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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dr Ridox on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dr Ridox on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ridoxprogrammer?source=rss-aee089138a6b------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Dr Ridox on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ridoxprogrammer?source=rss-aee089138a6b------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:24:38 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reflected XSS in Login Redirect Parameter — Real Bug Bounty Case Study]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ridoxprogrammer/reflected-xss-in-login-redirect-parameter-real-bug-bounty-case-study-a4dba5ec9329?source=rss-aee089138a6b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a4dba5ec9329</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[reflected-xss]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[injection-attacks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dr Ridox]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:52:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-03T16:52:54.433Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reflected XSS in Login Redirect Parameter — Real Bug Bounty Case Study</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*ZbwIX-IzZKDB4LVwNFvVbg.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>During a security assessment on a Bugcrowd program, I identified a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in a login-related endpoint.</p><p>This issue allows an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript into a URL parameter that is reflected back into the application without proper sanitization. When a victim clicks a crafted link, the payload executes in their browser under the context of the trusted application.</p><p>Although this is a client-side vulnerability, its real-world impact can become serious when combined with phishing or session manipulation scenarios.</p><h3>What is Reflected XSS?</h3><p>Reflected XSS occurs when an application takes user input from a request and immediately includes it in the response without proper encoding or validation.</p><p>An attacker can craft a malicious link containing JavaScript payloads. When a user clicks the link, the script is executed in their browser within the context of the vulnerable website.</p><p>This allows attackers to perform actions such as executing scripts in the victim’s session, stealing sensitive information, or performing actions on behalf of the user.</p><h3>Business Impact</h3><p>If exploited, this vulnerability could enable an attacker to:</p><ul><li>Execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim’s browser</li><li>Conduct phishing attacks using a trusted domain</li><li>Steal session-related information (depending on cookie security flags)</li><li>Perform unauthorized actions as the victim user</li><li>Damage user trust and platform reputation</li></ul><p>Even though the exploit is client-side, the impact becomes significant in real user-targeted scenarios.</p><h3>Methodology</h3><p>The vulnerability was discovered using a structured reconnaissance and testing approach.</p><h3>Parameter Discovery</h3><p>I began by extracting hidden and exposed parameters across the target application using a parameter spider tool. This helped identify multiple potential injection points such as redirect-related parameters commonly used in login flows.</p><p>Among them, a specific parameter responsible for redirect behavior stood out as a high-interest candidate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/397/1*s4ODyjB-G3teONfaXzI_ow.png" /></figure><h3>Automated Reflection Testing</h3><p>After identifying potential endpoints, I used an automated reflection testing technique to detect unsanitized input reflections in the application responses,tool named kxss</p><p>This helped quickly identify parameters where user-controlled input was being reflected back into the HTML output without proper encoding.</p><p>The redirect parameter in the login endpoint showed clear signs of reflection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*A_xk4miXqdvFvGZyRMChCg.png" /></figure><h3>Vulnerability Details</h3><p>The issue exists in a login-related endpoint where a redirect parameter is used to control post-authentication navigation.</p><p>The parameter value is directly reflected into the response without proper sanitization or encoding, allowing script injection. and if you navigate to source code it will be reflected → initAuth: {<br> invite_active: “”,<br> invite_cid: “”,<br> invite_email: “”,<br> invite_name: “”,<br> invite_token: “”,<br> invite_uid: “”,<br> next: “batman&lt;/script&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(0)&lt;/script&gt;”,<br> reset_token: “”,<br> reset_uid: “”,<br> valid_token: “”,<br> applied_verify: “”,</p><p>so first i closed the original &lt;/script&gt; then inject my own simple script &lt;script&gt;alert(0)&lt;/script&gt; This resulted in a visible JavaScript execution (alert popup), confirming the presence of Reflected XSS.</p><h3>Root Cause</h3><p>The root cause of this vulnerability is improper handling of user input in the redirect parameter.</p><p>The application fails to properly:</p><ul><li>Encode output before reflecting user input</li><li>Sanitize special characters such as angle brackets</li><li>Restrict or validate redirect destinations</li></ul><p>As a result, user input is interpreted as executable HTML/JavaScript.