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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ringmast4r on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ringmast4r on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ringmast4r on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran Revealed: How the Regime and Hezbollah Left Their Digital Infrastructure Exposed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ringmast4r/iran-revealed-how-the-regime-and-hezbollah-left-their-digital-infrastructure-exposed-560ea2ab03f4?source=rss-93a7e401453------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigative-journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ringmast4r]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Feb 2026 05:42:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-01T05:42:23.487Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Case Study in Iranian Government Cybersecurity Failures</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DIWHrj4iqXK3s6tSrw8VRQ.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In late December 2025, Iran erupted into its largest uprising since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. What began as protests over the collapsing rial spread to 222 locations across 26 provinces. On January 8–9, 2026, the IRGC and Basij militia carried out mass killings under a near-total internet blackout. Khamenei ordered security forces to “crush the protests by any means necessary.”</p><p>The death toll remains disputed due to the communications blackout. Iranian state media acknowledged 3,117 killed. Iran Human Rights documented at least 3,428 protester deaths. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) documented 6,479 deaths with 17,091 additional cases under review. Iran International, The Guardian, and internal Ministry of Health estimates suggest the toll may exceed 30,000. Over 41,800 people have been arrested. The EU designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization on January 29, 2026.</p><p>While the regime was killing its own people, I conducted a comprehensive OSINT analysis of Iranian government and Hezbollah digital infrastructure. Through nothing more than DNS enumeration, certificate transparency logs, and basic HTTP header analysis, I mapped the regime’s digital footprint.</p><p>What I found: private IP addresses leaking through public DNS, VPN endpoints exposed for the Foreign Ministry, hidden API domains on separate TLDs, and Western tracking services embedded across anti-Western propaganda sites.</p><p>500+ subdomains. 75+ unique IPs. 6 government ASNs. All from publicly accessible data.</p><h3>The Private IP Leak</h3><p>IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) made a critical mistake. A subdomain in their public DNS resolves to a private IP address.</p><pre>kateb.irna.ir -&gt; 10.30.41.85 (RFC1918 PRIVATE IP)</pre><p>“Kateb” means “writer” or “scribe” in Farsi, indicating this is their internal editorial system. This is a split-horizon DNS misconfiguration.</p><h3>Internal Network Topology Exposed</h3><ul><li>10.30.41.x — Editorial systems (leaked)</li><li>217.25.48.x — Mail, Gallery, Tahrir</li><li>217.25.51.x — RS1 server farm</li><li>217.25.53.x — RS2 server farm</li><li>217.25.56.x — News, Streaming (Sky)</li><li>217.25.58.x — Remote access</li></ul><h3>Additional IRNA Infrastructure (50 subdomains total)</h3><ul><li>remote.irna.ir — 217.25.58.101 (remote access server)</li><li>mail.irna.ir — 217.25.48.34 (requires Firefox 65+/Chrome 70+)</li><li>lab1–3.irna.ir — Development/test servers</li><li>tahrir.irna.ir — Editorial system (12 language-specific editorial subdomains discovered)</li></ul><h3>The VPN Endpoint Exposure</h3><p>Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs exposed a VPN hostname in public DNS.</p><pre>r1.vpn.minister.local.mfa.gov.ir -&gt; 185.143.235.201 (ArvanCloud CDN)</pre><p>The hostname reveals:</p><ul><li>“minister.local” — Internal domain naming convention leaked</li><li>“r1” — Suggests multiple endpoints (r2, r3…)</li><li>“vpn” — Confirms VPN infrastructure exists</li></ul><p>Related discoveries:</p><ul><li>cp.mfa.gov.ir (Control Panel) → 109.201.11.102</li><li>ISP: Tose’h Fanavari (AS24631)</li><li>Organization confirmed: “Foreign Ministry of IRAN”</li></ul><h3>The Embassy Network</h3><p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains 182 subdomains mapping their entire diplomatic network:</p><ul><li>lebanon.mfa.gov.ir — Hezbollah connection</li><li>venezuela.mfa.gov.ir — Maduro alliance (disrupted)</li><li>russia.mfa.gov.ir — Strategic partner</li><li>china.mfa.gov.ir — Strategic partner</li><li>100+ country-specific embassy subdomains</li></ul><h3>Internal Systems Discovered</h3><ul><li>cms.mfa.gov.ir — Content Management</li><li>cloud.mfa.gov.ir — Cloud Storage</li><li>email.mfa.gov.ir — Email Portal</li><li>webmail.mfa.gov.ir — Webmail</li><li>visareq.mfa.gov.ir — Visa Requests</li><li>e_visa.mfa.gov.ir — E-Visa System</li><li>wvisa.mfa.gov.ir — Web Visa</li><li>econsulate.mfa.gov.ir — E-Consulate</li><li>appointment.mfa.gov.ir — Appointment Booking</li></ul><h3>The Supreme Leader’s Infrastructure</h3><p>Khamenei.ir has been online for 23+ years (first archived Nov 30, 2002). Through certificate transparency and JavaScript analysis:</p><h3>Infrastructure Details</h3><ul><li>Main IP: 5.160.10.200 (AS200554 Dade Pardaz Kimia Pouyesh — Tehran)</li><li>Mail Server: mail.khamenei.ir → 94.232.174.104 (AS48434 Tebyan-e-Noor)</li><li>Live Streaming: live1.khamenei.ir → 81.12.39.67 (AS42337 Respina)</li><li>DNS: ns1/ns2.nashridc.ir, ns1/ns2.nashridc.com</li><li>CMS: <a href="http://www.nastooh.ir/">www.nastooh.ir</a> (Iranian platform)</li><li>SSL: Let’s Encrypt wildcard cert (*.khamenei.ir)</li></ul><h3>Admin Portal Exposed</h3><pre>admin.english.khamenei.ir (discovered via Certificate Transparency)</pre><h3>Hidden API Domain</h3><pre>formx.khamenei.link (separate TLD to hide API)<br>Endpoint: https://formx.khamenei.link/farsi-json/topticker</pre><p>The hidden API domain was deliberately placed on a different TLD (.link instead of .ir) to avoid discovery.</p><h3>41 Subdomains Discovered</h3><ul><li>14+ language portals (Arabic, English, French, Spanish, Turkish, Urdu, etc.)</li><li>nojavan.khamenei.ir — “Youth” targeting subdomain (radicalization/recruitment)</li><li>10 per-language CDNs</li><li>12+ live streaming nodes for broadcasting speeches</li><li>Google Analytics: UA-6238962–2, G-8MVZ1HLJT0</li></ul><h3>Live Streaming Infrastructure</h3><p>The Supreme Leader’s website maintains dedicated streaming infrastructure:</p><ul><li>stream.khamenei.ir — Primary stream</li><li>live[1–12].khamenei.ir — Redundant nodes</li><li>cdn.[lang].khamenei.ir — Per-language delivery</li></ul><p>This infrastructure broadcasts Khamenei’s speeches in real-time across 14+ languages, representing significant investment in global propaganda distribution.</p><h3>Security Posture</h3><ul><li>HSTS with preload (1 year)</li><li>X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN</li><li>X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block</li><li>MISSING: Content-Security-Policy</li><li>MISSING: Referrer-Policy</li><li>WEAK: jQuery 1.6.2 (2011 — known vulnerabilities)</li></ul><h3>IRGC Media Infrastructure</h3><p>FarsNews (farsnews.ir), the IRGC’s news agency:</p><h3>Mobile APK Exposed</h3><pre>https://dl.farsnews.ir/app.apk</pre><h3>API Server</h3><ul><li>api.farsnews.ir — Returns 401 Unauthorized (requires auth)</li><li>Server: “ninja” (custom implementation)</li><li>Response Format: MessagePack binary (not JSON)</li></ul><h3>Device Fingerprinting Headers</h3><ul><li>X-Token — Authentication</li><li>X-RFID — Request identifier</li><li>APPVERSION / app-version — Mobile app versioning</li><li>duid — Device unique ID</li><li>platform, os — iOS/Android detection</li><li>app-market — App store tracking</li><li>app-scope — Permission levels</li></ul><h3>Streaming &amp; CDN Infrastructure</h3><ul><li>stream01.farsnews.ir — Streaming node 1</li><li>stream02.farsnews.ir — Streaming node 2</li><li>stream03.farsnews.ir — Streaming node 3</li><li>cdn.farsnews.ir — Primary CDN</li><li>ccdn.farsnews.ir — Secondary CDN</li><li>dl.farsnews.ir — Downloads</li><li>trace.farsnews.ir — Analytics</li></ul><h3>Internal Development Tools (30+ subdomains total)</h3><pre>jira.farsnews.ir - Atlassian JIRA<br>confluence.farsnews.ir - Atlassian Confluence<br>git.farsnews.ir - Git repository<br>svn.farsnews.ir - SVN repository<br>chat.farsnews.ir - Internal chat<br>my-api-tlg.farsnews.ir - Telegram API integration</pre><p>These subdomains do not resolve publicly (internal only) but their existence in DNS reveals the development toolchain.</p><h3>Service Worker Tech Stack</h3><pre>https://farsnews.ir/service-worker.js<br>Frameworks: Workbox, Capacitor, MessagePack</pre><h3>Hezbollah Hosting Strategy</h3><p>Hezbollah deliberately hosts infrastructure outside the Middle East for resilience.</p><h3>Moqawama.org.lb (Islamic Resistance)</h3><ul><li>Primary: 91.109.206.65 — Moscow, Russia — Okay-Telecom (AS199669)</li><li>Backup: 176.74.216.191 — Czech Republic — HOST-TELECOM (AS51248)</li><li>Server: Apache + PHP</li></ul><h3>Almanar.com.lb (Al-Manar TV)</h3><ul><li>Primary: 5.35.14.164–166 — Moscow — Selectel</li><li>Backup: 47.250.57.153 — Alibaba Cloud Malaysia</li><li>Server: nginx</li></ul><h3>Active Hezbollah Subdomains</h3><ul><li>video.moqawama.org.lb — Video archive</li><li>audio.moqawama.org.lb — Audio library</li><li>gallery.moqawama.org.lb — Photo gallery</li><li>games.moqawama.org.lb — Propaganda games</li></ul><h3>US Domain Seizures (Ineffective)</h3><p>US DOJ (EDVA) seized 13 Hezbollah domains:</p><ul><li>moqawama.org — DOJ seizure page</li><li>almanarnews.org — DOJ seizure page</li><li>manarnews.org — DOJ seizure page</li><li>almanar-tv.org — DOJ seizure page</li><li>alshahid.org — DOJ seizure page</li></ul><p>But .lb alternatives remain fully operational. Content 100% available. Operations completely unaffected.