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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rasheed on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rasheed on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Avalanche of DeFi: Struct.fi and Pollen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-struct-fi-and-pollen-19ad0715b627?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19ad0715b627</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[avalanche]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 May 2022 15:17:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-03T18:50:25.856Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Up9c1gxz4hBiMTjt2RD-hw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Struct.fi — Fixed rates and structured products</strong></h3><p>Arrow’s options will be useful for many trading and investing strategies that are already in use on Ethereum and in TradFi. StakeDAO, which is already on Avalanche, and <a href="https://app.ribbon.finance/v2/theta-vault/T-ETH-C">Ribbon</a> are the major players in <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/08/covered-call.asp">covered call</a> and put writing strategies.</p><p>But there are other structured products that can be created using options. In TradFi that usually involves investing in a zero-coupon bond plus an option on a risky asset (e.g., ETH) to create what is known as a principal protected note.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/998/0*TWVBYJFOzYyd5PZl" /></figure><p>No matter how poorly the option performs, the investor will always get 100% of their original investment back. If the underlying does well the returns could well exceed the initial investment. The blue line path gives 20% return, while the orange path gives 0% return.</p><p>Creating the zero coupon or fixed rate asset is the first challenge in creating such structures, and <a href="https://www.struct.fi/">Struct.fi</a> is focused on that use case before moving on to the structuring. As they stated in their <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/press-releases/struct-finance-secures-39m-for-structured-products-in-defi">seed round announcement</a>,</p><blockquote>Struct Finance will use this fresh injection of capital to build the tools for institutions to easily customize interest rate products and compose them with options to construct structured products better-suited to the profiles of different investors.</blockquote><p>Fixed rate protocols on other chains are a dime-a-dozen, and have already crossed over into Avalanche. Generally, they split a yield token into a fixed rate token and a residual.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*y68pt_onoys0k18z" /><figcaption>Source: Messari.io (original by author)</figcaption></figure><p>Struct uses as an example the USDX-AVAX pool on TraderJoe. A saver can receive a 15% fixed yield for three months on a USD-pegged stablecoin deposit, without taking impermanent loss risk (see below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*P-olQBh3_r8lI50i" /></figure><p>The floating tokenholder gets a leveraged position in the yield farm, while taking extra risk to the AVAX token. This leveraged yield investment cannot be liquidated. Effectively the fixed rate investor is financing the leverage to term.</p><p>At current Trader Joe AVAX-USDC pool yields, Struct’s example yield token offers an annualized 55% return over the three months.</p><p>While there are many different ways to <a href="https://messari.io/article/trading-future-yield-now?referrer=author:rasheed-saleuddin">split yields</a>, Struct’s tech resembles <a href="https://ondo.finance/">Ondo Finance</a> on Ethereum, where TVL has been growing rapidly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HEGReZlVT7A7yjl2" /></figure><p>But token splitting is only the first product on the roadmap for Struct.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ig6tYuSeOVGR5OL8" /></figure><p>The protocol will also become an aggregator for cryptoasset options pricing and trading, offering structured products combining fixed rate and yield tokens with crypto options.</p><p><strong>Preferred partners, and eventually anyone, will be able to construct and manage any complex instrument or strategy that can be created from the primitives supplied by Struct and partners.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dq-hNkIQ4X3oEIUK" /></figure><p>Between Arrow and Struct, Avalanche will have decentralized options, fixed rate investment opportunities and complex structured products. More gaps in Avalanche DeFi filled.</p><h3>Pollen DeFi — Crypto funds, for everyone</h3><p>While options and structured products are integral elements of TradFi, fund management is truly the “killer app” for retail investors. Exchange traded funds democratize diversified portfolio allocation at low cost. Active management, though shrinking, still provides enough demand for trillion-dollar firms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AYZDCEys8YtJuMeI" /><figcaption>Source: ADV Ratings</figcaption></figure><p>TradFi managers are indeed huge. Blackrock is around 8% the size of the entire global equity market capitalization, though of course they have fixed income and other non-equity mandates as well. Ten companies manage more than $ 2 trillion each.</p><p>Cryptoasset fund products, on the other hand, have lagged the general market, perhaps because most crypto natives are quite happy actively managing their own portfolios, and can afford the often outrageous gas fees to transact. With the whole crypto market cap around $2 trillion, the largest on-chain fund management protocol has less than $300 million in TVL, 0.15% of total. Grayscale is the largest off-chain manager at around 40 billion, or 2% of total crypto market cap.</p><p>The next generation of crypto investors are not going to be quite as sophisticated, or as wealthy, as the OGs. One would think that retail investors would therefore be very interested in finding experienced and knowledgeable investment managers to help them navigate the risky waters of crypto.