</p><h3>Recommendation</h3><p>To mitigate this issue, the following security measures should be implemented:</p><ul><li>Proper output encoding based on context (HTML/JavaScript)</li><li>Strict validation of redirect parameters using an allowlist approach</li><li>Avoid directly reflecting user input in responses</li><li>Use safe redirect mechanisms instead of raw user-controlled URLs</li><li>Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) as an additional layer of defense</li></ul><p>A secure design should only allow trusted internal paths for redirects rather than arbitrary user input.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This case demonstrates how seemingly harmless redirect parameters can become a vector for client-side attacks when input validation is missing.</p><p>By combining parameter discovery and reflection testing techniques, it was possible to identify and confirm a Reflected XSS vulnerability with minimal effort.</p><p>Even simple injection points can become high-risk issues when they exist in authentication or login flows, where user trust is highest.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a4dba5ec9329" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Password Reset Token Leakage via Host Header Poisoning (Real Bug Bounty Case Study)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ridoxprogrammer/password-reset-token-leakage-via-host-header-poisoning-real-bug-bounty-case-study-8382c3735e19?source=rss-aee089138a6b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[password-reset]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[host-header-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[json-array]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dr Ridox]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 13:13:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-01T14:39:55.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Password Reset Token Leakage via Host Header Poisoning (Real Bug Bounty Case Study)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*cW9HefnLL1qMky6wOvhRCA.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Password reset functionality is one of the most critical components in any web application. If it is not properly secured, it can lead to full account takeover and compromise of user accounts.</p><p>In this case study, I describe a real-world vulnerability I discovered in a bug bounty program where the password reset flow was vulnerable to Host Header Poisoning, allowing manipulation of password reset URLs.</p><p>For responsible disclosure, the target has been anonymized as target.com.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rkaFxKbGLz6CsSt2GgpNsg.png" /></figure><h3>Vulnerability Overview</h3><p>Host Header Poisoning occurs when a web application improperly trusts the Host header provided by the client.</p><p>By manipulating this header, an attacker can influence how the application generates absolute URLs, including password reset links sent via email.</p><p>In this case, the application directly used the Host header when generating password reset links. This allowed an attacker to inject a malicious domain and control the reset URL sent to users.</p><p>As a result, password reset links were generated using an attacker-controlled host instead of the legitimate domain.</p><h3>Business Impact</h3><p>This vulnerability can lead to serious security consequences:</p><ul><li>Full Account Takeover (via password reset manipulation)</li><li>Password reset link redirection to attacker-controlled domains</li><li>Phishing attacks using trusted email flows</li><li>Unauthorized account access</li><li>Loss of user trust and reputational damage</li></ul><p>Since password reset flows are part of authentication trust boundaries, any manipulation in this process is considered high to critical severity depending on implementation.</p><h3>Attack Scenario (Real-World Execution)</h3><p>In my actual proof of concept, I used an Ngrok tunnel as an external interaction endpoint to observe how the application generated password reset links.</p><p>The attack flow was:</p><ul><li>I initiated a password reset request for a valid account email</li><li>I intercepted the HTTP request using Burp Suite</li><li>I modified the Host header to an attacker-controlled Ngrok domain</li><li>I forwarded the request to the server</li><li>The application generated a password reset link using the modified Host header</li><li>The password reset email contained a link pointing to the attacker-controlled domain</li><li>Opening the link confirmed that the reset flow was influenced by the manipulated Host header</li></ul><p>This confirmed that the application relied on user-controlled Host headers for generating sensitive URLs.</p><h3>Steps to Reproduce</h3><ol><li>Navigate to the “Forgot Password” page</li><li>Submit a valid registered email address</li><li>Intercept the request using Burp Suite</li><li>Modify the Host header to an attacker-controlled domain (e.g., evil.com or Ngrok URL)</li><li>Forward the request</li><li>Check the password reset email received by the account</li><li>Observe that the reset link contains the modified Host instead of the legitimate domain</li><li>Open the reset link and confirm the password reset flow is based on the manipulated Host header</li></ol><h3>Additional Header Manipulation Testing (Supporting Analysis)</h3><p>During testing, I explored multiple Host-related parsing behaviors to understand how different components interpret HTTP headers.</p><p>These tests were performed to assess potential alternative attack vectors. However, only direct Host header manipulation was effective in this case.