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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Richard J Morrissey on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Richard J Morrissey on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Richard J Morrissey on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rees-Mogg, Aquinas, and the Problem of Hiroshima]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/rees-mogg-aquinas-and-the-problem-of-hiroshima-72d542ff5bb8?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72d542ff5bb8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sir-jacob-rees-mogg]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[just-war-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tucker-carlson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hiroshima]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[catholic-church]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 13:43:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-20T13:43:16.183Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>On Tucker Carlson’s show, a Protestant gave the Catholic Church’s answer on Hiroshima and a Catholic argued against it</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NQw3Kv1_qaFui0Nv0mg_Ew.jpeg" /></figure><p>Earlier this month Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg appeared on the <a href="https://youtu.be/WDwKfFV8eCU?si=o2V-9RI8bKoPD0C4"><em>Tucker Carlson Show</em></a>. They discussed the Russia-Ukraine conflict, British defence, atomic bombs, the nature of deterrence and Britain’s decision to fight Nazi Germany in WW2. Needless to say, it was the Nazi conversation, where Tucker mentioned that “you attacked the Germans”, which gained real traction amongst the chattering classes, especially on the right.</p><p>For anyone who has noticed how boundary-setting conservative media really dislike Tucker Carlson, the headlines were predictable. The <em>National Review</em> (of anti-Pat Buchanan fame) for example ran with: “Tucker Carlson Receives a World War II Education”. Ben Shapiro’s <em>The Daily Wire </em>(of “Tucker is bad for the Jews” fame) noted: “How Tucker Carlson Was Rees-Mogged By Conservatism”. Closer to home, <em>UnHerd</em> ran a piece by British historian Andrew Roberts (of anti-Churchill-revisionism fame) saying Tucker was taught a “history lesson”. Social media influencers also got involved, with many self-described conservatives on X (including the likes of Rod Dreher, who called Carlson a “scoundrel”) praising Sir Jacob’s calm, fact-based performance, while attacking Carlson’s historical claims and biases.</p><p>The discussion surrounding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki passed with little notice or comment from the same right-leaning political commentators and standard-bearers. But for me, that was one of the most interesting parts of the interview. In it, Carlson made clear that he was completely opposed to the bombings, and to the deliberate killing of the innocent.</p><p>The Rees-Mogg view was that the bombings were “unquestionably” justified under Christian just war theory. And he cited Aquinas in support. He argued they met the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, and proportionality because they shortened the war and in doing so saved lives overall. He agreed that this included accepting the deaths of innocent non-combatants, including children, as a Christian position in that context.</p><p>The criteria Aquinas used do indeed mention legitimate authority and just cause. But his third criterion is right intention rather than proportionality as cited by Sir Jacob. Aquinas follows St. Augustine on the nature of right intention in condemning the desire to harm.</p><p>The problem is that the US atomic bombing mission was absolutely driven by the intention to harm the Japanese. And harm them so much and so devastatingly that they would capitulate and surrender.</p><p>Philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe understood what was at stake here. In 1956 Oxford University proposed to give US President Harry Truman an honorary degree. Anscombe, a Catholic convert and a research fellow at Somerville, spoke out against it, but easily lost in a subsequent vote. Her view was that to choose to kill the innocent as a means to achieve one’s ends is always murder. The defence that the bombs ultimately saved more lives and shortened the war didn’t matter. Murder was still murder.</p><p>The Catholic Church, of which Sir Jacob is also a communicant, agrees with her. In 1965 the Second Vatican Council, in <em>Gaudium et Spes</em>, condemned “any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population” as “a crime against God and man himself.”</p><p>When the Episcopalian Carlson asked Sir Jacob what the Catholic Church’s position was, he said there had been only one <em>ex cathedra</em> pronouncement since 1945 (<em>Munificentissimus Deus: </em>bodily assumption of Mary, in 1950), which was true, but beside the point. Catholics owe their assent to more than just infallible teachings, and <em>Gaudium et Spes</em> is an example of this requirement. Sir Jacob should have known that. Perhaps he did.</p><p>In the same interview he called the killing of the unborn the greatest tragedy of the West but somehow failed to see how the intentional killing of innocent born children is also a great tragedy.</p><p>This is not some minor historical disagreement about wars and their causes. The traditional teaching of the Church that Rees-Mogg is part of has consistently held that you may never deliberately kill the innocent as a means to an end. Calculations about more lives saved or ending wars do not provide a get-out clause. Rees-Mogg is right to call the killing of the unborn the greatest tragedy of the West. Where he is wrong is in treating the intentional killing of other innocents as a proportionate and Christian necessity.</p><p>The Nagasaki atomic bomb, for its part, detonated almost directly over Urakami Cathedral, the heart of Catholic Japan, killing thousands of the city’s Catholics, including those waiting inside for Mass.</p><p>The fact that this part of the podcast resulted in so little reaction on the political and cultural “right” is itself the more significant fact. Protecting the traditional narratives around WW2 and the resultant post-war consensus appear to outweigh the Christian moral tradition that many of these same voices claim to defend.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72d542ff5bb8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Come Back Home, if You Must]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/come-back-home-if-you-must-24f065cc471c?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/24f065cc471c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[reform-uk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conservative-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 13:14:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T13:14:10.526Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Kemi Badenoch is courting voters who aren’t there and scorning the ones who are.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ocfbrhaSPESWtQWvbpVmwg.jpeg" /></figure><p>I find the whole party conference circuit completely cringe. Politicians are not like us. But they have power, so we need to keep tabs. I watched Kemi Badenoch’s recent Conservative Party conference speech live. What I was waiting to hear from her was how she would handle Reform, once riding high in the polls, but now a couple of points behind the Tories.</p><p>The main takeaway was that she ruled out a pact with Reform; “to those who say ‘unite the right’, we are not uniting with <em>that”</em>. “That” had a touch of venom in it. She also asked the voters who had left the Tories for Reform, to “come back home.” It was a strange juxtaposition. Mocking an insurgent party to the right of you, while at the same time asking for their supporters to return to the Conservatives.</p><p>What is obvious from this speech at least is that the current pitch from the Tories is really aimed at the so-called Blue Wall, where the Lib Dems got most of their 72 seats from the Conservatives. The Conservative pitch is focusing on the economy, tax cuts (inheritance) and competence. There was no red meat on immigration apart from the usual “deport illegal migrants, not house them” and she was keen to emphasise that her party would never support identity politics on race. “Reform MPs are openly questioning people’s identity. They are not like us, we are not like them.”</p><p>So right now, Kemi is making a bet: that a sensible economy-focused offering coupled with competence and seriousness about immigration (especially illegal), can convince enough mainstream centre-right voters to give the conservatives another chance.</p><p>The problem is that there aren’t enough of these voters. The Conservatives won 121 seats in 2024. If they won back every seat the Lib Dems took from them they would still only have around 180 seats and well short of the 326 needed to form a majority government.</p><p>Also, the competence argument has an obvious weakness. They were in power for fourteen years (which ended just two years ago), and the voters who left them did so with that experience, and the outcomes it produced, firmly in mind. Understanding the levers of power doesn’t wash when you mess up pulling them or avoiding the lever pull for the best part of fourteen years.</p><p>However, I suspect all of this won’t stop a reprise of “Project Fear” as we get closer to the next election. There will be constant warnings, maybe even supported in the press, that if Reform gains power the country will fall apart, the civil service will refuse to implement policy and the financial markets will collapse. The problem of course is that the target audience, Reform voters, have heard all this before during the EU Referendum. They didn’t believe it then and are very unlikely to believe it the next time.</p><p>Badenoch of course may pivot back towards Reform voters as the election nears, but right now, betting on centrists to win the day looks like a weak bet and the contempt she is showing for Reform politicians is very unlikely to convince their supporters to “come home”.</p><p>The polls will change again before the next election, and the case for some form of compromise doesn’t depend on who’s leading. Reform has its own reason to want one: Rupert Lowe’s Restore Britain, polling between four and eight per cent, is currently doing to Reform what Nigel Farage did to the Tories.</p><p>If the Tories are ahead, Badenoch can lead on the term-setting: reduced campaigning in the Labour seats where Reform came second, and in return Reform pulling back in the seats the Lib Dems took from the Tories. And both parties explicitly ruling out a vote that might keep Labour in power.</p><p>If Reform is leading in the polls Kemi can offer experienced politicians from in the Commons and the House of Lords who have run departments and know Whitehall.</p><p>In either case the larger party will gain most as it would lead the government while the smaller party would have a place at the table and real power it couldn’t win on its own.</p><p>Contempt will close off both options, and so will any fight over decency and character rather than policy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24f065cc471c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Eulogy Is the Confession]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/the-eulogy-is-the-confession-36933614e175?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/36933614e175</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[emma-bonino]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[giorgia-meloni]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-leopard]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 15:22:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-01T15:22:27.031Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*wCYVQ5RtSy51mqKkuGg9oA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Tancredi’s line has long outlived the novel that produced it: if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. People quote it as cunning. In the book it is bleaker. The Sicilian aristocracy of <em>Il Gattopardo</em> keeps its titles, its balls and its funerals, and gives away everything the titles were for. Don Fabrizio sees what is happening and attends the ceremonies anyway. The ceremonies are what remain. Lampedusa was writing about forms that survive the order which made them intelligible.</p><p>Emma Bonino died on 11 September at seventy-eight. Days later the Italian political class gathered in the Campidoglio for a civil state funeral. Giorgia Meloni was there, with the president of the Republic and a row of former prime ministers. She had already written that their stories and sensibilities had been distant, and that this had never prevented her from recognising Bonino’s <em>peso</em> and her <em>ruolo</em> in the public life of the nation. The funeral said the same thing standing up.</p><p>Decency explains a condolence. It does not explain the wording, and it does not explain the attendance. The newspaper version is thinner still: that she was buying a morning’s respectability from papers which will call her a fascist again by Friday.</p><p>What she said was true. She meant it. That is the difficulty.</p><p>Bonino’s significance is not in dispute. She procured an illegal abortion in 1974, handed herself to the police the next year, and worked with a centre that performed abortions by the thousand. The private offence became a public campaign. She entered parliament in 1976. Law 194 followed in 1978. Then a term as European commissioner, the foreign ministry, and a career premised on the claim that Catholic Italy’s moral order stood in the way of human freedom and should be dismantled. She was the one who made it public, and she lived long enough to be eulogised for it.</p><p>Meloni has been in office nearly four years. Law 194 remains.</p><p>What was fought as an assault in 1978 is now, in the mouth and in the presence of the Italian right’s most successful politician, a role in the public life of the nation. The people who lost are the ones inheriting it.</p><p>Statesmen praise enemies they still mean to beat. That is an old permission of the funeral oration. Naming <em>peso</em> and a role in the nation’s public life, then taking a seat in the Campidoglio, is the language used for a founder.</p><p>She did not have to abuse a dead woman, or time a statement on the unborn to a coffin. A private note would have done. Silence would have done, and everyone who watches these things would have read it. She took neither.</p><p>Her Catholicism does not run that way. She is openly Catholic; her opponents say so more loudly; for four years the European commentariat has treated her as the face of a Christian politics in Europe. The faith is there. It has the status Don Fabrizio’s titles had once the ceremonies were all that was left of them.</p><p>An inheritance gives you a vocabulary and a story about your people. It asks for what you were already prepared to give. Jurisdiction keeps telling you what you may not concede after the concession has become popular, after the coalition has made its peace, after reversal would look like vandalism. The first produces tributes. The second produces refusals.</p><p>Most of what now calls itself Christian politics in Europe is the first. It defends cribs in town squares and crosses in classrooms, and it is right to, because those things are being taken down by people who know what they are doing. You can keep the furniture and accept every settlement the furniture was meant to express. The crucifix stays on the wall. Nothing taught under it follows from the crucifix. Honour the woman who legalised abortion, stand at her state funeral, call yourself the last defender of Christian Europe: there is no contradiction if the Christianity is a possession rather than a bind.</p><p>The obituaries also record her friendship with the late Pope Francis, “despite” their views on abortion and euthanasia, and that he encouraged her humanitarian battles. The pope, whose office exists to hold what cannot be conceded, kept a warm friendship with the woman who legalised abortion in Italy. The disagreement is mentioned in the tone used for two friends who support different clubs.