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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Riley Boughton on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Social media and Australian elections: why we need reform today]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rileyboughton/social-media-and-australian-elections-why-we-need-reform-today-8e7ccbec6516?source=rss-e60ea3a248eb------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Riley Boughton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Jun 2018 01:02:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-10T01:16:38.374Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TzaziCrAcqBD3TWJ3IatOw.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is no doubt social media has become part of our everyday lives. <a href="https://www.socialmedianews.com.au/social-media-statistics-australia-january-2018/">About 15 million Australians are active Facebook users and a similar number are active YouTube users.</a> But social media has also become part of our fundamental infrastructure for communicating — including communication about political matters and our government. However, while television, newspaper and radio advertisements of a political nature are regulated, social media is largely not. As a result of social media becoming critical only in the last few years, the electoral regulatory regime has simply not kept pace. Furthermore, given the recent evidence of abuse of social media in the American electoral context, nations are clearly susceptible to abuse to the potential detriment of democratic outcomes. Further regulation of social media in an Australian electoral context is therefore clearly required.</p><h3>Current Regulatory Regime</h3><p>As it stands, political communications are regulated primarily by the <em>Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 </em>(Cth) (‘<em>Electoral Act</em>’). The rules that apply to social media and other digital platforms are extensions of the provisions that apply to other forms of campaigning material. The extent of this regulation is <em>Electoral Act</em> pt XXA, and more specifically s 321D(5), which requires that certain types of electoral matter must be authorised by the candidate, politician, political party or other associated entity distributing that communication. Under s 321D(5), the types of electoral matter are set out in a table that describes the type of communication and the respective particulars of how an authorisation should be incorporated into that communication. For example, in a television advertisement, this is the familiar black screen with white writing hurriedly speaking:<em> ‘Authorised by the Australian Government, Canberra.’</em></p><p><a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1037969X1103600302">Despite some attempts by the legislature to cover internet communications</a>, the provision has never been purpose fit to cover social media. Under powers to add to the provision, however, the recent determination from the Australian Electoral Commissioner has now ensured that the authorisation regime provides coverage for social media. The<em> 2018 Determination </em>expanded the types of communication requiring authorisation under s 321D(5) to include a particular category of authorisation for ‘social media’. Specifically, the new provision requires that if the communication is by social media then the particulars must be notified either at the end of the communication or, if the particulars are too long to be included in the communication, then a website that can be accessed by a URL included in the communication or a photo in the communication. The determination also included further clarification for the types of authorisations required by search advertising, streamed music, digital banner advertisements, mobile phone applications, computer applications and video-sharing.</p><p>However, <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Backgrounders/authorisation.htm">authorisations are currently the extent of the regulation placed upon social media in an electoral context.</a> While the <em>Electoral Act </em>s 329 makes it an offence to publish misleading or deceptive material, including by internet, the defence provided in s 329(5) effectively neuters its operation in all but the most egregious cases. Additionally, the only enforcement mechanism provided for the Australian Electoral Commission is the ability to seek an injunction in the Federal Court against those breaching or the carriage service involved in distributing the communication. Crucially, an interim injunction is only granted if it is in the opinion of the Court to do so. While in this author’s opinion the authorisation regime has performed well in the years prior to social media, the issue is whether this regime alone is enough to regulate against abuses of democratic process.</p><p>In addition to the <em>Electoral Act</em>, the <em>Broadcasting Services Act 1992 </em>(Cth) (‘<em>Broadcasting Act</em>’) also plays a role in regulating electoral communications. Specifically, sch 2 provides for regulation of electoral advertising on television, newspapers and radio. The major provision is the <em>Broadcasting Act</em> sch 2 s 3A, which provides that <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-what-are-the-rules-governing-political-advertising-57880">no election advertising shall be broadcast after the Wednesday before the polling day of a federal election.</a> Social media and online advertising, however, is not included in this blackout period. The issue is again whether this measure is strong enough to regulate against abuses of the democratic process.</p><h3>Why Is Further Regulation Necessary?</h3><p>The current regulatory system is not strong enough to protect against abuse. Three key reasons demand why further regulation is needed: (i) there are obvious gaps in the current regime that need to be remedied, as well lessons being learnt from the United States which demonstrate the potential for abuse of the system; (ii) further regulation to remedy these concerns are largely straightforward and would only need to properly extend the provisions already in place; and (iii) social media is crucial platform for political communication such that it warrants sufficient protection.