<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Major Laurence Roche on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Major Laurence Roche on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:54:26 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Evolving Global Security Situation and its Impact on the European Theatre, NATO and HQ ARRC]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/the-evolving-global-security-situation-and-its-impact-on-the-european-theatre-nato-and-hq-arrc-2e0b03532b9f?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e0b03532b9f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:25:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:25:09.238Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Maj Alex Michael (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong><em>We live in a security environment that contains a broad and evolving set of challenges. The international order and norms are changing. Both known and emerging actors are regularly adjusting their strategic aims and so unpredictability is flourishing once more.</em></strong></p><p>As we approach the end of the second decade of the 21st Century, the NATO Alliance faces both new and resurgent threats to our security. Within an ‘arc of instability’, to the east a single state actor is vying to strengthen its sphere of influence, while to the south the threat is two-fold, security threats from radical Islam, and the economic threats and humanitarian challenges of migration.</p><p><strong>To the East</strong>….Russia’s strategic objectives are to restore its international status and, against the tide of NATO expansion, strengthen its influence in ‘near abroad’ states. In order to rebalance regional power and status, Russia’s hybrid tactics aim to cause regional instability and expose the capacity of the European Union (EU) and NATO. Looking for a solution to this might be easier if our relationship with Russia was not so multi-dimensional. A complex, contemporary, strategic environment, caused by themes of common interest between the Alliance, the EU and between individual countries and Russia, demands a sophisticated and pragmatic approach. This means that some problems might be better managed together with Russia, and not in opposition.</p><p><strong>To the South</strong>….A potent mix of state and non-state actors, interwoven with migration, organised crime, traditional rivalries and the combination of an explosive demography with an insufficient economic growth, have created a series of challenges on Europe’s southern borders. While in some cases far from the European theatre, it is the second and third order effects of this instability that can influence NATO and the EU the most. As an example, Daesh’s ideological expansion and its intent upon Western societies has caused an unprecedented refugee movement into Europe which, in addition to the administrative burden, has masked the movement and intention of past and potential terrorists.</p><p>What is more, these two apparently distinct challenges create complexities where they converge on Europe’s borders. Although Russia shares a number of objectives with the West in Syria and Iraq, it exploited an opportunity, manifested by a lack of coordinated and efficient Western action to project strength. Russia’s rapid decision making, no viable political opposition to decisions and public willingness to accept military operations enabled her to promote a competitive advantage in the region. Thus the impression of perceived threat (West against East) ferments.</p><p><strong>What is NATO doing to reduce the threat in the East?</strong></p><p>What has been done in answer to Russia’s violence in Eastern Ukraine, its occupation of Crimea, her arming of the separatists and a general desire to want her to move from confrontation back to cooperation? NATO’s role is one of deterrence, where the Allies are leveraging all instruments of state power. The military component has been based predominantly on a relatively new, flexible, NRF model that holds responsive and mobile forces at high readiness in addition to a rotational forward presence within some of the states bordering Russia. While this certainly reassures the nations geographically close to Russia, it does not deny the effects ‘below the threshold of open aggression’ that promote the interests of Russia as a competing nation. But while sometimes aggressive competition can be easily mistaken for confrontation, a better understanding of Russian aims is required to tailor our overt approach.</p><p><strong>What more can be done to reduce the threat in the East?</strong></p><p>Although there is recent evidence that both sides can cooperate effectively, Russia has chosen a different path. But why?</p><p>President Putin has chosen anti-Western rhetoric and nationalist self-assertion as the basis for his regime and he justifies Russia’s aggressive actions on the basis of perceived Western encirclement. This means that the current Russian sentiment will not change quickly. But should we not be looking to dispel his fears? While deterring, competing and engaging do not exclude each other, a flexible, adaptable political approach and military posture is still needed. But avoiding miss-calculation and achieving conflict prevention, regardless of the competition, remains crucial.</p><p>While politicians and diplomats engage with Russia to understand the mutually acceptable middle ground, they also need to understand when deterrence can antagonise. History has shown that Russia will rise to the challenge, but we do not need to make it a challenge.</p><p><strong>Future</strong></p><p>A state will rarely need to fight if it deters effectively enough. The military arm of NATO must improve its understanding of deterrence, and ability to deter — indeed it should always look to, particularly while the threat changes so regularly. How can the military arm of NATO improve?</p><ul><li>Training must be as complex as the most demanding scenario. A truly responsive and effective multi-national military force can only be established through more, and better, training. Forces also can improve through specialisation — because they are able to train more regularly for that discipline.</li><li>For warfighting at scale (an essential skill for effective deterrence), the Corps HQ role is missing in the NATO Long Term Rotation Plan (LTRP). This manifests itself in capability gaps, and reduced understanding of the challenges of warfighting at scale against a peer adversary in the complex environment of the 21st Century. The Corps HQ also provides the important gearing between the LCC and Divisional levels of command and can coordinate the activity of up to five divisions (a LCC HQ cannot because it sits at the operational level and thus has a longer planning horizon) and corps troops. It will also focus on shaping the various levels of deep battlespace to ensure success in the Close battle.</li><li>You cannot become a warfighting Corps HQ overnight. NATO HRF(L)s need time to specialise and train as a NATO Corps (higher-tactical) HQ. The SACEUR-endorsed LTRP dictates when certified HRFs are at Readiness. For HQ ARRC it shows us when we are to be at Readiness either as a Joint HQ (Strategic/ Operational level) or Land Component Command HQ (Operational). The issue is that there is no time set aside to specialise as a NATO Corps HQ. What is more, as Ex ARRACE FUSION 17 has demonstrated, it takes time to excel at commanding at the Corps level: it is the most challenging role that ARRC undertakes.</li><li>A Corps HQ operates within the detail of the higher-tactical level thus more, not less, time is needed to maintain/ improve processes. Rotating through different roles can contribute to the challenges a HQ staff will face and potentially accelerate skill fade. To maintain and improve the ability of a HQ it stands to reason that they should specialise on a particular discipline. We are beginning to see this emerge while MNC-NE now has a regional function — this approach should be expanded.</li><li>Corps Troops are essential to enabling the success of the corps level of operation. Thus to train and fight as a Corps requires dedicated corps-level capabilities, not double hatted as divisional capabilities, that are as familiar with the HQ Staff as the Staff are with them. The complexity of fighting the corps battle (Deep, Close and Rear across all domains) and management of the battle space requires familiarity and cohesion that is difficult to achieve rapidly unless formations are familiar with each other and their processes; an essential aspect of high readiness deterrence forces.</li></ul><p>With this in mind, HQ ARRC has chosen to focus on the role of a Corps HQ because it is the most complex of the roles it may be required to fulfil, and because it is arguably easier to scale down the complexity of a certified Corps HQ to that of a LCC HQ. In addition, it enables our UK and multi-national Divisional training affiliations to nest into an operational Corps HQ; enjoying support from an experienced rather than adhoc HICON structure. What is more, our potential adversary uses the Army and Corps levels of command effectively — we therefore need a capable counter to deter (and potentially defeat) at that scale and complexity of command.</p><p>The challenge is finding the time and resources to get this specialisation right, while concurrently meeting LTRP commitments. Although we remain ready if committed to the ‘fight tonight’, our current target is to be certified as a Corps Warfighting HQ within five years. However, to be able to war fight at this scale and complexity not only requires a change of mind-set but also a radical adjustment to the structure and training of our NRF HQs. Acknowledging this, perhaps we should make the bold adjustments sooner rather than later?</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy in the G7 Branch at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Previously he worked as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE JUMP.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e0b03532b9f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Gender Advising at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps — A success story?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/gender-advising-at-hq-allied-rapid-reaction-corps-a-success-story-39b73c0d1315?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39b73c0d1315</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:23:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:23:57.203Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Capt Nina Schommers (DEU-A)</strong></p><p><strong>Adopting a gender perspective means considering the socially constructed attributes of men, women, boys and girls, thus taking the entire population into account, whilst recognising their differences. The point to prove is that the implementation of gender perspective into the planning and conduct of military operations will have an effect on immediate and more importantly long term mission success.