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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dan Smith on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Dan Smith on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Dan Smith on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Debunking “Who is EndWokeness?”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis/debunking-who-is-endwokeness-887cbbb0487d?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Smith]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Aug 2024 13:57:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-19T13:57:31.892Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Debunking Ryan McBeth’s claim that right-wing Twitter account @EndWokeness is secretly operated by Jack Posobiec.</h4><p>“Disinformation (Noun): false information deliberately […] spread […] in order to influence public opinion…”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bVmcusF5h9HcdSBGY737Aw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zZeZFs5KLQ">“Who is End Wokeness?” Youtube Video</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Introduction</h4><p>On July 19, Ryan McBeth posted <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zZeZFs5KLQ">a video to his YouTube channel titled “Who is End Wokeness?”</a> Within two weeks, this video had gained well over 800,000 views (becoming his fourth most viewed video) and was rapidly spread across social media. In it, he accuses <a href="https://x.com/EndWokeness">far-right Twitter account “EndWokeness”</a> of being secretly run by <a href="https://x.com/JackPosobiec">equally far-right pundit Jack Posobiec</a>. However, evidence also quickly began emerging that disproved the three key points he makes. After I chose to contact Ryan with this information, he provided another three points (which were then disproven/disregarded as irrelevant), before accusing me of “acting in bad faith” and refusing to answer further emails.</p><p>As such, I feel the need to publish our evidence fully, debunking both the video and his follow-up points. Before I begin, I feel it is important to note that I am staunchly against the opinions held by EndWokeness and Jack Posobiec. This is not a defence of them or their actions, nor do I support using this as an opportunity to “attack” Ryan, or the people who believed his video.</p><p>I also want to credit the corner of the Bellingcat Discord community who helped investigate this with me, for their help analysing Ryan’s evidence, and their support in helping me publish.</p><p>Within this article, I repeatedly refer to data collected and published by Ryan, which can be found <a href="https://www.ryanmcbeth.com/single-post/endwokeness-tweet-proof">here</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240817223051/https:/www.ryanmcbeth.com/single-post/endwokeness-tweet-proof">archived version</a>).</p><h4>Point 1 — “Shlit”</h4><p>To kick things off, McBeth picks up on the prevalence of the term “shlit” across both EndWokeness’ and Posobiec’s Twitter posts. It seems likely that this is done to avoid the algorithm “marking down” posts that contain swear words, with the term appearing to be present across right-wing Twitter. McBeth mentions this only in reference to the Libs of TikTok account, its owner Chaya Raichik, as well as EndWokeness and Posobiec. However, upon <a href="https://x.com/search?q=Shlit&amp;f=live">simply searching up the term “shlit”</a>, or “holy shlit”, on Twitter, it becomes immediately clear that it is used ubiquitously throughout the right-wing Twitter bubble. As such, it doesn’t narrow down potential suspects, and doesn’t point specifically towards Posobiec.</p><p>McBeth even admits that this alone doesn’t prove anything — verifying that despite both using “shlit”, EndWokeness is not Chaya Raichik due to “pattern of life” analysis (i.e. seeing what times accounts regularly post to determine matching time zones), which demonstrated an offset in regular posting times by about two hours. He also notes a significant decrease on Saturdays, matching Raichik’s status as an Orthodox Jew and her compliance with Shabbat (i.e. not using technology on Saturdays). Oddly, he doesn’t seem to directly compare the same timezone metric when looking at Posobiec, though does briefly show that where EndWokeness posts in a band between 7 AM and 7 PM (Eastern Time), Posobiec tweets in a band between 8 AM and 12 PM (ET). It doesn’t make a huge amount of sense for a timezone-based difference to disprove her involvement almost entirely but not for Posobiec.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wB7sOGsklTipQFG0N3H5fg.png" /><figcaption>A comparison of Jack Posobiec vs EndWokeness’ tweeting times.</figcaption></figure><p>Admittedly, the trend data is quite messy and if you’re looking for similarities, it would be easy to understand if Ryan were to have made a mistake here (that is, if he compared this data to begin with). You’ll notice I said EndWokeness’ active band is between 7 AM and 7 PM, despite both accounts regularly posting up until 11–12 PM/AM. This is because there is a steep decline in EndWokeness’ posts around this time when compared to Posobiec’s relatively shallow decline. I’ve highlighted these in green and pink respectively.</p><p>Still, the most important point in this section is the widespread use of the term “shlit”, not the convoluted pattern-of-life analysis.