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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mike Konczal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mike Konczal on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Mike Konczal on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Only 1.4% of Free College Spending Would Go to Children of Millionaires and Billionaires]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/only-1-4-of-free-college-spending-would-go-to-children-of-millionaires-and-billionaires-39c0d2c2fa1b?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[free-college-tuition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-college]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decommodification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soak-the-rich]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2019 22:03:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-20T22:29:30.008Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here’s an argument you hear often brought up against free college. “Instead of providing free college tuition for the children of millionaires and billionaires…”</p><h3>Pete Buttigieg on Twitter</h3><p>Instead of providing free college tuition for the children of millionaires and billionaires, I will open doors of opportunity for Americans who choose not to go to college with massive investments in apprenticeships, workforce training, and lifelong learning programs.</p><p>Fair enough. But how much of the money spent on free public college tuition would actually go to the children of millionaires and billionaires? A lot, or a little? The rich are more likely to go to college than everyone else, but don’t they go to fancy private schools usually?</p><p>Lucky for us Raj Chetty’s <a href="http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/data/">Equality of Opportunity Project</a> had a great paper about college and mobility using tax data, <a href="http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/papers/coll_mrc_paper.pdf">Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility</a> (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, Yagan). They were kind enough put <a href="http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/data/">data aggregates by college</a> online that anyone can access.</p><p>This data has a list of some 2,200 colleges, and for each college they have their tiered rankings, their number of students, the number of students whose parents are in the top 1 percent of incomes, and the sticker price of their tuition. This isn’t perfect, but with some quick multiplication we can make a guesstimate of how much of free college would benefit millionaires and billionaires.</p><p>(PRELIMINARY disclaimer: For those born in 1991, at college age their parents would make $630,500, so this data will include more rich people than just millionaires and billionaires. My working assumption is that this data undercounts public attendance. Both would bias in favor of over-representing millionaires and billionaires in the answer. I exclude for-profits, as I think many are missing and the rich are very unlikely to attend them in this data. Also exclude those not attending college. The data itself is slightly randomized since it is tax data, though their methods prevent randomized errors. Again, this is just a quick acid test.)</p><p>First, compared to the rest of the population, the rich are more likely to attend elite, private schools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fn4yeoBsdO-FG1kdJwybWw.png" /></figure><p>7.6 percent of students who are the children of millionaires and billionaires are off to Ivy League Plus schools, compared to just 0.75 percent of everyone else off to college. Since free public college doesn’t cover those schools, that’s not an issue to worry about.</p><p>What about from the institution side? Checking, if you look at the public schools and private schools they have data for, 1 percent of public higher education students come from the top 1 percent. Compare that to the 4.8 percent of private higher education students that come from the top 1 percent.</p><p>So what about spending? This isn’t an easy question, but to get a quick answer, I multiply the sticker price of tuition with the number of students at each public colleges to get total spending. I then do the same for the number of 1 percent students attending to get elite spending. I then divide the latter by the former. The answer is 1.4 percent.</p><p>1.4 percent of the total spending of free public higher education would benefit these students who parents are in the top 1 percent. That’s 98.6 percent for everyone else.</p><p>The entire cost of free college will be paid for by the rich, whether it’s Bernie Sanders’s financial transaction tax or Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax or many other options. It is true that the rich will recoup 1.4 percent of that, but that seems like a worthwhile tradeoff.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39c0d2c2fa1b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Warren’s Medicare for All Plan Jumpstarts a Stalled Debated, Finds a Way to Circumvent the Power…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/warrens-medicare-for-all-plan-jumpstarts-a-stalled-debated-finds-a-way-to-circumvent-the-power-61c2e0c54a0c?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[elizabeth-warren]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[m4a]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-primary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medicare-for-all]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Nov 2019 01:29:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-06T15:13:49.998Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Warren’s Medicare for All Plan Jumpstarts a Stalled Debate, Finds a Way to Circumvent the Power of Employers</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*WNZGh1wq3qcjRSzkGJDkuA.jpeg" /></figure><p>There’s been a wave of education and political mobilization around Medicare for All (M4A) since Bernie Sanders centered the demand in the 2016 primary. It’s also been a dominant question in the primary, with each candidate positioning themselves in or around the idea. Yet for all the ways it saturates the public discussion, there’s wide avenues of debate over the policy that has been stalled during this time, and little progress has been made towards understanding the political tactics and strategies that will be necessary. With the release of Elizabeth Warren’s Medicare for All <a href="https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/paying-for-m4a/">financing plan</a> last week there’s now a framework to start the debate around those questions. Warren, in particular, gives us a starting point on how to structure the initial taxes to make them market power and monopsony-proof, so bosses and owners don’t steal a windfall.</p><p>I don’t mean debate in the pedantic “can we afford it?” way. M4A is fundamentally a financing question, and financing is the foundation of all the major political questions. Financing determines how we distinguish enemies from allies, the element of who gets what, who benefits, and who bears what pain. These are fundamental political questions, especially when it comes to taking on a powerful status quo.</p><p>I don’t work on health care directly, but working on the economy broadly means you interact with health care since health care permeates everything. And much of the work that has been developed around inequality in recent years interacts awkwardly with M4A. That’s fine, politics is about understanding and working through the ways movements don’t line up. But watching these interactions closely, they haven’t had frameworks or institutions to move them towards answers. Let me first give three examples of what I mean by this, before discussing some new things that Warren has put onto the table.</p><p><strong>Three Open Questions</strong></p><p><strong>First</strong>, I and others spend a lot of time arguing that there’s significant revenues that can be <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/wealth-tax-bernie-warren/">raised</a> through taxes on the rich and wealthy. These high-end taxes not only raise revenue, but also restructure the economy towards less extraction and a better overall distribution of income. I’m around <a href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/why-spending-money-on-ambitious-new-programs-is-a-feature-not-a-bug-in-todays-economy/">efforts to emphasize</a> that the current deficit is nothing to worry about and can even expand, given secular stagnation and that growth is higher than prevailing interest rates. This is <a href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/decarbonizing-the-us-economy/">especially true</a> when it comes to the Green New Deal. In practice this means we do a lot of research and education around the deficit and increasing high-end taxation, and little on middle-class taxation. You can do a lot, from saving the climate to creating free college, daycare, paid family leave, and more simply through debt and soaking the rich.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*loCYH0oe3Mmb-rimV0ahmw.png" /><figcaption>these were current as of a year ago</figcaption></figure><p>Except for M4A. There you need a whole other universe of offsets, spending redirects, and revenue raising to carry it out. That makes sense and is fine, as it’s largely a puzzle around moving already existing spending to public balance sheets. Yet it causes two pieces of confusion. You get endless arguments that conflate the two sets of policies, that drive up a massive headline number for the overall progressive agenda, a number that is driven by M4A. This is often done to argue against taxation on the rich or make the possibility of reform seem more limited, even though there’s a pretty clear way to distinguish between tackling M4A, other social programs, and climate initiatives like the Green New Deal.</p><p>A more practical problem is that you have an entire tax policy infrastructure on standby, not knowing where to start digging, researching and developing arguments about broad taxation. For example, I have no idea if, in the back of my head, I should be preparing arguments for a value-added tax (VAT). Scandinavian countries use VATs for their health care. Will we? I don’t care about the exact number; I do care about the balance and scope, because preparing the broader movement and public around these arguments and doing the work of developing them is part of the politics. I was no closer to understanding before this last week than I was years ago.</p><p><strong>Second</strong>, left-liberals spend a lot of time arguing that our economy is structured to send too much income to those at the very top. Inequality isn’t natural, but instead the result of how the economy is structured, and we have terrible institutions in place to check the incomes and rents of bosses, shareholders, the financial sector, and others who profit off the basic life necessities. Doctors too. I wrote <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/health-insurance-medicare-for-all-doctors/">a piece</a> for The Nation about how one of the most important challenges for M4A is taking on the medical establishment and paying doctors less. This is true because that’s where the money is, doctors have historically been the ones mobilizing social and economic capital to kill single payer, and they have fought claims that we can spend less overall on health care driven by the rate it would pay doctors.</p><p>The Nation quickly <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/letters-from-the-june-3-10-2019-issue/">got a letter</a> from three doctors stating that this was wrong, I was “sounding a false alarm that doctors’ opposition will torpedo single-payer health-care reform” and that M4A administrative savings “means doctors’ take-home pay could be stable.” If I wrote about squeezing hedge fund rents and then three people from hedge funds responded saying there’s a lot we can do to reform the financial sector while keeping hedge fund salaries stable, I’d know what was going on. But these three doctors were from <em>Physicians for a National Health Program</em>, arguably the leading public advocacy group for M4A. This was part of a <a href="https://www.vox.com/health-care/2019/4/29/18518215/medicare-for-all-costs-adam-gaffney">broader messaging</a> they were doing, arguing that total health care expenditures by providers should only be brought down by administrative savings, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/health/medicare-for-all-hospitals.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share">and</a> “the line here can’t be and shouldn’t be soak the hospitals.”</p><p>I’ve been around movement politics enough to know when the advocacy groups are trying to set limits on what people should be saying, but when I tried to find who was managing this question of doctors and providers within M4A I found basically nothing. (Even now M4A advocates phrase the <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2019/11/medicare-for-all-taxes-finances-warren-sanders">political challenge as</a> “the battle we’ll need to wage against insurance companies, drug companies, and the political establishment” with no mention of doctors, hospitals and providers.) Some advocates of M4A were assuming pretty heroic savings from providers, yet the leading advocacy group was against this line of public argument. That M4A decommodifies health care for individuals is enough of a moral case for it. But many, including myself, like the idea of M4A because it allows you to squeeze the massive rents and profits out of an inefficient system. Until last week, I didn’t understand what people were actually prioritizing here when it came to how to position vis-a-vie providers.</p><p><strong>Third</strong>, I’m around a lot of people arguing that wages aren’t determined by marginal productivity, or human capital, or the economy-wide bidding of skills by employers. They are determined by power. Supply and demand form a range of potential outcomes, a field between which a massive battle takes place over who will benefit from the surplus that our economy creates. If you suddenly become $5,000 more profitable to your employer, who benefits from that $5,000 is a political question.</p><p>Unless if that $5,000 comes when the spending your employer does on health insurance disappears after M4A. Then it goes to you instantaneously, as if by an invisible hand moving through spontaneous order. Your boss actually walks up to you the moment M4A passes, and drops a sack of money with a dollar sign on it on your desk. (This abstract boss is happy, because normally he has the distressing job of telling everyone they are fired if they make between the old and new minimum wage every time the minimum wage increases.) The employer-side incidence argument has gotten to the point where people are referring to it as a tax, not in a philosophical sense but in a ‘this will show up one-for-one in your paycheck’ sense. There’s a very strong presumption in the M4A debates that since employers probably deduct the spending they do on health care for their employees from their salaries, removing that spending will cause salaries to increase.</p><p>Labor and left-liberals have <a href="https://www.jpands.org/vol20no3/beezley-smith.pdf">been skeptical of this argumen</a>t when it was deployed as an argument for the ACA’s “Cadillac Tax.” There are <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a84_3ay_3a1994_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a622-41.htm">many</a> <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w3557">studies</a> of tax incidence that find in the United States that employers push the costs of benefits onto workers, though that literature is more <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167718714000630">ambiguous</a> than you would think. But there’s no reason to believe that it can work in the opposite direction. The whole point of monopsony theory is to explain why employers can push costs onto employees while keeping profits for themselves. Perhaps, after 5–15 years and a business cycle or two, this would balance out on its own. But maybe we can design policy to accelerate this? M4A would represent a once-in-a-lifetime moment where who benefits within a firm would change, and we should move to prevent bosses and owners from taking it and instead make sure it benefits the public and workers. But to do so, we need a baseline of what the tax structure looks like.</p><p><strong>Baselines to Argue From</strong></p><p>So where does Warren’s financing plan leave us? First, it gives us a baseline on the doctor question. I’m pretty sure this is the first time in the M4A debate I’ve seen the promise that M4A “lowers reimbursements for overpaid specialties.” She <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/4ubxbgy9463z/2Tg9oB55ICu2vtYBaKKcVr/d124e0eeb128ad3a8d8ab8a6ccae44c0/20191031_Medicare_for_All_Cost_Letter___Appendices_FINAL.pdf">would</a> “set reimbursement for physicians and non-hospital providers at 100% of current Medicare rates” and “pay hospitals at an average of 110% of current Medicare rates under Medicare for All.” There’s then also crackdowns on mergers.</p><h3>Dan O&#39;Neill on Twitter</h3><p>This point is often lost in hand-wringing about &quot;austerity.