</strong></p><p>For this purpose, the position of Gender Advisor (GENAD) at HQ ARRC was introduced in 2014. During peacetime establishment, the GENAD position is a part-time job which becomes a full-time position in exercises and missions, as staff numbers are increased. A GENAD is the point of contact for the commander when it comes to gender-specific issues during missions.</p><p>Viewing operations from a different angle turned out to be a real necessity for HQ ARRC for the first time in 2015, when it assumed its role as a Joint Task Force. At the moment, the most important job of the GENAD at HQ ARRC is to raise awareness for gender-related issues. This includes clarifying the term and its impact on the conduct of operations. HQ ARRC follows the NATO guidelines on the subject and has now firmly established its position as both an advocate and a pioneer in the field of gender on the highest tactical level.</p><p><strong>Why is the Integration of the Gender Perspective Important for HQ ARRC?</strong></p><p>Often, the GENAD is associated or even confused with an equal opportunities officer. The focus of the GENAD, however, is directed outward. He or she observes the behaviour and the effects of a military unit in its assigned area of operations. GENADs focus on the civilian population in theatre, not on equality and equal rights within HQ ARRC or NATO Forces.</p><p>“Women’s participation in global security isn’t a favour to women. There can be no lasting peace without equal inclusion of both men and women.” (Secretary General Stoltenberg, 2016).</p><p>It is a fact that wars have different effects on men, women and children. All too often, conflicts cause great harm to the civilian population, especially to those who are particularly vulnerable. Gender-based crimes such as mass or gang rapes, trafficking of women and girls, slave trade, forced marriages and the recruitment of child soldiers are often used as warfare strategies. This is why they have to be assessed as part of the enemy situation, just like the type, strength and behaviour of the enemy forces.</p><p>NATO has officially applied the gender perspective since 2009. The work is based on NATO’s Bi-SC Directive 40–1 (“Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structure Including Measures for Protection during Armed Conflict”). The directive determines that the gender aspect has to be considered in the early planning stages of operations. Thus, it is the duty of the HQ ARRC GENAD to accompany the working and planning process from the beginning until the end. He or she provides support through specialised expertise, similar to the political advisor (POLAD) and cultural advisor (CULAD). This can, for instance, take the form of contributions or annexes to Operation Orders. Theses can deal with everything from general gender aspects in operations, sex desegregated reporting, sexual and gender based violence as well as the code of conduct in the area of operation. Another aspect of their job is to integrate women — who often participate in conflicts to a significantly lesser extent than men — into the post-conflict peace and reconstruction process via networking and inclusion measures. The aim of integrating the gender aspect is to expand the military sphere of influence by gaining more information and a more complete operational picture.</p><p><strong>Gender in NATO Missions Abroad</strong></p><p>Current operations such as KFOR in Kosovo and RSM in Afghanistan have already seen the successful integration of GENADs. While these positions are manned by individual nations, they ensure that NATO as a whole has integrated the gender aspect into deployments. Not every nation necessarily needs to provide such a position. For example during ARRC’s time as the NRF in 2017 Spanish, British, Italian, Czech and other military units had to report to the HQ. All those countries have trained GENADs, as do 21 out of the 29 NATO member states. Whether one of their GENADs would actually be available in the event of an operational deployment however, could not be determined.</p><p>The number of women in theatre — or rather the fact that there are female soldiers available for NATO missions at all — is important for many different reasons. Depending on the mission and the security situation, female soldiers are needed and employed as “female searchers”, as part of female engagement teams (FET) or mixed engagement teams (MET). Through the inclusion of women, all measures can contribute to a better understanding of the operational environment and the protection of forces.</p><p><strong>The Integration of the Gender Perspective at HQ ARRC</strong></p><p>To guarantee that the gender perspective is taken into account across the whole HQ, all Branches have Gender Focal Points (GFP). The GFPs act as multipliers and sensors for the GENAD. In addition to completing an online-based NATO training programme, they are offered courses on the subject of “gender in operations” and learn what to watch out for in their respective field. They provide the GENAD with access to their department and he or she can benefit from their expertise. Together they ensure that the military action taken by the HQ incorporates the gender perspective.</p><p>In its role as a Corps HQ, ARRC is the highest tactical level of command. Specific points of contact with the population in theatre however are to be found at lower levels of command. Ideally and in the future, the HQ should further intensify cooperation on gender issues with its subordinate units. The network of GENADs and GFPs must reach all the way down to the lowest tactical level, in order to transform the strategic goals of NATO into measurable tactical success. When new units are assigned to HQ ARRC, it will be essential to carry out an initial examination of what gender advising structures already exist and how these can be applied and exploited during the mission.</p><p><strong>2017 Gender Conference</strong></p><p>In May this year, HQ ARRC hosted the “8th Allied Command Operations Gender Conference”. This was the first time it was held at one of the nine Corps level HQs. On this occasion, the GENADs of NATO’s Command Structure met to discuss the directive as well as conceptual developments and current issues. The conference takes place biannually under the chairmanship of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) GENAD, Mr James Collins. As part of an awareness and training brief for HQ ARRC staff, he underlined the increasing relevance of the GENAD in planning operations and advising the commander. He also drew attention to the fact that the number of women within the NATO structure, as well as on missions, should not necessarily be determined on the basis of a quota, but rather women should be represented in an “appropriate proportion”.</p><p>All in all, the conference attracted the interest of the media as well as the HQ itself. The participation of the SHAPE GENAD and almost all HQs of the NATO Command Structure clearly accentuated the importance of the topic. Lieutenant General Tim Radford (GBR), Commander of HQ ARRC, stated: “We cannot afford to, nor should we ignore the challenges associated with gender in modern warfare. The human dimension is central to our business.”</p><p>After the conference, one of the states represented at the HQ declared its willingness to provide a full-time GENAD position. This can be seen as a huge success and is an important step in facing the challenges mentioned above.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong></p><p>Both NATO and HQ ARRC must acknowledge that integrating the gender perspective is a process that needs to happen in parallel at all organisational levels and during all phases of operational planning. It is essential to be aware of, not only the classic conflict parties, but of the entire population. In our role as soldiers this gives us the opportunity to guarantee access to capabilities, knowledge and potential which would otherwise remain unused.</p><p>Implementing the gender perspective can help a military organisation to decide and act in a better and more empathic way and facilitate the achievement of set objectives. While the actual results that are related to having applied a gender perspective are difficult to detect, monitor and assess, there are other indicators of success.</p><p>The way of integrating gender perspective at HQ ARRC certainly has proven to be effective in raising awareness, not just within the HQ, but across the NATO Command Structure. On several occasions HQ ARRC has been highlighted by the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations as a success story on the tactical level. This said, at the end of the day it will be up to each individual to pass on gender awareness and consideration, before it can truly prove itself as a concept.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Capt Nina Schommers (DEU-A) is currently Information Operation SO3 EXE in the Joint Fires and Influence Branch and as a secondary function, she serves as Gender Advisor to the Commander of HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39b73c0d1315" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Keeping Ourselves Busy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/keeping-ourselves-busy-9c1746cf3897?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c1746cf3897</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:22:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:22:51.703Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Col Jakob Henius (DNK-A)</strong></p><p><strong>‘Work seeks to be where it is performed’ — this is an old truth, but it does not explain why Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is so busy. Whilst NATO’s various major component headquarters have remained robust, the tactical-level manoeuvre units that comprise them have continuously shrunk for various reasons. What challenges does this pose to HQ ARRC and NATO as a whole?</strong></p><p>In the wake of the Cold War, particularly during the last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century, NATO and Western coalitions oversaw substantial stabilisation operations, most notably those in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations justified the continuous existence of major headquarters in order to manage such operations on a rotational basis.</p><p>Since then the appetite of Western leaders to commit to such operations has diminished and this has been compounded by two distinct occurrences. First, the ever-increasing costs associated with evolving military technology and the associated reduction of Western military budgets has seen NATO units everywhere reduce in size. Second, the progressive rebound from the 2008–2009 financial crisis has resulted in increasing competition from the civilian labour market, which now poses significant challenges as it pertains to the draw and retention of qualified military personnel.