</p><h4>Point 2 — “ę”</h4><p>Having found that “shlit” alone is not enough to prove Posobiec’s guilt, McBeth moves onto both accounts’ use of the Polish character “ę”. Again though, he points out flaws in his own argument — where EndWokeness uses the character as a way to avoid the algorithm (similarly to point 1) when using violent language such as “raped”, “murdered”, and “attacked”, Posobiec is Polish and posts with semi-regular frequency in Polish. He has never used “ę” in any other context, even when using the same words that EndWokeness censors for the algorithm, which he likely would if he believed those words negatively impacted him, as EndWokeness clearly does.</p><p>McBeth goes on to say that despite these differences, EndWokeness must be using “ę” as it would be a convenient character to use if he were sharing the same physical Polish keyboard as Posobiec. However, we know this isn’t the case as McBeth’s dataset contains information showing the device on which a post was made. Low and behold, every post from EndWokeness containing the “ę” character was written on an iPhone, where it is installed by default for anyone to use. As such, EndWokeness doesn’t need a physical Polish keyboard, and the character can be frequently seen being used in right-wing circles, meaning this second point also fails to directly implicate Posobiec.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*Db_-7BfTPzalUlsGTkHPNw.png" /><figcaption>Instances of EndWokeness using “ę” found in <a href="https://www.ryanmcbeth.com/single-post/endwokeness-tweet-proof">McBeth’s dataset</a>.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*riYVi9UObE6UKvTE-iPkpg.png" /><figcaption>Instances of Jack Posobiec using “ę”, found in <a href="https://www.ryanmcbeth.com/single-post/endwokeness-tweet-proof">McBeth’s dataset</a>.</figcaption></figure><h4>Point 3 — Retweet timings</h4><p>Potentially the most egregious of Ryan’s mistakes in his video: He uses the data he collected to suggest that EndWokeness regularly retweets Posobiec’s tweets within a single second of it being posted, and that this proves they are the same person. Besides being impossible, even with a bot or the use of two Twitter instances (which he mentions), the core of the point is categorically untrue. Looking at the data in any detail shows that the timestamp he is referring to is not the time a post was retweeted, rather, it is the time at which the original post was made. This is true for every retweet in the database, including for posts from figures like Elon Musk.</p><p>It seems as if Ryan only checked the Posobiec retweets and has subsequently fallen for his own confirmation bias (something he regularly warns others to be cautious of).</p><h4>Emails</h4><p>By this point in our investigation, it became clear that the evidence that he supplied was simply not enough. As such, I approached Ryan by email. Below is an embedded document containing those in full. As you’ll see, he gave me permission to share the email covering his additional points. I’ve chosen to share the rest of them as I believe it provides justification for the publishing of this article.</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1laphs4QDFo3rn6Gzyizn6O6_H48gt2y-/preview">RyanMcBeth_DanSmith EW Debunking Emails.pdf</a></p><p>In these emails, he mentions one potentially strong point — and this is EndWokeness’ supposed intimate knowledge of Polish politics. While this could be true, having mentioned a few different Polish cabinet members and one well known far-right member of European Parliament, I wouldn’t characterise this as a specific interest in Polish politics beyond EndWokeness simply commenting on global far-right figures/movements. In fact, during the time period that Ryan recorded his database, it appears the account only mentioned Poland exclusively 17 times, putting it in 19th place in terms of mentions, behind countries like Germany, South Africa, and Israel, further contributing to this theory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*adk4c4c_9tC_vjOywPE_vA.png" /><figcaption>“Countries Mentioned” tab in McBeth’s database sorted by most to least mentions.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*oLtLCZ35jLmiEBmAyfV8Xw.png" /><figcaption>“Countries Mentioned” tab in McBeth’s database sorted by most to least mentions — including an orange bar representing posts filtered to those exclusively mentioning Poland.</figcaption></figure><p>He also mentions a supposed contact within the Republican Party, which I disregard as it is both unverifiable (as this source is unlikely to want to go on record) and not open source, despite Ryan’s public claim that his research is entirely reproducible.</p><p>Upon picking up on this, I was accused of “acting in bad faith”, was asked for verification of my identity (which I subsequently provided via a trustworthy vouch), before being outright ignored. I’ve since spoken to him again via <a href="https://discord.gg/FDrS9wwPDG">his public discord server</a> where he continued to say I am acting in bad faith based on my “tone”. He also said that he’d been approached by multiple people and was “getting to it”. Given I first contacted him on July 22nd, and at time of writing, it is now August 18th, this doesn’t seem like a great excuse.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>As far as I am concerned, every single point Ryan has made to suggest that EndWokeness is secretly Jack Posobiec has been debunked. Despite knowing this, he has ignored hard evidence and continues to allow the spread of his video to a trusting audience. Whilst it isn’t a textbook definition, this is clearly disinformation (meaning, knowingly false information, spread for one’s own benefit). It is up to us, as informed people, to tell the truth and be open about when we make mistakes. This would have had a happier outcome had Ryan admitted from the get-go that the evidence he presents is not nearly as firm as his public stance currently implies.