</p><h4><em>Clear Issues with the System</em></h4><p>The existing regime is in place to serve both the purpose of transparency and enhancing the operation of our system of representative democracy. Specifically, s 321C(1) notes the object of the <em>Electoral Act </em>provisions as enhancing:</p><blockquote>(a) the transparency of the electoral system, by allowing voters to know who is communicating electoral matter;<br>(b) the accountability of those persons participating in public debate relating to electoral matter, by making those persons responsible for their communications;<br>(c) the traceability of communications of electoral matter, by ensuring that obligations imposed by this Part in relation those communications can be enforced.</blockquote><p>However, there is a clear hole in the regime where the legislation has failed to keep pace with the development of technology. Despite these stated aims, even the <em>2018 Determination</em> presents difficulties. It attempts to require the same authorisation for all forms of social media without regard to how these platforms function. Furthermore, the only logical rationale for the failure of the blackout period to cover social media is that it was conceived before social media, especially given social media has featured heavily in elections since 2013. The existing regime must, therefore, be updated so as to continue providing strong protection through transparency.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1F2HFA_r-kMAPcv0ABEctA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The potential for abuse has become apparent in the recent United States presidential election.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/indictment-russian-tech-facebook.html">There are also strongly founded allegations that foreign actors placed political content across social media in the recent US presidential election</a> in an effort to sow division amongst American voters. <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4434050/Mark-Zuckerberg-s-testimony.pdf">According to Facebook’s testimony for a congressional inquiry,</a> posts purchased by Russian operatives reached as many as 126 million Americans. This was on top of the 2752 Twitter accounts linked to Russian operatives. Many appeared as if they were American and some went so far as to organise rallies in the field. While the United States has no legally enforceable authorisation regime for social media advertisements, it does have a strongly-regulated regime of foreign participation in its elections. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-22/book-reveals-extent-of-chinese-influence-in-australia/9464692">Given the recent news of potential interference by foreign governments in Australian society,</a> there is a well-founded concern that a similar issue could arise in Australia. <a href="https://theconversation.com/australians-born-overseas-prefer-the-online-world-for-their-news-84355">Australians are consuming news and political content on social media at increasingly high rates</a> meaning any abuse by foreign actors could have severe consequences. For example, current research shows that 15 million have a Facebook account that is active at least monthly. It is also where a significant percentage of Australians consume their news. It is clear that social media is a platform that needs to be further protected than the current regime provides.</p><h4><em>Further Regulation Is Straightforward</em></h4><p>Specifically, the blackout period enforced on advertising in traditional media should be extended to cover advertising on social media and other modern advertising. For all intents and purposes, social media advertising is used in the exact same way by political parties as traditional broadcast advertising. This is especially apparent when parties are using the exact same video advertisements in social media advertising as they are in television advertising. <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/why-the-2016-federal-election-could-be-the-facebook-election-20151030-gkmn0g.html">Parties have even expressed signalled that they are using social media as a way of circumventing the blackout period.</a> Furthermore, the ability for the parliament to implement a blackout would be straightforward. Where currently the blackout is enforced through imposing conditions on broadcasters, a blackout on social media advertising could be enforced by imposing a prohibition on the buyers themselves. It is easily conceivable that an amendment to the <em>Electoral Act </em>could prohibit the same entities who are required to make authorisations from purchasing any form of advertising online from the last Wednesday before polling day. Coupled with the <em>Broadcasting Act</em>, this would remedy a gaping hole in the safety net of our system of democracy and ensure that the current regulation continues to serve the original objectives that it sought to achieve.</p><p>However, ensuring that the current regime meets its intended objective in a modern context is not the only reason that social media needs to be further regulated. In the face of recent voter manipulation in the United States and the importance that it plays in communication in our modern society, the regulation of social media needs to go further in order to protect the overall effective operation of our representative democracy. This could be achieved in a number of different ways. Firstly, similar to the requirements of the <em>Broadcasting Act </em>sch 2 s 5, platforms that provide advertising services in Australia could be required to record the authorising particulars of any political advertisement placed on their platform. This could be coupled with an update to the enforcement provisions of the <em>Electoral Act</em>. Currently, when the AEC seeks an injunction against either a party or a carriage service distributing content in breach of the provision, an interim injunction is only granted if it is deemed necessary in the opinion of the Federal Court. This could be amended to include the granting of an interim injunction by default pending a hearing on the injunction. Additionally, consideration should be given to the unlimited role that foreign actors can currently play in the Australian political system.