</p><p>Indeed, this potential for decentralized ETF and active investing has attracted a lot of new projects in the space. We chose to invest in <a href="https://pollen.id/">Pollen</a>, an on-chain portfolio management platform on Avalanche, primarily due to its unique formula for identifying top managers in a transparent and gamified manner.</p><p>On Pollen, anyone can become a “Pollenator”, and set up a portfolio — permissionlessly and at low cost — by simply staking native PLN tokens. “Delegators” can stake their PLN with any manager. Both will earn PLN tokens if the portfolio does well. Tokens will be burned if not.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SndDsmZyzda-PAXh" /></figure><p>So far, this is like <a href="https://pollen.id/">fantasy football</a>. Portfolios are virtual, rather than asset-backed, and earnings are in PLN only. Over time, however, <strong>winners will watch their Reputation Score increase, and high scores should attract the attention of investors</strong>.</p><p>Once Pollen’s asset-backed indexes feature is live later this year, investors will be able to buy into portfolios set up and managed by top Pollenators via index tokens. These portfolios will be on-chain, transparent, and, perhaps most importantly, low cost.</p><p>Not only are there no running management fees, gas fees can be shared amongst all investors. Additionally, index managers and investors will be splitting profits (or losses) 80/20, so sharing both rewards and risk.</p><p>Data collected via virtual portfolios can inform decision-making for the asset-backed indexes, should index managers choose to use those signals.</p><p>This “trade to earn” gamification has an important benefit in that it identifies individuals in the crypto community who outperform. Though past performance does not necessarily imply future outperformance, following the best historical managers also forces discipline on investors, who might otherwise tend to overtrade, or fall victim to far worse traps such as rug pulls or hacks.</p><p>Aventures is pleased to be backing both <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/press-releases/struct-finance-secures-39m-for-structured-products-in-defi">Struct.fi</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/AventuresDao/status/1471956533349171205?s=20&amp;t=DS5livQcDvgBIbfM9sz_9w">Pollen</a>.</p><p>Next, Valk…</p><p><strong><em>About Rasheed</em></strong></p><p>Rasheed Saleuddin, PhD CFA is an advisor/angel/VC with Aventures, TheBoringDAO and the Cosmic Cartel, as well as independently. He is also co-chair of the University of Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) DeFi research steering committee.</p><p><strong><em>About AVentures</em></strong></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aventuresdao.io/&amp;sa=D&amp;source=editors&amp;ust=1645302342490326&amp;usg=AOvVaw2L65V0JTpOzEtB4x9_hu61">AVentures</a> is an investment DAO composed of OG Avalanche community members on a mission to support the ecosystem. The team boasts multiple successful blockchain developers and project owners, content creators, advisors and domain experts that have come together to channel our expertise to support the Avalanche ecosystem.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19ad0715b627" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-struct-fi-and-pollen-19ad0715b627">An Avalanche of DeFi: Struct.fi and Pollen</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/aventures">AVentures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Avalanche of DeFi: Arrow Markets]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-arrow-markets-86394e498ae0?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86394e498ae0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2022 18:02:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-29T15:27:44.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just because there is an apparent gap in the Avalanche DeFi ecosystem, does not mean that just anybody can fill it, or even that it needs to be filled. Of course, the opposite is also true. Just because there are already competitors in a space does not mean that a new competitor can’t win.</p><p>We at Aventures are looking for teams that have the capacity and knowledge to set them themselves apart from <em>any</em> competition, current or future. As Avalanche OGs and active community members, we add support as a service in addition to our funding.</p><p>In Part II I covered <a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-part-ii-732da2ac11eb">Dexalot</a>, who will profit from its layer 1’s fast finality to bring order book market making and fair launches to Avalanche. While they are certainly filling a niche, it’s the team and the technology that impress us. They also have the community. But, if they didn’t, we could help with that as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Kwm3PyK60iQ_CaMa" /></figure><p>This week I’ll be presenting several of our other core DeFi investments, Struct and Pollen, as well as two protocols we are very excited about: Valk and Arrow. Each addresses a niche that was previously empty.</p><h3>2. Arrow Markets — Options without the middleman</h3><p>A <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_option">call option</a> is the right but not the obligation to buy a fixed amount of an underlying asset at a fixed price (the “strike”) over a pre-determined time horizon (up to or at “expiry”). A put option is a right to sell the underlying. There is evidence of active trading of both in the <a href="https://www.worldsfirststockexchange.com/2021/01/22/confusion-de-confusiones-1688-a-historical-stock-exchange-drama/">17th century</a>, though they may originate earlier than this.<br>It wasn’t until the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black%E2%80%93Scholes_model">Black-Scholes-Merton</a> model circulated in the 1970s that traders felt confident enough to make prices on any option on any liquid underlying. That confidence turned out to be <a href="https://docs.arrow.markets/options-advanced/limitations-of-bsm-model">misplaced</a>, and workarounds were invented after the Crash of 1987.