&quot; Whatever its other flaws, this plan would pay American hospitals ~65% more than hospitals in other rich countries, and would ensure that American physicians &amp;amp; nurses remain the best-compensated clinicians in the world. https://t.co/ojroKl4gQW</p><p>This probably isn’t the all-out war the Neo-Brandeisian at <a href="https://prospect.org/health/how-warren-should-pay-for-medicare-for-all/">The American Prospect</a> want, but it’s a marker. I can now gauge a more aggressive and less aggressive stance in relationship to it. In turn, doctors and provider groups now have a pain point, and can figure out their stance, while analysts can try and make objective calls on the effects. It’s a start to now evolve the politics.</p><p><em>Distribution of the Employer Question</em></p><p>Warren also raises revenue from employers already paying for health care, instead of through income or payroll taxes. She does this by assessing the total amount all employers are spending on health care at time of enactment, raising $8.8 trillion dollars over 10 years. In the long run, through the churn of the market, this evolves into a per-capita employer tax.</p><p>Let’s chart out what that looks like compared to what Bernie Sanders is likely to propose. Sanders released a <a href="https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/options-to-finance-medicare-for-all?inline=file">variety of options</a> that could be included for financing, but doesn’t commit to any. I’m going to make two reasonable assumptions. First is that he would include both an income tax and an employer payroll tax, his first two options. He’s talked about the first and is implying the second in his criticism of Warren. Sanders raises $3.9 trillion from the employer payroll tax and $3.5 trillion from the income tax. My second assumption is that we should understand these as equivalent approaches. They each tackle the question of employer-provided spending. They each raise about the same order of magnitude — $8.8 trillion versus $7.4 trillion. Sanders’s numbers are a few years old, and the two plans probably converge on the same high taxes for the rich. Here’s where they get their funding from:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/0*qGVXPj480_IfeaO6" /></figure><p>With this, we can now start to ask the question in a political manner, not just an accountancy one. A few thoughts:</p><p>With one move, Warren shoves the “will I be better off?” questions off a cliff in the short-run. Small businesses that don’t provide any health care aren’t taxed under Warren. A family of four on Medicaid making $40K in a blue state doesn’t pay any new income taxes. A married nurse and a cop making $120K don’t have to worry about whether they show up as relative winners or losses on the income tax side. The New York Times spent a bunch of time trying to figure out the income threshold <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/will-medicare-for-all-hurt-the-middle-class-elizabeth-warren-and-bernie-sanders-struggle-with-questions-about-its-impact/2019/10/05/a645fb3e-dbdb-11e9-ac63-3016711543fe_story.html">where</a> people go from winners to losers, and here the question is moot. Warren does this <em>while raising the same (or more) revenue</em> than Sanders does on the overall employer-provided question.</p><p>I know this proposal has already moved the debate forward, because I see a lot of concerns that converging to a per-capita employer payment is too regressive. You have to consider this as a whole, given the trillion in taxes the rich would pay. It certainly wouldn’t be net regressive once you count the savings that happens for people. I like seeing the debate but personally worry less about this because (a) you can always converge to another distribution, say a payroll tax or something else, while keeping the initial distribution of revenue and (b) where things go in the long-run always changes. Social Security funding certainly did, as did the ACA’s individual mandate and Cadillac taxes.</p><p>This framing has already introduced more debate, for me at least. There’s concerns that exempting firms under 50 employees would be manipulated around, though Sanders introduces an exemption for the first $2 million in payroll. I’m not sure which is easier to game, though I’d guess it is easier to move money than bodies on the corporate side, but it’s all at risk until workplace classification is fixed. I’m curious to see if people defend an income tax under the assumption it makes M4A salient, like Social Security taxes have defended that program.</p><p><strong>Monopsony Protection</strong></p><p>But the thing I find most interesting is that the Warren’s Employer Medicare Contribution is, in my reading, a proactive move to check the power of employers. It is generally accepted that the amount employers pay for health care ends up being paid by their employees through lower salaries. But given the monopsony power of employers it’s not clear that employers will simply hand off that money to workers when M4A passes. They will very likely keep it for themselves.</p><p>Let’s make this more concrete. In his financing option, Sanders argues correctly that his payroll tax means “employers would pay a 7.5 percent payroll tax to help finance Medicare for All — just $3,750 — a savings of more than $9,000 a year for that employee.” That’s true, but I just don’t believe the employee will see that money. I think that $9,000 would go straight to bosses and owners. Through what mechanism would it get to workers? The threat of transitioning to another job, something that has been <a href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Declining-Entrepreneurship-Labor-Mobility-and-Business-Dynamism-A-Demand-Side-Approach.pdf">plummeting for years</a>? Competitive markets, even as industries become <a href="https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2018/papersandhandouts/824180819philipponhandout.pdf">more and more concentrated</a>? Demands from workers, even though this is one of the least salient and known costs workers will ever encounter? On what time-frame are we thinking, and will it be before the next election?</p><p>Warren’s plan shortcuts this by just using that money entirely for M4A, avoiding the political question of whether it will end up with workers or shareholders. All that money goes to health care, rather than half to health care and half to be fought over. In turn, workers pay less on their income taxes. In this sense it forces the money to actually be workers’ salaries, now just moved over towards the public. It’s an elegant solution for one of the more vexing problems here.</p><p>It also leaves the far more salient and clear payments workers make out of their own paychecks for health care free to be claimed by them directly. That itself would also be a challenge, but a much better one, and we’d prefer to move the battle over workers’ claiming these deferred wages to the more favorable ground. Setting up the political stage is what analysis is important for, and with this we can start having better discussions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61c2e0c54a0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Should the Green New Deal Repeat the Failures of Cap-and-Trade?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/second-time-as-farce-should-we-repeat-the-strategy-of-cap-and-trade-instead-of-a-green-new-deal-997f8cd7cb4f?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/997f8cd7cb4f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[green-new-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[obama]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cap-and-trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 Mar 2019 22:35:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-08T14:22:57.398Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*mDsagW92CftZBinB6UuIHQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://creativeaction.network/products/the-green-new-deal-by-jordan-johnson">Poster</a> by Jordan Johnson for Creative Action Network</figcaption></figure><p>We are always acting in light of our failures, either trying to evolve past them or break through them. The current push to address climate change is taking place in response of one of the biggest political failures of the past decade, the failure to pass cap-and-trade during President Obama’s first two years in office. The intense debate that has broken out over the Green New Deal between activists and the center, who all believe climate change is real and needs a response, is largely about this: can we simply repeat the strategy that cap-and-trade tried, or do we need something new? (When I say “cap-and-trade” I don’t mean the policy, which may or may not be a good thing for a Green New Deal to incorporate. As I will elaborate, I mean the way activists tried to pass cap-and-trade in 2009 to 2010.) You can’t “yes, and” the strategy used by cap-and-trade and the strategy envisioned by the Green New Deal, and resources, energy, time and money need to be allocated with some strategy in mind.</p><p>There’s been a wave of attacks against the Green New Deal not just by conservatives, but by people in the center supportive of climate action that is actually about this question. The ugliness of it is a function of the fight over who will get to determine what the strategy looks like. This question is opaque enough to be confusing to general readers. Is there really this much intensity about whether increased soil health should be on a climate agenda resolution? As <a href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/3/28/18283514/green-new-deal-climate-policy">Dave Roberts notes at Vox</a>, virtually all the policy criticism of the Green New Deal by the center (<em>it should highlight a carbon tax! It needs nuclear energy!</em>) are things that can easily be incorporated within a Green New Deal, and part of the Green New Deal is creating a mechanism for debating this. These attacks tend to duck the actual question we face.</p><h3>Kate Aronoff on Twitter</h3><p>@rortybomb how dare you deny the game-changing potential and momentum of a carbon pricing mechanism designed to appeal to congressional republicans, a strategy that has never been tried</p><p>So I’m happy to read <a href="https://niskanencenter.org/blog/an-open-letter-to-green-new-dealers/">An Open Letter to Green New Dealers</a>, by Jerry Taylor, the president of the Niskanen Center, which starts to put these cards on the table. Taylor’s piece is long. Woven through it is an argument for a political strategy that mirrors the one cap-and-trade used. For myself and many others like me, Taylor’s political case is so self-evidently wrong it isn’t worth trying, though I think it is worth discussing. First we need to know how we got here.</p><p><strong>Learning Two Lessons</strong></p><p>We call it Obamacare, but we could also call it Post-Hillarycare. The most important thing to know about the strategy for passing the Affordable Care Act is that the people who designed it and carried it out did so in light of the failure of President Clinton’s push to pass universal healthcare in the early 1990s. They were either directly involved or <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5921.html">studied</a> it. Everything odd about trying to enact the ACA makes sense viewed this way. President Obama leaving it to Congress to debate too long, the revenue-neutral battles with CBO and the mandate structure avoiding the idea it was a tax increase, getting industry on board and making pledges about keeping your health care: all of these make sense as people reacting to conventional theories about why President Clinton’s health care push failed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/1*42n6zF-l13XobjEhnRwkew.png" /><figcaption>Learning lessons from policy</figcaption></figure><p>I always understood that. But as Theda Skocpol found in her excellent 2013 review of how cap-and-trade failed, <a href="https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/skocpol_captrade_report_january_2013_0.pdf">Naming the Problem</a>, cap-and-trade strategists learned a different lesson from their most proximate experience, the acid rain amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1990. These amendments successfully created a cap-and-trade system that solved the problem. They learned that small, targeted, technical, market-based solutions to environmental problems can bring enough support from both business and moderate Republicans to be successful. Don’t make it big, and don’t call too much attention to it. The experience during the 2000s no doubt encouraged it, with Senator John McCain pushing for a price on carbon <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_Stewardship_Acts">alongside</a> Joe Lieberman.</p><p>Here is how Skocpol <a href="https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/skocpol_captrade_report_january_2013_0.pdf">described that cap-and-trade strategy</a>:</p><blockquote><em>“[the cap-and-trade] campaign was designed and conducted in an insider-grand-bargaining political style that, unbeknownst to its sponsors, was unlikely to succeed given fast-changing realities in U.S. partisan politics and governing institutions. What is more, this partially successful yet ultimately abortive attempt did much to provoke and mobilize fierce enemies and enhance their populist capacities and political clout for future battles. […] Environmentalists can no longer presume that most officials in Washington DC or in many non-coastal state capitols are looking for expert solutions to agreed-upon problems. Many politicians and officeholders now have powerful ideological and career-related reasons to shun environmentalists and other elites.”</em></blockquote><p>This strategy failed. McCain and every other moderate Republican bailed, and climate change action was mobilized against by every part of the movement conservative apparatus. Say what you will about the shortcomings of the Affordable Care Act or Dodd-Frank (trust me, I’ve heard it on the latter), but they passed. Cap-and-trade did not. There’s a weird dance around calling this a failure, as if clean energy investments in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act make up for this failure, but it was a failure. The movement was in a deep funk for the subsequent 8 years until some <a href="https://www.sunrisemovement.org/">young people</a> started occupying spaces demanding a Green New Deal, and now it is all anyone can talk about. I can understand why people in 2006 thought their cap-and-trade strategy could work, though it didn’t. I don’t understand why they think that in 2019.</p><p><strong>Two Visions Going Forward</strong></p><p>You have to read between the lines to see what Taylor is arguing as a political strategy, but it is all written out. I’ll summarize, using language from across his piece put into one paragraph (my bold added):</p><blockquote><em>“The biggest difficulty associated with tackling climate change is that reducing greenhouse gas emissions imposes very real, very transparent, and very immediate costs with the prospect of benefits that will only become apparent someday down the road. The most effective way to do that is bipartisanship. By putting both parties on the record in favor of cost imposition, you make it harder to run against one. Another useful way to break the traceability chain is to </em><strong><em>play down costs and render them (via clever policy design) opaque and difficult to detect.</em></strong><em> [A Green New Deal] confirm[s] — and raising to a whole new level — unwarranted fear that the cost of addressing climate change is staggeringly high. And no matter how you cut it, high costs do not a useful selling point make. </em><strong><em>Getting legislation through Congress is far better achieved by quiet persuasion done behind the scenes than by pounding the pulpit.</em></strong><em> Policy change is not reliably driven by electoral outcomes or public opinion. It is instead a product of </em><strong><em>intense insider activity</em></strong><em> to overcome profound status quo biases.</em><strong><em> [O]ne can imagine Republicans embracing some degree of meaningful climate action.</em></strong><em>”</em></blockquote><p>It is pretty funny Taylor makes you read 10,000 words before getting to the argument that clearly animated it from the beginning, that “one can imagine Republicans embracing some degree of meaningful climate action.” But there’s a clear theory of change here, one that sounds exactly like that from the 2009 cap-and-trade push.</p><p>Now let’s think of what a strategy that evolves past cap-and-trade looks like. Skocpol again, this is from 2013:</p><blockquote><em>[In 2009–2010] it is not clear that the [cap and trade strategists] even tried to spell out concrete benefits that new legislation could bring to ordinary families- because, in fact, the cap and trade bills debated in Congress were all about inter-organizational deals among corporations, unions, advocates, and industrial sectors, not about specific benefits that would be directly delivered to individual citizens. […]</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Reformers of all sorts who want to change energy production and use in the United States will have to publicly dramatize the challenges and offer understandable solutions that do not appear inimical to the everyday values and economic concerns of ordinary American families struggling in an era of stagnating incomes and contracting opportunities. Climate change warriors will have to look beyond elite maneuvers and find ways to address the values and interests of tens of millions of U.S. citizens. To counter fierce political opposition, reformers will have to build organizational networks across the country, and they will need to orchestrate sustained political efforts that stretch far beyond friendly Congressional offices, comfy board rooms, and posh retreats. Compromises with amenable business interests will still be necessary. But insider politics cannot carry the day on its own, apart from a broader movement pressing politicians for change.