYism,” which “rais[es] the temptation to value the fate of a few acres of land over potentially game-changing climate solutions.” NIMBYism, at its core, is the marriage of entrenched special interests (leading, over time, to enormous inequity and entitlement), <em>performative </em>plurality, and creative lawyers and litigants willing to stampede values by manifestly — but legally — misusing well-intentioned policies and processes for protecting <em>real </em>plurality.</p><p>In each of the examples referenced by Nowinski, groups — some of whom advocated strongly and impactfully for many of the environmental protections now codified into state and federal law — leveraged the existing laws, originally designed to slow down anti-environmentalist development, to stop projects manifestly and objectively good for the climate and/or biodiversity.</p><p>Why? Because navigating hurdles is time and money. That’s the whole point, <strong><em>that’s </em></strong>how these protections were intended to shield against expensive and years-long infrastructure projects sure to damage ecosystems and send carbon into the air. <strong>Protection through process, because process is time and money. And those with power have more of it to spend than those without. Red tape becomes currency.</strong></p><h4><strong>Ok, so what’s the point?</strong></h4><p>The point is this: The United States is a pluralist society. We place a high premium on individualism. Our Bill of Rights is a roster of individual entitlements, and both the structure and substance of our legal system reflects this bias.</p><p>To a large extent, <strong>a “lawyerly society” is the price we pay for the ability to be individuals in a society <em>where others are also empowered to be individuals</em></strong>. Every person is their own universe, and universes bump up against one another. Resolving these conflicts is tedious, as is designing responsible remedies and reaching new communal understandings. Process is how we do it, however imperfectly.</p><p>But process — or policy, or regulation, or administration, or bureaucracy, or whatever other phrases we might use to describe an awful lot of procedural barriers to accomplishing much of anything — is a tool like any other. It can be used effectively for many purposes, including state control and power accumulation by a select few.</p><p>The United States, whether it’s moving fast or slow, is no stranger to breaking things and breaking people. Even more dangerous, we might do so while carrying our historical ode to plurality. <strong>We might operate under the tedious guise of lawyers, all while engineering a very different, darker version of America.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ccef9c72e87" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/how-the-u-s-uses-red-tape-to-break-things-and-break-people-6ccef9c72e87">How the U.S. Uses Red Tape to Break Things and Break People.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Material Consequence of Localism: If We Moved More, Maybe We’d Have More Housing.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/the-material-consequence-of-localism-if-we-moved-more-maybe-wed-have-more-housing-7749fa36b945?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7749fa36b945</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[organizing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abundance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 19:13:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-22T19:13:33.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SnyO2lq2fElP4cxn6zC0_w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Michael Tuszynski on Unsplash. Put down roots, they say. Local is where change is made. What if it’s more complicated than that?</figcaption></figure><p>The United States has a housing problem. This won’t come as a shock to anyone paying attention — least of all anyone who, like me, would very much like to own a home in the city where they live but can’t, either because the math of mortgage versus rent no longer makes the sense it did a generation ago or because purchasing would require a retreat from public transit, public parks, and public cultural spaces.</p><p>It also won’t come as a shock for the <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-many-homeless-people-are-in-the-us-what-does-the-data-miss/">more than 771,000 individuals</a> who experienced homelessness in 2024. That’s 23 out of every 10,000 Americans. It’s an 18 percent increase year-over-year from 2023. Depending on the estimate, there’s a national shortage of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/04/23/1246623204/housing-experts-say-there-just-arent-enough-homes-in-the-u-s">between four and seven million</a> homes. By one measure, only <a href="https://nlihc.org/gap/about">35 “affordable and available” rental homes exist for every 100 renters living below the federal poverty line</a>. In sixteen years — 2008 to 2024, the same period of time during which we got 3D printing, self-driving cars, the emergence of AI, gene-editing, and lab-grown meat — the percentage of the homeless population left unsheltered dropped only marginally, from <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-many-homeless-people-are-in-the-us-what-does-the-data-miss/">40 percent to 36 percent</a>. This is an indictment, if there ever was one, of the richest nation that has ever existed.</p><p>There’s plenty of explanations for how we got here. But as I dug in, one explanation surprised me: We’ve stopped moving.</p><h3><strong>We’re Stuck.</strong></h3><p>To say the United States suffers from a housing shortage, or even to say we suffer from a housing affordability crisis, is not quite right. There’s plenty of cheap housing across the nation, just not <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2025/02/mobility-moving-america-stuck/681740/">“in the places where most people want to live.”</a> Housing becomes cheap when jobs disappear. It becomes cheap far away from public transit or highway access. It’s cheaper in food deserts and in poorly resourced school districts.</p><p>Against what one might reasonably assume, “[i]t is richer cities with low overall poverty rates that see more homelessness.”<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Likewise, homelessness doesn’t appear to rise with unemployment — it falls. Homelessness is at its highest where the cost of rent is high and vacancy is low. In other words, where there is more demand for homes than supply. But why — <em>why</em> — would the market, subsidized when necessary by government funding and capacity, fail so egregiously to coordinate demand and supply? That is famously what markets do best.</p><p>“Abundance” discourse, which I previously wrote about <a href="https://irrationalreview.substack.com/p/a-primer-on-the-lefts-abundance-vs">here</a>, says that the more attractive opportunities exist in an area — and thus the wealthier, more powerful, more politically savvy the population — the more prevalent, exclusionary, expensive, and effective the collective action against affordable housing and other public infrastructure projects. Here we get to the usual suspects in any discussion about the lack of housing supply: local zoning restrictions; impossibly burdensome (and often redundant) municipal, state, and federal building regulations; and <a href="https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/2022AG_2-11_Avoiding-Overcoming.pdf">NIMBY-ism’s</a> favorite tool: the weaponization of civil rights and environmental conservation laws by affluent, and frequently rhetorically progressive, communities.</p><p>In his new book, <em>Stuck: How the Privileged and the Propertied Broke the Engine of American Opportunity</em>, Yoni Appelbaum argues that these hindrances are cause and effect of Americans increasingly staying in place.</p><h4>Why We Used to Move and Why We Stopped.</h4><p><em>Stuck</em> makes the case that a <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">“sharp decline in geographic mobility”</a> — the tendency and the ability to move houses, cities, and states, and to do so often — <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">“is the single most important social change of the past half century”</a> in the United States. In the early days of the nation, roughly a third of individuals packed up and moved every year. In 1970, it was closer to a fifth. Today, it’s more like seven percent.</p><p>Appelbaum explains that, before the “heyday of American mobility,” early Puritan communities legalized the individual’s right to leave, but maintained the community’s right to exclude. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, this right to exclude was — unevenly and imperfectly — eliminated:</p><blockquote>“Americans turned migration from the last resort of the desperate and the destitute into the exercise of a fundamental right… As Americans moved around, they also moved up. The extraordinary geographic mobility of the United States drove its equally distinctive levels of social and economic mobility. Though the process of moving was always wrenching, the pain of relocation real, people who went to new places often found new beginnings, new connections, new communities, and new opportunities. They had the chance to break away from stultifying social hierarchies, depleted farmland, and dead-end jobs. On average, migrants have always grown more prosperous than those who stayed in place, and conferred better futures on their children — a correlation that, remarkably, has remained robust across four centuries, in a society that has changed in countless other ways.”</blockquote><p>So why have we stopped? Appelbaum argues that <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">“American mobility has been slowly strangled by generations of reformers, seeking to reassert control over their neighborhoods and their neighbors.”</a> This, of course, happened gradually. As towns flourished and city-centers boomed in the early 1900s, those benefiting most from this growth — those with the most influence to assert — began to fashion new types of order aligned with their own interests. It’s the oldest story there is: When you’re on top, why continue to evolve? Cash-out while you’re ahead. Over the last century, in cities across the nation, this has produced <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">“a peculiarly dysfunctional system [within which] all new construction in the United States now requires government approval, and anyone with sufficient time and resources and education can effectively veto that approval, or at least impose great expense and delay.”</a></p><p>The result is a deep incapacity to accommodate newcomers, which further results in a dangerous and <em>learned</em> inability to seek newcomers. The economic and social costs are significant. Our turn away from nomadic tendencies has resulted in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094119017300591">increased inequality</a>, <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">less entrepreneurship</a> (which has fallen by about half since 1985), <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2025/03/book-excerpt-from-stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/">less job-hopping</a> (something scorned by many, but which the data consistently demonstrates is strongly correlated with economic mobility), and — most alarming and damning — <em>less</em> socializing. Americans who stay in place belong to fewer community groups, report less fellowship and group affiliations, and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2025/02/mobility-moving-america-stuck/681740/">“tend to become more cynical, more embittered, more disconnected over time.”</a></p><p>Strict loyalty to local interests may not, it turns out, produce deeper roots and kinder, more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/opinion/national-politics-localism-populism.html">“emotionally intelligent”</a> community problem-solving. Appelbaum’s argument is that, rather than invent and expand our individual, communal, and political identities — to, as they say, “vote with our feet” — we’ve begun to shrink identify into only what is inherited. Only what can be seen and felt in our own backyards. Connect this to the United States’ housing problem, which is at its core a problem of local political will, and it’s frighteningly easy to see that our tribalism is material in its consequences.</p><h3><strong>Localism Is in Vogue, and That’s a Problem.</strong></h3><p>Buying local, investing local, organizing local, limiting media consumption to what is local, giving credence only to authority figures that tout their local bona-fides — there’s no quicker or more effective way, whether you are situated on the political right or left, to signal your virtue.</p><p>It’s no mystery why localism is reigning triumphant. Negative effects of globalization are felt most acutely at the very local level. It is small, often tight-knit and deeply rooted communities that have been forced to witness thriving downtowns turn ghostly. Around the world, the accelerated globalization of the last several decades is giving way to populist sentiment.