</p><h3>Hezbollah’s Custom DNS Infrastructure</h3><p>Hezbollah operates their own DNS service outside Western jurisdiction:</p><pre>Nameservers: ns1.awt-lb.com, ns2.awt-lb.com<br>IP: 185.112.156.85<br>Location: Budapest, Hungary<br>ASN: AS210772 (NewPush Europe)</pre><p>“AWT-LB” = “AWT Lebanon” — A custom Hezbollah-controlled DNS service hosted in Hungary.</p><p>Additional DNS backup via ClouDNS (Bulgarian free DNS provider) — ns41–44.cloudns.net</p><p>Hosting strategy: Russia (web servers), Hungary (DNS), Bulgaria (backup DNS), Malaysia (CDN). Four countries, zero Western jurisdiction.</p><h3>Al-Ahed News Domain Migration</h3><ul><li>english.alahednews.com.lb redirects (301) to alahednews.news</li><li>Migrated from .com.lb to .news TLD</li></ul><h3>Hezbollah Social Media Accounts</h3><ul><li>Twitter: @almoqawama1, @English_AlAhed</li><li>YouTube: MoqawamaOrg</li><li>SoundCloud: audiomoqawama</li><li>Facebook: AlAhedEnglish</li><li>Telegram: t.me/Eng_ahed</li></ul><h3>Tasnim News — Self-Hosted Analytics</h3><p>IRGC news outlet runs private Matomo analytics alongside Google:</p><ul><li>analytics.tasnimnews.com — Self-hosted Matomo (formerly Piwik), returns 403 Forbidden</li><li>Google Tag Manager: GTM-PZ3N9B8</li><li>Google Analytics: G-MGYZR3Q3BS</li></ul><p>Avoids sending some data to Google while still using Google Analytics — contradictory OPSEC.</p><h3>The Western Tracking Irony</h3><p>Anti-Western regime sites extensively use Western tracking services.</p><h3>Google Analytics on Iranian/Hezbollah Sites</h3><ul><li>khamenei.ir — UA-6238962–2 (Universal Analytics) + G-8MVZ1HLJT0 (GA4)</li><li>almanar.com.lb — UA-199941297–1 (Universal Analytics) + G-JJ1SM3JFZW (GA4)</li><li>tasnimnews.com — G-MGYZR3Q3BS</li><li>presstv.ir — G-F359E8PMME</li><li>mehrnews.com — G-ERSHRYVTBP</li><li>defapress.ir — G-94BW46TZJM</li><li>moqawama.org.lb — G-Z8F3HPDSWG</li><li>alahednews.com.lb — G-KLX8R3DK7V</li></ul><h3>Clicky Analytics</h3><ul><li>almanar.com.lb — Clicky ID: 101369727 (third analytics platform beyond Google and Microsoft)</li></ul><h3>Google Tag Manager Containers</h3><ul><li>GTM-TLJW8TR — Al-Manar/Hezbollah media network (links almanar.com.lb, almanartv.com.lb, manartv.com.lb)</li><li>GTM-PZ3N9B8 — Tasnim News (IRGC)</li></ul><h3>Microsoft Clarity (Session Recording)</h3><ul><li>cgaike4iub — almanar.com.lb (primary project)</li><li>cs22bibpe3 — almanar.com.lb (secondary project)</li><li>o2z34ibfin — mehrnews.com</li></ul><p>Google has visibility into all their traffic. Microsoft records user sessions on Hezbollah media sites. Clicky tracks Almanar visitors independently.</p><h3>PressTV — CDN Edge in Virginia</h3><p>Iranian state media presstv.ir serves content through a CDN edge located in Ashburn, Virginia, USA:</p><ul><li>X-Edge-Location: Ashburn, US</li><li>Tech: ASP.NET Core</li><li>Cookie: .AspNetCore.Session</li></ul><p>Anti-American propaganda literally served from American soil.</p><h3>MehrNews Internal Infrastructure</h3><p>MehrNews (mehrnews.com) exposed internal systems through subdomains:</p><ul><li>prtg.mehrnews.com — PRTG Network Monitor (infrastructure monitoring)</li><li>hrm.mehrnews.com — HR Management system</li><li>bot.mehrnews.com — Automation bots</li><li>election.mehrnews.com — Election coverage system</li><li>majles.mehrnews.com — Parliament/Majles system</li></ul><h3>President.ir Exposure</h3><p>The Iranian presidency website leaks information through headers and certificates:</p><ul><li>X-SID header leaks session identifiers</li><li>Wildcard certificate: *.president.ir (enables hidden subdomains)</li><li>IP: 194.225.148.241 (AS34592 — Presidential Admin dedicated ASN)</li><li>Subdomains: service.president.ir, video.president.ir, media.president.ir</li><li>Historical archives: dolat7–8.president.ir (Ahmadinejad era), dolat9–10.president.ir (Rouhani era)</li></ul><h3>DMARC Email Addresses Discovered</h3><p>DMARC/SPF DNS records exposed internal email addresses:</p><ul><li>mailauth-rua@khamenei.ir — Supreme Leader’s office DMARC reporting</li><li>mailauth-ruf@khamenei.ir — Supreme Leader’s office DMARC forensic</li><li>dmarc-error@mfa.gov.ir — Foreign Ministry DMARC errors</li><li>noc@farsnews.ir — IRGC Network Operations Center contact</li></ul><p>These reveal internal team structures and provide additional contact vectors for intelligence correlation.</p><h3>EXIF Metadata Attribution</h3><p>Hezbollah media sites preserve EXIF metadata in images:</p><ul><li>1679.jpg — Adobe Photoshop 7.0–2023–04–15 15:27:26</li><li>1713.jpg — Adobe Photoshop 7.0–2023–05–31 07:13:38</li><li>1808.jpg — Photoshop CS6 (Win) — 2014–07–22 16:07:36</li><li>1833.jpg — Photoshop CS6 (Win) — 2024–01–22 14:34:12</li></ul><p>Photoshop 7.0 (2002) = likely pirated. Timestamps = Beirut working hours.</p><h3>WhatsApp OPSEC Failure</h3><pre>&quot;WhatsApp Image 2025-12-13 at 9.50.45 AM.jpeg&quot;<br>Location: english.alahednews.com.lb</pre><p>Staff uploads directly from WhatsApp without renaming. Reveals internal communication patterns.</p><h3>Timestamp Filename Patterns (Al-Ahed News)</h3><p>Files named with format YYYYMMDDHHmmss.jpg:</p><ul><li>20260101193702.jpg — Uploaded 2026–01–01 at 19:37:02</li><li>Times consistent with Beirut working hours (UTC+2/+3)</li><li>Automated upload system with no manual review</li></ul><h3>Government ASN Ownership</h3><ul><li>AS34592 — Iranian Presidential Admin — president.ir</li><li>AS29079 — IRNA — irna.ir network</li><li>AS24631 — Tose’h Fanavari — mfa.gov.ir</li><li>AS48434 — Tebyan-e-Noor Institute — khamenei.ir mail</li><li>AS200554 — Dade Pardaz Kimia Pouyesh — khamenei.ir main</li><li>AS205585 — ArvanCloud — ALL gov sites CDN</li></ul><p>ArvanCloud = Single point of failure for Iranian regime web infrastructure.</p><h3>Google Site Verification Exposure</h3><p>Iranian government sites exposed their Google Search Console verification codes in HTML meta tags and DNS TXT records. These codes can be used to:</p><ul><li>Identify the Google account managing the site</li><li>Correlate webmaster identities across multiple properties</li><li>Discover additional domains managed by the same team</li></ul><p>Combined with Google Analytics IDs, this creates a fingerprint for tracking regime web administrators.</p><h3>Exposed Hashes and Credentials</h3><p>A hash database of 21 real collected items was compiled from HTTP responses, API calls, HTML sources, and DNS records:</p><ul><li>PHP Session Hashes: 3 (from Hezbollah HTTP responses)</li><li>Cookie Sessions: 1 (from FarsNews API)</li><li>CSS Cache Hashes: 1 (from Al-Manar HTML)</li><li>API Tracking Hashes: 1 (from Khamenei API)</li><li>Google Site Verification: 1 (from DNS TXT)</li><li>Google Analytics IDs: 9 (from HTML)</li><li>GTM Container IDs: 2 (from HTML)</li><li>Microsoft Clarity IDs: 3 (from HTML)</li></ul><h3>Hezbollah Emails Discovered</h3><ul><li>info@moqawama.org.lb — Official contact</li><li>games@moqawama.org — OPSEC FAILURE: still uses seized .org domain instead of active .org.lb</li></ul><h3>Critical Exposures Summary</h3><ol><li>VPN endpoint in public DNS — Target for credential attacks</li><li>Private IP leak (10.30.41.85) — Internal network revealed</li><li>APK download exposed — Reverse engineering possible</li><li>Admin portal in certs — Administrative interface found</li><li>Hidden API domain — Deliberately hidden infra exposed</li><li>Google Site Verification codes — Webmaster identity exposed</li><li>WhatsApp filenames — OPSEC failure</li><li>Photoshop metadata — Attribution possible</li><li>Seized domain in email — games@moqawama.org still used</li></ol><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While Iran’s regime massacred thousands of its own people — with estimates ranging from 3,117 to over 30,000 killed — their digital infrastructure stood exposed the entire time.</p><p>Intelligence Collected:</p><ul><li>500+ subdomains mapped</li><li>75+ unique IP addresses</li><li>6 government ASNs identified</li><li>Private IP addresses leaked</li><li>VPN endpoints exposed</li><li>Western tracking on anti-Western sites (9 GA properties, 2 GTM containers, 3 Clarity projects, 1 Clicky)</li><li>PressTV CDN edge in Ashburn, Virginia (anti-US propaganda from US soil)</li><li>DMARC emails exposing internal team structures (including IRGC NOC)</li><li>MehrNews internal systems (PRTG monitor, HR, bots)</li><li>president.ir session leaks and historical archives</li><li>EXIF metadata enabling attribution</li><li>ArvanCloud as single point of failure</li><li>12+ live streaming nodes for propaganda</li><li>Internal dev tools (JIRA, Confluence, Telegram API)</li><li>Google Site Verification codes exposing webmasters</li><li>21-item hash/token database</li><li>Hezbollah custom DNS (awt-lb.com) in Hungary</li><li>Multi-country hosting: Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Malaysia</li><li>Self-hosted Matomo analytics on IRGC media</li><li>FarsNews mobile APK + device fingerprinting system</li></ul><p>Tools Used:</p><ul><li>dig, nslookup (DNS queries)</li><li>curl (HTTP header analysis)</li><li>crt.sh (Certificate transparency logs)</li><li>Shodan, SecurityTrails (Infrastructure mapping)</li><li>VirusTotal (Domain analysis)</li><li>Wayback Machine (Historical data)</li><li>Browser DevTools (JavaScript analysis)</li><li>EXIF extraction tools</li></ul><p>No exploitation. No zero-days. Just publicly accessible infrastructure and basic OSINT methodology.</p><p>A regime that massacred thousands while leaving its digital infrastructure wide open.</p><p><em>Iran OSINT Project — January 2026</em></p><p><em>All data collected from publicly accessible sources without authentication bypass or system compromise.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=560ea2ab03f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cuba Revealed: How the Communist Regime Left Government Infrastructure Exposed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ringmast4r/cuba-revealed-how-the-communist-regime-left-government-infrastructure-exposed-10e92fd4b08f?source=rss-93a7e401453------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/10e92fd4b08f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cuba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ringmast4r]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Feb 2026 04:38:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-01T04:38:04.925Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A Case Study in Cuban Government Cybersecurity Failures</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eAx73CfIWO_IZcJD-8i62w.