</p><p>If only politicians did this, one could talk about votes. The votes belong to people who like the settlement. A pope does not stand for election. He has no coalition and no paper to placate. The same gesture from the Vatican and from Palazzo Chigi, toward the same woman, and then the prime minister in the hall: cowardice will not cover it.</p><p>Both had decided, without putting it so, that 1978 was permanent, and that the remaining task was to be humane inside it. Honour costs nothing once she is no longer an opponent. She is the past you came from. That history runs one way, and that the settlements it produces are final, is a thing the secular left has said openly since the Revolution. The Church spent most of that period saying otherwise. The eulogies are how you can tell it has stopped.</p><p>Don Fabrizio knew. He went to the ceremonies knowing what had been lost and what the forms were now worth. That knowledge is why he is tragic and not merely finished. The Italian right has the ceremonies. It thinks it is holding the line as it files past the coffin.</p><p>Those who still hold the older view are a faction inside institutions whose leadership does not. They will be called uncharitable, disproportionate, late. Some of that will come from men in mitres. It will not be argued, because nobody involved experienced it as an argument. There is no vote to point to, no encyclical, no moment anyone can be held to.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36933614e175" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What the Right Never Built]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/what-the-right-never-built-3ad713bf098e?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ad713bf098e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[restore-britain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reform-uk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conservatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-17T19:18:52.129Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Fifteen years of parties and no institutions.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xLCzIrxmDLE3gdeXcx1v8A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Reform UK took about half the vote in every ward of Makerfield at the local elections. Six weeks later it fought the by-election and lost badly. Restore Britain stood against them. At the time people argued — I was one of them — that the split would potentially hand the seat to Andy Burnham. It didn’t.</p><p>A professional machine already held the ground and the money and still could not convert it. Nobody needed to spoil the result. Burnham is now Prime Minister.</p><p>The usual reply is that the Conservatives and Reform should do a deal. Allister Heath said so plainly in the Telegraph: accommodate each other or go down together. If the only problem was vote-splitting, that would settle it. Makerfield suggests the real problem sits further back.</p><p>For fifteen years the right has produced the same pattern. UKIP fractured. The Brexit Party absorbed what was left and then dispersed. Reclaim went nowhere. Reform consolidated for a time. Then Ben Habib left and started Advance, and Rupert Lowe left and started Restore. A merger of the last two has been discussed and has not happened.</p><p>Each split was presented as a matter of principle, yet each one followed the personal trajectory of the man who walked out. Tim Stanley, writing in the same paper, called it psychological: a civil war conducted as a series of family rows.</p><p>Under first-past-the-post a party has only one position that really counts. The leader is also a candidate, so his reputation and the organisation’s standing are the same thing. The name can be taken out of the building — Habib did it, then Lowe did it. Success is measured in seats, which means everything is timed to a five-year cycle. The structure tends to produce leaders rather than people content to stay in second place.</p><p>Engineers spend their careers removing single points of failure. A party under this system is made of almost nothing else: one reputation, one portable name, a small number of donors, and a result that arrives on one day every five years.</p><p>A party also needs a great deal before it has done anything useful: deposits, candidates, agents, premises, insurance, compliance, and money that in Britain comes from a small number of large donors. Most importantly, it needs people who are authorised to speak for the whole. That difference matters. A movement can contain people who disagree, embarrass each other, or get things wrong in public. Once someone is entitled to speak for the organisation, every public disagreement becomes a problem of authority.</p><p>That is what the recent attacks on Restore were reaching for. In early August Heath called its supporters sewage, reprobates and maniacs. The Sunday Telegraph followed with Jake Wallis Simons announcing a twenty-first-century British fascism. A news report noted that Lowe’s family firm holds a Royal Warrant and that the palace might take an interest. Exclusion, ridicule and commercial pressure in a few days. Those instruments land hardest on a formal party with a visible leader and authorised spokesmen. They are less effective against a looser movement.</p><p>Whether any of it worked is another matter. A man told by the Telegraph that he is sewage does not conclude that he has been reading the wrong X posts. He concludes that he was right about who is running things.</p><p>The two diagnoses did not even agree. Heath’s was recent and derivative: woke rightists copying the left’s racial obsession. Simons drew his line from Mein Kampf through Mosley to Cable Street. One is last year’s infection; the other has been incubating since 1936. Both appeared in the same family of papers inside a week. Neither explained how the same people could be both.</p><p>Heath is right that much of the online right has settled into grievance. Young men with nothing else to belong to will take whatever is on offer, and what is on offer is an argument about dispossession conducted on the internet. Scattering them only multiplies the perceived problem.</p><p>The deeper issue is older. The strongest political movements in this country existed for years before they became parties. Labour grew out of unions, chapels and local societies. The Anti-Corn Law League organised nationally and won the argument in the country while Parliament still resisted. Underneath both were the friendly societies, mechanics’ institutes and working men’s clubs that taught ordinary people how to run their own affairs. The right has almost never built anything comparable. It has think tanks, which are staff-run, donor-funded and pitched at a few thousand people near the top. What it has never had is fraternities and local associations paid for and run by the men in them. The Primrose League was large and effective, but it was created by the Conservative Party for the Conservative Party and disappeared when the party no longer needed it.</p><p>For the last fifteen years every new vehicle on the right has started the other way round: a known figure at the top, then a search for members to sign up. Restore began by speaking the language of a movement and then became another party. There was a brief chance to build local associations first. That chance was not taken. What arrived instead was another vehicle built around one man’s visibility, with the failure point in place from the beginning.</p><p>The older institutions that once formed people have largely gone, absorbed into the welfare state, closed, sold off, or emptied. By the time the right wanted a base, little remained. So it started at the top.</p><p>Everything it has built still runs through Westminster on the assumption that success means a parliamentary majority. When that majority cannot deliver — because of the civil service, arm’s-length bodies, spending rules, treaties and judicial oversight — there is no second channel. The accumulation simply stops.</p><p>This is not a counsel of despair about politicians. It is what has repeatedly happened to the ones who won. Governments have taken office with clear mandates on immigration and then presided over the opposite. Sometimes they lied. More often they discovered in office how little room they actually had. The young have noticed. Some withdraw. Others decide the whole system is a fraud. Both responses are dead ends. The historical alternative is the one that used to work: the country moves first, and the institutions eventually follow. That is how the big nineteenth-century changes happened.</p><p>It is also how Leave succeeded in 2016. No mainstream party campaigned for it. The party that had made the argument for twenty years held a single seat. The case had been put in the country for a generation by people with no realistic prospect of office, and it was won anyway. Farage entered Parliament in 2024, eight years after the constitutional position of the country had changed. The seat and the achievement had almost nothing to do with each other.</p><p>A referendum is a special instrument: one national question, no seat arithmetic, the only contest in which a movement holds every advantage. What existed before 2016 was a campaign, and campaigns end the morning after they succeed. The energy went into parties within months, and those parties delivered little of what Leave voters thought they had bought. The right took from 2016 the lesson that it could win. It had built nothing capable of holding a win.</p><p>The right has spent fifteen years getting better at managing voters and has built almost nothing that forms them. Campaigning, messaging and targeting are techniques for handling people who already exist. They do not create the next generation.</p><p>People will continue to vote for Reform, the Conservatives, Restore or anyone else on the ballot. That is not the problem. Treating the vote as the whole of politics is. The objection is always that an election is coming and this kind of formation work takes too long and will not affect the result. The objection treats both tasks as drawing on the same account. They do not. The campaign already has its candidates, agents, money and professional staff. The formative work needs none of them and takes nothing from them. The objection has been made for more than a decade. Each time it was true, and each time it explained why nothing was built. There is always an election coming. Fifteen years of that reasoning have produced a string of parties and no institutions.</p><p>Lose the next election and the absence remains. Win it and the new government still meets a permanent machine with no broader country already moved behind it. Either way the same work is left undone.</p><p>The change the right says it wants is generational. It cannot be delivered inside one parliament. The people who are twenty-five now will be running things in 2050. What they run them for will depend on what is built around them in the next ten years, not on who holds any particular seat. That work does not require permission. It is not being done. But it’s how you unite the right.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ad713bf098e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Premise Both Sides Share]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/the-premise-both-sides-share-84a97fbb05bb?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84a97fbb05bb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[catholicism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[doctrine-and-covenants]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protestant-liberalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:13:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-24T14:13:55.257Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How Protestant Theology Became the Anglo-American Consensus and What Recovery Requires</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/830/1*55G8trNhG1KhE9XuOjZZpg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The argument has been going on for forty years, and almost nobody has noticed that both sides are making it from the same ground.</p><p>The free market right and the progressive left disagree about nearly everything visible: the role of the state, the meaning of equality, the claims of national identity, the management of the economy. But underneath those disagreements they share a premise so fundamental that it rarely surfaces as a premise at all.</p><p>The sovereign individual, self-owning, choosing, responsible only for obligations voluntarily incurred, is the basic unit of reality for both of them. Community, where it appears, is instrumental: a means to individual flourishing, not a constitutive reality that precedes individual choice. Obligation, where it appears, is contractual: binding only where consented to, dissolvable where the terms no longer suit.</p><p>Thatcher and Blair are the clearest English expression of this. They are usually presented as opposites. They were applications. Thatcher applied the premise to the economy: markets liberate the individual from dependency on collective structures that have no right to his labour or her choices. Blair applied it to culture: progressive liberalism liberates the individual from identities, traditions, and social expectations that have no right to constrain personal expression. The enterprise culture and the diversity culture look like different projects. They dissolve the same thing — the claim of unchosen community on the person who was formed by it.</p><p>This is not a partisan observation. It is an anthropological one. And once you see it, the political instability of the last decade looks less like a failure of policy and more like a consequence of a premise. The Yellow Vest protests, the Brexit vote, the rise of parties nobody predicted — these are the political expression of people who experienced the dissolution of their communities as a loss and found no language in the mainstream for what had been taken from them, because the mainstream had long since agreed that what was taken from them was an obstacle rather than a gift.</p><p>The premise has a history. It did not arrive fully formed from nowhere. It has a genealogy, and that genealogy runs through a specific and identifiable strand of Protestant thought — not as accusation, not to re-litigate the Reformation, but because understanding where an idea came from is the precondition for understanding what it is doing now and whether it is possible to think differently.</p><p>That is what this piece is about. Not restoration of a world that is gone. Recovery of something that world knew, and we have since unlearned.</p><p>The argument that follows traces how this anthropology emerged from a particular strand of Protestantism, migrated into secular liberalism, structured the Thatcher–Blair consensus, and what an honest recovery would require.</p><p>Two terms will recur throughout. Both want defining before the argument begins. The older vision I will call covenantal: persons as constituted by unchosen relationships and inherited obligations, formed by communities they did not design and cannot simply exit. The newer vision is liberal: persons as sovereign units who choose their relationships, incur only the obligations they consent to, and can exit any association when the terms no longer suit. The essay is about how the second displaced the first, and what that displacement has cost.</p><h3>What was there before</h3><p>The pre-Reformation world is usually approached through its failures. The corruptions are real and documented, and Protestant polemicists have been cataloguing them for five centuries. But Eamon Duffy’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Stripping_of_the_Altars"><em>The Stripping of the Altars</em></a> did something that had not been done systematically before: it approached the medieval church through its own evidence — the wills, the guild accounts, the churchwarden records, the testamentary bequests — and asked not what the reformers thought of it but what the people who lived inside it actually did.