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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rotem Shacham on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rotem Shacham on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Rotem Shacham on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Growth Investors Fixate on Financial Metrics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/why-growth-investors-fixate-on-financial-metrics-ab579229cb70?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab579229cb70</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startupş]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-metrics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2025 10:13:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-27T10:13:45.095Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/1*jvnYSK59z9wMaWfK_MxJKw.png" /></figure><p>A picture is worth a thousand words, the saying goes. Well, for growth investors financial metrics tell the real story behind the picture founders often paint.</p><p>Let’s put our nerdy accounting glasses on and see what stories numbers can tell us as growth investors.</p><ol><li><strong>Topline</strong></li></ol><p>This is the most obvious one. Revenue, ARR or Revenue Run Rate tells us if the dogs are eating the dog food. Or rather, if they’re paying for the dog food. The most straightforward metric to see if the product is creating value.</p><p>Bookings or CARR are a leading indicator. They are a good estimate of the actual revenues in the next period.</p><p>The difference between the two or rather ARR divided by CARR could indicate a potential issue in the sales motion. A low figure indicates either customers are signing up but not following through or there are product implementation issues. This latter issue comes up more often than not in HealthTech startups where connecting or customizing their product to different players in the healthcare industry is burdensome.</p><p><strong>2. Gross Profit and Gross Margins</strong></p><p>These two are a proxy for the value the company is generating. Two $10M Revenue companies with one at 60% GM and the other at 40% GM generate very different values. To generate the same gross profit the second business needs to have 50% more revenue!</p><p>This difference comes up a lot between software and hardware companies where the higher cost of revenue for hardware companies is indeed a barrier to overcome.</p><p><strong>3. OpEx</strong></p><p>Operating expenses are critical as a metric because they dictate, and I’m simplifying, the company’s burn profile. As expenses in startups, whether R&amp;D, S&amp;M or even G&amp;A, antecede Revenue they are usually what define the burn profile. A high burn profile is not problematic on its own. The higher the investment the higher the return will need to be to make it worthwhile from an investor perspective.</p><p>When we break up OpEx to its different components, there is a big difference between high spend on R&amp;D, which broadly makes sense as it will drive the company’s technology, competitive advantage, future revenue and overall value, compared with high spend on S&amp;M. Low sales efficiency, which is defined as S&amp;M spend compared to the new revenue it generates is indicative of inefficient or unfocused GTM. It is a good indicator of fuzziness around ICP immature processes, broader market issues such as small TAM or even product issues.</p><p>High G&amp;A, when compared to revenue, tells a story of inefficiency or even splurge. VC money is basically pension fund money. It should be treated with respect. Beyond that excess splurge, whether on office spaces, people or events, raises a flag about old fashioned judgement.</p><p><strong>4. EBITDA or Net Income</strong></p><p>High negative EBITDA, compared to net new ARR or revenue is a good estimate for overall value generation over a period of time. Another way to “skin the cat” is to look at burn multiple, or net new ARR divided by cash burn. Obviously the younger the company the more difficult it is to gauge these metrics given revenue is still growing at a hockey stick trajectory. Similarly, the deeper the tech the lower the EBITDA will be, at least at first. Nonetheless, these are all good measures to see how efficiently the company is growing.</p><p>These 4 metrics are just scratching the surface. Some other financial metrics that tell interesting stories about the business are ACV, revenue concentration, GDR/NDR and others.</p><p><strong>5. ACV</strong></p><p>ACV is a good indicator of the ability the company has to scale and of the value the product is generating. Not that higher ACV is always better than low ACV, but generally speaking, it is usually easier to scale revenue with large contracts rather than small ones. Either way, ACV should align with the GTM motion each company has chosen. For instance enterprise sales motion with AEs, SDRs and long sale cycles usually do not work with a low ACV. Sooner or later that mechanism will break because it won’t be able to carry its costs in a reasonable way. The relationship between ACV and GTM motion is a good way to ascertain the level of sales leadership capabilities.</p><p><strong>6. GDR/NDR</strong></p><p>Gross Dollar Retention or Net Dollar Retention are also simple figures that convey a big story. They indicate the stickiness of the product and are a good proxy for customer satisfaction. For instance with 60–70% GDR for an enterprise B2B business, there is little reason to talk to customers. It is clear they are unhappy. 90–100% NDR for instance for a similar business will convey an issue with expansion or lack of product breadth and depth.</p><p><strong>7. Customer concentration</strong></p><p>Customer concentration is another telling metric. If it’s high it means the company put many of its eggs in a single basket. It raises questions about whether that company has really achieved product market fit or rather lucked out with a few early adopters. Even if there’s a good explanation to why product market fit should not be questioned, high concentration still poses significant risk for the future. What happens if one of the major customers churns? There are a myriad of churn reasons that are unrelated to the company or the product and if that does happen, it will represent a significant set back.</p><p>The list goes on. Every number tells a different part of the story.</p><p><strong>The power of derivatives</strong></p><p>Beyond pure numbers, what I find increasingly interesting is not how each metric stands on its own, but rather the story of derivatives. If we move from accounting to economics, derivatives might tell a much more interesting story than the numbers themselves.</p><p>For instance, the first derivative of revenue tells the story of growth. Is the business growing and how much? Interest rates define the time value of money and growth shows us what is the future return on money we invest today. The second derivative of revenue is momentum or the growth of growth. Is growth accelerating or decelerating? In true hockey stick stories we’ll see growth accelerating at certain stages.</p><p>All together, derivatives are the best way to tell the story of the company over time. Investors in general are trying to predict the future based on the present and the past. Derivatives are a key lever in doing so.</p><p><strong>Concluding thoughts</strong></p><p>As we can see numbers can tell an equally compelling, if not more accurate, story about a company than slides or testimonials. Perhaps they don’t deserve the center stage, but without doubt, are key in fundraising and ongoing management of any business.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab579229cb70" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unpopular opinion: we’re not yet Scaleup Nation; But this is how we could be]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/unpopular-opinion-were-not-scaleup-nation-but-this-is-how-we-could-be-b8dd4f330393?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b8dd4f330393</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scaleup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 15:34:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-28T15:37:00.996Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8P9_Q2ItOB67cg-f" /></figure><p>We love tech. Pride ourselves in making shortcuts. Thinking outside the box. Innovating and creating real value. We disregard the rules and succeed in making moonshot achievements. This all gave birth to the term Startup Nation; coined to describe the Israeli tech ecosystem. An ecosystem that is excellent in going from 0 to 1. I’ve heard many times the term “Scaleup Nation” as the 2.0 version of Israeli tech. We so desperately wanted to grow up and grow out of simply being “Startup Nation”. We wanted to be recognized for building large tech companies and believed we’ve crossed this chasm and proved we could. However, my unpopular opinion is that we are not there yet. Why do I think we’re not there yet? In short, we need to adjust our set of values and the skills we revere. We should readjust our priorities because the same skillsets and qualities that make us so great in innovation are the same ones that hold us back from building scale, from going from 1 to many. People will point to a few large companies representing the Israeli ecosystem as proof that we can indeed scale and have done so successfully. I would argue that the few examples we have are mere exceptions. We are in fact pretty far from being Scaleup Nation and the few large companies that emerged did so despite, not because of, our strengths. Nonetheless, our current status is not set in stone, and there are clear steps we can take to start the journey towards “Scaleup Nation”, one company at a time.</p><p><strong><em>Why we still are Startup Nation and not Scaleup Nation</em></strong></p><p>The saying goes that to fix a problem one should first acknowledge its existence. There lies the challenge. We’ve put on pedestals the values that make us excel from 0 to 1. We have not yet faced the fact that these same values make it difficult to scale from 1 onwards. As always, some balance will go a long way.</p><p>The difference between scaling up and starting up is that scaleup entails a well oiled machine that produces results over and over again, while a startup entails inventing something new, once. An organization that has successfully scaled up, has not just developed a technology, built an MVP, delivered a POC, but rather is one that can systematically, predictably, and consistently, acquire new customers and deliver quality results over time in the form of products or services.</p><p>It’s quite straightforward to see that the values and qualities that propelled us forward and made us excel in innovation are directionally opposed to the ones necessary for scaling up. For the former we need agility, ingenuity, resilience, adaptability, thinking outside the box, not taking no for an answer, amongst others. On the other hand, the values and qualities that are correlated with building well oiled machines are consistency, transparency, forecastability, orderliness, patience, continuous improvement, established processes, and others..</p><p>Clearly, if we want to grow we need to augment our values and adopt a more balanced palette. We need to credit a broader set of skills.</p><p><strong>What does adopting Scaleup mentality look like</strong></p><p>In one sentence — companies need to invest in corporate functions and processes.</p><p>Thinking like a grownup is not enough, we need to act like one. The functions below are key in making the transition from Startup to Scaleup. They are the levers to achieving consistency, forecastability, orderliness, patience, continuous improvement and structured processes. As a growth investor I see many companies trying to go from 1 onwards, and I can say from experience, building these functions is often done too late and more often than not as lip service rather than as a growth lever.