</p><p>In 2018, David Brooks, the widely-read <em>New York Times</em> opinion writer (who <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/10/trumpism-republican-party-exile-david-brooks/680243/">describes himself</a> as a “longtime conservative, alienated by Trumpism… [and living] on the moderate edge of the Democratic Party”), <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/opinion/national-politics-localism-populism.html">explained the inevitability and superiority of localism</a> like this:</p><blockquote>“Localism is truly a revolution. It literally means flipping the power structure… under localism, the crucial power center is at the tip of the shovel, where the actual work is being done. Expertise is not in the think tanks but among those who have local knowledge, those with a feel for how things work in a specific place and an awareness of who gets stuff done. Success is not measured by how big you can scale, but by how deeply you can connect… Wise young people leave the centers for towns where they can make a visible difference.”</blockquote><p>Brooks goes on to describe localism as a “renewal of old forms.” Elders act as “city mothers and fathers.” Supplanting the “technocratic structures of the past 50 years” are “more intimate and personalistic… face-to-face relationships” that bring conservatives and liberals together to enact gradual, iterative change” — and this change can’t always be “reduced to data.” For example, rather than asking what can be done about homelessness, Brooks describes locals asking their neighbors “what they need in order to have a home.”</p><p>I don’t mock any of this. There’s great power and great wisdom in affecting change where you have the most direct and pronounced leverage. There’s also just the experience of being alive today. As Oliver Burkeman wrote in his latest book, <em>Meditations for Mortals</em>, “anyone scrolling a social media platform can be instantaneously invited to care more about human suffering than the greatest saints in history would have encountered over the course of their whole lives.” It’s overwhelming to situate yourself forever in the context of a whole world.</p><p>But I worry that localism, while valid in both its emotional and strategic appeal, takes us — when wielded as an ideology rather than a good way to spend a life — in directions we don’t actually want to go. Put down roots, they always say. Tend to your own backyard. Solve the problems you can, the ones right in front of you, the ones impacting your kid and your neighbor. Local is where change occurs. Local is where meaning is made. What if it’s more complicated than that?</p><h4>Labs of Democracy, or Retreats from It?</h4><p>In one <a href="https://www.chesterton.org/localism/">particularly zealous definition</a>, localism is made synonymous with “having a say in what happens to you” and “keeping accountable those who have power that affects you.” It’s true democracy is closer at the local level, and far more responsive. But I worry that romanticizing the places where civic participation is most rewarded, decreases the likelihood that we’ll fight for it to be rewarded elsewhere.</p><p>If we valorize the pursuit of local interests as inherent acts of democracy, while curtailing the potential for collective action against power structures which transcend city and state lines — and which pose large threats to our national democratic institutions — then I fear we’ll end up mistaking small victories for actual strength and sustainability. This isn’t to say local organizing doesn’t matter; rather, it matters a great deal to many individuals, and a greater deal to all of us <em>if</em> performed within the context of deeper, broader struggle.</p><p>It’s one thing for local venues to serve as labs of democracy — the places we go to take care of our neighbors <em>and</em> to find out what works and what doesn’t — but something else entirely for local venues to serve as retreats from the stickiest projects. As if there’s no hope to solve the crisis of homelessness at a national scale, so we might as well, as Brooks put it, ask our neighbor what they need to buy a home.</p><p>We can and must do both. Most of us will do our part at the local level. But the broader scope exists whether we want it to or not. We should pay attention and strategize accordingly.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <em>Abundance</em>, Ezra Klein &amp; Derek Thompson.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7749fa36b945" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/the-material-consequence-of-localism-if-we-moved-more-maybe-wed-have-more-housing-7749fa36b945">The Material Consequence of Localism: If We Moved More, Maybe We’d Have More Housing.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Primer on the Left’s Abundance vs. Scarcity Discourse: A False Choice?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/a-primer-on-the-lefts-abundance-vs-scarcity-discourse-a-false-choice-4c433caac91d?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c433caac91d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[future]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abundance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[degrowth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 13:26:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-10T13:26:45.091Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UMEJyhWEXwrZ0Wx43-cUiA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Jeremy Bishop on Unsplash. Do we want to avoid losing a beautiful world, or do we want to win a better one?</figcaption></figure><p>There’s a new — or rather, an updated and rebranded — <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/10/abundance-ezra-klein-derek-thompson-book-review">discourse</a> <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/abundance-americas-next-political-order/682069/">around</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/09/opinion/musk-trump-doge-abundance-agenda.html">abundance</a> <a href="https://www.slowboring.com/p/what-abundance-means-to-me">emerging</a> within the U.S. political left, and, instinctively, I’m all for it. Scarcity has always felt like the other team’s game: When the Trump administration insists that scarcity of housing will be solved by scarcity of immigrants, or that deprivation of perceived “freedom” will be caused by deprivation of rights, it’s difficult not to lurch hard in the direction of an abundance framework. If we need more housing (<a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/americans-recognize-housing-affordability-crisis-support-new-policies-to-fix-the-market-and-build-more-homes/">and we desperately do</a>), let’s build more houses. If we need freedom (and we do), let’s demand it democratically, rather than pray it trickles down in a limited form to <em>some</em> of us tyrannically.</p><p>The <strong>Abundance Agenda</strong> — which is, in its current iteration, headlined with recent works by Marc Dunkelman (<a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/marc-j-dunkelman/why-nothing-works/9781541700215/"><em>Why Nothing Works</em></a>), Yoni Appelbaum (<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/700580/stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/"><em>Stuck</em></a>), Jerusalem Demsas (<a href="https://www.strandbooks.com/on-the-housing-crisis-land-development-democracy-atlantic-editions-9781638931966.html"><em>On the Housing Crisis</em></a>), and Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson (<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Abundance/Ezra-Klein/9781668023488"><em>Abundance</em></a>) — essentially <a href="https://thebaffler.com/latest/whats-the-matter-with-abundance-harris">calls on progressives to achieve “the future we want” by “build[ing] and invent[ing] more of what we need.”</a> It asks those that care deeply about liberalism to focus on supply rather than demand; on the size and result of the implementation effort rather than the size of congressional allocation or legislative promise. It’s one thing to have conviction that housing is a human right, and another to have the executive capacity to manifest that conviction into actual dwellings for those experiencing homelessness — and the political audacity to cut the red tape, even if it was constructed with liberalism in mind, that keeps you from doing so.</p><h3><strong>Have Our Cake and Eat It, Too?</strong></h3><p>I’m in the process of reading and digesting the books referenced above, as well as the many critiques they have spurred (<a href="https://thebaffler.com/latest/whats-the-matter-with-abundance-harris">here</a>, <a href="https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2025/03/24/the-abundance-agenda/">here</a>, <a href="https://prospect.org/economy/2024-11-26-abundance-agenda-neoliberalisms-rebrand/">here</a>, and <a href="https://prospect.org/infrastructure/housing/2025-04-01-last-abundance-agenda/">here</a>), and my plan is to digest them “out loud” in this newsletter. But as my own study of this discourse has picked up in recent days, I’ve made a concerted effort to be wary of my eagerness toward it. It’s not hard to understand why abundance feels better than scarcity. For one, the politics are easier: Scarcity tends to evoke sacrifice and cynicism, and is so often used as a fear tactic to produce yet more scarcity (see generally: all of MAGA). Abundance says we can have our cake and eat it, too. We can keep growing, without necessarily — or at least not imminently — challenging entrenched corporate power structures or needing to rely on the hard and slow work of collective action. We can just grow better — smarter, faster, more humanely — and we’ll get to where we need to go <em>if</em> those who do the building, or at least those who fund and regulate the building, share our vision for the future.</p><p>The <strong>De-growth Agenda</strong>, on the other hand, calls for deep recognition of ecological scarcity, and challenges the dominant doctrine that more is better than less. It demands a complete rewiring of incentives — away from exponential accumulation of technological capacity aimed at ever-more wealth generation, toward redistribution of what currently exists so that everyone has <em>enough</em>. De-growth, as an alternative to capitalism rather than as a softened version of it, claims to, according to one of its primary thought-leaders Jason Hickel, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/7rurlMXSZMB5VlholLMNpD">“prioritize human wellbeing and ecological stability” over an “intrinsically expansionary” focus on extraction and production</a>. De-growth states plainly that high-income nations like the United States will need to sacrifice hugely, and that capitalists — defined as the relatively few individuals who own today’s major means of production — will need to reorient to a system no longer <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/7rurlMXSZMB5VlholLMNpD">“organized around and dependent on perpetual growth.”</a> In other words, de-growth brands itself a total flip of the dominant system. I like this. I <em>want</em> this. I believe today’s global marketplace, which is increasingly run by behemoth multinationals that often enjoy more political influence and economic power than most governments, is an effective monster. It works very well as an engine of concentrated wealth directed toward short-term objectives; which is to say, it works <em>as designed</em>. It is wildly productive and dangerously depleting. As it creates, it takes — that’s <em>how</em> it creates. So, a flip of the system sounds good to me.</p><p>And yet, I’m skeptical. Not only because I tend to be (perhaps unfairly) skeptical of movements taking place at the level of rhetoric rather than at the level of implementation, but also because the future <em>I want</em> does indeed involve things we do not yet have: universal healthcare and access to quality education, universal basic income, resilient green infrastructure across the most vulnerable urban districts, protected oceans and rewilded swaths of continent, vertical farming, and cures for diseases like Alzheimer’s, cancer, and diabetes. Many of these <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/opinion/supply-side-progressivism.html">“great dreams linger on the demand side of the ledger,”</a> but not all.</p><p>This future, which certainly seems compatible with the ideals of de-growth, will require supply-side innovation and production. It will require growth, as well as strategic government regulation <em>and</em> a sizeable measure of targeted deregulation. I don’t yet know where our need for material and scientific abundance meets the imperative of disrupting growth for growth’s sake. My point, rather, is that recognizing scarcity, placing responsibility for destruction of the environmental and atmospheric commons on those most liable, and resisting violent power structures is good — just maybe not good enough.