</p><p>By using intelligence documents and leveraging his extensive military background, he’s positioned himself as an expert when he clearly isn’t. He even mentions in his video that he wrote and presented a paper on disinformation in disaster environments, whilst seemingly peddling it himself. Whilst I have been harsh in this article, it is only because I believe in the wider open-source community as a force for good and that someone like Ryan, who acts as an ambassador for us to new audiences via TikTok and YouTube, should represent us well.</p><p>Again, this should not be taken as an attack on Ryan. I can only hope this has been a mistake and is not indicative of him as a person or the direction of his content — however his recent responses to criticism regarding his video covering Project 2025 seem to suggest this might be the case.</p><p>Either way, thank you for reading and I wish everyone all the best,</p><p>Dan Smith</p><p><em>Hopefully this is the last time I feel the need to post about this… I’m so sick of it.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=887cbbb0487d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Publir: American Insurrectionists and Russian Information Warfare]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis/publir-american-insurrectionists-and-russian-information-warfare-d474122f6be1?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Smith]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Sep 2023 14:07:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-21T21:56:07.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Using Well-Known.dev to track the funding behind Russian-backed disinformation site Veterans Today.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U9BDISjAbP7wR0KEyk8Mjw.png" /></figure><p>The sun was setting on another unproductive, rainy day. I was sitting at my desk, doomscrolling through Twitter when an article caught my eye: “<a href="https://checkmyads.org/branded/is-realclearpolitics-running-publir/">Is RealClearPolitics secretly running a disinfo ad network called Publir?</a>”, written by the Check My Ads Institute, a non-profit advertising watchdog. I recommend you give it a read, as it provides an in-depth background to this article, which I won’t fully cover here. In short, it links a site called RealClearPolitics, via an ad company called Publir, to the subreddit-turned-web forum The_Donald (now known as patriots(.)win). The forum is partially credited in helping stoke the January 6th Insurrection in the US, and remains a bastion of support for former President Donald Trump.</p><p>RealClearPolitics markets itself as an impartial news platform, providing “<a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/about.html#:~:text=original%20reporting%20present%20balanced%2C%20non%2Dpartisan%20analysis%20that%20empowers%20our%20readers%20to%20stay%20informed">balanced, non-partisan analysis</a>” to readers. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/us/politics/real-clear-politics.html">An article by the New York Times published in November 2020</a> suggests that following a number of donations from murky, pro-Trump benefactors, their content has become skewed towards the right wing.</p><p>However, what really interested me wasn’t the story itself, rather the tools being used. <a href="https://well-known.dev/">Well-Known</a> is a database of common file locations from millions of domains, across the web. The files at those locations communicate the website’s information for use by developers, other services and us, as investigators. As I do with anything new, my immediate reaction was to test it, and to do this, I chose vtforeignpolicy(.)com, one of the three domain names used by the news platform Veterans Today.</p><p>In all honesty, I only chose the site as I’ve had it bookmarked on Google for several months, though for good reason. Since its inception in 2004, VT has published blatant disinformation and conspiracy theories with article titles ranging from ‘<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230515190202/https://www.veteranstodayarchives.com/2011/08/29/911-video-of-missile-hitting-pentagon-leaked/">9/11: Video of Missile Hitting Pentagon Leaked</a>’(August 2011) to ‘<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.vtforeignpolicy.com/2023/09/kiev-regime-worsens-already-rampant-drug-abuse-among-its-troops/">Kiev regime worsens already rampant drug abuse among its troops</a>’ (September 2023). <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/12/how-russia-targets-the-us-military-215247/">According to Politico</a>, around 2013, they began publishing articles from ‘New Eastern Outlook’, a site run by the Russian SVR (Russia’s equivalent to the CIA) and currently sanctioned by both the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0628">US’ Department of the Treasury</a> and the British Foreign Office, likely due to its pride of place amongst Russia’s information warfare arsenal. <a href="https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2017/10/Junk-News-on-Military-Affairs-and-National-Security-1.pdf">In a paper published by Oxford University</a>, they claim further connections between VT and the Russian media outlets ‘Strategic Culture Foundation’ and ‘SouthFront’, operated by the SVR and FSB (Russian secret police) respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7AQPXhX7ZhrFD6oLHuIzmg.png" /><figcaption>Screenshot of archived article “9/11: Video of Missile Hitting Pentagon Leaked”. A link to an off-site archive can be found <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.veteranstodayarchives.com/2011/08/29/911-video-of-missile-hitting-pentagon-leaked/">here</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Scanning down the list of VT’s <a href="https://well-known.dev/resources/ads_txt/sites/vtforeignpolicy.com">65 Direct Selling Publishers</a>, I caught Publir. The same site from earlier, that coordinates access to ad exchanges for those running the far-right insurrectionist forum patriots(.)win. In fact, as I looked closer, I noticed more and more entries under their name. <a href="https://well-known.dev/resources/ads_txt/sites/vtforeignpolicy.com/supply_chain_graph.svg">This supply chain graph</a>, created using Well-Known, shows that Publir is vtforeignpolicy’s only connection to the wider ad supply network, meaning it also controls a chunk of their funding. In short, Publir is actively contributing to Russian intelligence’s disinformation capabilities through VT.