</p><ol><li><strong>Finance </strong>— Finance is a key business function, extremely important in creating enterprise value, and building consistency across the organization. Eisenhower once said “plans are worthless but planning is everything”. One of Finance’s primary roles, of forecasting and budgeting, allows organizations to define value metrics and build investment plans that can deliver upon those metrics. Enterprise value is a product of topline growth and efficiency. Every management team should make sure they invest in the right blend of activities that yield their targeted balance of growth and profitability. Another critical component of Finance that is key for planning is creating data driven transparency by setting up information systems such as ERPs, BIs, CRMs, etc. Robust systems, allowing for information exchange and acting as a source of truth, are pivotal for decision making. Without having a clear grasp on the status of the business, management teams are at best the blind guiding the blind. The mistake I see happening more often than not is keeping Finance outsourced for too long. As a rule of thumb, crossing $1m of ARR is a good milestone to start building a strong Finance function inhouse.</li><li><strong>Legal </strong>— Often treated as a nuisance, Legal can actually be a lever for protecting equity value. As an example, oftentimes companies’ intellectual property gets contaminated along the way. If not maintained properly, different parties such as previous employees, consultants, suppliers, and others, can claim their work benefited the company’s innovation, and thus demand partial ownership of IP. One of Legal’s key roles is to protect the ownership of IP. As shareholders, employees and executives, we all should have the incentive to make sure that the IP the company develops is fully owned by the company. Otherwise, we’ll just be working for someone else’s benefit. This is just one of many examples, for the importance of setting up the right legal foundations for growth and a potential exit down the line.</li><li><strong>HR </strong>— As companies grow beyond their founding team and mature over the years there is a grave importance of creating good culture. Defined here as the uncodified way of behaving and operating within the organization, culture is key in attracting and retaining talent. Beyond just financial gain, people are attracted to organizations that fulfill them, give them a sense of purpose and provide them a supportive and enjoyable working environment. Too often the idea of culture receives its prominence only when it is identified as broken. Sometimes employees are disengaged, sometimes there are habits of missing targets, sometimes customer dissatisfaction is left untreated and many other different cultural ailments may lead to a broken organization. A strong HR function, built in advance, can be a cultural ambassador throughout the organization.</li><li><strong>Operations </strong>— Often treated as a “no man’s land” or a home to pieces that don’t properly fit with the traditional corporate functions, Operations is overlooked and is persistently underinvested. Whether it is treated as a standalone function or as pieces within other functions the concept of Operations should be considered as the glue that ties together the value delivery process of the company. SalesOps, DevOps, FinOps, MLOps are not nice to have. They represent methodologies that focus on creating consistency, continuous improvement, orderliness and other key qualities for scale up businesses. More often than not a robust operations practice is key in creating clear ROI for customers and attractive unit economics.</li><li><strong>Security </strong>— We pride ourselves as a cyber powerhouse but the state of security of many Israeli startups is far from desirable. What is the point of building something if a bad actor can seize it or demolish it quickly. In a similar fashion to the view of Legal, even for young growing organizations, Security is not a “nice to have”. Management teams should invest in building a secured infrastructure, proper processes and data governance, not just to meet different standards, but to actually protect the company as a going concern.</li></ol><p>As management teams proceed with their journey in scaling up, I have two pieces of advice: 1) Don’t reinvent the wheel. Learn from existing best practices and standards about how to build and invest in strong corporate functions, 2) Do it earlier rather than later.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b8dd4f330393" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why 2024 Should Be The Year Of Secondaries]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/why-2024-should-be-the-year-of-secondaries-a29211416b8e?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a29211416b8e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[funding-round]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cap-table]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2024 10:15:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-04T10:15:10.823Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/0*zmQa9JIVxJ0xX4vu" /></figure><p><strong><em>– Shifting gears from problems to solutions –</em></strong></p><p>A recent recurring topic in the tech ecosystem revolves around the problems that surface when multiple stakeholders share cap tables and things go slightly sideways. These range from conflicting incentives and legal duties, differences in valuation considerations, varying goals for fundraising, variance in hold period expectations, different need for liquidity, and many others. I’ve touched on a few in my recent pieces about <a href="https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/refresher-on-fiduciary-duties-in-private-tech-investing-b1af885c2a0d">fiduciary duties</a> and the impact of <a href="https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/how-safes-turned-from-pain-killers-to-funding-killers-ffc8dcd1c4ad">SAFEs</a>. Enough though about problems — let’s start to discuss solutions. More specifically, why and how secondary transactions can help overcome many of these issues.</p><p>Before we jump to how secondary transactions can be a great tool to help with cap table misalignment, one can’t avoid discussing the bad reputation these transactions earned in the last couple of years. Recently, these transactions were blamed for creating an easy cash out for founders who have not yet managed to build a long lasting company or prove true product market fit. In the heyday of the tech bubble, secondary transactions were seen as a win-win solution. They were used on the one hand, to offer a mini exit to founders, to materialize some of the value they created. On the other hand, secondary transactions were a way for investment firms to increase their holdings without increasing the size of the primary round and further diluting existing shareholders. The argument against such transactions was that this VC money that went to secondary transactions, created misalignment of incentives. It provided an easy way out to founders who were no longer incentivized to build a scalable sustainable company, and in general did not really help in building long lasting technology ventures. The short response is that it’s all true. The longer one is that it depends on the circumstances. Like any tool at our disposal, secondary transactions are not inherently bad. They can produce benefits or cause harm. It depends on how and when they are used.</p><p><strong>Let’s not bury the lead: secondary transactions can solve misalignment across the cap table, they can provide liquidity at reasonable returns when public markets are less active, and they are relatively easier to execute than primary transactions.</strong></p><p><strong><em>– A numeric example –</em></strong></p><p>These benefits can clearly be articulated through an example. The numeric example below is hypothetical but relates dearly to the situation many companies face in the current environment.</p><p>Let’s consider a company called TechVenture. Founded in 2015, it raised $37m over a span of 3 rounds. Each round was an attractive up-round, valued at 2x the previous round, with the last one at the heat of the bubble in ’21. As 3 years have passed from its last funding round the company understandably has exhausted its reserves and is looking to raise fresh capital. Similar to many companies, TechVenture’s last valuation was inflated compared to the commercial or technological milestones it had achieved. Only now, in ’24, TechVenture has grown to justify its last valuation. Leading to a likely flat round. For purposes of this discussion, let’s assume TechVenture has developed a viable product, has reached product market fit, and needs more funding to continue and grow. From a historical view, throughout the last 9 years, from ’15 to ’24, all invested capital in the company was used as primary capital. So far, the situation seems standard. We can expect some tensions about valuation of the new round, between the company and the new investors, but nothing out of the ordinary. However, under the surface, the cap table is bubbling. Significant misalignments across the cap table and between existing investors will soon surface.</p><p>The following simplified cap table showcases the different rounds TechVenture raised and the different players on the cap table. Important to note that we’re using a very simplified cap table structure for the purposes of this discussion. For simplicity we ignore ESOP, SAFEs, Warrants and other instruments that are often prevalent. Again for simplicity’s sake, we assume each round took place in January of that year, and that this investment is representative of each fund’s portfolio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*diifY9CT_6IQ8qMI" /><figcaption>Very simplistic illustrative cap table</figcaption></figure><p>Using this structure, let’s explain how in an even relative success story, like the one of TechVenture, misalignment easily arises.</p><p><em>Early Stage VC 1</em> that led the Seed round, invested $5m way back in ’15 and additional $3m in ’17. The firm is already 9 years into its investment in TechVenture. Assuming the next round will be a flat round, the pre-money valuation will be that of the previous post-money valuation, or $104m. To understand <em>Early stage VC 1’s</em> incentives, let’s consider 3 key fund metrics: TVPI, IRR and DPI, and the firm’s performance across them. <em>Early Stage VC 1’s </em>TVPI (Total Value to Paid In Capital; a metric measuring fund performance similar to an investment multiple) is solid at ~3.3x, as the value of their investment rose throughout the years. However, their gross IRR (Gross Internal Rate of Return; a metric measuring returns before fees, incorporating the element of time) is at ~15% and going down as time progresses without a significant up round in sight. More importantly their DPI (Distributed to Paid In Capital; a measure of cumulative distributions to a fund LPs) is at 0. At this point <em>Early Stage VC 1</em> is pressed for cash. Either they’re looking to raise their new fund, or they’d like to start to recoup their LPs, or they’d like to cash in some carried interest, or any combination of the three. They will likely trade future value creation for immediate liquidity. Their time horizon is short and they are focusing on some sort of exit.</p><p>On the complete other size stands <em>Growth Fund 1</em>. They are only 3 years in, still at a TVPI of 1x, with a 0% gross IRR due to the flat round. Potentially due to overpaying at entry. They’re focused on value creation. An exit event now will set a valuation quite close to their entry price and will produce a low TVPI, IRR and DPI. Even if they start to think about exit readiness at this point in time, it is still a long process. And more likely than not, they are looking to continue to build value over immediate liquidity. They would probably even like to participate in any upcoming round.