</p><p>What emerges is not the superstitious ignorance of Protestant legend, nor the golden age of Catholic nostalgia. It is a functioning system of intergenerational obligation, locally organised and personally felt. The guild member who left money for Masses to be said for his soul was not purchasing salvation through an extraction mechanism, as Luther would have it. He was maintaining his place in a network of prayer that ran in both directions across time — the living praying for the dead, the dead understood as still present to the community that remembered them. The chantry priest who said those masses was employed not by the institutional church in the abstract but by a specific community of named people, living and dead, who had a claim on his office.</p><p>The monastery was an economic as well as a spiritual institution — a hospital, a school, a source of agricultural knowledge, a holder of land in trust for purposes that extended beyond any individual lifetime. The parish held obligations across generations that no single householder could have maintained alone. The guild regulated trades not to extract rents from members but to preserve standards, train apprentices, and ensure that the knowledge and practice of a craft survived the individuals who carried it.</p><p>What underwrote all of this was a specific and coherent understanding of what a person is. Not a self-contained unit who then chooses relationships and obligations. A person constituted by relationships they did not choose and could not exit — to the living, to the dead, to those not yet born. To be a person was already to be obligated. The question was not whether you had duties you had not consented to. The question was whether you were discharging them faithfully.</p><p>This was not elite theology. It did not require Aquinas. It required a community that embodied the understanding in its practices, its architecture, its calendar, and its pattern of dying. The theology was there for those who wanted it. The formation happened whether or not you could read.</p><h3>The demolition</h3><p>Luther’s break was not primarily political or institutional. It was anthropological. The move that mattered was locating salvation in the individual conscience rather than in the sacramental community. This was experienced, and in many respects was, a liberation — from clerical corruption, from the sale of indulgences, from a mediating apparatus that had accumulated power alongside its genuine pastoral function. The grievances were real. The liberation was real. But the mediating institutions were not only extracting power from the people beneath them. They were also constituting persons as embedded in a web of obligation that preceded and survived the individual. When Luther dissolved them theologically, he dissolved something whose loss he had not reckoned with.</p><p>Henry dissolved them materially. The English Reformation was not primarily a doctrinal event. It was a demolition. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_the_monasteries">dissolution of the monasteries</a> between 1536 and 1541 transferred productive land and accumulated endowment from institutions whose purpose was intergenerational — holding property in trust for the dead, the living, and the unborn — to the Tudor gentry, who held it for themselves. The chantries followed in 1547. The guilds were stripped of their religious functions and gradually stripped of their economic ones. The prayers for the dead ended. The endowments that had funded hospitals, schools, and the perpetual employment of priests to maintain the memory of the departed were redistributed upward into private hands.</p><p>Hilaire Belloc, writing in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Servile_State"><em>The Servile State</em></a> in 1912, made the argument that nobody else was making at the time and that has aged better than almost anything written in that period: the dissolution of the monasteries did not merely change religion. It created the structural preconditions for industrial capitalism by concentrating productive property in a proprietary class that had not previously existed at that scale. The welfare state, when it arrived four centuries later, was not the correction of this settlement. It was its administrative completion — managed dependency replacing the covenantal mutual obligation that the dissolution had destroyed.</p><p>John Calvin extended what Luther had begun. Election is individual. The corporate dimension of the biblical covenant — obligations running laterally across community and vertically across generations — is subordinated to the vertical transaction between the individual soul and the sovereign God. The congregation assembles to witness individual encounters with grace. It does not constitute the persons who compose it.</p><p>This is not the whole of Calvin. The Reformed tradition retained a corporate political theology — the consistory, the Christian commonwealth, the theocratic element that Calvinist thinkers as late as the 1890s were still defending against the individualist tide. But that element was precisely what the Anglo-American settlement stripped out first. What migrated into liberal anthropology was not Calvinism whole but a Protestantism that had already shed its corporate and politically-directing dimensions, retaining the solitary soul before God while discarding the communal structures that soul had been embedded in.</p><p>The covenantal anthropology had not been refuted. It had been evicted — first from its theological rationale, then from its institutional embodiment, then from the imagination of a culture that had forgotten it had ever organised its life around anything else.</p><h3>The migration into secular life</h3><p>The solitary individual before God did not stay in the church. Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries he migrated into law, politics, and economics, shedding theological vocabulary as he went while retaining the anthropological structure underneath it. By the time he arrived in secular form he was so familiar that he no longer needed explaining. He was simply what a person was.</p><p>John Locke gave him political dress. Rights precede community in Locke’s account — they are not granted by social membership but possessed prior to any association, and the legitimate state exists only to protect what the individual already owns by nature. Consent is the only legitimate basis of obligation. Community is the instrument of pre-existing individual interests, not the condition of their possibility. The Protestant subject, stripped of his theological framing, had become the liberal citizen. The logic was the same. The vocabulary had changed.</p><p>Adam Smith gave him a market stall. The invisible hand is secularised Providence — the mechanism by which individual self-interest, pursued without reference to any wider obligation, produces general welfare as its unintended consequence. What this required, and what Smith largely assumed rather than argued, was that the self-interest in question was that of persons already formed by something outside the market: the Presbyterian moral culture, the embedded community obligations, the habits of honest dealing that market exchange presupposed but could not itself generate. The mechanism worked on the assumption that the formation had already happened. It had no account of what happened when it stopped happening.</p><p>Immanuel Kant completed the philosophical architecture. The autonomous moral agent owes nothing to tradition or inherited obligation that cannot be rationally justified from first principles. Moral maturity is freedom from heteronomous constraint: the capacity to legislate for oneself rather than receiving law from outside. What the medieval Christian would have recognised as a description of the fallen will, the refusal to receive obligation as given, the insistence on being the author of one’s own law, became the Enlightenment’s definition of moral achievement. The direction of travel reversed. The same destination.</p><p>Samuel Smiles is the hinge. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-Help_(Smiles_book)"><em>Self-Help</em></a>, published in 1859, is the point at which the theology-turned-philosophy becomes popular culture. The self-made man requires no aristocratic birth, no institutional membership, no inherited network of obligation — only effort, discipline, and the refusal to lean on structures that would diminish him by supporting him. This was not a description of how successful men actually operated. It was the formation of an ideal that would shape how ordinary people understood their obligations to one another for the next century and a half. You owe your condition to yourself. Your neighbour owes his condition to himself. The claim of one on the other is therefore weak — charity at best, interference at worst.</p><p>This was not inevitable, and it was not unopposed. Within the Protestant tradition itself there were serious dissenters from the individualist migration — Reformed thinkers who maintained that Calvinism was a social and political faith, not merely a theology of personal election, and who saw the laissez-faire capture of conservatism as an apostasy from their own tradition rather than its fulfilment. They lost. The individualist stream won the culture, and the corporate stream was left as a minority voice within a tradition that had already moved on.</p><p>None of these thinkers invented the autonomous individual. They found him already present in the culture that Protestant theology had been forming for a century or more, and gave him systematic expression.</p><p>Other forces were moving in the same direction. Renaissance humanism had already begun relocating the measure of things from God to man. Nominalism had loosened the metaphysical bonds between persons and the universal categories that had held them in common membership. The Enlightenment would add its own secularising pressure. But these streams entered Anglo-American political culture through a particular channel — a Protestant anthropology that had already shaped the language of conscience, the habits of worship, and the structure of the household across two centuries of popular formation before Locke wrote a word. The philosophical genealogy is contested. The cultural one is less so.</p><p>The migration was not a conspiracy. It was a consequence.</p><h3>The political expression — Thatcher, Blair, and the consensus</h3><p>The point that will surprise readers who have spent forty years thinking of Thatcherism and Blairism as opposites is that they are not. They are sequential applications of the same anthropology to different domains, separated by a decade and a half and united by the premise neither acknowledged.</p><p>Thatcher was necessary in some respects. The sclerotic corporatism of the 1970s had produced genuine dysfunction, and the market liberalism that replaced it restored economic dynamism the country had lost. But the same liberalism that freed the economy also dissolved the institutions the economy had been embedded in. The mining communities, the trade unions, the networks of working-class mutual obligation — these were not only economic structures. They were the secular residue of something older: communities that understood obligation as constitutive rather than contractual, that held people accountable to one another across time in ways the market neither required nor rewarded. Thatcher’s market did not merely defeat them. It replaced them with nothing, because the anthropology underlying it had no category for what they were.</p><p>The most quoted expression of that anthropology is the one she did not quite say but nearly did. “There is no such thing as society” — the full sentence qualifies it with individual men and women and families — but the qualification shows the structure as clearly as the slogan. The household is the terminal unit of social reality. Above it, there is no institution generating genuine obligation. There are only aggregates of individual choices, and the state, which exists to protect those choices from each other.</p><p>Blair was not the correction of this. He was its cultural extension. New Labour accepted every economic premise of the Thatcherite settlement — the markets, the financialisation, the flexibility — and added a progressive cultural agenda that extended individual sovereignty into every remaining domain where it had not yet reached. The enterprise culture liberated the individual in the market. The diversity culture liberated him in identity, lifestyle, and personal expression. Both treated inherited community as a constraint on the person rather than a condition of his formation. Both celebrated liberation from unchosen obligation as the direction of history.</p><p>The same anthropology produced a third consequence that neither side has faced squarely. If persons are sovereign units of production and consumption rather than members of constituted communities, then labour is a commodity, borders are inefficiencies, and the claim of an indigenous community that its continuity and coherence might be damaged by rapid demographic change cannot be registered — not because it is untrue, but because the framework has no conceptual slot for it. The argument here is not about whether any particular level of immigration is wise. It is about why the framework had no means of registering the question at all. A worldview that recognises only individuals and their choices cannot recognise the community as a good that can be harmed. The decision to open labour markets and permit mass immigration was not taken cynically, though cynicism was present. It was taken by people operating inside a framework that could not think the objection. You cannot weigh a cost you cannot see.</p><p>The fruits of that incapacity are visible now in ways they were not in 1997. The communities that absorbed the consequences — the towns, the cities, the working-class neighbourhoods that had no say in the transformation of the places they had built across generations — were told that objection was prejudice. The framework required that conclusion. If community is merely an aggregate of individual choices, then attachment to a particular community’s continuity is mere preference, and strong preference for your own community over others is by definition irrational at best, racist at worst. The liberal anthropology pathologised the objection it could not answer.</p><p>The result was a political consensus that ran, with only surface variation, from 1979 to at least 2016. No major party made a structural argument for covenantal community in that period. The people who experienced the dissolution as a loss found no language in the mainstream for what had happened to them, because the mainstream had long since agreed that what happened to them was progress.</p><p>The Brexit vote was many things. One of them was the political expression of people for whom the consensus had produced not liberation but abandonment — and who reached, however inchoately, for a vocabulary the consensus had spent forty years telling them they were not allowed to use.</p><h3>The serious attempts at recovery</h3><p>The argument against the dissolution was made seriously three times in the twentieth century, and three times it failed to produce the political vehicle its diagnosis required. That failure deserves attention before reaching for optimism about the current moment.</p><p>Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton made it first and most directly. The diagnosis Belloc had already pressed in his account of the English Reformation is the foundation of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributism">distributist programme</a>: if the dissolution of the monasteries created the concentrated proprietary class that industrial capitalism required, then the correction is not state management of that concentration but its dispersal. Wide ownership of productive property — land, tools, the means of making a living — as the material precondition of genuine community. Guild organisation of trades as the institutional form through which obligation between practitioners could be maintained across time. Subsidiarity as the political principle: decisions taken at the lowest level capable of taking them, which means most decisions are not taken by the state at all.</p><p>Chesterton gave the argument its popular form. Three acres and a cow — the formula is easy to mock, and was mocked, but the anthropological claim underneath it was not ridiculous. A person who owns the means of his subsistence is not dependent on an employer’s goodwill or a state’s administration. He has the material basis for genuine agency, genuine membership of a community, genuine stake in what happens to it. The self-made man of the Smilesian tradition was a fantasy available to the few. The smallholder was a reality that had existed, been destroyed, and could in principle be rebuilt.