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p><em>[NOTE: Some content in this article is redacted ]</em></p><p>Cuba remains one of the most isolated countries in the Western Hemisphere. The communist regime controls all media, restricts internet access, and monitors its citizens through a pervasive security apparatus. ETECSA, the state telecom monopoly, is the only internet provider on the island.</p><p>I conducted a passive OSINT assessment of 131 Cuban government domains. What I found was a mix of surprisingly good security, deliberate obfuscation, and glaring failures.</p><p>The IT security team at the University of Havana got exposed by their own misconfigured WordPress API. The Communist Party website claims to run on “Windows 95.” Military sites leak camera metadata. And the Agriculture Ministry has better security headers than the Armed Forces.</p><p><strong>131 domains. 5,164 URLs scraped. 194 IPs mapped. 14 WordPress users exposed.</strong></p><h3>The WordPress Problem</h3><p>Cuban government sites running WordPress left their REST APIs exposed:</p><h3>SLD.CU (National Health Portal) — 9 Users Exposed</h3><ul><li>admin</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li></ul><h3>UH.CU (University of Havana) — 5 Users Exposed</h3><ul><li>adminnodo</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li>[REDACTED]</li><li><strong>seginf</strong> — IT Security team (ironic)</li><li>[REDACTED]</li></ul><p>Plugins detected: Yoast SEO v25.7, Polylang, ACF. Social media: @UdeLaHabana (Twitter).</p><p><strong>The irony:</strong> “seginf” appears to be the IT security team. They were exposed by the same misconfiguration they should have secured.</p><h3>Gravatar Hash Risk</h3><p>Each WordPress user has an associated Gravatar hash (SHA256 of their email). These hashes were exposed and can potentially be reversed using rainbow tables or compared against known email databases.</p><h3>The “Windows 95” Deception</h3><p>Two Cuban government sites return fake server headers:</p><ul><li><strong>pcc.cu (Communist Party)</strong> — Fake Header: Windows95 — Actual Stack: Drupal 10 + PHP 8.1.20 — Load Balancer: SERVERID=www2</li><li><strong>etecsa.cu (State Telecom)</strong> — Fake Header: Windows95 — Actual Stack: Drupal 10 + PHP 8.1.20</li></ul><p>Both sites are running Drupal 10 on PHP 8.1.20. Windows 95 cannot run PHP 8 (released 2021). PCC also leaked a load balancer identifier (SERVERID=www2). <strong>Coordinated obfuscation strategy</strong> to confuse automated scanners or discourage attackers.</p><h3>The ETECSA Internal Certificate Authority</h3><p>Cuba’s state telecom operates their own internal CA:</p><pre>Issuer: ETECSA Centro de Datos<br>Validity: 12 YEARS (Nov 2019 - Jan 2031)<br>Usage: aduana.gob.cu</pre><h3>Implications</h3><ul><li>12-year validity is extremely unusual (standard is 1–2 years)</li><li>Internal CA means ETECSA can issue certificates for any domain</li><li>Potential for man-in-the-middle attacks on Cuban internet users</li><li><strong>ETECSA controls all internet traffic AND operates their own CA</strong></li></ul><h3>Military Location Data Exposed</h3><h3>MINFAR Headquarters (Full Address)</h3><pre>Avenida Independencia e/ Gral Suarez y 20 de mayo<br>Edificio Sierra Maestra<br>Plaza de la Revolucion, La Habana, Cuba</pre><p>Published in HTML og:street_address meta tags.</p><h3>Aduana General (GPS Coordinates)</h3><pre>Latitude: 23.1230455<br>Longitude: -82.3913368<br>Precision: ~1 meter</pre><p>Embedded in Google Maps URL on public website.</p><p>Basic OPSEC failure. Geographic coordinates and full addresses of military installations should never appear in public-facing web code.</p><h3>The MININT DNS Anomaly</h3><p>Cuba’s Ministry of Interior (secret police) runs isolated DNS:</p><pre>ns1.minint.gob.cu<br>ns2.minint.gob.cu</pre><p>Unlike other Cuban government sites using ETECSA DNS, <strong>MININT trusts no one</strong>. They maintain complete control over their own domain resolution.</p><h3>Camera Metadata Exposure</h3><p>Military and state media preserve EXIF metadata in images:</p><h3>MINFAR (Armed Forces) — 29 Images</h3><ul><li>Server: PortalMINFAR (custom header)</li><li>Nikon D5600 (with GPS capability)</li><li>LG LM-Q710.FG Android phone</li><li>Timestamps: 2016–2020 exposed</li></ul><h3>Radio Rebelde (State Media) — 51 Images</h3><ul><li>Sony A7S II (~$2,500 mirrorless)</li><li>Canon EOS 6D Mark II (full-frame)</li><li>Adobe Lightroom Classic 9.2</li><li>W3 Total Cache 2.8.15 + Stackpath CDN</li></ul><h3>Software Identified</h3><ul><li>Adobe Photoshop CS6 (2012–14 years old, likely pirated)</li><li>Adobe Lightroom Classic 9.2 (Recent)</li></ul><p><strong>182 images with preserved EXIF metadata collected.</strong></p><h3>Fresh Timestamp Finding</h3><p>The metadata leaks are not historical — they are ongoing:</p><pre>File: 0901-ley-transparencia.jpg<br>Created: 2026-01-09 17:54:15 (Cuba time)<br>Edit time: 37 seconds (quick export)<br>Software: Adobe Photoshop CS6 (Windows)</pre><p>A file created days before collection, still leaking full EXIF data. The 37-second edit time indicates a quick resize/export rather than editing — meaning EXIF stripping was never configured in their workflow.</p><h3>XMP Machine Tracking</h3><p>Unique XMP identifiers embedded in images enable workstation fingerprinting:</p><pre>DocumentID: xmp.did:5B5B8435AEEDF011...</pre><ul><li>Same prefix = same Photoshop installation</li><li>Can correlate images across time periods</li><li>Enables tracking of specific machines used for media production</li><li>Machine fingerprint captured from government workstations</li></ul><h3>AI Infrastructure Discovered</h3><p>Cuba is developing AI capabilities despite sanctions:</p><h3>Central Bank (bc.gob.cu)</h3><pre>Component: &lt;VirtualAssistant client:load /&gt;<br>Framework: Astro.js<br>Status: &quot;Temporarily Hidden&quot; (disabled in DOM)<br>API: api.bc.gob.cu (Node.js/Express)</pre><h3>ETECSA (State Telecom)</h3><pre>Module: etecsa-asistente-block<br>Framework: Drupal custom module<br>Status: Active in DOM</pre><p>Modern fintech and customer service automation underway.</p><h3>Google Analytics on Government Sites</h3><p>Despite anti-US rhetoric, Cuban government sites send visitor data to Google:</p><ul><li><strong>MINED (Education)</strong> — UA-107169760–1</li><li><strong>Aduana (Customs)</strong> — UA-144247220–1</li><li><strong>Juventud Rebelde</strong> — UA-291893–2</li><li><strong>Trabajadores</strong> — UA-89356472–1</li><li><strong>Trabajadores</strong> — GTM-TKWLSZN (Tag Manager)</li><li><strong>Granma</strong> — G-D39KSEBN9Q</li><li><strong>Finlay Institute</strong> — UA-142146896–1</li><li><strong>Tribuna</strong> — UA-131250309–1</li><li><strong>Ahora</strong> — UA-79009587–1</li><li><strong>Cubana Airlines</strong> — G-CRYZ9ZCZ5Z</li></ul><p><strong>12 Google Analytics IDs discovered across Cuban government and state media sites.</strong></p><p>Multiple state media outlets share similar analytics configurations. ACN and Juventud Rebelde share Laravel infrastructure. User behavior is trackable across government properties via correlated tracking IDs.</p><h3>The Central Bank API</h3><pre>api.bc.gob.cu - Node.js/Express backend<br>Endpoints: /docs (403 - requires auth), /api (301 redirect)</pre><p>Cuba’s financial infrastructure is more technologically advanced than public-facing government sites suggest.</p><h3>Security Header Analysis</h3><ul><li><strong>BEST:</strong> minag.gob.cu (Agriculture) — Full CSP, 2-year HSTS, COEP, COOP, Permissions-Policy blocking camera/mic</li><li><strong>WORST:</strong> Multiple sites — Missing all security headers</li><li><strong>MINFAR (Military):</strong> 6-month HSTS only</li></ul><p><strong>The Agriculture Ministry has better web security than the Armed Forces.</strong> HSTS: 2 years for tractors vs 6 months for tanks.</p><h3>Security Ratings by Organization</h3><ul><li><strong>BEST:</strong> minag.gob.cu (Agriculture) — Full header suite</li><li><strong>GOOD:</strong> uh.cu (University of Havana) — Blocks scraping</li><li><strong>POOR:</strong> minfar.gob.cu (Armed Forces) — Device info leaked, weak HSTS</li><li><strong>POOR:</strong> radiorebelde.cu (State Media) — Full EXIF exposed on 51 images</li></ul><h3>Honeypots Detected</h3><ul><li><strong>ujc.cu</strong> — Drupal honeypot_time field</li><li><strong>aduana.gob.cu</strong> — Drupal honeypot module</li><li><strong>etecsa.cu</strong> — Honeypot detected</li><li><strong>radiohc.cu</strong> — WP Armour 2.3.04</li></ul><p>Cuban security teams actively monitor for reconnaissance. They’re trying to catch scrapers.</p><h3>GAESA Military Enterprises</h3><p>GAESA (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A.) is the Cuban military’s business conglomerate. These military-controlled commercial entities were enumerated:</p><ul><li><strong>gaviota.cu</strong> — Gaviota S.A. — Tourism/Hotels</li><li><strong>cimex.cu</strong> — CIMEX — Retail/Import</li><li><strong>trd.cu</strong> — TRD Caribe — Retail stores</li><li><strong>cubalse.cu</strong> — Cubalse — Foreign trade</li><li><strong>habaguanex.cu</strong> — Habaguanex — Old Havana tourism</li><li><strong>marlin.cu</strong> — Marlin — Nautical tourism</li><li><strong>palmares.cu</strong> — Palmares — Restaurants</li><li><strong>caracol.cu</strong> — Caracol — Retail</li></ul><p><strong>9 GAESA domains collected.</strong> These military-owned businesses generate hard currency that sustains the regime. Their web infrastructure reveals commercial operations under military control.</p><h3>Exposed Tokens and Sessions</h3><p>Security tokens discovered in page sources:</p><h3>CSRF Tokens</h3><ul><li><strong>cujae.edu.cu</strong> — [REDACTED] — Joomla</li><li><strong>radiorebelde.cu</strong> — [REDACTED] — WordPress Popular Posts</li><li><strong>ics.gob.cu</strong> — [REDACTED] — WordPress admin-ajax</li></ul><h3>Facebook Integration</h3><pre>Site: aduana.gob.cu (Military Customs)<br>Facebook App ID: [REDACTED]</pre><p>Military customs integrated with Facebook’s platform.