</p><p>In the middle, in between these two funds, many stakeholders reside. <em>Early Stage VC 2</em> is clearly there with TVPI of 1.7x, IRR of 9% and DPI of 0. The founders are stuck in the middle as well. They are still very much big believers in the company and would like to continue to build, but after 9 years in, understandably, they would like to see some real money rather than only dreams, having already created tangible value. All the stakeholders thus are balancing future value creation versus immediate liquidity, with different weights based on their specific circumstances.</p><p>One can easily appreciate that as the company seeks to raise additional primary capital, these tensions will continue to build and exacerbate. As the variance in time of investment and entry valuation increases as the cap table expands, the incentive misalignment will continue to rise. Combining that with the current situation in the market, where full exits such as IPOs or buyouts are few and far between, what results is many internal disagreements and even paralysis. These tensions will manifest in all managerial aspects, ranging from budget composition, R&amp;D and product priorities, growth strategies, exit strategies, and much more.</p><p>A clear solution to these issues will be to realign the cap table and reduce variance in entry valuations and hold durations through a secondary transaction. In other words, a new investor can inject more money to the company for its organic growth agenda, but can also fully or partially buy out existing investors. This type of secondary transaction will create alignment in the hold period and reduce price or valuation disparity. By creating liquidity in a market that yearns for it, secondary transactions can infuse early stage funds with returns to improve their DPIs. When done in moderation, secondary transactions can also provide founders some breathing space to continue and build. And in tandem, secondary transactions can, and often are, at a lower valuation than the primary transactions, thus allowing the new investor to average out its entry price without lowering too much the primary valuation.</p><p>Even when there is no need for a primary infusion of capital, a secondary transaction can be used to “restart” the cap table and align incentives across the different investors. In these situations, when the company is not a party to the transaction, it can allow for liquidity to early stage investors at an attractive valuation, which can be lower than the last post-money valuation without affecting it. Thus secondary can be a tool to alleviate the challenge that high valuations pose on companies. By completing transactions in lower valuations, usually for a lower class of shares than the most recent one, shareholders can transact without affecting the most recent valuation. Or at least, allowing for all parties to maintain face and tell the story they want to tell.</p><p>Another positive feature of secondary transactions is that they are relatively easy to push through and close. Usually there are significantly less hoops to jump through, especially for the company.</p><p><strong><em>– Time to execute –</em></strong></p><p>Secondary transactions are not new, but in the ’24 environment that we are in, they could command a higher share of total transactions. As mentioned above, we see less full exits these days. The IPO window has yet to fully open, and the majority of liquidity events are within the private markets. In tandem, high levels of uncertainty increased the bar to raise fresh capital. These all lead to extended duration between funding rounds and liquidity, lower exit valuations than what we saw during the bubble, and overall more misalignment across the cap table. Add to that, the severe need for liquidity from funds perspective, looking to improve metrics such as DPI and IRR, and we see a perfect storm brewing.</p><p>Now is the time to be proactive, for all parties involved. Management and founders can work to facilitate secondary transactions in parallel to primary transactions. Early stage funds should seek later stage funds that conduct such transactions. Buyers are there with significant capital, sellers are there with significant incentives to sell.</p><p><strong>The market is there. I expect ’24 to be very interesting in fostering these types of transactions.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a29211416b8e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How SAFEs Turned From Pain-Killers to Funding-Killers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/how-safes-turned-from-pain-killers-to-funding-killers-ffc8dcd1c4ad?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffc8dcd1c4ad</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-18T12:02:47.218Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/0*mqMZJzknDSZA8I3z" /></figure><p><strong>What are SAFEs?</strong></p><p>Simple Agreement for Future Equity or SAFE is an agreement between an investor and a company, usually a startup. The investor makes an investment in the present, and in return the company agrees to issue equity in the future if a certain trigger event occurs. SAFEs thus do not provide shares of the company at the time of investment, but rather a legal right to receive them in the future, if certain conditions materialize. Usually the trigger event is defined as a future funding round. At that such funding round, at a future date, the SAFE investment plus any new primary capital raised, will convert to shares of the company. Beyond detailing the conditions of the trigger event, SAFEs also include specific terms on the conversion mechanism, such as any discounts or caps as they relate to the price per share or valuation of the future fundraising round, i.e. the trigger event.</p><p>SAFEs were developed in Silicon Valley as contractual frameworks to allow quick interim funding to fast growing startups. In simple terms, the idea was to allow for a relatively small investment in the present, by avoiding the heavy lifting of commercial and legal negotiations, and postponing them to a future date. On the legal side SAFEs are usually shorter documents than a traditional Share Purchase Agreement. On the commercial side, SAFEs usually do not include a current valuation of the company. On both fronts, these elements are postponed to the next funding round, sometimes led by a different investor. In summary, SAFEs were developed to offer speed in lieu of completeness.</p><p>One could argue that this tradeoff is surprising. Especially given that one of investors main roles, if not the key one, is to value companies. It is after all what we are paid to do. Equally surprising is that investors were willing to supply capital without receiving equity. It is surprising because it opens the door for a variety of legal risks that unfortunately this is not the place to discuss. These risks and question marks are not new and are evident to seasoned investors using SAFEs. However, many have argued that when startups were growing quickly and building value, investors and founders alike, were right to optimize around immediacy. Founders wanted financing and investors wanted a way into outperforming companies. They both relied on quick value creation, which in turn has led to a rapid sequence of funding rounds that resolved the temporary lack of valuation and formality of share issuance.</p><p><strong>SAFEs in ‘22-’23</strong></p><p>During the fall from grace of the tech ecosystem in ‘22-’23, many startups unfortunately were running out of cash. High OpEx and burn profile were more suited to the reality of ‘20-’21 where cash was cheap and easy to raise. As the conditions changed, the bar for new funding rounds increased and many companies found themselves needing cash but unable to reach the new financial, operational or technical metrics required. In other words, companies planned for 18 months between rounds and assumed their cash will bring them to whatever milestones they needed to achieve. As the bubble collapsed, the requirements for A rounds, B rounds, C rounds (or any letter of your choosing) increased. To raise the same round as before companies now needed more runway to allow sufficient time to achieve the higher bar that was now required. First we saw layoffs and other attempts to reduce OpEx and extend runways. Once that was exhausted, management considered the prospect of fresh new capital and realized it was either slim or unattractive as it entailed a lower valuation. As such, many management teams sought capital from existing investors. These internal rounds of financing often used the mechanism of SAFE. As can be seen from many industry reports, in Israel and abroad, the prevalence of these rounds increased significantly during the last two years.</p><p>Although the state of these startups was very different from the state of affairs that birthed the idea of SAFEs, they were still used as the chosen mechanism. Suddenly the “Bugs” of this commercial structure became “Features”. As described above, SAFEs were designed initially to provide for speed in exchange for robust valuation assessment and legal formality. The act of valuation was pushed aside to accommodate for speed. However, in ‘22-’23, when used by internal investors to finance struggling companies, speed was not really an issue. Boards are well aware of companies’ cash balance. When a company is heading towards depleting its cash reserves the situation and timeline is usually quite clear in advance. SAFEs were thus not used to allow for speed, but rather to avoid the challenging valuation discussion. Companies were struggling. The rules of the game had changed. If in ’21 one could raise an A round without any revenues, suddenly $1m ARR had become the standard. If a company was not meeting the $1m threshold, new capital would obviously come at a lower valuation than a typical A round. Trying to avoid solidifying a low valuation, management teams and investors agreed to provide bridge financing to companies, perhaps in the hope that valuations will revert back to ‘20-’21 levels.</p><p><strong>The impact of SAFEs in ’24 dynamics</strong></p><p>The SAFE rounds that took place in ‘22-’23 gave companies much needed runway to achieve financial, operational or technical milestones. These extensions provided between 6–18 months of runway. However, they resulted in a significant overhang of unconverted investment on the captable. Today it is not uncommon to see companies with 25%-50% of the capital they’ve raised as unconverted SAFE.</p><p>Why is this so important? The short answer is that the unconverted SAFE will lead to a very wide bid-ask spread for the next funding round. In layman’s terms, the SAFE will make it more difficult to complete the next round of financing and reach an agreed upon valuation.</p><p>Let’s use an example for the long answer. Let’s consider a company that raised $15m in a combination of Seed and A rounds. The company also raised $10m in an uncapped SAFE that converts at a 20% discount. Not uncommon terms for ‘21-’22. Now let’s assume the company has reached the required milestone for a B round and is seeking a $20m capital infusion. As was explained above, the trigger event for SAFEs conversion is usually the next funding round. As such, the new round in effect will be $30m, not $20m. Now let’s assume a typical 25% dilution for this round. If there was no SAFE, the 25% dilution combined with $20m of new investment will set a $60m/$80m pre/post money valuation. Now, taking into account the SAFE, with its discount, to attain the same 25% ownership for the new investor, they will have to set a $47.5m/$80m pre/post money valuation. That is a 20% lower pre-money valuation compared to the no SAFE scenario. From the existing investors, on the other side, the situation is quite different. If they’d like to reach the same 25% dilution, they need to see a $97.5m/$130m pre/post money valuation. That accounts for a 60% higher pre-money valuation compared to the no SAFE scenario. Taking into account the SAFE, the result is a $47.5m to $97.5m bid-ask spread for the pre money valuation. Without doubt, such a spread is very hard to bridge. If nothing changes, it is likely there is no deal to be made here.