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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Robert Folker on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Robert Folker on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Robert Folker on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Critical Thinking Is the #1 Meta-Skill in 2025]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/why-critical-thinking-is-the-1-meta-skill-in-2025-d23dfcd3aa61?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[critical-thinking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 14:41:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-04T14:41:07.439Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an era overflowing with information, rapid technological change, and complex challenges, one skill repeatedly rises above the rest: critical thinking. As we navigate 2025, critical thinking is more than just a personal asset — it’s the ultimate “meta-skill,” the engine behind effective learning, sound decision-making, and resilient careers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*m8e0bhIYZCFHmFCH.png" /></figure><p><strong>What Is a Meta-Skill?</strong></p><p>A meta-skill isn’t just a task-specific talent or a technical competency. It’s a master key — an ability that enhances other skills and makes individuals adaptable in an unpredictable world. While coding, marketing, or design may launch your career, meta-skills like critical thinking keep it thriving in the face of change.</p><p><strong>Why Critical Thinking Outpaces All Other Skills</strong></p><p><strong>1. Information Overload Demands Discernment. </strong>Every day, we’re bombarded by data, opinions, news (and fake news), and viral content. The ability to separate fact from fiction, recognize logical fallacies, and spot biases is no longer optional. Critical thinkers filter signal from noise.</p><p><strong>2. AI and Automation Make Judgment Essential. </strong>Artificial Intelligence is automating routine analysis and repetitive tasks. But what machines can’t replace (at least not yet) is human judgment — the ability to question assumptions, interpret context, and make ethical decisions. Critical thinking empowers us to work with AI, not be replaced by it.</p><p><strong>3. Problem Solvers Are Future-Proofed. </strong>Technical skills have a shelf life. But the capacity to break down problems, challenge groupthink, and examine issues from multiple angles never goes out of style. Critical thinkers are the innovators, leaders, and decision-makers every organization needs to stay competitive.</p><p><strong>4. Adaptability Starts Here. </strong>Career pivots, new industries, and evolving technology require swift learning. Critical thinking allows you to learn how to learn — to rapidly master new subjects, ask the right questions, and connect unfamiliar dots.</p><p><strong>5. Trust Is Scarce — Skepticism Is Strength. </strong>Today’s world runs on trust, but trust must be earned in a landscape of scams and clickbait. Critical thinkers don’t accept things at face value. They analyze, research, and verify, making them valued colleagues, partners, and leaders.</p><p><strong>How to Sharpen Your Critical Thinking in 2025:</strong></p><p>· Ask better questions, not just for answers but for deeper understanding.</p><p>· Analyze sources before accepting information as true.</p><p>· Challenge assumptions — your own and others’.</p><p>· Practice perspective-taking to understand diverse views.</p><p>· Reflect on your conclusions and be willing to revise them.</p><p><strong>The Bottom Line. </strong>If 2025 has taught us anything, it’s that change is the only constant. In this environment, critical thinking isn’t just a desirable trait — it’s the foundational meta-skill powering every other skill you’ll ever need. Whether you’re leading a team, adapting to a new job, or simply trying to make sense of the world, critical thinking is your ultimate competitive advantage.</p><p><strong>Sharpen it now, and you’ll future-proof your success for years to come.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d23dfcd3aa61" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Operationalizing Air Force Critical Thinking*]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/operationalizing-air-force-critical-thinking-3f0c1a0aece?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[forecasting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 03:32:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-28T13:18:57.953Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Lt Col James M. Davitch, USAF and Lt Col Robert D. Folker, Jr., USAF</p><p>*In the Summer 2017 edition, Air &amp; Space Power Journal published an article by Col Adam J. Stone, USAF, entitled, “Critical Thinking Skills in USAF Developmental Education.” The authors believe that the proposal within could be one way to quantitatively measure and develop critical thinkers within the Air Force to meet Colonel Stone’s objectives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*lUJ3_FBRDAQv2_6UQKrMLQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-31_Issue-4/V-Davitch_Folker.pdf">Operationalizing Air Force Critical Thinking</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the </em><a href="http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/ASPJ"><em>Air and Space Power Journal </em></a><em>requests a courtesy line.</em></p><h4><strong>The Requirement for Critical Thinkers</strong></h4><p>Air Force senior leaders have stressed the importance of developing and maintaining critical thinking capability. The service has approached the requirement as an academic shortfall, failing to accord this important skill its place as a core combat capability. The 2015 Air Force Future Operating Concept (AFFOC) plainly states that the Air Force must “recruit [and] assess individuals with [the] demonstrated potential for critical thinking” to successfully fight and win in contested environments.1 Although the Air Force articulated an ambitious end state to build and utilize Airmen of the future who can think critically about vexing issues, it is not properly identifying personnel who possess the necessary skills. The USAF has habitually relied on intuitive assessments regarding high-stakes outcomes in uncertain conditions. Individual judgment is typically plagued by overconfidence, cognitive biases, and other psychological factors that lead to poor decision making. The Air Force needs a more deliberate approach if it wants to improve critical thinking so that it can make better decisions across a range of areas including strategic planning, budgeting, human capital management, intelligence, medicine, and acquisition. Implementing a forecasting program is one low-cost method which would allow the Air Force to measure critical thinking, provide accountability, and identify Airmen with the ability to demonstrate and improve critical thinking by mitigating cognitive errors. To start this process, critical thinking is defined as a mode of reasoning in which one improves the quality of their thought by skillfully analyzing, assessing, and reconstructing their thought processes. A forecasting program, as will be discussed in this article, will provide the best means to measure progress. Before discussing a practical implementation plan, it is useful to identify why, given multiple requests to improve critical thinking, it has not yet occurred. This problem requires a different resourcing strategy than the typical Air Force acquisition response to meet requirements. Critical thinking is essential to waging modern warfare today, but its intangible nature complicates the service’s ability to resource it as compared to how it resources most other combat capabilities. For instance, to adequately meet operational plan requirements for defensive counterair, the Air Force understands it must purchase a certain amount of jets, radars, and air-to-air missiles. Thus, the Air Force is able to measure this traditional combat capability by the number of aircraft, weapons, and qualified aircrew. The Air Force approach to develop critical thinking has primarily consisted of formal training classes, such as the Critical Thinking and Structured Analysis course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. While such attempts may be helpful, no process exists to routinely measure the critical thinking capability within the Air Force. Accurately measuring critical thinking cannot be done by counting graduates from a course. Rather, the individual critical thinking skills of each Airman should be developed and measured throughout their careers. Critical thinking skills should be measured over time in a way similar to how instructor pilots conduct periodic check rides for their students. In a cognitive check ride, the evaluator can host a sort of forecasting debriefing or a survey, from which data can be used to improve thought processes. Until we hold ourselves accountable for our assessments derived from critically analyzing problems, it is impossible to judge whether one’s subjective opinion is worth anything.</p><h4>The Illusion of Expert Judgment</h4><p>In the absence of a systematic effort to collect critical thinking metrics, the Air Force turns to those with experience. Considering experienced individuals have seen and often been instrumental in key decision-making events, this seems to make perfect sense. It is not unreasonable to assume that these individuals would be best suited to recommend future solutions simply by their experiences. Unless decisions are captured in a policy memorandum, most experienced individuals rarely have any documented history of making the best decisions. Indeed, multiple scientific studies have shown that individual judgment is habitually plagued by overconfidence, cognitive biases, and other psychological factors.2 Oftentimes, those affected by decision makers’ judgments do not know whether critical thought was applied to a problem, or if the best decision to solve it was made. In many cases, the thought processes behind decisions simply are not documented using a standard rubric. In the absence of these things, the Air Force by and large resorts to considering qualifying details such as one’s time in service or some outward signifier of experience, such as a weapons school graduate patch on the uniform that signifies some specialized training or experience, rather than solid evidence of critical thought and good decision making. Certainly, extensive experience carries a quality all its own, but experience by itself does not equate to skill in critical thinking. Individuals with unexamined records of success should not answer complex predictive questions based solely on their intuition. At the very least, these same individuals, when asked to provide critical thought, should first be held to an objective standard that measures the secondary and tertiary effects of a proposed course of action.</p><h4>Some Inconvenient Results</h4><p>Col Adam “Mez” Stone was one of the first Air Force officers to measure critical thinking ability. He used a standardized exam called the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA). The test consisted of 40 questions, measured five critical thinking skills, and provided a means for identifying critical thinking ability in comparison to a similar reference population.3 He knew senior leaders were asking for better critical thinkers, but his first task was to establish a baseline of behavior and to answer the question, “Where do we stand, right now?” His results, which were published in the fall of 2008, became an indictment of the Air Force’s critical thinking skills at the time.4 The group of 180 junior Air Force officers who were the test subjects scored well below average when compared to the graduate degree norm group. While studying at the Air War College (AWC) in 2015, Colonel Stone used the WGCTA again for a similar study of officers’ critical thinking skills at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), AWC, and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). In his study, SAASS students scored in the 61st percentile. The ACSC and AWC students scored in the 36th percentile, which was below average in comparison to similar master’s level programs.5 The 2015 study concluded with a condemnation of the Air Force’s failure to appropriately educate and train its personnel to develop critical thinking skills through professional military education programs. His assertion is coincident with demands at the highest levels of our leadership for better critical thinking skills. Despite Colonel Stone’s efforts to measure the Air Force’s critical thinking capability, there are still no sustained, long-term measurements collected within it. Although measuring critical thinking will not in and of itself provide a complete picture, the mere fact of having individuals make verifiable assessments will improve their critical thinking skills. In short, performance will improve through measurement, feedback, and repetition. The Air Force should capitalize on Colonel Stone’s findings and begin to methodically gather data to measure and improve the critical thinking skills of Airmen.</p><h4>Ways and Means: Practicing and Measuring Critical Thinking</h4><p>Participants who learn to overcome cognitive traps by measuring their performance and adjusting their approach based on reliable feedback will demonstrate a quantifiable ability to think critically, consistent with the definition proposed earlier in this article. Fortunately, there is evidence that one’s subjective judgment can be aided in several ways to avoid mental pitfalls. In so doing, we may identify critical thinkers like Colonel Stone did, build critical thinking capability, and adequately respond to our senior leaders’ stated request for critical thinkers. Few areas are as fraught with cognitive pitfalls as forecasting. While we do not dispute there are many avenues to improve one’s critical thinking skills, attempting to anticipate future events provides unique opportunities for individuals to get unambiguous feedback, identify cognitive errors, and improve skills. Therefore, due to the proven success demonstrated by the Good Judgment Project, an Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)-funded geopolitical forecasting tournament and research study in which “thousands of people around the world predict global events,” this article recommends a long-term critical thinking program which uses forecasting as one measure of critical thinking ability.6 The program should include a modest amount of training to deal with typical errors in reasoning, such as overconfidence, bias, and base-rate neglect.7 The program’s participants would make predictive estimates based on numeric probabilities (that is, 40 or 60 percent), rather than possible or probable estimative language. Finally, the program should track performance over time. Multiyear-long research studies funded by IARPA have shown impressive results with this approach. The first IARPA tournament began in 2011 and explored the potential of crowd-sourced forecasting. Participants made predictions about real-world events, which were then judged by their forecasts’ precision. Perhaps the most important aspect of the IARPA forecasting events was that it measured participants’ performance longitudinally. These measurements identified individuals who consistently improved and performed well over time. Dubbed super forecasters, they demonstrated the same critical thinking skills, such as bias mitigation and open-mindedness, the Air Force desires in its personnel. Thus, the primary method to develop critical thinking is submitting regular forecasts in areas of specific interest to the Air Force. For example, since the DOD programming, budgeting, and acquisitions cycle takes years to produce a new weapons system, it is necessary to make the right decisions as to which weapon systems the Air Force should invest to counter a future adversary threat. When making these forecasts, individuals should characterize uncertainty and express that characterization in probabilistic terms through predictive analysis that drives good decision making. Social scientists have published empirical data showing the ability to improve one’s forecasting accuracy can be cultivated.8 They have identified characteristics that differentiate between those who are better and worse at accurately predicting the results of a course of action over a period. Those elements are not indicative of natural-born intelligence or aptitude, but rather a mental determination to exercise critical thought and learn from mistakes. Critical thinkers will take the feedback obtained by measuring their performance, critique the process they used to make a forecast, and improve their decision making. The process of evaluating an individual’s forecast might appear to generate subjective results, which is the reason that the forecasting questions and scoring should be done by an independent central authority, such as the Air Force Research Laboratory. Moreover, proper academic preparation can help minimize the influence of natural heuristics and biases yielding forecasts with remarkable precision.9 Several studies in the field of decision theory show that a modest amount of preparation can radically improve cognitive performance compared to those who do not receive training.10 Training is needed that helps identify certain cognitive errors including overconfidence, confirmation bias, and base rate neglect. Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Philip Tetlock all explored critical thinking in great detail as it relates to forecasting and cognitive dissonance.11</p><h4>What’s Your Brier Score? Operationalizing Critical Thinking</h4><p>The results of repeated assessments should be graded using a Brier Score, which is a useful way to verify the accuracy of a probability forecast. Brier Scores provide a quantitative means to compare and improve critical thinking while also holding individuals accountable for their estimates. For instance, consider the following question, “Will the ruler of Country X conduct a nuclear test by the end of 2017?” The outcome is binary, the leader will (100 percent) or will not (0 percent) test a nuclear device. Assume a predictive analyst forecasts a 60 percent chance the test occurs and a 40 percent chance that it does not. If Country X conducts the test, then the score for the assessment would be 0.16. If it does not, the score would be 0.36. Since the Brier Score measures error, the lower the number is, the better, like a golf score.12 If the Air Force commits to improving its personnel’s critical thinking skills through a forecasting program, it could prove both inexpensive and lucrative. This program would require an administrator function to manage enrollment, generate forecast questions, and score the results. But how might the program attract participants? One option is through monetary incentives. The Air Force already incentivizes individuals to gain and maintain foreign language capabilities. If they attain a high enough reading, writing, and speaking proficiency level on the Defense Language Proficiency Test, they then receive additional compensation. If the Air Force judges that critical thinking skill is as valuable as, or more so than, foreign language capability, then there is a precedent for such incentive pay. Alternatively, individuals could opt into the program purely to better their cognitive capabilities and compete with peers. It may be possible that the pursuit of a better Brier Score might be incentive enough to improve cognition. Studies show that job satisfaction routinely eclipses financial incentives as primary drivers of personal fulfillment.13 Since a Brier Score is an objective method to determine the accuracy of a forecast, it levels the playing field. This approach could spotlight a young, inexperienced Airman seeking a reputation for being a person whose thinking is objective and uncluttered by bias. It could also repel those who have established a reputation for fear that their lack of critical thinking skill will be exposed. In short, because it provides accountability, some may avoid establishing a Brier Score if given a choice. Just as the Air Force requires physical training (PT) culminating in regular tests, so should it mandate participation in a “cognitive PT” program. While coercive, this approach could maximize participation at the lowest cost. Over time, the Brier Score could become a part of the Air Force culture, and the benefits would become obvious to all. Results from multiple large-scale forecasting tournaments revealed, “Prediction accuracy is possible when people participate in a setup that rewards only accuracy — and not the novelty of the explanation, or loyalty to the party line.”14 In other words, competition like this fosters critical thinking while sharpening skills on an individual level. Furthermore, a mandatory competitive program may lend itself to developing and asking questions that can be answered, measured, and scored. Competitive events are not new for the military. For decades, fighter pilots have trained against rival squadrons during “turkey shoot” events. Winners receive accolades and the recognition of their peers. The Air Force would be well-served by a cognitive turkey shoot, challenging participants to form their conclusions based on openly available information, thereby granting agency to the individual and allowing motivated professionals to best demonstrate their analytic prowess. Ideally, to check a peer’s decision-making process, individuals might routinely ask each other, “So, what’s your Brier Score?” Furthermore, the prediction tournament proposed in this article would be one way to quantitatively measure and develop critical thinkers within the Air Force to meet Colonel Stone’s objectives. For instance, the top forecasters in the prediction tournament should be measured for critical thinking skills according to Colonel Stone’s method to test for a correlation between forecasters with above average Brier’s scores and higher than average critical thinking skills. If a positive correlation exists, then the forecasting tournament may prove to be one of the most effective ways to measure and develop stronger critical thinking skills within the Air Force.</p><h4>Summary</h4><p>In short, we must value critical thinking as a core combat capability and measure it. It requires the same degree of training, monitoring, and validation that flying qualification demands. The Air Force would never allow a nonqualified aviator to pilot an aircraft. The risk to individual life and equipment is too great. Similarly, we must ask, why would we be less stringent about larger situations of uncertainty that could introduce risk to thousands? In areas that demand verified critical thinking skill, why would we turn to one’s intuitive judgment that may be susceptible to unmitigated cognitive error? President John F. Kennedy once said, “Too often we. . . enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.”15 As scientific studies have shown, intuitive judgment is flawed. Institutionalizing a culture of critical thinking will complement expert intuition by mitigating cognitive error and bias. In doing so, the Air Force will step toward a process that rewards true skill through measurement, accountability, feedback, and improvement. </p><h4>Endnotes</h4><ol><li>USAF, Air Force Future Operating Concept, <a href="http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/AFFOC.pdf">http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/AFFOC.pdf</a>, 30 September 2015, 43.</li><li>Welton Chang, Eva Chen, Barbara Mellers, and Philip Tetlock, “Developing Expert Political Judgment: The Impact of Training and Practice on Judgmental Accuracy in Geopolitical Forecasting Tournaments,” Judgment and Decision Making 11, no. 5, 509–26, September 2016, <a href="http://journal.sjdm.org/16/16511/jdm16511.pdf">http://journal.sjdm.org/16/16511/jdm16511.pdf</a>.</li><li>Goodwin Watson and Edwin Glaser delineated the five skills of critical thinking: inference, recognition of assumptions, deduction, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments.</li><li>Col Adam J. Stone, “Critical Thinking Skills of Air Force Intelligence Officers: Are We Developing Better Critical Thinkers?” (master’s thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 2008).</li><li>Col Adam J. Stone, Critical Thinking Skills of US Air Force Senior and Intermediate Developmental Education Students (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 2016).</li><li>Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), “The Good Judgment Project,” accessed 26 July 2017, <a href="https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/newsroom/iarpa-in-the-news/2015/439-the-good-judgment-project">https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/newsroom/iarpa-in-the-news/2015/439-the-good-judgment-project</a>.</li><li>Base rate neglect, or base rate bias, is a formal fallacy. If presented with related general information, such as 85 percent of small businesses fail within the first 5 years, the base rate, and specific information, such as this particular business owner has special training or skill, the mind tends to ignore the former and focus on the latter.</li><li>Chang, Chen, Mellers, and Tetlock, “Developing Expert Political Judgment,” 509–26.</li><li>Based on the research report generated after one large-scale predictive tournament, this training can be executed in 45 minutes.</li><li>Barbara Mellers et al., “Psychological Strategies for Winning Geopolitical Forecasting Tournaments,” Psychological Science 25, no. 5, 2014, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956797614524255">http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956797614524255</a>.</li><li>Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two eminent psychologists, have written extensively on each.</li><li>A Brier Score measures the mean squared error of one’s assessment. If Country X conducts a nuclear test, the Brier Score is calculated as [(1.00–0.60)2 + (0.00–0.40)2 / 2 = 0.16. If Country X does not, the Brier Score is calculated as [(0.00–0.60)2 + (1.00–0.40)2 / 2 = 0.36.</li><li>Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones, “What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?,” American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (2012): 2083–110, <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.5.2083">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.5.2083</a>.</li><li>Angela Chen, “Philip Tetlock’s Tomorrows,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 5 October 2015, <a href="http://www.chronicle.com/article/Philip-Tetlock-s-Tomorrows/233507">http://www.chronicle.com/article/Philip-Tetlock-s-Tomorrows/233507</a>.</li><li>John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “Kennedy Library and Museum Rededication Film (1993): Source of Quotation, ‘We Enjoy the Comfort of Opinion. . .,’ Address by President Kennedy, 11 June 1962, Yale University Commencement,” <a href="https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Kennedy-Library-Fast-Facts/Yale-University-Commencement-Address.aspx">https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Kennedy-Library-Fast-Facts/Yale-University-Commencement-Address.aspx</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f0c1a0aece" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Realizing the Potential of Analytics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/realizing-the-potential-of-analytics-2b25830b46c5?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b25830b46c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jul 2016 18:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-17T18:36:01.316Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Arming the Human Mind</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*7ypopMH0o72qLgE8." /></figure><p><em>The collection systems worked more or less. But, there were no analysts capable of interpreting the data, since the Army had moved to maximum automation — and the automated systems were not programmed for so unexpected a contingency as a deployment to an African backwater. — Ralph Peters, The War in 2020</em></p><h4>The Analytic Gap</h4><p>The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) exposed an analytical deficiency within the intelligence community.[1] However, the US Air Force has invested in expanding collection capacity, as evidenced by the 375 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms added since 9/11.[2] More remarkably, the increase in ISR platforms has come at a time when the total Air Force inventory has decreased by 500 aircraft.[3] ISR platforms such as the RQ-4, MC-12, and MQ-1 directly address an important element of ISR — but at the cost of other critical elements, such as intelligence analysis. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, &amp; Reconnaissance Operations, defines global integrated ISR as the “cross-domain synchronization and integration of the planning and operation of ISR assets; sensors; processing, exploitation and dissemination systems; and, analysis and production capabilities across the globe to enable current and future operations.”[4] However, today’s investment in collection capacity does not address the mounting limitations of intelligence analysis initially highlighted by the 9/11 Commission in 2004.[5]</p><h4>Defining Automated Analysis and Analytics</h4><p>Because the imbalance between collection capacity and intelligence analysis has prevented realization of true global integrated ISR operations, key Air Force leaders are promoting investment in automated analytical programs as a means of removing this disparity.[6] This article considers automated analysis the utilization of algorithms to transform a series of collected data into a usable intelligence product. Analytics can handle immense amounts of data by using preprogrammed models to produce decisive, actionable results.[7] This procedure has boosted profits in the private sector by influencing consumers’ buying decisions and conducting Wall Street transactions in microseconds, processing more information and acting more quickly than a stock analyst.[8] Consequently, the intelligence community is exploring analytics as a means of managing large quantities of data, identifying patterns, and developing products to anticipate the activities of future adversaries.[9] A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed that an analytics program drawing on data from public databases and airline reservation codes could have identified all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers for further investigation before that fateful date.[10] Such examples have driven key leaders to look at analytics as a possible solution to the present analytical deficiency. Nevertheless, the use of analytics is not without peril. We must judiciously approach investing in analytics to improve intelligence and must fully understand its advantages and limitations. Closing the gap will involve matching analytic technology with the skill set of the intelligence analyst, thus optimizing the concept of global integrated ISR operations promoted by the Air Force.