</p><h3>Certificate Expiration Warnings</h3><p>16 SSL certificates collected. <strong>15 sites use Let’s Encrypt</strong> (free, automated). <strong>1 site uses ETECSA’s internal CA</strong> (aduana.gob.cu).</p><p>Several government certificates were expiring within 30–60 days of collection:</p><ul><li><strong>sld.cu</strong> — Jan 24, 2026 — Health portal</li><li><strong>cujae.edu.cu</strong> — Jan 24, 2026 — Engineering university</li><li><strong>radiorebelde.cu</strong> — Feb 24, 2026 — State media</li><li><strong>parlamentocubano.gob.cu</strong> — Feb 22, 2026 — Parliament</li></ul><p>Expired certificates would trigger browser warnings, potentially exposing users to downgrade attacks or eroding trust in government sites.</p><h3>Complete Infrastructure Summary</h3><h3>Domains Analyzed: 131</h3><ul><li><strong>Presidency/Executive:</strong> 10</li><li><strong>Ministries:</strong> 20</li><li><strong>Military/Security:</strong> 25+</li><li><strong>State Media:</strong> 20+</li><li><strong>Infrastructure/Telecom:</strong> 15+</li><li><strong>Judiciary:</strong> 6</li><li><strong>Other Government:</strong> 35+</li></ul><h3>Collection Statistics</h3><ul><li><strong>Total Files:</strong> 1,494</li><li><strong>Total Size:</strong> ~30 MB</li><li><strong>Unique URLs Scraped:</strong> 5,164</li><li><strong>IPs Mapped:</strong> 194</li><li><strong>WordPress Users Exposed:</strong> 14</li><li><strong>Google Analytics IDs:</strong> 12</li><li><strong>SSL Certificates:</strong> 16</li><li><strong>EXIF Images:</strong> 182</li><li><strong>Email Addresses:</strong> 64</li><li><strong>Phone Patterns:</strong> 7,321</li><li><strong>CSRF/Session Tokens:</strong> 5+</li><li><strong>GAESA Enterprises:</strong> 9</li></ul><h3>Technology Stacks Discovered</h3><ul><li><strong>Drupal 8/10:</strong> MINFAR (Varbase), PCC, ETECSA, CITMA, CITMATEL</li><li><strong>WordPress:</strong> SLD, UH, MINED, Radio Rebelde (W3 Total Cache 2.8.15)</li><li><strong>Laravel + Vue.js:</strong> ACN, Juventud Rebelde</li><li><strong>Node.js/Express:</strong> Central Bank API</li><li><strong>Joomla:</strong> CUJAE (CSRF tokens exposed)</li><li><strong>Astro.js:</strong> Central Bank frontend (VirtualAssistant component)</li></ul><p>No standardization across government = more attack surface.</p><h3>RSS/Atom Feeds Exposed</h3><ul><li>granma.cu/feed — Communist Party newspaper</li><li>juventudrebelde.cu/feed — Youth newspaper</li><li>acn.cu/feed — Cuban News Agency</li></ul><p>Public RSS feeds enable automated content monitoring.</p><h3>High-Value Government Emails Exposed</h3><p>Official contact addresses discovered in page sources and metadata:</p><ul><li><strong>despacho@presidencia.gob.cu</strong> — Presidential Office</li><li><strong>webmaster@presidencia.gob.cu</strong> — Presidential Webmaster</li><li><strong>asambleanacionalpp@anpp.gob.cu</strong> — National Assembly</li><li><strong>atencionpoblacion@bc.gob.cu</strong> — Central Bank</li><li><strong>publico@aduana.gob.cu</strong> — Customs (Military)</li><li><strong>apoblacionmf@unicom.co.cu</strong> — MINFAR Public Affairs</li><li><strong>rectorado@tesla.cujae.edu.cu</strong> — CUJAE Rectorate</li><li><strong>digital@trabajadores.cu</strong> — Workers Newspaper</li><li><strong>web@acn.cu</strong> — Cuban News Agency</li><li><strong>radio.reloj@icrt.cu</strong> — State Radio</li><li><strong>hosting@enet.cu</strong> — ETECSA Data Center</li></ul><p>These are official institutional contact addresses.</p><h3>Personal Email Failures</h3><p>Government organizations publish personal Gmail/Yahoo accounts as official contacts:</p><ul><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — UJC (Young Communists)</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Artists Union</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Academy of Sciences</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Academy of Sciences</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Academy of Sciences</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Health Network</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Radio Havana</li><li>[REDACTED]@gmail.com — Developer (JS library)</li><li>[REDACTED]@yahoo.es — Academy of Sciences</li></ul><p><strong>9 personal email accounts on government sites.</strong> Personal identification exposed. Breach database correlation possible. Social engineering vectors identified.</p><h3>What This Reveals</h3><h3>1. Deliberate Obfuscation</h3><p>Fake “Windows 95” headers indicate security awareness. Coordinated across PCC and ETECSA.</p><h3>2. Institutional Silos</h3><p>MININT operates isolated DNS. Different security postures across government.</p><h3>3. Basic Failures</h3><p>WordPress APIs exposed. EXIF metadata preserved. GPS coordinates leaked. Still leaking fresh data as of January 2026.</p><h3>4. Western Dependency</h3><p>Google Analytics across government sites sends data to US servers despite embargo.</p><h3>5. Internal CA Concerns</h3><p>ETECSA’s 12-year CA enables potential surveillance of all Cuban internet traffic.</p><h3>6. Machine Attribution</h3><p>XMP DocumentIDs and EXIF timestamps enable tracking of specific government workstations across time.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Cuba’s communist government maintains one of the most controlled internet environments in the world. Yet passive reconnaissance revealed:</p><p><strong>Exposed:</strong></p><ul><li>131 government domains mapped</li><li>5,164 URLs scraped across all targets</li><li>194 unique IP addresses mapped</li><li>14 WordPress users (including IT security team)</li><li>GPS coordinates of military facilities</li><li>182 images with EXIF metadata (ongoing — fresh timestamps from Jan 2026)</li><li>XMP DocumentIDs enabling workstation fingerprinting</li><li>12 Google Analytics IDs sending data to US</li><li>Internal CA with 12-year validity (ETECSA Centro de Datos)</li><li>Fake server headers (coordinated obfuscation)</li><li>Active honeypots (Drupal + WP Armour)</li><li>9 GAESA military enterprise domains</li><li>7,321 phone patterns</li><li>64 email addresses (9 personal Gmail/Yahoo on gov sites)</li><li>Gravatar hashes reversible to emails</li><li>CSRF tokens and Facebook App IDs</li></ul><p><strong>Tools Used:</strong></p><ul><li>DNS queries</li><li>HTTP requests</li><li>Certificate analysis</li><li>WordPress API enumeration</li><li>EXIF extraction</li></ul><p>No exploitation. No hacking. Just publicly accessible information and basic OSINT methodology.</p><p>A regime that surveils its own people while leaving government infrastructure exposed.</p><p><em>Cuba OSINT Project — January 2026</em></p><p><em>All data collected from publicly accessible sources without authentication bypass or system compromise.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=10e92fd4b08f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Unlocked Vault: How Venezuela’s Government Exposed 188GB of Sensitive Data Through Basic…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ringmast4r/the-unlocked-vault-how-venezuelas-government-exposed-188gb-of-sensitive-data-through-basic-31dd9e80df6e?source=rss-93a7e401453------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31dd9e80df6e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venezuela]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ringmast4r]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 03:38:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-15T03:38:49.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_dxbPZjttb6eIARbzZcuKQ.png" /><figcaption>The Venezuelan flag with seven stars — the flag of a free Venezuela.</figcaption></figure><h3>The Unlocked Vault: How Venezuela’s Government Exposed 188GB of Sensitive Data Through Basic Misconfigurations</h3><p>A Case Study in Venezuelan Cybersecurity Failures</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In late 2025, Venezuela announced the “Crystal Vault” — a centralized surveillance database built by Chinese telecom giant ZTE. The system was designed to merge citizen identity records, banking data, and social program participation for more than 30 million Venezuelans. President Maduro praised it as a tool for “social protection.”</p><p>What the regime didn’t announce: the same government agencies tasked with surveilling citizens had left their own digital infrastructure wide open. Through nothing more than publicly documented WordPress APIs and basic EXIF extraction, I was able to collect approximately 188 gigabytes of government data, including staff GPS locations, internal system routes, and enough information to identify personnel across dozens of agencies.</p><p>No hacking required. No authentication bypassed. Just publicly accessible endpoints that anyone with a web browser could reach.</p><h3>The WordPress Problem</h3><p>WordPress powers roughly 43% of all websites globally. By default, the WordPress REST API exposes several endpoints without authentication:</p><pre>/wp-json/wp/v2/users    - Lists all registered users<br>/wp-json/wp/v2/posts    - All published content<br>/wp-json/wp/v2/media    - All uploaded files</pre><p>This is documented behavior. It’s in the WordPress developer documentation. It’s been discussed in security circles for years.</p><p>Yet, when I began probing Venezuelan government websites in December 2025 and into 2026, I found dozens of agencies running WordPress with these endpoints fully exposed:</p><p>Key findings by agency:</p><p>VTV (State Television) — <a href="http://vtv.gob.ve/">vtv.gob.ve</a>: 168,178 media files exposed</p><p>INCES (Worker Training) — <a href="http://inces.gob.ve/">inces.gob.ve</a>: 20,168 media files exposed</p><p>AVN (State News) — <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/redir/general-malware-page?url=http%3A%2F%2Favn%2einfo%2eve">avn.info.ve</a>: 7 users exposed, 13,809 media files</p><p>SAIME (Immigration/ID) — <a href="http://saime.gob.ve/">saime.gob.ve</a>: 298 media files exposed</p><p>SAREN (Notary Registry) — <a href="http://saren.gob.ve/">saren.gob.ve</a>: 3 users exposed, 1,245 media files</p><p>PATRIA (Social Control System) — <a href="http://patria.org.ve/">patria.org.ve</a>: 1 user exposed, 11 media files</p><p>CORREO DEL ORINOCO (State Newspaper): 6 users exposed, 11,420 media files</p><p>EJERCITO (Army) — <a href="http://ejercito.mil.ve/">ejercito.mil.ve</a>: 8,000+ media files (users protected)</p><p>ARMADA (Navy) — <a href="http://armada.mil.ve/">armada.mil.ve</a>: 3 users (hashes stripped)</p><p>AVIACION (Air Force) — <a href="http://aviacion.mil.ve/">aviacion.mil.ve</a>: 401 Protected</p><p>MILICIA (Militia) — <a href="http://milicia.mil.ve/">milicia.mil.ve</a>: 2 users (hashes stripped)</p><p>The Patria platform, which tracks 21.8 million Venezuelans’ benefits, voting patterns, and social participation, had its WordPress admin account discoverable through a simple API call.