</p><p>Adding some simple cap tables for those who wish to follow the different scenarios.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1FXi9FbvoFbRqoT7" /></figure><p>The gap in valuation arises from the fact that the SAFE is directly affecting the post money valuation while the cash has already been depleted and exhausted its potential to create additional value.</p><p>This is not a hypothetical example. It’s the state of affairs of many companies in the ecosystem.</p><p><strong>OK, but now what? Convert the SAFEs</strong></p><p>The only way out of this challenging situation would be to clean up the cap table and convert the SAFEs pre round. The SAFEs were born out of an attempt to avoid an unflattering valuation. They now result in an inability to raise new money and misalignment with new investors. To fix this situation existing investors and founders need to bite the bullet, and convert the SAFEs pre round. That could be done at cost value of the SAFE or alternatively at what would have been the appropriate valuation at the time of the SAFE’s funding, meaning resulting in a larger discount to the current round. Effectively the SAFE should be incorporated in the pre-money valuation and its FD share decided based on negotiation between the internal stakeholders. That will result in the likely dilution of non-SAFE investors. It will reflect the simple reality that the SAFE investment was used to create part of the pre-money value of the company.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffc8dcd1c4ad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Refresher on fiduciary duties in private tech investing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/refresher-on-fiduciary-duties-in-private-tech-investing-b1af885c2a0d?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b1af885c2a0d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiduciary-duty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jan 2024 08:07:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-02T08:13:03.844Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*dklp8hLt3JT6QR85l5DfUA.png" /></figure><p>As a growth stage investor navigating 2023, and a likely not very different 2024 in some respects, we see new challenges. As in other aspects of life when things get hard, conflicts rise. In the wake of the tech bubble and its collapse back in 2022 funding rounds have become scarcer. Many have written about the higher interest rates leading to scarcity of supply. I’d like to shine a light on a less discussed topic — scarcity of demand. Beyond the cushion of cash some tech companies sit on, which negates the need for funding, others are facing fundraising challenges because of internal misalignment. Misalignment of incentives and interests between management and shareholders and within the shareholders themselves is extremely detrimental to fundraising, and even ongoing management.</p><p>I believe we’ll see more and more companies struggling to raise additional funding because of this internal misalignment. It’s easy to consider situations such as down-rounds or rounds with different structures that will elicit misalignment and conflict. That’s all true but unfortunately our experience shows that even up-rounds can cause conflict internally. I’ll explain more below, but without the risk of burying the lead, I believe a refresher on fiduciary duties will go a long way in solving some of the issues.</p><p>Let’s consider a hypothetical situation that is a good example of how unresolved misalignment of interest can hurt even the best of companies. Let’s assume an external investor agrees with a company’s management on a round of investment. That round consists of primary and secondary transactions that offer the company an infusion of cash at a much higher valuation than its current one and some liquidity to internal investors and shareholders that seek it. Let’s also assume that the majority of the board and shareholders are in favor of such a deal. In theory, such a deal is attractive at face value and is in the best interest of the company, and should materialize.</p><p>However, as happens many times, the deal might be in the best interest of the company, its management and some shareholders, but might not be in the best interest of a particular shareholder. Or at least it might not align with how they perceive their own interests. How can that possibly be? Well, although the deal is accretive to the company it might be perceived as decretive to a single shareholder. To name a few reasons they might perceive it that way: the deal might represent a lower valuation than the one marked in that investor’s own books, because they marked it up internally. At some firms the rules for marking up investments are quite fluid. Alternatively, the deal might result in some dilution to said investor if they cannot for some reason invest further primary money to maintain their ownership stake. Some investors focus on percentages rather than on dollar value. One could argue that both these reasons do not really explain why the deal is decretive to such an investor. Intrinsically it is accretive to them. However, suffice to say that for a myriad of reasons they believe otherwise.</p><p>If said investor was merely a passive one, simply holding shares of the company, the conflict would be limited. Assuming the rest of the shareholders and of course the board of directors see the deal as it is, accretive to the company and in its best interest, it will pass. The issues emerge when said investor has another role. Sometimes such an internal investor might also serve on the board of directors of the company. In these situations, that investor needs to cast their vote on the potential deal both as a board member and later as a shareholder. They may sometimes feel they are conflicted between different interests. The company’s best interest and their best interest as shareholders. I think they erroneously feel they need to choose between the company’s best interest and their own. Making matters worse, sometimes they choose what they perceive to be their own best interest over the company’s. Thus, they vote against the deal at the board or work to kill it some other way. Let’s not be naive. An aggressive investor, even one lacking any legal grounds, can block a deal. Bullies are everywhere.</p><p>I’d like to argue that in the hypothetical situation described, not only did the internal investor potentially miss to uphold their fiduciary duties to the company, but they have also potentially did not act in their own best interest.</p><p>The outcome they have created is bad for the company and is bad for them. What they should’ve done is vote for the deal, while wearing their board member hat, and then vote against the deal, if they’d wish, while wearing their shareholder’s hat. Better yet, they could have voted for the deal on both occasions and see how it was beneficial for them in the long term.</p><p>Before we dive into that point more broadly, it’s important to note that disagreement is a key part of corporate governance. We all reach better decisions through deliberations. As the cap table gets more complex, more interests are present. It’s part of investing, it’s part of fundraising. The key in every disagreement is to figure out a Pareto improvement, or a situation where everybody is better off or at least some parties are better off while others are not worse off. The highroad is to follow fiduciary duties, act in the best interest of the company, and find a middle ground.</p><p>Let’s explain why the outcome in our hypothetical situation is bad for all parties.</p><p>For the company and its shareholders the answer is clear. Everybody was in favor of the transaction and saw value in it. Shareholders would have enjoyed liquidity and a markup to their existing investment. The company would have received an infusion of cash to facilitate its strategy implementation. The absence of the transaction is thus worse off for the shareholders and the company.</p><p>Why is it worse off for the single investor who blocked the deal? On the face of it, they got what they wanted. But did they?</p><p>They face both legal implications and business implications to their actions.</p><p><strong><em>Legal implications</em></strong></p><p>As tech investors we usually wear two hats. As directors in the board of directors and as shareholders in the company. As such we bear multiple duties, that in some situations, might conflict. First and foremost, as board members we need to uphold our fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the company. These duties are the foundation of corporate law. They take precedent. When we vote at the board of directors on a potential decision such as a funding round, we need to consider the best interest of the corporation. This is, amongst others, how the duty of loyalty is manifested. On the other hand, when we vote as shareholders in the company’s shareholder meeting, we can consider different interests, such as our own, but even then, we are bound, according to Israeli law, to act in good faith.</p><p>Legal repercussions for failing to uphold the duty of loyalty exist. There are legal remedies against directors and board members who fail to uphold them. We see it often in the public arena where proxy fights are sometimes used to force directors and management to act in the best interest of the company and shareholders. Derivative actions are another legal option. However, no one would be surprised that such legal actions are scarce in the private world. The tech and VC industries shy away from the court rooms. Without going into the reasons for this reality, suffice to say that objectively, this is the reality. In this reality one could argue that where there is no remedy, there is no right. And perhaps that is what our hypothetical protagonist believes.</p><p>However the remedies are not always legal.</p><p><strong><em>Business implications</em></strong></p><p>Internal investors should follow fiduciary duties not only because it is good law but because it is good business.</p><p>As an example, a known tale in the local industry is that there is an early stage fund that is saved as “DO NOT ANSWER” in founders phones. They have apparently earned that title through their actions.</p><p>When investors act in their own interests and not the interests of the companies they invested in, there are repercussions. In an industry that’s built on cooperation. We seek partnerships. As investors and founders, we want to work together as board members to build value. When existing investors fail to optimize for a company’s interests, it makes it that much harder to build value. Knowing that such behavior negatively affects value creation, we tend to avoid these toxic environments.