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KA_yRJZeAJmNEb9Q" /><figcaption>Supply chain graph via Well-Known showing that Publir is VT’s only connection to the wider ad supply. The green node is the site, light blue nodes are ad systems and the red nodes are classed as “other” (In our case, the red VT node connected to publir(.)com is the same as the green node). <a href="https://well-known.dev/resources/ads_txt/sites/vtforeignpolicy.com/supply_chain_graph.svg">The entire network graph can be found here</a>, however, you must have an account, and be logged in, on Well-Known.dev to access it.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://checkmyads.org/branded/is-realclearpolitics-running-publir/#:~:text=Publir%20is%20running%20dark%20pools%20with%20RealClearPolitics">As is documented in Check My Ads’ article</a>, Publir uses false seller accounts to manage the ads of hundreds of websites in ‘dark pools’. I’ll admit that I don’t know nearly enough to go into detail about dark pools, but essentially, they mix high quality, brand safe sites with lower quality, shadier websites to boost the collective pool’s ad price (<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cpm.asp">otherwise known as CPM</a>). This creates numerous risks for these higher quality sites, who may not know they are being taken advantage of by potentially malicious actors. In some cases these high profile sites are aware of the risks, but aren’t able to use conventional ad exchanges (For various reasons) and so are stuck using Publir’s services.</p><p>These kinds of companies are both incredibly lucrative for their owners, and incredibly detrimental to wider civil society. Without proper regulation and community development, disinformation outlets remain viable not just as a means of conducting information warfare but as a business. The fact that we can draw such an obvious connection between a US-based ad system, operating on behalf of prominent right-wing figures, and a fringe website supported by Russian intelligence shows just how intertwined malicious actors are within the peripheries of western politics.</p><p>To reverse this, we need to work within disaffected groups and build resilience from inside communities, cutting off the demand for disinformation and the businesses who support it.</p><p>Thank you for reading: If you’re interested in similar investigations, follow me on <a href="https://twitter.com/rosa_noctis">Twitter</a> or <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/rosa-noctis.bsky.social">Bluesky</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eM3xAEC_FTfDhGZ7rE9jGg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d474122f6be1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tracking the Somali Institute for Chinese Studies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis/tracking-the-somali-institute-for-chinese-studies-6b09736b36a6?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b09736b36a6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Smith]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Aug 2023 18:17:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-09T18:17:24.290Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A Case Study on Chinese Influence Operations targeting English-Speaking Africans on Twitter</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iEt9y0oSGyhFeFJpwrbLnw.png" /></figure><p>Despite everything they claim, China is at war. Not yet one of bombs, bullets and missiles, but still unmistakably, a war. It is fought online, promoting political environments beneficial to the Chinese state. While many look at the Belt and Road initiative as their landmark influence campaign, instead we should be watching the ever increasing network of social media accounts pushing propaganda to the masses. Where BRI is largely only visible to politicians, analysts and business-people, centralised platforms like Twitter, Facebook and their various offshoots have become crucial vectors for influencing targeted civilian populaces. This is due to its unparalleled access to international audiences and the difficulty private companies face in regulating their constant firehose of content.</p><p>Since April, I have been watching one Twitter account in particular: The <a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS">‘Somali Institute of Chinese Studies’</a> (otherwise known as SICS), an independent think tank based in Somalia, providing “reports &amp; expert commentary about China’s politics/economy/society”, though in reality, none of this is true. Instead, it sows disinformation, promotes Chinese influence and actively works to degrade trust in Western media and institutions. Incidentally, these same characteristics make it an interesting insight into ongoing Chinese information operations. I’ll cover this insight, and the trends I’ve noticed later in this article.