</p><p>Why it failed: distributism was competing against two fully confident systems, Keynesian social democracy and free market liberalism, at the moment of their maximum credibility. The post-war settlement delivered material improvements that were visible, measurable, and attributable. The long-term costs of the anthropology underlying both systems — the erosion of community, the dissolution of intergenerational obligation, the production of persons incapable of the covenantal relationships the market and the state presupposed — were not yet visible. The diagnosis was correct. The political moment had not arrived.</p><p>T.S. Eliot and C.S. Lewis made the argument from a different angle and with a different instrument. Where Belloc and Chesterton worked on the economy and the political structure, Eliot and Lewis worked on the formation question — what kind of person the culture was producing and whether that person was capable of covenantal life at all.</p><p>Eliot’s <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Notes-Towards-Definition-Culture-Eliot/dp/0571063136"><em>Notes Towards the Definition of Culture</em></a> makes the claim that culture cannot be separated from the religion that animates it. Culture is not primarily intellectual, not a set of propositions or aesthetic preferences, but the sediment of practised life accumulated over generations. It is what a community does before it thinks about what it is doing: the calendar, the liturgy, the food, the festival, the way the dead are remembered. You cannot argue your way back to it. You cannot legislate it. You can only rebuild the practices that form it, slowly, in communities small enough to be actual communities, over time long enough to be actual formation.</p><p>Lewis’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Abolition_of_Man"><em>Abolition of Man</em></a> is the complementary text. The removal of the Tao — the inherited moral framework that precedes individual choice and makes it possible — does not produce liberated individuals. It produces men without chests: people educated out of the affective formation that covenantal obligation requires. The chest is not formed by argument. It is formed by habituation, by practice, by the kind of community that the Protestant-liberal anthropology had been systematically dissolving for three centuries. You cannot reason someone into the capacity for obligation. You have to form it, in childhood, in community, through practices that are not primarily intellectual.</p><p>Both understood that the recovery required was not restoration but renewal — not copying the pre-Protestant world but recovering the principles it embodied in forms available to contemporary life. Neither was optimistic about how quickly this could be done or how much of the existing culture could be saved in the process.</p><p>Alasdair MacIntyre arrived at the same conclusion from the philosophical direction. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Virtue"><em>After Virtue</em></a><em>,</em> published in 1981 at the precise moment the Thatcherite settlement was being constructed, argued that the Enlightenment project of grounding morality in individual reason had failed, was always going to fail, and that the consequence was the moral fragmentation visible in every contemporary ethical debate: rival positions making incommensurable claims, no shared framework capable of adjudicating between them, every argument reduced eventually to assertion. The recovery MacIntyre pointed toward was the rebuilding of communities of practice capable of sustaining the virtues, which meant, in the end, something very close to what Eliot had said: formation before argument, community before politics, practice before programme.</p><p>Roger Scruton was the most recent and in some ways the most practically minded of the group. He understood that the recovery was a formation challenge before it was a political one — that you could not build a covenantal politics without first building covenantal communities, and that covenantal communities required the aesthetic, liturgical, and architectural dimensions of shared life that the Protestant-liberal tradition had either destroyed or reduced to personal preference. The sacred carried the community’s obligations to the dead and the unborn, holding them visible to the living.</p><p>His favourite formulation of the intergenerational obligation is the best single sentence the recovery argument has produced: we do not inherit the earth from our ancestors but borrow it from our children. Covenantal anthropology compressed into twelve words, available to anyone, requiring no theological education to understand.</p><h3>The Catholic question</h3><p>The obvious objection to everything argued so far is Roman. If the Protestant-liberal anthropology is the source of the dissolution, and the Catholic tradition formally retained the covenantal anthropology, then the conclusion would seem to be that Rome was right and the answer is there. The argument is available, and serious Catholic intellectuals make it. It is not quite as clean as it looks.</p><p>The formal claim is strong. Catholic social teaching from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rerum_novarum"><em>Rerum Novarum</em></a> in 1891 through <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laudato_si%27"><em>Laudato Si</em></a> in 2015 maintained a coherent account of the person as constituted by community, of property as holding social obligations, of subsidiarity as the organising principle of political life, and of the family as a covenantal institution rather than a contractual association of consenting adults. The Catechism preserved the theology. The encyclicals preserved the social argument. The doctrine survived the twentieth century substantially intact.</p><p>The formation did not. Among nominal Catholics — the majority who retain the affiliation without the practice — divorce rates, attitudes to sexual ethics, and ambient cultural assumptions in Western Europe and North America are largely indistinguishable from those of secular neighbours. The German <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synodal_Way"><em>Synodal Way</em></a> is not an aberration. It is the institutional expression of what has already happened at the popular level: a Catholic laity that has absorbed the Protestant-liberal anthropology while retaining Catholic vocabulary, and now wants the vocabulary updated to match the anthropology it actually holds.</p><p>The practising minority tells a different story. Catholics who attend Mass regularly show meaningfully different outcomes — lower divorce rates, stronger retention of traditional moral teaching, greater resistance to the ambient culture. The pattern is the argument in concentrated form: where the covenantal anthropology is actually embodied in practice, it works. The problem is that the institutional Church has been unable to transmit that embodied practice to the nominal majority who retain the affiliation without the formation.</p><p>The pattern is not unique to Catholics. Protestants who maintain serious practice — weekly worship, Scripture read in community, accountability to a tradition they did not choose and cannot simply redesign — show the same formation effects. The variable is not confession but practice. Where the covenantal anthropology is embodied in regular, demanding, communal life, it holds. Where it is reduced to occasional attendance and private belief, the liberal anthropology fills the space left behind, regardless of what the tradition formally teaches.</p><p>The Catholic post-conciliar liturgical reform is part of the explanation, though only part. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_of_Paul_VI"><em>Novus Ordo</em></a> is formally Catholic. But experientially it moved the Mass closer to the Protestant individual-and-congregation model — the priest facing the people, the vernacular, the emphasis on comprehension and participation, the reduction of the liturgy’s cosmic and intergenerational dimensions to a weekly communal gathering of people who happen to share beliefs. The pre-conciliar Mass located the individual within a liturgical reality they had not designed, could not modify, and which connected them to the dead who had prayed it before them and the living who were praying it simultaneously across the world. The difference is not primarily aesthetic. It is anthropological. One form of worship forms a certain kind of person. The other forms a different kind.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Illich">Ivan Illich</a> saw this coming earlier than almost anyone. By the 1970s he was arguing that the institutional Church had become the primary vehicle of the very modernity it claimed to resist — that the professionalisation of pastoral care, the bureaucratisation of charity, the substitution of managed services for covenantal mutual obligation, had turned the Church into an engine of the dependency it should have been countering. In many of its institutional forms it had not merely accommodated the secular world. It had become it, wearing different clothes.</p><p>The more serious Catholic intellectual tradition — Alasdair MacIntyre, Patrick Deneen, Adrian Vermeule — is making the right argument. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Why_Liberalism_Failed"><em>Why Liberalism Failed</em></a> identifies the liberal anthropology with precision and shows what it has destroyed. The integralist project attempts to recover the political theology that would ground a covenantal politics. These are minority voices, serious ones, competing against a much larger Catholic liberalism that has accepted the Protestant-liberal premises while retaining enough Catholic vocabulary to avoid noticing the contradiction.</p><p>The honest conclusion cuts both ways. The formal resources for the covenantal argument are more intact in Rome than anywhere in the Protestant tradition. The actual formation of actual Catholics in the Anglo-sphere has been as thoroughly colonised by the Protestant-liberal anthropology as anyone else’s. Which is not a reason to dismiss the Catholic argument. It is evidence of how deep the dissolution runs — that even the tradition which formally preserved the covenantal theology could not prevent the colonisation of its people’s lives by the anthropology it opposed. If doctrine alone were sufficient, the Catholic Church would be the obvious answer. The fact that it has not been sufficient is the argument in its most concentrated form: the recovery requires formation, and formation requires communities, and the communities have been dissolving for five centuries, and doctrine preserved in texts and taught in classrooms has not been able to stop it.</p><h3>Where covenantal thinking survives and what recovery requires</h3><p>The dissolution is not complete. A piece that traces five centuries of erosion without accounting for what has survived risks producing a counsel of despair dressed as analysis, and despair is not an honest conclusion — it is a failure of observation.</p><p>Covenantal thinking survives where practice has been maintained against the pressure to abandon it. The household that builds for its children rather than launching autonomous individuals into the market. The parish that prays the daily office and names its dead. The Jewish community that has resisted liberal assimilation for two centuries: the same mechanism Eliot identified, operating in a different tradition. Orthodox Christian communities, some Muslim communities, some Catholic ones, retaining strong intergenerational identity not because they have won the argument but because they have maintained the practice. Wherever obligation is understood as something you were born into rather than chose, the covenantal anthropology is still alive, however precariously.</p><p>The post-liberal intellectual tradition in Britain is at an early stage but it is real. Writers and thinkers drawing on Scruton, Eliot, Belloc, and the broader post-liberal canon are making the anthropological argument rather than just the policy argument — asking not which lever to pull but what kind of person the culture is forming and whether that person is capable of the obligations a free society requires. This tradition’s intellectual resources are better than its political organisation, and its central unresolved problem is the one MacIntyre identified: you cannot think your way to formation. The argument can clear ground. It cannot build what needs to be built on the cleared ground.</p><p>The distributist diagnosis has aged better than almost anyone predicted in 1912. The post-war consensus is visibly crumbling. The digital economy has made small-scale production and distributed ownership viable in ways the industrial economy did not — the craft revival, the local food movement, platform co-operativism, collaborations, community land trusts are all reaching for a theory they do not yet have. They are distributist instincts in search of a vocabulary. A political movement capable of articulating what these instincts are reaching for would be doing something new — not because the ideas are new, but because the moment for them may finally have arrived. Belloc was right about the diagnosis and wrong about the timing. The timing may be changing.</p><p>The sequencing point is the practical observation the recovery argument has most consistently produced. Rod Dreher’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Benedict_Option"><em>Benedict Option</em></a> instinct is probably right about priority even where it is wrong about the degree of withdrawal required. You cannot build a covenantal politics without first building covenantal communities. You cannot build covenantal communities without first forming covenantal persons. Formation before organisation. Practice before programme. Community before politics.</p><p>This is slow. It is slower than the political cycle, slower than the news cycle, slower than the attention span the current media environment has trained people to bring to serious questions. It requires the kind of institutional patience that the Protestant-liberal anthropology has spent five centuries systematically undermining — the willingness to act for people not yet born, to maintain obligations to the dead, to subordinate immediate individual interest to the continuity of something larger than oneself. These are not incidental demands. They are the capacities that the dissolution has been eroding.</p><p>Which is not a reason for paralysis. It is a description of the task. The communities that have maintained covenantal practice know things that the broader culture has lost the capacity to say. The intellectual tradition that is recovering the argument knows things that the political mainstream cannot yet hear. The question is whether these two things — the communities with the practice and the thinkers with the argument — can find each other before the dissolution goes further.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Return to the opening observation: left and right have been arguing about means while sharing the same premise. The premise is not neutral. It has a history. It has produced predictable consequences. And it is now producing the political instability, the civilisational disorientation, and the inability to think across generations that are the presenting symptoms of the current moment.</p><p>The pre-Protestant world is not recoverable and should not be copied. But it knew something about human beings that the Protestant-liberal tradition dissolved and has not replaced. Eliot and Lewis understood what was required: not restoration but renewal. Not repetition but recovery of the principles that the tradition embodied in forms that are no longer available to us, in forms that might be.</p><p>We do not inherit the earth from our ancestors but borrow it from our children. A culture that has forgotten this does not become freer. It becomes less capable of the obligations that freedom requires.</p><p><em>Richard Morrissey writes on family life, politics, theology, and culture. He publishes at </em><a href="https://richardmorrissey.substack.com/"><em>Happy Family Better Worl</em></a><em>d and at </em><a href="https://formationofyoungmen.substack.com/"><em>The Formation of Young Men</em></a><em>. His advisory practice is at </em><a href="http://www.richardmorrissey.org/"><em>richardmorrissey.