</p><p>Given the nature of our industry, investing is a “Repeated Game”, borrowing from game theory terminology. Although each investment stands on its own, we live in a small world, and a small country. Just as previous success is sometimes indicative of future success, so is previous behavior. If an actor acts in bad faith or by breaching their duty of loyalty, by blocking for instance an attractive transaction due to foreign incentives, other actors learn from those signals. The result is that other actors will avoid dealing with said bad actor. Their likelihood of making new investments will decline. Their existing investment will also suffer. The likelihood of other actors investing in those companies will decline as they will anticipate bad behavior from these bad actors. Founders, management, and investors alike, will all shy away from partnering with such bad actors. As mentioned earlier, we seek partnerships and corporations. By potentially optimizing a single occurrence of the game these bad actors are hindering their own long term outlook. They have won a fight but will lose the war.</p><p>The benefits of treating investing, from the investor perspective, and fundraising, from the company’s perspective, as repeated games is that it’s easy to see how trust is built. Have a track record of upholding fiduciary duties and other parties will want to engage. On the flip side — it’s very easy to break trust. Breach duties one time, and people will expect it in the future and try to avoid any engagement. In an industry where good news travels fast but bad news travels faster, every actor should consider how their actions are perceived by future partners. As the saying goes — if you wouldn’t like it covered in Sunday’s paper — don’t do it.</p><p><strong><em>Final note to founders</em></strong></p><p>The lessons here for investors are clear. Uphold your fiduciary duties. Act in good faith.</p><p>There are also lessons for founders.</p><p>First, diligence the fund and the investor before an investment is made. Prevention is the best medicine. Make sure that the investor seeking to invest in your company will act in the best interest of the company when push comes to shove. Seek examples of how they deal with disagreement, of which duties they follow in times of conflict.</p><p>Second, if for some reason, you find yourself in a toxic environment, where ego and outside interests govern the situation, you can always work to optimize your cap table. Structure a situation where said investor is bought out.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b1af885c2a0d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Secrets Behind Market Sizing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/the-secrets-behind-market-sizing-fb34536f73b0?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb34536f73b0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market-size]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Aug 2023 08:58:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-02T08:58:28.746Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*wlAxNoE90ozw8phN" /></figure><h4><strong><em>Why is Market Sizing Important?</em></strong></h4><p>Whether we’re talking about early stage or growth stage investing, investors are looking for similar ingredients. Three main elements are mentioned time and time again. These are necessary, but not sufficient, requirements for success. Often referred to as the 3 Ts — Team, TAM &amp; Tech.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*x7Nb2xCT6YgT5nS3h-rvzw.png" /></figure><p>Not surprisingly, investors and founders alike, look for a strong exceptional team, innovative technology with strong competitive defensible moats, and a large addressable market. The way these elements materialize is different across the stages of investment. In the beginning, investors look for potential, and as the stage gets more advanced, investors all look for the hard proofs.</p><p>So why should we dedicate this whole piece on TAM out of the top 3 requirements, which are in and of themselves only a subset of a longer list of requirements? The answer in short, is simple — it’s because it’s a shortcut and time saver. Since all the other elements are more complex to ascertain, if the venture does not pass the TAM hurdle, or in other words if the market is not large enough, there really is no reason to check the other topics.</p><p>Why is the size of the market so important? Well, that ties to the valuation of the company and the exit considerations of investors. Both early and growth stage investors look to generate returns to their own investors. As such, post investment and through their hold period they look to create value, and usually sell their holdings of the company at a profit. Given our focus in this piece is not how to value tech companies, suffice to say that the valuation is tied to current and future company performance.</p><p>A good indication of future performance is current revenue growth. Yet, if the market overall is small, even the fastest growing company has a glass ceiling in terms of revenue. There’s only so much it can sell. The portion of value tied to future performance will thus be discounted significantly as growth cannot be sustained for much longer. If the entire market is only a few hundreds of million of dollars in revenue, even a fast growing company with tens of millions in current revenue can not be valued at a high valuation. It’s potential is limited because it has a glass ceiling to its top line.</p><p>As investors, we need to have conviction that at exit, either the company can command a high enough valuation due to its current performance at that time or due to its future potential. Future potential would be high only if the company is growing fast and the glass ceiling is still far away or non-existent. This only happens when the market is sufficiently large.</p><p>As we’ll explain, assessing the size of the market is feasible, quick, and can be done with a high level of conviction as TAM has some unique qualities that make it a good candidate to be first to address:</p><ul><li><strong>Objective </strong>— It can be objectively assessed and requires little to no subjectivity</li><li><strong>Estimative </strong>— even new markets size can be estimated based on a combination of facts and assumptions, and the sensitivity of results to different assumptions can be assessed</li><li><strong>Constant </strong>— the market is usually not idiosyncratic to a specific feature of the product and will likely not change significantly over the lifespan of the company</li><li><strong>Projective </strong>— it is possible to estimate and project market trends and growth</li></ul><p>On the other hand, there are multiple reasons as to why the other requirements for success are more challenging to build conviction around. In early stage investing ascertaining the exceptional qualities of the team is not straightforward. As many studies have shown there are really no cookie cutter templates to the makeup and qualities of a successful team. From a tech or product perspective, many times the venture is still just an idea. There’s nothing to assess and even if there was, it will likely change a million times over the lifespan of the company. In growth stage investing on the other hand, assessing the existing technology against competitors is also not an easy feat. It requires technical, customer and competitor review which is expensive, timely and complex. On the team aspect, in growth stage investing, the answer of whether the team is exceptional is less of a binary decision. There are many shades of gray and a management team usually has strong players and weaker players. The question becomes multidimensional and complex.</p><h4><strong><em>How to Size the Total Addressable Market</em></strong></h4><p>There are two main ways to size TAM: top-down and bottom-up.</p><ul><li>Top-down methodology entails looking at the whole forest. We try to estimate the size of the market altogether by comparing it or deriving it from other markets.</li><li>Bottom-up methodology entails looking at a single tree or group of trees and then trying to assess the number of trees in the entire forest. In other words, we look at all the potential customers and make assumptions on contract value or pricing to estimate the total dollar value of the market.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*GJNqUxNezdHe5407" /></figure><p>The best way to explain these two methodologies is through an example. Yet before we dive in, best to highlight that both methods should lead to the same ballpark of a figure. Nevertheless, it’s always a good exercise to do both as it helps in identifying key assumptions along the way.</p><p>Also important to highlight that the math that is usually required to size markets is at elementary school level. It usually entails multiplying and dividing a few numbers. The challenge, as always, is what numbers to choose.</p><p>Without further ado let’s consider an example of a tech enabled asset manager in the music space. We choose this example because this is a relatively new market without many off the shelf reports to do the job for us. The market in question is the market for acquiring intellectual property in music. It is the combination of FinTech and Music. Recording artists, composers, producers and other entities hold rights to songs. Each time that song, composition or lyric is used, royalties are paid to the right owner. Without going in too deep, we can establish that the emergence of streaming has changed the music industry completely. From an industry that was deeply based on live shows and physical sales it has shifted to rely on consumer subscriptions in streaming platforms. These streaming platforms pay royalties to the content owners for the right to use their songs. Today, each push of a “play” button by a consumer leads to a royalty check, albeit very small, to the right’s holder. Essentially, songs or music royalties rights have turned into a fixed income type instrument. In a very simplistic way, the song is produced and then generates annual income based on the number of times it was played each year, and follows a certain decay curve until sometime, many years later, it becomes obsolete.</p><p>Very large dedicated asset managers operate in this space such as <a href="https://www.hipgnosissongs.com/">Hipgnosis</a> or <a href="https://primarywave.com/">Primary Wave</a>, to name a few. They buy royalty rights of iconic artists such as Bruce Springsteen, Bruno Mars, Taylor Swift and others, in deals reaching hundreds of million of dollars in value. Although songs by these artists represent only a fraction of the total number of songs in the market, estimated just shy of 100M today, they represent a large chunk of the revenue and value in the music industry. Not only that these catalog generate significant revenue today, these songs have a large fan base that continues to listen to them across many years. As such, these iconic music catalogs are sold today in LTM revenue multiples of 20x and even higher. The total market size of these iconic deals has surpassed $5B in 2021. However, and here is where our tech enabled asset manager comes into play, the majority of the market remains unserved. The incumbent asset managers focus on catalogs by the biggest artists, leaving unserved the mid/small-tier segments of the market. Given the manual work entailed in sourcing, pricing and managing these catalogs it’s only fitting that the incumbent non-tech players focus on the iconic artists, who’s catalogs are worth many hundreds of millions of dollars. Transaction costs are so high that only large deals make sense. However, a scalable tech enabled company could reduce transaction costs and leverage new technologies to source, price and manage smaller catalogs and even single songs. By eliminating size as a constraint, technology will allow asset managers to target the mid-tier segment of the market and buy their songs. What is the size of this segment? How do we estimate it? Let’s dive in.