</p><p>First though, I want to try to prove its origins, or rather disprove the origin they claim. As a supposed ‘think tank’, I would expect it to have a website, or at least some other form of online presence, especially considering how active it is on Twitter. For reference, data retrieved using TruthNest<a href="https://app.truthnest.com/analysis-results/user/Somali_ICS"> found that the account posts upwards of eight times a day</a>. Despite this, they don’t link to an off-platform site and Google search results show either the wrong organisation, or back to the original Twitter account. Reverse image searching of its profile picture yields similar results, and they are completely absent from the <a href="https://ebusiness.gov.so/search/name-search?_token=CQJAB6Zz33qmZDnqsFEzNXddrhRJLkiIw2BoMJs1&amp;q=Somali+Institute+of+Chinese+Studies">Somali Ministry of Commerce’s business registry</a>. In short, this means outside of that account, it does not exist as an organisation.</p><p>We can also disprove their claim about being based in Somalia. Using a combination of OSoMe’s now-defunct Botometer, and TruthNest, we can see the average dispersal of posts across a 24 hour period, in turn, allowing us to compare it with relevant time zones. The below graph shows data taken from April 27, 2023 and uses East Africa Time (EAT), the timezone used in Somalia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/0*zq-4JAul-u3haFJb" /><figcaption><a href="https://botometer.osome.iu.edu/">Sourced via OSoMe’s Botometre</a></figcaption></figure><p>The data suggests that were it based in Somalia, the majority of posting begins at 7 p.m., peaks at 1 a.m. and eventually stops at 6 a.m. While not proving that someone inside China is running the account, this is wildly inconsistent with <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17ZPWGuCSI_VnxHF4aFxMTa2E94WEnWn1LYL0gllTdpU/edit#gid=579226155">what posting would look like if they were based in Somalia</a>, disproving another significant claim; it also brings up the question, why would the operators of the account choose to lie about otherwise trivial details?</p><p>To answer that, we need to look at the concept of authority bias. By positioning themselves as a research institution within the region, SICS is able to take advantage of our authority bias, a cognitive mechanism making us more likely to trust those we perceive as having authoritative knowledge on a subject. Audiences who have already bought into views supporting the contents messaging can justify their belief in disinformation by attributing it to supposed ‘expert analysis’, even without proof. SICS uses a false origin to appear more well-informed and trustworthy. This doesn’t mean they solely target such audiences, in fact, by offering a direct contrast SICS contributes towards the erosion of trust in Western institutions even in previously unaffected audiences, though often to little effect.</p><p>Unfortunately, there isn’t an easy fix to this. Cognitive biases are not inherently bad and there are plenty of instances where trust in institutions is essential to public safety, such as in medicine. Complete scepticism is unhealthy, as we have seen within the anti-vaxx movement, which evolved from scrutiny into misinformation. There is a fine line between trusting too much, and trusting too little, a line that I don’t know enough about to comment on. In place of that, I’ve linked some resources on authority bias, <a href="https://www.rocketwheel.com/post/authority-bias-obedience-the-milgram-experiment-and-influencer-marketing-examples">one is a fairly short article</a>, the <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opis-2019-0009/html">other is a much more in-depth academic paper</a>. I recommend giving them a read if the topic interests you.</p><p>In short, lying about a piece of content’s origins, and taking advantage of psychological biases, acts as another layer to make accounts like SICS more effective at consolidating disinformation narratives in both pre-existing, vulnerable audiences and . The question must be asked then, what are those narratives?</p><p>I have spoken about almost everything except the content itself. I think it is worth noting here that many of the themes I am going to cover can be found over and over across all manner of pro-CCP media, from state television, to paid influencers. As Twitter splinters, the ability to recognise common disinformation narratives in the wild becomes increasingly important in identifying new sources, and the actors behind them.</p><p>Of these common disinformation narratives, denial of genocide in Xinjiang may be one of the most prevalent across Chinese backed outlets, to the point where I actively look for such posts. Even official embassies have posted such content on <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230712171312/http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202206/t20220622_10707637.htm">their websites</a>. The frequency with which it is mentioned is likely down to its prevalence in counter-CCP activism. To be an effective influencer abroad, China needs to quash claims of domestic wrongdoing.</p><blockquote><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1650119473595047937">“Chinese Muslims of the Uyghur ethnicity are full of patriotism and love for country”</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1650119473595047937">Archive</a>)</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1673831704828452865">“Forced misinformation! Another example of narrative framing!”</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230717105935/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1673831704828452865">Archive</a>)</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1619071964181852160">“After a total investment of $27 billion last year in the Xinjiang tourism industries — the Chinese gov is forcing the Uyghurs to accept jobs in the tourism industry”</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230717110012/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1619071964181852160">Archive</a>)</blockquote><p>For reference, the below links are from China Daily (Reportedly run by the Chinese Central Propaganda Department).