</p><p>All of this comes at a time that sees Russia making concerted efforts to reassert itself on the world stage, which necessarily means that NATO formations must reacquaint themselves with long forgotten military concepts and doctrines. Stated another way, one could say in this regard that Russia “saved the day” for NATO and its major tactical headquarters. By this it is meant that NATO for sure will remain, despite downsizing, a viable presence, in light of Russia’s hearkening back to the Cold War with its subtle (and sometimes not no subtle) sabre rattling.</p><p>As a result NATO’s chief challenge is not whether it can truly win a major military confrontation, but, rather, a matter of convincing potential opponents that it is too risky to test the Alliance. This gives NATO force structure headquarters two immediate challenges and one long-term challenge.</p><p>First, NATO must ensure its major tactical and operational headquarters regenerate their ability to command and control major multinational formations during high intensity conflicts with peer and/or near-peer adversaries. Within HQ ARRC this is exactly the efforts being carried out as it executes what it calls ‘Corps Recalibration’. Make or break, win or lose, the result of these efforts are almost entirely in the hands of HQ ARRC’s plethora of well-qualified, well-educated multinational staff officers; it is a composition replicated across NATO and it must be leveraged.</p><p>Second, NATO countries must make earnest efforts to (re-)generate and modernise the tactical formations that corps-level headquarters will require. It remains to be seen to what extent this will play out, but added to these tactical formations must also be the inherent addition of logistic capabilities that will allow for the deployment and sustainment of them as well as the creation or strengthening of sufficient reserve personnel, supplies and equipment.</p><p>Finally, and perhaps more long term in nature, is the challenge of managing the effects of NATO-Russia relations once they eventually normalise. Studying and understanding centuries of Russo-Western history in the context of which it has taken place gives us reason to believe that normalised relations will follow a period of disagreement; neither party has anything to gain or benefit from by maintaining permanently frozen relations.</p><p>Everything, however, is not as bleak as it may seem. Indeed efforts have been underway for some time within NATO to address the very challenges addressed here such as the formation and deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence across Eastern Europe. Ultimately, though, a normalised and peaceful relationship with Russia is the goal. When that time comes, NATO must be ready to once again define its raison d’étre. Fortunately, NATO has been quite successful in doing so since its founding in 1949 and rest assured that the dedicated multinational staff of HQ ARRC will remain busy seeing to it.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Col Jakob Henius has been ACOS of the Central Staffs at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps since January 2017. He is also the Danish Senior National Representative in the ARRC as well as for all Danish military personnel serving in the United Kingdom. He has deployed seven times to international operations in Iraq (twice), Mali (twice), Kosovo (twice) and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Among many other assignments he has commanded at all unit levels up to Deputy Commander of a multinational task force.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c1746cf3897" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[EX ARRCADE BUGLE — Lessons in Corps Warfighting from the Battle of the Bulge]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/ex-arrcade-bugle-lessons-in-corps-warfighting-from-the-battle-of-the-bulge-1f0bec186a8?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1f0bec186a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:21:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:21:34.703Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>LTC Scott Morrison (CAN-A)</strong></p><p><strong>Staff Rides, or Battle Field Tours as they are more commonly referred to, are an essential part of military education. They enable students to understand the lessons from previous conflicts and consider their relevance to modern operations. The Battle of the Bulge offers an ideal subject to look at the challenges of conducting Corps Warfighting in a high intensity conflict.</strong></p><p>In late 1944 and early 1945 ‘<strong><em>Operation</em></strong> <strong><em>Wacht am Rhein’</em></strong> was Hitler’s last attempt to interdict the Allied build-up of forces on Continental Europe and to regain the initiative. The intent was for the German army to break through the US lines in the Ardennes, cross the River Meuse and take Antwerp; thereby cutting the Allied forces in two. To Hitler, this was achievable based on Germany’s experiences at the start of WWII, but was, in reality, doomed to failure from the outset.</p><p>Despite this flawed thinking, the ability of the Germans to concentrate over two hundred thousand men and about fourteen hundred tanks and assault guns has to be one of the greatest feats of military organisation of the entire war. Equally impressive was the fact that they did so under the noses of the Allies. The Americans, in particular, were quite unaware of the build-up in the Eifel; opposite the weakest sector of their front.</p><p>Over a five-day period, Staff Officers from HQ ARRC conducted a visit to the Ardennes Region to study the battlefields of the operation; better known as the Battle of the Bulge. The trip formed part of the ARRC’s recalibration work to understand and develop processes and procedures for the conduct large scale military operations in the 21st century.</p><p>Supported by Dr Guy Finch, a military historian, participants looked at both German and Allies’ planning and execution in order to understand the thinking behind the plans, and compare how one would plan and fight a similar operation today.</p><p>The exercise began three weeks prior to the trip with a short academic presentation on the Strategic and Operational background leading up to the late part of 1945. This focused on the German key personnel and their thinking, as well as a consideration of Allied officers, and why they had not anticipated such an operation. It was important to understand the background leading up to the Operation and understand the strategic issues surrounding not only the decision by Hitler to undertake such an offensive and the secrecy with its planning and build up, but also why the Allies misinterpreted what they were facing in the Ardennes. An important part of ‘Mission Command’ is an understanding of the higher level thinking in terms of main effort and end state, and since our study was at the Corp level, understanding Army/ Theatre aspects was a necessity.</p><p>The week itself started with a visit to the Henri-Chappelle American cemetery. This was the first of three cemeteries visited during the trip, the other two being the Recogne German cemetery near Bastogne and the commonwealth cemetery in Hotton. As well as the historical aspects, short remembrance ceremonies were held at each. Paying of respects to the fallen is an extremely important aspect of any staff ride; it allows the participants time to reflect on the many sacrifices made by the men and women of many Nationalities, but also to hoist aboard the concept that the planning of tactical land actions has consequences for those who have to execute the plans. Additionally, the participants learned some of the historical and cultural aspects and theory behind the layout and design of cemeteries from the various countries involved.</p><p>Day two saw the study begin in earnest, beginning with an overview of the Eifel region, near Hollerath in Germany, where the participants were able to view the terrain in which the Germans built up their forces. Following this, participants move on to the Elsenborn Ridge and considered the importance of the Allies successful defence of this vital ground; forcing the Germans to significantly change their planned Scheme of Manouevre (SOM); before finishing in Spa outside Hotel Britanique, which had been used by General Hodges HQ 1st US Army. The main themes considered during the day were at included the importance of Joint Fires, the Sustainment of the force, considerations of how the modern Law of Armed Conflict might have changed aspects of the planning and conduct of the operation, and the role played by Command and Leadership on both sides. With the generational improvements in technologies and the vast sophistication of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, namely satellite imagery and unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs), it was concluded that it would have been doubtful for the German’s to have kept their build-up a secret. Along those same lines, in todays congested battlespace it is extremely important to synchronise and de-conflict effects (lethal and non-lethal), and it was useful for a comparison of the use of long range fires during WWII to today’s firepower, and the modern day targeting process. A discussion on the German build-up and a look at the required sustainment challenges (fuel in particular) demonstrated some of the risk Hitler accepted and the affiliated attempts to mitigate those risks during the operation. In a multinational environment as today, risk acceptance becomes more and more of a challenge for a Corps Commander, but without risk taking, own actions will be very much predictable.</p><p>Day three focussed much more on the tactical actions of the battle and included visits to battlefields at Stavelot, La Gleize, Houffalize and Noville, south of Bastogne. Even today, just travelling between the various locations provided incredible insight into the difficulties faced by both the attacking Germans and the defending Allies. The topics considered included the challenges of manoeuvre, the conduct of Obstacle and River Crossings, management of the battlespace and the coordination of Division activities, and the role of risk management. All were compared to the planning of our warfighting exercise ARRCADE FUSION 17 later that year. It was important to discuss coordination of Division activities as HQ ARRC is in the midst of a Corps recalibration, after several years of operating at the Operational/ Joint level. In terms of Obstacle crossing, there has not been much if any change in doctrine on how to cross a defended obstacle; indeed this tactical action is factored into all major exercises today.