</em></blockquote><p>In almost every sense, the Green New Deal is a reaction to the failed strategy of cap-and-trade. Rather than try and hide what is happening through opaque structures and diffuse mechanisms, it takes it straight on as part of a broader vision of economic transformation. Instead of an insider strategy of peeling off the most moderate members of the Republican Party through a focus on their immediate influencers, it instead ties itself to an outside strategy of a broader social movement. Instead of viewing fighting climate change as a cost nobody wants to own, the Green New Deal instead looks at it as an opportunity to change our economy.</p><p><strong>Next Time Will Be Different!</strong></p><p>I have no idea if a Green New Deal strategy will work. But it is so self-evident to me that a second go at the cap-and-trade strategy would fail, a true second-time-as-farce utter failure, that it is hard for me to understand where its advocates like Taylor are coming from. But not everyone agrees. There’s a lot of debate about Obama’s legacy and the 2009–2010 period, and maybe now that things are different the outcome will be different. So let’s try to think about what could be different about trying this strategy going forward out here in 2019.</p><p><em>Conservatives</em></p><p>As extreme climate events become more common and the threat of global warming becomes more obvious, perhaps conservatives will move to take climate seriously. But I see no evidence that this is happening. Where would it even come from? Among the four key components of the conservative infrastructure, the donors, intellectuals, base and media, none of them have budged on the issue of climate in the past decade. The money that is even nominally about climate on the conservative side doesn’t bother to prioritize it; see Rebecca Leber’s <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2018/11/jay-faison-whats-the-real-deal-with-this-gop-megadonor-whos-claimed-he-wants-climate-action/">reporting</a> on Jay Faison.</p><p>We should also understand that if and when conservatives take global warming seriously there’s no reason to assume they move to technocratic, market-based solutions, instead of nationalism and fascism. Eric Levitz has <a href="http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/climate-science-invites-liberal-solutions-or-fascist-ones.html">a great piece</a> on this; there’s every reason to believe that as conservatives start to engage climate change they’ll want bigger walls, more military, and go even further into viewing international affairs as fundamentally zero-sum; this is, politely, not a worldview conducive to putting a social cost put on carbon.</p><p><em>Obama, 2009</em></p><p>For people who aren’t conservatives, blaming President Obama for failures in 2009–2010 tends to be associated with the further Left. But there are a lot of polished people high up in the environmental space who speak privately of Obama in ways that make dirtbag podcasters sound <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/9780062426970/audacity/">like Jonathan Chait</a>. “If only President Obama….” is common in the cap-and-trade space, often with the criticism that Obama could only do one big thing, and chose to do health care instead, leaving climate in the lurch.</p><p>Similarly, people blame the context of 2009 and 2010. 10 percent unemployment, bank bailouts, millions of foreclosures, the deepest recessions since the Great Depression. How can you ask people to be willing to pay more to prevent climate catastrophe decades out when they’ve lost their jobs and homes? Maybe next time will be different.</p><p>I’m sure these were relevant for 2009, but I have no idea how they will make next time different. How will “generic moderate Democrat TK” do better than Obama? President TK is still going to face the same challenges but even more mobilization against him or herself. There’s no evidence that a better economy is moderating opposition to climate action, certainly conservative infrastructure was fighting any price of carbon from being in budget negotiations throughout the mid-2010s, and it is possible that we’ll be in another recession when the next opportunity happens anyway.</p><p><em>Depolarization and Hiding the Ball</em></p><p>Maybe a new go of using a cap-and-trade strategy will do a better job of hiding the ball? The Tea Party was a very 2009 specific movement, and maybe it will be harder to mobilize against climate action if we do an even quieter job of hiding it. I don’t see how this is possible. The conservative media infrastructure will amplify anything, and money will move to mobilize against it no matter what. It’s really important to understand this wasn’t just the Tea Party and Rush Limbaugh, but the conservative think tank infrastructure as well. These are people who will absolutely find anything that implicitly tackles climate change and polarize it as if it was the full Green New Deal. Even if we come up with the “Nothing to See Here, Definitely not a Price on Carbon” Act and get moderate Republicans to play along, the conservative movement will find it and mobilize against it.</p><p><strong>A Broader Movement is Needed</strong></p><p>It would have been nice if a strategy based around influencing moderates to diffuse attention from what needs to be done worked a decade ago. But it did not. We are stuck here with figuring out where to go next, and that will involve a broader movement that incorporates more people with a better vision of what is possible. To do the same old failed thing again is the definition of insanity.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=997f8cd7cb4f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Do Not Understand Why the Left Should Want a Sovereign Wealth Fund]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/i-do-not-understand-why-the-left-should-want-a-sovereign-wealth-fund-a2e64e82126e?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a2e64e82126e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[left]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sovereign-wealth-funds]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Aug 2018 18:55:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-28T18:55:37.204Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I do not understand why the Left in a country like the United States should want to see the creation of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) as part of their agenda. It is not necessary for and probably one of the worst ways to go about securing the Left’s agenda. The problems of the United States do not stem from trying to manage resource booms, temporary trade surpluses, debt denominated outside our currency, or any of the traditional reasons for a SWF. Our problems are systemic, and a SWF could easily amplify them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/405/1*dKIM9kffnMuvPldWv3GW5A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Dream of the 90s is Alive in the Policy Left</figcaption></figure><p>Yet the idea continues to show up on the Left. It is in all the “market socialism” literature of the 1990s. Hillary Clinton almost endorsed such an idea in 2016. Economist Noah Smith <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-05/robot-takeover-matters-less-if-we-re-all-shareholders">brings it up often</a>. And now Matt Bruenig of People’s Policy Project has <a href="https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/projects/social-wealth-fund/">a big, well-designed launch for creating one</a>, calling it the American Solidarity Fund. Journalist Rachel Cohen asked me to comment for <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/08/28/social-wealth-fund-united-states/">her piece on the launch</a>, and I gave her some critical ones. I thought I’d write out why here.</p><p>I see three potential economic objectives of a SWF for the Left: it can increase spending, reduce inequality and the power of wealth owners, and regulate the activities of business. The SWF is not necessary for any of these three goals. Worse, a SWF is a particularly weak way to bring about these changes. So what? A lot of policies aren’t the best ones but they can build up a movement. But, third, there’s good reason to think that a SWF could easily backfire and make it harder to make progress on any of these goals. Since it is an unnecessary idea poorly deployed and prone to backfiring, it should not be a priority of the Left. Let’s take these in turn.</p><p><strong>Increased Spending</strong></p><p>The United States needs to spend more money. It needs to spend more on a variety of goals, from basic income to infrastructure to removing key spheres of life like health and education from the market. Let’s abstract from what form that spending should take. Bruenig’s American Solidarity Fund would pay out in a basic income, but we can also imagine the profits of a SWF going to free college, the expansion of Medicare or better infrastructure.</p><p>A SWF is a terrible way to try and increase spending in the United States. It introduces a new failure point in the otherwise straightforward mechanism of spending and requires extensive and unnecessary prefunding. Normally we increase taxes on income X to secure spending Y. Here we increase taxes on income X to buy assets Z whose profits then secure spending Y. What is the point of this extra step? There is no economic argument presented that argues you can raise revenues more effectively or efficiently this more complicated way.</p><p>It also requires saving in order to spend, postponing resources necessary to meet urgent, contemporary needs. Let’s take free public college, which costs <a href="https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000786-an-analysis-of-senator-bernie-sanderss-tax-and-transfer-proposals.pdf">about</a> $80 billion a year. We can do that by passing a financial transaction tax. But if we did this with a SWF, assuming a 5% returns on the fund, we’d need to first spend $1.6 trillion dollars buying up financial assets. We’d have to prefund 20 years of free college in order to give the very first person free college. You need to do this in order to secure the assets necessary to make the income necessary to get this spending. This problem presents itself no matter how to go about funding that $1.6 trillion dollars, be it printing money, taxing incomes or putting requirements on public firms. Why not spend that trillion and a half dollars in a useful way right now?</p><p>There are reasons you may want to prefund spending. Private companies may not be around in the future to pay out their pensions, hence we have a policy interest in them not working on a PAYGO mechanism. But we need to be very skeptical of applying that logic to the public sector. Why should we build programs assuming the government won’t be there in the future to tax the income to pay for them? It has major consequences. As J.W. Mason, Arjun Jayadev and Amanda Page-Hoongrajok <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/evolution-of-state-local-balance-sheets/">have found</a>, the increasing pressure to prefund spending has been a major constraint on state and local spending. Conservatives know this. When they wanted to weaken the Post Office, they <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-postal-service-s-problems-20151001-column.html#">forced</a> them to prefund all their future health care liabilities in a manner unique among government agencies.</p><p>Note that this can easily backfire. We have urgent needs for spending now, not later. If the Left comes to believe that spending needs to come from prefunded savings that weakens our overall position in securing programs. And in a period of depressed demand and secular stagnation the logic of building up savings to spend out of is even worse, and could make the macroeconomy even weaker.</p><p><strong>Decrease Inequality and the Power of Owners</strong></p><p>There is more than just spending more money. Another goal for the Left is reducing the massive inequality in income among the top, as well as reducing the power exercised by owners of financial wealth. Mileage varies on this, but economists increasingly <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w22897">believe</a> that shareholders themselves are strangling the economy, through a combination of short-term pressure to prioritize payments to owners over investments, and by concentrating industries and exercising oligopolistic pressure via large asset management holdings.</p><p>We have many legal and regulatory tools to change this besides a SWF. But a SWF is a particularly weak tool for dealing with this. By tying public goals to the profits of shareholders, it means that we have a vested public interest in ensuring that owners exercise even more control over the economy. Shareholders do not own firms. They are one of many groups in a large nexus of contracts, each exercising numerous mutual obligations and rewards. Since the 1980s, there’s been an intellectual hijacking arguing that shareholders own the firm and the firm should only work for them. It has lead to a large <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/the-shareholder-revolution-devours-its-children/">runup</a> in the size of dividends and stock buybacks. A SWF piggybacks on this awful development.</p><p>Let’s consider a SWF versus very high taxes on the rich. We know very high taxes on the rich reduce market income inequality, because they make it difficult for the rich to take money out of the firm at the top. Why is a board going to approve a superstar salary if 80 percent of it is taxed? This <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w17616">“third elasticity”</a> shows that taxes have a very important regulatory function in keeping the rich in check. But a SWF could backfire by pushing in the exact opposite direction. It would incentivize getting money out the top by tying it directly to not only dedicated funding of programs, but citizenship itself.</p><p>It’s not even clear how this fund would play out in terms of inequality. If we printed a trillion dollars and then went to the financial markets and bought a trillion dollars worth of stocks, it’s not clear how that punishes the financial sector. It would bid up the value of stocks, and leave the previous holders with more cash. It does not own or even interact with privately-held wealth. You couldn’t buy share in Koch Industries, for instance, since there aren’t any shares. A significant amount of financial wealth claims aren’t traded publicly.</p><p><strong>Regulate the Economy</strong></p><p>The last major goal is to change the behavior of corporate America. Corporations treat their workers poorly, ignore stakeholders, and raise costs to all Americans. Whether it is raising the minimum wage or dealing with climate change, corporate America is an obstacle to reform.</p><p>Yet a SWF is one of the worst ways to deal with this. There was a period where I’d go to meetings about responsible investing, people who wanted public pension funds to invest in companies that treated their workers better or took proactive measures on the environment. And there was always a moment where someone stood up and said “why should we do this when hedge funds and private equity promise us better returns?” All the answers about stakeholders and broader commitments and “#actually, it’s more profitable” wouldn’t really cover it. And indeed, public pension funds go into hedge funds and can’t even bring transformation of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/business/gretchen-morgenson-pension-funds-fees.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Ffair-game&amp;action=click&amp;contentCollection=business&amp;region=stream&amp;module=stream_unit&amp;version=latest&amp;contentPlacement=2&amp;pgtype=collection&amp;_r=0">their fee structure</a>, much less a broader social change.</p><p>This whole conflict is built into the concept of “market socialism.” We want shareholders to ruthlessly extract profits, but here for the public, yet we also want the viciousness of market relations subjected to the broader good. Approaching this as shareholders is probably the worst point of contact to try and fix this essential conflict.</p><p>The “profits” from the SWF don’t fall from the sky. They are the result of decisions society makes about how the fruits of economic relationships are distributed. The value of a SWF is just the sum total of future corporate profits, and if we are worried about those profits being too large the SWF nudges us in the wrong direction.</p><p>This could easily backfire. Imagine someone looking at their phone and seeing that they will get a $3,000 citizen’s dividend. Then they look at the news and see that a major strike is about to break out at a large public company. A labor representative says that workers think that owners are taking too much of the profits and workers deserve a raise. Do you think that person is more or less likely to support the strike, given we’ve worked so hard to identify their interests with owners?