</p><h3>The Gravatar Loophole</h3><p>WordPress doesn’t just expose usernames. It exposes Gravatar hashes: MD5 or SHA256 hashes of user email addresses used to fetch avatar images.</p><p>These hashes appear in the HTML source of any WordPress page and in API responses:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;id&quot;: 1,<br>  &quot;name&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;,<br>  &quot;avatar_urls&quot;: {<br>    &quot;96&quot;: &quot;https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/1d2141ead3cf3d83b031be7b64ad9117&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>That hash (1d2141ead3cf3d83b031be7b64ad9117) is a one-way function of the user’s email. In theory, you can’t reverse it.</p><p>In practice, you can. Tools like Hashcat can run millions of email permutations per second against these hashes. With a targeted wordlist of Venezuelan government email patterns (nombre.apellido@agencia.gob.ve), I cracked 269 email addresses from government and media staff accounts, a 10.5% success rate.</p><p>The methodology:</p><ol><li>Collect hashes from /wp-json/wp/v2/users across all target sites</li><li>Generate wordlists based on Venezuelan naming conventions and domains</li><li>Run Hashcat with MD5/SHA256 modes on dual RTX 3070 GPUs</li><li>Match successful cracks to source agencies</li><li>Use cracked patterns to refine wordlists and crack more</li></ol><p>From ~2,555 collected hashes, 269 emails were recovered:</p><ul><li>GOVT: 33 cracked (from vicepresidencia.gob.ve, mindeporte.gob.ve, defensapublica.gob.ve, sudeban.gob.ve, abae.gob.ve, patria.org.ve)</li><li>MEDIA: 236 cracked (from ultimasnoticias.com.ve, diariodelosandes.com, contrapunto.com, telesurtv.net)</li><li>NGO: 4 cracked (from CEDICE, PROVEA, COFAVIC)</li><li>EDU: 2 cracked</li></ul><p>Notable recoveries included the webmaster account for Patria (Venezuela’s social control platform), institutional accounts at Sudeban (banking regulator), and the official vicepresidencia@vicepresidencia.gob.ve address.</p><h3>The Scale of Exposure</h3><p>I documented 190 Venezuelan government domains across all categories. Of these, I probed 33 domains and collected hashes. 156 domains remain untested, including high-value targets like:</p><ul><li>Military/Security: fanb.mil.ve, dgcim.mil.ve, sebin.gob.ve, cicpc.gob.ve</li><li>Key Government: cne.gob.ve (Elections), tsj.gob.ve (Supreme Court), bcv.gob.ve (Central Bank), presidencia.gob.ve</li><li>State Enterprises: cantv.com.ve, pdvsa.com, corpoelec.gob.ve</li><li>Regional: All 23 Venezuelan states have .gob.ve domains — only Lara was probed</li></ul><p>Hash sources by volume:</p><p><a href="http://ultimasnoticias.com.ve/">ultimasnoticias.com.ve</a>: 614 hashes (State-aligned media)</p><p><a href="http://elpitazo.net/">elpitazo.net</a>: 236 hashes (Independent news)</p><p><a href="http://telesurtv.net/">telesurtv.net</a>: 158 hashes (State media)</p><p><a href="http://prensa-latina.cu/">prensa-latina.cu</a>: 100 hashes (Cuban State News Agency)</p><p><a href="http://diariodelosandes.com/">diariodelosandes.com</a>: 100 hashes (Regional newspaper)</p><p><a href="http://nuevopais.net/">nuevopais.net</a>: 83 hashes</p><p><a href="http://larazon.net/">larazon.net</a>: 32 hashes</p><p><a href="http://contrapunto.com/">contrapunto.com</a>: 23 hashes</p><p><a href="http://cedice.org.ve/">cedice.org.ve</a>: 22 hashes (Economic think tank)</p><p><a href="http://correodelorinoco.gob.ve/">correodelorinoco.gob.ve</a>: 16 hashes (State newspaper)</p><p><a href="http://mindeporte.gob.ve/">mindeporte.gob.ve</a>: 15 hashes (Sports Ministry)</p><p><a href="http://defensapublica.gob.ve/">defensapublica.gob.ve</a>: 13 hashes (Public Defender)</p><p><a href="http://minhidrocarburos.gob.ve/">minhidrocarburos.gob.ve</a>: 11 hashes (Hydrocarbons Ministry)</p><p>+ 20 other domains: 1,132 hashes</p><p>TOTAL: 2,555 hashes</p><p>The Cuban connection is notable: prensa-latina.cu (Cuba’s state news agency) had 100 exposed hashes, demonstrating the Venezuela-Cuba digital integration.</p><h3>EXIF: Photos That Talk</h3><p>When Venezuelan government staff uploaded photos to agency websites, many forgot a critical step: stripping EXIF metadata.</p><p>EXIF (Exchangeable Image File Format) is embedded in photos by cameras and smartphones. It can include:</p><ul><li>GPS coordinates (latitude/longitude)</li><li>Device make and model</li><li>Date and time of capture</li><li>Camera serial numbers</li><li>Software used for editing</li></ul><p>I downloaded 485,775 media files from exposed WordPress endpoints.</p><p>My analysis revealed:</p><p>Files with any EXIF: 13,209 (~3%).</p><p>Files with GPS coordinates: 436</p><p>Unique camera models:143</p><p>Staff phone models identified: 30+</p><p>**436 photos contained GPS coordinates from government staff phones.**</p><p>The INCES training institute was the worst offender, with 16 photos with GPS from staff Xiaomi and Samsung phones, clustering around facilities in Caracas, Merida, Falcon, and Carabobo states.</p><p>Phone models identified included:</p><ul><li>Xiaomi Redmi A3x</li><li>Xiaomi M2004J19C / M2006C3LG / M2006C3MG</li><li>Samsung SM-J260MU</li><li>Samsung SM-A107M</li><li>HONOR JDY-LX3</li><li>EPIKONE X655</li></ul><p>Each photo with GPS essentially broadcast: “A government employee was at these exact coordinates on this date using this phone.”</p><h3>The CNE Intranet Leak</h3><p>Venezuela’s CNE (National Electoral Council) presented a different exposure vector. The agency didn’t use WordPress. They built a Next.js application.</p><p>Next.js, a React framework, generates a file called _buildManifest.js that lists all application routes. On the public-facing CNE site, this manifest was accessible and revealed 78–154 internal application paths:</p><pre>/siacper/privada                    - Private personnel system<br>/siacper/privada/TablaFallecidos    - Deceased persons table<br>/siacper/privada/TablaNegados       - Denied requests table<br>/siacper/privada/TablaVerificados   - Verified persons<br>/ari/retenciones                    - Tax withholdings<br>/fideicomiso                        - Trust fund system<br>/constancia-trabajo                 - Work certificates<br>/recibo-pago                        - Pay receipts<br>/registro/[cedula]/[token]          - Registration by cedula number</pre><p>While the endpoints themselves required authentication, their mere existence revealed the internal structure of CNE’s personnel and financial systems.</p><h3>The Intelligence Agencies: Digital Ghosts</h3><p>Ironically, Venezuela’s intelligence services showed better operational security than civilian agencies by having almost no digital presence at all.</p><p>SEBIN (Bolivarian National Intelligence Service):</p><ul><li>sebin.gob.ve: Does not exist</li><li>No official website of any kind</li><li>Only presence: Dormant Twitter account from 2016</li></ul><p>DGCIM (Military Counterintelligence):</p><ul><li>dgcim.mil.ve: Does not resolve</li><li>dgim.mil.ve (old domain): Does not resolve</li><li>Primary presence: Instagram (@dgcimoficial, ~58K followers)</li></ul><p>The agencies responsible for surveilling citizens operate in near-complete digital darkness. Their Instagram accounts, however, still occasionally posted photos with identifiable faces, locations, and equipment.</p><h3>OFAC: The US Government’s Contribution</h3><p>The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list of individuals and entities under US sanctions. This is public data, downloadable from <a href="http://treasury.gov/">treasury.gov</a>.</p><p>For Venezuela, the list contains 470 entries including:</p><ul><li>Full names and aliases</li><li>Cedula numbers (Venezuelan national ID — extremely sensitive)</li><li>Passport numbers</li><li>RIF numbers (tax ID)</li><li>Dates and places of birth</li></ul><p>Cross-referencing OFAC cedula numbers with other exposed data creates powerful correlation opportunities. The bounties on listed individuals total over $70 million USD.