</p><p>The impact of war on the local population may not have been a major consideration during the conduct of the battle itself, but now is extremely important during modern military planning. The participants visited the ‘December 44’ museum in La Gleize which included a video with unique footage from captured German combat cameras. This along with the Tiger tank in front of the museum, and a short talk be the museum’s curator, demonstrated the negative and long lasting impacts of war on the civilian population; a reminder of why it is now a planning consideration in the contemporary planning process.</p><p>Following an overnight stop in Bastogne, day four consisted of visits in and around the town; with discussion topics including Medical support, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operations, Air/ Land Integration and working with Allies. Bastogne was a city that the Allies (US VIII Corps) held during this entire offensive, although it was reinforced with both the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The desperate defence was supported logistically by air drops, and a clear example of how locals and the military force protecting an area can complement each other’s actions on the battlefield. On the other hand, collateral damage and the acceptance of collateral damage will play a decisive role in today’s Corps Commanders decisions where and how to fight the battle. The participants were able to visit ‘Bois Jacques’ which was the actual location of ‘Easy Company’ from the hit series Band of Brothers. There are still remnants of the original defensive positions (trenches) which provided an outstanding vantage point to discuss not only defence, but effects of terrain on both offensive and defensive operations. The participants were also able to spend some time at the Bastogne War Museum which was an interactive display allowing for additional learning.</p><p>Throughout the programme, Dr Finch supported the learning by providing an historical context and insight into the battle in terms of time, terrain and importance. This was followed by short presentations by the participants, a question and answer session, and concluded with amplifying thoughts on both the historical aspects, and lessons that could be brought forward to the contemporary operating environment and had a definite impact on the participates on how to visualize warfighting and the related challenges on Corps level warfighting on the way to ARRCADE FUSION 17. This important HQ ARRC battlefield tour of the ‘Battle of the Bulge’ provided an extremely useful learning environment from which to reflect on tactics and doctrine from late 1944, and consider how tactics and doctrine have either changed over time or stayed the same. This type of analysis and discussion on an actual battlefield provides the best possible learning environment.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Lt Col Scott Morrison is currently Battlespace Manager in the G3 branch at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f0bec186a8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ex ARRCADE LIGHTNING 17 — A New Model for Professional Study?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/ex-arrcade-lightning-17-a-new-model-for-professional-study-1e68102e17b1?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e68102e17b1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:20:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:20:33.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Brig Paul Tennant — (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong><em>Militaries have always needed to reinvent. Frequently, this is borne of the need to adapt to a change in the threat and security landscape. Alas it is also occasionally influenced by the urge to appear fresh and innovative — the proverbial “old wine in new bottles”.</em></strong></p><p>The Staff Ride has historically been a useful filter to examine our behaviours and preconceptions, and to ensure as far as possible that we are pursuing a change because it is necessary to do so. That confidence can be reinforced by military precedent, usually a specific campaign. The trouble with this approach revolves around 2 core truths: firstly, human beings are not on the whole as well attuned to what we should not learn from something as opposed to what we should; and the long (relative) peace since the Second World War, combined with tremendous technological progress, has changed the character (and some would even argue, the nature) of warfare to such an extent that the rhyme of history is less obvious or relevant.</p><p>It is debatable whether there is any difference between a Staff Ride and a Battlefield Tour. There is, however, a clear difference between these two, and the much more recent framework of a Terrain Walk; which more directly looks at the contemporary context, and whose primary filter is not history but geography.</p><p>It was with this backdrop in mind that HQ ARRC conceived the idea for Ex ARRCADE LIGHTNING 17. Its aim was threefold: to understand the ground in relation to Offensive and Defensive Corps operations, with an eye to ARRCADE FUSION 17 (AF17)1; to study real world issues and local perspectives; and to conduct Key Leader Engagement in Poland and the Baltic States. Its stated balance was to focus around 60% on the contemporary (to include the ground over which we might operate) and around 40% on the historical and the synthetic (the latter specific to the scenario for AF17). Loosely, therefore, one could argue that it was planned as 60% Terrain Walk and 40% Staff Ride. For want of a better term, I would describe it as a Regional Immersion.</p><p>Attending, in addition to the 25 or so key members of the ARRC Command Group, were the 5 Divisional Commanders in the AF17 ORBAT and a host of key 1* officers across the joint and multinational spectrum. The journey started in HQ ARRC in Gloucester with a morning of academic context. The party then flew to Warsaw, and travelled through the Suwalki Gap, to Kaunas, then to Siauliai and eventually left from Riga. It was optimised at the 2* level, included detailed country briefings at up to Secret from Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and covered stands on tactical actions as follows: Suwalki Gap, for inload and setting the theatre; River Neman for Obstacle (Wide Wet Gap) Crossing; and Siauliai, for Urban Operations. Historical illustration was provided with reference to the Warsaw Uprising; Operations Barbarossa and Bagration; Napoleon’s crossing of the Neman; and the battle of Raseiniai. Future conflict was visualised with the help of a commercial wargame. Finally, Key Leader Engagement was conducted throughout; the highlight being a lunch with the President of Poland and his National Security Adviser.</p><p>Given its profile, it is important to emphasise the Strategic Communications and Public Affairs potential for such events. This also has implications for a trip’s security profile. Strict procedures were adopted for the use of Personal Electronic Devices, and a very low public profile maintained — but with no suggestion of concealment or evasion. Regular updates were provided both to the MoD in London and to SHAPE. Whilst not entirely coincidental, the fact that Ex ZAPAD 17 was scheduled to finish previous week was a source of very positive creative tension in discussions.</p><p>The great benefit of this approach was that it demanded that participants rigorously examine history for that which remained relevant to today, and discard that which did not. To help them in doing so, engagement with the people of the nations in the region who live and breathe the security challenges — often at very senior level — routinely altered the participants’ perspectives and preconceptions. It turned the week into a kind of rolling analysis, in which people frequently arrived at differing and even conflicting conclusions when presented with the same inputs. This then generated a rich debate, which was captured in a period of consolidation on the final day. Improvements could certainly be made to the format, and it needs to be tailored precisely to the needs of the moment and of the participants, but as a first attempt at a new model for professional focus it was generally felt by those taking part to have been a great success. Lessons identified from the week, and questions arising from discussions within it, have been captured and are being taken forward as part of the ARRC’s Corps Recalibration process.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Brig Paul Tennant currently heads up the Joint Fires and Influence Branch at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e68102e17b1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Developing Leadership Through Adventure Training — Exercise SELVA BACKSTOP 2017]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/developing-leadership-through-adventure-training-exercise-selva-backstop-2017-9cf0a1328aee?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9cf0a1328aee</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climbing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:19:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:19:28.771Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Maj Dave Latimer (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong><em>The British Army is one of the few Armed Forces within NATO to consider Adventurous Training as an essential element of Force Development. Through it individuals are challenged and pushed beyond their comfort levels, learning more about themselves, their limits and their abilities. HQ ARRC places considerable emphasis on ensuring all its personnel have the opportunity to participate an Adventurous Training expedition each year.</em></strong></p><p>Ex SELVA BACKSTOP is the premier Adventure Training event in the ARRC calendar. The 2017 exercise (SB17) took place between 2–16 June 2017 in the Lofoten Islands, Norway; a stunningly beautiful archipelago where sheer, rocky mountains rise dramatically from clear blue seas. SB17 was a mountaineering expedition focused on mountain walking and traditional multipitch rock climbing that provided a superb opportunity to develop leadership skills outside of the typical military environment. Sixteen officers and soldiers from the ARRC Group, representing six different nations, participated in the exercise. The participants were broken down into two sub-groups, walking and climbing, for the majority of the expedition. This article will focus on the climbing group.</p><p>The climbing group began their training at the sea cliffs at Paradiset, home to a huge range of low grade climbs with a spectacular view across the sea to mainland Norway. Here the novice students were taught the basics of climbing, such as knot tying and belaying through to the more advanced systems required to climb as a team of three on multipitch (more than a single rope length of 60m) climbs. The short nature of the climbs at Paradiset (less than 20m) allowed the teams to practise climbing techniques such as basic footwork and hand placement to ‘jamming’ (painfully wedging toes and hands into cracks) in a relatively friendly environment. As the difficulties of the climbs increased, the ability of the climbers to assess and solve problematic climbing moves in an increasingly uncomfortable (and sometimes daunting) situation developed rapidly. The teams progressed over the next few days to multipitch climbs up to 150m high on cliffs overlooking the picturesque fishing village of Henningsvaer. These routes allowed the teams to further hone fundamental ropework skills and practise their climbing techniques before moving on to greater challenges.