</p><blockquote><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221012064746/https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202210/11/WS6344e75ea310fd2b29e7bd55.html">US disinformation campaigns on Xinjiang: A playbook of “thief crying ‘stop thief’”</a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220922133048/https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/22/WS632c29aea310fd2b29e793ec.html">China’s UN envoy rejects accusations over abuse of ethnic minorities</a></blockquote><p>There are consistent anti-western undertones, though alone, this doesn’t make something disinformation or part of a coordinated influence effort. Instead, it is the framing of such content, replacing US involvement with Chinese involvement. Rejection of US aid and the benefits of trade with China are both prominent in their earlier content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/0*AgXDkBhgV6iddynY" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1644137673911828480">Sourced via Twitter</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1644137673911828480">Archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/898/0*I4BvuD1yvUwMBaOs" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1643394885704200192">Sourced via Twitter</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230717105653/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1643394885704200192">Archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/886/0*La4sA9FQm9iUfatl" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1640838763055046656">Sourced via Twitter</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1640838763055046656">Archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Beyond this, it also frequently comments on political events from around the world. Earlier, I mentioned that SICS can provide insight into ongoing information operations, which is only possible because they aren’t overtly affiliated with the Chinese state. Unlike other platforms (i.e. CGTN, Xinhua), they can make statements without it being seen as an official narrative. In the 5 days following the outbreak of conflict between RSF PMC and the Sudanese Army on 15 April 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=Sudan%20(from%3ASomali_ICS)&amp;f=live">they posted 28 tweets mentioning Sudan</a> often accompanied by comments on western influence in Africa. These received fairly high traction, similarly to other accounts’ coverage of events around that time, though in their case it allowed them to further promote their content to East African audiences. From <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230407195059/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS">7 April 2023</a> to <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230419172623/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS">19 April 2023</a>, they gained 275 followers. More recently, <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=FranceRiots%20(from%3ASomali_ICS)&amp;f=live">they have been posting about protests in France</a>, using the hashtag ‘#FranceRiots’, and since early July,<a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=Japan%20(from%3ASomali_ICS)&amp;f=live"> have frequently touched on Japan’s plan to discharge nuclear wastewater into the Pacific ocean</a>. In both cases, elements of these events have been exaggerated to portray nations as either more chaotic, or intentionally dangerous, than they actually are.</p><p>In one case, SICS shared a video showing a rhino walking down an urban street, claiming it was released from the Paris zoo by protestors. In reality, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/B5GAPrTJpQG/">the video, originally posted by an environmental activist on Instagram, is from 2019 and was taken near Chitwan National Park in Nepal</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/884/0*qkAA7H93xKHCM4CY" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1675966719448186882">Source</a><a href="https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1640838763055046656">d via Twitter</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230717190526/https://twitter.com/Somali_ICS/status/1675966719448186882">Archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>So, where can we go from here? We’ve disproven their origins, looked to understand how they use people’s inherent biases to their own ends and the types of narratives they then promote. Before access to the Twitter API was closed, I downloaded SICS’ following list. Despite being 5 months outdated (Having been recorded on 8 April, 2023) and missing over 3000 new followers, it is still valuable to look into further. For instance, it shows they are followed by at least 29 Chinese officials, including the <a href="https://twitter.com/FeiShengchao">Chinese ambassador to Somalia</a>, the <a href="https://twitter.com/liupheonix">Director of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/XIEYongjun_CHN">Director of the Information Department of the Chinese MFA</a>. It is also interesting to note that 106 accounts list their locations inside China, despite the platform being banned on Chinese internet. Given the prevalence of VPNs and the fact that as we’ve seen, this kind of self-reported information can be false, the accurate figure is potentially lower. However, many of those accounts still promote state-narratives, meaning the likelihood of them opposing Chinese internet regulation is low.