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84a97fbb05bb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Against the New Pacifism: On Magnifica Humanitas and the Just War]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/against-the-new-pacifism-on-magnifica-humanitas-and-the-just-war-c10d14495364?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c10d14495364</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 15:26:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-12T15:26:36.174Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>This piece was written in response to <em>Magnifica Humanitas</em> (Leo XIV, 15 May 2026) and is the fourth in a series on Christian use of force.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/894/1*phovH7A5xYR2g8bBfZwmQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Over the past year I have written three pieces on the use of force by Christians. The first argued that Pope Leo XIV’s <a href="https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/when-the-pope-gets-it-wrong-why-supporting-capital-punishment-is-pro-life-5877c9078dc8?sk=ad8bfcf6d9eb101caf1167669eeb12e5">equation of abortion</a> with capital punishment collapsed the distinction between the innocent and the guilty that Augustine, Aquinas, and Pius XII had preserved. The second argued that the <a href="https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/without-mercy-why-this-war-fails-every-christian-test-4744ba2ac370?sk=321231668768bd901e16c1f2f8f07586">American military campaign </a>against Iran has failed every test the just-war tradition demands. The third argued that Alexander Karp’s Palantir <a href="https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/silicons-strange-god-66de4d0b3245?sk=6110327dde56ecc5c5b8ff1ef2135221">manifesto</a> for a contractor state restoring the magistrate’s sword had bypassed the moral architecture that makes the sword lawful at all.</p><p><a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html"><em>Magnifica Humanitas</em></a> (Leo XIV, 15th May 2026) requires a fourth. Paragraph 192 declares that the just-war theory “has all too often been used to justify any kind of war, [and] is now outdated.” Humanity, the encyclical proposes, possesses “far more effective and capable tools for promoting human life and resolving conflicts, such as dialogue, diplomacy and forgiveness.”</p><p>The Karp piece described a sword without a magistrate — a contractor’s instrument that had slipped the moral community authorised to restrain it. The encyclical describes the opposite condition: a moral community without a sword, a fraternity that has been told it possesses better tools than the framework the Church developed across fifteen centuries to govern the use of force. Both approaches miss what Aquinas taught. The magistrate’s sword is lawful because it is bounded by the moral community, and the moral community has duties that cannot be discharged without the sword. To remove either side of that arrangement is to leave the innocent without protectors and the magistrate without restraint.</p><p><strong>What §192 actually does</strong></p><p>The qualifier in §192 is important: “Without prejudice to the right to self-defence in the strictest sense.” What is declared outdated is the theory itself — the framework of moral reasoning that has historically governed when force may be used and how. The framework that articulated when that right may be exercised, against whom, by what authority, and within what limits, is demoted.</p><p>What “in the strictest sense” means is the question the encyclical does not answer. Read narrowly, it preserves only the immediate act of repelling an attack in progress. Read broadly, it preserves the wider Catholic doctrine of legitimate defence by military force articulated in Catechism §2309. The narrow reading leaves a nation under invasion with no framework for determining proportionality, discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, or whether its conduct meets the tradition’s conditions. The broad reading concedes that the framework remains in force, which contradicts the declaration that the theory is outdated. The encyclical does not resolve the ambiguity.</p><p>Some readers will treat “in the strictest sense” as preserving Catechism §2309 in full, regarding the declaration of obsolescence as pastoral emphasis rather than doctrinal revision. Yet if §2309 is preserved, the framework of legitimate defence remains in force with its four conditions intact. The claim that the theory is outdated then becomes either empty rhetoric or an un-argued demotion of prior teaching. In either case a doctrine whose operative content cannot be clearly stated is not a developed teaching.</p><p>Three paragraphs later the encyclical applies just-war criteria to autonomous weapons (§§199–200): personal responsibility, protection of civilians, traceable decision-making, human control over lethal force. These are the very criteria the document has just declared outdated. The framework survives in the encyclical because the encyclical needs it. Its standing as authoritative Catholic teaching does not.</p><p>A reigning pontiff cannot formally repudiate a tradition this old without provoking a doctrinal crisis. What he can do — as Pope Francis did with capital punishment in 2018 and Leo now does with the wider tradition — is declare the prior teaching superseded in language that has the effect of repudiation while preserving the form of continuity. Catholic philosopher <a href="https://firstthings.com/pope-francis-and-capital-punishment/">Edward Feser </a>identified this pattern in his work on the 2018 Catechism revision. The magisterial register is deployed to render the prior teaching effectively inoperative without ever formally engaging its authority. The framework is displaced rather than developed.</p><p><strong>What the tradition actually teaches</strong></p><p>The Catechism of the Catholic Church §§2307–2317, promulgated under John Paul II and still operative, articulates the doctrine in its standard contemporary form. It sets out the four traditional conditions for legitimate defence by military force: the damage inflicted by the aggressor must be lasting, grave, and certain; all other means of ending it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; there must be serious prospects of success; and the use of arms must not produce evils graver than the evil to be eliminated. The Catechism treats the framework as live, applicable, and authoritative.</p><p>Aquinas formulated the substance in <em>Summa Theologiae</em> II-II q.40: legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention. Later writers added discrimination and proportionality. The conditions are cumulative. The tradition has always treated dialogue and diplomacy as the first obligation of the lawful magistrate; war is <em>ultima ratio</em>. The framework exists precisely to make that judgement possible when the first obligation has been discharged.</p><p>§192 does not engage this point. It addresses a caricature — the version “used to justify any kind of war.” The pastoral concern is legitimate: the tradition’s vocabulary is routinely abused. The honest response to abuse, however, is to enforce the standard, not abolish it. To declare the framework outdated because it has been abused is to remove the only standard against which abuse can be identified.</p><p><strong>Aquinas on the lawful authority</strong></p><p>The first condition in <em>Summa Theologiae</em> II-II q.40 establishes the architecture. War must be waged by the <em>auctoritas principis</em> because the private person has no standing to seek redress by force. The sword belongs to the magistrate because the care of the common good has been entrusted to him by the community, and the community has been entrusted by God with the duty of defending the innocent.</p><p>This is the architecture <em>Magnifica Humanitas</em> dismantles. Remove the magistrate’s lawful capacity to draw the sword and the community’s act of entrustment becomes ceremonial. Remove the community’s authority to bound the magistrate and the sword becomes the instrument of whoever holds it. The contractor state failed the second condition. <em>Magnifica Humanitas</em> fails the first.</p><p>The Catholic tradition has insisted on this structure from Vitoria and Suárez to Pius XII and the Catechism of John Paul II.</p><p><strong>On the binding force of prior magisterium</strong></p><p>The framework is the continuous teaching of the Church, carried by every major Catholic theologian who has addressed the question of force, and binding on the conscience of the faithful. To declare it outdated is to break with that continuity. The break is presented as development.</p><p>The objection that the just-war framework is merely prudential rather than dogmatic mistakes the tradition. Aquinas treats the conditions as substantive moral theology. The Catechism §2309 presents them as authoritative teaching under the heading “Legitimate defence by military force.” Reclassifying the framework as prudential to avoid its binding character is a move the encyclical needs but cannot make while the Catechism remains in force.</p><p>Newman’s criteria for authentic development (preservation of type, continuity of principles, conservative action on the past, etc.) are not satisfied by a doctrine that contradicts the magisterial teaching of every prior century yet continues to rely on its criteria in the same document.</p><p>The standard parallels — slavery, usury, religious liberty — offer no precedent for declaring a fifteen-century moral framework obsolete while continuing to invoke its operative content.</p><p><strong>Newman on the conscience that remains</strong></p><p>Newman wrote that he would drink “to the Pope, if you please — still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards.” The magisterium teaches moral truth but does not create it. A Catholic whose conscience has been formed by fifteen centuries of just-war teaching cannot simply discard that formation because a later encyclical calls the tradition outdated. The prior teaching binds; the current document does not engage its authority; and conscience comes first.</p><p>This is the position in which a Catholic engineer asked to build an autonomous weapon, a Catholic statesman asked to consent to an unjust war, or a Catholic moral theologian asked to teach the tradition to seminarians, now finds himself. The framework that formed his conscience is the framework the encyclical has declared outdated. He cannot, in good conscience, treat the framework as outdated when his conscience has been formed within it and the prior magisterium continues to bind him.</p><p><strong>The encyclical’s positive concerns</strong></p><p>The encyclical’s treatment of AI weapons (§§197–200) raises serious and correct concerns: lowered thresholds for force, opaque automated processes, reduction of victims to data. Yet the framework it needs to press these points with theological precision is the framework it has declared outdated. Autonomous systems fail right intention, discrimination, and proportionality — classic just-war criteria.</p><p>What the encyclical offers instead — dialogue, diplomacy, multilateralism, forgiveness — is insufficient. Rwanda 1994 illustrates the point. All the preferred tools were present; the genocide proceeded. The just-war framework would have called out the evil as one requiring intervention by legitimate authority. The encyclical’s vocabulary permitted the world to say the events were concerning. Only the tradition would have said they were <em>per se</em> illegitimate and demanded a response.</p><p><strong>Why has the encyclical made this move</strong></p><p>The deeper reason is anthropological. <em>Magnifica Humanitas</em> envisions a civilisation of love built through fraternity and encounter. Within that frame, the magistrate’s sword becomes a scandal rather than an instrument of justice. The tradition has always required a more sober anthropology: fallenness and evil are real; aggressors exist who cannot be dissuaded by dialogue and against whom force is the only available defence of the innocent; the magistrate’s office is ordained by God and the sword is constitutive of it. Peace is the fruit of justice, and justice sometimes requires force.</p><p>The pattern is consistent. <em>Fratelli Tutti</em> (2020), the 2018 Catechism revision on capital punishment, and now this encyclical progressively redefine legitimate lethal force exercised by lawful authority out of Catholic teaching while demoting the framework that has distinguished legitimate from illegitimate force. The result is a Church that finds it harder to defend the innocent than it did a decade ago.</p><p><strong>The fourth panel</strong></p><p>The four pieces make the same argument from four directions. In each case the tradition supplies the diagnosis. Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, Suárez, Pius XII, the Catechism still in force, and Newman on the formed conscience stand together. The defenders of the tradition are neither warmongers nor pacifists. They are heirs of a body of moral reasoning that took fifteen centuries to develop and has not been improved by either dominant alternative.</p><p>The merciless American crusader and the humanitarian pacifist are equally far from Augustine. The contractor state and the fraternal community are both inadequate to the question the tradition was developed to answer: when may force be used in defence of the innocent, by what authority, against whom, within what limits, and toward what just peace.</p><p>The just-war theory is not outdated because the conditions that required it still exist.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c10d14495364" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Makerfield: How the Right Hands Labour a Lifeline]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/makerfield-how-the-right-hands-labour-a-lifeline-eab7ae812d88?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eab7ae812d88</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2026 14:06:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-16T14:06:03.035Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H3j9k--R5jPc3tyeNjTPtg.avif" /></figure><p>So Rupert Lowe’s Restore Britain is to contest the Makerfield by-election. The seat has been vacated for Andy Burnham, who needs a Commons place before he can move against Keir Starmer. Survation’s modelling, reported by ITV, suggests Burnham’s personal brand is the only thing turning what would otherwise be a Reform-leaning contest into one Labour can win. At the May local elections, Reform took around 50 per cent of the vote across every ward of the constituency. Labour managed roughly 23 to 26 per cent. The arithmetic is not complicated. A Restore candidate pulling eight to fifteen per cent from the same pool tips it to Burnham.</p><p>The stakes are therefore not parochial. A Labour win at Makerfield does two things at once. It gives Burnham the seat he requires for a leadership bid, and it gives the party a morale-restoring result at the exact moment ninety-odd of its own MPs are circulating letters asking Starmer to go. The insurgent right would, in effect, be handing the opposition a stabiliser at the point of maximum vulnerability.</p><p>The defence of contesting the seat runs as follows. New parties die in obscurity. Restore must show it can pull voters outside Great Yarmouth. A strong third place validates the membership claims, attracts money, and signals that the party is something more than Lowe’s personal vehicle. Each of these points has surface plausibility. None of them survives contact with this particular contest.</p><p>National polling has Restore at around four per cent. It is real but small, and parties of that size cannot afford high-visibility gambles in seats where the cost of splitting is this concrete. There are dozens of constituencies where Restore could test its reach without the cost of installing a future Labour leader in Parliament. The choice of Makerfield maximises media attention by attaching Restore’s name to Burnham’s. That is a calculation about media coverage rather than electoral reach.