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*e5H5VDtYG7c3Tq5H" /><figcaption>Source: Thorp and Kassouf, Black and Scholes, Cboe</figcaption></figure><p>Options allow speculators to add downside-protected leverage to a long market direction position, by buying a put when bearish or buying a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_option">call</a> when bullish. On the other hand, options sellers (writers) can earn income by taking the other side.</p><p>The TradFi options markets are enormous. On the largest exchange, the <a href="https://www.cboe.com/us/options/overview/">Cboe</a>, Apple options on 441 million shares traded in December 2021 alone. This doesn’t take into account the over-the-counter (OTC = non-exchange traded) options markets, which are even larger. OTC options on swaps, for example, traded more than $1 <em>trillion</em> in notional in <a href="https://www.clarusft.com/swaption-volumes-by-strike-q1-2021/">Q1 2021</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aCvpGSmnsT2MU-rx" /><figcaption>Source: Cboe, NASDAQ</figcaption></figure><p>As crypto natives tend to be very interested in leveraged speculation as well as in earning yield, options seem a perfect product for DeFi in general, and Avalanche currently hasn’t any native alternative. Arrow markets plans to be the first native options protocol on the Avalanche blockchain.</p><p>Paradigm, an OTC desk, currently dominates crypto options trading, executing $9 billion last month, primarily through the centralized <a href="https://www.deribit.com/options/BTC">Deribit</a> exchange. BTC options alone on Deribit accounted for $400 million in volume on an average day last month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hORbKTn66kOTU_B6" /><figcaption>BTC options volume on Deribit</figcaption></figure><p>Decentralized alternatives have also been gaining momentum, especially where they form the primitives on which structured product and strategies are based. Ribbon Finance and StakeDAO, for example, execute their automated strategies using the Opyn option DEX.</p><p>Options on Ethereum and Solana are indeed growing quickly, and the market gets more competitive with each new entrant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mjaqrhsQs8JvgOKr" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama. Protocol websites</figcaption></figure><p>Activity of Avalanche so far has been limited to a few of the largest cross-chain competitors, with no native protocols launched to date. That’s where <a href="https://www.arrow.markets/">Arrow Markets</a> comes in.</p><p>Compared to TradFi, and even to the dominant centralized exchange Deribit, decentralized options protocol traction has been somewhat disappointing. Two days of Deribit volume exceeds the entire TVL in the decentralized space. Arrow Markets aims to overcome the many headwinds by deploying on Avalanche, using an Automated Market Maker (AMM), and developing a novel pricing and risk management mechanism.</p><h4>Automated Market Maker for options, for maximum flexibility</h4><p>The first main issue with many options platforms is they rely on order matching (through a request for quote (RFQ) or order book). For a user to trade on Opyn or Friktion, another user with an opposite need must be found, or a professional market maker must step in. Other protocols, such as Dopex and Thetanuts, rely on option selling vaults for liquidity for option buyers, limiting the flexibility the platform can offer to traders.</p><p>Arrow, along with Hegic and Zeta, uses an automated market maker to provide flexibility to option buyers and sellers alike. Arrow’s AMM can provide liquidity for any option, so that any derivative on an underlying asset can theoretically be traded on the Arrow platform. There will be no need to find a matching buyer for every seller and vice versa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GyYFNQQDfXO2udir" /></figure><p>Any new option is valued with a utility-based indifference pricing engine. These complicated calculations are done off chain, but it is a priority on Arrow’s roadmap to bring them in some way, perhaps using a subnet with a custom VM.</p><p>If the trader wishes to execute at a price quoted by Arrow’s AMM, the trade is added to the pool, and any residual risk to the underlying asset is “delta” hedged by buying or selling in the spot markets. <strong>The AMM therefore allows buyers and sellers to act without any market makers or any other gatekeeping and fee-taking middlemen.</strong></p><h4>Partially collateralized</h4><p>Decentralized options are generally extremely capital inefficient. While option buyers only need to pay the (relatively small) premium upfront, options sellers usually need to be fully collateralized for any future liability they may have. In the case of selling call options, that obligation is technically unlimited. Arrow will be one of the few protocols to allow for partial collateralization. An insurance fund steps in if the collateral for each underlying asset is not enough to pay off all obligations.</p><h4>Complexity hidden from the UX</h4><p>Arrow’s Testnet reveals a very elegant UX that shields the user from the complex calculations and market transactions occurring behind the scenes. Options strategies are recommended based on simple parameters. The optimal position, according to Arrow’s Testnet, for a speculator that believes AVAX will rise 10% within 2 months is a 2 month call option with a strike price of $76. No need to understand the complicated option “greeks” or option pricing theory at all.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GQQ0hSWesY0fhwP2" /></figure><p>The market for options in TradFi is huge relative to the size of the spot markets. Deribit’s success in ETH and BTC proves that options on crypto assets are also popular. Centralized options risk the ire of regulators, however. Americans, Japanese, Koreans and residents of Canada’s most popular province <a href="https://www.deribit.com/kb/deribit-restricted-countries">cannot use Deribit</a>. Europe, so far, has not cracked down on crypto options., though regulatory action is on the horizon. Decentralized derivatives may offer a solution, for now.