</p><h4>Considerations for Analytics</h4><p>Evaluating the potential of analytics must start with a determination of what the technology promises — specifically, accurate and tailored intelligence products that rapidly utilize large quantities of collected data. Incorporating analytics into intelligence assessment offers an appealing solution to our analytical shortfall because it closely mimics the system and technology-intensive solutions, which successfully enhanced collection capacity.</p><p>Research conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology regarding the relationship between automation and humans revealed that automation may significantly affect a user’s situational awareness. [11] Analytics can decrease the occurrence of common human biases, including confirmation bias and assimilation bias.[12] However, it may introduce a new form — automation bias, which describes the human tendency to accept an answer generated by an automated system, even in the presence of contradictory information.[13] The likelihood of such bias increases with the complexity of the task performed by the automated system, primarily because the user has difficulty determining the major factors and processes that generate the automated solution. [14] Without this understanding, the user cannot reliably and confidently determine the accuracy of that solution. Further, the effects of an adversary’s cyber attack on our automated systems could go unnoticed, directly affecting the accuracy and reliability of global integrated ISR operations as a whole. The concept of automation bias raises a critical question: will more use of analytics close the gap between collection and analysis at the cost of increased bias?</p><p>A second significant risk associated with automated analysis and analytics concerns the lack of analytical agility associated with the coded algorithms. The term analytical agility denotes the ability of analysts, human or automated, to adapt their processes, given the introduction of new evidence or a paradigm shift. Analytically agile analysts and systems can quickly adapt assumptions and processes to changing information or new environments. Conversely, those who lack such agility dismiss new evidence or label new information incorrectly to remain within preestablished concepts. For a classic example of an individual without analytical agility, we need only look to the Cold War analyst who ignored the changing paradigms of global terrorism that led up to and followed the events of 9/11.</p><p>We must consider the significance of analytical agility when we evaluate the utility of increased analytics within global integrated ISR operations. Developing the algorithms that comprise analytics can prove time consuming. Additionally, humans do the programming, influenced by their own biases and assumptions they believed accurate and reliable at the moment of creation. Historically, we can attribute many intelligence failures to a lack of imagination or analytical agility necessary to identify new major factors and prevent surprise.[15] Analytics designers should be careful not only to look for previously observed signatures but also to consider emerging signatures or a possible change in the importance of an adversary’s existing signatures. Otherwise, analytics may hinder the discovery of evidence or misinterpret the contextual relevance of evidence that could lead to realization of an alteration in enemy tactics. Assumptions will change; therefore, we must update coding quickly to keep pace with a dynamic opponent.</p><p>Even without considering the fiscal constraints of modern military budgets, simply adding more human analysts can never match the expansive collection capacity of the Air Force. Innovative technology solutions such as analytics have been profitable in the private sector and may have even greater potential value for intelligence. However, we must consider and weigh such risks as automation bias and a paucity of analytical agility if we wish to invest effectively and improve the analytical capability resident within global integrated ISR operations.</p><h4>Recommended Investment Strategy</h4><p>Effective investment in these operations should concentrate on closing the gap between the Air Force’s current collection and analytical capabilities. Complete reliance on analytics and automated solutions to improve intelligence, however, represents a dangerous approach to solving that problem. The impact of automation bias and insufficient analytical agility associated with analytics could sideline human analysts, relegating them to rubber-stamping an automated assessment that reflects little understanding of accuracy or implications. But launching additional analysts who have no training in leveraging analytics effectively against an ever-expanding reservoir of data is an even bleaker proposition. Instead, Air Force leadership must develop a balanced investment strategy that includes analytics and, more importantly, the training of all-source human intelligence analysts in exploiting various techniques that will allow them to understand, operate, and optimize collection sensors and automated tools.</p><p>In spite of recent efforts to incorporate different analytical techniques into the core curriculum of the technical training school for intelligence officers and enlisted professionals at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, most ISR professionals (with the possible exception of graduates of the USAF Weapons School and the Air Force Advanced Analysis Course) are not adequately conversant in basic analytical methodologies. The latter include problem restatement, red teaming, weighted ranking, computation of conditional probabilities, hypothesis testing, and utility analysis. These courses provide a comprehensive set of tools for conducting objective, thoughtful analysis. Without this training, most intelligence analysts have to rely on their intuition, whereas effective leveraging of an automated system demands an understanding of its foundational principles and methodologies. Thus, we can maximize the capabilities of analytics only by offering training in specific analytical techniques coded in the programming of analytics. Expanding such training to include the methodologies and techniques of analytics would cost much less than a new collection system and, arguably, would produce better results.</p><p>This dual-pronged strategy will yield analytically astute, independent intelligence analysts poised to optimize the potential of analytics and realize the full capability of global integrated ISR operations. Integrating these analysts with analytics recognizes that we cannot pursue either path separately as the sole solution. Even though the speed of analytics permits the processing of more data, the human mind — even with its limitations — can supply the requisite analytical agility and imagination (a formidable task for analytics alone). Thus, productive consolidation of these pursuits can occur only if one is trained and equipped to manage an effective arsenal of analytical capabilities. Training intelligence analysts to better exploit various structured, analytical methodologies and investing in analytics will enable enhanced understanding, exploitation, and targeting of the adversary; improve the management of collection capacity and sensor employment; more effectively derive meaning from the collected data; strengthen the assessment of ISR effectiveness; and facilitate informed decision making — the ultimate objective.</p><p><em>End Notes</em></p><p><em>1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 411–16.</em></p><p><em>2. Air Force Document 120201–027, Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets, February 2012, 1,</em><a href="http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120201-027.pdf"><em>http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120201-027.pdf</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>3. Ibid.</em></p><p><em>4. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, 6 January 2012, 1, </em><a href="http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afdd2%E2%80%930.pdf"><em>http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afdd2–0.pdf</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>5. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 77, 78, 91, 119, 276, 342, 346–48, 353.</em></p><p><em>6. Debra Werner, “Automatic Intelligence: Potential for Analyst Cuts Prompts Call for Smarter Tools,” DefenseNews, 1 September 2011, 1,</em><a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110901/C4ISR02/109010319/Automatic-intelligence"><em>http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110901/C4ISR02/109010319/Automatic-intelligence</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>7. Thomas H. Davenport and Jeanne G. Harris, Competing on Analytics: The New Science of Winning (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007), 7.</em></p><p><em>8. Thomas H. Davenport, “Competing on Analytics,” Harvard Business Review, January 2006, 3.</em></p><p><em>9. Werner, “Automatic Intelligence,” 1.</em></p><p><em>10. Mary DeRosa, Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 6–8, </em><a href="http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040301_data_%20mining_report.pdf"><em>http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040301_data_ mining_report.pdf</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>11. M. L. Cummings, “Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support Systems” (paper presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics First Intelligent Systems Technical Conference, Chicago, 20–22 September 2004), 1, </em><a href="http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/papers/%20CummingsAIAAbias.pdf"><em>http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/papers/ CummingsAIAAbias.pdf</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>12. Confirmation bias describes the tendency to give unbalanced weight to evidence consistent with a hypothesis rather than seek evidence that could invalidate a hypothesis. Assimilation bias describes the tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence to support initial hypotheses. Both biases can result in incorrect intelligence assessments. See Jane Risen and Thomas Gilovich, “Informal Logical Fallacies,” in Critical Thinking in Psychology, ed. Robert J. Sternberg, Henry J. Roediger III, and Diane F. Halpern (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 112–14.</em></p><p><em>13. Ibid., 2.</em></p><p><em>14. Ibid.</em></p><p><em>15. James Bruce, “The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship,” in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, ed. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 204.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.</em></p><p>This article was previously published in the <a href="http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=115">Air &amp; Space Power Journal</a>. Coauthored by Robert D. Folker, Jr. and Kyle Benjamin Bressette.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b25830b46c5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Book Review]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/book-review-9b7bca9bfed7?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b7bca9bfed7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactical]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Jul 2016 18:16:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-03T18:22:46.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace</em></strong> by Dick Couch. Naval Institute Press, 2010, 160 pp., $22.95 (softcover).</p><p>Dick Couch, author of <em>A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace</em>, is a Naval Academy graduate who served with the Navy Underwater Demolition and SEAL teams for five years. As a platoon leader with SEAL Team One in Vietnam, he led a successful rescue of prisoners of war. He later served with the Central Intelligence Agency and taught ethics at the Naval Academy. Further, Couch is a best-selling author of several books and has frequently appeared as a military expert on syndicated television and radio programs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/1*bh-S_d_e4X4YV0A_poBE7A.jpeg" /></figure><p>In <em>A Tactical Ethic</em>, the author expresses the “belief that wrong things have taken place, are taking place, and are not being adequately addressed” (p. 4) on the battlefield. Couch recognizes that senior military leaders provide guidance on standards of conduct and ethics-related training. However, he believes that much of the value of this guidance and training is severely diminished by conditions in place at tactical units that allow dysfunctional conduct, which can spill over during combat. Furthermore, Couch observes that unethical conduct in combat can prove especially harmful to the nation’s cause during counterinsurgency since keeping the moral high ground is essential to winning the hearts and minds of the populace.</p><p>Although a slim book of just six chapters, it is a bit tedious in its explanation of the problem, and the reader may find the first five chapters repetitive. Moreover, some of the author’s arguments lack the scientific rigor expected when one makes conclusions about the effects of modern influences on ethical behavior. Nevertheless, Couch’s experience with the subject, coupled with his anecdotal evidence, lead the reader to accept his assessment. Additionally, he unnecessarily limits the scope of his discussion of tactical ethics to male-only, small ground-combat units in the Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces. However, during counterinsurgencies, the battle lines aren’t always clear, and the definitions of combat and support units are often blurred, as the nation realized when Pfc Jessica Lynch was captured during a firefight in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hence, <em>A Tactical Ethic</em> applies to a wider audience than initially targeted.</p><p>In the last chapter, Couch offers 10 rules of ethics (ROE) designed to create an ethical culture within tactical units and ensure proper behavior during combat. The author intends that junior combat leaders incorporate these rules as part of their daily leadership to instill and reinforce appropriate behavior. The ROEs represent practical, tangible guidance that enables someone to set and communicate clear expectations of right and wrong, provide the right example, eliminate bad behavior, promote communication, and enforce compliance with ethical standards. The last two rules specifically address ways of balancing loyalty and integrity when they compete and of exercising moral will when doing so is most difficult.</p><p>Although the Air Force offers values-based training in several topics and many formats, airpower is widely viewed as a technological solution in combat. Consequently, Airmen tend to focus on technical competence rather than discuss ethical behavior during day-to-day operations. Couch’s work addresses this omission head on and delivers realistic recommendations. Thus, every Airman can benefit from this work and should put <em>A Tactical Ethic</em> into practice.</p><p><em>“The views expressed in this book review are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or Department of Defense.”