</p><h4><strong><em>Top Down Example</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*yTkTE2R-NH1ihyin4SZYxg.png" /></figure><p>First, it’s best to understand the different potential royalty rights and revenue streams. To simplify, let’s assume we’re focusing on the right to a specific recording of the song, sometimes referred to as a “master right”. This right is different from “publishing rights” which are attributed to the composition and the lyrics of a song. In addition, each right generates multiple revenue streams. A recording, for instance, can be played on the radio, be synced in a movie or commercial, or downloaded and listened to on a streaming platform such as Spotify. For the sake of simplicity, let’s focus on the revenue generated from Streaming alone as it accounts today for a majority of the income related to master rights of mid-tier artists. Given these two simplifications we’ve made, on the type of right and the revenue stream, we can establish that our end result will be conservative, as it only accounts for a portion of the rights and a portion of the associated revenue streams.</p><p>With this in mind, as we’re discussing a relatively new market, we look to estimate it using derivatives of established markets. This established market would be streaming. Leveraging existing research done by <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/gs-research/music-in-the-air/report.pdf">Goldman Sachs</a>, we can estimate the total size of the Streaming market in 2022 and its breakdown into the different revenue pools. We leveraged 2021 streaming market figures in Goldman’s 2022 report and adjusted these figures for market growth. The result, as can be seen in the graph, is that $23B originated from paid streaming and additional $10B from ad funded streaming. The total Streaming market is estimated at $33B annually. The breakdown of total revenue is as follows: ~$5B goes to publishers (managing publishing rights), ~$10B is captured by streaming platforms, and ~$18B is distributed to the master rights royalty holders. We calculated this breakdown based on Streaming platforms reported take rate and content costs.</p><p>On to the next step. Master royalties are mostly held by two categories of entities: label records and artists. The label records are corporations such as Sony, Universal and Warner that represent and fund artists in exchange for music equity rights. According to market data we can estimate that usually the revenues are split 70/30 between the label and the performing artist. In addition, we know that 70% of the market is dominated by the largest labels. Both these figures can be derived from industry research. The result is that only $6B in annual revenues is attributed to the small labels and the independent artists of the world. Only this portion of the market is relevant for our tech enabled player. Thus the TAM of annual revenue from streaming “master rights” for mid-tier artists is $6B.</p><p>As an asset manager we acquire rights, so we need to estimate the TAM of royalty rights acquisition. In other words, we need to assess the total potential in assets to be acquired. For this we need to tie between LTM revenue and valuation, which is the standard valuation methodology in the music IP industry. In a similar fashion to iconic artists we need to assume a certain multiple. We know from industry research and benchmarks that iconic artists catalogs are valued and acquired at a 20x multiple, and even higher. However, we’re considering a lower quality asset and also a less liquid market with significantly less competition. Both these attributes lead us to assume our tech enabled player can acquire these rights at much lower multiples. Let’s assume 5x for the purposes of this exercise. Obviously, this kind of assumption is pivotal. It will also vary on a case by case basis. For these types of assumptions, robust validation is required. In addition, it is always best to perform sensitivity analyses of the results. Applying this assumption to our LTM revenue figure results in a $30B royalty rights acquisition market.</p><p>To complete the analysis we need to consider industry benchmarks of funding and capital structure. As we’re an equity investor we need to apply the right capital structure to our asset manager and assess only the equity share of the potential market. Industry benchmark analysis shows that debt usually funds between 55–65% of the asset. These figures can be extracted from public financial statements and debt market know-how. Assuming a 55–65% debt, leaves equity at 35–45% or at $11–14B.</p><p>In conclusion, the total addressable equity market for our tech enabled asset manager in the music space today is $11–14B. To that number we can apply future projections to incorporate music market growth, streaming share growth, and so on and so forth.</p><h4><strong><em>Bottom Up Example</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*iatO14tGamEiDHw1l-7VGA.png" /></figure><p>Our bottom-up analysis is structured differently. Similar to the top-down approach, we will try to estimate the total revenue from streaming master rights that is attributed to mid-tier artists. However, we will do that by estimating how many artists fall in our target market segment and how much they make from royalties. We will then multiply that number by the same benchmark LTM multiple, apply the right capital structure and extract the equity share of the market.</p><p>Let’s begin.</p><p>From <a href="https://loudandclear.byspotify.com/">Spotify</a>’s annual reports, we know that there are over 9M artists that uploaded songs to the platform. Of those, only 200K or 2% are estimated to be professional or aspiring professionally. Those are artists that have more than 10 songs on the platform. Only a fourth of those, or roughly 60K artists, generate at least $10K in annual revenue. We establish an annual revenue of $10K to be our threshold of mid-tier artists. We set the bar there because, based on industry data, in order to generate $10K one’s songs need to be played over 3M times, considering the average pay/stream is 0.3 cents. As an interesting data point, a song that has 3M all time, not annual, streams, is in the top 0.5% of songs. All to say, this industry has a very long tale and we choose to focus on the mid-tier segment.</p><p>As indicated in the graph, based on Spotify’s data we know how many artists are in each earnings bucket. For purposes of this exercise we consider mid-tier artists as those that make between $10K and $1M off from Spotify alone. As we do not know the distribution of earnings within each group, we assume a normal distribution and mid-range average income. Multiplying the number of artists in each group with the average revenue results in a total of $5B in annual royalty revenue. Based on Spotify’s disclosures we know that only 30% of these artists distribute directly, which means they, and not the large labels own the “master rights”. In addition, we also know that Spotify commands roughly 30% of the market. Which means that these artists also generate income from other platforms such as Apple music. To complete our calculation we thus multiply the $5B by 30% (to reach independent artists) and divide by 30% (to account for the full market and not only Spotify) which brings us back to $5B in annual revenue.</p><p>As a next step, we move from annual revenue TAM to equity acquisition TAM by multiplying $5B by our LTM multiple of 5x. We then apply the appropriate capital structure and reach a total royalty equity addressable market of $9–11B.</p><p>As we can see from our bottom-up and top-down analyses, we reached a TAM estimate that is not only within the same order of magnitude but also quite close. We can also establish that the market is sufficiently large and attractive for our tech enabled asset manager. As a good rule of thumb a market needs to be larger than $1–2B to be considered attractive. It’s important to note however, as evident in this example, that the exact figure is less important. It doesn’t really matter if the market is $9B or $10B. The fact that it’s large enough is what matters. We look for directional figures, not exact ones.</p><p>To conclude this piece, we’ve put together some best practices and common pitfalls in TAM assessment to help both founders and investors in applying these methodologies to their companies.</p><h4><strong><em>Best Practices in TAM Assessment</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*BKRJI9gFIVf5PZ8P" /></figure><p>First and foremost, one should use multiple methodologies and different sources to triangulate results. To start, one should leverage existing research. Google and online sources are a good place to start. Free sources are usually sufficient but sometimes paid market research reports are also necessary. New LLM tools such as Bard or GPT can also be a fine source of information. In other words, Google is an excellent place to start. As was evident in the example above, assumptions are necessary. We never have all the exact figures and that’s ok. We need to make reasonable assumptions, be prepared to defend them and understand what is the direction of error based on the assumptions we made. We need to understand if it leads us to overestimate or underestimate the size of the market. We’re not in precise medicine and we don’t look for exact figures. We look for directional conviction.</p><p>We have not shown this in the example above but it’s critical to think about market growth and trends. It’s not enough to estimate the market today. We need to have an opinion about where it will go from here and how will it look like 5 or 10 years from now. Last but not least, the scarcity of data or off the shelf research should not be daunting. It can be a good sign that one is dealing with a new market altogether.</p><h4><strong><em>Common Pitfalls and Mistakes in TAM Assessment</em></strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*UC4tnEK1cu7n4hiU" /></figure><p>The main pitfalls many fall into is estimating the wrong market. For instance, some tech companies that operate in the ecommerce market state the size of the ecommerce market as their TAM. However, they sell tech — not clothes. In actuality their market is a derivative of the ecommerce market and is the software for ecommerce sellers market. To be precise, sometimes it is even a derivative of that in many cases.</p><p>Another common mistake involves making overly optimistic assumptions. Our advice in this regard would be to think separately about the assumptions and stress test them. In tandem, sensitivity analyses are often a good mitigation.</p><p>Lastly, oftentimes new technologies and trends are ignored in assessing TAM. For instance, new LLM applications will be sure to disrupt many markets — reducing the size of some and growing others. This should be accounted for.</p><p>Our hopes are that this piece was helpful in explaining why TAM is important, why we should focus on it initially and how to size it. As was evident, it’s far from being rocket science but it does require thought and application of some key principles.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb34536f73b0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Basics of Storytelling]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/the-basics-of-storytelling-78f052365e57?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78f052365e57</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[storytelling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Apr 2023 11:32:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-02T11:32:42.136Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fgAisOL9qTxJh1xcgTf3zQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Why the “How” is as Important as the “What”</strong></h3><p>As an investor I talk a lot about numbers. How much did the business grow? How do unit economics perform? What is the size of the market? And on and on. An outside observer, founder or CEO, might get the impression that we only care about numbers. As a big proponent of looking at the basic economic elements as early as possible, you won’t hear from me of all people that numbers are not important. However, and it’s a big “however”, numbers are not everything. The story and vision are as important as the numbers. The “how” is as important as the “what”. How you describe a company, a vision, an idea, is as important as what is the product, what is the vision or the essence of the idea.