</p><h3>1. Duplicate Host Headers</h3><p>try to duplicate the host and put the attacker domain first</p><p>Host: attacker.com<br> Host: target.com</p><p>then try to duplicate the host and put the original domain first then in the second host put the attacker domain</p><p>Host:target.com</p><p>Host:attacker.com</p><p>Some systems may interpret the first or last value differently, depending on infrastructure.</p><h3>2. X-Forwarded-Host Injection</h3><p>Host: target.com<br> X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com</p><p>Some reverse proxies may prioritize this header for URL generation.</p><h3>3. Alternative Proxy Headers</h3><p>Forwarded: host=attacker.com<br> X-Original-Host: attacker.com</p><p>Different frameworks may interpret forwarded headers differently.</p><h3>4. Malformed Host Values</h3><p>Host: attacker.com:target.com</p><p>Improper parsing may lead to ambiguity in hostname resolution.</p><h3>Additional Observation: JSON Array Input Handling (Separate Finding)</h3><p>During testing, I also observed how the backend handles JSON input when multiple values are provided for a field that expects a single value.</p><p>This is a separate input validation observation and is not directly part of the Host Header Poisoning vulnerability.</p><h3>Normal Request</h3><p>{<br> “email”: “victim@gmail.com”<br> }</p><h3>Modified Request</h3><p>{<br> “email”: [</p><p>“victim@gmail.com”,</p><p>“attacker@gmail.com”</p><p>]<br> }</p><h3>Why This Matters</h3><p>This tests whether the backend enforces strict schema validation for authentication-related fields.</p><p>In secure implementations, the system should:</p><ul><li>Enforce strict string type validation</li><li>Reject arrays or multiple values</li><li>Prevent ambiguity in identity processing</li></ul><h3>What Can Go Wrong in Weak Implementations</h3><ul><li>Iteration over multiple values instead of rejection</li><li>Inconsistent selection of first/last value</li><li>Data normalization inconsistencies</li><li>Authentication logic bypass in complex flows</li></ul><h3>Security Relevance</h3><p>While this does not directly contribute to Host Header Poisoning, it may become relevant in sensitive workflows such as password reset, where:</p><ul><li>Input affects recipient selection</li><li>Multiple processing paths exist</li><li>Validation differs across components</li></ul><h3>Key Takeaway</h3><p>User-controlled headers must never be trusted for generating security-critical URLs such as password reset links.</p><h3>Root Cause</h3><ul><li>Trusting user-controlled Host header</li><li>Lack of canonical domain enforcement</li><li>Improper reverse proxy configuration</li><li>No server-side base URL validation</li></ul><h3>Proof of Concept (Conceptual)</h3><p>Host: attacker-ngrok-domain.com</p><p>Result:<br> <a href="https://attacker-ngrok-domain.com/reset-password?token=XXXX">https://attacker-ngrok-domain.com/reset-password?token=XXXX</a></p><p>Expected:<br> <a href="https://target.com/reset-password?token=XXXX">https://target.com/reset-password?token=XXXX</a></p><p>This mismatch allowed external control over password reset link generation.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Host Header Poisoning is often underestimated, but when it affects password reset flows, it becomes a critical authentication vulnerability.</p><p>This issue demonstrates how a single trust failure in HTTP headers can escalate into a full account takeover scenario.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8382c3735e19" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From ‘Access Denied’ to P1: Escalating SQL Injection]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ridoxprogrammer/from-access-denied-to-p1-escalating-sql-injection-9aa407fb141e?source=rss-aee089138a6b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9aa407fb141e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[injection-attacks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sql-injection]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dr Ridox]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 11:09:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-01T11:16:31.513Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*_M-kodpYXJiiBpwY7moPDw.png" /></figure><p>In bug hunting, the difference between a “dead end” and a P1 vulnerability is often just a matter of persistence and the right methodology. Recently, during an engagement on Bugcrowd, I encountered a target that initially seemed completely hardened. My requests were met with “Access Denied” messages, but I knew the surface area had to be larger than what appeared on the surface.</p><p>From ‘Access Denied’ to P1: Escalating SQL Injection</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bpscViLtuLe6QCKe5fMkaw.png" /></figure><p>In bug hunting, the difference between a “dead end” and a P1 vulnerability is often just a matter of persistence and the right methodology. When I first attempted to visit this target, I was met with an immediate “Access Denied” (403 Forbidden) response. Many researchers would have taken this at face value, assumed the target was fully hardened, and moved on to another program. I knew, however, that a 403 response is often just a sign that you haven’t found the right entry point yet.</p><p>The Recon Phase</p><p>Rather than giving up, I chose to dig deeper. I started by using Katana to crawl the application and map out hidden endpoints that aren’t visible through standard manual browsing. This process of mapping the attack surface is where I uncovered the endpoints that were actually accessible, despite the main landing page being restricted.