</p><h3>Complete Tech Stack Enumeration</h3><p>Probing revealed a patchwork of platforms across Venezuelan government infrastructure:</p><h3>WordPress Sites (API Exposed)</h3><p>EJERCITO (Army) — ejercito.mil.ve: WordPress + Elementor, Users protected, Media OPEN (8000+)</p><p>SUDEBAN (Banking Regulator) — sudeban.gob.ve: WordPress, 4 users, MD5 hashes, FULLY OPEN</p><p>SAREN (Notary Registry) — saren.gob.ve: WordPress, 3 users, SHA256 hashes, FULLY OPEN</p><p>PATRIA (Social Control) — patria.org.ve: WordPress, 1 user, MD5 hash, FULLY OPEN</p><p>Correo del Orinoco — correodelorinoco.gob.ve: WordPress, 6 users, MD5 hashes, FULLY OPEN</p><p>TeleSUR — telesurtv.net: WordPress, 140 users, Users OPEN</p><p>La Iguana TV — laiguana.tv: WordPress, 47 users, Users OPEN</p><p>VTV (State TV) — vtv.gob.ve: WordPress, Users 401, Media OPEN</p><p>INCES — inces.gob.ve: WordPress, Users 401, Media OPEN</p><p>Ultimas Noticias — ultimasnoticias.com.ve: WordPress, 520+ users, Cloudflare protected</p><h3>Non-WordPress Government Sites</h3><p>CNE (Electoral Council) — <a href="http://cne.gob.ve/">cne.gob.ve</a>: Next.js + React + nginx/1.14.1 (Build manifest leaked 78–154 routes)</p><p>BCV (Central Bank) — <a href="http://bcv.org.ve/">bcv.org.ve</a>: Drupal (RDF prefixes detected)</p><p>BANDES (Development Bank) — <a href="http://bandes.gob.ve/">bandes.gob.ve</a>: Laravel (PHP)</p><p>Ciudad CCS — <a href="http://ciudadccs.info/">ciudadccs.info</a>: Laravel (PHP)</p><p>MINTUR (Tourism) — <a href="http://mintur.gob.ve/">mintur.gob.ve</a>: Laravel (PHP)</p><p>INTT (Transport) — <a href="http://intt.gob.ve/">intt.gob.ve</a>: Custom PHP</p><h3>Military Sites</h3><p>Armada (Navy) — <a href="http://armada.mil.ve/">armada.mil.ve</a>: Custom nginx (“ArmadaBolivariana” header), Locked down</p><p>Aviacion (Air Force) — <a href="http://aviacion.mil.ve/">aviacion.mil.ve</a>: 404 Not Found</p><p>Ejercito (Army) — <a href="http://ejercito.mil.ve/">ejercito.mil.ve</a>: WordPress, 403 blocks Tor, media open via direct access</p><h3>Inaccessible / Geo-blocked</h3><p>AVN — <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/redir/general-malware-page?url=http%3A%2F%2Favn%2einfo%2eve">avn.info.ve</a>: SSL cert invalid</p><p>BDV — <a href="http://bdv.com.ve/">bdv.com.ve</a>: DNS failure</p><p>PDVSA — <a href="http://pdvsa.com/">pdvsa.com</a>: Timeout</p><p>CNE (main) — <a href="http://cne.gob.ve/">cne.gob.ve</a>: Geo-blocked from US</p><p>Gob Anzoategui — <a href="http://anzoategui.gob.ve/">anzoategui.gob.ve</a>: Timeout (WordPress confirmed)</p><p>Gob Lara — <a href="http://lara.gob.ve/">lara.gob.ve</a>: Timeout</p><h3>Cracked Credentials by Agency</h3><p>From 2,555 unique hashes, 269 emails recovered (10.5% success rate):</p><h3>Government Agencies (33 cracked)</h3><p>VICEPRESIDENCIA (<a href="http://vicepresidencia.gob.ve/">vicepresidencia.gob.ve</a>): 1 cracked — <a href="/service/mailto:vicepresidencia@vicepresidencia.gob.ve">vicepresidencia@vicepresidencia.gob.ve</a></p><p>PATRIA (<a href="http://patria.org.ve/">patria.org.ve</a>): 1 cracked — <a href="/service/mailto:webmaster@patria.org.ve">webmaster@patria.org.ve</a></p><p>MINDEPORTE (<a href="http://mindeporte.gob.ve/">mindeporte.gob.ve</a>): 8 cracked — ac@, alazara@, apereira@, framirez@, gblanco@, mmosqueda@, yosorio@, yvillamizar@</p><p>DEFENSA PUBLICA (<a href="http://defensapublica.gob.ve/">defensapublica.gob.ve</a>): 4 cracked — dubraska@, genesis.franco@, jose.silva@, ninoska.fernandez@</p><p>SUDEBAN (<a href="http://sudeban.gob.ve/">sudeban.gob.ve</a>): 1 cracked — sudeban@ (institutional)</p><p>ABAE (<a href="http://abae.gob.ve/">abae.gob.ve</a>): 1 cracked — rvalladares@</p><h3>Media Organizations (236 cracked)</h3><p>Ultimas Noticias: 180+ cracked (Major state-aligned daily)</p><p>Diario de los Andes: 30+ cracked (Regional outlet)</p><p>Contrapunto: 15+ cracked (News site)</p><p>TeleSUR: 10+ cracked (Multi-state network)</p><h3>NGOs (4 cracked)</h3><p>4 emails cracked from 3 agencies: CEDICE, PROVEA, COFAVIC</p><h3>Education (2 cracked)</h3><p>UNIMET (private university)</p><h3>What This Reveals About Venezuelan Cybersecurity</h3><p>Venezuela is not unique. The failures documented here reflect systemic issues across the region:</p><h3>1. Default Configurations Are Rarely Changed</h3><p>WordPress ships with REST API enabled. Most agencies never disabled it. This is a training and awareness failure.</p><h3>2. No Metadata Hygiene</h3><p>Staff upload photos directly from phones without EXIF stripping. No upload pipelines, no automated sanitization, no policies.</p><h3>3. Development Artifacts in Production</h3><p>Build manifests, debug endpoints, and internal routes exposed on public-facing sites. No separation between development and production environments.</p><h3>4. Centralization Without Security</h3><p>Venezuela built a centralized surveillance database but couldn’t secure the websites announcing it. The irony is stark.</p><h3>5. No Rate Limiting</h3><p>I could paginate through hundreds of API pages and download thousands of files without triggering any blocks. Basic DDoS protections would have limited exposure.</p><h3>The Broader Implications</h3><p>Venezuela’s government spent resources building surveillance infrastructure to monitor 30 million citizens. That same government:</p><ul><li>Left 2,555+ staff accounts discoverable via public API</li><li>Allowed staff GPS coordinates to leak through photo uploads</li><li>Exposed internal system architectures through build manifests</li><li>Failed to implement basic WordPress hardening</li></ul><p>The agencies tasked with repression — SEBIN, DGCIM — are documented human rights violators. DGCIM is sanctioned as an entity. Former SEBIN director Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez is sanctioned by the US, EU, Canada, and UK for overseeing torture.</p><p>Open source investigators can now correlate:</p><ul><li>Staff identities from WordPress user enumeration</li><li>Staff locations from GPS-tagged photos</li><li>Sanctioned individuals from OFAC data</li><li>Internal system structures from leaked manifests</li></ul><p>All without touching anything that wasn’t publicly accessible.</p><h3>Remediation (What Should Have Been Done)</h3><ol><li>Disable REST API user enumeration</li><li>Strip EXIF on upload</li><li>Remove Gravatar integration</li><li>Separate build artifacts</li><li>Implement rate limiting</li><li>Security audits</li></ol><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The Venezuelan government built a vault to store citizen data. They forgot to lock their own door.</p><p>188 gigabytes of government data — staff identities, GPS locations, internal systems, and more — were accessible to anyone who knew to look. The tools used were:</p><ul><li>A web browser</li><li>The WordPress REST API (publicly documented)</li><li>ExifTool (open source)</li><li>Hashcat (open source)</li><li>The US Treasury website</li></ul><p>No exploitation. No zero-days. No social engineering. Just publicly exposed infrastructure and basic OSINT methodology.</p><p>This is not a sophisticated attack. It’s a documentation of negligence. And it raises serious questions about the security posture of government agencies across Venezuela, particularly those claiming to protect citizen data while failing to protect their own.</p><p><em>Crystal Vault Project — 2026</em></p><p><a href="https://github.com/Ringmast4r/crystal-vault"><em>https://github.com/Ringmast4r/crystal-vault</em></a></p><p><em>All data collected from publicly accessible sources without authentication bypass or system compromise.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31dd9e80df6e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Revitalizing Retro Tech With Modern Elements]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ringmast4r/revitalizing-retro-tech-with-modern-elements-d191f5458099?source=rss-93a7e401453------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d191f5458099</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-boy-advance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-boy-color]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gameboy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-boy-printer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[retro-gaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ringmast4r]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 04:33:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-13T04:33:47.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Breathing New Life into Game Boy</h4><p>An interesting thing to revisit a nostalgic classic from our childhoods: Nintendo’s Game Boy systems. After a recently reinvigorated interest with Game Boys, I stumbled into the world of Game Boy modding.</p><p>Game Boy mods have brought new life to Nintendo’s Game Boy community and to the retro gaming community alike. Game Boy mods range from custom shells, to custom holographic stickers, to soldering in modern components like RTC clocks, backlit screens, RGB buttons, and touch sensors to cycle through color palettes or brightness levels.</p><p>The way this discovery came about was when, one day I thought to myself — “I wonder where the hell my old Game Boy is?”</p><p>The first step to this endeavor would be to tackle my storage unit to find a Game Boy or to purchase one online. After a quick search online, I quickly discovered there are modern elements which are being added onto the original game console’s PCBs. The most notable being the backlit screens, what an incredible difference between picture quality. The backlit screens alone have created a new surge for Game Boy consoles. To this very day, a used Game Boy still sells at around the original MSRP of $100.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GFi8bSREQhXgMlBBbW5pdQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see from the photo, the Game Boy on the left has a much more vivid quality due to the IPS backlit screen. As well as the screen being 15% larger, and equipped with a louder speaker: It’s a fun device to game on.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F2drlnD64oxsqEkgph7%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F2drlnD64oxsqEkgph7%2Fgiphy.mp4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F2drlnD64oxsqEkgph7%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c0ecdd819c01aca25ac86ef615ff342a/href">https://medium.com/media/c0ecdd819c01aca25ac86ef615ff342a/href</a></iframe><h4>Getting Games for your Game Boy</h4><p>The next process would be to get some games. A feat considering some of the older Game Boy Cartridges can range anywhere from $3 to $15,000+ depending on the game. While searching for nostalgic games, I came across the EZ-Flash Omega for the Game Boy Advance and the EZ-Flash Jr for the Game Boy &amp; Game Boy color. Compatible cartridges which allow an external micro-sd card to be plugged in. All that is required is to drag and drop the firmware onto the micro-sd card, and then drag and drop the game ROMs into a folder within that firmware. So instead of hunting down 30 year old Game Boy games from online marketplaces, it is much easier instead to get the games from Internet Archive. The inner digital preservationist in me is overcome with the excitement of the prospect of being able to have not just one, but <strong>every </strong>Game Boy<em> </em>game.