</p><p>Avalanche currently has almost no options volume, and even the top DeFi protocols have limitations. We believe Arrow Markets could become the dominant decentralized options platform, on Avalanche and beyond.</p><p>Next… Struct.fi</p><p><strong><em>About Rasheed</em></strong></p><p>Rasheed Saleuddin, PhD CFA is an ex-hedge fund manager and experienced crypto angel, currently investing and advising with AventuresDAO, TheBoringDAO and the Cosmic Cartel. He is also a researcher at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School, where he is co-chair of the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) DeFi research steering committee.</p><p><strong><em>About AVentures</em></strong></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aventuresdao.io/&amp;sa=D&amp;source=editors&amp;ust=1645302342490326&amp;usg=AOvVaw2L65V0JTpOzEtB4x9_hu61">AVentures</a> is an investment DAO composed of OG Avalanche community members on a mission to support the ecosystem. The team boasts multiple successful blockchain developers and project owners, content creators, advisors and domain experts that have come together to channel our expertise to support the Avalanche ecosystem.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86394e498ae0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-arrow-markets-86394e498ae0">An Avalanche of DeFi: Arrow Markets</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/aventures">AVentures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[An Avalanche of DeFi, Part II]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-part-ii-732da2ac11eb?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/732da2ac11eb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[avalanche]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2022 21:22:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-01T20:10:49.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>AVenturesDAO in action, and the adventures of Dexalot</h4><p>Hopefully you’ve made it through <a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-5fe98d5bb5f8">Part 1</a> of the <a href="https://aventuresdao.io/">AVentures</a> take on DeFi, and have been waiting patiently for Part 2 of my deep dive.</p><p>In Part 1, I covered the evolution of DeFi primitives on Ethereum and Avalanche, and where the ecosystem now stands with respect to token trading infrastructure. Remember: 80% of the entire DeFi ecosystem, as measured by total value locked (<a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/glossary/total-value-locked-tvl">TVL</a>), consists of DEXs, lending/borrowing (including CDP stables), bridging and yield aggregating . A good portion of the liquid staking TVL is also driven by borrowing/lending (Lido’s <a href="https://lido.fi/terra">bLUNA</a> on <a href="https://app.anchorprotocol.com/">Anchor</a>), so the DeFi basics account for nearer 90% of all capital allocated to DeFi.</p><p>There is of course more to TradFi and crypto capital markets than just trading facilitation, however, and every chain that claims to offer a full DeFi ecosystem needs to build on top of the primitives. A full product suite of DeFi Dapps beyond the primitives covered in <a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-5fe98d5bb5f8">Part 1</a> would need to include options, perpetuals, price and smart contract insurance, and structured products. This second layer of DeFi — a small, yet crucial part of the whole ecosystem–allows users to seamlessly access all aspects of crypto capital markets from any layer 1 blockchain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ig0bjb8B8TtMRES0" /><figcaption>The primitives for trading (excluding liquid staking, which is less relevant for AVAX)account for over 90% of DeFi TVL. Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>Indeed with effective bridging, even assets native to other chains can easily be utilized on Avalanche if the tools exist. Once on Avalanche, there should be little need to move on.</p><p>Of course, there are other needs DeFi can meet that don’t relate to replicating the TradFi financial system for crypto-native assets. In Part 4 I cover entirely new use cases for DeFi, including facilitating real world assets.</p><p>Here in Part 2, and again in Part 3 of this four part series, I outline Avalanche’s ongoing needs as it replicates and expands on Ethereum’s full DeFi offering, and then develop AVenture’s DeFi investment thesis, illustrated through the latest AVentures-backed DeFi projects.</p><h4><strong>DeFi continued: Where are the customers’ yachts?</strong></h4><blockquote>Once in the dear dead days beyond recall, an out-of-town visitor was being shown the wonders of the New York financial district. When the party arrived at the Battery, one of his guides indicated some handsome ships riding at anchor. He said,</blockquote><blockquote>“Look, those are the bankers’ and brokers’ yachts.”</blockquote><blockquote>“Where are the customers’ yachts?” asked the naive visitor.</blockquote><ul><li>Ancient story (as published in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Where-Are-Customers-Yachts-Street/dp/0471770892">Where Are the Customers’ Yachts</a>)</li></ul><p>Fred Schwed originally published his book on the disintermediation of investors in 1940. For the most part, present-day markets demonstrate remarkable continuity, except on two fronts: the markets are much bigger and the fees are much higher.</p><p>Indeed, the TradFi system is heavily centralized, trusted and lucrative. Broker-dealers and the largest fund companies stand in between investors and financial products, issuers and markets. Information is gated: Much of the best is private or, at the very least, very difficult to access. Aggregated public and some private data are for sale by the giant fintechs of the markets, such as Bloomberg. Gatekeeping in financial services, in almost any form, is highly profitable. Goldman Sachs, just one such intermediary, earned over $20 billion on $60 billion in revenues in 2021, a record year.