</p><p>The author of my favorite <a href="https://thebaffler.com/latest/whats-the-matter-with-abundance-harris">critique to-date of the Abundance agenda</a> — just as he begins juxtaposing the left-wing cry for “more stuff” with the other left-wing cry for less — makes an urgent aside to assure readers that “whatever [they’ve] heard about degrowth, advocates of it “<em>do</em> want the fast trains.” Of course they (we) do. But one of the central tenets of the abundance framework is that those who most want fast trains — and for the right reasons: to make cities more accessible and affordable, and to decrease fossil fuel emissions and overall energy use — are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/09/opinion/musk-trump-doge-abundance-agenda.html">also those least likely to build them</a>. This seems a worthy contradiction to interrogate, if for no other reason than we do — we really, really do! — want fast trains, fewer emissions, and city grids that promote equitable movement and community.</p><h3><strong>A False Choice.</strong></h3><p>It’s too easy to pretend these economic and political alternatives — Abundance vs. De-growth — are true opposites. They are not. Both call for a future where people have enough of what they need and less of what they don’t. Both are optimistic, in that they chart a course toward a future where, in the words of famed socialist Michael Harrington, “humankind does not, in the most dramatic display of creativity since Genesis, annihilate itself.” And both need the other.</p><p>The hallmark of abundance thinking is that it insists on making room for utopia — but it does so by enabling existing market systems to take us there, and thereby at the expense of tolerating an intolerable status quo. It does <em>not</em>, at least on its face, insist on fundamental systems or structural change. And yet, one of the standard-bearers of the abundance framework, Ezra Klein, defended his position in 2021 by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/opinion/supply-side-progressivism.html">referencing</a> socialist Aaron Bastani’s <em>Fully Automated Luxury Communism</em>:</p><blockquote>“What if everything could change?… What if, more than simply meeting the great challenges of our time — from climate change to inequality and aging — we went far beyond them, putting today’s problems behind us like we did before with large predators and, for the most part, illness? What if, rather than having no sense of a different future, we decided history hadn’t actually begun?”</blockquote><p>Jason Hickel, the standard-bearer for de-growth, likewise recognizes the need for abundance. If tolerance of the neoliberal structure is abundance’s achilles-heel, austerity — sacrifice at the least, insufficiency and violence at its most extreme — is de-growth’s weakness. In 2018, Hickel ended an essay by stating that <a href="https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2018/10/27/degrowth-a-call-for-radical-abundance">“degrowth is the very opposite of austerity.”</a> Whereas austerity is intended to artificially create scarcity and thus drive competition and growth, de-growth <a href="https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2018/10/27/degrowth-a-call-for-radical-abundance">“calls for abundance in order to render growth unnecessary.”</a> So we need both.</p><p>My posture toward this debate (insofar as it is one), at least at the outset as I prepare to dive in, is summed-up by Malcom Harris in <em>The Baffler</em>:</p><blockquote>“Abundance is not a way around the hard questions of our age. At its best, this perspective reminds us that there’s a lot at stake in how we answer — a better world to win as well as a beautiful world to lose.”</blockquote><p>At the risk of being too simple, this, to me, is the dichotomy the left faces: Do we want to avoid losing a beautiful world, or do we want to win a better one? The answer to the first question must be yes; but I’m wary of arguments that insist not losing our world equals building a better one. It doesn’t. One is survival, the other something more. We must survive. I’d love to also do something more.</p><h3><strong>Read Along!</strong></h3><p>We’re four weeks into <strong>(Ir)rational Review</strong>, and I’ve already learned a few things about writing a newsletter. First, weekly is <em>weekly</em> — as in, every week (go figure). I chose this pace as a forcing function, but I’m not yet convinced it’s conducive to analytical thinking, generous prose, and novelty (important, given the newsletter’s focus on reinvention). So, I may shift to bi-weekly. Second, and in the theme of today’s edition(!), less is probably more. Shorter, punchier, more ad-hoc writing is not my typical style — I am a lawyer, after all — but it creates more room for others (you!). And room for others is what thinking out loud in public is all about.</p><p>Finally, it’s difficult not to write on topics pulled directly from the headlines. We are — measured against a multitude of metrics — in crisis. As critical and heady as the news-of-the-hour always is, (Ir)rational Review is ultimately about something that’s both deeply related to <em>and</em> much bigger and longer-lasting than the Trump administration: how we define and then build the social, political, material, and ecological economy we deserve — one that will likely be radically different than the one we have. My hope has always been to ask more questions than offer answers, and today’s edition does this.</p><p>Read along with me? I’m diving into the following titles, all related to today’s subject matter. DM or comment with your own recommendations — I’m eager to hear what’s on your list.</p><p>· <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/marc-j-dunkelman/why-nothing-works/9781541700215/"><em>Why Nothing Works</em></a><em>, </em>Marc Dunkelman</p><p>· <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/700580/stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/"><em>Stuck</em></a>, Yoni Appelbaum</p><p>· <a href="https://www.strandbooks.com/on-the-housing-crisis-land-development-democracy-atlantic-editions-9781638931966.html"><em>On the Housing Crisis</em></a><em>, </em>Jerusalem Demsas</p><p>· <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Abundance/Ezra-Klein/9781668023488"><em>Abundance</em></a>, Ezra Klein &amp; Derek Thompson</p><p>· <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250266774/recodingamerica/"><em>Recoding America</em></a>, Jennifer Pahlka</p><p>· <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393634044"><em>Public Citizens</em></a>, Paul Sabin</p><p>· <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/441772/less-is-more-by-jason-hickel/9781786091215"><em>Less is More</em></a>, Jason Hickel</p><p>· <a href="https://www.chelseagreen.com/product/doughnut-economics-paperback/?srsltid=AfmBOoptaDyM84LTL10pWLRKLEQCWqeEoTAr5q1w1HmKi1LsjCkl8_Yv"><em>Doughnut Economics</em></a>, Kate Raworth</p><p><a href="https://www.chelseagreen.com/product/limits-to-growth/?srsltid=AfmBOoqPnR_7IiJqdweetbJ3th08zD8pWi3aW9XB7axmioYjS_RFFdSI"><em>Limits to Growth</em></a>, Donella Meadows</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c433caac91d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/a-primer-on-the-lefts-abundance-vs-scarcity-discourse-a-false-choice-4c433caac91d">A Primer on the Left’s Abundance vs. Scarcity Discourse: A False Choice?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[There’s a Deeper Pattern of Corruption Behind the FCPA Enforcement Pause — and It Begs a Big…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/theres-a-deeper-pattern-of-corruption-behind-the-fcpa-enforcement-pause-and-it-begs-a-big-f4128475bbc3?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4128475bbc3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rule-of-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 19:13:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-17T20:24:11.138Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>There’s a Deeper Pattern of Corruption Behind the FCPA Enforcement Pause — and It Begs a Big Question: How Are We to Do Good?</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bim6V7rFvqgt0wj3ONSC_g.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Photo by Giorgio Trovato on Unsplash.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-9569/pdf/COMPS-9569.pdf">Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)</a> is a U.S. federal law enacted in 1977, largely in response to the stunning frequency and heft of <a href="https://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1976_0512_SECQuestionable.pdf">corporate bribes to both domestic and foreign governments and political officials</a> revealed in the <a href="https://fcpa.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20120101-the-story-of-the-fcpa.pdf">wake of the Watergate scandal</a>. Although the FCPA has always had detractors, the majority consensus is <a href="https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-the-law-against-business-bribes-is-good-for-business/">favorable</a>: the criminalization of — and creation of civil liability for — corrupt behavior in dealings with foreign governments by companies organized under or subject to the laws of the United States has, indeed, deterred corruption. It has done so by regulating U.S. companies and foreign companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as by empowering more than 40 developed nations to <a href="https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0293">enact similar legislation</a>. In short, it has done a rare thing in today’s globalized market: incentivized a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/108830/fcpa-suspension-bad-for-business/">race to the <strong>top</strong></a>.</p><p>On February 10, President Trump issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/pausing-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-enforcement-to-further-american-economic-and-national-security/">Executive Order</a> directing the Attorney General to pause enforcement of the FCPA for 180 days (and then at her discretion, for 180 days after that). It has already been posited by many that this “pause” is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/fcpa-bribery-trump-antibribery-law-executive-order-b656ef40a0035591618d053aa0ac7458">a precursor to a more permanent stop-order</a>, although repeal of the FCPA is something only Congress can do. In the order, Trump justifies the pause by claiming FCPA enforcement has been “overexpansive and unpredictable,” and that penalizing U.S. companies for “routine business practices” wastes government resources and “actively harms American economic competitiveness.” The order also claims — in contradiction to <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">statements made by Trump’s administration during his first term</a> — that national security depends on corporate capacity to engage in corrupt acts in pursuit of “strategic business advantages” in foreign markets. These arguments are <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/six-reasons-why-corporations-like-and-want-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-even-if-they-wont-admit-it/">hardly new</a>, but they <em>are </em>unfounded. There is little more unpredictable and expensive than a corrupt market, and <a href="https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&amp;context=til">as U.S. leadership in this space has prompted other nations to regulate similarly</a>, the playing field has become <em>more</em> level, not less. Smaller companies can afford to compete in global supply chains, and large U.S. companies — many of which have <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/which-u-s-companies-receive-the-most-government-subsidies/">received U.S. tax dollars at some point in their life</a>, and many of which are critical to U.S. policy and security interests — are free to invest in research, technology, and innovative product application rather than invest in bribes to foreign officials.</p><p>As I researched this piece, I intended to write a straight-forward analysis of the economic, rule-of-law, and human rights impacts of an FCPA enforcement pause. Plenty of solid analysis of this already exists, but — similar to <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/who-really-loses-global-trade-war-workers-furthest-from-taylor-ecele/?trackingId=updPbmUT7AsWWVSQOHispQ%3D%3D&amp;lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_pulse_read%3BTabI%2FQ6JSJuf%2BiRlbsue5g%3D%3D">my piece earlier this month</a> on the true human cost of tariffs — I hoped to shed additional light on the human toll of corruption, and more broadly, the inherent power dynamics within the modern global market that produce incentives to act corruptly. I’d still like to explore this last question in future pieces, but today’s newsletter is something slightly different — and it introduces more questions than it answers. Bear with me.