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FJ816diU1vlIXTOJ4M9%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2FJ816diU1vlIXTOJ4M9&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FJ816diU1vlIXTOJ4M9%2Fgiphy.gif%3Fcid%3D790b7611fc2cc1de5894f54fcba30d865f38e29f229d7cbe%26rid%3Dgiphy.gif%26ct%3Dg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="418" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/23503fc2da1b1d016ddc72db9ad66772/href">https://medium.com/media/23503fc2da1b1d016ddc72db9ad66772/href</a></iframe><p>So now I have every single Game Boy game from existence on a single USB drive. (As well as other games which were never released or unofficial games, hacked games such as the Pokémon variants, all the promo &amp; demo videos for the in-store displays) An archive of a database which is at my disposal with over 7,000 games between Game Boy, Game Boy Color, and Game Boy Advance at a total of 30.7GBs. Eat your heart out Call of Duty at 199+GBs for a single game. So with this alone, the fact that I am able to contain thousands of games on a single USB which is less than 31 GBs is remarkable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HostUyHE8um2o8a_qVfWlg.jpeg" /><figcaption>EZ-Flash Game Cartridge</figcaption></figure><p>The convenience of this brings an entirely new element to Game Boy. Gone are the days of having to lug around boxes and bags of game cartridges. Now I carry one game cartridge with every game loaded onto that single sd card.</p><h4>Modernizing the Game Boy Printer</h4><p>I then remembered about the Game Boy Printer &amp; Camera! An oddly unique piece of hardware which was developed for Game Boy. I found my Game Boy Printer &amp; Camera and began printing photos out on the 24 year old thermal printer and paper.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dOhp8TD5DB2DW6L4PV7hiA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*slYqegXKPZKalztJy61W7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Game Boy Printer</figcaption></figure><p>Over a period of weeks of enjoying my revitalized Game Boy, I began to wonder about further modifications to the handheld consoles. All up until I stumbled across <a href="https://www.instagram.com/gameboycameraobscura/">@gameboycameraobscura</a> on Instagram. What a delightful surprise to find! An artist who exclusively takes photos with a Game Boy Camera and exhibits his photography in galleries! Not only that, but he somehow managed to discover a way of taking colored photos with candy wrappers and an infra-red blocking lens from a telescope! Remarkable.</p><p>A few moments into his page, I was overtaken by a brewing thought; “How the hell did he digitalize the photos to post on Instagram?”</p><p>After some research and a conversation with <a href="https://www.instagram.com/gameboycameraobscura/">@gameboycameraobscura</a>. I quickly found the device. A tiny piece of hardware called a ‘Camera WIFI Printer for Gameboy’ designed by Suicidebattery in the United Kingdom on Tindie.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0P46rZ2OCViiTtXRN6zf2A.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1BSsQj9zGuunrd2TRsh6gw.jpeg" /><figcaption>WIFI Printer from Suicidebattery</figcaption></figure><p>Powered by an ESP8266 chip and attached to a custom PCB, the device emulates a Game Boy Printer by being attached through the original cable adapter which is used to connect a Game Boy to the Game Boy Printer. Once the photo is printed from the Game Boy it is sent to a local web server with a fixed IP using the ESP8266, which can then be saved to a computer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TWNs_4AcelfcZj72NRZ6aQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Game Boy Printer vs WIFI Printer</figcaption></figure><p>First step is to substitute the original Game Boy Printer for the WIFI Printer. The device connects via the Game Boy Printer cable, and then connect the WIFI Printer to power source.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rzU5hFwJnbyePSVx5AvmTA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Modded Game Boy</figcaption></figure><p>Select the photo you are going to send to the WIFI printer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vnyVfaDETsnzkqlRBxhseQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Game Boy Camera</figcaption></figure><p>Print the photo through the Game Boy Camera. This will transfer the photo to the ESP8266’s internal memory. Which can then be accessed through the fixed IP on the device.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8be-CFRAGx9IWtF7A9LIAg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Once the photo has been transferred. Connect to the GameboyPrinter newly shown Wi-Fi which has generated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ITTxkGMxMT9Z3FjleUZnag.jpeg" /></figure><p>Go to the URL: 192.168.4.1</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/804/1*hhmiwjpkOfsgr5i4xwN24w.png" /></figure><p>Once on the website, you will be able to view all of your transferred photos. You can save them to your computer, post them online, or reprint them on a better thermal printer! lol.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eHYZLiNWaJcvWqHLAPx8BA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z4jP-SG05RBMuS8NXmlqpA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Munbyn Thermal Printer</figcaption></figure><p>I used my Munbyn Thermal printer, which I have been having a lot of fun with. Here is the same photo across the two printers. The original Game Boy Printer paper, and two other size options from the Munbyn Thermal Printer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QIzCjm22tX_IYiPYAmRNfg.jpeg" /></figure><p>A fun thing to discover how such a small change in technology can create such an unexpected result. It only opens the door to creativity with what can be accomplished. The idea that these cameras were designed with no method of extracting from the game cartridge is amazing, the photos only existed on that specific camera cartridge. Now the photos are digitalized and saved. Here is the raw photo which was taken from a modded Game Boy Color using an original (not modified) Game Boy Camera cartridge: And is now online.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*eeOa36ggSkwlIpLo4hAS5A.jpeg" /><figcaption>A photo of an original Game Boy Color with a Game Boy Pocket Camera taken on a modded Game Boy Color with a Game Boy Camera</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d191f5458099" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kismet Monitoring From a Hak5 Wi-Fi Coconut]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ringmast4r/kismet-monitoring-from-a-hak5-wi-fi-coconut-f30ed828b68a?source=rss-93a7e401453------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f30ed828b68a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hak5]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wigle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kismet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wardriving]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ringmast4r]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Sep 2022 02:33:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-04T02:33:32.573Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Kismet Monitoring From a Hak5 Wi-Fi Coconut: Coconut War Rig</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vjzqFBM_ZuqJCHsCctzCXg.jpeg" /></figure><p>An unexpected thing to find ourselves here… How did it come to be this way?</p><p>Throughout the last year, I have been fascinated by the act of ‘wardriving’. A unique practice that combines hardware savvy, technical skill, and radio knowledge into a beautiful symbiotic art form. Packaged into a grotesque ordinance of wires, batteries, microcontrollers, and antennas it is an alluring sight to behold. All of which together are the finished product of our beloved ‘rigs’. Thus, the name has been dawned on the tool of our scanning adventures: <em>Wardriving Rigs.</em></p><p>I have been tinkering with several projects over the years, mostly with raspberry pis, and have been more recently drawn to my new home in the world of ‘Cyberdecks’. Wardriving and Cyberdecks combined, it only made sense to create wardriving rigs. So with that said, over the past year, I have been interested in wardriving/warwalking rigs.</p><p>Recently released at DEF CON 30, Hak5’s Wi-Fi Coconut, became an immediate area of interest. While at the Linq Casino bar, my good friend who happens to be a red team pentester told me about the Wi-Fi Coconut and even took it out of his bag to show me with excitement of what it might do. An unexpected surprise, as the Wi-Fi Coconut was brought to DEF CON 30 by Hak5 unannounced and was not on their website yet for sale. As it was released at DEF CON 30, only a select few of people learned about the discovery of the yet-to-be-unveiled device. Amongst the horde of humans and shenanigans, this would be an easy thing to miss without prior knowledge of it.</p><p>As I read the given instructional card within the box a particular area immediately caught my eye, “…utilizes an array of finely tuned 802.11 radios to simultaneously monitor all channels of the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi spectrum”. I gasped with shock and excitement and exclaimed to my hacker companion “…this could be a wardriving monster!”</p><p>Two weeks after DEF CON, I purchased one with glee.</p><p>The coconut arrives in due time which brings us to where we are now. Considering I may be one of about 30 people (if that) in the world who have one of these devices this early, it would be fun to write about it. In an attempt to document my process for creating a Coconut War Rig guide for y’all, I thought it would be a simple task. However, quickly into what was supposed to be an easy setup, turned to be a myriad of issues. So rather than a full walkthrough, this will serve more of an array of troubleshooting guides with a general sense of what I am trying to accomplish.