</p><p>That is the proximate miscalculation. What follows from it concerns Restore’s deeper problem: the right’s inability to grow up. The history between Lowe and Nigel Farage is not subtle. The whip was withdrawn within days of Lowe publicly criticising Farage in February 2025. The bullying allegations, the police referral, the open letter from Lowe’s staff describing the complaints as vexatious, the running line that Reform’s leadership tried to end his career: this is not a disagreement about deportation policy. It is a personal rupture that has now been institutionalised as a party. Restore exists, in part, because Lowe and Farage cannot occupy the same political space.</p><p>The British right’s recurring failure under first-past-the-post is not a shortage of options. It is that its leading figures keep producing new vehicles for themselves rather than submitting to any structure that might constrain them. UKIP fractured. The Brexit Party absorbed and dispersed. Reclaim went nowhere. Reform consolidated. Ben Habib left Reform to build Advance UK. Lowe left Reform to build Restore. Habib has since floated a merger with Restore that has not happened. Each split has been narrated by its principals as a matter of principle. Too soft, too compromised, too captured. Each has, in practice, tracked the personal trajectories of the men involved.</p><p>Sam Francis named this pattern thirty years ago. In <em>Beautiful Losers</em> he argued that the American right had developed a settled preference for the aesthetics of principled defeat over the discipline of actual power. The losing was not incidental; it had become the point. The satisfaction of being right while losing had crowded out the work of winning.</p><p>The insurgent right in Britain is now reproducing the pattern with fidelity. Each split is narrated as integrity. The narrative arrives reliably in time to prevent the consolidation that might make winning possible. Francis’s own later trajectory is the warning attached to the diagnosis. The man who saw the gravitational pull toward marginality was, in the end, pulled into it himself. The pattern does not exempt those who can see it; it has to be actively worked against, and that work is institutional rather than rhetorical.</p><p>What the pattern reveals is the absence of the very thing the self-styled serious right keeps saying Britain needs: settled institutions, hierarchical discipline, and the willingness to accept a place within a structure one does not personally lead. The men who shout loudest about restoring order cannot, on closer inspection, remain in the same party as one another for longer than eighteen months. This is a formation problem, not a policy problem, and it will not be solved by another splinter.</p><p>An institutional solution would mean binding internal disputes mechanisms, multi-signatory leadership, and the acceptance that no single figure walks away with the brand. Reform itself only consolidated after earlier vehicles were absorbed or dispersed. Consolidation, not another splinter, is how the right wins under this system.</p><p>The counterclaim, then, is technically valid and strategically thin. Restore needs to show it exists. Differentiation from Reform matters if the party is to mean anything beyond its founder’s biography. But the test of seriousness is whether a political movement can subordinate the satisfaction of its leadership to the arithmetic of the system it operates within. Standing in Makerfield, against this opponent, at this moment, fails that test. It chooses the visible short-term win over the medium-term project of removing a Labour government.</p><p>If Restore comes in at a strong third without collapsing the Reform vote, Rupert Lowe will claim vindication. The likelier outcome is that Reform’s share is suppressed just enough to put Burnham in the Commons, after which the right spends three years explaining to itself how it installed the next Labour Prime Minister. That is the difference between a tendency and a party.</p><p>Movements that cannot discipline their own egos do not get to lecture the country about discipline. Sam Francis saw the shape of the problem in 1993. Britain’s insurgent right still has not found a way out of it.</p><p><em>Richard Morrissey writes on family life, politics, theology, and culture. He publishes at </em><a href="https://richardmorrissey.substack.com/"><em>Happy Family Better Worl</em></a><em>d and at </em><a href="https://formationofyoungmen.substack.com/"><em>The Formation of Young Men</em></a><em>. His advisory practice is at </em><a href="http://www.richardmorrissey.org/"><em>richardmorrissey.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eab7ae812d88" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DEI is Not The Real Problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/dei-is-not-the-real-problem-e0e2049dcbb3?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e0e2049dcbb3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conservativism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[globalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 14:42:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-06T14:42:40.134Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The Tradition the Right Abandoned</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ALMdSqge2hWcbhhn2-qf1g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The conservative case against DEI has hardened into orthodoxy of the unexamined sort. Dismantle the quotas, end the sensitivity training, restore meritocracy: the argument is straightforward and the frustration behind it is genuine. But when a political movement responds to ideological excess with its own ideological excess, the result is not clarity. It is a different kind of dogma.</p><p>Stripped of its most preposterous excesses, DEI points toward problems that any serious conservative should want to address. The fact that it addresses them badly does not mean the problems are not there.</p><p><strong>What Globalism Has Undone</strong></p><p>Britain’s young adults are roughly half as likely to own homes as their parents were at the same age. Median household income has changed little since the 1990s in real terms, while housing costs have escalated far beyond wage growth. More than forty per cent of American graduates end up in jobs that do not require their degrees, a decade after completing them. These are not isolated data points. They describe a system that has broken its side of the implicit bargain with the people participating in it.</p><p>The standard right-wing answer is meritocracy: remove the bureaucratic friction and let ability rise to the top. This is correct in principle and incomplete in practice. Elite networks, credential inflation, and the compounding advantages of inherited social capital mean that what passes for meritocratic selection frequently rewards the well-positioned rather than the capable. A 25-year-old lumbered with student debt and working a part-time job well below their qualification level has not failed to compete. The competition itself has been structured in ways that don’t favour them.</p><p>DEI, whatever its other failures, registers this as a real problem. The conservative response to the DEI bureaucracy has been to dispute the response without engaging the underlying diagnosis.</p><p><strong>The Transference Question</strong></p><p>Over eighty per cent of HR professionals in the United Kingdom are women, and younger women have been among the most consistent drivers of corporate inclusion policy. The usual conservative explanation is that this reflects ideological capture or a misapplication of female instincts toward harmony — plausible as far as it goes, but not far enough.</p><p>The more uncomfortable observation is this: delayed family formation, unaffordable housing, and the pressure of a biological clock that does not adjust to economic conditions have left many women without the domestic structures that would previously have channelled those instincts. The workplace has become the primary site of community for people who cannot yet form, or cannot afford, families of their own. The drive to make it inclusive and stable is not irrational. It is displaced — a search for the belonging that affordable housing, stable partnership, and child-rearing no longer reliably supply.</p><p>The evidence is in the vocabulary. Corporate handbooks now speak of “psychological safety,” a term borrowed from secure-attachment theory in family psychology. That the language of functional households has migrated into HR documentation is not a coincidence. It is a map of where belonging has gone when the household itself became unaffordable.</p><p>This is not a defence of DEI. It is a charge against the conservative commentator who mocks the impulse without asking where it comes from. The globalism many conservatives still defend has made family formation harder, community continuity rarer, and the corporation the dominant institution of daily life. DEI is the predictable result.</p><p>Jean-Claude Michéa, the French philosopher of the radical left, argued that cultural liberalism and economic liberalism are not antagonists but mutual dependencies — each dissolving the communal structures the other needs cleared away. DEI is a case study in his thesis: it emerges from exactly the social fragmentation that globalism produces, and it offers a corporate simulacrum of the belonging that globalism destroys. The corporation thus profits twice: first by lobbying for the labour and trade policies that dissolve community, then by selling belonging back to its employees as a workplace benefit.</p><p><strong>What a Conservative Vision Would Actually Address</strong></p><p>The right’s standard offering of lower taxes, deregulation, and GDP growth does not reach the housing crisis. It does not address the wage competition that undercuts workers at the bottom. It does not change the fact that the credential economy saddles people with debt for qualifications that underdeliver on their promise.</p><p>A more serious conservatism would notice that policies framed as support for working mothers, specifically tax credits structured around dual-income households, effectively penalise the choice to prioritise a parent at home. Tax relief for single-income families, with appropriate caps to avoid simply subsidising the already comfortable, would acknowledge that raising children as a primary occupation is a social contribution worth supporting. The state currently prices it as a cost.</p><p>To be clear: today’s DEI bureaucracy does not invoke subsidiarity — it invokes metrics, audits, and liability. But the underlying complaint, that an atomised market society leaves people without standing or security, is one that Catholic distributists and Tory paternalists once answered better than the left ever has. The organising logic of that tradition held that functions belong at the lowest viable level: to household before community, to community before state, and to both before the corporation. The principle behind DEI, that businesses operate within communities and bear some relationship of obligation to them, is not a progressive invention. Economic patriotism is a better name for it, and a better policy frame than the HR bureaucracy that currently carries it.</p><p><strong>The Argument Worth Making</strong></p><p>Scrapping DEI without a coherent alternative is not a policy position. It is a reaction. Gen Z’s absorption in questions of identity and belonging is a symptom, not the root disorder — what happens when markets fragment communities and people search for solidarity wherever they can find it. That energy is available to be redirected toward national identity, local loyalty, and civic obligation. Leaving it to the DEI consultants, because the right is too committed to free-market orthodoxy to engage with it, is a significant political failure.</p><p>That alternative begins with housing: making shelter a family asset rather than a financial instrument for capital, and continues with the conditions of low-wage work that globalism has left deliberately unaddressed. Neither is currently thinkable in mainstream conservative circles. That is itself a diagnosis.</p><p>The tokenism, the guilt frameworks, and the bureaucratic incoherence of DEI deserve to be dismantled. But the questions of belonging, fairness, and stability that gave DEI its traction are not going away if the diversity officers are made redundant. A conservatism that ignores them, or assumes the market will eventually resolve them, is writing a permission slip for the next iteration of the same phenomenon, in a form that may be considerably less tractable.</p><p><em>Richard Morrissey writes on family life, politics, theology, and culture. He publishes at </em><a href="https://richardmorrissey.substack.com/"><em>Happy Family Better Worl</em></a><em>d and at </em><a href="https://formationofyoungmen.substack.com/"><em>The Formation of Young Men</em></a><em>. His advisory practice is at </em><a href="http://www.richardmorrissey.org/"><em>richardmorrissey.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0e2049dcbb3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Silicon’s Strange God]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/silicons-strange-god-66de4d0b3245?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66de4d0b3245</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[paul-feyerabend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palantir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alex-karp]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:07:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-23T12:07:02.332Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Theology Hidden Inside Palantir’s Manifesto</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/1*Kap1mBhB5wtnACBVbj2o4A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Alexander Karp has written a book, and someone at Palantir has turned it into a creed. <a href="https://amzn.eu/d/0hNWM5zB"><em>The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West</em></a>, co-authored by Karp with Nicholas Zamiska, is a reasoned prose argument running to several hundred pages. Circulating on X in recent days, however, is a distilled version of its case: twenty-two numbered theses, each a declarative proposition, presented as <a href="https://x.com/PalantirTech/status/2045574398573453312?s=20"><em>The Technological Republic, in brief</em></a>. The book is the argument. The theses are the tract. Whoever produced them, and the form strongly suggests the authors themselves or their immediate circle, made a revealing choice about how the argument should work. They chose the shape of a creed.</p><p>That choice is where this essay begins, because the choice is itself diagnostic. A book can argue; a creed can only be received. Twenty-two numbered theses nailed to the door of one’s own industry is not an argument in any ordinary sense. It is a confession of faith. The distilled <em>Technological Republic</em> announces a moral debt, a universal duty, an ending age, a new era of deterrence. Its central villain is decadence. Its saints are those who build. Its priesthood is the engineering class, called back from the error of building photo-sharing apps to the harder calling of building weapons. Even the phrase Karp reaches for when defending the dignity of public service, that public servants need not be our priests, gives away the structure of what, in distilled form, he is actually writing.</p><p>Karp and Zamiska have grasped something their critics on the progressive left and the libertarian right have mostly missed: that the present disorder of the West is a spiritual condition before it is an economic or strategic one. They are right about the softness. They are right that the corrosive caution of public life has left us with ineffectual vessels, that the theatrical pacifism of the last century has outlived its occasion, that a civilisation incapable of defending itself will eventually be called upon to try. Many readers who will never open the book are sensing something real when they sense that something serious is being said in it.</p><p>What is being said, however, is a theology without a church: a creed with no authority, no discipline, and no one entitled to say no. Whether Karp knows this about his own project is a question I cannot answer. He writes at moments as a sincere moralist grieving a loss he cannot quite name, and at moments as a technocrat who has found the theological register a convenient vehicle for a commercial one. The piece that follows takes him at his more serious word. The judgment applies either way.