</p><p>By day four, a relatively short space of time for the more novice climbers, the teams were ready for the 400m high route named <em>Only Bilberries</em>, which is regarded as one of the best routes of its grade in the world. The start point of the climb is over an hours walk from the nearest road at the end of a scenic Fjord. The psychological pressure of operating in an extreme, difficult to access, vertical environment, combined with the potential risk of falling meant that the teams would have to show a great deal of courage to conquer <em>Only Bilberries</em>. After seven pitches of sustained, difficult climbing followed by a number of exposed abseils (rappels), the teams successfully completed the route; a significant achievement and an unforgettable experience.</p><p>By this stage of SB17, the teams had developed excellent cohesion, through mutual trust and effective communication. Throughout the remainder of the trip they went on to climb a number of outstanding routes of a similar nature to <em>Only Bilberries</em>. Of particular note was an ascent of <em>Sea Eagle</em>, a gruelling slab climb which took more than twelve hours of constant climbing. The magnificent Artic ‘midnight sun’ helped the climbers by ensuring they were not having to climb or abseil in the dark. The discipline required to stay focused on safety critical tasks, such as belaying, during a length of climb like this is mentally exhausting. On another day, in extremely poor weather conditions, one of the teams ascended the highest peak in Lofoten, <em>Vagakallen</em> (943m). An arduous walk, followed by a tricky scramble to the rocky summit gave a tough fourteen hour outing which required considerable robustness and determination from the team.</p><p>The real highlight of the trip was perhaps the ascent of the <em>Svolvaer Goat</em>. This 100m high detached pinnacle overlooks the town of Svolvaer with two rocky ‘horns’ at the summit. Although shorter than many of the routes climbed, the steep ground on the approach to the pinnacle made the climbing phenomenally exposed. Having reached the top, it is traditional for climbers to step across the gap between the ‘horns’. This seems simple when standing at the base but on the summit standing in a wildly precarious position, it becomes an extremely bold move and requires total confidence. The abseil from the ‘horns’ is equally terrifying; hanging from an awkward belay, the teams had to conduct a ‘free’ abseil (dangling in space without touching the rock) to gain the sanctuary of flat ground.</p><p>In summary, many linkages can be found between mountaineering and military challenges. A difficult climb is comparable in many ways to a demanding military operation. Conditions for both activities can be arduous and complex, requiring personnel to possess a high level of training, understanding, physical and mental robustness, and good communication skills. Understanding the balance of achievement of the objective (such as the summit for climbers or the mission on operations) against the risk involved is also critical. Success or failure in both activities is often defined by leadership and the strength of the bond within the team. The valuable experience of the participants on SB17 will therefore enhance the operational effectiveness of the ARRC in the future.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Maj Dave Latimer (GBR-A) is currently serving as SO2 Plans in the G35 Branch at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9cf0a1328aee" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Delivering Corps Deep Fires in a High Tempo Multinational Environment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/delivering-corps-deep-fires-in-a-high-tempo-multinational-environment-e816f2a9f75e?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e816f2a9f75e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:18:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:18:04.460Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Lt Col Tim Iddon (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong>Deep Fires within the land environment has been a hot topic since the re-emergence of the Division and Corps to pre-eminence in the warfighting order of battle (ORBAT). It is an emotive subject that does not wane, involving numerous interested parties and subject matter experts (SME). The complexity of the environment, the ever-changing character of conflict and the evolutionary and cunning psyche of potential foes, necessitate a constant re-evaluation of doctrine to ensure its relevance (especially in light of the continuing emergence of full-spectrum, multi domain weaponry and its gradual seepage down to the tactical level).</strong></p><p>In short, what constitutes the Deep Battle and the corresponding way in which Deep Fires are delivered will remain to some extent in a state of flux, requiring an agile and open approach by Staff Officers.The following quote from Maj Roy Sevalia’s (3rd US Army) article <em>Fighting Deep with Joint Fires</em>, will set the scene and help frame this article firmly within a high-intensity war fighting scenario.</p><p><strong><em>‘It is imperative that we strike fast, deep and often to dictate our will upon the enemy. We must own the enemy decision cycle by attacking him through the depth of the battlefield with all joint and coalition fires available. Deep fires is the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire, armed aircraft, and other lethal and non-lethal means in support of the commander’s battle plan that give us the competitive edge to dominate the air, land and sea.’</em></strong></p><p><strong>Setting the Parameters</strong></p><p>This short and unclassified look at delivering Corps Deep Fires will be limited to the involvement of Aviation (Avn) and Surface to Surface (S2S) fires available within Corps Troops. It is beyond the scope of the article to discuss Air, Electronic Warfare (EW) or Information Operations (IO), except in passing comment where their involvement is intrinsically linked to the delivery of Avn and S2S fires. The article will firstly define in simple terms, a number of key assumptions the author has devised to frame the context in which the article is set. It will then discuss the planning and targeting process used to assist decision-making before concentrating on the delivery of Deep Fires (including the role of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and the rules that govern fires) before briefly looking forward to what’s next.</p><p><strong>Assumptions</strong></p><p>a.<strong>Corps Deep Battlespace</strong>: An area reaching forward of the Corps left and right boundary; starting at the planning range of AS90 approximately 15 km beyond the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and indicated by the Corps Co-ordinated Fire Line (CFL) — and ending approximately 280 km beyond the FLOT; indicated by the Fire Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL).</p><p>b.<strong>Integrated</strong>: Combining Air, Avn, S2S fires, ISR and other resources (Lethal and Non-Lethal) to achieve concentrated, massed fires throughout the Corps Battlespace.</p><p>c.<strong>High Tempo</strong>: Conducting fires in a NATO Article 5, high intensity warfighting scenario, against a peer or near peer enemy.</p><p>d.<strong>Multinational</strong>: Using a combination of fires assets from the 29 members of NATO additional partnering nations taking part in an operation.</p><p><strong>The Corps Targeting Cycle (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A))</strong></p><p>The key to effective deep fires is accurate, timely intelligence that can be translated into targeting data for execution by the full range of fires assets available to the Commander and having a robust, multinational, interoperable, Command Control Communication Computers and Information (C4I) structure to support it.</p><p>Within HQ ARRC’s Joint Fires and Influence Branch (JFIB) the Joint Fires team (consisting of ACOS Joint Fires, Joint Fires Current Operations (JF Ops), Joint Fires Plans (JF Plans) and Joint Fires Targets (JF Tgts)) are responsible for the nominating, planning, refining and the execution of integrated and synchronised deep strikes on legitimate enemy High Value Targets1 (HPT). These sub teams however, do not work in isolation. They are intrinsically linked, effectively working as one entity to deliver Deep Fires on time and on target.</p><p>JF Tgts works closely with G2 and other branch leads to analyse the enemies Centre of Garvity (COG), tactics and laydown and in conjunction with the results of the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment, plan targets out to 96 hrs using the D3A cycle (fig 2). JF Plans work with G5 and G35 to inform Corps planning and the refinement of resulting Courses of Action (COA). They synchronise fires and fires resources with the manoeuvre plan at every stage. These links formed by JF Plans with G5/G35 allows the JF Plans team to perform a key role in informing and influencing the activity of the Target Working Group (TWG) and subsequent Targeting Board (TB), where the submission of targets for approval takes place in the guise of Plan (96 hrs), Refine (72–48 hrs) and Execute (24 hrs). The output of the TB is a Commander approved, prioritised and synchronised Target Engagement Plan (TEP) (fig 3), a target nominations list for submission to higher HQ and an Attack Guidance Matrix2 (AGM) (fig 4). The TEP and AGM provide the holder with the Commander’s authority to strike the targets listed without further reference to the Target Engagement Authority (TEA); as long as the targets, prior to being struck, remain valid, are within the rules laid down in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROE), and are still within the TEA’s delegated authority or constitute a combat engagement or an engagement in self-defence (e.g. counter fires). Prior to the execute stage, the TEP and AGM will be passed to JF Ops and the Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) allocated to the Corps (via the Corps Artillery Headquarters) for execution. The TEP will link together Weapons, Targets, Target Areas of Interest (TAI) and ISR in time and space. The AGM will act as an engagement authority for JF Ops to engage listed targets without further reference as long as the conditions set in the AGM are met.