</p><p>Now there’s more than one way to skin a cat. (Sorry my cat lover friends, ilu) However, with my style of doing things, I enjoy running operating systems from USB booting them. There is something about containing an entire operating system on a USB, which I can carry around with me anywhere on such a tiny device. It&#39;s fascinating. If you damage something on the operating system, you just reflash the USB and problem solved. Everything is self-contained within the USB drive, and nothing is altered on the original operating system of the computer that is used. Which means, I can carry around my computer with me anywhere and I can run it from any computer and pick up what I was just working on. That is also my double spin take on the meaning ‘my other computer, is your computer.’ Quite literally so.</p><p>A great alternative to installing an operating system to your local machine or having to create a partition within your hard drive to multiboot your pc. Or potentially totally crashing or wiping your own machine with no knowledge of how to fix it. Its quick and easy and removes a lot of headache from the equation which would otherwise eat into your time: if you’re not already familiar with any of these steps.</p><p>We are going to USB Boot Kali Live OS (kali-linux-2022.3-live-amd64) on a Samsung FIT Plus 128GB 3.1 (MUF-128AB/AM) USB Flash Drive with persistence from a MSI Stealth GS Series Stealth Laptop, and run the Hak5 Wi-Fi Coconut through kismet after downloading and installing the correct software and drivers. Here we go!</p><h4><strong>Download Kali</strong></h4><p>1. Download the Live Boot option for Kali OS</p><p>2. Go to <a href="https://www.kali.org/get-kali/">https://www.kali.org/get-kali/</a> (or go find the downloads on their official website.)</p><p>3. Go to Live Boot</p><p>4. Select and download the latest Kali image from the selections ( it will be in the middle with a blue notification below which says ‘recommended’ )</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nr4s2LtuDNO3wvytgKhaeQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>5. Wait for the image to finish downloading to your computer</p><p>6. Huzzah! You just downloaded Kali Live OS</p><h4><strong>USB BOOT KALI</strong></h4><p>1. Download the Live Boot image OS from kali.org</p><p>2. Flash the image to a USB using <em>Rufus</em> (I had issues with persistence using Balaena Etcher)</p><p>3. Select the full partition size (we want to use the entire USB’s memory space)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/485/1*Q4fQ8-iGs1A87R7DJfsV8w.png" /></figure><p>4. Boot the USB from your computer of choice</p><p>5. Once at the menu, select the ‘Live system with USB persistence’ option</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*sb9K88CQmIbNS9gGWHvpuw.jpeg" /></figure><p>6. The system will boot directly to GUI/Desktop</p><p>7. Huzzah! You are on Kali OS!</p><h4><strong>Test if Persistence is Working</strong></h4><ol><li>Right click on the desktop</li><li>Create a new folder</li><li>Name the folder whatever you want, <em>‘test’</em></li><li>reboot the system and login to see if the folder is still there</li></ol><h4>Update Kali</h4><p>We are going to update the operating system as well as do a full upgrade to ensure everything is installed and up to date running the latest version of Kali</p><ol><li>Open a terminal</li><li>Type in the command;</li><li>sudo apt update &amp;&amp; sudo apt full-upgrade -y</li><li>Wait forever for this to finish installing.</li></ol><h4><strong>Create User with Root Privileges</strong></h4><p>There are two ways to do this both ending with the same result. The quick and easy way, or the normal way.</p><p><strong><em>Method 1— Quick and Easy</em></strong></p><ol><li>Open a terminal</li><li>Type in the command;</li><li>sudo adduser <em>USERNAME</em></li><li>Type in your password of choice</li><li>Hit Enter into the following fields leaving them blank</li><li>Press Y to accept changes</li><li>Enter in the command to give root access;</li><li>Sudo usermod -a -G sudo <em>USERNAME</em></li><li>Su <em>USERNAME</em></li><li>Test if you now have root access by entering the following commands</li><li>Whoami</li><li>Sudo whoami</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tuBmPq-KhN_c4qggfqNDfg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Method 2— The normal way</em></strong></p><p>1. Open a terminal</p><p>2. Enter in the commands;</p><p>3. Sudo useradd -m <em>USERNAME</em></p><p>4. Sudo passwd <em>USERNAME</em></p><p>5. Sudo usermod -a -G sudo <em>USERNAME</em></p><p>6. Sudo chsh -s /bin/bash <em>USERNAME</em></p><p>7. Su <em>USERNAME</em></p><p>8. Test if you now have root access by entering the following commands</p><p>9 Whoami</p><p>10. Sudo whoami</p><h4>(Optional) <strong>Sudo Password Removal</strong></h4><p>Now it&#39;s time to remove that pesky password prompt in terminal every time you run a sudo command. <em>DISCLAIMER</em>: This is not a recommended security practice. This is being done out of sheer convenience.</p><p>1. Open a terminal and enter in the following commands;</p><p>2. Sudo visudo</p><p>3. At the bottom of the document, enter in the following;</p><p>3. <em>USERNAME</em> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL</p><p>4. ctrl + X</p><p>5. y</p><p>6. press enter</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*luSqiXMR1vxsqIwIjrNBaQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Install GPSD</strong></h4><p>There are different ways to Install gpsd to ensure gps is working properly. This is just one.</p><ol><li>Sudo apt install gpsd</li><li>To test if gps is working. Run the command;</li><li>cgps</li><li>or run the command;</li><li>xgps</li></ol><p>6. If these aren’t working you may need to manually start gpsd(or reboot your pc? sometimes after rebooting your system it will work right away);</p><p>7. sudo gpsd /dev/ttyUSB0 -F /var/run/gpsd.sock</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9NmoGi-_XH3Y2axO_ahMkA.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Install Hak5 Wi-Fi Coconut’s Drivers</h4><p>Now its time to download the Wifi Coconut Software and drivers. I followed The Hak5 Wifi Coconut documentaiton. Located at docs.hak5.org. The following is my attempt of documenting how I accomplished this.</p><ol><li>sudo apt update</li><li>sudo apt install build-essential cmake libusb-1.0–0-dev libpcap-dev git</li><li>git clone <a href="https://github.com/hak5/hak5-wifi-coconut">https://github.com/hak5/hak5-wifi-coconut</a></li><li>cd hak5-wifi-coconut<br>mkdir build<br>cd build<br>cmake ../</li><li>sudo make</li><li>sudo make install</li><li>sudo wifi_coconut</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/899/1*LOK4Qg6QzfbF3HjeTPH7tw.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Configure Kismet to recognize the Wifi Coconut</strong></h4><ol><li>Remove any Kismet installed from source</li><li>sudo rm -rfv /usr/local/bin/kismet* /usr/local/share/kismet* /usr/local/etc/kismet*</li><li>Download Kali Nightly git</li><li>wget -O — <a href="https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/kismet-release.gpg.key">https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/kismet-release.gpg.key</a> | sudo apt-key add -<br>echo ‘deb <a href="https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/apt/release/kali">https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/apt/release/kali</a> kali main’ | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/kismet.list<br>sudo apt update<br>sudo apt install kismet</li><li>Update kismet with nightly git;</li><li>sudo apt install kismet-capture-hak5-wifi-coconut</li><li>Fix the broken package which is not installing correctly;</li><li>sudo apt install kismet-core kismet-adsb-icao-data</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l-oO4TaSs_t03qqyBI44HA.jpeg" /></figure><p>9. sudo apt install kismet-capture-hak5-wifi-coconut</p><p>10. Check to see if coconut is being read;</p><p>11. kismet_cap_hak5_wifi_coconut — list</p><p>12. Run kismet with coconut;</p><p>13. kismet -c coconut:name=WifiCoconut</p><p>14. Go into kismet data sources and select the WifiCoconut</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ch-4W-pFHC0UX3E8O1zzGg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Troubleshooting</h4><p>I would surprised if you don’t run into issues. It’s just how computers are. 95% of your time will be spent troubleshooting and figuring out how to debug the issue. Thats where all the fun lies, within the puzzle of trying to solve the problem.</p><h4>GPS</h4><p>GPS works fine, but when Coconut starts Kismet it does not read coordinates within Kismet: Tell me about it… I am still working on that.</p><p><strong>Flashing USB</strong></p><p>If you have any issue with the USB device not being discovered by your computer. Open diskpart on a windows machine and use diskpart to correct the issue</p><ol><li>list disk</li><li>select disk <em>1</em></li><li>clean</li><li>create partition primary</li><li>reformat the drive through file explorer</li></ol><h4>Persistence on the USB not persisting</h4><p>This gave me the most trouble. I have regularly used balena etcher in the past to flash a majority of my USBs and Micro SD cards. However, this time around I ran into most of my issues. Persistence wasn’t holding whenever I would reboot my machine. I kept losing all of my work. Rufus ending up working in the end to some degree for this. Some USBs would not work, while others did. On one occasion my kali instance was still there, however the user had been totally deleted. After recreating the user and testing after reboot. The user was still there…odd.</p><p>I still have some things to work out for it to be the way I like. But for now, the coconut is being recognized in kismet and the software is successfully compiled. I need to see why the gps is not working when Kismet is running the coconut. For now, I’ll take this as a win as it&#39;s been great practice. This is my first Hak5 device! I’ve been having a blast playing with it. I plan on using it to build a portable Coconut War Rig to boost my wigle numbers.</p><p>~Ringmast4r</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AvNFrQqp_qbCQ2rciFTWFg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f30ed828b68a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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