</p><p>Investing is a combination of art and science. This is true for all stages of investing. The balance probably shifts as companies mature but both elements are important. As a founder or a CEO, numbers and facts will only get you so far. You need to sell the potential of the business. You need to get investors to BELIEVE something about the future. The reason is simple. As every first year finance student will explain, current value is just current performance plus future performance discounted to present value. Even late stage investors thus need to believe something about the future. On a side note, this is true not only for investors but for customers, employees, suppliers and other partners. All in a way are buying into the future.</p><p>Nothing I say here is new. Aristotle wrote about the three modes of persuasion more than 2000 years ago. Logos, Ethos and Pathos. Storytelling is tied to all three elements but it’s mostly intertwined with Pathos. It goes without saying that every investor is looking for reason, or Logos. They want to understand what is the problem your product is solving? What is the overall market? How big is it? How is the product or the technology unique and innovative? You need to prove with facts and logic that your venture either has potential or that you’re living up to that potential, depending obviously on the stage of the company. Similarly, investors are looking for Ethos. We need to recognize that the person pitching the company has credibility. That you have what it takes to execute upon your plan, to raise the next round, to lead your team. It’s not just “what” and “how” the story is told, but also “who” is telling.</p><p>But let’s go back to Pathos. How the story is told. If you’re still not convinced it’s important I’ll leave it with this final reasoning. Some people, and some investors, have a short attention span. One driver is of course personality, but another is simply the day to day motion of being an investor. We meet many people and are pitched many ideas. To rise above the “noise”, you need to get your listener excited. You need to tap into their feelings. They need to care about what you’re trying to achieve. How to tell a story in an exciting way? In a way that elicits positive emotion? Similarly to investing, that’s also a combination of art and science.</p><h3><strong>10 Best Practices in Storytelling</strong></h3><p>As the saying goes “there are many ways to skin a cat” and there are many ways to tell a story or to present a company. There’s definitely no single right answer. However, based on my own experience and others as well, I’ve put together the following list of best practices to consider when crafting your story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*OV6rDWDJTLQZ1wZ64ht_1g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Hy_7Vp9R8sU39R-0oGbJJA.png" /></figure><p><strong>1) Know your audience</strong></p><p>First and foremost, know your audience. This is true if you’re pitching to investors but also if you’re selling your product to customers or if you’re trying to recruit talent. It’s pivotal to answer questions such as: Who is your audience? What do they care about? What is top of mind for them? If it’s a customer, ask what is their main concern? or what is the problem they’re trying to solve? If it’s an investor, ask what are they looking for? What are they passionate about? put your audience first. If the story you’re telling ties to their 6th and not their 1st priority, you lost the game. You’ll only get through if you truly help THEM.</p><p>Another key element to consider is culture. Goes without saying that different presentation modes and different storytelling work well with different cultures. Less of an action item, it is something to bear in mind and make sure your behavior is aligned with your audience’s cultural expectations.</p><p><strong>2) Choose the setup (who, when, where)</strong></p><p>After you’ve thought about your audience it’s best to think about the setup. Where is the meeting taking place? Do you prefer in person or over Zoom? What medium will suit you best? There are pros and cons to each. Zoom is by far more efficient from a time management perspective. Yet as many agree, some interpersonal elements get lost in the way. The choice of medium or venue will depend heavily on your goals or what you’re trying to achieve.</p><p>Beyond the medium, it’s also important to think about timing. On one hand, you never want to be a dollar short or a day late. On the other hand, being too pushy in scheduling has its downside as well. It’s a fine balance between being overly eager and too aloof.</p><p>Next, consider who, from your end, is pitching. Too many times I’ve been in meetings where people are present but do not say a word. Don’t be a plant. If someone is in the meeting they need to be active. If they have nothing to say or contribute, better to not be at the meeting at all. It sends the wrong message. So if several people from the company attend the meeting, whether it’s with investors, customers or whomever, make sure they have a role.</p><p><strong>3) Align on your goals and define success</strong></p><p>Be very clear on what you’re trying to achieve from every specific meeting. The idea is to articulate what, in your perspective, would constitute a successful meeting. The emphasis here is on a particular meeting. Obviously, when we talk about the whole process defining success is relatively clear. When pitching to an investor, securing an investment is usually the definition of success. Similarly, when selling to a customer, a final sale is usually the definition of success. These are easy. Yet processes are usually more like a marathon than a sprint. It’s better to make sure every step will propel you in the ultimate direction you’re seeking. Thus, it’s important to articulate before each meeting what it is that you’re trying to achieve. These goals can range from getting to know the investors, sparking their interest, building relationships, all the way to securing a “yes” from an investment committee. Your specific goals will dictate your overall storytelling and specifically what elements in the story should be emphasized.</p><p><strong>4) Decide between top down or bottom up structure</strong></p><p>Next, you need to decide how to tell the story. Beginning, middle and end. From my experience there are two main ways — deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is top-down and starts with the overall picture. You start with a statement that tells the whole story. In other words you start with your main argument, and then provide examples. For instance, a pitch based on deductive reasoning could start with an overview of the company, key metrics, and future proforma. Only afterwards the TAM, problem being solved, product, and other elements will be covered. A pitch based on inductive reasoning on the other hand is very different. It could start with describing a problem, then covering the market, showcasing the product, and only then discussing overall how the company is doing, where it’s headed, and what is its mission.</p><p>Like other elements on this list there is no right answer to the question of “how to build your pitch?”. It depends on your personal style, what your audience prefers, the duration of the meeting, its location, and the stage of the company, amongst others.</p><p><strong>5) Deliver your main points early on</strong></p><p>Irrespective of the storytelling structure you choose, it’s pivotal that your main points are delivered early. As mentioned before your audience needs to get excited about what you’re selling. If they don’t know what it is — it’s hard to get excited. All too many times, 30 minutes into the meetings it’s still not clear to us what is it that you do. Achieving this is especially challenging when inductive reasoning is chosen. Yet even then, the way to overcome this challenge is to build up quickly to what you’re solving for and then expand. Basically, this approach has two motions. Relatively quick inductive approach and then another more elaborate inductive sequence.</p><p><strong>6) Don’t forget about the “why”</strong></p><p>This next element might seem trivial but it’s a trap many seem to stumble into. Make sure your story includes the problem that you’re solving for. What is the catalyst for your company’s existence? Think about the “why”. Many technical leaders sometimes fall in love with the technology they’ve built. However, if it doesn’t solve a real problem, the likelihood of success is slim. The mentality of “if we build it they would come” rarely works.</p><p><strong>7) Iterate as you go</strong></p><p>It’s hard to get it right the first time so iterate as you go. Every meeting is an opportunity to improve the story even further. Actively listen to your audience. Is it easy for them to follow each building block of the story? Do they get confused? Do they get excited? Adapt your story based on the questions and feedback you get along the way. For instance, maybe you chose deductive reasoning and people don’t get excited. Consider switching. Or vice versa.</p><p><strong>8) Test your logic</strong></p><p>Storytelling focuses a lot on emotion, on Pathos, but Logos is equally as important. Test your logic and make sure your reasoning is sound. This is relevant for different elements of the story. From the connection between the features of the product you’re developing to the problem they’re trying to solve, through calculating the size of the market, or budgeting for the next two years.</p><p><strong>9) Plan but be flexible</strong></p><p>Once you’ve crafted your story, tested and iterated it, you’re obviously ready for the next pitch. You’ve planned and prepared as much as possible. But don’t be stiff. Be flexible and let the audience navigate the conversation. Borrowing from Amazon’s principle of being customer obsessed, be audience obsessed. At the end of the day, you’re there for THEM.</p><p><strong>10) Be authentic</strong></p><p>Last but not least — be authentic. Craft your story in a way that suits you. Authenticity builds trust and trust is key. As people say “be yourself, everyone else is already taken”.</p><p>With these 10 storytelling best practices I’ve covered a lot, but obviously this is not an exhaustive list. Nevertheless, it can be a good place to start when you’re thinking about your next pitch, to whomever. Good luck!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78f052365e57" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Growth is nice but here’s what really matters: the resurgence of “Unit Economics”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rotem.vc/growth-is-nice-but-heres-what-really-matters-the-resurgence-of-unit-economics-fa765822d0f6?source=rss-bc9f90a16a58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa765822d0f6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unit-economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rotem Shacham]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:37:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-10T12:17:18.194Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qlONIJCmklqBn3lHmlKDWA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In 2021/22 growth was king. Investors and founders alike were focused on reaching higher growth at all costs. With low interest rates money was cheap. By the end of 2022 and as the beginning of 2023 has unfolded, the macro environment turned upside down. We’re witnessing a “back to basics” mentality. Growth on its own is not the best indicator for value anymore. Profitable growth in general, and efficiency in particular, are regaining their rightful place alongside growth on the throne of leading KPIs.