</p><p>katana -jc -u [Target_URL]</p><p>The crawler returned a list of endpoints. One in particular stood out, as it seemed to handle data queries for the product catalog. To expand my reconnaissance, I also utilized tools like Waybackurls, Waymore, GAU, GAUplus, and Golinkfinder to perform deep link discovery and JavaScript file analysis, ensuring no hidden parameters or API routes were left unexamined.</p><p>The Discovery</p><p>I noticed the product display page utilized multiple URL parameters. As a researcher, I know that filter parameters are high-risk vectors for injection because they often interact directly with the database. I began systematically fuzzing each parameter. When I injected a single quote (’) into the YEAR parameter, the application returned a verbose database error:</p><p>com.microsoft.sqlserver.jdbc.SQLServerException: Incorrect syntax near the keyword ‘and’.</p><p>This was the “Aha!” moment. The error confirmed three critical facts:</p><ol><li>Backend Tech: The application was running Microsoft SQL Server.</li><li>Lack of Sanitization: The input was being concatenated directly into the query.</li><li>Vulnerability: The application was susceptible to SQL Injection.</li></ol><p>Manual Verification</p><p>Before automating, I manually validated the vulnerability to ensure it was a genuine flaw and not a false positive. In a UNION-based SQL injection, the injected sub-query must align perfectly with the original (super) query’s column count. To do this, I first used an ORDER BY clause to determine that the super query was returning only 1 column.</p><p>A key trick here was using -2025 for the YEAR parameter. By setting this to a value that doesn’t exist in the database, I forced the original query to return no results. This cleared the way for the system to display only the output of my injected sub-query instead.</p><p>Furthermore, because the original database query likely ends with another single quote (to close the initial statement), I used — and a space (represented as — ) to comment out the remainder of the original SQL statement. This prevents the database from executing the leftover syntax, which would otherwise trigger a syntax error and break my injection.</p><p>With the column count confirmed and the super query cleared, I successfully extracted metadata from the server. Using this approach, I confirmed:</p><p>Database Version: …&amp;YEAR=-2025 union select @@version —</p><p>Database Name: …&amp;YEAR=-2025 union select DB_NAME() —</p><p>To further escalate and retrieve the table names, I utilized the following URL-decoded payload:</p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.openingsstudio.com/AAOS/AAOM/WebViewer%3FOP%3DBO%26YEAR%3D-2025">https://www.target.com/AAOS/AAOM/WebViewer?OP=BO&amp;YEAR=-2025</a> UNION SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables — -&amp;CATEGORY=Swing&amp;SEARCH=&amp;COUNTRY=UNITED STATES&amp;LIBRARY=Automatic Door Library</p><p>Exploitation</p><p>Once verified, I used sqlmap to assess the full scope of the exposure.</p><p>sqlmap -u “[URL_with_parameter_marked_by_*]” — dbs</p><p>The tool successfully identified 12 accessible databases, including sensitive system databases like master and Users. This confirmed that the vulnerability provided an entry point for full database enumeration and potential exfiltration.</p><p>Impact and Remediation</p><p>The business impact was severe: an attacker could exfiltrate sensitive customer data, tamper with system records, or potentially perform remote code execution depending on the server’s configuration.</p><p>To remediate this, the development team must shift away from dynamic string concatenation. The fix is two-fold:</p><ol><li>Parameterized Queries: Use Prepared Statements to ensure user input is never treated as executable code.</li><li>Principle of Least Privilege: Configure the database user account used by the web application so that it cannot access system-level databases like master or msdb.</li></ol><p>The Pro-Tip: Don’t Stop at 403 Forbidden</p><p>A “403 Forbidden” or “Access Denied” response is not the end of the road — it is often just a sign that you haven’t found the right path yet. Never give up on a target just because of an initial block. Expand your search surface by using automated crawling and discovery tools to find hidden gems:</p><ul><li>Katana: For advanced web crawling and endpoint discovery.</li><li>Waybackurls/Waymore: To pull historical URLs and potentially find deprecated endpoints.</li><li>GAU/GAUplus: To discover all URLs known to common search engines for a domain.</li><li>Golinkfinder: To hunt for hidden links in JavaScript files.</li><li>JavaScript Crawling: Always scan JS files to find API keys, hidden endpoints, and business logic flaws.</li></ul><p>Conclusion</p><p>This case serves as a vital reminder: even in 2026, classic vulnerabilities like SQLi remain a massive threat to enterprise applications. Persistence in the reconnaissance phase and a methodical approach to parameter testing are the researcher’s most valuable assets. If you encounter a 403, change your strategy, use your toolkit to map the depth of the application, and keep digging. Your next P1 might be hiding behind a page you originally thought was restricted.</p><p>About the Author: PhD in Cybersecurity, Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), and expert in web application security, active Bugcrowd researcher specializing in infrastructure defense.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9aa407fb141e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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