</p><p>The TWG and Fires Working Group3 (FWG) were combined prior to Ex ARRCADE CHARGER 17 (AC17) to reduce the number of JFIB meetings and streamline the decision-making process. This new approach was working well and was refined and tested throughout Ex ARRCADE FUSION 17 (AF17) and will continue to be on Ex DYNAMIC FRONT 18 (DF18). The intuitive, easy to understand targeting priorities displayed in the TWG (listed by unit) has been further developed by JF Tgts for use by JF Ops during the execution phase. These linked documents display clear fires priorities and the Target Selection Standards (TSS) required to be met before a strike takes place (simplifying the decision-making process and the execution of fires).</p><p><strong>The Delivery of Deep Fires</strong></p><p>The requirements placed upon Deep Fires in terms of effects are easy to articulate but the desired outcomes are at times, challenging to achieve. They depend on a number of variables including the availability of suitable collection, strike and support assets. If all goes well the effect of deep fires will be to shape4 the battlespace in line with the Commander’s plan and set the conditions for the delivery of the decisive action5. The types of targets appropriate for striking by deep fires will vary depending on the phase of the operation but will invariably be considered as HPTs (linked to effects and objectives). These HPTs may include enemy reserves, 2nd echelon forces, command and control (C2) nodes and key equipment such as air defence assets, artillery, engineer equipment and aviation.</p><p>The allocation of a FAB and a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) into the ARRC ORBAT, under Corps Troops, adds the firepower required to combat a peer/near-peer enemy. It allows the Corps to shape the battlespace out to approximately 280 km beyond the FLOT. However, with the inclusion of this firepower comes the requirement for detailed planning by G5 (beyond 96 hrs), G35 (24–96 hrs) and G3 Ops (for dynamic targets out to 24 hrs) planning teams, and the necessity to establish a robust C4I structure that enables the sensor shooter links. Depending on the operation and subsequent ARRC ORBAT, 1 (UK) Artillery Brigade or a US FAB are likely to form the Corps Artillery HQ (CAHQ) with a Tactical (TAC) HQ attached to HQ ARRC to control the FAB or FABs (if more than one) S2S assets and execute the S2S TEP. Similarly, the CAB would also supply a TAC HQ to HQ ARRC, providing SMEs and conducting Avn planning (to include Hasty and Pre-planned Deep Strikes). Ex DYNAMIC FRONT II in Feb-Mar 17 saw JFIB take the first steps in establishing this concept, with AC17 taking the process a stage further. It was exercised fully on AF17 and will be during DF18. For the Corps Deep fires to be truly effective however, they must be integrated and synchronised with manoeuvre. To achieve this requires practice and a great deal of teamwork, involving Staff from all Branches. The use of Avn to conduct Deep Strikes adds real value in an operation where resources such as Air, EW and ISR are limited but it also carries high risks where the A2AD threat remains. Avn adds flexibility and a unique solution to the normal targeting issues accompanying the use of S2S fires. Avn can find, fix and strike the enemy (hard and fast), destroying hard and soft targets while simultaneously passing targeting data for strikes by Air and S2S assets such as GMLRS and ATACMS. Avn can also provide Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) to inform the intelligence process and the requirement for re-attack. Using Avn has its risks however, and the enemy has a vote. The myriad of enemy Air Defence systems spread throughout the battlespace have to be bypassed, suppressed, neutralised or destroyed to allow Avn freedom of action and maintaining crew and air frame survivability. Hence the intricate planning that takes and the requirement for an integrated Air, Avn, S2S and EW package to support an Avn deep strike. S2S engagements where air superiority is not guaranteed are no less complicated as they rely on ISR assets (air and ground) to find, fix and communicate accurate target co-ordinates to the firing platform.</p><p><strong>ISR</strong></p><p>Organic ISR available to the Corps is scarce and limited to those assets that are packaged with Corps Troops (this may include Radars (US Q series) and UAVs (MQ-1 and RQ-7)). Additional ISR will be bid for by the Corps ISR manager and HQ ARRC’s requests will compete with other formation requests for resources. ISR support to targeting and the TEP therefore, cannot be guaranteed and innovative backup solutions including the use of Non Traditional ISR6 (NTISR) must be considered. Unless it is accepted that some engagements will take place unobserved, ISR in all its forms, will be key in ensuring successful S2S engagements, limiting avoidable collateral damage, preserving ammunition and providing BDA.</p><p><strong>Rules Governing Fires</strong></p><p>LOAC, ROE and the NATO equivalent of the UK Targeting Directive together with standing conventions such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, provide the rules which govern the way war is conducted. They place both freedoms and constrains on opposing forces but not always in equal measure. As an example, the Convention on Cluster Munitions which applies to many NATO countries may not apply to an opposing force. In this case the convention restricts the options available to HQ ARRC when countering armoured formations. Conversely, an advisory may have the choice of using cluster munitions (Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM)) such as those used most effectively in Ukraine in 2014.</p><p><strong>Looking Forward</strong></p><p>HQ ARRC’s Corps recalibration programme is gathering pace and is creatively linked to a multitude of training events and Conceptual Development and Experimentation activities leading into 2018 and beyond. AF17 and external training support tasks such as Ex IRON RESOLVE and Ex PEGASUS CLAW will assist in furthering the HQs considerable understanding and development of their Corps warfighting role. For JFIB and elements of the wider HQ, DF18’s multinational, lethal fires-focused training event will further enhance an already enviable capability; while planed study periods and Ex ARRCADE THOR will consolidate lessons learned. Other areas of development moving forward include the USAREUR sponsored Theatre Surface Fires Command (TSFC) and the seeking out of new fires affiliations to enhance HQ ARRCs offensive and defensive capabilities.</p><p><strong>Application of Corps Deep Fires at the ARRC</strong></p><p>The integration of a CAB and FAB within Corps Troops facilitates the synchronisation of Air, EW, IO and ISR of all types. The resulting effects unlock the battlespace for the Commander and provide him the freedom to manoeuvre; it also denies the enemy the same freedom, keeping him off balance and paralysed to act. As the planned activities listed above unfold (AF17, DF18), the Jt Fires Staff grow in confidence, experience and capability (illustrated by the flexible and innovative approach taken to streamline the D3A process). Furthermore, their thorough understanding of TEAs and the application of ROE target decreased engagement times. The formation of a comprehensive TSFC will add a welcome and significant capability. When coupled with Corps troops it will increase the lethality of S2S Fires within the European theatre when it reaches Full Operating Capability in 2025.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Lt Col Tim Iddon is currently SO1 Fires Co-Ord Current Ops in the Joint Fires and Influence Branch at HQ Allied rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e816f2a9f75e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Air C2 Challenges in Corps Warfighting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/air-c2-challenges-in-corps-warfighting-d5589b68f25d?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5589b68f25d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:11:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:11:37.141Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Gp Capt Chris Mullen (GBR)</strong></p><p><strong><em>As the ARRC continues on its path to Corps Recalibration — beginning with the C2 and Close Battle on ARRCADE FUSION 17 (AF17) and refocusing on the Corps Deep Battle for the first half of 2018 — it has become clear that there is a need to address the delivery of Air-Land Integration (ALI); including the functionality required at the Corps level and more importantly, the Air C2 construct that will enable the requisite authorities and permissions to support the desired integration of effects. This short article describes the current C2 model, why the potential to operate as a Corps in a Major Joint Operation (MJO) against a near-peer enemy has driven the need for review, and the activity underway to present potential options for HQ AIRCOM and NATO.</em></strong></p><p><strong>Current NATO ALI Model</strong></p><p>The current ALI model utilized by NATO is enabled through the use of permanently embedded Air Operations Coordination Cells (AOCCs) within the 9 High Readiness Force (Land) (HRF(L)) HQs; they are tasked with providing air advice to the Corps Commander whilst supporting the Corps’ Plan, Refine and Execute activity on behalf of HQ AIRCOM and the nominated Air Component Commander in the event of Operations. The AOCCs are further supported by additional air liaison or coordination elements from the nominated Air Component should the Corps be required to act as the LCC or JTFHQ as part of the LTRP. Recent experience on Exs TRIDENT JUNCTURE 16 and AF17 has demonstrated that providing support to the plan and refine functions is an achievable task, especially given the permanent nature of the AOCC within the Corps. However, delivery of an execute function presents a fundamentally different challenge. Situated within the OPCEN, the AOCC would be required to enable the apportionment of aircraft assigned to APCLO tasks, service immediate requests for additional air support and manage the airspace requirements in a potentially dynamic scenario. All of this activity requires direct communication to the Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) and any JTACs supporting the Divisions and Brigades. However, a differing equipment provision and manning structure across the 9 AOCCs has led to a the default ‘procedural’ position whereby the AOCC staff enable the dynamic control of aircraft and airspace but rely upon the JFAC to execute the task via airborne or ground-based Command and Control assets.