</p><p>A reader may object at this point that it is unfair to hold a secular American nationalist to the standards of a Christian moral tradition. The objection would be decisive if Karp had written in any register but the one he has chosen. He has given us theses, liturgy, priesthood, decadence, and restoration. The critique that follows is therefore immanent rather than imposed: once a writer reaches for the form of the sacred, he becomes accountable to what the form presupposes.</p><h3>The liturgy of the theses</h3><p>Consider the form. Palantir have given us twenty-two propositions of the kind one might read from a pulpit, declarative and cadenced, each carrying the moral weight of the one before it. Thesis four tells us that hard power in this century will be built on software. Thesis five tells us the question is not whether AI weapons will be built but who will build them. Thesis twelve announces the end of the atomic age. The propositions do not argue with one another; they accumulate. One recites the Nicene Creed. One does not debate it.</p><p>Yet a creed requires a church, and Karp has none to offer. There is no community that has authorised the formulation, no tradition within which the propositions are intelligible, no body of the faithful capable of distinguishing orthodoxy from heresy. What he has instead is a reading public and a contractor’s ledger. The theses float above the condition they diagnose, asking to be received without ever specifying the receiving body. When Karp calls for national service as a universal duty, the question is not whether he is right about the erosion of civic obligation. He almost certainly is. The question is service to what, under whose authority, answerable to which tradition. On this neither the book nor its distilled form has a serviceable answer.</p><p>One might object at this point that Karp is in fact building a church of his own. Palantir functions as something close to a monastic order, with a vocational ideology, a rigorous novitiate, and a mission that promises to redeem the decadence of the wider culture. National service as Karp imagines it would extend the novitiate to the whole citizenry. The trouble is that a corporation cannot serve as a church, because a church’s authority runs against the state’s interest when conscience requires, and a contractor’s runs with it by design. Karp has mistaken alignment for obedience; he has built a guild, and called it a calling.</p><h3>Hooker on the magistrate’s sword</h3><p>The relevance of the Anglican divine Richard Hooker to a company that writes targeting software may not be obvious at first glance. Bear with me. Hooker’s <a href="https://davenantinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Hookers-Laws-of-Ecclesiastical-Polity-vol-1-excerpt.pdf"><em>Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity</em></a>, particularly the long reflection of Book VIII, is the most sustained English argument we possess for the proposition that the magistrate reduced to the client of his own armourer has ceased to be a magistrate at all.</p><p>Hooker refuses two errors that Karp’s argument silently reproduces between them. The first is the Puritan error, that the sovereign is answerable only to a direct reading of scripture, above the accumulated wisdom of the community. The second is the absolutist error, that the sovereign is answerable to nothing at all save the success of his own enterprise. Hooker’s achievement is to insist that the magistrate’s sword is lawful precisely because it is bounded: by positive law, by ancient custom, by the moral community that authorised him to bear it, and by the older reason of which human law is a participation. The sword’s legitimacy comes from the community that restrains it, not from the one who wields it.</p><p>Karp wants the sword restored. So did Hooker. What Karp does not want is the restoration of the moral architecture that makes the sword anything other than an instrument of whoever holds it. When the book proposes that a Marine asking for a better rifle should receive one, the proposition is unobjectionable. When it extends the same logic without remainder to software, to AI-mediated targeting, to the integration of private contractors into the deterrent posture of the state, something has happened that Hooker would have noticed. It is not merely that private firms are supplying the military; they have always done so. The difference is that earlier contractors built objects the state operated, whereas the Palantir-type firm supplies the decision systems themselves, the models whose outputs structure what an operator can see and choose. The magistrate used to hire armourers. He now hires epistemologists, and the epistemologists do not tell him how the weapon thinks. The magistrate’s sword has passed to a priesthood that does not answer to the magistrate. Whether what remains can any longer be called a republic is a question Hooker would want asked before the first line of code is deployed.</p><h3>Taylor on the conscience that remains</h3><p>Jeremy Taylor’s <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A63844.0001.001?view=toc"><em>Ductor Dubitantium</em></a> is the most sustained English treatment of conscience we possess, and its central insistence is one Karp’s argument quietly walks past. No external settlement, whether the prince’s calculation or the expert’s technique or the engineer’s assurance that he has modelled the case, can dissolve the obligation of the individual to examine what he is being asked to do. This is crucial. Taylor writes for a world in which men are asked to swear, fight, build and refuse, and he does not grant them the comfort of believing that someone higher has already done the moral work on their behalf.</p><p>Karp’s proposal of universal national service is where this kicks in. Sharing the risk and the cost of the next war is, in isolation, an old republican virtue, and a Christian one too. Karp, however, relocates moral agency from the individual to the system. Whether this war, now, in this manner, is one a Christian or any serious moral agent can participate in has, in his framing, already been settled at the level of the state. The individual’s task is to accept his portion of the burden. It is fair to note that the book does name an object for the service it proposes: the American Project, the defence of the West, the renewal of democratic values. Yet none of these, named without a confession of human nature to interpret them and a community authorised to do the interpreting, meets the demand Taylor would have placed on the question. A slogan is not a tradition. Taylor would have called this the error of taking the prince’s case for granted because the prince has a technique and a hurry.</p><h3>Feyerabend and the monism Palantir will not name</h3><p>Taylor’s argument concerns what the individual owes his own conscience. The deeper problem runs underneath it. Karp’s argument, whether in the book’s extended form or in the theses’ distilled one, assumes that a single rationality, the engineering one, can answer political and moral questions that have historically resisted any single method. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend">Paul Feyerabend</a> spent a career arguing that this assumption is itself a theocratic move.</p><p><em>Against Method</em>, written in 1975 against a very different technocratic confidence, reads today as if it had been drafted with Palantir in mind. Feyerabend’s claim was that there is no single rationality, no master method, no procedure that adjudicates between rival accounts of the world from a position above all of them. Science advances, he argued, not by the discipline of a unified reason but by the proliferation of approaches, including unruly and incompatible ones, which a pluralist society permits and which a monist one suppresses. From this he drew a political conclusion that has aged better than most things written in the seventies: the state must be separated from science as it was from the church, because the fusion of political authority with a single supposedly-universal rationality is a theocratic move dressed in lab coats.</p><p>Karp’s pitch, in both registers, is that superior technique dissolves political questions into engineering ones. The question of whether a given AI weapon should be deployed becomes, in his framing, merely the question of who builds it and for what purpose. The answer, once the decadence has been overcome, is us, and for the right reasons. What has been elided is the prior question, whether the moral community retains the standing to contest the category of the weapon itself. It is what distinguishes a republic from a contractor’s state.</p><h3>A case in point</h3><p>The argument is not hypothetical. Earlier this year, <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/">Anthropic</a>, the laboratory that produces the Claude AI model and which had contracted with the Pentagon, declined to permit its technology to be used for two purposes: mass domestic surveillance of American citizens, and fully autonomous weapons that take humans out of the targeting loop. The Department of War, as the Pentagon is now styled, had demanded access for “all lawful purposes” without condition. The point is structural. When Anthropic refused, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth designated the company a supply chain risk, a label normally reserved for foreign adversaries, and the Pentagon’s Chief Technology Officer accused Anthropic’s founder of harbouring “a God-complex.”</p><p>A private firm attempts to preserve two refusals, one of them drawn directly from the Catholic and Anglican tradition of moral theology on autonomous killing, and is told by a Defence (War) Secretary who sports a Jerusalem cross tattoo that its scruples are a national security threat. The theocrat, in this account, is the one declining to hand over the instrument. I take no view on whether Anthropic’s specific formulation was the right one; my own tradition would probably have drawn the line somewhere else. A polity that has lost the capacity to hear the word <em>no</em> from within its own contractor class, and that reaches for the language of corporate excommunication when it does hear it, has confirmed the very diagnosis Karp’s project means to correct.</p><h3>The atomic analogy, refused</h3><p>Karp claims that one age of deterrence is ending and another beginning. The atomic age, for all its horror, retained a theological scaffolding that moral theologians of several traditions could engage; which is to say it retained recognisable moral limits, human decision points, and accountable authority. Mutually assured destruction was legible within just-war categories because it assumed sovereigns, thresholds, and the possibility of refusal. The American Catholic bishops of 1983, in <a href="https://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise-our-response-1983.pdf"><em>The Challenge of Peace</em></a>, did not reach their agonised conditional acceptance of deterrence because they found it compatible with the Gospel. They reached it because the object they were assessing had properties the Gospel could recognise. Presidents could say no. Treaties bound them. The weapons themselves were sufficiently terrible that their use required a decision at the top of the chain of command.</p><p>Little of this survives in the successor regime. AI-mediated pre-emption distributes decision across systems whose operators do not fully understand them, collapses the interval in which refusal becomes possible, and hands to private contractors functions that used to belong to the constitutional order. Karp is not wrong that a new era is beginning. What he has not noticed or admitted is that the conditions under which deterrence could be morally reasoned about at all are what is passing with it.</p><h3>What a serious answer would require</h3><p>The threat Karp describes is real. Adversary capability is real. The Christian tradition has never been pacifist, and a Christianity that pretends otherwise to avoid the question Karp has put is not a Christianity worth defending.</p><p>A serious answer would restore the moral community Karp has bypassed on his way to the armoury. It would require sovereigns who can be held to account, not contractors who cannot. It would require public servants formed more seriously than the federal pay scale alone can form them, formed within a tradition capable of telling them when to refuse. It would require a citizenry whose conscience has not been outsourced to an expert class. Above all, it would require some body older and stranger than the state, within which the sword can be kept lawful because it is kept answerable; the very body whose absence Karp’s theses mourn.</p><p>A civilisation that reaches for a technical priesthood because it has lost the religious one has not overcome its decadence. The engineers in Karp’s temple are building beautifully. What no one in the book, and no one in the tract it has become, seems to notice is that they are not kneeling.</p><p><em>Richard J Morrissey writes on politics, theology, and the transformation of Western societies.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66de4d0b3245" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Seesaw and the Shift]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/the-seesaw-and-the-shift-63699af5ddc4?source=rss-e670ad6119d2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63699af5ddc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[raymond-ibrahim]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[judiasm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[douglas-murray]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard J Morrissey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2026 14:52:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-20T15:30:32.851Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The surge in anti-Muslim content after the Iran strikes is not organic. It is manufactured, funded, and aimed at you.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OP1SYm8Gg1LmO64Dq08E4Q.avif" /></figure><p>When US and Israeli forces struck Iran in late February, something predictable happened on X. Within days, the <a href="https://www.csohate.org/2026/03/09/us-israel-iran-war-islamophobia/">Center for the Study of Organised Hate</a> recorded daily anti-Muslim posts jumping from under two thousand to over six thousand — amplified more than elevenfold through reposts. The content followed a template most regular users of the platform will recognise: Islam as an ancient civilisational enemy, the Iran conflict as confirmation of an irresolvable theological incompatibility, Israel as the West’s natural ally in a war it has been fighting for fourteen centuries.</p><p>What was less predictable — and more significant — is how many people on the political right no longer find that template convincing. Among the online conservative commentariat, including figures who two years ago held strongly pro-Israel positions, the automatic equation of Israeli interests with Western interests has been eroding steadily since Gaza, and the Iran war has accelerated it. The seesaw argument, which asks Europeans and Americans to see themselves in Israel’s conflict because Islam is their enemy too, is losing ground precisely among the audience it was constructed to hold.</p><p>This makes the intellectual case for that argument worth examining with some care. Raymond Ibrahim’s recent piece in <a href="https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/opinion/israel-islam-antisemitism-iran-war/">Hungarian Conservative</a>, “The Seesaw Fallacy,” represents its most serious available form — historically grounded, rhetorically controlled, and mistaken in ways worth tracing carefully. Understanding where it fails matters more now than it would have two years ago, when the framework still commanded broader assent. It also matters that the argument is not merely mistaken. Since September 2025, we have documented evidence of the mechanism by which it is manufactured and distributed. But the history comes first.