</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b7bca9bfed7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gallipoli: The Consequences of Mission Creep and Failed Trial-and-Error Campaign Planning]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/gallipoli-the-consequences-of-mission-creep-and-failed-trial-and-error-campaign-planning-155ded263835?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/155ded263835</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gallipoli]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lessons-learned]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2016 04:04:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-14T23:43:00.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*yvqjORksaXt-PgNSnjfF1Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Early in World War I, Winston Churchill promoted the idea of using the Royal Navy to control access to the Dardanelles Straits in Turkey. The purpose of the naval action was to provide a direct link to Russia by way of the Black Sea, open a new front as an alternative to the stalemate of trench warfare in Europe, and encourage other Balkan states to join the effort against the Central Powers in Europe. What was initially conceived as a naval operation evolved into a land invasion to occupy Constantinople taking Turkey out of the war and relieving pressure on Russia in the Caucasus. The land invasion developed into trench warfare and another stalemated front. The allies were eventually forced to retreat from the peninsula.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>Over 33,000 allied and 86,000 Turkish soldiers died during the campaign. Due to better planning of the evacuation, no further allied lives were lost in the withdrawal. This paper will revisit the events leading up to the disaster at Gallipoli and discuss the role of intelligence in military campaign planning and execution. Hopefully, this will help the reader understand why the allies decided to embark on such a disastrous expedition and how political and military leaders might avoid repeating some of the same mistakes in future military operations.</p><p><strong>EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE BATTLES AT GALLIPOLI</strong></p><p><strong>Road to The Great War</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/274/1*xO64QvRVC1ygQzG-xkLAUQ.png" /><figcaption>Kaiser Willhelm II</figcaption></figure><p>German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, thought it important to maintain friendly relations with Russia while staying in a majority of three in any conflict between the Five Great European Powers: Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. However, Kaiser Willhelm II upset this delicate balance of power by refusing to maintain friendly relations with Russia. Germany soon found itself allied with Austria-Hungary, the weakest of the Five Great Powers. On 28 July 1914 Austria declared war on Serbia. Russia declared war on Austria.</p><p>The whole continent was mobilizing for war, and soon Germany found itself at war with Russia, France, and Great Britain. The head of the Royal Navy, German-born Prince Louis of Battenburg, was forced to resign. This left Britain’s sea arm under divided leadership in the early months of a world war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*w8K6TwQe2a8rkwOwyhImGA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. The Western Front</figcaption></figure><p>The German’s planned to fight the war by holding the Russians at bay in the east. The German Army would sweep through the neutral Belgium bypassing French fortifications. Then they would attack south towards Paris and destroy the French Army. Nevertheless, after some initial success, the Western Front became stalled in trench warfare.</p><p><strong>Meanwhile in Turkey</strong></p><p>When war was appearing imminent, The Ottoman Empire sought to make allies to protect its interests: secure its borders and abolish economic capitulation. Initially, Turkey attempted to join the Triple Entente: Great Britain, France, and Russia. But Great Britain did not recognize the strategic importance of Turkey and cancelled delivery of two British warships to Turkey. On 2 August 1914, Turkey felt compelled to sign a treaty with the Triple Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Yet, Turkey was not ready for war and kept the treaty secret.<a href="#_ftn1">[2]</a></p><p><strong>Admiral Souchon’s Secret Orders</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/279/1*V1RhaGynHTLUA-uUCrRDuQ.png" /><figcaption>Admiral Willhelm Souchon</figcaption></figure><p>German Admiral Willhelm Souchon commanded two battle cruisers, the <em>Goeben</em> and the <em>Breslau</em>. These were the only two warships that the German Navy had stationed in the Mediterranean Sea. The <em>Goeben</em> was one of the most formidable warships of its time. In July of 1914 the <em>Goeben</em> was in Austrian-controlled port of Pola undergoing repairs while the <em>Breslau</em> was in good repair anchored off the coast of Italy.<a href="#_ftn1">[3]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*vMBkJsCkuJ6-iEBAUGGsvA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2. The Route of Pursuit from Pola to Turkey</figcaption></figure><p>Admiral Souchon was carrying secret orders that he was to implement in time of war. The orders instructed him to attack the French military stationed in Algeria then join the rest of the German Navy in the Atlantic. On 1 August Admiral Souchon received notice that Germany had declared war on Russia and would soon declare war on France. Admiral Souchon ordered the <em>Goeben</em> to leave port immediately and join the <em>Breslau</em>. On 3 August he received a change to his orders. Instead of joining the rest of the fleet in the Atlantic, he was to sail east to Turkey and persuade Turkey to enter the war on the side of Germany. On the morning of 4 August while deceptively flying the Russian flag in violation of international law, the <em>Goeben</em> and the <em>Breslau</em> shelled the French colonial ports of Philippeville and Bona in Algeria. The two German warships headed for Italy to take on more coal before continuing to Turkey.<a href="#_ftn2">[4]</a></p><p><strong>The Royal Navy in Pursuit</strong></p><p>Earlier, Vice Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne, the commander of the British fleet, was ordered to locate and track the two German warships. Britain had not yet declared war on Germany, so he could shadow Germany’s ships but not attack. Admiral Milne sent two battle cruisers, the <em>Indomitable</em> and the <em>Indefatigable</em>, to find the German warships. The afternoon of 4 August, as the two British warships passed Algeria, they were surprised to see the two German warships steaming right towards them. The <em>Indomitable</em> and the <em>Indefatigable</em> circled back and followed the two German warships toward Italy. By nightfall Admiral Souchon had outran his British pursuers and, again ignoring international law, entered neutral Italian waters, where German coal ships waited for him. Admiral Milne did not pursue but deployed his two battle cruisers to the west thinking that the Germans would head for the Atlantic or back to the port of Pola.<a href="#_ftn1">[5]</a></p><p>Italian officials urged the German ships to leave immediately. Admiral Souchon received word that Turkey had not yet given permission for his ships to enter the harbor at Constantinople. Undaunted, he left for Turkey at midnight. Great Britain declared war on Germany the same day; it was 5 August.<a href="#_ftn2">[6]</a></p><p><strong>German Warships Escape to Turkey</strong></p><p>The British spotted the German warships heading east. Admiral Milne was sure he had the Germans trapped in the eastern Mediterranean. He ordered his ships to give up the chase and diverted some other ships to guard the Suez Canal from possible attack. He never suspected the Germans were planning to head for Turkey.<a href="#_ftn3">[7]</a></p><p>The <em>Goeben</em> and the <em>Breslau</em> reached the entrance to the harbor at Constantinople on 10 August. When Admiral Souchon arrived in Turkey he expected some resistance. Instead, a small boat met him and guided his ships into the harbor. German diplomats in Turkey reminded the Turks that Great Britain had not only rebuffed their offer to become allies but had also refused to deliver two British warships. The Germans offered the <em>Goeben</em> and the <em>Breslau</em> for sale to Turkey. Turkey accepts, keeps the original crews, and makes Admiral Souchon commander-in-chief of the Turkish navy. Turkey renames the two warships the <em>Yavuz Sultan Selim</em> and the <em>Mildin</em>.<a href="#_ftn4">[8]</a></p><p><strong>Turkey Enters the War</strong></p><p>After completing some overdue repairs, Admiral Souchon ordered the <em>Yavuz</em> and the <em>Mildin</em> into the Black Sea. On 29 October, the two warships shell three Russian cities without the knowledge of the Turkish government. The next day Turkey officially entered the war on the side of the Germans.<a href="#_ftn5">[9]</a></p><p><strong>CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND PLANNING</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/269/1*Ac0dpCp4iqqtnzChJ7HcNQ.png" /><figcaption>Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill</figcaption></figure><p>The Western Front in Europe was stalled in trench warfare. Great Britain’s ally, Russia, was suffering severe casualties on its front with Germany. To make matters worse, the Turks were putting additional pressure on the Russians in the Caucasus. By late 1914 the British and French governments agreed it was necessary to gain control of the Dardanelles. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, felt a moral obligation to help Russia and saw the strategic importance of taking action against Turkey. He asked Vice Admiral Carden, the commander of the naval squadron blockading Turkey, to devise a plan for a naval demonstration. “Carden’s hypothetical plan for a slow and methodical reduction of the outer and inner forts, and the vital clearing of the minefields, was carried by Churchill to the War Council meeting of 13 January and presented as a low-cost, low-risk method of breaking the deadlock in Europe.”<a href="#_ftn6">[10]</a></p><p><strong>Romanticism and Expanding Objectives</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/354/1*t0Y8otNg0fQlfYBleGyy-w.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3. Plan to Force the Straits</figcaption></figure><p>Churchill advanced the notion of the utility of an allied naval demonstration against Turkey. “He thought the Turkish Empire a ripe fruit ready to fall if the branches were shaken a little. In the Dardanelles British sea power could have a disproportionate effect on the outcome of the whole war, much more cost-effectively than feeding yet more men into the slaughter of the Western Front.”<a href="#_ftn1">[11]</a> Admiral Sir John Fisher agreed to “support an operation in the Dardanelles just so long as it did not threaten the naval balance in the North Sea. He could spare a squadron of old surplus warships to blast their way through the straits; if more effort was required, he would support a joint operation in which the Army predominated.”<a href="#_ftn2">[12]</a></p><p>Soon the romantic notion of taking Constantinople and re-fighting the Trojan War took hold. “The possibilities soon began to impress themselves on all the participants. It was hoped that the appearance of a powerful fleet off the Golden Horn would precipitate a political crisis that would take Turkey out of the war. It would secure the intervention of Italy on the side of the Allies and galvanise [sic] the whole of the Balkans into a coalition against the Central Powers. It would open a supply line to Russia, releasing her grain to the West in return for badly needed munitions.”<a href="#_ftn3">[13]</a> “[W]hat began as a naval demonstration to relieve Russia… became an order for a naval expedition to bombard and take the Gallipoli peninsula, with Constantinople for an objective.”<a href="#_ftn4">[14]</a></p><p><strong>Incrementalism and Trial-and-Error</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/269/1*DNpZFUN61rbxKj6SbuurBw.png" /><figcaption>Lord Kitchener</figcaption></figure><p>Because the leadership within the Army and the Navy were unable to adequately express their unique viewpoints on the desired approach to the Gallipoli campaign, no one really understood what the objective really was. This would later make successful coordination between the services nearly impossible.<a href="#_ftn5">[15]</a> The Minister of War, Lord Kitchener, was reluctant to divert troops and equipment from the Western Front; however, he was willing to let the Navy try it.<a href="#_ftn6">[16]</a> He later agreed that if it proved successful, he would send troops to occupy Constantinople.</p><p>The War Council wanted to attempt to obtain their objectives with the least amount of resources possible. They promised that more resources would be considered and to escalate the attack, if the effort began to look promising. If not, they agreed to cut their losses early. “The consequence of all this indecision was an incremental campaign in which the objectives changed as it went along, in which fundamental questions and issues were not addressed and in which both naval and land forces were fed into the theatre too late and in dribs and drabs. Naval and Army commanders regularly complained that the campaign would have been won had the forces in theatre at the end of the campaign been present at the beginning.”<a href="#_ftn7">[17]</a> Eventually, they agreed to give it a try with a naval bombardment in February.</p><p>“[T]he naval attack was begun on 19 February and the outer forts were thoroughly knocked about. Parties of marines…were able to land at Sedd el Bahr and destroy some damaged guns there. The attack would have passed into the Narrows but bad weather delayed further progress. The net result of the attack in that inclement season was to announce our serious interest in the area to the enemy with the greatest clarity.”<a href="#_ftn8">[18]</a> The British navy made repeated attempts to attack the forts and clear mines in between the days of bad weather. The Turk forces worked to increase their defenses.</p><p>General Birdwood, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) Commander, observed the naval operation and issued a report on 4 March that troops were needed to secure passage through the Dardanelles. The French quickly organized a colonial division and offered its services in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lord Kitchener had envisioned a much smaller force commanded by General Birdwood, but the introduction of French troops made that impossible; General Birdwood was too junior in rank to lead such a large combined and joint force. On 12 March Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.<a href="#_ftn9">[19]</a></p><p><strong>THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN</strong></p><p><strong>The Naval Battles</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*fMF0FWz9RAjfJROrj1h8qg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Major Ports and Minefields Protecting the Dardanelles</figcaption></figure><p>On 9 March due to the bad weather and concern over the high rate of expenditure of ammunition Admiral Carden informed Churchill that the naval force would concentrate on clearing mines in the straits. However, failure to clear the mines at night forced Admiral Carden to prepare an order for daylight action. On 17 March Admiral Sir John de Robeck, who had replaced Admiral Carden due to ill health, issued the order.