</p><p>Goldman and others gatekeep a wide variety of products and services that range far beyond the DeFi primitives in Part 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9UFfnKf7d3x7V38K" /></figure><p>Having so many intermediaries with pricing power generates huge inefficiencies that the financial industry can exploit. Two examples are indicative of the power asymmetry in TradFi: the practice of repackaging assets into structured products for a fee, and shutting down Robinhood’s right to trade Gamestop. Additionally, a lack of transparency allows risks to build up until they eventually threaten to collapse the system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*odGWxOQWcabhFjNV" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/citadel-under-fire-over-its-role-in-gamestop-trading-20210929">Financial News</a>. <a href="https://twitter.com/fintechfrank/status/1503910469828026373">Twitter.</a> Creative Commons</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Expanding trading infra and tools</strong></h4><p>DeFi promises to disintermediate markets, reduce friction, and remove the need to rely on custodians and brokers as trusted parties. The first primitives replicated the basic TradFi tools for investing, offering a more secure environment to trade, leverage and short cryptoassets than the rickety and often fly-by-night earliest exchanges.</p><p>Though the basic primitives dominate TVL in DeFi, there are many other financial instruments that need to exist for the cryptoasset markets to be complete. Ethereum and, occasionally, other layer 1s have been leading the way with:</p><ul><li>order-book DEXs</li><li>options markets</li><li>fixed rate and tranching protocols</li><li>indexes and managed fund platforms</li><li>structured products</li><li>insurance providers</li><li>investment tools</li><li>incubators</li><li>liquid staking</li></ul><p>All of these sectors are big business on Ethereum and select other chains (e.g. order book DEXs on Solana). DeFi insurance, for example, is over $1 billion in TVL. Yet on Avalanche, there are few successful DeFi projects beyond the primitives. But they are (mostly) on their way.</p><p><strong>Our fundamental investment thesis for DeFi on Avalanche is to back high-quality teams, that are themselves supported by the community, in each of the DeFi sub-sectors we identified above.</strong></p><p>As AVenturesDAO co-founder Tamer has put it,</p><blockquote>We believe the next wave of growth in DeFi will be from Options, Perpetuals and Structured Finance.</blockquote><p>To date, AVenturesDAO has facilitated Avalanche’s expansion into many of these new products and services, by funding and supporting Dexalot, Struct, Pollen, and Colony.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TlW4OylzBIMgym76" /><figcaption>Source: AVenturesDAO. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2022-03-21/struct-finance-lands-3-9-million-to-build-structured-products-on-defi">Bloomberg</a></figcaption></figure><p>Two others we have our eyes on are Valk and Arrow. In addition, we backed Platypus, an innovative stableswap DEX on Avalanche.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nkFUL0eOtsX-8vExH7CsEQ.png" /><figcaption>Facilitating Avalanche’s expansion into new DeFi sub-sectors</figcaption></figure><p>Each platform offers Avalanche a much-needed native element in its DeFi ecosystem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NPEXYFQxvIkO2v7K" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama. Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>There remain some gaps in the AVenturesDAO DeFi portfolio, mirroring the gaps in Avalanche DeFi. Avalanche is currently lacking an insurance protocol, though two Avalanche-native projects are being seeded as I write. While insurance protocols on Ethereum have been rather disappointing, it’s hard to dismiss the potential impact that effective and capital-efficient smart contract, de-peg and even IL cover could have on a space where hacks and algo stable collapses are commonplace. Someone should be able to get this business right. Perhaps that will happen first on Avalanche?</p><p>Derivative DEX volumes are booming on ETH layer 2s, with over $4 billion in volume last week alone. Avalanche also has no native algo USD-stablecoin. Fiat-backed stables USDC and USDT, however, are now native, and there is talk of a partnership with UST. FRAX is also on the way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WwmxrTvJGLDwXS_a" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama. Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>“DeFi on new layer 1s” is a common thesis throughout crypto, but it’s really this second generation of DeFi that is one of the targeted areas for AventuresDAO on Avalanche. Certainly, some parts of the market are crowded. Just how many Sushiswap/Uniswap DEX forks does an “alt” later 1 need? But for now there are opportunities for Avalanche to catch up to Ethereum in terms of the range of offerings in DeFi. In some cases we expect Avalanche to leapfrog its competitors.</p><p>The addressable markets for new Avalanche DeFi are enormous, whether measured against Ethereum DeFi or TradFi. Options, insurance and indexing are billion dollar or near-billion dollar businesses on ETH, and trillion dollar opportunities in TradFi. We are still early on in Avalanche’s evolution.</p><p>Below I begin listing the next generation of AventuresDAO-backed Avalanche DeFi, with Dexalot first. More will follow next week.</p><h3><strong>1. Dexalot — A native order book DEX</strong></h3><p><strong><em>The advantages of an order book exchange…</em></strong></p><p>All centralized exchanges (CEXs), in both crypto and TradFi, use central limit order books (CLOBs). The Automated Market Makers (AMMs) such as Uniswap v2 or any Uniswap forks that appeared during the last cycle, and remain a critical source of liquidity for traders, offer compromises that are needed because of Ethereum’s limitations: slow finality and high costs.</p><p>CEXs such as Binance offer order books and immediate finality. “Market orders” where traders accept the “market” price are immediately matched with limit orders, often from professional market makers.