</p><p><strong>Changing Requirement</strong></p><p>Whilst a purely procedural approach has proven to be effective in a low intensity and relatively permissive environment, where we are able to retain control of the air and aircraft can be handed over to JTACs in order to support the land forces, it is judged to be overly restrictive and time consuming should the tempo and complexity increase. Indeed, as Ex AF17 demonstrated, the enemy threat, complexity, contested environment and competition for resources presented by an MJO will require a more flexible approach. Furthermore, if faced with a near-peer enemy, it will be imperative that we are able to maximise our operational effectiveness through careful integration of our fires, aviation and air resources during planned <em>and</em> dynamic activity. In such a scenario, procedural deconfliction, through time and/or space may prove to be counter-productive and limit the utility of our capabilities. Therefore, there is a clear requirement for Air personnel in the OPCEN with the delegated authority, training and resources to dynamically control air assets and airspace that have been allocated to the Corps/LCC; in effect a Combat Ops Directorate1 capability ‘forward’.</p><p>Ex AF17 also highlighted the need to prioritise scarce assets in response to additional requests for air support from multiple Divisions in a high tempo situation. Such activity must be informed by the Corps Commander’s priorities, driving the requirement for the designated Air C2 entity to be collocated with the Corps decision-makers. Some nations already maintain a similarly enabled capability for employment at the Divisional level; however, organisations such as the UK ASOC that exercised with the ARRC on AF17 are limited to a few NATO nations and are not yet aligned with the HRF(L)s. Indeed, should the ARRC deploy with up to 5 multi-national Divisions, it is likely that a number will not have the ability, or delegated authority, to control or coordinate aircraft and airspace that may be allocated to them. In summary, we need to enable a suitable entity with the functionality to support the Corps in prioritization of air assets across multiple divisions, the integration of Corps aviation and fires, and management of Corps battle space within a complex and contested environment.</p><p><strong>The Plan…</strong></p><p>So now that we have identified the issue, what is being done to address the challenge? At the NCS-level, HQ AIRCOM have instigated a study to investigate the functionality that an Air C2 entity would require to deliver an execute role at Corps level as described above. Utilising existing personnel and equipment from the DACCC2, a nascent structure has been formed, modeled on the framework of the Divisional ASOC adopted by the UK and US; they have subsequently used numerous air-land exercises in Europe during 2017 to carry out differing levels of concept development. More recently and in parallel to the DACCC activity, HQ ARRC has assisted the development through our CD&amp;E programme during AF17. Supported by the UK ASOC, we investigated the challenges associated with a nascent Corps ASOC delivering a coordination role over the 5 subordinate Divisions in a complex and high tempo scenario where we were not able to consistently maintain control of the air. We were able to take many lessons forward, which we will provide to HQ AIRCOM to inform their ongoing study. The main lessons centered on the C2 arrangements and authorities required to deliver the coordination and controlling functions; these will likely inform the structure of the organisation and the necessary training and standardisation that the JFAC will dictate prior to delegating control authority. In addition, the Corps may have to examine the layout of the OPCEN so as to enable the most effective flow of information between the key functional areas; we may also need to consider the most appropriate individual that should be empowered to prioritise assets across the Corps. The next step for HQ ARRC will be the incorporation of a similar Air C2 capability on Ex DYNAMIC FRONT 18 (Ex DF18) in March 18. This is intended to be a step up from AF17, where we will be supported by the DACCC from Poggio Renatico in addition to the UK ASOC and intend to implement the lessons identified during AF17 in a live, dynamic scenario; a truly exciting prospect.</p><p><strong>Future Challenges</strong></p><p>Beyond the current challenges of delivering an effective Air C2 within a Corps construct, lies a future issue for ALI that we will also need to address; integration of 5th Generation capability. At a recent Airpower Conference, COM AIRCOM highlighted 4th and 5th generation air platforms, such as the F-35, as potential Air Domain Game-Changers. However, although some platforms are nearing operational capability, we do not yet fully understand how we are going to integrate them into our planning or execute functions, which will be necessary in order to reap the maximum benefit these assets can provide. In particular, given the breadth of capability within a formation of 5th Gen aircraft, we may need to review our standard air support request process that focuses on APCLO missions such as CAS, AI and SCAR3. A package of F-35s could provide shared SA through ISR, strike, localised control of the air and prioritise potential targets during one mission; the challenge will be ensuring that the Corps and associated Air C2 entity is integrated sufficiently to draw upon the vast amounts of information that will enable the continued integration of Land effects.</p><p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>In summary, it is recognised that the effective integration of Air capability with organic Land effects will be key in a Corps war-fighting scenario. This can be achieved within the current NATO ALI construct but it is acknowledged to be sub-optimal and insufficiently dynamic to be effective in a high-tempo, complex and contested operational environment. HQ AIRCOM’s current work to identify a potential solution is timely but the functionality required in a revised context must be understood fully before the form of any revised air C2 entity can be clearly defined. In the meantime, it is likely that National ASOCs will be required to provide a short-term ‘sticking plaster’ to provide NATO the time to develop an enduring, sustainable capability.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Gp Capt Chris Mullen is Chief G3 Air within the Joint Fires and Influence Branch and Chief AOCC(L) at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5589b68f25d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Near Real-World Planning — Turning Wales and Warsaw Summits into Reality]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/near-real-world-planning-turning-wales-and-warsaw-summits-into-reality-df981eda4394?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df981eda4394</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:09:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:09:55.310Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Col Richard Clements (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong><em>In early 2017, Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), whilst stood by as the NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC) Headquarters, undertook a period of crisis response planning (CRP) in preparation for Exercise NOBLE JUMP 2 (Ex NOJP2). Ex NOJP2 was a readiness and deployment exercise, in which elements of HQ ARRC and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) (VJTF(L))1 brigade deployed to another Allied Country.</em></strong></p><p>HQ ARRC’s planning was the first of its kind by a High Readiness Force (Land) Headquarters as it was based on a modified real world regional Graduated Response Plan (GRP). This enabled HQ ARRC to develop a LCC Operation Order (OPORD), replicating what would occur for real should that GRP be activated. As such, it was the first time that a GRP had been subject to notable scrutiny, and the first time that it had been used to plan for real troops deploying to the region; albeit in a planned exercise using a scenario. This short article aims to highlight some of the lessons identified during CRP, in particular: the value of near-real world planning; the challenges faced when writing GRPs with sufficient detail to be executable rapidly, whilst also being sufficiently generic to cater for numerous potential eventualities; the complexities of rapid deployment planning and the potential value of incremental deployments.</p><p><strong>Value of Near-Real World Planning with Host Nation and Key Staff</strong></p><p>The first significant lesson was the value of using near-real world or real-world plans. This lesson had previously been identified during 2015, when HQ ARRC planned and deployed to the Baltics. ARRC’s lessons from 2015 were incorporated into the development of the GRP for that region. Whilst NATO policy is not to exercise real plans, a small amount of revision of these plans — to de-sensitise them and build in a near-real world scenario — enables significant training value to be gained. Members of the planning staff at HQ ARRC were able to develop a great understanding of the detail in the real-world GRP, undertake detailed branch level analysis and understand the implications of the geography, regional dynamics and Host Nations’ (HN) capabilities. This experience will be invaluable if the real-world GRP is to be activated at any stage whilst enhancing the value of ARRC’s readiness training and professional development. Another lesson confirmed was the immense value of HN liaison officers and NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) staff. NFIUs are relatively new NATO staff capabilities in HNs; not only do they provide an immediate link between NATO forces and HQs with HNs forces and HQs, but they are critical in early enablement of NATO forces.</p><p><strong>Inconsistencies in GRPs</strong></p><p>Unsurprisingly, planning also identified inconsistencies between and within the levels of GRPs, which can only be found when testing the plans thoroughly through execution, albeit in a training context. GRPs are constructed with plans at the strategic, operational and tactical (component) levels. Whilst developed collaboratively, these plans are complex and detailed and it is challenging to achieve perfection. Consequently, some of the details contained in the plans were inconsistent between the different levels of plans, while others were inconsistent within a plan. For example, some plans talked of ‘X’ days of supply (DOS), whilst others articulated ‘Y’ DOS; indeed one plan talked of ‘X’ in the main body and ‘Y’ in the annexes. Whilst seemingly trivial, such detail becomes important in the timely execution of plans and can now be corrected.</p><p><strong>Command and control.</strong></p><p>Command and control (C2) is a persistent challenge in an Alliance context. C2 arrangements are already well defined in all GRPs, but what is often not well defined in order to retain agility, is which HQ is to undertake which role. For example, the plans do not stipulate which HQ would act as the LCC HQ as there are several different options above that of HQ ARRC in 2017. This said, the lengthy and complex discussions over exact C2 between force elements for Ex NOJP2, further blurred and compounded by national, real-world and exercise C2 differences, highlighted how essential early and detailed clarity of C2 is. Execution of a GRP under time-pressure does not afford NATO the opportunity to discuss and resolve these C2 challenges in the face of a real opposition; which HQ is delivering what C2 must be more clearly defined in the baseline GRP.