</p><h3><strong>Corruption Distorts Economies, Relationships, &amp; Public Trust.</strong></h3><p>Critics of the Executive Order have pointed to the obvious explanation for Trump’s FCPA maneuver: that he favors a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/fcpa-bribery-trump-antibribery-law-executive-order-b656ef40a0035591618d053aa0ac7458">“Wild West of dealmaking”</a> over a rule-based international order. This is certainly true and concerning, <strong>but the consequences are likely to be far more violent than the images typically associated with white collar crime.</strong></p><p>It <em>will be</em> a wild west. Corruption <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whartons-philip-nichols-we-have-to-line-up-incentives-so-people-dont-act-corruptly/">“distorts economies”</a> by <a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2017/11/to-preserve-biodiversity-start-with-five-universal-truths-about-corruption/">lowering investment</a>, decreasing corporate risk tolerance, threatening the integrity of other regulatory practices and policies, and ultimately dampening economic growth. It also <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whartons-philip-nichols-we-have-to-line-up-incentives-so-people-dont-act-corruptly/">“distorts the people who occupy government positions”</a> in corrupted economies, and it <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whartons-philip-nichols-we-have-to-line-up-incentives-so-people-dont-act-corruptly/">”distorts the public[‘s] relationship”</a> with government by <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/75468/corruption-is-a-national-security-threat-the-crook-act-is-a-smart-way-to-fight-it/">“undermin[ing] democracy, hollow[ing] out the rule of law, and prevent[ing] the efficient and fair delivery of government services.”</a> And finally, it distorts the United States’ ability to build, shape, maintain, and <em>trust</em> its own relationships with allied nations. In 1976, Senator Frank Church (ID-D) <a href="https://fcpa.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20120101-the-story-of-the-fcpa.pdf">testified</a> in the lead-up to passage of the FCPA:</p><blockquote>“U.S.-based corporations should not be allowed to weaken a friendly government through bribery and corruption while the United States is relying on that government as a stable sure friend in supporting our policies.”</blockquote><p>It should be no surprise that corruption corrupts. The FCPA — while certainly <a href="https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2020/08/04/theres-no-panacea-for-corruption-so-we-can-all-stop-pointing-that-out/">not a panacea</a> for eliminating public or private bribery — minimized the extent to which the United States’ dealings with other governments could be hijacked by private incentives. It lessened critical, and potentially debilitating, information asymmetries in foreign policy and in the global market. President Trump seems most comfortable with strength by force, but <strong>the world economy was built on the strength and integrity of information</strong>.</p><p>Corruption, to say the very least, creates a lemon problem: buyers (of goods and services, but also of intelligence and protection) will transact less, unsure of whether the seller — potentially distorted by an unregulated market of incentives — is offering a lemon. (For the uninitiated, the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lemons-problem.asp#toc-asymmetry-of-information">“lemon problem”</a> was popularized by Nobel Prize-recipient Geroge Akerlof and describes what happens when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information. Consider how much you would pay for a used car <em>with</em> a crash report versus <em>without</em> a crash report. Without assurance from the seller of the quality of the thing you’re buying, you’re likely to offer less.)</p><h4>The Wild West Will Have Human Cost.</h4><p>The above notwithstanding, the most sinister and pervasive — and least reportable — consequences of a post-FCPA world order will emerge as adjacent issues <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/75468/corruption-is-a-national-security-threat-the-crook-act-is-a-smart-way-to-fight-it/">“inextricably linked to corruption,”</a> including human trafficking, black markets, terrorist activity, and severe and systematic human rights abuses. For example:</p><ul><li>During the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions’ (SEC) investigation of Watergate-era corporate corruption, it was uncovered that United Brands — the U.S.-based parent company of Chiquita Bananas — <a href="https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-the-law-against-business-bribes-is-good-for-business/">illicitly paid the President of Honduras $2.5 million to resolve a tax dispute</a>. Since the 1970s, Chiquita has continued to be linked to other instances of corruption in Latin America as well, including making <a href="https://earthrights.org/media_release/colombian-victims-win-historic-verdict-over-chiquita-jury-finds-banana-company-liable-for-financing-death-squads/">a series of illegal payments between 1997 and 2004 to a paramilitary group</a> (and U.S. designated terrorist organization) operating in Colombia — which, in turn,<a href="https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2021/7/8/cal-files-amicus-brief-asking-supreme-court-to-protect-victims-identities-in-doe-v-chiquita"> killed and tortured trade unionists, banana workers, political organizers, and social activists</a> who stood in the way of Chiquita’s access to valuable farming land. In 2024, a jury for the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida <a href="https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/2024-06-10-Jury-Verdict-CHQ-TRIAL_Redacted-1.pdf">held Chiquita liable</a> for financing the murders of at least eight individuals.</li><li>In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wEJvx_L0Ok">2022 documentary</a> by <em>Vice News</em>, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/07/somaliland-frankincense-female-workers-exploited-abuse">series of articles</a> in <em>The Guardian</em>, and a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/672d055926c79e25af564dc6/1731003741652/What+Price+for+the+King+of+Oils%3F+FINAL.pdf">2024 report</a> by Chicago-based NGO Corporate Accountability Lab, it was revealed that U.S.-based company doTERRA — which controls much of the global essential oils market — and its frankincense supplier in Somaliland have allegedly paid bribes to government officials; subjected workers to forced labor; committed violence against journalists; and facilitated a sex trafficking scheme all in pursuit of <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/672d055926c79e25af564dc6/1731003741652/What+Price+for+the+King+of+Oils%3F+FINAL.pdf">“monopoliz[ing] the industry and orchestrat[ing] a climate of fear designed to keep [the supplier] on top.”</a> In November 2024, the Department of Homeland Security under the Biden administration (and pursuant to authority under <a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:19%20section:1307%20edition:prelim)">Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930</a>) issued an order blocking all imports into the United States by doTERRA <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-against-asli-maydi">“of frankincense and frankincense-based products produced using forced labor”</a> in Somaliland. The same month, Corporate Accountability Lab <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/672d055926c79e25af564dc6/1731003741652/What+Price+for+the+King+of+Oils%3F+FINAL.pdf">recommended the U.S. Department of Justice investigate allegations against doTERRA and its supplier under the FCPA</a>.</li><li>In 2022, Glencore — a Swiss mining behemoth — was fined $700 million for violations of the FCPA (as part of a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/glencore-entered-guilty-pleas-foreign-bribery-and-market-manipulation-conspiracies">larger $1.1 billion judgment</a> involving market manipulation in the United States). This result was the culmination of <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/108830/fcpa-suspension-bad-for-business/">“a decades-long conspiracy of paying bribes, through intermediaries, to officials in countries throughout Latin America and the African continent to gain favorable contracts, make lawsuits go away, and avoid government audits.”</a> In 2024, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre demonstrated that Glencore’s human rights record throughout this period of corruption was <a href="https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2024_Transition_Minerals_Tracker_EN.pdf">one of the worst across the global minerals sector</a>. This example was recently highlighted in <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/108830/fcpa-suspension-bad-for-business/">a publication by <em>Just Security</em></a>, which forcefully articulated the likely outcomes of an FCPA enforcement pause.</li></ul><p>While not always causal, the relationship between corruption and human rights is easy to locate, at least in part because <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1116&amp;context=jil">“corruption disables a state from meeting its obligations to respect, fulfill, and protect the human rights of its citizens.”</a> It might do this by replacing a <em>right</em> to something like water, food, education, healthcare, or access to justice with a bribery requirement — satisfied either by money or favors — that informally regulates access to water, food, education, healthcare, and justice. Or it might do this by elevating political and economic actors — those without much interest in governing well or behaving ethically — to positions of influence and monopoly, such that, over time, abuse of public confidence and human rights becomes a norm.</p><h3><strong>Corruption is More Than Transaction; It’s Plunder.</strong></h3><p>In November 2020, during President Trump’s first impeachment trial, several dozen professional writers publicly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/letters/quid-pro-quo.html?fbclid=IwAR1RSvNm2gmWVZDoVdnROILliSg6qyYnANhGcQGxAVsQwvnDIWagqzsJYps">“plea[ded]” with the New York Times</a> to cease describing Trump’s alleged behavior — which included withholding military aid from an allied nation until action against Trump’s political opponent was taken — as “quid pro quo.” The writers argued that “most people don’t understand” what the Latin phrase <em>quid pro quo</em> means and, even if they do, <em>quid pro quo</em> describes an exchange — this for that — of any kind, including benign transactions. Trump’s behavior, on the other hand, was criminal. The writers wanted the New York Times and other media to describe crimes <strong>as crimes</strong>.</p><p>I’ve thought a lot about this over the past several weeks. At what point do we lose ourselves in rhetoric? Is it possible that, as urgent an issue as a deregulated environment for corruption will be, arguing the specifics of this point hides something larger? The dizzying speed at which Trump’s second administration is upending the status quo has made pattern-recognition difficult. But zoom out and there <em>is</em> a pattern. Consider just the following two instances, pulled out of a hat of several dozen:</p><ul><li>Just days before taking office, Trump launched his own cryptocurrency, asking investors — MAGA fans, really — to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-launches-own-meme-coin-cryptocurrency/">“celebrate everything we stand for”</a> by purchasing a Trump “meme coin.” These coins have no economic or transactional value, but nonetheless <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/trumps-meme-coin-made-nearly-100-million-trading-fees-small-traders-lost-money-2025-02-03/">netted Trump and his family more than $100 million in trading fees</a> within two weeks of the launch. Meanwhile, more than 800,000 people — again, most of whom voted Trump into office — <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-meme-coin-2-billion-ls-1235261422/">collectively lost $2 billion</a>.</li><li>On March 14, Trump issued an Executive Order barring lawyers from Paul Weiss — a top law firm that has represented a litany of powerful clients, including ExxonMobil and Citigroup — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/21/nyregion/what-is-paul-weiss.html">from “meeting with government employees or entering government buildings.”