</p><h4>The Millennium He Skips</h4><p>For over a thousand years — the very period Ibrahim treats as evidence of Islam’s civilisational hostility to the West — Jews lived in Muslim lands with a degree of security and communal autonomy unavailable anywhere in Christian Europe. When Spain expelled its Jews in 1492, they fled not to Christian territories but to the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Bayezid II welcomed them. By the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire contained the world’s largest Jewish population.</p><p>Ibrahim’s argument requires Islamic hostility toward Jews to be hardwired into the tradition. A thousand years of coexistence is not a footnote that can be explained away — it is the argument. If Islamic theology contained an intrinsic, irresistible drive toward Jewish persecution, 1,300 years of Jewish-Muslim coexistence, documented by scholars from <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Mediterranean_Society.html?id=g13-owKVXY4C">S.D. Goitein</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691139319/under-crescent-and-cross">Mark Cohen</a>, would be inexplicable. I examined this record in detail in an earlier piece, <a href="https://medium.com/@richardjmorrissey/before-israel-when-muslims-and-jews-lived-together-694a860f21cb">Before Israel: When Muslims and Jews Lived Together</a>, but the headline facts bear repeating here. Moses Maimonides worked as court physician to Saladin. Samuel ibn Naghrillah served as vizier of Granada and commanded Muslim armies. No equivalent participation was available to Jews anywhere in Christian Europe during the same period.</p><p>Ibrahim’s account of Islamic history moves from Muhammad to the present as though the intervening millennium were continuous civilisational assault. The long period of relative Jewish-Muslim coexistence simply disappears from his narrative.</p><p>A new history of Jewish-Muslim relations by <a href="https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2026/2-april/books-arts/book-reviews/book-review-children-of-abraham-the-story-of-jewish-muslim-relations-by-marc-david-baer">Marc David Baer</a>, professor of history at the LSE, reaches the same conclusion from the other direction: rejecting both the interfaith utopia myth and the countermyth of unbroken enmity, Baer locates the almost total breakdown of symbiosis firmly in the modern period, attributing it to European imperialism, nationalism, and the political consequences of 1948.</p><h4>The 1948 Break</h4><p>The transformation of Islamic attitudes toward Jews is dateable with unusual precision. Before 1948, Jewish communities were established across the Arab world — Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Casablanca. Within a generation, they had almost entirely gone. Neither the Qur’an nor Islamic law had changed. What changed was politics: the creation of Israel, the displacement of approximately 750,000 Palestinians, and the subsequent expulsion of around 850,000 Jews from Arab countries — a demographic exchange that both sides experienced as catastrophe.</p><p>A hadith concerning Jews and the end times, the <a href="https://sunnah.com/bukhari:2926">“stones and trees”</a> tradition, had existed for over thirteen centuries without generating systematic persecution. The most widely used classical commentary on this hadith collection — by the fifteenth-century Egyptian scholar <a href="https://www.islamweb.net/amp/ar/library/content/52/5322/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF">Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani </a>— states plainly that “the time indicated by the Prophet for fighting the Jews has not yet come.” The tradition’s own interpreters, for century after century, read the text as distant eschatology rather than present instruction.</p><p>After 1948, the same hadith appeared throughout extremist literature, recast from eschatology into a call for immediate violence. Ancient texts that had coexisted with Jewish communities for centuries were reinterpreted through the lens of a contemporary territorial conflict. European anti-Jewish tropes — the Protocols, blood libel, conspiracy theory — were imported into Muslim discourse and given Islamic dress. What presents itself as ancient is, in large part, modern.</p><p>Ibrahim’s argument requires us to treat this transformation as either irrelevant or merely the re-emergence of something always latent. But if it were always latent and equally potent across history, the coexistence needs explaining. He offers no explanation because his framework cannot accommodate one.</p><h4>The Instrumentalisation Question</h4><p>The historical omission is important, but there is a distinction Ibrahim’s piece conspicuously avoids making about what that omission is being used to justify today.</p><p>That mass Muslim immigration to Europe has created genuine social pressures is not seriously in dispute. The strains on social cohesion, the persistence of parallel legal cultures, the importation of anti-Jewish attitudes into European communities: these are real phenomena that deserve honest engagement on their own terms.</p><p>What Ibrahim’s piece does — and what much of the discourse he represents does more broadly — is deploy these pressures as a political instrument rather than address them as a domestic problem. The implicit argument runs: Islam is your civilisational enemy; Israel is fighting Islam on your behalf; therefore Israel’s interests and yours are aligned. Europeans alarmed by demographic and cultural change are invited to see Israel as the frontline of a shared defence.</p><p>What was previously an inference about how this discourse functions has, since September 2025, become a documented fact. Leaked documents — published by <a href="https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/leaked-israel-reputation-survey-research-mark-penn-stagwell?hide_intro_popup=true">Drop Site News</a> and subsequently confirmed by <a href="https://www.thedrum.com/news/havas-subcontracted-stagwell-group-conduct-research-israeli-government">The Drum</a> and Adweek — revealed that Stagwell Global, commissioned by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, surveyed over 13,000 people across thirteen countries to identify the most effective messaging for restoring Israel’s reputation. The research concluded that stoking fear of radical Islam and jihadism was Israel’s most effective available tactic. When that framing was deployed, Israeli support rebounded by an average of over twenty points in each country. Framing Islamic ideology as a threat to other religions was identified as particularly persuasive among conservative audiences. Stagwell confirmed it had conducted the work.</p><p>This is not conjecture — it is a documented communications strategy, paid for by a foreign government, designed to recruit Western conservative anxieties about Islam into the service of Israeli foreign policy.</p><p>The ecosystem in which Ibrahim’s work circulates makes this connection structural rather than incidental. Gatestone Institute, where he holds a <a href="https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/biography/Raymond+Ibrahim">Distinguished Senior Shillman Fellowship</a>, was founded by Nina Rosenwald, whose family foundations have directed funding toward counter-Islam and pro-Israel causes as a combined portfolio. The Shillman Fellowship itself is named after Robert Shillman, whose philanthropy spans both counter-jihad and pro-Israel advocacy. For the major donors in this network, anti-Islam scholarship and pro-Israel advocacy are the same project. Ibrahim may approach that project from his own convictions — he is a Coptic Christian with a long record of writing about the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries, and those convictions are genuine. But his work does not circulate in a neutral space. It circulates within an infrastructure built on the premise that the seesaw is real and should be kept in motion.</p><p>Ibrahim is not the only prominent figure in this ecosystem. Douglas Murray writes for the Spectator, the New York Post, and a string of other mainstream outlets on both sides of the Atlantic, appears regularly on Fox News, and has built one of the largest platforms of any conservative commentator in Britain — his books selling in the hundreds of thousands. He is also a senior fellow at Gatestone Institute: the same institution, the same Nina Rosenwald funding network, the same combined anti-Islam and pro-Israel donor portfolio. His 2025 book frames the Israel-Hamas conflict as a civilisational struggle between democracies and death cults, and he received formal recognition from the Israeli president the same year.</p><p>His most recent <a href="https://nypost.com/2026/04/09/opinion/douglas-murray-we-must-crush-iran-now-so-it-cant-come-back-and-spread-terror/">New York Post column</a>, published this week, illustrates the pattern exactly. It opens by invoking Bernard Lewis — the intellectual godfather of the clash of civilisations thesis — to argue that the Iran ceasefire must not hold and that the war must be prosecuted to completion. Those who question this position, Murray argues, are either partisan Democrats or conservatives “so devoid of morals” that they are justifying the Iranian regime’s murder of protesters. Dissent is closed by moral disqualification rather than answered by argument, which is the seesaw mechanism operating in its purest form. Murray has previously stated that he holds to a journalistic rule of never commenting on a country he has not visited. He has never been to Iran. In this tradition, the civilisational framework and the military prescription are inseparable — and the intellectual standards are negotiable. Where Ibrahim provides the historical scholarship, Murray provides the mass-market cultural commentary, and the division of labour between them is telling.</p><p>The same funding network has a street-level counterpart. The <a href="https://www.meforum.org/">Middle East Forum</a>, part of the same Rosenwald-funded ecosystem as Gatestone, <a href="https://www.meforum.org/mef-organizes-25000-strong-protest-in-support">confirmed</a> in 2018 that it bankrolled three demonstrations in London in support of British “patriot” Tommy Robinson. MEF president Daniel Pipes acknowledged the connection directly, telling the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-are-us-pro-israel-groups-boosting-a-far-right-anti-muslim-uk-extremist/">Times of Israel</a> that he had developed a natural affinity with Robinson because of their shared preoccupation with the Islamist threat, and that this was a common feature of organisations invested in Israel’s security. Robert Shillman, whose fellowship funds Ibrahim’s position at Gatestone, separately financed a fellowship that paid Robinson’s salary at the Canadian outlet <a href="https://www.rebelnews.com/">Rebel News</a> (then known as Rebel Media) in 2017. Robinson subsequently visited Israel at the invitation of a Likud minister, where he was photographed on an Israeli military tank in the occupied Golan Heights. The visit was condemned by the UK’s <a href="https://www.thejlc.org/news/statement-tommy-robinson-invite">Board of Deputies</a> of British Jews, who described him as “a thug who represents the very worst of Britain.”</p><p>Robert Shillman’s reach has also extended into mainstream American conservatism. Shillman had for years provided approximately $2 million annually to Turning Point USA and its founder Charlie Kirk. He reportedly withdrew that funding in the weeks before Kirk’s death in September 2025, citing frustration with Kirk’s increasingly sceptical stance on Israel and his refusal to distance himself from figures like Tucker Carlson. The New York Times confirmed the donor pressure Kirk faced in his final months; leaked texts showed Kirk’s mounting frustration at being told which voices he could and could not platform. The Shillman thread runs from Ibrahim’s academic fellowship to Robinson’s salary to Kirk’s organisational funding and its withdrawal — the same donor, enforcing the same political line, at every register of conservative life.</p><p>The point is not that Ibrahim, Murray, Robinson, and Kirk are equivalent — they are not, in background, seriousness, or intent. The point is that the same donor infrastructure supports the scholar, the commentator, the street agitator, and the campus organiser, because for those donors the argument is the same argument regardless of who is making it. Ibrahim provides the historical scaffolding; Murray provides the cultural reach; Robinson provides the street mobilisation; Kirk, before the funding was withdrawn, provided the mainstream organisational base. The Stagwell research provides the strategic rationale connecting all of them to a foreign government’s communications budget. What looks like separate phenomena turns out, on inspection, to be different registers of a single coordinated effort: keeping Western anxieties about Islam pointed in a particular political direction.</p><p>This is the seesaw running in Ibrahim’s preferred direction rather than the direction he criticises. He objects to those who elevate Islam by condemning Israel. His own argument elevates Israel by foregrounding an Islamic civilisational threat. The logical structure is identical; only the valence differs. And recruiting indigenous European anxieties about Islam into the service of a foreign government’s communications strategy does those anxieties, and the people who hold them, no favours. It turns a genuine domestic concern into a proxy for a conflict that is not primarily Europe’s.</p><h4>What This Argument Is Not</h4><p>None of this is to say that Islamic hostility towards Jews is invented or trivial. It is real and it has genuine roots in certain readings of Islamic texts. The argument here is about provenance and politics — whether the hostility is ancient and continuous, as Ibrahim contends, or substantially modern and politicised, as the evidence presented here suggests. That is a historical disagreement, not a moral one.</p><h4>What an Honest Account Looks Like</h4><p>Islamic civilisational conflict with the West is real, has deep historical roots that predate Israel, and coexists with a contemporary hostility toward Jews that is equally real and dangerous. These two facts are compatible with a third: that this hostility is substantially a twentieth-century political phenomenon, driven by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and expressed through the weaponisation of older texts rather than their unbroken transmission.</p><p>Ibrahim’s piece collapses this distinction because his argument needs Islamic hostility toward Jews to be ancient and continuous. An honest account would hold all three claims together — acknowledging the pre-modern civilisational record and tracing the specific political origins of modern hostility, without letting either observation serve as cover for the other.</p><p>Scepticism about the seesaw framework is not indifference to Christian civilisation, nor softness about the social consequences of mass migration into Europe. A Christian who takes seriously the theological roots of Western culture, who believes the rapid transformation of European societies through migration poses genuine threats to social cohesion and cultural continuity, and who thinks the Church has something irreplaceable to contribute to public life — that person has no obligation to arrive at Tommy Robinson’s conclusions or Raymond Ibrahim’s framework.</p><p>A robustly Christian political theology, properly grounded in the tradition rather than in the preferences of American donors or evangelical Christian Zionists, reaches different conclusions from the ones the seesaw demands. Christian concern for Western civilisation does not require us to act as auxiliary infantry for someone else’s foreign policy. It requires something harder — clarity about what we are actually defending, and honesty about who benefits when we are not.</p><p>The seesaw fallacy, properly understood, runs in both directions — and Ibrahim is standing on one end of it while complaining about the other.</p><p><em>Richard Morrissey writes on family life, politics, theology, and culture. He publishes at </em><a href="https://richardmorrissey.substack.com/"><em>Happy Family Better Worl</em></a><em>d on Substack, and at </em><a href="https://www.theforge-hub.com/"><em>Forge Hub</em></a><em>. His advisory practice is at </em><a href="http://www.richardmorrissey.org/"><em>richardmorrissey.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63699af5ddc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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