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*WIoc_OHoWgF2D3sYiieCnQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>By tying citizenship and economic security directly to the power of shareholders we are working in exactly the wrong direction. It isn’t necessary, and it isn’t even an effective way of accomplishing our goals. So why all the effort?</p><p><em>(Special thanks to </em><a href="http://jwmason.org/"><em>J.W. Mason</em></a><em> for discussing this issue.)</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a2e64e82126e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Democrats are Moving Left, and the Real Work is Just Starting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/the-democrats-are-moving-left-and-the-real-work-is-just-starting-e05fc298be31?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e05fc298be31</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[progressive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jun 2018 18:08:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-05T18:14:45.893Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Do Democrats running for office for the first time have their act together when it comes to economics? Writer Ryan Cooper is skeptical, <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/775583/democratic-party-flying-blind-economics">writing</a> at <em>The Week </em>that “The Democratic Party is flying blind on economics.” He interviewed eight candidates for office and found that while there was “a strong consensus on social justice issues like gay marriage, transgender rights, and police brutality […] the party as such makes virtually no attempt to put forward a consistent party line on economic issues.”</p><p>Cooper’s concerns derive from the candidates’ lack of knowledge or agenda to deal with a future recession. Cooper believes that the “greatest political-economic risk for Democrats” is taking power in a recession like President Obama did. He finds that the candidates he talks to are unfamiliar with “the argument for potential stimulus to prioritize employment over deficits” and blames the Democratic leadership for that. While Democratic leadership have embraced becoming “academic jargon-wielding crusaders for the downtrodden” on “social justice politics”, there has “been no such thorough process on political economy.”</p><p>I do not think this is true. My experience with actual campaigns on the ground is similar to that of political scientist Theda Skocpol, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/opinion/democrats-populist-campaign-midterm-trump.html">who told</a> David Leonhardt “I just don’t see a huge set of divisions in the Democratic Party. They’re all talking about economic issues.”</p><p>Before I start I want to emphasize that this isn’t a debate over whether the Democrats are #actually Good or #actually Bad now. The important thing to do is to correctly understand the vulnerabilities that an economic agenda is going to face in the future, and if we are still debating whether anything is happening we will miss both the forest and the trees at the same time.</p><p>Is it true that the Democrats do not “put forward a consistent party line on economic issues”? I went to the websites of each of the candidates and just starting copying and pasting phrases from their issue page into a spreadsheet. I also <a href="https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/11/19/1163009/-Daily-Kos-Elections-presidential-results-by-congressional-district-for-the-2012-2008-elections">added</a> how much of the vote Hillary Clinton got in the district. I included Liz Watson, who beat a candidate Cooper interviewed in his piece. Let me know if you can see any consistency here:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RzUMyUMyUuI0-32wvDBG9w.png" /></figure><p>See any patterns? Every candidate but one has expanding Medicare on their website, either as a public option or as single-payer. All but one has a living wage, with the majority explicitly stating $15 an hour as the goal. Some version of free college, most notably the “debt-free” model, was represented across the board.</p><p>I grabbed these since they are worlds I know best and were easy to find. But the left flank was aggressive across the board. There was no demonizing immigrants. There was a consistent focus on jobs. But it goes even beyond that. Let’s stick with Liz Watson, since she defeated the more progressive candidate in IN-9, where Hillary only got 34% of the vote. She beat the progressive candidate, so she must be pretty squishy, right? Liz Watson <a href="https://lizforindiana.com/school-plan/">states</a> “On the whole, however, charter schools are a slippery slope into a two-tiered system of education. That’s why, as a policy matter, I oppose any further expansion of charter schools.” That’s a start.</p><p>When it comes to Social Security, Watson <a href="https://lizforindiana.com/strengthening-social-security-and-medicare/">states that</a> “If you elect me to Congress, I will (1) Oppose raising the retirement age. (2) Support cost of living increases in benefits and oppose any reductions.” What should we do then? “We can maintain and increase benefits by adopting Senator Bernie Sanders’ plan to ‘scrap the cap’ that limits what higher-income workers contribute through payroll taxes, so that everyone pays the same percentage of their income toward Social Security.” This is a world away from Barack Obama, who famously failed to get Republicans to help him cut Social Security.</p><p><strong>Awkward Politics of Recession Busting</strong></p><p>Cooper is focused on the candidates’ lack of full employment knowledge. But it is sitting right there. Each candidate was focused on good jobs, even with unemployment under 4 percent. Wages haven’t risen as unemployment continues to fall. (One of my favorite parts of Jobs Day is the writer Malcolm Harris <a href="https://twitter.com/BigMeanInternet/status/992396192075132935">taunting</a> economic commentators on nonexistent wage growth using Marx. He’s not wrong.) So the jobs and wages focus really is a commitment to addressing full employment and its current weaknesses, just not using that language.</p><p>Recession busting as a political policy is awkward since it is about describing something you may do if something else happens in the future. Candidates are talking about doing infrastructure now, rather than doing it further into the future. Indeed, if infrastructure is such a good idea, why not do it now rather than later? (This is a version of Matt Bruenig’s <a href="https://peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/03/22/some-notes-on-federal-job-guarantee-proposals/">critique</a> of providing care and climate work through a job guarantee, since the provisioning will only fully be available in recessions.) Can you imagine the chant?</p><blockquote><strong>What do we want!</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Good infrastructure jobs!</blockquote><blockquote><strong>When do we want it?</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Not right now, the projects aren’t good enough to justify doing them at full employment. We want them when their NPV goes positive from low rates and unused capacity!</blockquote><p>I actually love this chant, it genuinely speaks to me, and we should be compiling such projects for the future. But it’s not a good chant.</p><p>And though I would love it if candidates worked <a href="http://rooseveltinstitute.org/expanding-monetary-policy-toolkit/">setting long-term interest rates and coordinating QE purchases with Treasury debt issuances on the maturity side</a> into their speeches, I think that’s even a worse way to get a crowd excited. Keep talking about jobs, and the role the public can play in creating good ones, because joblessness is the metric that people will experience the next recession through.</p><p><strong>The Actual Debate</strong></p><p>The Democrats are moving left on economics. In which ways and to what extent is an open question. And that doesn’t mean Democrats are “good”, or that everything is solved, or anything else, really. But it does mean the actual debate and analysis we need is very different than before.</p><p>Contra Ryan Cooper, I’m more worried about the Democrats taking power with the economy booming, and inflation and interest rates taking off. The Democrats really didn’t attack the notion of debt itself while opposing the Trump Tax Cuts. They instead attacked what it was being used for. But if rates start to rise it will be harder to keep this line. Note that this may or may not happen; we may be in for decades of secular stagnation like Japan. But if we aren’t this will be a major challenge. The biggest problem will be raising revenues. Democrats are not yet ready to ask everyone to pay more in taxes for more services. Though taxing the rich properly would get us far, Democrats will need to get to broader taxation if they want the most ambitious agenda.</p><p>They will also have a problem with prioritization. There is so much moving that the ordering matters quite a bit. If Trump had gone with tax cuts first, removing the individual mandate, it was more likely health care repeal would have happened. (Indeed, this is part of why conservatives are considering one last push on ACA repeal this year.) I have no clue on how to manage the prioritization and ordering, a debate that will have to happen with many stakeholders. But we should be discussing this now.</p><p>There’s also the issues of scale and tradeoffs. Is it better to rapidly expand Medicare as a public option at nearly zero cost, or take on the difficult challenge of mandatorily moving all people with private insurance into Medicare via single-payer? Should we be providing more public services consistently and at high-quality, or providing more public jobs, which will come and go with unemployment? There are tensions here that will become clearer as the debate moves on.</p><p>There’s more, no doubt. The left is moving the debate. Unfortunately it means that the work is going to get harder. But that is the best kind of problems to have.</p><p>For fun, when it comes to candidates saying bad macroeconomic things while running for office, I offer:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WiIhi8E6Hy0gvapO3r3L_A.jpeg" /><figcaption>The picture is from 1936 and Hoover Dam, well after this speech.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Now, what I should like to do is to reduce, in so far as possible, the problem of our national finances to the terms of a family budget […] For over two years, my friends, our Federal Government has experienced unprecedented deficits, in spite of increased taxes. […] A powerful cause contributing to economic disaster has been this inexcusable fiscal policy and the obscurity and uncertainty that have attended and grown out of it. There it remains for all to see — a veritable cancer in the body politic and economic.</em></p><ul><li>Franklin Delano Roosevelt, <a href="https://fdrlibrary.org/budget">Campaign Address on the Federal Budget</a>, Forbes Field, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 19, 1932.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e05fc298be31" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Are There No Good Conservative Critiques of Trump’s Unified Government?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/why-are-there-no-good-conservative-critiques-of-trumps-unified-government-e849663fed10?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e849663fed10</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trump-administration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conservatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2018 01:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-06T03:16:17.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*YJG8yekLXmN7QARdhnoy7g.png" /><figcaption>word vomit, or maybe the other kind</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Obama Prelude</strong></p><p>I had the “Obama in 2009” word vomit recently. I was talking with several people on the left involved in politics in the early Great Recession, and Larry Summers’<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/"> new paper</a> on regional inequality came up. Someone joked that Summers should get the chance to direct hundreds of billions of dollars towards longer-term, widely dispersed infrastructure investments someday. Everyone laughed, because Summers was the one who blocked progressive attempts for making the composition of the 2009 stimulus focus more on longer-term infrastructure investments, rather than timely, temporary tax cuts created under the assumption of a rapid recovery.</p><p>And then it happened. Someone brought up how better off the health care situation would have been with a public option. Before I knew it, I was adding “they destroyed the lives of five million families, ripped out of their homes while they did nothing to fight foreclosures, and then wondered why nobody wanted to vote for them in the midterms.” You often see this with progressives who went through 2009. (There’s a<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/obamas-legacy-of-impunity-for-torture/555578/"> version happening now</a> over Obama’s refusal to investigate Bush’s torture regime, now that those tied to it are taking senior positions under Trump.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*3-IewYc_O7unK8_obiLbRg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Arthur Delaney and Ryan Grim wrote some of the best articles on the left-liberal fights in 2009–2010, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/08/power-struggle-inside-the_n_529884.html">here is one</a> on the failure of the public option</figcaption></figure><p>I’m not bringing this up to litigate it (again). The point, instead, is that there was a critical conversation among left-liberals about what happening under united Democratic government. This wasn’t from some adolescent need to complain, or navel-gazing purity politics, as it is sometimes portrayed. Instead, it was the left trying to articulate the tradeoffs being made, the choices, decisions and potential consequences of how Obama and the Democrats were governing. It forced people to articulate what they were thinking and how they justified their answers in a public manner. It also gave those on the left a sense of how power worked, and how it didn’t, lessons they are incorporating now as Democrats look to 2020.</p><p><strong>So…How’s Your Unified Conservative Governance?</strong></p><p>We are now 14 months into united conservative governance. Conservatives came into power with a clear plan to rip out Obama’s achievements and overhaul the whole modern state. Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell planned on running everything through reconciliation. They also had a President who would sign anything. So how is it going?</p><p>I’d like to know, because I can’t find any actual debate of what has gone right and wrong in their plans. I’m still thinking through this point, and since this could be misread I want to state it clearly. There’s a lot about how bad Trump is. There’s also a ton of bitching and moaning about Republicans messing things up. But I see very little among the network of conservative publications and institutions in terms of strategic discussions of how their conservative agenda is unfolding as it meets political power. This is notable as liberals usually think of the conservative infrastructure as disciplined and powerful. I think this lack of discussion has consequences, because the implosion of conservative policy is just as important of a story to our moment as anything Trump does.</p><p>It’s tough to prove something doesn’t exist. I only read so much, and maybe I’m missing it. Though as a quick example to what I’m getting at, if you read conservatives you might be surprised to learn that they control the entire federal government. Chris Hayes<a href="https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/vox/the-ezra-klein-show/e/51128685"> noted</a> that if you turn on Fox News you’d have no clue that conservatives run anything, much less everything, since the coverage is just the rage-inducing culture war battle of the day. The Right seems far more focused on campus hecklers or teenagers demanding not to be shot rather than on evaluating their own exercise of political power.</p><p><strong>Arm’s Length Coverage</strong></p><p>One way I see this is with good coverage that describes what is happening, but doesn’t seem to engage with why events are unfolding the way they are and how power could be exercised otherwise. Peter Suderman had an interesting piece on how Trump and conservatives had<a href="/service/about:blank"> started replacing</a> Obamacare without repealing it. “For better and for worse, and with little coherent vision at work, they are making Obamacare their own. […] And it’s a dynamic that in the long run puts Republicans — and everyone who supports more market-driven health care — at a disadvantage relative to their more engaged Democratic opponents.” You’d be forgiven for not realizing Suderman has spent the last decade of his adult life fighting against President Obama’s expansion of health care by this for-better-or-worse nonchalant description.