</p><p>As investors and founders are looking to create sustainable growth, this means we all should drop our fixation on top line growth alone and revisit some forgotten concepts of Unit Economics. These are the fundamental building blocks of sustainable profitable growth.</p><h3><strong>What are Unit Economics and Why are They Important?</strong></h3><p>There are many definitions for Unit Economics. For our purposes Iet us define them as the following:</p><p><strong><em>The direct revenues generated from selling one unit of product or service compared to the variable costs incurred from selling that unit.</em></strong></p><p>As one notices, unit economics is a way of analyzing the company in a relatively steady state. We assume the product, or some version of it, is ready and we focus on the marginal benefit and costs from selling an additional unit of that product or service. This does not mean that only mature companies should spend time analyzing their unit economics. In a similar fashion, young companies should review the progression of these indicators and improve them over time.</p><p>This view of marginal benefits and associated costs is extremely important because of several basic premises of the way tech startups grow and deliver value:</p><ol><li><strong>Costs are usually antecedent to revenues</strong> as investments are required in both Research &amp; Development (R&amp;D) and Sales &amp; Marketing (S&amp;M). Founders need to first build a product and then market and sell it to prospective customers before any revenue is recognized.</li><li><strong>Revenues are generated over time</strong>, either because customers repeat or because customers use the product or service over multiple periods.</li><li><strong>Startups are thus loss generating at first</strong>, and it takes time to recoup the initial development and sales costs.</li><li><strong>All valuation methodologies assume positive free cash flows</strong> at some point in the future to reach a positive NPV or net positive value.</li><li><strong>Positive unit economics</strong>, with revenues <em>significantly</em> higher than variable costs, are thus the only way to achieve positive NPV.</li></ol><p>Unit economics provide a growth and efficiency focused perspective that can span several time periods to assess value creation.</p><p>Before we continue to the nitty gritty of calculating unit economics and leveraging it to create value, we should first consider a few heuristics of the cost structure of tech companies.</p><p>A basic fundamental in economics is that scale brings along benefits. Meaning, that as revenues grow, costs grow to a lesser extent. For tech companies this is also true, but not for all cost buckets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d8FAhjdS55QuJ8Dy" /></figure><p>This assertion is true for G&amp;A costs. Whether the company is small or large it will usually need only one CEO, one CFO, one CTO, etc. These costs as percentage of revenue will thus decrease. This is also true for R&amp;D costs. As the company grows R&amp;D creates assets which last over time. Although revisions, alterations and enhancements are always necessary, companies don’t rewrite their code architecture every single year from scratch.</p><p>Unlike G&amp;A and R&amp;D, there are two major cost buckets that do not enjoy scale benefits in tech companies. These are Cost of Revenue and S&amp;M. Although Gross Margins usually improve over time they reach saturation. There is only so much optimization that can be done to cloud costs and support. Similarly S&amp;M tend to grow linearly with revenue. In Enterprise B2B companies sales usually rests on the performance of account executives. AEs can usually handle only a certain quota (let’s say $1M as a rule of thumb). Experience shows that as companies mature, rather than significantly increasing quota per AE, the path for growth entails hiring more AEs. As the sale process is many times labor intensive with demo calls, product exploration and negotiations, it does not scale with size in a material way. In a similar fashion, B2C companies that mostly use digital marketing and self-serve for their sale processes, also enjoy very limited scale benefits. Marketing channels tend to show diminishing RoI once a certain size has been reached.</p><p>As different cost buckets exhibit different characteristics, and considering our focus on the marginal costs in the Unit Economics perspective, when discussing variable parameters it’s best to mostly consider Cost of Revenue and S&amp;M.</p><h3><strong>Calculating Unit Economics — More than One Way to Skin the Cat</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_SiKK23mkqWpbr22" /></figure><p>Unit Economics are a concept rather than a specific formula. As such, there are multiple ways to think about unit economics and to compare between the direct revenues and variable costs. Based on my experience there are 3 main ways to assess unit economics, considering 3 different elements as the “unit”: the customer view, the dollar view and the product view.</p><h3>Customer Based Unit Economics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bAtc3t_Z6rG1GnWY" /></figure><p>In this perspective of unit economics we’re trying to ascertain the value generated for every additional customer onboarded. The main metrics include: ACV, LTV and CAC and their relationship in the form of LTV divided by CAC. With this calculation we’re trying to understand the relationship between the cost to onboard a customer (CAC) and the value that that customer provides to the company over their lifetime, calculated as their net revenue (revenue times gross margins) divided by churn. Although the value of CAC and ACV vary between business models, a good rule of thumb for LTV/CAC would be larger than 3x.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LWq3_RIWM_NPuENT" /></figure><p>To understand the benefit of looking at LTV/CAC let’s use an example. We see two companies with very different characteristics. Company A is a good example for one that sells a software product for SMBs. It has a relatively low ACV of $20K and a corresponding low CAC of $20K. With 75% gross margin and a churn of 33% (not out of the ordinary for SMBs) it yields an LTV of 50K. Company B is a good example for one that sells a software product for Enterprises. It has a robust ACV of $50K yet with a high CAC of $80K. As a side note — having a higher CAC than ACV is not unusual for Enterprise B2B companies. With similar gross margins to Company A and a lower churn of 10%, Company B yields an LTV of $375K. As Company B delivers a significantly higher LTV/CAC compared to Company A, 4.7 vs. 2.5 respectively, it will produce significantly more value from the same S&amp;M spend. The graph on the right depicts a hypothetical investment of $1M of S&amp;M spend in each company and tracks the cumulative cash generated from it. Assuming some relaxing assumptions that customers are onboarded immediately we can see that by year 5 Company B significantly outpaces Company A. Although the same $1M could onboard significantly more customers with Company A, because the relative value of each customer is higher, in a long term perspective, Company B produces significantly more value.</p><h3>Dollar Based Unit Economics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*qBq5MSmIHXxqzM8fnvrNQg.png" /></figure><p>Dollar based unit economics answer a different set of questions than customer based. They aim to ascertain how efficient the S&amp;M spend is. In other words, they aim to assess how much revenue or gross profit each dollar of S&amp;M generates. The flip side of that assessment is answering the question of how long does it take to recoup the acquisition spend on a net profit basis. The main metrics used in the dollar based unit economics assessment are thus Magic Number or CAC ratio and Payback period. A good target for magic number and CAC ratio would be &gt;1 and &gt;0.75 respectively. These are rough figures and there are more refined benchmarks based on different companies characteristics. For the payback period a good benchmark for B2B Enterprise type businesses is less than 12–18 months. In a similar fashion one can find more granular benchmarks for this metric as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1wRDI7ZSUT_gljSV" /></figure><p>To understand the benefits of looking at dollar based unit economics or at the efficiency of S&amp;M spend, let’s use another hypothetical example. In this example we have two companies, Company C and Company D. These two companies have the same LTV/CAC yet with very different payback periods. Company C has an acquisition cost of $30K and yields $80K in ACV. Company C has a very high churn rate (for example purposes only) of 40% and gross margin of 75%. Combining it all with the assumption of equal distribution of revenue across the year, Company C’s payback period is 6 months. Based on Company D’s figures, it has a much longer payback period of 18 months.</p><p>Although both companies exhibit the same LTV/CAC, and generate the same long term value from that perspective, their cash needs are significantly different. Put it differently, Company C will require significantly less cash to operate. The graph on the right hand side depicts the cumulative cash needs over 36 months for both companies, assuming an equal $50K monthly acquisition spend on S&amp;M. As can be seen in the graph, Company C will need less than $0.5M of funding to fund this particular go-to-market plan and will reach break-even on a variable basis in the projected period. In comparison, Company D will need almost 3 times as much funding, and will be quite far from break-even by the end of the 3rd year. As cash and equity are becoming scarcer this is a very important difference.</p><h3>Product Based Unit Economics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Do6zIqjmLmt7uc63" /></figure><p>Last but not least are product based unit economics. This perspective is especially helpful in more mature companies where multiple product lines exist. Comparing the contribution margin of various product lines can highlight which ones are accretive and which ones are dilutive. Contribution margin examines over the time the additional value generated from each product line, subtracting from revenue both initial S&amp;M and Cost of Revenue. As S&amp;M are a heavy burden, from the 2nd year onward, a good benchmark would be higher than 60%.</p><h3><strong>Leveraging Unit Economics for Efficient Growth</strong></h3><p>Hopefully by now everyone can see that analyzing unit economics dictates no more than elementary school math. We’re multiplying and dividing a few numbers. That’s it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AwL6ThVPAQTnI3qW" /></figure><p>Yet the process of analyzing unit economics can be extremely impactful and beneficial to companies. Calculating unit economics and tracking them over time can be a great tool in identifying issues and deciding where to invest resources. It can shine a light on deciding which levers to pull.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9g1RpkKIbkNfAXzb" /></figure><p>The slide above encompasses a non-exhaustive list of a few examples of what potentially can be done if LTV/CAC is too low or if the payback period is too long. It goes without saying that this list is just the beginning.</p><p>Adopting a practice of analyzing unit economics should be table stakes for any founder or investor, especially in times like these.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa765822d0f6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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