<a href="#_ftn1">[20]</a></p><p>Admiral de Robeck had information that the Turk forces were low on supplies and ammunition. He thought that the minesweepers could be effective during the daylight if accompanied by a larger protective force, because the Turks would choose to fire their artillery sparingly at the larger ships ignoring the smaller minesweepers. He divided his fleet into three sections. The first two sections comprised of English ships and the third made up of French ships. He planned for the first two sections to enter the straits to clear the mines and destroy the forts. The French would follow and continue on to Constantinople.<a href="#_ftn2">[21]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/106/1*WwwBwWY4ZFI6n7zM-PgaCw.png" /><figcaption>Admiral de Robeck</figcaption></figure><p>On 18 March Admiral de Robeck commenced his attack. The first section penetrated as far as the first row of mines. The battleships shelled the forts for about three hours. Turkey’s artillery fell silent. The minesweepers moved forward to clear the first of the two rows of mines in the straits. But they were forced to withdraw under fire from Turkey’s mobile artillery that had not been suppressed. The German officers in charge of the Turkish defense had identified the mines as key to a successful defense. They ordered that the mines must be defended at all costs and replaced as quickly as possible. Admiral de Robeck expected the defenders to fire on his battleships and ignore his minesweepers, but the defenders concentrated their artillery on the minesweepers and left the mines to take care of the other warships. The defender’s strategy worked. After a seven-hour battle, Admiral de Robeck ordered a withdrawal after losing three of his ships were sunk and three other were badly damaged. The defenders were almost completely out of ammunition and surprised by the sudden retreat of the allied navy. They knew that they could not have held out much longer.<a href="#_ftn3">[22]</a></p><p>Admiral de Robeck had intended to re-attack within a few days, but after having time to reflect on his losses, he reconsidered. He thought that the Turkish defenders must be better supplied than he thought and decided the straits could not be taken without an amphibious assault. On 23 March Admiral de Robeck reversed his plan of action. After a conference with General Hamilton, Admiral de Robeck proposed a joint operation in which troops would attack the forts on the peninsula and clear the way for his fleet. Lord Kitchener and Churchill strongly opposed the introduction of troops into the campaign at that time, but they could not get the War Council to order Admiral de Robeck to renew the naval attack. That decision led to the military debacle called Gallipoli.<a href="#_ftn4">[23]</a></p><p><strong>Operational Intelligence, Planning and Preparation</strong></p><p>General Hamilton had little intelligence or time to prepare for this amphibious assault. There was no systematic comprehensive British intelligence collection effort in Turkey.<a href="#_ftn5">[24]</a> The limited intelligence he was given included a 1912 handbook on the Turkish Army and an inaccurate map.<a href="#_ftn6">[25]</a> Air reconnaissance was used during the campaign; however, the advantage proved not to be great. The airplanes “had no photographic equipment and the effectiveness of air reconnaissance depended on the pilot’s ability to sketch what he had seen.”<a href="#_ftn7">[26]</a></p><p>Lord Kitchener assigned Hamilton a Chief of Staff, not allowing Hamilton to pick his own. The advantage of surprise that an amphibious assault offers was denied him. The preceding naval attacks had given Turkey fair warning, and the Turks were preparing their defense. Lord Kitchener had placed other restrictions on Hamilton as well. He was concerned that this “naval demonstration” was escalating out of control and ordered Hamilton to not spread the effort to any other part of Asia Minor. This forced Hamilton to plan an assault on the cliff-ridden shores of the Gallipoli peninsula. Lord Kitchener made it clear that the 29th Infantry Division was on loan only and could be recalled at any time, if they were needed at the Western Front. This contributed to poor communication, as Hamilton was reluctant to ask for additional troops for fear Kitchener may take troops from him. In fact, Kitchener had made additional troops available to Hamilton, but Hamilton was left unaware of this.<a href="#_ftn8">[27]</a></p><p><strong>Try Again at Cape Helles and ANZAC Cove</strong></p><p>On 25 April a combined joint force attacked the Gallipoli peninsula at points along Cape Helles and ANZAC Cove. The attack at Cape Helles began when allied ships surrounded the coast and fired on its defenses. The objective of the amphibious forces was to capture the hill of Achi Baba, some twelve kilometers inland. Three battles ensued until the end of May and another battle in June lasted eight days. A major factor contributing to the inability of the invading allied forces to advance was the lack of coordinated naval artillery to support the effort.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*hUZUfv8YQXsZ0q1xDbQWmA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5. Cape Helles Attack</figcaption></figure><p><strong>V Beach. </strong>A steamer was converted into a rudimentary landing craft in hopes of getting the troops safely ashore at V Beach. However, this new “Trojan Horse” attracted a fatal concentration of Turkish artillery. The hills from which the Turks were deployed provided a commanding view of the shore, and they were prepared. The defenders had placed several machine guns along the hills to catch any invading force in a deadly crossfire. The British infantry was cut down as it attempted to make it ashore. A few survived by hiding behind a low sandbar. The British were able to complete their landing at V Beach under cover of night.<a href="#_ftn9">[28]</a></p><p><strong>W Beach. </strong>The second main attack at Cape Helles on that first day was at W Beach. The beach here was defended by less than 100 Turks, but it was mined and rows of barbed wired and other entanglements delayed the allied landing. The delay allowed the Turks to reinforce their defense and cut down many of the invading troops with machinegun crossfire. The invading battalion lost half its strength on the first day of the attack.<a href="#_ftn10">[29]</a></p><p><strong>X Beach. </strong>Only a few fortifications and about 1200 Turkish defenders protected this beach. The minimal defense was attacked by robust allied naval artillery in support of the invading amphibious forces, and ensured the allies got ashore with very few casualties. Yet, the landing forces had not prepared well for the logistics of such an operation. Rather than taking a few days the landings continued for months. Once again the allies were delayed and lost the initiative.<a href="#_ftn11">[30]</a></p><p><strong>S and Y Beaches.</strong> Little resistance was expected at these beaches; however, it appears that the concentration of the allied naval artillery effort was directed here. “The ships at Y were supposed to keep the heavy Turkish batteries further inland on Achi Baba quiet, while the ships at S did the same to the Turkish guns on the Asiatic shore. The result was thin coverage at V and W beaches where it was, as things turned out, most needed.”<a href="#_ftn12">[31]</a></p><p>The troops landed at Y Beach entirely unopposed. “But there was an embarrasing [sic] confusion over which of the two colonels was in command locally…[and the orders] implied that the force was only there to prevent Turks moving south until the remainder of the division got ashore and joined them later that day. The force dug in and repelled Turkish counter-attacks but accomplished nothing further. Early next day, the local commander evacuated the position!”<a href="#_ftn13">[32]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*NYKwJ1HiCEueyvrwL6aojg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6. ANZAC Cove</figcaption></figure><p><strong>ANZAC Cove.</strong> The navy deposited the ANZAC troops about a mile north of where they had planned to land. Even though a sheer cliff greeted the disembarking troops, it was almost a fortunate mistake. The Turks defenses here were unprepared and the handful of Turkish troops deployed there began to retreat. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemel happened to be training some of his troops in the vicinity. When he saw the Turk troops running from their positions, he asked why they were retreating. He saw the ANZAC soldiers were advancing rapidly. He knew that unless he could delay their advance until reinforcements could arrive the peninsula would be overrun. He ordered the few Turks there to defend their homeland. His inspirational words, “I’m not ordering you to attack. I’m ordering you to die!” had the desired effect. Reinforcements arrived and the Turks stopped the ANZAC advance.<a href="#_ftn14">[33]</a></p><p>The ANZAC troops attempted to retreat back to their ships but they lacked the proper vehicles to make their way back. Upon getting word of the disaster, Hamilton considers calling off the whole operation. About the same time he gets a report from a British submarine secretly operating in the straits that it had successfully penetrated the two minefields and successfully sunk an enemy ship. Hamilton considers this a good omen and instead of retreating orders his ground commanders: “Dig, dig, dig until you are safe!” Over the next few months, the allies find themselves in the very predicament they had hoped to avoid, the stalemate of trench warfare.<a href="#_ftn15">[34]</a></p><p><strong>Try, Try Again at Sulva Bay</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*lX0W86KN2uX06HTLBPyQsw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7. Sulva Bay Assault</figcaption></figure><p>On 9 August Hamilton launches another attack at Sulva Bay in an attempt to encircle the Turks and cut off the route for reinforcements. Determined not to let the lack of secrecy again divulge his plans, Hamilton keeps the details of the operation from his ground commanders until the last possible moment. This tight security leads to poor communication and another failure. The allies surprise the defenders and make a successful landing; however, because of poor communication the ground commanders are unsure of what to do next and fail to advance. The defenders take the opportunity to reinforce their positions and once again prevent any hope of a successful invasion.</p><p>As a diversion to this main effort by the allies, the troops at ANZAC cove are ordered to launch an attack to keep the defenders occupied. Their attack is preceded by naval artillery that forces the defenders from their trenches. Nevertheless, due to lack of proper synchronization the artillery bombardment stops seven minutes before scheduled giving the defenders time to return to their trenches. In a series of futile attacks the ANZAC troops take heavy losses and are again stopped from advancing.<a href="#_ftn16">[35]</a></p><p><strong>Hopelessness and Evacuation</strong></p><p>The allied disaster at Gallipoli does not encourage the Balkans to join with the allies. On 6 September Bulgaria joins the Central Powers. The British War Council asks Hamilton to consider withdrawing his forces. Hamilton is fearful that a withdrawal from the peninsula will result in even worse casualties. General Monro replaces Hamilton in October. General Monro supports a withdrawal and begins planning.<a href="#_ftn17">[36]</a></p><p>On 20 December allied forces are withdrawn from Sulva Bay and ANZAC Cove. The remaining forces at Cape Helles soon follow. They withdraw on 9 January. The allies finally achieve a measure of success; they take the Turks completely by surprise and take no casualties during the evacuation. “Retreats are never victories, but this one came close to being one. It was meticulously organized in two separate stages first from Anzac and Sulva then from Helles. The Turks were fooled into missing their opportunity to inflict huge casualties by careful deception and inspired organisation [sic] at every level of the operation. Amazingly there were virtually no casualties; everyone got away and much of the supplies that would have been of use to the Turks was skillfully destroyed.”<a href="#_ftn18">[37]</a></p><p><strong>CONCLUSIONS</strong></p><p><strong>Why Gallipoli?</strong></p><p>Great Britain’s failure to see the strategic importance of controlling the Dardanelles led to their failure to arrive at a diplomatic solution by bringing Turkey into their alliance with France and Russia. This failure gave the Germans de facto control over this vital supply route, and cut off Russia from its allies. This in turn led to Russia’s supply problems and their failure to make significant gains along the Eastern Front. The stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front combined with Russia’s failure to advance on the Eastern Front created the desire to open a new front against Germany.</p><p>The escape of German warships through the Dardanelles, the subsequent bombing of Russian ports, and Turkey entering the war and fighting the Russians in the Caucasus provided the emotional impetus to do something. Great Britain finally realized the strategic importance of controlling the Dardanelles but had romanticized notions or re-fighting the Trojan War. All these events in combination with knowledge of Turkey’s supply and ammunition shortages and a desire to get the Balkan states to join in the effort against Germany led to the inevitable decision to attempt a naval expedition to force the straits.</p><p>The determined resistance of the Turks and their ability to identify the mines as key to protecting the straits led to them sinking three allied warships. Admiral de Robeck did not expect this and questioned the reports of Turkey’s supply and ammunition shortages. He reversed his original decision to re-attack. The lack of unity of command in the allied force prevented Churchill from forcing Admiral de Robeck to press the attack without support from ground troops. In hindsight it appears that all these events contributed to the decision to launch an amphibious assault on the peninsula of Gallipoli.</p><p><strong>The Failures of Gallipoli</strong></p><p>The problems created by a lack of unity of command in the allied naval expedition were compounded when the allies decided to make it a joint operation as well by attempting an amphibious landing. The British neglected preparing for amphibious operations at the beginning of the century, and “the division of responsibility at Gallipoli was decided, impromptu, on the basis of ‘some army book’ and the King’s Regulations.”<a href="#_ftn19">[38]</a> Communication among the leadership was poor. “[T]he machinery for joint action was plainly far from perfect. Corbett was rather proud of the fact that there was no joint force commander since he preferred a ‘combination of equals’. The Army and the Navy went about their complementary business largely in isolation.”