</p><p>Importantly, as with any regulation of a political communication, the implied constitutional protection for political communication must be considered. While largely established by a series of cases in the 1990s, the test has been eloquently restated by the High Court in <em>McCloy v New South Wales</em>. Namely, three elements must be considered in assessing a law against the implied protection: whether it burdens political communication; whether the purpose of the law is compatible with representative government; and whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to meet that purpose. Importantly, however, this protection does not prohibit regulation of political communication and, as an extension, social media. On the contrary, it has already been established that regulation of other important mediums for political communication is valid. Furthermore, the suggested proposals are largely about lifting social media to the same level as these other important mediums. While the final language of any mechanism ultimately must be scrutinised, the regulation of social media is not prohibited by the implied protection and it is further likely that proposals of these nature would not fall foul of this implied protection either.</p><h4><em>Crucial Platform for Political Discussion</em></h4><p>The evolution of the use of social media by political parties demonstrates that there is no doubt that social media is now an established forum for political activity and discussion. Given this importance, there is a clear foundation for the need for regulation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*5fiCS4EWoyv7VmfleMbrIA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The federal election in 2007 was one of the first to feature use of social media. Photo Credit: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/evarinaldiphotography/8385956774/sizes/o/in/photostream/">Eva Rinaldi</a></figcaption></figure><p>While social media in various forms have existed now for more than a decade, the first Australian election to feature prominent use of social media was the 2007 federal election. <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/news/national/the-youtube-election/2007/07/13/1183833772806.html">Dubbed by some as the ‘YouTube election’,</a> both John Howard and Kevin Rudd uploaded videos to YouTube as well as launched MySpace pages <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/story/0,20867,22065976-2702,00.html">to much media acclaim.</a> In reality, however, there was little widespread engagement by politicians with social media in the 2007 campaign. Only 13 out of 226 incumbents posted a YouTube Video, 26 had a MySpace page and 7 had a page on Facebook. It was merely a novelty way of gaining media attention.</p><p>The use of social media evolved by the time of the 2010 federal election, with the use of social media more than doubling on the 2007 election. This included Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. However, there was still little attempt to use social media in a fit-for-purpose manner. Furthermore, it did not appear that social media was part of any cohesive media strategy.</p><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/digital-campaigns-coalition-and-labor">The 2013 federal election was the first time that both major parties invested significant resources in the strategy and execution of digital communications.</a> Not only did both parties invest considerable resources, online advertising became a major campaign tool with the ALP making significant advertisement buys on Facebook largely during the traditional media blackout period. It appeared as if both the major parties were finally taking digital communications as a serious platform for engaging with electors.</p><p>The serious treatment of digital communications grew exponentially for the 2016 federal election. <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/get-prepared-major-parties-eye-off-social-media-for-next-federal-election-20180322-h0xtsb">Both major parties appeared to treat it as a critical part of their broader communications strategy.</a> The ALP purchased advertising across all major platforms with a strong focus on Facebook. The advertising was targeted based on demographic data and well-resourced compared to previous elections. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jul/09/labors-medicare-campaign-delivered-largely-online-not-via-traditional-ads">This is exemplified by the Medicare campaign in which significant resources were expended in the targeted advertising online.</a> The Liberal Party engaged in equally aggressive online campaigning. It invested significant resources in promoting the personal brand of Malcolm Turnbull with advertisement achieving 1.3 million views online.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Social media has become a key platform for Australians to communicate on matters ranging from academic debate to cat memes — and this includes political discussion. Its importance, and its importance to political communication, is difficult to understate in our current context. This is especially the case when one examines the effort now being placed by political parties into these platforms. Given its importance and the effective absence of regulation when compared to other important mediums, the case for further regulation is clear. Not only should social media be held to the same standard as other important communication mediums, the case for regulation is made even stronger in light of the recent troubling events in the United States presidential election. While these potential ways for regulation have been suggested, further study needs to be done to ultimately determine the necessary mechanisms for regulating social media. Ultimately, our democracy will be better off for it.</p><p><em>Riley Boughton is a former digital communications adviser to the Australian Labor Party. This article was originally written for undergraduate studies at The Australian National University.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e7ccbec6516" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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