</p><p><strong><em>…trustlessly…</em></strong></p><p>But CEXs have their downsides. Not only have they been historically fragile and prone to failure and manipulation, but they require traders to trust the exchange. That trust has often been broken. Exchanges can censor users. They can run off with the money or simply delay giving it back to you. They can be hacked.</p><p>What many users want, it seems, is an order book exchange where assets are self custodied and control rests with the users and the community. Dexalot offers just that.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*U3b0gS0JEOd89DrJ" /></figure><p>Dexalot makes use of Avalanche’s fast finality and cheaper-than-Ethereum transaction costs to host an order book DEX on-chain, trustlessly. The result is a UX that is remarkably similar to the top CEXs, such as Binance. This is not by accident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*f1w00-NjYPiJOike" /><figcaption>Binance v Dexalot UI</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>… and with improved capital efficiency.</em></strong></p><p>The downsides of using a CEX, and being KYC’d and risk losing control of one’s keys, has driven users to <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/dexs-and-amms-c79bce065703">DEX AMMs</a> in spite of the latter’s capital inefficiencies. AMMs have two significant weaknesses that order book DEXs and CEXs do not have.</p><p>Firstly, for liquid markets traditional AMMs (as opposed to Uniswap v3) need massive amounts of liquidity. How much? Well Curve’s AMM pool for USDC/FRAX has TVL of $2.845 billion, and currently trades $21 million per week. Volume is less than 1% of total capital committed. On Uniswap v3, which is more efficient than a passive AMM but less efficient than an order book, one tenth the capital generates twice the volume of Curve. So why do liquidity providers still deposit to Curve? Because of the inflationary token incentives.</p><p>Secondly, passive AMMs are effectively dumb, and make markets even in the face of overwhelming buy or sell pressure. The result is <a href="https://finematics.com/impermanent-loss-explained/">impermanent loss</a>, which can easily turn permanent without, once again, inflationary token incentives.</p><p>Dexalot tokenomics are not diluted in the same way as other DEXs that have huge incentive requirements. It is true that around 50% of issuance will go to users. But it’s not the passive yield farmers who gain. Tokens will go to limit order traders, professionals and retail alike, directly incentivizing active liquidity at the current market price.</p><p><strong><em>Subnets are coming</em></strong></p><p>If you’ve traded on Dexalot’s <a href="https://app.dexalot.com/trade">Beta version</a>, you might be aware that finality is not always as fast as promised. Indeed, when there is a big NFT drop/mint, the chain — like any others — can get slow and expensive. Dexalot’s team, however, has a solution in sight: <a href="https://support.avax.network/en/articles/4064861-what-is-a-subnet">Subnets</a>.</p><p>Much as the major order book spot and derivatives platforms such as dydx, PERP, GMX and Loopring have migrated to Ethereum layer 2s to take advantage of lower fees and faster confirmations, Dexalot is destined to be Avalanche’s equivalent.</p><p>Avalanche <a href="https://news.bitcoin.com/avalanche-foundation-launches-290-million-multiverse-incentives-program-for-subnets/">Multiverse</a>, a $290 million incentive program, has already begun incubating the <a href="https://bowtiedisland.com/dfk-chain-avax-multiverse-first-subnet/">latest generation</a> of blockchains that will, like Polkadot or Cosmos, have their own DApp-specific validator set. Once Dexalot has its own chain by Q3 2022, finality should be consistently fast, and costs even cheaper.</p><p>There is more to Dexalot than just an order book DEX. <a href="https://medium.com/dexalot/dexalot-discovery-bc2a9a8a479e">Dexalot Discovery</a> uses its market for non-custodial secondary trading to provide a fairer launch process for new token issuance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rvzCbGald2xqb5TvRYUCeQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Dexalot Discovery is an auction-based, transparent and barrier-free listing solution for projects that are coming to market. Projects can utilize this transparent auction to allow both buyers and sellers to participate simultaneously (unlike alternatives) and let the market define the fair price for their token, similar to how real world assets are auctioned.</p><p>The first successful test case of their approach was with its own <a href="https://medium.com/dexalot/dexalot-token-launch-and-listing-d29071c22ded">ALOT token</a>, with many more to come.</p><p><strong><em>Product and market are not enough</em></strong></p><p>Dexalot’s TAM is huge. It offers the same UX as a CEX and better capital efficiency than most DEXs. Just one exchange, Coinbase, trades more than $3 billion weekly. Solana’s order books traded $300 million last week.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Dqm7oOFBugWBYsWN" /><figcaption>Coinbase 7-day volume. Source: The Block</figcaption></figure><p>The secret to successful start-up investing is to identify a solid team and ensure its support within the community at large. Dexalot has both of these.</p><p>The experienced team is advised by Avalanche OG Firestorm, an expert in trading systems and exchanges. The team are no slouches in the space, of course. The co-founder and key team members are experts in electronic trading platforms, and know what it takes to build and launch an order book exchange.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OTlMC_ktpaAdQyc2" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/FireStorlvl/status/1507074224652898314">Firestorm</a> with the Dexalot axolotl mascot at the Avalanche Summit in Barcelona (left) and the founders’ profiles (right).