<a href="#_ftn20">[39]</a> The supporting naval artillery was uncoordinated and not synchronized well with the movements of the ground troops. Hamilton was not given much time to prepare and plan for such a massive operation. He was not able to determine the resources needed to ensure the success of such an endeavor, rather, he was given resources that were available and that would not divert too much from the Western Front. Complicating the planning process was the total lack of the most basic strategic, operational, or tactical intelligence.</p><p><strong>The Turk Perspective</strong></p><p>The Turkish soldiers put up a formidable resistance. They were defending their homeland, and they had competent, inspirational leadership. German General Otto Liman von Sanders made expert use of his limited resources. He identified the two rows of mines in the straits as the center of gravity in his successful defense. Because his forces were low on ammunition, he used his artillery for the sole purpose of protecting the mines. He prevented the allies from clearing the mines and forced Admiral de Robeck to reconsider another naval attack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/1*RchMoGhnNmnn6qdQHDrvXg.png" /><figcaption>Mustafa Kemel</figcaption></figure><p>Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemel was key in stopping the allied amphibious invasion of Gallipoli. He recognized that a war of attrition served his interests as the defender. Hamilton was limited by the availability of resources. He needed to fight a quick war of annihilation and take the peninsula before Turkish reinforcements could arrive, but he did not. The Turks suffered more deaths and casualties than did the allies, but they could more easily reinforce their positions by moving troops down the peninsula.</p><p>Aiding the Turks in this war of attrition was disease. “June arrived and the weather was becoming hotter. With the heat came the increase in the flies and the spread of sickness and disease. By July a health crisis was developing. Sanitation became an increasingly vital concern and the medical officers had to work hard to see that every effort was taken to improve conditions. Dysentery and diarrhoea [sic] spread through the regiments, which were quickly weakened by the high sickness rate and consequent evacuations of the sick to the hospitals.”<a href="#_ftn21">[40]</a></p><p>The terrain also provided the Turks with a commanding view of the shores. Thus, the Turks had the advantage of tactical intelligence. The Turkish defenders could not man the entire coastline. They did not leave the coasts undefended. Where there were few or no troops they built up fortifications and placed mines and obstacles on the shores. Again, the terrain offered the defenders a view of the entire coast and when allied troops showed up unexpectedly, the mines and obstacles delayed the advance until the defenders could reinforce their positions.</p><p>The allies were denied the advantage of surprise during their first amphibious invasion on 25 April because of the previous naval battles; the Turks were prepared for subsequent attacks. Although Hamilton ensured security before the attack at Sulva Bay on 9 August, poor communication among the allied ground commanders prevented their advance. The allied landings were disorganized throughout the campaign.</p><p><strong>Lessons Learned</strong></p><p>The expanding objectives and incremental approach pursued in an attempt to achieve those objectives provided clear warning to the defenders of the allied intent. “In the Dardanelles campaign [Pye said] there was a thorough absence of cooperation between the Admiralty and the War Office, including the failure to determine a definitive objective, and a woeful misconception of the force required for the success of the expedition…. The failure should be attributed to the Admiralty and the War Office, because of their failure to determine the forces required for the task and for their lack of support of the forces in the theater of operations.”<a href="#_ftn22">[41]</a></p><p>The trial-and-error approach to campaign planning drew the allies into this disastrous campaign. The allied leadership lacked experience and time to competently plan and prepare. They traded the lives of their subordinates for adequate planning and preparation. “The lack of understanding of modern warfare, to which most of these officers had not yet been fully exposed, a failure to appreciate the input of technology — especially the Turk’s clever employment of machine-guns — and poor staff-work, all showed how little experience there was within the command structure. It was still believed that discipline and aggressive spirit were the essence of military success.”<a href="#_ftn23">[42]</a></p><p>A structured, formal planning process is crucial to any military campaign but especially important to joint/combined campaigns. Leadership must agree on and set clear objectives, determine what resources are needed to accomplish the objectives, and determine if the resources are available.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*DwS2UB2uPjOhLnJ8V9FJdg.png" /><figcaption>Major Factors Contributing to the Failure at Gallipoli</figcaption></figure><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a>Versaware Technologies, Inc., “Gallipoli Campaign,” URL: <a href="http://www.funkandwagnalls.com/">http://www.funkandwagnalls.com</a>/encyclopedia/low/articles/g/g009000104f.html, accessed 29 March 1999; and The Columbia Encyclopedia, “Gallipoli Campaign,” URL: <a href="http://cbs.infoplease.com/ce5/CE019997.html">http://cbs.infoplease.com/ce5/CE019997.html</a>, accessed 13 Jun 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[2]</a>FOCUS Online Magazine, “Gallipoli 1915,” URL: <a href="http://www.focusmm.com.au/">http://www.focusmm.com.au/</a>anzac_01.htm, accessed 13 Jun 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[3]</a>Paul Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet,” URL: <a href="http://www.worldwar1.com/">http://www.worldwar1.com/</a>sfgb.htm, accessed 13 Jun 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[4]</a>Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[5]</a>Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[6]</a>Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[7]</a>Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[8]</a>S. Kagan Agun, “Gallipoli Wars,” URL: <a href="http://www.iit.edu/~agunsal/canakkale/canwar.html,">http://www.iit.edu/~agunsal/canakkale/canwar.html,</a> accessed 30 April 1999; and Chrastina, “German Warships Flee British Fleet”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[9]</a>Agun, “Gallipoli Wars”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[10]</a>John Lee, “Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles,” <em>Fallen Stars: Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disasters</em>, ed. Brian Bond (London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1991), 36.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[11]</a>Geoffery Till, “Brothers in Arms: The British Army and Navy at The Dardanelles,” <em>Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced</em>, ed. Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 162.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[12]</a>Till, 162.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[13]</a>Lee, 36.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[14]</a>Lee, 36–37.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[15]</a>Till, 162.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[16]</a>Till, 162.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[17]</a>Till, 161.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[18]</a>Lee, 37.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[19]</a>Lee, 39.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[20]</a>E. Michael Golda, “The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare,” URL: <a href="http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/summer/art6su98.htm,">http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/summer/art6su98.htm,</a> accessed 5 May 1999.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[21]</a>Agun, “Gallipoli Wars”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[22]</a>Agun, “Gallipoli Wars”; and Golda, “The Dardanelles Campaign”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[23]</a>Golda, “The Dardanelles Campaign”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[24]</a>Richard Popplewell, “British Intelligence in Mesopotamia: 1914–1916,” <em>Intelligence and Military Operations</em>, ed. Michael I. Handel (Portland: Frank Cass, 1990), 141.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[25]</a>Lee, 39.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[26]</a>Popplewell, 154.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[27]</a>Lee, 39.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[28]</a>“What the Turks Saw: A View From the Other Side of the Line,” URL: <a href="http://user.glo.be/~snleders/">http://user.glo.be/~snleders/</a>turks.html, accessed 30 April 1999.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[29]</a>“What the Turks Saw”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[30]</a>Till, 171.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[31]</a>Till, 170.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[32]</a>Lee, 43.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[33]</a>A. Mete Tuncoku, “On Gallipoli,” URL: <a href="http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/interviews/tun1.html,">http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/interviews/tun1.html,</a> accessed 30 April 1999.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[34]</a>Anthony Milburn, “British Submarines in the Dardanelles,” URL: <a href="http://www.cronab.demon.co.uk/">http://www.cronab.demon.co.uk/</a>subs2.htm, accessed 30 April 1999; Lee, 42.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[35]</a>Peter Burness, <em>The Nek: The Tragic Charge of the Light Horse Brigade at Gallipoli</em> (Kenthurst NSW, Australia: Kangaroo Press Pty. Ltd,. 1996), 142.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[36]</a>Lee, 48.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[37]</a>Till, 173.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[38]</a>Till, 160.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[39]</a>Till, 165.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[40]</a>Burness, 75.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[41]</a>Russell F. Weigley, <em>The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy</em> (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 257.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[42]</a>Burness,138.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/rob-folker-45a19740">Robert Folker</a> is an Air Force officer, a graduate of and former instructor at the United States Air Force Weapons School, and holds a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University. He is currently an Air Power Strategist with Checkmate on the Air Staff at the Pentagon. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=155ded263835" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Need for Standardized Training and Certification for Intelligence Analysts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/the-need-for-standardized-training-and-certification-for-intelligence-analysts-b6f26e197489?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6f26e197489</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[certification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-community]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jun 2016 03:21:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-31T23:40:08.553Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*rnJhyJgwwQnPlx3e.jpg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.udemy.com/level-1-intelligence-analyst-certification/?couponCode=L1IACDISC">https://www.udemy.com/level-1-intelligence-analyst-certification</a></figcaption></figure><p>Although anyone can claim the title of “intelligence analyst,” there is no commonly understood, standardized certification available within the Intelligence Community to confirm analytic skill and proficiency. Some may argue that each analytic assessment should be judged on its content and not on the certification or reputation of the author. However, an analytic product can often read well even though its analytic underpinnings are flawed. Additionally, it would be beneficial to have some objective measure of an analyst’s skill before selecting him for a task, rather than to discover afterwards that the analyst was unable to meet the task. Having addressed why certifications are needed and assuming certifications would provide a worthwhile benefit, the discussion then turns to how and in what areas should one attain certification. Through an analysis of the concept of analysis, the author proposes that three basic divisions be created to train and certify one as either a descriptive, explanative, or predictive intelligence analyst.</p><h4><strong>THE CONCEPT OF ANALYSIS</strong></h4><p>The concept of “analysis” consists of two basic notions: divergence and convergence. First, one must break a problem down into its component parts and examine each part separately. Then, with a better understanding of each individual component, the analyst must reassemble the separate parts into a coherent whole and examine how the whole functions. There are five basic steps in the analytical process: 1) problem restatement which involves refining and clarifying what the customer wants, 2) data research which includes examining both existing data and gathering new evidence as necessary, 3) hypotheses generation and evaluation, 4) hypothesis selection based on the evidence, and 5) setting milestones to reevaluate and revalidate conclusions.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LcGR_Y6bSxoffKje-HleEA.png" /></figure><p>Steps one and three in the analytical process are divergent. These steps help broaden the analyst’s perspective and consider many aspects before proceeding to step four and converge on a solution. Several different specific divergent and convergent techniques and analytical methodologies are based on these five basic steps. However, no one specific methodology can be applied to every type of analytical problem. The analyst’s task is to select and apply the analytical methodology that best fits the specific intelligence problem he is trying to solve.</p><h4><strong>DESCRIPTION, EXPLANATION, AND PREDICTION</strong></h4><p>Basic intelligence establishes the baseline reference for all other intelligence. It answers the basic questions of who, what, where, how, and when. It describes potential adversaries, available resources, and their capabilities. Current intelligence interprets current events. It seeks to explain an adversary’s behavior, answer the question “why,” and establish causal relationships. Estimative intelligence is more forward-looking. It attempts to predict future actions and events.