</a> This order was penalty for former Paul Weiss partner Mark Pomerantz’ <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/5213733-the-paul-weiss-settlement-is-a-shameful-disgrace/">decision to leave the firm in 2021 to assist the New York District Attorney in investigating Trump’s finances and allegations of bank fraud</a>. In other words, an attorney associated with Paul Weiss made Trump mad. The Executive Order is likely illegal, but the firm appears to have nonetheless appeased Trump’s whim for revenge by agreeing — in exchange for relief from the order — to assign $40 million in pro-bono legal time to certain causes aligned with the Trump administration’s agenda and by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/us/politics/paul-weiss-deal-trump-executive-order-withdrawn.html">acknowledging “wrongdoing” by Pomerantz</a>. The details of the deal are less important than the fact that it was struck at all.</li></ul><p>There’s a danger in discussing corruption as merely a transaction. It is more than moving money from <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whartons-philip-nichols-we-have-to-line-up-incentives-so-people-dont-act-corruptly/">“one place to another,” </a>and it <em>does more</em> than further enrich those powerful or wealthy enough to utilize it. It loots. It plunders. Corruption — public and private — doesn’t erode public trust, community wealth, and individual safety — it steals it. It <em>wields</em> it, in fact, for dictatorial gains.</p><p>In Timothy Snyder’s <em>On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century</em>, he implores readers not to “obey in advance.” People, he insists, “are remarkably receptive to new rules in a new setting.” Trump wants corruption — that much is clear — but he’s already been given more than he’s asked for, and certainly more than he is constitutionally authorized to obtain. Any adaptation to this — most of which will be veiled in language about <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2025/03/26/big-laws-capitulation-to-donald-trump-may-be-bad-for-business">corporate existential crisis</a>, fiduciary duty and economic competitiveness — is “teaching power what it can do.”</p><h3><strong>Run the Tape Forward: How Do We Expect to Be Good?</strong></h3><p>As news cycles accumulate — with <a href="https://substack.com/inbox/post/159983176">reports</a> of deportations to foreign jurisdictions without due process; abductions in major U.S. cities by masked, plainclothes-wearing police officers; and arbitrary detentions of university students who participated in peaceful protests — it has become achingly clear that the United States is <a href="https://www.thebulwark.com/p/this-is-the-land-of-wolves-now">far beyond</a> an embrace of bribes and <em>quid pro quo</em>. There’s corruption — that’s happening — and then there’s the corruption that corruption wrought. In an environment where only the bullies thrive, how do we ever expect to do good?</p><p>I’m reminded of a striking passage from Katherine Boo’s remarkable book, <em>Behind the Beautiful Forevers</em>, which reports on the impact of globalization-fueled inequality in a Mumbai slum in the early 2000s:</p><blockquote>“It is easy, from a safe distance, to overlook the fact that in [cities] governed by corruption, where exhausted people vie on scant terrain for very little, it is blisteringly hard to be good. The astonishment is that some people <em>are</em> good, and that many people try to be… [but] [i]f the house is crooked and crumbling, and the land on which it sits is uneven, is it possible to make anything lie straight?”</blockquote><p>In Boo’s book, she describes a young man’s ongoing quest to hang a picture on the wall of his makeshift home, but the picture will never hang straight. It can’t. The wall is uneven, and the wall is uneven because the home’s foundation was poured at a significant tilt, and the foundation was poured this way because the land under it had literally been scraped away for development that — no matter the efforts of the young man or his community — would always benefit someone else more powerful. It’s a useful reminder that corruption — and the human cost it so often is correlated with — is, and has always been, inherently violent.</p><p><a href="https://substack.com/inbox/post/160028152">Collective action</a>, including by exhausted people fighting for scarce resources — and those in power will try very hard to convince those without power that resources <em>are</em> scare — must be the muscle and the intellect that keeps corruption at bay. But how? There are ways — I’m sure of it — but finding them first requires recognizing where we are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4128475bbc3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/theres-a-deeper-pattern-of-corruption-behind-the-fcpa-enforcement-pause-and-it-begs-a-big-f4128475bbc3">There’s a Deeper Pattern of Corruption Behind the FCPA Enforcement Pause — and It Begs a Big…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Big Oil’s Play to Get Rich While It Still Can, Planet & People Be Damned.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/big-oils-play-to-get-rich-while-it-still-can-planet-people-be-damned-393a5bf00e5d?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/393a5bf00e5d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[supply-chain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2025 15:15:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-28T19:13:52.125Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N7HcQZgVjKJWGX-qRaAtsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Tim van der Kuip on Unsplash. The world’s most powerful economy is forfeiting its own competitiveness and the planet itself.</figcaption></figure><p>There’s a French phrase that has been circling, almost obsessively, in my mind for the past two months: <em>après moi, le deluge</em>. After me, the flood. It’s about running out the clock on your own time. It’s about facing certain catastrophe, but doing all you can to ensure that when unrelenting disaster arrives, you’re already gone. The flood will come, you know that. There’s no denial, there’s no resistance. There’s just an all-out campaign — which you can organize and execute because you have power — to secure your own well-being (which, to you, is the same as wealth) before the water rushes in.</p><p>It’s not self-deceit that motivates you to run out the clock at the cost of others’ mass suffering (although that, too, would be unforgivable); it’s strategy. You don’t believe you can win — the water <em>will</em> rush in — so you might as well lose in spectacular and profitable fashion. Others will lose too, but horrifically. You’re fine with that.</p><p>Yes, this is a metaphor for the fossil fuel lobby and the climate crisis. It’s also an apt description of national and foreign policy — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/06/big-oil-investigation-congress-republicans">paid for by Big Oil</a> — under President Trump.</p><p>While Trump making good on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/gauravsharma/2025/01/20/drill-baby-drill-donald-trump-declares-us-energy-emergency/">his promise to “drill, baby, drill”</a> is hardly a shock, and the fossil fuel lobby’s control over this agenda is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/apr/01/globalwarming.usnews">nothing new</a>, there is an additional layer of unnerving complicity baked into the environmental deregulation and energy priorities announced since Trump began his second term. The <a href="https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/what-they-are-saying-leaders-applaud-epas-historic-deregulatory-actions-power-great">claim </a>— made by every conservative politician or pundit near a laptop or a podium over the last several weeks — is that <em>if we </em>eliminate renewable energy incentives for both investors and consumers; boost oil, gas, and coal production above already historic levels of production; and disentangle the United States from the global critical minerals supply chain, <em>then </em>“American energy dominance” will be restored; long-term national security will be ensured; and the United States’ position as the world’s innovator will be further cemented.</p><p>No element of this claim is true. That’s hardly a surprise, given who made it — but the lie matters all the same.</p><p>It matters most for the obvious reason: a rapidly accelerating climate crisis is bad for everyone, and worse for those least responsible and most vulnerable. It also matters because of what it reveals about the United States’ strategy during Trump 2.0: <strong>Big Oil, Trump’s cabinet, and congressional Republicans <em>must</em> know they’re losing the global energy race, and with it, an enormous level of geopolitical and economic influence — and they’re not trying to win. They’re going to get rich while running out the clock.</strong></p><p>This article breaks it down.</p><h3>They Know They’re Losing.</h3><p>Let’s talk about stranded assets. If your eyes just glazed over, hang in for another few paragraphs — stranded assets have a lot to do with why the planet is burning.</p><p>A stranded asset is an investment that is <a href="https://www.thecorporategovernanceinstitute.com/insights/lexicon/what-are-stranded-assets-and-why-are-they-important/?srsltid=AfmBOooF35oCqx6GcgjDtW0arsXYsHKQo77x7dO9SlCeVGvt3vDlhyaK">“significantly devalued because the market around [it] has changed.”</a> Most often this occurs after technological advancements render certain assets obsolete, or when macroeconomic shocks result in shifting consumer sentiment and decreased demand for specific products and services. The term has gained new relevance over the past few decades, as demand for renewable energy has threatened the value of assets held by the fossil fuel industry. This includes the fossil fuels themselves: To cap global temperature rise below two degrees Celsius, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0973082623000145">nearly half the world’s known oil and gas reserves and nearly all — up to 97 percent — of known coal reserves must stay in the ground</a>. The United States possesses the largest share of coal reserves (enough to maintain the current production pace for more than 400 years), and the <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/gas/us-natural-gas/">fourth largest share</a> of natural gas reserves. Conservatively, this represents the potential for <a href="https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/prices-and-outlook.php">hundreds of trillions of dollars</a>. For the U.S. fossil fuel lobby, carbon stuck in the ground is a very expensive problem.</p><p>So expensive, in fact, that oil and gas supermajors — including Shell and earlier corporate iterations of Chevron, ExxonMobil, British Petroleum, Sunoco, and ConocoPhillips — began preparing to meet this moment decades ago. In 1954, these companies funded a study by Caltech that demonstrated the <a href="https://climateintegrity.org/news/view/big-oil-knew-as-early-as-1954">“considerable significance to civilization”</a> of continuing to produce CO2 by burning fossil fuels. In the 1970s, Exxon predicted the planetary consequences of global warming with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/12/exxon-climate-change-global-warming-research#:~:text=A%20trove%20of%20internal%20documents%20and%20research,risk%20even%20earlier%2C%20from%20around%20the%201950s.">“breathtaking[]” accuracy</a>. In 1988, Shell <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climate-change-warnings#:~:text=In%20the%201980s%2C%20oil%20companies%20like%20Exxon,forecast%20the%20planetary%20consequences%20of%20these%20emissions.&amp;text=Although%20the%20details%20of%20global%20warming%20were,the%20companies%20contributing%20the%20most%20to%20it.">internally estimated</a> that CO2 levels would likely double by 2030. The fossil fuel lobby has long understood that its relevancy and profitability was time limited.</p><p>The historically high cost of solar and wind technologies, <a href="https://www.earthday.org/fueling-the-distortion-how-oil-subisidies-skew-markets-and-stifle-clean-energy/">generous subsidies</a> to the oil and gas sector, and a <a href="https://www.ucs.org/resources/climate-deception-dossiers">devastating scale of disinformation</a> has mostly protected Big Oil’s bottom line from the shift toward clean energy. But over the last ten years, <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/data-insights/solar-panel-prices-have-fallen-by-around-20-every-time-global-capacity-doubled">the cost of solar and the cost of battery storage have plunged more than 90 percent, and the cost of wind more than 70 percent</a>. The <a href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/inflation_reduction_act_one_page_summary.pdf#:~:text=SUMMARY:%20THE%20INFLATION%20REDUCTION%20ACT,our%20long%2Dterm%20emissions%20goals.">Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)</a>, enacted under President Biden in 2022, then created an array of financial incentives — for both investors and consumers — to encourage a rapid transition to clean energy; before Trump 2.0’s agenda cast doubt on the longevity of the IRA, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-ira-two-years-on-a-signpost-of-the-new-economic-policy-consensus/">$1.2 trillion in public incentives</a> was expected to flow to renewable technology by 2032. Climate change itself has also quickened the pace toward achieving a clean energy grid, by making clear the inevitability: All ten warmest years on record, since data was first gathered in 1850, <a href="https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/wmo-confirms-2024-warmest-year-record-about-155degc-above-pre-industrial-level#:~:text=The%20past%20ten%20years%202015,dead%20but%20in%20grave%20danger">occurred in the last ten years</a>. Yes, that’s ten for ten. Renewables are the only direction we can possibly go.