</figcaption></figure><p>When it comes to community, we aim to support those that are already supported, or help them integrate into the ecosystem. We offer support in many areas, including tokenomics, marketing and strategy. Dexalot is already established in Avalanche. It was seeded by the Avalanche Foundation, while Avalanche’s native growth <a href="https://avalanche.today/how-to-get-in-on-the-200m-avalanche-blizzard-fund/">accelerator</a> Blizzard, founded by the Foundation, led the strategic round that raised $7 million in February. No lesser an Avalanche veteran than <a href="https://www.avalabs.org/team">Ava Labs</a> CEO Emin Gün Sirer <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/press-releases/dexalot-raises-7m-to-build-dex-on-avalanche-led-by-blizzard-fund">commented </a>on the raise, stating that,</p><blockquote>[While] most chains lack the capacity and velocity to maintain an on-chain order book, forcing users to settle for poor trade execution,… Dexalot capitalizes on Avalanche’s speed to deliver a peerless user experience.</blockquote><p>Dexalot aims to be community owned and controlled, with all operational parameters to be controlled through governance proposals and voting, built on top of <a href="https://openzeppelin.com/">OpenZeppelin</a>. Blizzard and the Avalanche Foundation are already investors. As Dexalot users earn rewards, they too will be part of the decision-making process.</p><p>Dexalot fits AVenturesDAO’s investment thesis perfectly:</p><ul><li>Huge TAM — Providing a needed primitive for DeFi on Avalanche, with the potential to compete with other chains and even centralized exchanges</li><li>Proven market on other chains and layer 2s — Volumes on other chains skyrocketing</li><li>Innovative products — Dexalot discovery is leading the way in fair launches, in the first instance with its own token</li><li>Experienced team — Founders and the leads are experienced builders of order book technology</li><li>Strong community — Respected Avalanche-focused investors fill the cap table and are keen to support the project as it moves out of Beta, and beyond.</li></ul><p>Next week, in Part 3, I will cover our other DeFi investments in depth, before using my crystal ball to predict the future of multichain DeFi, and what it means for Avalanche and AVentures, in Part 4.</p><p><strong><em>About Rasheed</em></strong></p><p>Rasheed Saleuddin, PhD CFA is an ex-hedge fund manager and experienced crypto angel, currently investing and advising with AventuresDAO, TheBoringDAO and the Cosmic Cartel. He is also a researcher at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School, where he is co-chair of the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) DeFi research steering committee.</p><p><strong><em>About AVentures</em></strong></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aventuresdao.io/&amp;sa=D&amp;source=editors&amp;ust=1645302342490326&amp;usg=AOvVaw2L65V0JTpOzEtB4x9_hu61">AVentures</a> is an investment DAO composed of OG Avalanche community members on a mission to support the ecosystem. The team boasts multiple successful blockchain developers and project owners, content creators, advisors and domain experts that have come together to channel our expertise to support the Avalanche ecosystem.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=732da2ac11eb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-part-ii-732da2ac11eb">An Avalanche of DeFi, Part II</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/aventures">AVentures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Avalanche of DeFi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-5fe98d5bb5f8?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5fe98d5bb5f8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[avalanche]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2022 16:47:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-11T16:47:41.586Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Avalanche has become one of the top layer 1 blockchains for decentralized finance (DeFi) on the back of its compatibility with Ethereum, strong native token incentives for blue chip projects, and a vibrant VC, incubator and launchpad ecosystem. <a href="http://aventuresdao.io/">AventuresDAO</a> is proud to be one of the many supporters of Avalanche projects, joining other contributors such as <a href="https://www.colonylab.io/">Colony Lab</a>, Avalaunch and the <a href="https://twitter.com/BlizzardFund">Blizzard Fund</a>. In anticipation of the <a href="https://www.avalanchesummit.com/agenda">Summit</a> in Barcelona this month, DAO member <a href="https://twitter.com/r_sale">Rasheed</a> reports on the state of DeFi on Avalanche. This first week covers the history and the status quo, while future blogs will present the AventuresDAO DeFi investment thesis: Where are we, as dedicated members of the Avalanche community, putting our time, money and energy?</p><h3>Part 1: The Rise of DeFi</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*StUFYe1J8y-sqB4d" /></figure><h4><strong>Alternative Layer 1s</strong></h4><p>Decentralized finance was jump-started in the “<a href="https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/362319">DeFi summer</a>” of 2020 on Ethereum, still the dominant smart contract platform.</p><p>In early 2021, lacking better alternatives, smaller users and lower-value services were driven by spiking transaction costs on Ethereum to cheaper and less secure side chains and Ethereum “forks” (copies) such as Binance Smart Chain (BSC) and Polygon.</p><p>These newly-emergent DeFi ecosystems consisted of (often) poor copies of Ethereum’s original protocols. Nevertheless, the savings in transaction costs — “gas” fees — brought in users, proving that there was a product market fit for blockchains compatible with Ethereum, yet cheaper and faster. By May 2021, BSC and Polygon together had attracted $30 billion in “capital committed”, also known as Total Value Locked (TVL).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0q-HDZn4d8KW8kdm" /><figcaption>BSC and Polygon made up half of the non-Ethereum TVL and 35% of total by May 2021. Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>It wasn’t until the summer of 2021, in many cases after years in development, that newer alternative layer 1s, with better security and reliability, began to attract the attention they deserved. And prices spiked. In the past year, most of the top challengers saw gains in the triple digits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tExpigE-wc7Qn24N" /><figcaption>Source: Messari</figcaption></figure><p>In terms of attracting capital and users, some highly-specialized chains gained significant traction, for very specific use cases. Terra is focused on supporting and providing a platform for its algorithmic stablecoins, including the fast-growing UST. Solana is a work in progress, attempting to push the limits as to what is possible in order book trading.