<a href="#_ftn1">[2]</a></p><p>Intelligence analysis relies on all three types of intelligence: description, explanation, and prediction. Descriptive intelligence is the foundation that all other defense intelligence analysis is built upon. One cannot explain why events occurred, if one does not know what events occurred. Similarly, an intelligence analyst cannot predict future events without understanding the underlying causal relationships. An intelligence analyst must develop a firm foundation based on basic and current intelligence on which his prediction can stand. An understanding of the causal relationships comes from identifying all relevant factors through descriptive intelligence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ra2HU6gxE3giESY9FdPilw.png" /></figure><h4><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></h4><p>As a minimum, every intelligence analyst should be proficient in analyzing descriptive intelligence. Thus, each relevant intelligence education and training course should ensure its students graduate with the descriptive intelligence analysis certification. As the analyst gains experience and expertise he adds the ability to explain events and finally predict them and has the opportunity to earn additional certifications through advanced formal courses and on-the-job training. The analyst cannot move into one area of intelligence and ignore another; neither can he start with explanation or prediction without first becoming proficient in descriptive intelligence. Rather, the analyst must progress sequentially from proficiency in descriptive intelligence through explanatory intelligence to predictive intelligence. Training and certifying intelligence analysts sequentially along the descriptive, explanative, and predictive divisions will ensure they are equipped with the appropriate analytic skills to meet the increasing responsibilities as they progress in their careers. Also, the intelligence consumer will be able to better determine whether an analyst is qualified to provide the analysis needed. I propose the course provided via the following link be the standard to train and certify its graduates as Level 1 Intelligence Analysts for descriptive analysis within the Intelligence Community: <a href="https://www.udemy.com/level-1-intelligence-analyst-certification/">https://www.udemy.com/level-1-intelligence-analyst-certification/</a></p><p>��</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a>As taught from 1998–99 at the Joint Military Intelligence College course ANA630, “Intelligence Analysis: Continuity and Change,” and derived from Ronald D. Garst, “Chapter 4: Fundamentals of Intelligence Analysis;” reprint in <em>Intelligence Analysis: ANA630</em> vol. 1 (Washington: Joint Military Intelligence College, nd.), 18–28.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[2]</a>Garst, 8–9.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=AAIAAAiR1sYBmx7T8FuuYvS4KKacQc322rtfBTU&amp;trk=nav_responsive_tab_profile"><em>Robert Folker</em></a><em> is an Air Force officer, is a graduate of and former instructor at the United States Air Force Weapons School, and holds a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University. He is currently an Air Power Strategist with Checkmate on the Air Staff at the Pentagon. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6f26e197489" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Air Force’s Struggle with Innovation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@robertfolker/the-air-force-s-struggle-with-innovation-477ac51434d0?source=rss-6e9d45639059------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/477ac51434d0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bureaucracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Folker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Nov 2015 22:22:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-17T02:16:07.739Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Although the word “bureaucracy” may conjure an image of a large, mindless, and soulless organization, military bureaucracies can provide some positive benefits when executing predictable processes to make routine decisions and act as a necessary check on impulsivity. Moreover, since military bureaucracies are inherently resistant to change, bureaucratic bias to the status quo may delay or prevent the implementation of potentially destructive policies.</p><p>Conversely, the slow, bureaucratic approach to military decision-making and planning may not be able to keep pace with more agile adversaries or adequately respond to threats in an increasingly dynamic environment. Bureaucratic bias can also frustrate efforts to innovate and prevent the change required to keep a competitive military advantage or ensure survival. Ironically, one’s innovative idea stifled by the military bureaucracy is in the view of another a harmful idea that was wisely prevented. Thus, officers who operate within military bureaucracies must be able to wisely discern between the two then optimize the strengths and safeguards inherent within the organization while minimizing the deleterious effects of bureaucratic culture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/272/0*YO8vIFLUb4YkA3qL." /></figure><p>According to an article published a couple of years ago in <em>Wired Magazine</em>, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis (U.S. Army) lost faith in our senior military officers’ ability to make improvements to the military bureaucracy. “Over the past 20 years, our senior leaders have amassed a record of failure in major organizational, acquisition and strategic efforts,”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn1">[1]</a> Davis writes. “These failures have been accompanied by the hallmarks of an organization unable and unwilling to fix itself.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn2">[2]</a> Resistance to improvement and innovation can occur even when leaders actively promote it.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn3">[3]</a> However, military leaders are ultimately responsible for the successes and failures of the organization. Last year the early retirement of the top two officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Michael Flynn and Mr. David Shedd, was announced.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn4">[4]</a> The retirements were due, at least in part, between the conflict with their vision and the entrenched bureaucracy. Other military organizations are not immune from Davis’ critique; bureaucratic resistance to change is a problem shared by all the services. For example, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force (VCSAF), General Larry Spencer, recounted the story of how two innovating airmen at Andrews Air Force Base met considerable resistance when they proposed a modest cost savings measure to discontinue a high-end car lease in favor of using standard sedans within their vehicle fleet to shuttle VIPs to and from the flightline. Each time their request was rebuffed, they appealed up their chain of command. Eventually, their appeal reached the VCSAF who approved the request.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn5">[5]</a> This success story of innovators who wouldn’t take “no” for an answer, also underscores the bureaucratic resistance to change that is pervasive within today’s Air Force.</p><p>A primary factor contributing to this resistance to change is the bureaucratic culture that discourages dissent and inhibits innovation. In recognition of the bureaucratic tendency to discourage dissent, the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), General Schwartz, stated the Air Force must be an organization that views debate “as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn6">[6]</a> The current CSAF, General Mark A. Welsh III, emphasized that the Air Force’s competitive advantage comes from its ability to recruit and retain innovative airmen to lead the way in the air, space, and cyberspace. “This spirit of innovation, of seeing problems from an alternative perspective, is in our culture, in our heritage, and in every Airman — Active, Guard, Reserve and Civilian — regardless of his or her specialty or role.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn7">[7]</a> In spite of the last two CSAFs expressing a desire to foster constructive debate and innovation within the Air Force, examples abound of “a bureaucratic mindset” that discourages airmen from voicing a dissenting opinion or pursuing innovation.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn8">[8]</a> Some critics argue the Air Force is suffering from a lack of innovation due to a growing disconnect between its core culture and stated mission.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn9">[9]</a> For example, an article in DefenseNews stated that “[p]ilots of manned aircraft still occupy the center of Air Force culture. However, its mission has become increasingly fragmented…in air, space, and cyberspace.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn10">[10]</a> The argument contends the current culture of the Air Force contributes to a bureaucratic mindset that attempts to reinforce the status quo of the dominance of manned aircraft at the expense of competing technologies and discourages innovation that might disrupt the manned-aircraft paradigm.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn11">[11]</a></p><p>Furthermore, the disparity between what leaders say and what they do (articulated versus axiomatic behavior), contributes to organizational dysfunction. “[The] culture-mission disconnect leads to inconsistencies in how the Air Force presents itself to the executive and legislative branches, and how these branches of government understand the Air Force’s role.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn12">[12]</a> As important is how these inconsistencies affect how airmen feel, think, and behave. An important aspect of leadership is to provide clarity of purpose and objectives. When leaders behave, reward behavior, or expect behavior different from what they have expressed they desire, they cause confusion and get out of strategic alignment with the organization while they pursue their own interests.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn13">[13]</a> As an extreme example, the hypocrisy of leaders in unprofessional sexual relationships or those reluctant to take appropriate action to prevent sexual assault may give increase to the number of sexual assaults from within the ranks.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn14">[14]</a> Examples like this create pressure to take authority away from commanders and distribute it, which complicates decision making. Yet, this overreaction strengthens the bureaucracy at the expense of the individual, which inhibits organizational agility and stifles innovation. A better reaction would be to hold individual commanders personally accountable for their actions and decisions rather than collectively diluting the authority of all commanders.</p><p>More commonly, the hypocrisy of an officer who pays lip service to innovation but frustrates the efforts of innovators may cause some innovative airmen to leave the Air Force and others to abandon attempts to innovate. Oftentimes, this inconsistency between word and deed occurs because many leaders micromanage due to feelings of insecurity, especially in uncertain times, in spite of their intellectual understanding that delegating more to subordinates will improve innovation and their stated desire to innovate.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn15">[15]</a> Unfortunately, the disparity between articulated and axiomatic behavior and the resulting dysfunction are endemic in bureaucratic culture, all too ubiquitous within today’s Air Force, and are undermining attempts to reinvigorate a culture of innovation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/266/1*TSdIN7SgyTjPtYwklYiMrw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Moreover, dysfunctional organizational behavior is exacerbated by inter-service rivalries, which are compounded by fears of current and projected budget shortfalls.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn16">[16]</a> Contributing to the inter-service rivalry are the conflicting views on the role of the Air Force by military leaders.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn17">[17]</a> Space and cyberspace notwithstanding, airpower is viewed by many enthusiasts as a strategic capability. For example, “classical airpower theorists (such as Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and others) viewed strategic airpower as the capacity to destroy enemy state capacity without destroying the enemy’s fielded military forces. Neo-classical airpower theory (most notably in the form of John Warden’s “Five Rings” theory) held much the same view, with some sophisticated tweaks.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn18">[18]</a> However, there are others whose less than “enthusiastic visions of airpower have focused on the role that airpower can play in setting the terms for decisive battle (weakening fielded enemy forces, destroying enemy logistics and communications) and in providing direct tactical support for friendly land and sea forces. Under these terms, the strategic contribution of airpower is not independent, but rather as part of strategic landpower and seapower.” <a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn19">[19]</a></p><p>In response to the debate over the role of airpower and within the context of current budget battles, the Air Force has teamed with the U.S. Navy to promote the Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAMGC)<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn20">[20]</a> concept as a means to help the nation respond to anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) challenges, enhance deterrence, and ensure freedom of action across the globe. However, “implementing [JAMGC] will require significant investments in advanced technologies, including long-range precision-strike capabilities and submarine modernization. Furthermore, [JAMGC] primarily involves investments in the Air Force and Navy, raising questions about how best to rebuild the readiness of the Army and Marines. Even within the Air Force and Navy, there are disagreements about which programs represent the highest priority for the U.S. military.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn21">[21]</a> This seems to indicate that the JAMGC concept may be as much or more about protecting the bureaucracies of the Air Force and the Navy rather than developing a strategy to meet the needs of the nation. Regardless, the new defense budget does not seem to support the new strategy.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn22">[22]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/299/1*x1j1ChHdJhbBr862gppFEA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The apparent disconnect between strategy and the projected budget may be due to, in some measure, failing to integrate the Pentagon’s policy shop in the effort to develop a new strategy. Instead, the director of cost assessment and program evaluation at the Pentagon is in charge of the “Strategic Choices and Management Review.” As a consequence, national security strategy is not driving the defense budget; instead, the defense budget is resource-driven.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn23">[23]</a> While an assessment of any strategy from a resource perspective provides a useful sanity check, beginning strategy development from this perspective limits creativity and innovation. Thus, this resource-driven bias may be another factor that is discouraging innovation in the Air Force. The focus of many is to preserve the status quo, rather than on taking the calculated risks needed to evolve the organization to meet new security challenges. For those interested in preserving the status quo, innovation can be a disruptive, unwanted risk during times of fiscal instability. Although, they may repeat the words of the CSAF about the importance of innovation, risk-adverse leaders often deride those who propose big ideas, and reward those who defend the current state of affairs.