</p><p>Indeed, what even happened with health care repeal? Is anyone on the Right really trying to figure out what went wrong in a public venue? When the public option failed in 2010 left media covered the ins-and-outs of it in<a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/08/power-struggle-inside-the_n_529884.html"> great detail</a>. Joe Lieberman is<a href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/joe_lieberman_lets_not_make_a.html"> not in good standing</a> with liberals for his refusal to support a Medicare buy-in at 55, which is what he previously endorsed. Do conservatives blame John McCain for killing the “skinny repeal” in a last-minute thumbs down vote just as much? Did they even like skinny repeal?</p><p>There’s a lot of other examples of what I’m trying to describe from the time period, such as this 2010 Ryan Lizza piece in the New Yorker on the<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza?currentPage=all"> failure of cap-and-trade</a>. It made tough points (“But on climate change Obama grew timid and gave up, leaving the dysfunctional Senate to figure out the issue on its own”) while also providing details on how the process failed in multiple ways, all grounded in the political agency of real people. I don’t see any conservatives talking about their agenda in this way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*Vo01cph51YT2LfzdwGThiQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>What was the point of scrubbing all those pans if you can’t do a number on Medicaid?</figcaption></figure><p>Or take Yuval Levin<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/budget-deal-and-republican-agenda-yuval-levin/"> describing how</a> there won’t be an ambitious reconciliation bill this year. “I think it becomes fairly likely that there will be no 2019 reconciliation bill and so no welfare-reform bill and no return to health care. […] I suspect that’s a better bet for Democrats than for Republicans, but it looks like we’ll find out.” The whole conservative movement was pushing for a hit in 2018 on social insurance through reconciliation. The tax bill removed the individual mandate, which would have taken away the negative headline on coverage loss from the CBO. Yet this chance is gone, and it is hard to understand why this is the case. Who failed, and how could they have done something differently? Again, maybe people are talking about this in venues I don’t know. But if they aren’t, why don’t conservatives care?</p><p><strong>Deeper Examples — Omnibus and Essential Health Benefits</strong></p><p>Let’s consider two detailed examples of how conservative arguments are detached from the realities of governing or just ignoring them. If these are too wonky just skip to the end, because there are reasons to debate this.</p><p>The National Review described the recent spending bill as<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/omnibus-spending-bill-disgrace-federal-budget/"> a “disgrace.”</a> But there seems to be very little to help understand how this happened in their writeup, or how things could have gone differently. Who failed, how? Were conservative spending goals never achievable? Is the tradeoff of more general spending for more defense spending a bad one, or one that was unnecessary for a military buildup? They do yell a lot about spending, but they yell in the same tone as they complain about anything. There’s little sense of tradeoffs, tensions, or exercises of power.</p><p>One thing that jumps out at me is this complaint: “On health care, the hope of deregulating the individual insurance market to counteract rising premiums has been dashed.” This critique is particularly telling, because it shows the National Review doesn’t understand or is intentionally ignoring how the Omnibus must work. Proposals to deregulate insurance coverage could only have passed as part of a reconciliation, and even then it wasn’t clear it could.</p><p>The idea that you could remove “essential health benefits” through reconciliation, only requiring 50 votes, was something floated by a handful of conservatives in 2017. Yuval Levin, in a widely circulated March 2017<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/whats-next-republicans-health-care-yuval-levin/"> piece</a> on how conservatives would approach health care, note that the proposals “seem to be functions of a similar process of imaginary negotiation with an imaginary Senate parliamentarian” and imagined ways to remove benefits through the reconciliation process. The Senate parliamentarian later<a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/mike-lee-senate-parliamentarian-told-me-its-possible-to-push-harder-on-repealing-obamacare-regulations"> said</a> “it’s possible” to Senator Mike Lee that this was an option (as if the parliamentarian could dismiss something out of hand without text or a bill), and it became a focal point for conservatives. McConnell didn’t proceed with this approach at the time, and it is absurd to think it would have passed through the Omnibus. Was that really a reasonable demand for conservatives to make here? To the extent that the National Review sets the debate agenda amongst conservatives, to me they are just complaining about anything, rather than discussing actual strategy.</p><p><strong>Deeper Examples — Death of a Conservative Dodd-Frank Talking Point</strong></p><p>Or sometimes their whole argument collapses and nobody seems to care. A major Treasury report recently concluded that Dodd-Frank’s new powers, which allow the FDIC to takeover and wind down a financial firm like Lehman Brothers (orderly liquidation authority, or OLA), should simply be tweaked instead of removed. This was a power that could have been destroyed in reconciliation since there’s a budgetary cost (<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/18/congress-is-considering-an-extremely-dangerous-idea-almost-nobody-has-heard-of/?utm_term=.78572e558a57">for made-up reasons</a>), and doing it through reconciliation was a strategy that conservatives had built towards over years.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgfycat.com%2Fifr%2FUnequaledEmptyFlyingsquirrel&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgfycat.com%2FUnequaledEmptyFlyingsquirrel&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fthumbs.gfycat.com%2FUnequaledEmptyFlyingsquirrel-size_restricted.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=gfycat" width="1280" height="720" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/af1e6fc0c4eea102d855b1402672aa6f/href">https://medium.com/media/af1e6fc0c4eea102d855b1402672aa6f/href</a></iframe><p>I spent a lot of time and energy fighting a repeal of OLA. Here are public pieces in<a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/3/15143230/financial-regulations-dodd-frank-repeal-funding-consumer-protection"> Vox</a> and<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/opinion/the-gop-plan-to-unleash-wall-street.html"> the New York Times</a> I wrote saying we needed to be prepared for it, but a lot more work took place behind the scenes. I remember panicked calls after the election discussing the reconciliation process and how it would play out with Dodd-Frank, figuring out how to amplify bipartisan validators who could argue the power was important (here’s<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/these-rules-could-stop-the-next-big-financial-crisis-dont-get-rid-of-them/2017/05/25/91984350-338a-11e7-b373-418f6849a004_story.html?utm_term=.a600fc9b4246"> a Paul Volcker and Shelia Bair op-ed</a> arguing not to end OLA, to show how many people were worried), and how to point out the weaknesses of conservative arguments and alternatives.</p><p>Attacking OLA has been a central obsession of the institutional Right over the past eight years, and this feature centered their criticism of Dodd-Frank as a regime of permanent bailouts. Let’s give you a quick taste of the rhetoric around OLA from the conservative infrastructure.<a href="https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2017-04-24_financial_choice_act_of_2017_comprehensive_summary_final.pdf"> House Committee on Financial Services:</a> “a recipe for more bailouts.”<a href="https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba09-wstate-jtaylor-20130515.pdf"> John Taylor:</a> “by definition, be a bailout.”<a href="https://www.city-journal.org/html/too-convoluted-succeed-13602.html"> Manhattan Institute:</a> “Dodd-Frank enshrined too big to fail”<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/rules-bailouts-nicole-gelinas/"> and</a> “is still a bailout.”<a href="http://www.aei.org/publication/too-big-to-ignore-the-future-of-bailouts-and-dodd-frank-after-the-2012-election/"> American Enterprise Institute:</a> “OLA as a bailout vehicle.”<a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/state-attorneys-general-challenge-title-ii-dodd-frank-ammon-simon/#"> Competitive Enterprise Institute:</a> “[OLA is] unprecedented and unconstitutional.”</p><p>But now that’s over, and OLA will remain. Can anyone explain what happened? The handful of<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-treasury-still-needs-to-bid-adios-to-ola-1520189245"> reactions</a> I can find are largely the same talking old points regurgitated, with little analysis of how they got there. Don’t blame President Trump, either — not removing OLA is from Mnuchin and Treasury, well outside the President’s chaos window, and I sincerely believe this would have happened under any Republican President. Were their ideas actually unworkable, which is what I thought, and they just refuse to admit it in public? Do they even care about policy specifics, or was the point always to multiply the ways to attack Dodd-Frank and complain about President Obama?</p><p>Left-liberal policy disagreements in the Obama-era, especially around Secretary Geithner and the financial sector as well as the macroeconomy, were loud and clear. In 2009 to 2010, during united Democratic governance, you could tune into websites from the Baseline Scenario to Paul Krugman’s blog to see the policy debates and plans get hammered out in real-time. You could read <a href="http://nymag.com/news/politics/paul-krugman-2011-5/">coverage from journalists</a> about how there were real stakes to these battles. I see little equivalent on the Right now. The policy debates that do happen on the Right seem to occur in a vacuum, people spitballing about their bugaboos, detached from what is actually happening.</p><p><strong>What Actually Passed and What is Actually Imploding</strong></p><p>Yes, I know there’s been a ton written by conservatives about Trump <em>himself</em>. That is just a conservative spin on the freak show that disgusts and captivates everyone. Yet the strategy for Ryan and the rest of the conservative movement was to simply to go around the President. As Grover Norquist<a href="https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/2/13/1064417/-Grover-Norquist-on-the-GOP-candidates-All-we-need-is-someone-who-can-handle-a-pen"> said</a> in 2012, “We just need a president to sign this stuff. We don’t need someone to think it up or design it. […] Pick a Republican with enough working digits to handle a pen to become president of the United States. This is a change for Republicans: the House and Senate doing the work with the president signing bills. His job is to be captain of the team, to sign the legislation that has already been prepared.” Trump was ready to sign a bill hitting income support, subsidy cuts for the ACA, and Medicaid. Why couldn’t Ryan and McConnell pull it off?</p><p>Indeed, Trump’s recent “taking charge” (as Ross Douthat<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/opinion/trump-president-tillerson-pompeo.html"> puts it</a>) communicates that Trump gave Ryan a year to do his agenda, and now Trump can move on trade, immigration and foreign policy on his own. Trump is different than the elite Republican positions on all three, holding ones more in line with their base, and Trump is building a new team to carry out his vision. The DC take on this is that Trump now feels comfortable in the job. But stepping back, it seems to me that part of the change is that Ryan failed to accomplish his big agenda, and it is time to move to new things.</p><p>Beyond Trump, there are two reasons this lack of conversation matters. First, we aren’t just seeing the chaos of the Trump administration to date. We are also seeing that the Republicans ultimately don’t have the ability to pass the agenda that they spent the past eight years, and really the past several decades, arguing for. This is a different implosion that is no less consequential. If they can’t ultimately move their ideas to the point where their own intellectuals can find interesting things to say about their failures, that means we should understand their whole project to be far weaker than they admit.</p><p>Second, an agenda has clearly passed — tax cuts for the rich, stuffing the judiciary and administration with deregulators, and actions against civil rights and towards more punitive immigration enforcement. Put another way, what we’ve seen from the first 14 months is that the actors who matter are the business interests and the base, and that the mediating conservative infrastructure simply doesn’t matter much, either as actors or chroniclers. For all the talk about brilliant policy minds on the Right who want to reform the state, the real brilliance and energy in their agenda is in not investigating Equifax, giving corporations tax cuts for fissuring their workforce, unleashing ICE and dismantling the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.</p><p>At best, the Right’s policy voices are all ideas and no consequences. More likely, they form a kind of entertainment industry that only is consequential to the extent it channels business interests or mass resentment. My understanding is that some of the analysis of what has gone wrong is being done in quiet rooms, led by the money people and the lobbyists. But if all the real analysis is done in private, and its goals are only to boost a balance sheet or channel talk radio, why should we read conservatives?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e849663fed10" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Getting Beyond Getting Government Out of the Way: A Review of The Captured Economy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/getting-beyond-getting-government-out-of-the-way-a-review-of-the-captured-economy-cffbdeaa15b0?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cffbdeaa15b0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[the-captured-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brink-lindsey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[steve-teles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jan 2018 00:30:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-04T00:58:29.196Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/368/1*q_mcOK1wH69-ktf2S66sFw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Imagine responding to our current political moment by thinking the opposition to Trump should be rooted in libertarianism. It’s the argument put forward in <em>The Captured Economy</em> (<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-captured-economy-9780190627768?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">TCE</a>), by Brink Lindsey and Steve Teles. In it, they want to build a political project around challenging inequality by attacking regressive regulations, or “government policies [that] restrict and distort market competition through entry barriers and subsidies.” These regressive regulations are generally “government policies that create rents in the form of entry barriers or subsidies.” Their book discusses four key categories: financial regulations, intellectual property, occupational licensing, and land use.</p><p>These topics are fine as far they go, but the book wants to be more than the sum of a handful of policy chapters. TCE wants to make two major statements. First, they argue that regressive regulations are central to the story of how high-end inequality has grown and why the economy struggles overall. They aren’t focused on regulations that create rents for those at the bottom, like the minimum wage. Instead, they note that the “main rent-creating policies that have emerged and grown in recent decades have a much tighter focus on helping out those at the top.” Their second statement is that they argue that a focus on regressive regulations can create a new interesting political framework, scrambling the left and right into new ways of thinking that can tackle both our economic problems and our political gridlock.</p><p>Being the area I know best, I turned first to the chapter on financial reform. The argument there was a mess, but it was a mess in a very productive way, one that showed why the whole book isn’t up for the task it sets up for itself. Though I share their interest on several of these issues, (1) the book fails to convince that regressive regulations are behind what they discuss and (2) the concept of regressive regulations won’t do any good in helping our politics, or even answering the big questions we face.</p><p><strong>Did FDIC Cause Financialization?</strong></p><p>In <em>The Captured Economy</em> (TCE), Lindsey and Teles argue that one of the substantial causes of financialization is the “large and destabilizing subsidies” from the government to the financial sector, which in turn have negative distributional and allocative effects. They acknowledge that there were “sins of omission” in finance, where the government simply didn’t act to stop abuses — a topic that goes beyond the scope of the book.