</p><p>And so, the fossil fuel lobby has invested massively in electing state and federal leaders who will do all they can to stall the tide of history. This political privatization reached new, unnerving heights during the 2024 U.S. general election, when fossil fuel interests poured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/23/big-oil-445m-trump-congress">$445 million</a> into electing President Trump and congressional Republicans.</p><h4>It’s Not Climate Denial, Not Anymore. More Like Bankrolled Indifference.</h4><p>The bet appears to have paid off. Immediately after he was sworn in for the second time, President Trump declared a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/">national energy emergency</a> — claiming, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/trump-administration-wrong-energy-crisis-us-experts/story?id=119668360">against all evidence</a>, that the country is suffering from a lack of energy — and directed all federal agencies to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/">“unleash”</a> the production of crude oil, natural gas, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, coal, and critical minerals. In <a href="https://www.huschblackwell.com/newsandinsights/trump-executive-actions-impacting-renewable-energy">subsequent orders</a>, Trump halted issuances of new permits for onshore and offshore wind energy projects; ordered existing permits for offshore wind projects to be reviewed and possibly terminated; and instructed agencies to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/01/omb-memo-m-25-11/">“immediately pause disbursement of funds appropriated”</a> under the IRA. (Most of these funds have, ironically, <a href="https://www.latitudemedia.com/news/its-conservative-states-that-benefit-most-from-the-ira/">benefited Republican-led states</a>.)</p><p>In response to these directives, the administrator for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced his intention to eliminate or severely limit more than 30 federal rules protecting the environment and regulating the fossil fuel industry. These <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/12/climate/epa-zeldin-rollbacks-pollution.html">rollbacks</a> range from the expected (amending tailpipe pollution standards, a <a href="https://www.corporateknights.com/transportation/fossil-fuel-lobby-against-new-car-emissions-rules-us/">thorn in the side of Big Oil</a>) to the bizarre (overturning limits on mercury emissions, which are linked to developmental damage in infants and children). While these changes are merely symbolic until scrutinized and approved under the <a href="https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-act">Administrative Procedures Act</a>, the gift to the fossil fuel lobby is clear. This is <a href="https://www.ecowatch.com/epa-zeldin-environmental-regulations-rollback.html">“the day Trump’s Big Oil megadonors paid for.”</a></p><p>It’s tempting to chalk this up to the usual climate denialism. But while “hoax” language still makes for a good MAGA soundbite, a deeper study of today’s Republican party reveals less denial and more cynical indifference. A 2023 poll by National Public Radio concluded that nearly three-quarters of individuals identifying as Republican were in favor of prioritizing the economy <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/03/1191678009/climate-change-republicans-economy-natural-disasters-biden-trump-poll">“at the risk of ignoring climate change.”</a> This side-step maneuver has grown popular among congressional Republicans as well. Senator Rick Scott of Florida would like to address climate change, but not <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/climate/republicans-climate-change.html">“where you’re killing jobs.”</a> Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana is a champion of funding adaptation and resilience projects for when sea levels threaten coastal cities, but refuses to entertain <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/climate/republicans-climate-change.html">“policies to curb the amount of oil that is drilled off the Louisiana coast.”</a> Former Senator Mitt Romney of Utah — who has received <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary?cycle=all&amp;ind=E01&amp;mem=Y&amp;recipdetail=S">more than $8 million</a> from oil companies — <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/12/republicans-climate-vote-no-00050830">wrote a letter</a> condemning those who dismissed the “cataclysmic threats” posed by climate change, and then voted against the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2022/08/02/the-inflation-reduction-act-is-the-most-important-climate-action-in-us-history/">most important piece of climate legislation in U.S. history</a>.</p><blockquote>“We cannot live without fossil fuels or chemicals, period, end of story.” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/climate/republicans-climate-change.html">— Sen. Cassidy</a></blockquote><p>Senator John Cornyn of Texas — also a <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary?cycle=all&amp;ind=E01&amp;mem=Y&amp;recipdetail=S">major recipient</a> of oil money — admitted in 2021 he had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/climate/republicans-climate-change.html">“no doubt the climate is changing and people contribute to it.”</a> Yet he recently celebrated slashing <a href="https://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/2465415/member/27/title/cornyn-votes-to-confirm-lee-zeldin-for-epa-administrator.html">“burdensome regulations”</a> on the fossil fuel industry in Texas.</p><p>It’s difficult to shift your weight with very heavy thumbs on the scale. Republicans who have been bankrolled by Big Oil must <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gop-transitioned-climate-denial-climate-misrepresentation-experts/story?id=113056571">“reconcile any interest in addressing climate change [with]… a commitment to maintain reliance on fossil fuels.”</a> They are increasingly doing so by reluctantly accepting the science, and then casting heavy doubt on the solution: renewable energy. This “logic” is everywhere, from <a href="https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf">Project 2025</a> (“climate policies have worsened global food insecurity and hunger”) to <a href="https://www.heritage.org/china/report/how-the-forced-energy-transition-and-reliance-china-will-harm-america">reports by the Heritage Foundation</a> (“green energy policies will… reduc[e] global temperatures only by a fraction of a degree by 2100”) to <a href="https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/what-they-are-saying-leaders-applaud-epas-historic-deregulatory-actions-power-great">statements applauding the EPA’s reduced focus on health and safety</a> (“this isn’t about abandoning environmental protection — it’s about achieving it through innovation”).</p><blockquote>“I concur that it is happening and it is a problem. The argument is about how to best address it.” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WN88FneY63I">— Sen. Mitch McConnell, Kentucky</a></blockquote><p>Despite this rhetorical gymnastics, the dissonance between positions is too big to hide. The result is clunky — see <a href="https://www.heritage.org/china/report/how-the-forced-energy-transition-and-reliance-china-will-harm-america">this report</a> by Project 2025 authors, which chastises the Biden administration for “forcing” the energy transition with its “extreme and progressive climate and energy policies” <em>and also</em> for failing to subsidize the energy transition quite as effectively as China.</p><p>So, which is it? Rescue fossil fuels or compete with China? Fossil fuels.</p><h3>They’re Not Trying to Win.</h3><p>The renewable energy market is here to stay. Global investment in fossil fuels was static at <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">approximately $1 trillion in 2024</a>, while investment in renewables skyrocketed to $2 trillion. Solar, wind, and batteries <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">“are proliferating rapidly”</a> in emerging economies, including those that have yet to industrialize fully. The Gulf States have even embraced the shift toward green energy: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) — a petroleum giant — <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">recently deployed a solar project</a> large enough to power all its data centers without interruption; and Saudi Arabia, also a petroleum leader, is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">investing more in renewable technology than in oil and gas</a>.</p><p>While progress is still far too slow to meet <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement">targets set by the Paris Agreement</a>, renewable energy <em>is</em> the future of energy; and it will be rolled out, like all disruptive technology, at an exponential rate. This is one genie that cannot be put back in the bottle. For all President Trump’s bluster about restoring the United States’ energy dominance, “drill, baby, drill” won’t cut it. Not in 2025; not ever again.</p><h4>“American Energy Dominance” Looks a Lot Like Market Forfeiture.</h4><p>Renewable energy technologies — wind turbines, solar panels, and electric vehicles (EVs) — require critical minerals. China has largely cornered this market, by controlling <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/chinas-role-critical-mineral-supply-chains">roughly 60 percent of global production and nearly 90 percent of global processing</a> of critical minerals. Of the 50 minerals designated by the Biden administration as “essential for U.S. national or economic security,” the United States imports between 50 and 100 percent of all but seven minerals — and for many of these, China is the primary import source. Even if the United States were to become energy independent by boosting oil, gas, and coal production above <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545#:~:text=United%20States%20produces%20more%20crude%20oil%20than,ever%20%2D%20U.S.%20Energy%20Information%20Administration%20(EIA)">already historic levels of production</a>, the national security and long-term economic consequences of relinquishing all critical mineral market control to China would be enormous. Because energy is both power and protection, the <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2024/11/trump-repeal-biden-climate-policies-manufacturing-jobs/">“future prosperity of countries hinges on being part of the clean energy supply chain… If [the United States] exit[s] the competition, it will be very difficult to re-enter.”</a></p><p>While Trump’s flurry of initial executive orders in January <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/">referenced increased investment in domestic production of minerals</a>, the attention paid pales in comparison to the assault on renewable energy incentives — an assault which directly impacts demand for products requiring a supply of critical minerals.</p><p><a href="https://heatmap.news/economy/trump-critical-minerals-energy">“If there’s uncertainty about demand, it will hold back investment,”</a> and if investment is held back, innovation and supply chain resilience — the very objectives articulated by the Trump team’s agenda — will suffer. (For those who point to the vast amounts of energy needed for the United States to win the race to artificial general intelligence (AGI) as justification for doubling-down on oil and gas, it’s worth noting that <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/california-climate/2024/05/07/move-over-evs-ai-needs-critical-minerals-00156725">artificial intelligence also requires critical minerals</a>.)</p><p>China has also far outpaced the United States’ EV production, selling <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/03/china-electric-vehicles-jinhua-leapmotor/">four times</a> as many EVs as American manufacturers in 2024. Any further retreat from the renewables market is likely to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/12/11/trump-will-throw-us-clean-power-into-question">“expand China’s global order book”</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/12/11/trump-will-throw-us-clean-power-into-question">“cement Beijing’s leadership in the sector.”