</p><p>The spreadsheet also lists a number of interesting accounts including <a href="https://twitter.com/BenjaminNorton">Ben Norton</a>, a prominent “journalist” notable for his anti-western bias, <a href="https://twitter.com/Jerry_grey2002">Jerry’s China</a>, a western influencer based in China who supposedly ‘debunked’ the Uyghur genocide in Xinjiang, and <a href="https://twitter.com/iyoba4u">Iyoba</a>, an anonymous influencer prevalent in East African audiences. These three deserve their own articles, but their presence shows how ingrained SICS is in the anti-West Twitter sphere and how large its influence is relative to its size.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fTDuV79vjSKcyuZLl0jMPw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17ZPWGuCSI_VnxHF4aFxMTa2E94WEnWn1LYL0gllTdpU/edit#gid=1937923831">Created in Google Sheets</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17ZPWGuCSI_VnxHF4aFxMTa2E94WEnWn1LYL0gllTdpU/edit?usp=sharing">If you’re interested, the spreadsheet can be found here</a>.</p><p>This account isn’t alone in what it does. <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17ZPWGuCSI_VnxHF4aFxMTa2E94WEnWn1LYL0gllTdpU/edit#gid=1530628861">In the process of documenting SICS, I came across 4 other accounts</a>, the largest of which has around 980 followers (As of 6 Aug 2023). Chinese disinformation outlets and influencers continue to promote the narrative that neocolonialism is a purely Western phenomenon, when in reality, nations in the Global South continue to face attacks on their national sovereignty originating from more powerful actors, notoriously Russia and China. More needs to be done to build digital resilience within targeted communities, though these efforts continue to face issues around regional instability, often themselves exacerbated by localised mis/disinformation campaigns and cultural divides.</p><p>Only by addressing the underlying issues and circumstances within communities, can we progress towards the development necessary for a more free and democratic world, resilient to these kinds of disinformation campaigns.</p><p>If you have questions about my research, please contact me at “<a href="/service/mailto:rosa.noctis@proton.me">rosa.noctis@proton.me</a>”.</p><p>Thank you for reading :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b09736b36a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Russian Government Control and Propaganda in the age of Social Media: “Life.ru”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rosa.noctis/russian-government-control-and-propaganda-in-the-age-of-social-media-life-ru-299812c9cff0?source=rss-56483a660bcc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/299812c9cff0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan Smith]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2022 22:23:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-08T14:07:03.950Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>VKontakte is a truly huge social media site. <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/867549/top-active-social-media-platforms-in-russia/">According to this statistic</a>, it was the second most used social networking platform in the world during later stages of 2021, with over 76% of survey participants reportedly using it. Given its particular significance in Russia, VK’s user base is a perfect target for Kremlin propaganda . For this article, I’ll be looking at how I traced an otherwise ordinary looking media channel back to its state-sponsered owners, and how the content it produces is perpetuating government control of the Russian information ecosystem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/714/0*eqlvt581YnwiszQJ" /><figcaption>Leading social media platforms in Russia in 3rd quarter 2021, by penetration rate (Statista)</figcaption></figure><p>Enter “Life.ru”, a pro-government news outlet with over 2.3 million followers on VK. I first noticed it due to its <a href="https://vk.com/life?w=wall-24199209_18932515">pinned post detailing supposed torture and execution of civilians by Azov in Mariupol</a>. It’s hard not to notice the accompanying documentary, with its thumbnail emblazoned with flames and a swastika. The 51 minute video has no English captions — It is clear who their target demographic is. Unlike Russia’s exported, often crude, attempts to shield themselves from international criticism, internally-targeted disinformation is far more dangerous and subtle, designed to turn its own audience and citizens into weaponry for the state. Other articles from them similarly follow established propaganda narratives, with one article titled `<a href="https://life.ru/p/1517256">Dangerous games with a peaceful atom: Which countries will be covered if Ukraine blows up the ZNPP</a>`, which directs blame away from Russian troops and onto those of Ukraine despite reports of Russian troops using the ZNPP (A nuclear powerplant in south-east Ukraine) as a staging ground for missile and rocket attacks on surrounding cities. It seeks to solidify government accounts, degrade credibility in non-government accounts, and encourages readers to only accept information from ‘trusted sources’ (and by that, they mean state media), subsequently isolating them from less biased outlets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/626/0*ehVOzYGnNX0EdVs3" /><figcaption>A documentary on the “Life.ru” VK page titled: “Azov: A History of the 4th Reich” | Survivors’ Revelations of Torture and Cruelty in Ukrainian Concentration Camps</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://whois.domaintools.com/life.ru">WHOIS records for the “Life.ru’’ site</a> lists its registrant organisation as AO News media, a Russian joint