</p><p>Instead, Lindsey and Teles focus on sins of “commission,” identifying three such regressive regulations. First, there’s a “regulatory subsidy” for mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a creation that was “invented, developed and nurtured by the” government for the quasi-public government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Then, there are two “main explicit subsidies.” The second consists of an “implicit safety net” of emergency lending and bailouts that “has extended far beyond the traditional banks.” This Too Big to Fail (TBTF) subsidy allowed finance to borrow artificially low interest rates before the crisis and thus grow far too big. The final is a poorly priced and too expansive guarantee for depositors. “Deposit insurance [acted] to subsidize heavy reliance on deposit to fund banking operations.”</p><p>Let’s take these backwards. It is very difficult to tell a story of financialization in which deposits play an increasingly dominant role in the financial sector over the past 30 years, or one where they were a major driver of losses in the housing crash. If this was the case, we’d expect to see deposits growing as a share of total funds and that their losses would be higher on average from housing losses. Neither is correct.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/946/1*Qlfoa3ck4foZ-MhdfnbivA.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 1. Source: Financial Accounts of the United States, Author’s Calculations</figcaption></figure><p>One of the key things about the changes to the financial sector since the 1980s has been the relative decline of traditional banking as a core focus. Figure 1 shows that deposits held by banks, which have an “explicit subsidy” TCE identifies, falling from 60 percent of GDP in the mid-century period, to closer to 40 to 45 percent. It also shows short-term liabilities outside traditional deposits — shadow banking financial instruments like repurchase agreements, commercial paper, and money market mutual funds — rapidly expanding, overtaking deposits in 1997. More broadly, the percent of financial assets held by depository banks declined from 40 percent in the mid-century period to 20 percent after 1980. It’s difficult to tell a story of financialization that results from the increasing power of depositors subsidized through regressive regulation when their relative presence is in decline.</p><p>Deposit institutions’ mortgage losses were small compared to growing mortgage securitization. One estimate by Mark Zandi, consistent with many others analysts, has depository institutions realizing losses of 5.8 percent of mortgage debt from 2006 to 2012 (<a href="https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2013-06-26-Resurrection-of-RMBS.pdf">Zandi 2011</a>). This is higher than the 3.7 percent losses of the GSEs, but much lower than the 20.3 percent losses of private-label mortgage securities. If financialization is about depositors not disciplining the balance sheets of their banks, why were their losses so much less than those in the capital markets?</p><p>Meanwhile, it is difficult to tell a story where the second explicit subsidy, a TBTF subsidy that allows the biggest players to borrow more cheaply, accounts for the growth of the financial sector before the crisis. Studies pre-crisis differed, but in general they weren’t looking at the shadow banking market where the risk was. Two notable studies post-crisis find no substantial subsidy in the United States before the crisis, though they find them increasing dramatically from 2009 to 2011, before decreasing significantly (<a href="http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/c3.pdf">IMF 2014</a>, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf">GAO 2014</a>). One quick sanity check here: If banks take on more risks than they would have otherwise because of a TBTF subsidy, this would increase the risks equity holders face, since equity takes the first loss. If this is an important mechanism, then TBTF equity should have flat or increasing levels of risks in the buildup to the crisis. We see the opposite.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1006/1*iTxa--drcqZ3L_tu5d3X3A.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 2. Source: Yahoo Finance, Author’s Calculations</figcaption></figure><p>Figure 2 shows the covariance of stock prices with the overall market — a common financial measure for equity risk known as “beta” — for four of the largest banks: Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. A higher number reflects that a firm moves more with aggregate market changes, and thus contains more risk. We can see that all four of these banks’ beta decline dramatically from the 1990s through the crisis. They have numbers less than 1, implying a very safe institution. This says that even equity holders didn’t see the banks as risky. Note that this number skyrockets during the the aftermath of the crisis, when the TBTF subsidy was real.</p><p>It’s not clear why it is necessary to pin the financial crisis on the government. There is limited cognitive bandwidth, and spending time on these issues means less for the real problems. It is probably counterproductive; weaker FDIC insurance would have meant more credit intermediation in the shadow banking sector, where the real, documented problems were. But if you are going this route, you should be able to point to actions that matches the severity of the problem. I do not believe these subsidies are a driver of any major financial sector trends. If they even exist, they are at no level to explain the vast growth in the nature and profitability of the financial sector over the past 30 years.</p><p><strong>Quod Erat Demonstrandum</strong></p><p>According to the latest research (<a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr561.pdf">Johnson 2017</a>), the recent growth of occupational licensing causes “the number of annual interstate migrants [to be] reduced by 93,600” and “explains 6 percent of the decline in interstate migration and 2 percent of the decline in job-to-job flows over this time period.” That’s percent, not percentage points, so it doesn’t explain 98 percent of the decline in job-to-job flow — and the labor market is about 160 million people. I’ll leave it to you to determine if that’s a crisis, but how does occupational licensing drive the 1 percent? Is that about owners and bosses making out like bandits?</p><p>TCE argues it is because 1 percent incomes are driven by licensing. One of their key arguments is that while people “may think of Warren Buffett and Marc Zuckerberg when they envision the top 1 percent, it is actually the surgeon who replaced their hip, the dentist who performed their last root canal, or the lawyer who handled their divorce who are the more typical representatives of that elite demographic.”</p><p>There’s no source for this, because it is obviously untrue. Figure 3 is a reprint from the best IRS data we have on occupations within the top 1 percent (<a href="https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf">Bakija 2012</a>). Medical professionals (15.7 percent) and lawyers (8.4 percent) together are less than executives in non-finance (31 percent), and even less with those executives combined with workers in finance (13.9 percent). Doctors and lawyers also haven’t increased their presence in the top 1 percent over this time period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g9j0K-5ZprFeLWaI97i4gg.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 3. Reprinted from <a href="https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf">Bakija et al 2012</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>But even if we wanted to focus on lawyers and doctors, why would we focus on their licensing as a driver of their high-end incomes? TCE seems to argue that there are high-end rents in these occupations, and, as we know, these occupations have licensing, so therefore the licensing must be the driver of the rents. (<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/78573/qed-motherfucker">QED motherfucker.</a>)</p><p>That doesn’t seem correct, and they don’t provide sourcing to really argue it. They note that it is “seemingly paradoxical” that “the United States has far more lawyers per capita than other countries” yet high-end lawyers make a substantial premium over other countries. But why wouldn’t we look at the activities of lawyers as the driver? There’s been a <a href="https://associatesmind.com/2013/08/19/historical-growth-rate-of-lawyers-in-usa-chart/">giant increase</a> in the supply of lawyers since the 1980s, yet their presence in the top 1 percent is unchanged. And this makes sense, as top-end lawyers are taken from only the top 5, 12, or 20 law schools. More lawyers at the margins won’t compete away these high-end rents.</p><p>For medicine, they argue that “while failing to serve the interests of patients well, medical licensing is very effective in boosting physicians’ incomes.” Their source on medical pay just determines that doctors are paid more in the U.S. than elsewhere (<a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0204">Laugesen 2011</a>), concluding that it is driven by higher fees but not by physician supply. They note that our supply of doctors per population is higher than the U.K. and about the same as Canada and Germany. Which, of course, makes sense; those countries don’t control their health care costs by having weaker licensing or having a very high population of doctors, but stronger pricing controls. (Ironically, one hypothesis their source has is that “High physician fees in the United States may reflect the cost of attracting skilled candidates to medicine in a society with a relatively more skewed income distribution.”)</p><p><strong>Regulatory Subsidies and Rents Have a Question-Begging Baseline Problem</strong></p><p>Even if the numbers don’t add up, maybe a focus on regressive regulations is a useful political tool? Lindsey and Teles have had a major victory already. In their book, they argue that “the lax rules for allowing class action lawsuits [creates] heavy dependence on high-priced legal expertise to navigate the artificial and gratuitous complexities of the legal environment.” This places lawyers in the top 1 percent, a regressive regulation that allows them to collect rents. The Republicans, perhaps after reading a copy of TCE, <a href="https://www.americanbanker.com/news/senate-repeals-cfpb-arbitration-rule-in-win-for-financial-institutions">voted</a> to repeal a rule from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) that removed mandatory arbitration from financial products, giving consumers the option for a class action lawsuit. That was a win for TCE’s arguments against rents. Yet I’d argue the opposite, however, as these are rents for the financial sector. Mandatory arbitration incentivizes financial institutions to nickle-and-dime their consumers. It removes consumers’ rights as citizens to go to the courts. It gives finance more power when they already abuse the power they do have.</p><p>Whatever you make of that debate, does calling one side or the other “rents” help clarify it? I’d note that the focus on regressive regulations doesn’t actually clarify anything. I’d argue that for all the major problems we face now, the notion of emphasizing economic freedom and getting the government out of regressive regulations will do virtually no analytical work. “Get rid of the rents” (or even “economic freedom”) is meaningless here, because the question revolves around how we structure markets in the first place.</p><p>Think of some of the major debates in financial regulations: Should financial transaction be subject to a tax? Should private equity income be taxed as labor income? Should derivatives go to the front of the line in bankruptcy? Should there be a special legal regime for the failure of a financial firm outside bankruptcy? What should be the safe harbor for someone who makes a subprime mortgage that fails? Should there be a dedicated consumer regulator with power over unfair and deceptive practices? Should firms with access to deposit insurance be limited in their size or scope of activities? How much transparency should be mandated in markets for derivatives and hedge funds?</p><p>TCE describes the changes in regulatory structure during the 1980s and 1990s as a way to inhibit competitions and put up barriers. But the arguments for them at the time said that not doing them were what was really inhibiting competition. TCE argues, as traditional banks did at the time, that the lax oversight of money market mutual funds and mortgage-backed securities were a form of “regulatory subsidy.” Yet at the time <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/american-finance-for-the-21st-century/">proponents argued</a> that tighter regulations on these new instruments would have benefitted traditional banking as its own form of regulatory subsidy.</p><p>Think of the major economic problems we faced in the recent decade: Is the wave of mergers and acquisitions consistent with the consumer welfare standard or antitrust, and do we need to go beyond that standard? Should public options like Medicare use its footprint to drive down health care costs? What is appropriate monetary and fiscal policy in a low-interest rate environment? How we should analyze and tackle market power? Or consider all the big questions of the Trump era: What should be the tax base? At the margins, who should be able to claim income from profits and who should claim income from wages? (Given that the top 1 percent <a href="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/distribution-business-income-august-2016/t16-0184-sources-flow-through-business">takes home</a> 50 percent of pass-through business income and that progressive taxation has <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/latest-debate-over-taxing-rich-misses-one-crucial-fact/">kept</a> top incomes in check in the past, the tax code is oddly missing from the book.) Should ISPs be indifferent to the source of their traffic? Should there be a mandate to purchase private health care? If all lower corporate taxes do is drive up share buybacks is that good or bad?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*3QupbGaAd3751mchLtP_vQ.gif" /><figcaption>This fella showed up in a search for “cute dog begging the question.” You deserve a treat if you read this far. (<a href="https://giphy.com/gifs/vidme-dog-cute-please-R6nV6C5uC16Fy">Source</a>.)</figcaption></figure><p>All of these have an intractable “baseline problem.” Each side of the question provides a benefit for some actors and a barrier for others. To try and judge them in terms of just getting rid of the rents and subsidies won’t get us very far. The concept of economic liberty can do no clarifying work here, and these answers aren’t just a matter of technocratic tinkering. The structuring of our markets — embedded in the laws, norms, institutions, and enforcement — determine how economic activity is exercised, and there’s no pre-state liberty baseline to draw upon. One could say that the answer is whatever involves the least amount of government, but that’s just generic anti-statist libertarianism, precisely what this book wants to transcend.</p><p>TCE argues that this agenda allows liberalism to “show that it can once again be a genuine fighting faith rather than an anemic justification for the status quo.” Yet, if one is around Washington D.C., one has heard this agenda for a while. You can feel the lanyard thick on your neck at some think tank luncheon; you can hear the polite chatter at the posh townhome of some #NeverTrump lobbyist. We live in a world characterized by inequality, weak dynamism, secular stagnation, high concentration, insecurity, large capital profits and market power. To the extent the book tries to tie their agenda, whatever you make of it, to these problems, it bounces off. To respond to both Trump and this moment, we are going to need more than just the same old “getting government out of the way.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cffbdeaa15b0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Medicare for All, Budget Reconciliation, and a “Get One Reform Free” Coupon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/medicare-for-all-budget-reconciliation-and-a-get-one-reform-free-coupon-459d14408344?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/459d14408344</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[single-payer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bernie-sanders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[obamacare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medicare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Sep 2017 22:40:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-15T01:16:03.335Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OGaEgEX4KO16X4f02N0jQg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Medicare for All Launch (Photo via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/publiccitizen/37224639155/in/photolist-YHq1kn-YujtRR-Y67xc9-YqTUS1-XpWAsA-YFDZs4-XpdcZy-Ym2Hpj-Y2jLoj-YnTtUx-YmAqwa-XWGJ2w-YxCRkn-YxCQez-YxCNJa-YxCM96-YxCKTk-XgPowd-XiPVkp-XgPn67-XgPmwb-XgPm23-XgPkvy-XgPjnS-XgPigJ-XgPhfL-XgPgof-XgPfsh-XiPMyT-XiPLzD-XiPKGg-XiPJU4-XiPJcc-YxCx7t-YxCwHn-YxCwmk-YxCvUD-YxCvr4-XgP6Kh-XgP5Mf-Yk8GnD-Yk8FXv-Yk8F5P-YfYFbC-YfYEtf-YfYDvo-YfYC3o-YfYB7W-XWAn6L-Yfnwod">Public Citizen</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Senator Bernie Sanders released the latest version of his Medicare for All bill Wednesday. But this time he has 16 Democratic co-sponsors, including many Senators with their eyes on running for President in 2020. There’s been a lot written already about the bill, both on its political and policy frameworks.