</a></p><p>The counterargument to this analysis goes something like this: If fossil fuels are abundant and priced to sell, perhaps the world will slow-walk its approach to a global green grid. Defenders of the current U.S. strategy point to the United States’ renewed push to sell countries liquefied natural gas (LNG), of which the United States has huge reserves. But this is misguided. As Trump deploys his various <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/12/trump-fossil-fuels-oil-and-gas">bullying tactics</a> on allies and foes alike, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">“countries may offer LNG deals to the United States as diplomatic negotiating tools, but this will not alter economic realities in power markets.”</a></p><p>Moreover, there is broad consensus that global crude oil demand will peak around 2030, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">“with long-term consequences for U.S. exports and business opportunities abroad.”</a> Ultimately, while Big Oil may be able to successfully flood the global market with cheap energy for a period of time, and in so doing give Trump an opportunity to claim he stymied China’s grip on the global energy market, this will be a distraction. Before long, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/how-the-us-can-stop-losing-the-race-for-clean-energy?lang=en">“American energy assets [will be] outdated incumbents: stallions in the era of Ford’s Model T.”</a></p><p><strong>But that’s the point of a deluge you know is coming.</strong> You don’t need the distraction to last forever; you only need it to last long enough to hold you in power until you’ve hoarded what you came for. Indeed, the Heritage Foundation — the architect of Project 2025 — called the race for the renewable energy market <a href="https://www.heritage.org/china/report/how-the-forced-energy-transition-and-reliance-china-will-harm-america">“unwinnable.”</a> So why try? Surely not for the sake of the planet. Make a mad dash for cash instead.</p><h3>The Flood.</h3><p>It’s worth taking a moment to interrogate why and how any of this is possible. It’s complicated, sure, but also not. Existential threats — even those manifesting in front of us every day — typically play out on longer timescales than corporate reporting to shareholders, which occurs at minimum every three months. The fossil fuel industry, with its decades of deception and destruction, is monstrous; but it’s also responsive to the incentives that push and pull it — mostly the duty to, above all else, generate ever more wealth and concentrate ever more capital for owners. Can you imagine giving something so structurally short-sighted and one-dimensional keys to government? In the United States, <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/fifteen-years-later-citizens-united-defined-2024-election">this is exactly what has happened</a>. Government — which, for all its flaws, is <em>intended</em> to be inefficient and slow-moving when the timescale and the stakes most important to the public require it — reduced to quarterly earnings reports.</p><p>The world’s most powerful economy is forfeiting its own competitiveness and the planet itself so that a small group of individuals can have their way with the rest of us. The upshot of this is that it’s difficult to hide. For decades, the fossil fuel lobby has exercised significant control over elected leaders in the United States. Yet much of this deception and corruption is only now coming to light. As it does, avenues for accountability <a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1203&amp;context=sabin_climate_change">are opening</a>. Future installments of this newsletter will be devoted to describing those and proposing new ones.</p><p><em>“… at that point the richest pulled away into their fortress mansions, bought the governments or disabled them from action against them, and bolted their doors to wait it out until some poorly theorized better time, which really came down to just the remainder of their lives, and perhaps the lives of their children if they were feeling optimistic — beyond that, </em><strong><em>après moi, le deluge</em></strong><em>.” — Kim Stanley Robinson, The Ministry for the Future</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sVt-auyJ9sOB2jcquuqphA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*glzxRkkAVa-TFpDqiy4CPQ.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/irrationalreview/p/big-oils-play-to-get-rich-while-it?r=1pdzos&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=false">Big Oil&#39;s Play to Get Rich While It Still Can, Planet &amp; People Be Damned.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=393a5bf00e5d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/big-oils-play-to-get-rich-while-it-still-can-planet-people-be-damned-393a5bf00e5d">Big Oil’s Play to Get Rich While It Still Can, Planet &amp; People Be Damned.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Who Really Loses in a Global Trade War? The Workers Furthest from the Headlines.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/who-really-loses-in-a-global-trade-war-the-workers-furthest-from-the-headlines-06ddba990e70?source=rss-7afc25d3eb07------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/06ddba990e70</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tariffs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[workers-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supply-chain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reynolds Taylor]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Mar 2025 02:53:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-13T18:52:07.800Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VsrWgJhPT_oUnrNzd3U9Ow.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by CHUTTERSNAP. Tariffs are most dangerous for the workers with the least power to hold responsible actors accountable.</figcaption></figure><p>There’s no shortage of voices lamenting the consequences of President Trump’s latest trade war. No matter how often or how loudly the President claims that American businesses, consumers, and workers will be better off in his hyper-protectionist world, they won’t be. We’ve run this tape before: It is domestic companies that are legally responsible for depositing higher tariffs into the U.S. Treasury, and it is consumers — and, ultimately, workers — in the United States who will absorb most of that cost. This has been demonstrated across history’s scoreboard: in the 1930s after passage of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Smoot-Hawley-Tariff-Act">Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act</a>, in the 1960s as a result of heightened tariffs and trade tensions between Europe and the United States (dubbed the <a href="https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbp-017.pdf">“chicken war”</a>), and in 2018 when — during Trump’s first term — the nearly $80 billion raised from newly imposed tariffs was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">“borne almost entirely by American households and American firms.”</a></p><p>Remarkably, Trump’s tariffs have produced consensus in an otherwise deeply polarized era. Look anywhere other than Trump’s own cabinet and Republicans in Congress, and you’ll find the following grim predictions:</p><ul><li><strong>Cost of living in the United States will increase.</strong> Annual cost of living for U.S. households will increase <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/business-democracy/2025-trump-tarrifs-impacts">on average by $1,250</a> in 2025 — <em>before</em> considering <a href="https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/">reciprocal tariffs already promised and imposed by Canada and China</a>. Inflation is expected to rise — <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/business-democracy/2025-trump-tarrifs-impacts">far more for necessities than luxury items</a> — and consumer confidence to fall.</li><li><strong>Economies will grow far less than anticipated.</strong> The combined impact of all initial and reciprocal tariffs imposed in 2025 will be GDP growth loss between <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/250206-economic-research-macro-effects-of-proposed-u-s-tariffs-are-negative-all-around-13407507#:~:text=The%20S&amp;P%20Global%20Ratings%20economics,smaller%20than%20for%20trading%20partners.">0.3</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/morgan-stanley-cuts-us-growth-forecast-2025-tariff-concerns-2025-03-07/">and</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/business/trump-tariffs-spending-cuts-economy.html">1.1 percent</a> in the United States (that’s losses up to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-explainer-399b5d4da6e6be77cefabf25ceaa8191">$300 billion</a>), between <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/250206-economic-research-macro-effects-of-proposed-u-s-tariffs-are-negative-all-around-13407507#:~:text=The%20S&amp;P%20Global%20Ratings%20economics,smaller%20than%20for%20trading%20partners.">1 and 2 percent</a> in Canada and Mexico, and up to <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-deflation-gdp-economy-trump-tariff-2040346">1.1 percent</a> in China.</li><li><strong>Job creation in the United States will be minimal.</strong> Heightened tariffs, especially when imposed across such a broad spectrum of goods, are unlikely to create meaningful employment in the United States. Any gains will be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">“more than offset by losses in industries that use imported inputs and face retaliation on their foreign exports.”</a> We’ve seen this recently — in 2020, American consumers <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">paid roughly $900,000</a> for every job created in the steel industry after tariffs were increased on steel imports.</li><li><strong>Wages and hours for workers in the United States will be cut, and capital investment — domestic and foreign-based — will slow.</strong> Despite expected consumer price increases, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/05/business/tariffs-food-supply-chains.html">“the ability of companies to pass along the tariffs to inflation-weary consumers may be limited.”</a> The cost that cannot be absorbed by consumers will impact wages and capital investment <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/trump-s-washing-machine-tariffs-are-costing-americans-almost-100-n999461">long before it impacts shareholders</a>. When corporations are faced with tariffs, they don’t invest in people or assets — even when they have the capital to do so. This was evident during Trump’s first term, when tariff-based uncertainty caused a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/tariffs-contribute-job-losses-american-manufacturing-fed-report-shows-n1108651">“sharp decline in corporate capital investment, even though companies were left flush with cash after the 2017 tax cut.”</a></li></ul><p>Negative as these predictions are, they are incomplete. <strong>Left out of the discussion — but not out of the suffering — are the impacts on workers and vulnerable communities around the world, in countries other than those directly affected by the tariffs.</strong> To ignore this is to ignore the modern state of supply chains.</p><h4><strong>Supply Chains Are Dizzyingly Complex — and Not at All Isolated.</strong></h4><p>Ensuring domestic industries remain globally competitive is a worthy objective, with high stakes for millions of Americans in sectors where the United States no longer enjoys comparative advantage, but attempting to do so with blunt-force trade barriers is nonsensical. Import tariffs are creatures of geography; they regulate material goods crossing physical borders. But supply chains aren’t that simple. “Domestic” industry is rarely territorially isolated. Manufacturers in the United States — including those that proudly label their goods as “made in America” — are frequently also importers. Look around you and you’re unlikely to see many, if any at all, American-made goods that weren’t made in part elsewhere (likely, <em>dozens</em> of elsewheres).</p><p>Take the “Big 3” automakers in the United States, who seem to have persuaded President Trump to give them <a href="https://time.com/7264924/big-3-automakers-trump-tariffs/">a reprieve on tariffs until the beginning of April</a>. In 2023, car parts were imported into the United States — often, to be assembled and sold by domestic companies like the Big 3 — from Mexico, Canada, China, and <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/usa?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1"><em>at least</em> 96 other countries</a>. The United States’ auto supply chain, without considering raw materials or Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers, involves more than 50 percent of sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations in 2025. A trade war between the United States and its three largest trading partners is, quite literally, a world event.</p><h4><strong>Racing to the Bottom is Far More Likely than Re-Shoring.