</p><p><strong>Reception Staging and Onwards Movement Planning</strong></p><p>Another notable challenge is timely and effective tactical level Reception Staging and Onwards Movement (RSOM) planning. In all GRPs, the operational commander directs a tactical HQ to undertake the tactical level RSOM planning and then command the tactical execution of RSOM in the land domain. Whilst NATO doctrine is that this tactical RSOM should be commanded by the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG), a lack of standing JLSG at high readiness precludes the JLSG from delivering this in a timely manner. As a result, a combination of the NFIUs and a nominated tactical HQ will be required to deliver RSOM. Ex NOJP2 employed HQ Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE)) as the tactical level RSOM HQ and this HQ developed the tactical level RSOM, ably supported in turn by HQ ARRC Enabling Command staff, who are supporting Joint Force Command (Naples’) JLSG in 2017. HQ MND(SE) managed numerous complexities and multiple competing pressures of different force contributing nations with a deployment over 3 different countries. This complex RSOM planning must be sufficiently pre-developed that rapid refinement can be conducted to ensure that RSOM structures and C2 are in place as lead elements of the VJTF(L) deploy. Tactical RSOM planning is the most time and resource pressured requirement in an emerging deployment and will represent one of the greatest risk to delivery of timely notice to effect.</p><p><strong>Incremental Deterrence and Balanced Force Packaging.</strong></p><p>The utility of the VJTF(L) in early deterrence was reinforced by planning for Ex NOJP2. Only part of the VJTF(L) brigade deploy on Ex NOJP2 and the deployment is being ‘played’ on the exercise as an incremental deployment, with further simulated follow-on forces deploying. This design represents a realistic and credible strategy of incremental deterrence, with increasingly capable and sizeable forces being deployed to ensure a balance is retained between the provocation and deterrence of a potential adversary. The concept of incremental deterrence should be further developed in the revision of GRPs for the VJTF. It should be noted that force elements deployed in such an incremental approach must consist of balanced force packages. For example, deployment of combat forces with no logistics support or firepower, is unsustainable and lacks credibility. Tailoring of force packages is required, for example some regions require bespoke capabilities, such as wet-gap crossing capabilities in areas with wide rivers.</p><p><strong>Conclusion.</strong></p><p>In sum, planning for Ex NOJP2 using a near-real world GRP provided an excellent opportunity for HQ ARRC to rehearse and refresh skills in planning for the execution of a real-world GRP. Not only did the staff learn notable lessons on the details in the plans, identifying inadvertent inconsistencies, but the staff gained a considerably greater understanding of a region and HN capabilities not previously studied. The detailed lessons identified can now be fed back into the revision of the real-world GRPs to make them more effective. Ex NOJP2 and the planning using a near-real world GRP tangibly demonstrates that the concepts of the Readiness Action Plan, GRPs and the VJTF as conceived at the Wales summit in 2014 and refined at Warsaw 2016, are now being delivered as truly deployable and credible capabilities.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Col Richard Clements is ACOS G5 Plans at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df981eda4394" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Enabling Crisis Response: Lessons from Ex NOBLE JUMP 17]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@roche.arrc.pao/enabling-crisis-response-lessons-from-ex-noble-jump-17-f62fb4680fbe?source=rss-8584e8ba7e49------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f62fb4680fbe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Laurence Roche]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Jun 2018 07:08:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-22T07:08:35.768Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Capt Mark Matthews (GBR-A)</strong></p><p><strong><em>Exercise NOBLE JUMP 17 (NOJP17) tested NATO’s ability to deploy the Land elements of its Very High Readiness Joint Task Force across Europe to Romania. Although NOJP17 was an exercise, it was a deployment of force conducted in real time, over real terrain and in the public domain. In doing so, it lay a vital element of NATO’s Graduated Response Planning at the feet of both the NATO public and its potential adversaries; bringing with it both risk and rewards for NATO Deterrence and Reassurance messaging.</em></strong></p><p>Deploying military force; with the right equipment, sustained to fight, in a timely manner, with the approval of all nations involved is a hugely complex task. To organise this, a deploying force would normally be preceded by logistic enablers to facilitate the Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) process. Depending on the size of the deployment, this presence could be as small as a Company Quartermaster’s Team, or as large as a Support Brigade. With the need for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) to be light and rapidly deployable, this traditional deployment method will not work. Due to deployment timelines and the need to concentrate fighting power, the VJTF has no assigned RSOM units, whilst the rest of the NATO Response Forces (NRF) are enabled by the strength of the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG).</p><p>To mitigate this, NATO relies heavily on advanced planning and the extensive use of Host Nation Support. This approach is best suited to defending known territories and not for an Expeditionary Force. National infrastructure, governmental agencies and existing routes can all be pre-identified and used to support deployment of forces, but theory can only go so far. Testing this model of deployment is essential to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the concept, this led to the development and execution of Ex NOJP17. The exercise saw elements of the VJTF, from seven nations, deploy from across NATO territory to the Cincu training area in Romania.</p><p>At its core, NOJP17 involved the deployment of over 2500 personnel and five hundred vehicles by road, rail, sea and air. The RSOM planning for this was done by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Enabling Command (ARRC EC) as part of the 2017 NATO Response Force (Land) JLSG HQ. As a multinational one star organisation, ARRC EC supported and augmented by representatives from NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), Host, and Transit Nations created the RSOM plan and delivered the function of a Theatre Entry Logistic Headquarters.</p><p>Having identified that the deployment of the VJTF falls outside the remit of the JLSG, HQ ARRC took NOJP17 as a chance to trial both a high readiness Theatre Entry capability and the Advanced JLSG (A-JLSG) concept. The A-JLSG is formed by a small element of the JLSG, held at a higher readiness and made up of personnel with the specific trade skills and experience required to enable RSOM. This advance element was charged with ensuring deployment of the VJTF but also setting conditions for the arrival of the NRF follow-on forces and the remainder of the JLSG.</p><p>The plan relied heavily on contracted and Host Nation, which created considerable discomfort for some. To ease this friction, detailed planning was conducted to augment the existing NATO deployment plan and ensure the right support was in the right place, at the right time, with the correct diplomatic clearances and contracts to back them up. Once the plan was finalised, it was rehearsed through a Table Top Exercise. This event was the first time the team from HQ ARRC met with HQ Multinational Division South-East (MND-SE). Based in Bucharest, MND-SE became the lead for execution as the RSOM HQ. To deliver this function MND-SE created a bespoke ops room to command and coordinate the whole process with ARRC EC personnel integrated into each of the branches. Whilst the HQ ARRC staff were subject matter experts on RSOM and had lead in the development of the plan, MND-SE staff had the local knowledge and command relationships that proved vital for the execution phase.</p><p>Although the RSOM process was the focus of the Exercise, it did not require any exercise scenarios. The challenges faced were real world, and included diplomatic clearance issues, air traffic control strikes, breakdowns, road closures and civil disturbances blocking convoys; all requiring multi-nation communication and coordination to solve.</p><p><strong>So What?</strong></p><p>With deployment of the VJTF into a realistic operational environment at the heart of the exercise, NOJP17 was a huge success and the A-JLSG concept showed its merit. The VJTF forces arrived with the commander in Cincu in good time and good order despite the 1750km covered and multiple borders crossed. There were three significant learning points:</p><ul><li>To be effective, the necessary logistic enablers need to be held at the same readiness as the VJTF and to have pre-established relationships with the NFIUs and relevant government departments of the NATO country in question.</li><li>The existing NATO deployment plans need to be bolstered by an organisation analysing and planning the deployment of the VJTF as a main focus. Due to the short timelines and lack of enablers, the deployment of this element is perhaps more complicated than the entire follow on force. Early and full integration of TCNs, JLSG and RSOM HQ personnel is vital to develop a successful plan and ensure smooth execution.</li><li>It is essential to practice the challenges of conducting multi-national deployments across international borders outside the freedoms presented by war. Financial and political restrictions limit opportunities to conduct exercises like NOJP17 at the size and scale needed to validate these processes. Yet an experience of all the possible frictions could prove critical for the timely deployment of the VJTF in response to any future emerging crisis.</li></ul><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Capt Mark Matthews is the Adjutant of Enabling Command branch at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and is the Battle Captain for the nominated NRF JLSG 17.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f62fb4680fbe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>