</p><p>The Medicare for All discussion Sanders unleashed is currently focused on aspirational goal-setting and overall politics, about how this lets Democrats demonstrate what they stand for while laying out markers for reform. Harold Meyerson <a href="http://prospect.org/article/genius-bernies-gradualism">describes</a> the plan as “aspirational — setting a long-term goal that will both motivate Democratic and progressive activists and clarify the Democrats’ purpose to an electorate” and as something that people can “support it in piecemeal fashion.” More telling is conservative writer Ben Shapiro, who <a href="https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/907960231509950464">tweeted</a> Single-Payer in the debate means “now, ‘corrections’ to Obamacare look moderate.”</p><p>Given the goal-setting, it seems in poor form to discuss tactics here. But there’s an element that I think is important as it all unfolds. I want to examine Medicare for All in light of budget reconciliation, and potential lessons we can learn from the recent effort by Republicans to repeal the ACA through that process. There are two types of Medicare for All in discussion, and one will be significantly easier to pass through reconciliation as a backup, while also providing a free bonus at the same time. It’ll be important to develop both.</p><p><strong>Two Types of Medicare for All</strong></p><p>The policy for Medicare for All has formed along two approaches. The first would be to allow everyone, including businesses, to buy into Medicare. Medicare has better prices and networks due to its size and scale, and that pricing power and scale would be more attractive for many people and employers. We could call this approach Medicare for More perhaps, but I’ll call it AmeriCare here, named after the pre-ACA approach Rep. Pete Stark proposed, which Dylan Matthews describes at length <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/2/3/10899790/single-payer-americare">here</a>. Several proposals along these lines have been floated recently, including from health care analysts <a href="https://shadowproof.com/2017/07/24/medical-insurance-care-national-single-payer-bill-mica/">Jon Walker</a> and <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/06/trumpcare-obamacare-repeal-ahca-single-payer">Timothy Faust</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/07/murphy-democrats-rising-star-healthcare-bernie-sanders-242455">Senator Chris Murphy</a>.</p><p>The second approach would be to move all people directly onto a universal, Medicare-like plan legislatively over a short transition period. Let’s call this Single Payer here. This is what Bernie Sanders’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/13/16296656/bernie-sanders-single-payer">new bill would do</a> over a four-year timeline.</p><p>It’s easy to list out the pros and cons of each approach. The first relies on competition to move people to public insurance; it’s easy to imagine years out many people will still have employer insurance, even if that insurance is cheaper and covers more to compete with Medicare. The disruption is voluntary and slow compared to Single Payer. Though Sanders’s plan would involve less spending on health care <em>overall</em>, moving that much private spending to the public payrolls would involve large tax increases. How those taxes are structured matters politically, as well as whether those with employer coverage would be able to secure raises as a result of businesses no longer carrying those health care costs. These are good debates to have; Josh Barro gives one such overview <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/bernie-sanders-medicare-for-all-democrats-single-payer-2017-9">here</a>.</p><p>I want to add one element to the debate: how budget reconciliation plays out. Picture it is 2025, and Democrats finally control all branches of government again. However their control of Senate seats is in the mid-50s. The operational way to pass Medicare for All will be through reconciliation, the budgetary procedure that allows the Senate to avoid the 60-vote threshold for filibuster. (Even if the filibuster is removed between now and then, this analysis will still matter even if it isn’t strictly binding.)</p><p>Reconciliation allows changes if they are budgetary and not regulatory, as long as the budgets match up. There was some debate about how much the ACA could have passed through reconciliation in 2010. The ACA passed with 60 votes in the Senate and was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamacare-was-not-passed-using-budget-reconciliation/2016/01/22/e72d321a-bed5-11e5-98c8-7fab78677d51_story.html?utm_term=.6cb2d3b0f03d">cleaned up with an additional reconciliation bill</a> shortly afterwards. The GOP took control this year assuming their whole agenda on health care, <a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/3/15143230/financial-regulations-dodd-frank-repeal-funding-consumer-protection">financial reform</a> and taxes would pass through reconciliation, so it wouldn’t need a single Democratic vote in the Senate. This has expanded how much you can push reconciliation to do policy work, and it is a one-way ratchet. When Democrats take power they’ll also need to use this process to enact their agenda, as the GOP is currently doing.</p><p><strong>Get One Free</strong></p><p>If AmeriCare comes up for a vote under reconciliation, the political problem will be how to spend all the savings. The CBO will analyze the proposal and basically say “Congratulations, you have $16 billion a year from your savings to spend, for free. What would you like to spend it on?” The CBO has <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44890">scored</a> an aggressive public option as savings money and done so <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/stark_letter-hr_5808-07-22.pdf">consistently</a>, on the order of $158 billion over ten years. It does this by lowering premiums overall, which means the ACA spends less on subsidies. But it also means more employers take advantage of it and pay people less through tax-free benefits, which increases the amount taxes collected. Combine it with some other easy budgetary reforms to pass through reconciliation, like having Medicare negotiate lower drug prices, which alone <a href="http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45250-Health_Programs_Proposals.pdf">would save</a> about $11 billion a year, and we can picture an overall savings of $30 billion a year.</p><p>What could you spend $30 billion dollars a year on? According to <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/doing-more-for-our-children/">the Century Foundation</a>, you could give every child under six a $2,500 child allowance, lifting 3.2 million children out of poverty, for less than that. $30 billion is <a href="http://www.crfb.org/blogs/sanderss-paid-family-leave-plan-explained">about the cost</a> of the FAMILY Act, which gives every worker 12 weeks of annual paid family and medical leave at 66 percent of their monthly wages. You could probably <a href="https://www.savethechildrenactionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Child-Care-Plan-HRC-BD-edits.pdf">get a really good start</a> on universal child-care with $30 billion a year. It’s like a “get one free” coupon, but instead of cheap pizza you get a reform that helps build a more secure and just society. If you must, you could use it to reduce taxes or the debt to secure center-right votes. (But you really shouldn’t.) This money would be <em>for free</em>, a magic pony but very real, with no taxes necessary to justify what it is used for.</p><p>This was exactly the Republican’s logic with trying to repeal the Affordable Care Act. By cutting Medicaid and subsidies so aggressively, they could in turn <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/7/14844362/ahca-ryancare-trumpcare-tax-cut-rich">cut taxes on rich people</a> “for free” as a happy base-supporting side product of taking away health care. The cuts in taxes were so aggressive it wasn’t clear which came first, taking away health care or cutting taxes. Spending this free money on tax cuts served an overarching tactical political goal, of reducing the revenue baseline to do even more tax cuts later. Cutting taxes on the rich is politically unpopular, even to the point that Fox host Tucker Carlson was <a href="http://www.salon.com/2017/03/09/watch-tucker-carlson-slams-paul-ryan-for-health-care-bill-that-will-send-more-money-to-richest-americans/">calling it out</a> on air. Providing an additional, needed public good will not be unpopular.</p><p><strong>Single Payer Reconciliation Fights</strong></p><p>If Sanders’s Single Payer comes up for a vote under reconciliation, the political problem would be exactly reversed: How do you raise taxes enough? Dean Baker <a href="http://democracyjournal.org/arguments/can-we-pay-for-single-payer/">just gave a quick estimate</a> that we need $1.8 trillion a year to fill the gap; let’s run with that. CBO will analyze Single Payer and say, “You need to raise $1.8 trillion a year to pass this through reconciliation. How will you raise taxes to cover this?” Then the battle becomes what kind of taxes, and at what rate, will be able to cover that spending.</p><p>Another lesson from the GOP failure is that reconciliation makes the costs very salient. When the CBO estimated that 15 to 20 million people would lose their health care it was both clear what the stakes were and it mobilized people quickly. As Congress bounces back and forth with the CBO on what kind of higher taxes are necessary to support this new level of spending, awareness of tax increases will become very high among voters.</p><p>Will it matter? <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/13/16300744/medicare-for-all-single-payer-public-opinion-polls">I don’t think we know</a>. We saw in <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colorado-single-payer-vote_us_581cdf8be4b0d9ce6fbbf369">Colorado</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/12/22/7427117/single-payer-vermont-shumlin">Vermont</a> Single Payer efforts fail in part because of the sticker shock for a new health care system. When people say they are willing to pay more to get health care, polling shows they usually aren’t thinking in the <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/4/14/11421744/bernie-sanders-tax-revolution">scale</a> that Single Payer would require.</p><p>Speed will also be another consideration. There will be, as there always is, a backlog of reforms needing addressing. Reconciliation itself will likely need to address other reforms as well. An effort that has the institutional budgetary wind at its back, where the problem is how much money Congress gets to spend for free, will work faster and quicker than the institutional problem of how to juggle a large new tax.</p><p>It is necessary that Democrats run on Medicare for All, both to demonstrate what they stand for and make clear how they will concretely benefit the lives of potential voters. The movement should, as well, develop plans on both tracks of that slogan. If the effort to make Single Payer happen flounders on tax hikes, having an aggressive Medicare for More public option plan worked out, one that will be easy to pass using budgetary process and open up space for an additional reform, will be critical as a back-up option.</p><p>(Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/TheBudgetGuy">Stan Collender</a> for discussing the reconciliation process and health care with me.)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=459d14408344" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Four Lessons from the Health Care Repeal Collapse]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/four-lessons-from-the-health-care-repeal-collapse-dd065c5f9b49?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd065c5f9b49</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[republican-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paul-ryan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[obamacare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Mar 2017 05:23:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-27T06:20:58.208Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believed the hype. At the beginning of this year I thought President Trump would sign a reconciliation bill gutting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by the time Congress took their February recess, the GOP’s own set schedule.</p><p>They didn’t. It turned out the GOP’s policy intellectual class were the ones that needed catastrophic coverage, not the country, as the failure of their plan was so ultimate and total it still surprises me. It’s an amazing moment for our country. Health care is now the public’s responsibility. We build forward, and we aren’t going back. Everyone should learn some lessons, and here’s how I’m updating my thoughts so far.</p><p><strong>This is the GOP’s Fault</strong></p><p>This is not President Trump’s fault. A President Rubio or President Jeb! would have had the same exact problems with the same exact outcome. This was driven by Congress, and it derives from the initial strategy of “repeal and delay” collapsing immediately and the backup plan not being tested.</p><p>Don’t lose sight that the original plan was repeal the ACA’s funding with a two year delay to get their ducks in order and threaten the Democrats with a collapse of the health care markets. This is the reconciliation bill they sent to President Obama in 2016 and was the plan for this year as well. This is pure debt ceiling logic — threaten chaos over the entire economy to try and force concessions from your enemies and solidarity among your side — that didn’t work particularly well for the GOP with Obama in charge, and would have been lethal to them while they were in charge.</p><p>I didn’t expect the eventual bill to be a mess that appeased no one because I assumed there was a concrete bill. But, as Mark Schmitt <a href="http://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/3/24/15055636/aca-repeal-angry">notes</a> in a righteously angry piece, “Despite years to prepare, repeal supporters did none of that work.” Instead it was meant to be developed over two years during the delay period. But that could never have been done without scaring too many people. Once they actually had to try to make a real plan there was no appetite for it. Perhaps Trump attacked the ACA too much from the left, but the GOP had been doing that for years. There was no plan, and the attempt to force one was dangerous and reckless.</p><p><strong>Activism Works</strong></p><p>I thought activism worked anyway. But I worried that, with polarization and geographic stratification, it would work less. The majorities in 2009 were much larger, but they were in many districts that leaned Republican and had centrist members. And Tea Party activism ultimately failed to stop the ACA from passing. Since then, hard ideological movement to the right and a massive funding network post-Citizens United had me worried that the Right would happily march off an electoral cliff to take away health care from millions of people.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*ynIhj9oe66FpkLZT2Lslrg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/109799466@N06/">Joe Piette</a></figcaption></figure><p>Everyone is blaming the House Freedom Caucus, but as Matt Fuller <a href="https://twitter.com/MEPFuller/status/846043386012483584">notes</a> the more notable event would have been the 30 moderate GOP members voting no if the vote had happened. Since the moderates chose not to support the bill, the GOP was forced to rely more on the hard-liners, who didn’t show up. Activists got to those moderates, and they got them by forcing them to accept continuity with the ACA, to acknowledge the coverage numbers mattered, and by getting them to defend Medicaid.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FxeafI0fMVLI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DxeafI0fMVLI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FxeafI0fMVLI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110b9d713f4694beacb101e6d04eeb70/href">https://medium.com/media/110b9d713f4694beacb101e6d04eeb70/href</a></iframe><p>They did that by demonstrating how these programs benefited them. News coverage used to focus on people who didn’t like the ACA; suddenly we got to see the stories of people who depend on it, the people whose lives were saved. It made the benefits far clearer than they had been before, and made it harder to go back.</p><p><strong>Universalism Works</strong></p><p>Hell yeah it does. I already thought this but it is humbling to see the concept reveal its awesome power.</p><p>I assumed no matter what else happened with the exchanges, Medicaid was going to get trashed. Gene Sperling was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/opinion/the-quiet-war-on-medicaid.html?