stock company based out of Moscow. This is corroborated by both the <a href="https://life.ru/legacy">legal page on their site</a> and its footer. A simple google search returns <a href="https://newsmedia.ru/index.html">News Media’s webpage</a>, listing 8 different affiliates, including the aforementioned “Life.ru” as well as another well known Russian news site ‘Mash’, who similarly provide pro-government slanted news content, and have more than 1.5 million subscribers on Telegram. As of 19 August, 2022, Mash still has open channels on both <a href="https://twitter.com/mash_breaking">Twitter</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/BreakingMashVideo">Youtube</a>, where they have 3000 followers and 58000 subscribers respectively, which is surprising as both platforms have recently become tougher on pro-Russian content. It is interesting to note that much of the imagery coming out of Ukraine has been watermarked by Mash, suggesting they may have ties within military organisations.</p><p>The lesser known affiliates include <a href="https://5pub.ru/">“Five Public”</a>, a ‘communications solution agency’ that helps with advertising regional news channels, and <a href="https://gigarama.ru/">“Gigarama”</a>, who reportedly work on ‘Digital storytelling’ through high definition, panoramic imagery of government events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/0*Omn5BiWWH-yl-tlq" /><figcaption>Screenshot of the footer on Life’s website.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*htB6dM-TX7It-YEGatFYlg.png" /><figcaption>Screenshot from <a href="https://newsmedia.ru/index.html">newsmedia.ru</a></figcaption></figure><p>Using the site <a href="https://hunter.io/">hunter.io</a> (which searches for all public emails using a specified domain, in our case “newsmedia.ru”), I found an email posted to this <a href="https://companies.rbc.ru/id/1057748141714-ao-nyus-media/#hunter-email:../aabrosina@newsmedia.ru">business database</a>. It lists AO News Media’s General Director as a man named Maxim Takhirovich Iksanov. By checking the company’s OGRN against the <a href="https://egrul.nalog.ru/index.html">Unified State Register of Legal Entities</a>, I verified that Maxim Iksanov does, in fact, own AO News Media.</p><p>This <a href="https://pflaghamiltonbitterroot.org/w/maksim_iksanov">Slovenian wiki article</a> says he’s the son of Anatoly Iksanov, former General Director of the Bolshoi Theatre of Russia. According to an<a href="https://theins.ru/news/238950"> Insider article</a>, Maxim lives in an apartment building owned by the Russian Presidential Administration along with a number of political figures looking to remain out of the limelight (meaning without public scrutiny). In 2020, during the COVID-19 lockdowns, he was given express permission to ignore guidance and move unrestricted around Moscow. Formerly working for popular news stations like Rossiya TV and Moscow 24, he undoubtedly understands the Russian media landscape better than most.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/578/0*DvecD4zfNidqv8XV" /><figcaption>Copies of the document can be found here: <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K96g8nNOPS64bWm-lD1_LkY3LBWJFzhe/view?usp=sharing">JSC News Media RU.pdf</a> <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/15mHP8x0etiKB4XHVfdNmMBdy32AFPswJ/view?usp=sharing">JSC News Media EN.pdf</a></figcaption></figure><p>So why is this company and the content it produces so dangerous?</p><p>In the west, we often look at Russian propaganda campaigns and see the blatant lies and falsities that they commonly try to push on foreign audiences, while neglecting to understand that as soon as we identify something as propaganda, it fails. This means that our idea of Russian propaganda is influenced by survivor-ship bias in which only those campaigns that we actively notice, and subsequently disregard as inept, are counted. What I have described in this article isn’t that. Instead, Life.ru is effective. These media channels sometimes have upwards of a million followers, every post on Life’s VK page has more than 4 comments. Hell, the documentary I referenced as what piqued my interest has more than 266,000 views. Every output feeds into a gradually condensing source from which Russian’s get their already severely limited information from. Following the protests over Putin’s election interference in Russia, the arrest of opposition figure Navalny, and more recently, the invasion of Ukraine, the walls blocking everyday citizens inside Russia from getting fair and unbiased news continue to rise. Sites like Twitter are banned, activists and journalists are arrested, internet surveillance is ever growing. Subtly, the articles and messages that sites like Life and Mash produce are worming their way into the Russian public consciousness, drowning out sensibilities and instead imposing a unique brand of Russian fascism. I paint a bleak picture, and from where we are now, there is very little we can do to avert it. But very little isn’t nothing. By promoting fact checking, scrutinizing the media we consume, and questioning our own beliefs, we can try to counter the unparalleled level of disinformation the world faces — One skeet, one tweet, one post at a time.</p><p>If you made it this far, thank you for reading! If you are interested in more articles similar to this one, consider following me on <a href="https://twitter.com/rosa_noctis">Twitter</a>, and <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/rosa-noctis.bsky.social">Bluesky</a>. Stay safe out there and goodbye.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=299812c9cff0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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