</strong></h4><p>As both President Trump’s tariffs and reciprocal tariffs are imposed, supply chains will shift. But manufacturing won’t move to the United States; that would be far too expensive, with high taxes on both imports and exports. Permanent relocation of production facilities in the United States would also require <a href="https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbesbusinesscouncil/2024/08/28/bringing-manufacturing-back-to-the-us-easier-said-than-done/">significant capital investment</a> — which, for most importers, will be unaffordable given the volatility and uncertainty of the trade wars so far. Realistically, the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/tariffs-contribute-job-losses-american-manufacturing-fed-report-shows-n1108651">“complexity and global scope of today’s industrial supply chains make it nearly impossible for multinational manufacturers to respond [by re-shoring].”</a> Rather, an accelerated race to the bottom will commence, in which smaller trading partners compete to increase their market share by offering the lowest cost of production.</p><p>It is far more likely that an American automaker adjusts to the tariffs by increasing the amount it purchases from existing suppliers in low-cost countries than re-locating production capacity from Canada to the United States. Costs that cannot be absorbed by consumers will be squeezed from these lower-cost suppliers, who will then respond — because they are likely already squeezed, even without tariffs — by cutting wages, refusing to pay overtime, sidestepping health and safety standards, and retaliating against workers who engage in collective bargaining.</p><p>Many of the sectors that will be most impacted by Trump’s tariffs and reciprocal tariffs are already <a href="https://www.earthday.org/beneath-the-seams-the-human-toll-of-fast-fashion/">rife with labor and human rights abuses</a>. To the extent that recently enacted or proposed <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-business/mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-mhrdd">human rights due diligence mandates</a>, increased <a href="https://asia.floorwage.org/dindigul-agreement-to-eliminate-gender-based-violence-and-harassment-signed/">brand accountability for supply chain violations</a>, and consumer emphasis on ethical and sustainable production have improved standards for suppliers contracting with U.S., Canadian, and European companies, what happens next is likely to curtail that progress. In a <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-tariffs-would-raise-prices-harm-u-s-workers-and-make-it-harder-to-solve-global-problems/">recent report</a>, the Center for American Progress noted there is “no way” to ensure manufacturers that move production to avoid tariffs “won’t reinforce the lowest international standards for health and safety, environmental impacts, labor rights, or decent wages when choosing where to produce, since their incentive will be to lower their production costs as much as possible.”</p><p>Indeed, rather than benefit workers in the United States who have suffered the consequences of globalization, sky-high tariffs are most likely to <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-tariffs-would-raise-prices-harm-u-s-workers-and-make-it-harder-to-solve-global-problems/">“further the ‘race to the bottom’ that has been so harmful to American workers.”</a></p><h4><strong>The Most Vulnerable Will be the Most Impacted.</strong></h4><p>Global, multi-tiered supply chains offer multinational companies more than low-cost production. They also create opportunities to offload risk, and this is most beneficial during times of macroeconomic shock. By engaging in futures markets, negotiating only short-term or conditional contracts, and leveraging currency depreciation in supplier countries (which is likely to occur as the dollar appreciates due to increased tariffs), large companies shift the risk of abrupt changes in supply and demand to workers at the bottom of the supply chain. This was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when supply chain workers around the world were <a href="https://www.just-style.com/news/investors-ngo-target-nike-over-unpaid-thai-cambodian-supply-chain-workers/?cf-view">denied wages</a> and <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/6215417279e31e7a979b915d/1645560180016/CAL+Always+Left+Holding+the+Bag+English+v7.pdf">forced to sell raw inputs at rates below what was promised</a> — including in sectors that reported <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/chocolate-giants-reap-huge-profits-promises-improve-farmers-incomes-ring-hollow">record profits during the pandemic</a>.</p><p>In 2025, as companies <a href="https://www.fairlabor.org/resource/the-impact-of-tariffs-on-sourcing-decisions/">“shift sourcing by significantly curtailing or ceasing sourcing and production… [or by] abruptly chang[ing] its sourcing profile by changing its orders or exiting factories and farms,”</a> international supply chain workers are likely to be left holding the bag. Informal agricultural workers are especially vulnerable. Consider <a href="https://www.slowboring.com/p/deadweight-loss-explained">this example</a>, provided by the publication <em>Slow Boring</em>:</p><blockquote>“Once a [pumpkin] farmer plants their fields, they’re pretty much locked into a given level of pumpkin production — the supply is inelastic. So if the government imposes a jack-o’-lantern tax, the farmer can’t really cut supply, but consumers can easily buy fewer pumpkins, so the farmer ends up eating most of the tax.”</blockquote><p>The counterargument, for better or worse, is that <em>American</em> workers will be better off with the jack-o’-lantern tax — so who cares about the foreign farmer with a surplus of pumpkins? But even if one dismisses concern for workers elsewhere, the trade-off is inefficient. American workers will not end up better off to the same degree that global workers end up worse off.</p><p>The late economist Arthur Okun famously argued that redistributive policies, including tariffs, were a <a href="https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/files/content/docs/OKUN_EQUALITY_AND_EFFICIENCY_(AS08).PDF">“leaky bucket.”</a> His primary insight was that value is not transferred from one entity perfectly to another — the value leaks along the way. A 25 percent tariff on goods imported from Canada will not result in a 25 percent increase to the U.S. Treasury and therefore will not result in a 25 percent increase in funds available to the American public. As prices rise, consumption will slow. Markets will shrink. Consumers will have less material wealth, businesses will experience decreased profit margins, and workers — who are also spending consumers — will be paid lower wages and demand fewer goods. So, what ends up in the U.S. Treasury is something far less than a 25 percent tax on imports; the gain is whatever is left in the bucket after the leak.</p><p>The same principle will apply to shifting supply chains. Manufacturing that moves from Canada to the Philippines will not result in a one-to-one transfer of jobs, wages, and economic growth. Instead, it will be the most vulnerable workers — the ones with no recourse — who are most deeply and negatively impacted. The gain isn’t a stronger American workforce, but a more volatile, less secure, less accountable global economy — where the biggest losers are those with the least power to begin with, and the “winners” don’t win much of anything at all.</p><h4><strong>Trade as a Soft Power Tool Will Be Diminished.</strong></h4><p>Tariffs as a negotiating tactic is a limited strategy. Yes, tariffs imposed on Canada and Mexico in 2018 <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">incentivized both countries</a> to cooperate with the United States on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) and pushed China to agree to purchase nearly $200 billion in goods from the United States. But the result appears larger than it was: the USMCA is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/5-things-to-know-about-usmca-the-new-nafta/">quite similar</a> to the agreement it replaced (NAFTA) and <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2022/china-bought-none-extra-200-billion-us-exports-trumps-trade-deal">China never purchased the goods</a> it said it would. Even if these outcomes had been far greater, there’s a ceiling to how many times — and how frequently — the United States can bully trade partners into more advantageous trade terms. National interest dictates that countries prioritize policies that <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">“are stable and predictable, with the goal of establishing a long-term, win-win partnership.”</a> It’s hard to love your teammates when they constantly adjust the rules in their own favor. At a certain point, team lines are redrawn.</p><p>This is self-defeating. The United States delivers much of its “soft power” through trade agreements. It is the promise of trade that enables the United States to insist on certain social and environmental standards of production. For example, the <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp">U.S. Generalized System of Preferences</a> requires countries to implement specific labor protections before receiving benefits. The USMCA — now on the chopping block — includes a <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca-cases">mechanism for workers to submit grievances</a>, as well as provisions <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20Government%20Trade%20Strategy%20to%20Combat%20Forced%20Labor.pdf">prohibiting goods produced with forced labor</a> from being imported to the United States, Canada, or Mexico. And so on. While these assurances are imperfectly designed and inadequately executed, they have provided human rights defenders, civil society, and government officials with a foundation from which to advocate for deeper change. They have also sent a clear message, one that is important to the Trump Administration: The United States will deliver on its promise to be a more responsible, more sustainable trading partner than China.</p><p>The United States forfeits this narrative — and robs advocates of their leverage — when it violates its own negotiated trade terms. If the motivating force behind the tariffs is to <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-tariffs-would-raise-prices-harm-u-s-workers-and-make-it-harder-to-solve-global-problems/">“disincentiviz[e] Chinese production, instead of rewarding high-standard production wherever it occurs,”</a> so be it. But as trading partners shift allegiances to “insure against an unreliable U.S.,” the adjustment <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/trumps-25-tariffs-on-canada-and-mexico-will-be-a-blow-to-all-3-economies/">“will include being more open to expanding trade and investment relations with China.”</a></p><h4><strong>Better Use Cases (and Topics for Future Discussion).</strong></h4><p>A tariff is a legal, economic, and political tool — that’s all. Right now, the tool is being wielded in a short-sighted and dangerous fashion. But it’s just a tool, one that has plenty of potential to push corporate and government incentives in a positive direction. For example, imagine a world where trade policies, including tariffs, were designed simultaneous to national investment strategies — <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/a-trade-strategy-for-the-post-neoliberal-world/">“creating constituencies of workers and companies that benefit from trade rules that incentivize ‘race-to-the-top’ behaviors.”</a> Or a world where firms that prove their commitment to decarbonization, worker rights, and political neutrality earn better trade terms. Or — cooler yet — a world where tariffs imposed on corrupt corporate actors were collected and distributed to victims of the associated abuse.</p><p>This is all possible — <a href="https://podtail.com/podcast/hidden-traffic-with-gwen-hassan/trade-law-and-human-rights-with-dean-pinkert/">some of it is already real</a> — if we build it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sVt-auyJ9sOB2jcquuqphA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/newsletters/ir-rational-review">Subscribe to receive weekly newsletters in your inbox.</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*glzxRkkAVa-TFpDqiy4CPQ.png" /></figure><p><em>This article is also available on Substack:</em></p><p><a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/irrationalreview/p/who-really-loses-in-a-global-trade?r=1pdzos&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=false">Who Really Loses in a Global Trade War? The Workers Furthest from the Headlines.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=06ddba990e70" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review/who-really-loses-in-a-global-trade-war-the-workers-furthest-from-the-headlines-06ddba990e70">Who Really Loses in a Global Trade War? The Workers Furthest from the Headlines.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/ir-rational-review">(Ir)rational.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>