</p><p>This dissonance may also have contributed to the inconsistency in how the Air Force has reorganized to realign the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process and functions. In 2009 the Secretary of Defense identified Air Force “core functions” to provide a framework to balance investments across Air Force capabilities. These core functions were incorporated into the Air Force’s budget for the first time in fiscal year 2010. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) designated seven Major Commands (MAJCOMs) as the Core Function Leads (CFLs) and divided the 12 core functions among them.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn24">[24]</a> For example, Air Combat Command (ACC) is the CFL for five core functions. The CFLs for the remaining seven core functions are split among six other MAJCOMs, which decentralized the process by delegating these responsibilities outside of the Pentagon. However, the recent reorganization of the Air Staff to realign the planning, programming, and budgeting functions exposes the bureaucratic bias to retain centralized control, and is at odds with the decentralized CFL approach. The conflicting organizational approaches have “added confusion to how MAJCOM resources are programmed.”<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn25">[25]</a> Recently, some Air Force leaders have expressed a frustration with weapon system advocates complicating the attempt to retire some systems to create the offsets needed to bring new systems online, such as the A-10 and F-35 debate.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn26">[26]</a> Rather than frame the budget discussion around weapon systems, the Air Force should talk about effects that are tied to its core functions and reduce the internal competition between weapon systems. This may also help remove federal analysts external to the DoD from the complicated details of how many of a particular type of aircraft the Air Force requires and instead help Congress focus on the more important strategic choices of where and how much funding is needed for each service core function to ensure the Air Force can accomplish its mission.</p><p>Although Air Force leaders at all levels may not have much control over the budget given to them by Congress and often encounter bureaucratic resistance to change, they can (and must) lead innovation. Innovation will occur when leaders resist the bureaucratic bias to retain the status quo and overcome their own emotional inclination to micromanage and, instead, push authority to make decisions down to the lowest level possible.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn27">[27]</a> The reason this works is because the closer the consequences of a decision are to the decision-maker, the better the decision and the sooner poor decisions can be changed or reversed. Conversely, the further the consequences of a decision are removed from the decision-maker, the worse the decision and longer it takes to change or reverse a bad decision.</p><p>This will require leaders to allow (if not encourage) subordinates to improvise, when the command is unable to fund or provide the expected resources. A leader must engage as many people in the organization as possible to define and describe the future they want to create, identify what needs to change to get there, determine how their organization will get there, and know when they have finished.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn28">[28]</a> Since innovation is often key to shaping the future, leaders must identify the risks involved with innovation (and the lack of innovation), set boundaries of behavior, and decide whether to promote disruptive innovation, sustaining innovation, or both. They must also set a means to strategically measure, regularly monitor, and deliberately incentivize innovation within their organization and hold themselves accountable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/339/0*SD_qwgPN98ad8XF-." /></figure><p>While the preceding may appear obvious, too many times leaders articulate the word “innovation” but fail to go further and leave the hard work of defining the term, identifying risk, and measuring progress to trial-and-error without providing proper incentives to innovate. Rather, leaders must ensure their actions are consistent with their stated desire to encourage innovation by selecting airmen for promotion who emulate innovative pioneers such as Billy Mitchell, Robin Olds, John Boyd, and John Warden. Consistent with these role models, they must encourage departures from bureaucratic restraints that inhibit dissent and shackle new thinking. The roots of the Air Force are in disruptive innovation, which fostered a break from the Army, allowed it to look at new technology, and adapt it to military use. However, technologies quickly become obsolete and bureaucracies are slow to change. Absent an innovative spirit that allows the Air Force to challenge the status quo (even with limited budgets) and adapt new ideas and technologies in the air, space, and cyberspace domains, the Air Force may find itself obsolete.<a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_edn29">[29]</a> If Air Force leaders fail to craft an overarching strategy that includes innovation and fail to overcome bureaucratic resistance to innovation, then they will create, through neglect, a dysfunctional organization that has forgotten its original culture rooted in innovation.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref1"><em>[1]</em></a><em> Allen McDuffee, “How to Fix the Army: Sack All the Generals,” Wired Magazine, </em><a href="http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/08/overthrow-the-generals/"><em>http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/08/overthrow-the-generals/</em></a><em>, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref2"><em>[2]</em></a><em> McDuffee.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref3"><em>[3]</em></a><em> Mark G. Czelusta, “Business as Usual: An Assessment of Donald Rumsfeld’s Transformation Vision and Transformation’s Prospects for the Future”, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series No. 18, June 2008, page 4.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref4"><em>[4]</em></a><em> Greg Miller and Adam Goldman, “Head of Pentagon Intelligence Agency Forced Out, Officials Say,” Washington Post, </em><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/head-of-pentagon-intelligence-agency-forced-out-officials-say/2014/04/30/ec15a366-d09d-11e3-9e25-188ebe1fa93b_story.html"><em>http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/head-of-pentagon-intelligence-agency-forced-out-officials-say/2014/04/30/ec15a366-d09d-11e3-9e25-188ebe1fa93b_story.html</em></a><em>, accessed 06 May 2014.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref5"><em>[5]</em></a><em> General Larry Spencer, “Air Force All Call,” Pentagon, Washington DC, 09 October 2014.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref6"><em>[6]</em></a><em> General (Ret) Norton A. Schwartz, “38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy,” Final Report, </em><a href="http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/USAFreportweb.pdf"><em>http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/USAFreportweb.pdf</em></a><em>, page 86, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref7"><em>[7]</em></a><em> General Mark A. Walsh III, “Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for America,” </em><a href="http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/GV_GR_GP_300DPI.pdf"><em>http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/GV_GR_GP_300DPI.pdf</em></a><em>, page 3, accessed 30 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref8"><em>[8]</em></a><em> Stephen Lendman, “Obama’s War on Syria: Dissent Within the Ranks,” The People’s Voice, </em><a href="http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2013/09/03/obama-s-war-on-syria-dissent-in-the-rank"><em>http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2013/09/03/obama-s-war-on-syria-dissent-in-the-rank</em></a><em>, accessed 06 September 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref9"><em>[9]</em></a><em> Paula Thornhill, “Commentary: Innovation and America’s 21st Century Air Force,” DefenseNews, </em><a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131125/DEFREG02/311250017/Commentary-Innovation-America-s-21st-Century-Air-Force"><em>http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131125/DEFREG02/311250017/Commentary-Innovation-America-s-21st-Century-Air-Force</em></a><em>, accessed 06 May 2014.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref10"><em>[10]</em></a><em> Thornhill.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref11"><em>[11]</em></a><em> Thornhill.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref12"><em>[12]</em></a><em> Thornhill.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref13"><em>[13]</em></a><em> John A. Warden III and Leland A. Russell, Winning in FastTime, (Montgomery, Alabama: Venturist Publishing, 2008), page 16.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref14"><em>[14]</em></a><em> Claire McCaskill and Loretta Sanchez, “Commanders Must Fight Sexual Assault in the Military,” USA Today, </em><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/29/women-congress-sexual-assault-column/2725081/"><em>http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/29/women-congress-sexual-assault-column/2725081/</em></a><em>, accessed 06 September 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref15"><em>[15]</em></a><em> Kenneth E. Fracaro, “The Consequences of Micromanaging,” Professional Development, </em><a href="https://www.ncmahq.org/files/articles/ecb0a_cm0707_c01.pdf"><em>https://www.ncmahq.org/files/articles/ecb0a_cm0707_c01.pdf</em></a><em>, accessed 23 February 2015.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref16"><em>[16]</em></a><em> Chris Carroll, “DOD Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal 2014; Can’t Rule Out Force Reductions,” Stars and Stripes, </em><a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/dod-planning-for-sequestration-in-fiscal-2014-can-t-rule-out-force-reductions-1.234271"><em>http://www.stripes.com/news/dod-planning-for-sequestration-in-fiscal-2014-can-t-rule-out-force-reductions-1.234271</em></a><em>, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref17"><em>[17]</em></a><em> Michael Auslin, “Why America Needs the Air Force: A Rebuttal to Prof. Farley,” Breaking Defense, </em><a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/13/why-america-needs-the-air-force-rebuttal-to-prof-farley/"><em>http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/13/why-america-needs-the-air-force-rebuttal-to-prof-farley/</em></a><em>, accessed 06 September 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref18"><em>[18]</em></a><em> Robert Farley, “Strategy: The Art of Eliminating the Enemy’s Vote,” The Diplomat, </em><a href="http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/21/strategy-the-art-of-eliminating-the-enemys-vote/"><em>http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/21/strategy-the-art-of-eliminating-the-enemys-vote/</em></a><em>, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref19"><em>[19]</em></a><em> Farley.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref20"><em>[20]</em></a><em> JAMGC was formerly called Air Sea Battle (ASB); the recent name change may be due in part to concerns that ASB implied a diminished role (and funding) for the U.S. Army in future conflicts.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref21"><em>[21]</em></a><em> Michael Horowitz, “How Defense Austerity Will Test U.S. Strategy in Asia”; The Diplomat, </em><a href="http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/09/how-defense-austerity-will-test-u-s-strategy-in-asia/"><em>http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/09/how-defense-austerity-will-test-u-s-strategy-in-asia/</em></a><em>, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref22"><em>[22]</em></a><em> Robert Haddick, “The New Defense Budget Does Not Support the Pentagon’s Strategy,” Small Wars Journal, </em><a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-new-defense-budget-does-not-support-the-pentagon%E2%80%99s-strategy"><em>http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-new-defense-budget-does-not-support-the-pentagon%E2%80%99s-strategy</em></a><em>, accessed 29 August 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref23"><em>[23]</em></a><em> Gordon Lubold, “Has the Pentagon’s Strategy Shop Gone MIA?” Foreign Policy, </em><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/01/has_the_pentagons_strategy_shop_gone_mia_defense_budget"><em>http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/01/has_the_pentagons_strategy_shop_gone_mia_defense_budget</em></a><em>, accessed 29 Aug 2013.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref24"><em>[24]</em></a><em> The Air Force Core Functions are: Nuclear Deterrence Operations; Air Superiority; Global Precision Attack; Rapid Global Mobility; Special Operations Forces; Personnel Rescue; Space Superiority; Cyberspace Superiority; Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, &amp; Reconnaissance; Agile Combat Support; Command and Control; and Education and Training.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref25"><em>[25]</em></a><em> Susan E. Seute, “Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) Adds Confusion to Air Force’s POM Development,” RAND Project Air Force, </em><a href="http://dtlweb.au.af.mil/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&amp;dvs=1399478981141~697"><em>http://dtlweb.au.af.mil/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&amp;dvs=1399478981141~697</em></a><em>, accessed 07 May 2014.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref26"><em>[26]</em></a><em> Brendan McGarry, “Praising the A-10 to Lawmakers is ‘Treason’,” DoD Buzz, </em><a href="http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/01/16/general-praising-the-a-10-to-lawmakers-is-treason/"><em>http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/01/16/general-praising-the-a-10-to-lawmakers-is-treason/</em></a><em>, accessed 20 January 2015.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref27"><em>[27]</em></a><em> Richard Brookhiser, George Washington on Leadership, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 63.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref28"><em>[28]</em></a><em> Warden and Russell, page 6.</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/new-story#_ednref29"><em>[29]</em></a><em> Thornhill.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=AAIAAAiR1sYBmx7T8FuuYvS4KKacQc322rtfBTU&amp;trk=nav_responsive_tab_profile"><em>Robert Folker</em></a><em> is an Air Force officer, is a graduate of and former instructor at the United States Air Force Weapons School, and holds a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University. He is currently a Program Element Monitor on the Air Staff at the Pentagon. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force.</em></p><p>����7���</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=477ac51434d0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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