_r=0">warning</a> out the door about Medicaid’s vulnerabilities, and the federal-state combo made it easy to do funding cuts that obscured their savagery of those changes. When I learned how Medicaid cuts would be turned into a first round of high-end tax cuts, ones that would prime the pump for permanent high-end tax cuts later, I thought it was in even more trouble. Before the election I even <a href="https://medium.com/@rortybomb/would-progressive-economics-win-over-trumps-white-working-class-voters-43f78cc7f005#.2h1untlbw">wrote</a> that the targeted universal nature of the Medicaid expansion wouldn’t be enough to get people to defend it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*0z_K6aLcRa4St9L2Tba7SA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>“This my shit, bow down bitches”</em></figcaption></figure><p>I was wrong, and the expansion of the program to people above poverty saved it. We need more work on this dynamic, but it looks like the merging of an anti-poverty program to a broader security measure for working class people triggers several defensive mechanisms. One is that it creates a broader coalition of defense, groups that might be bitterly opposed in many other ways but have a united interest in saving this program. Two is that it is transformed away from a “poor program for poor people” to a broader program in the popular imagination, one that becomes easier for the political class to defend. That’s unfair it has to come to that to get defense, but life is unfair. Another is that more influential, institutional networks are created around and rely on Medicaid as it is expanded, causing the defensive mechanism Paul Pierson <a href="http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/welfare-state/pierson_politics.pdf">identified</a> as halting the process of retrenchment. Clearly, the Republicans weren’t ready to go to war with Republican governors over starving their states and their medical constituencies of health care funding.</p><p><strong>Wonks Get Lost in Their Echo Chambers</strong></p><p>I don’t do health care, but like many others I was obsessed with it in past months, reading everything I could find. It’s crazy to come into an argument that’s already going, and seeing conservatives who were supposed to be the intellectuals convince themselves of the most absurd statements. Take this, from AEI’s “Improving Health and Health Care: An Agenda for Reform,” a defining <a href="http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Improving-Health-and-Health-Care-online.pdf">statement</a> by 10 policy writers:</p><blockquote>The central focus of the ACA and, in fact, the central focus of many health care reform efforts has been to decrease the number of Americans without health insurance protection. […] But this near-exclusive focus on health insurance is also ironic because, in truth, consumers generally are not all that interested in health insurance. What they care about is better health and access to care. […] that means promotion of more direct and more flexible methods for purchasing services [like health savings accounts].</blockquote><p>What has happened where you have “in truth, consumers generally are not all that interested in health insurance” as a defining health care statement that you use to guide the entire Republican establishment? From the sensible observation that bad insurance isn’t worth very much, they take the lesson that insurance <em>itself</em> doesn’t matter and people are indifferent between having insurance and self-funding health savings accounts.</p><p>Was this meant to tell the GOP that they can ignore a bad CBO analysis? I can tell you that out in the real world people are very sensitive to whether they have insurance, and programs designed to be tax giveaways to the professional class don’t make up the difference.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FSj_9CiNkkn4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DSj_9CiNkkn4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FSj_9CiNkkn4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fc4ea7cc63f050e0b59179ba0641dac9/href">https://medium.com/media/fc4ea7cc63f050e0b59179ba0641dac9/href</a></iframe><p>How did Republicans end up in this position where ideas that should function as a railing and guide end up speaking to nobody? McKay Coppins <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/nobody-knew-governing-could-be-so-complicated/520824/">wrote</a> that recent changes have led to “a caucus full of conservatives with excellent ratings from the Heritage Foundation, and no idea how to whip a vote” in Congress. The DC conservative policy apparatus has followed a similar path. It have also become accountable only to itself, ideological donors, polarizing media, and a race against their own extreme instincts. It’s the dynamic David Frum diagnosed in his classic Waterloo <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/the-republican-waterloo/520833/">essay</a>, but among the intellectual class as well.</p><p>So I’m taking the advice to make sure I never get too lost in my own cleverness and esoteric debates like the Right has. The goal is to address the needs of real people fighting on the ground with useful solutions, not parlor games with other ideologues. That’s good advice for us all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd065c5f9b49" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Banking Leverage Requirements Are Not Enough]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rortybomb/why-banking-leverage-requirements-are-not-enough-c54ebb434b42?source=rss-29da4352a659------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c54ebb434b42</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mike Konczal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Mar 2017 17:46:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-16T19:30:56.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why Banking Leverage Requirements Are Not Enough</h3><p>We’re going to hear a lot more from Republicans about how a single, simple 10 percent leverage requirement can replace much of what Dodd-Frank does. This idea is central to the Republican CHOICE Act, and it was also reiterated recently in FDIC Vice-Chairman Thomas Hoenig’s plan for <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmar1317a.pdf">regulatory relief</a>.</p><p>Hoenig’s plan calls for Congress to remove risk-weighted capital requirements, stress testing, and failure resolution planning, replacing all of the above with a 10 percent capital requirement and internal restructuring. (The internal restructuring is incorrectly described as a return to Glass-Steagall [1].)</p><p>In practice, a 10 percent leverage ratio by itself would be far too low to do what they want it to do; the Minnesota Fed recently <a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/news-releases/minneapolis-fed-releases-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail">argued</a> for a 15 percent leverage ratio alongside increasing the additional risk-weighted ratio to 23.5 percent as a start. But it’s important to understand the problems with it in theory.</p><p>This debate has gone back and forth in the financial reform community. To summarize broadly, there are leverage ratios, which are equity divided by assets, and there are risk-weighted capital ratios, which are equity divided by assets adjusted for perceived riskiness. Some argue we need both; others argue that only having a leverage requirement is enough, or even better.</p><p>I think it’s important to <a href="http://rooseveltinstitute.org/regulate_the_entire_balance_sheet/">touch all three parts</a> of the balance sheet, and with three targets we need three tools: Risk-weighting, leverage, and liquidity (the ability to make payments in a crunch) requirements need to go hand-in-hand. I think abandoning liquidity requirements is especially dangerous. Others, like Aaron Klein of Brookings, use a <a href="https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/risk-weights-or-leverage-ratio-we-need-both">chopsticks</a> metaphor to describe the balance.</p><p>I think it might be easier to explain this using a simple two-dimensional chart. This will be broad and require some assumptions, but I think those assumptions are clear and easy to make.[2] Let’s give it a try.</p><p><strong>Two Choices a Bank Makes</strong></p><p>A bank has to make two choices given the size of a portfolio. It has to choose the riskiness of the portfolio, and it has to choose the leverage of that portfolio, or the mix of how it funds itself with equity and debt. Let’s assume a strictly increasing relationship between them; all else equal, more risk means you should be funded with more equity to absorb losses. Stakeholders — which include owners of the firm, deposit and deposit-like holders, and society as a whole — want to ensure that these levels match up. (I’m assuming away liquidity risks, but this same exact argument will exist in another dimension based on a banks’ ability to make payments in a credit crisis.)</p><p>Let’s draw where the capital level matches the riskiness level as a straight line. Above it, in the green safe zone, there’s more capital funding than the minimum we’d like to see for the level of risk. Below it, in the red danger zone, there is more risk than desirable for a level of capital, or less capital for a level of risk.</p><figure><img alt="capital_leverage_graphs.001" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/499/0*Q3YvFCn2eh0i3AC0.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s also assume that, at the margins, banks would like to be below the line, but stakeholders would like them to be above the line. Banks benefit more from bigger bets with leverage. Because of information asymmetries, taxes, and other deviations from Modigliani-Miller, cost of capital is slightly increasing with higher capital eating into profits, and as such for any level of risk banks would like to fund it more with debt. Because of their dispersed nature and desire to hold informationally insensitive private money, stakeholders such as depositors and capital markets are bad at disciplining firms to stay at the line. But the cost of failures has negative externalities for the economy as a whole in the form of contagion, panics, and runs. As a result, banks would like to wander into the red zone, and capital regulations need to keep them in or at the green zone.</p><p>One ideal is to have capital requirements that reflect the risks of the portfolio. If the risks increase, so do the capital requirements. Capital requirements would thus be the line itself, as shown in the above graphic. This is the idea behind risk-weighting.</p><p><strong>Leverage in the Zone</strong></p><p>What does a leverage requirement look like in this scenario? A leverage requirement is a capital level that exists independent of the risks of the portfolio. It measures the size of assets, and weights all assets equally. Let’s draw such a line here.</p><figure><img alt="capital_bank_graph.002" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/506/0*7b27meZ9l5ilrb-c.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see in the red-circled area, the leverage requirement permits a bank to have more risk than the capital structure would find appropriate.</p><p>If we assume that the banks want some level of risk above their capital, that they want to move some amount of space into the red zone given an initial spot on the line, they can always do that by moving straight to the right. They do this by increasing the riskiness, but not the value, of their assets. They could, say, replace a less risky, highly rated instrument with one that is far more risky, one that A+ rated instrument that has a risk-weight of 20% with a BB+ that would have a risk-weight of 100% or one with a CCC+ that would have a risk-weight of 150%, all without changing their leverage ratio. A useful <a href="https://twitter.com/dsquareddigest/status/842437011684352004">example</a> from Daniel Davies is they can simply use leverage to buy into structures that are themselves highly leveraged, like a CDO, choosing a much higher level of risk that doesn’t get reflected in the balance sheet. They can try and hide risk off-balance sheet and in other ways that don’t show up in asset size; trying to tackle what goes in the denominator of a leverage ratio has been a big international fight.</p><p>Under the Hoenig/CHOICE Act leverage requirement regime, banks can always take on more risk, move to right, no matter where the leverage requirement is set. The whole point of regulations is to reduce or eliminate this movement, but with only this requirement in place, the bank can, in theory, choose to always go further into the red.</p><p><strong>Combined Together</strong></p><p>Nevertheless, as a special case of risk-weighted capital requirements, leverage requirements have two important advantages that make them an essential component of regulation.</p><figure><img alt="capital_leverage_graphs.003" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/496/0*yETLlyRBbx4MlF3e.jpeg" /></figure><p>Risk-weighted requirements are flawed, and there’s reason to believe they are flawed in one direction. While we think regulatory risk-weighting gives us the dotted line above, chances are the actual line where the bank is shifted to the down and right. Risk-weighting is pro-cyclical, and can also impact the underlying dynamics of the instruments themselves. It is a poor substitute when there is a market-wide correction of a class of assets, where for an asset class there’s actually much more risk involved. This is modeled here as a shift of the curve to the right. Risk-weighted requirements can also create situations in which banks game them, massaging their portfolios to mimic a safer construction of assets for a level of risk, here a shift of the curve down. As David Davies <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/facts-and-rubbish-about-bank-leverage-ratios-2c16bc7e57a5#.6r5rvrbyt">notes</a>, this gaming is found less in the literature than you’d think and leverage ratios are also suspect to gaming, but it is a relevant concern. In both scenarios, we think we are in the green but we are actually in the red. Regulators can take action against this by requiring analyses like stress tests, but this approach is still imperfect.</p><p>All else being equal, it’s also a good assumption that low levels of equity become more dangerous the less there is. Less equity means less of a chance for corrective measures. It means failure can happen quicker and with less preparation. It’s also more dangerous the further into the red you go. We model this in the graphic above by making the danger zone redder as equity approaches zero or goes further to the right.</p><p>In short, you can see that risk-weighting is dangerous because it can lead us to believe we are more safe than we are, and much of the associated risk is in a deep red danger zone.</p><p>But what if we add a leverage requirement?</p><figure><img alt="capital_leverage_graphics.001" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/517/0*J8we3UXlwEeFgXTq.jpeg" /></figure><p>A leverage requirement is more binding, as it requires less estimation of risk. This is because it simply ignores the risks of the underlying portfolio. While risk-weighting can be game to ignore the level of risk in a portfolio, a leverage requirement ignores them by construction. However, when combined with a regulatory instrument that does account for risk, both components become more powerful than they are by themselves. They each remove the worst case scenario of the other, preventing them from going deeper into the red. This is why Dodd-Frank incorporates both, and why we shouldn’t assume that a leverage requirement by itself would be harder on the banks or safer for any of us.</p><p>[1] To see why they aren’t the same, compare Hoenig’s plan with Glass-Steagall below. Hoenig keeps the financial holding company structure created under Gramm-Leach-Bliley rather than break apart the firms. Instead, Hoenig forces new holding companies at the intermediate level to be separately capitalized and resolvable.</p><figure><img alt="hoenig_charts.001" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/841/0*zJGmegts9grnEetV.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hoenig’s plan appears to abandon single point of entry, where a failure is handled through an FDIC interjection at the overall holding company level. Hoenig would instead focus on making banks go through bankruptcy at multiple independent points at the intermediate holding levels. It’s not clear why that would work better or be desirable. Much of the argument for Glass-Steagall derives from less complexity and breaking up political power. Abandoning the current work done on a single focal point of resolution to put multiple points at the intermediate level would likely increase complexity, and it’s not clear how this would weaken the political power of the firm itself.</p><p>[2] It’s okay if you don’t think this is real economics. Milton Friedman infamously <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1990/markowitz-lecture.pdf">said</a> Markowitz’s CAPM two-dimensional risk-reward box, the basis of portfolio theory, wasn’t real economics either. (Ketchup economics forever.)</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://rooseveltinstitute.org/24756-2/"><em>Roosevelt Institute</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c54ebb434b42" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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