</p><p>Several other chains chose to focus on improving upon Ethereum’s proof-of-work consensus while remaining compatible with its virtual machine (the EVM). Such chains provide an Ethereum-like platform to support any and all applications — gaming and NFTs, of course, but especially DeFi.</p><p>Enter 2022, and with Ethereum layer 2s on the rise, the race is on to attract users, developers, new use cases, and the dominant giants of decentralized finance.</p><h4><strong>Avalanche</strong></h4><p>In terms of ecosystem development, capital deployed (TVL) and user growth, <a href="https://ecosystem.avax.network/">Avalanche</a>, one of these EVM-compatible proof-of-stake (PoS) smart contract platforms, has been growing its DeFi ecosystem even through the recent crypto market volatility. While the overall market has been shrinking of late, Avalanche has been taking market share from earlier, more centralized and less reliable EVM compatible chains, such as BSC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TVW_dRU7onQITmI-" /><figcaption>BSC and Solana losing ground with Polygon flat. Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>Layer 1 season began in the spring of 2021 with Terra scaling up its UST dollar-pegged stablecoin, and offering a 20% annual return in its <a href="https://app.anchorprotocol.com/">Anchor</a> protocol. But, by the summer many other layer 1s were growing as rapidly, including Fantom, Solana, Tron, Harmony and of course Avalanche.</p><p>Early pioneers built out a full DeFi ecosystem, and users began slowly migrating to the smooth UX and EVM compatibility of Avalanche by the spring. Snowball was the first yield aggregator and the first stableswap DEX (which became Axial). Pangolin was the top DEX for some time. Yet there was so much more to come.</p><p>Avalanche timed its incentive program perfectly with layer 1 summer, launching <a href="https://medium.com/avalancheavax/avalanche-foundation-announces-180m-defi-incentive-program-d320fdfafff7">Avalanche Rush</a>, AVAX rewards to entice blue chip protocols to move to Avalanche, in August 2021. Soon after, Avalanche <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ninabambysheva/2021/11/01/avalanche-launches-220-million-crypto-growth-fund-targeting-defi-and-nfts/?sh=52143c9850e1">launched</a> its Blizzard ecosystem Fund. Avalanche TVL exploded, and this momentum has carried on into the new year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5zOLVp6j1cfN93HX" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>While Polygon, BSC, Fantom, Solana and even Ethereum have seen significant declines in the past 30 days, Avalanche, along with Terra, are shrugging off the volatility. Recent launches (Platypus and its ecosystem) and additional volumes in stableswaps (Curve) have been driving the recent growth.</p><p>Even without the incentives, Avalanche would have attracted many of the blue chip DeFi platforms, as it’s reasonably straightforward to port Ethereum Dapps over. Solidity developers need to change only a few lines of code. And new Avalanche protocols are also easier to fork from Ethereum, or develop from scratch, as Solidity remains the language of choice for EVM devs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sKA1TkkA10U3PQKM" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>While NFTs and GameFi have exploded on the network — the <a href="https://www.crabada.com/">Crabada</a> game accounts for over a quarter of all transactions — DeFi is driving Avalanche use. And users in turn are demanding more from DeFi. Avalanche is currently averaging a million transactions per day, not far off of Ethereum’s 1.1 million per day in the past week.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vEgso0eG5Z70wkKm" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://stats.avax.network/dashboard/c-chain-activity/">Avalanche</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>The DeFi primitives</strong></h4><p>The first order of business for an emerging blockchain is to offer all the tools users require to get on-chain, trade tokens, short assets, leverage their crypto, and manage positions. The protocols needed to recreate an asset trading and speculation ecosystem on-chain include:</p><ol><li><strong>Exchanges</strong>.</li><li><strong>Borrowing and lending</strong> protocols to facilitate margin borrowing and short selling.</li><li><strong>Yield aggregators</strong> to manage token awards that compensate for capital inefficiency (and more!).</li><li><strong>Bridges </strong>that represent assets from other chains on Avalanche (e.g. BTC wrapped as wBTC to be used on Ethereum).</li></ol><p>Tokens can be traded on-chain on <strong>decentralized exchanges</strong> (DEXs), both for spot and perpetual swaps (perps). Due to Ethereum’s limitations, most DEXs were designed to be automatic market makers (AMMs). Liquidity providers (LPs) deposit tokens in a trading pool passively, allowing traders to swap one token for another on-chain, non-custodially and permissisonlessly.</p><p>Using the <a href="https://research.paradigm.xyz/amm-price-impact">x * y = k</a> model, prices are set equal to the ratio of the two tokens on the exchange. On its own the system is far from ideal, but arbitrageurs who trade on centralized exchanges and other decentralized exchanges keep prices consistent.</p><p><strong>Leverage and shorting </strong>are facilitated by the <strong>borrowing/lending protocols</strong>. In an Aave or Compound type platform, users borrow tokens by depositing (overcollateralized) other tokens. This is often best for obtaining the means to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_(finance)">short sell</a>. Collateralized Debt Position (<a href="https://medium.com/@deepitag/ow-to-open-and-manage-a-cdp-on-makerdao-e83e89ea3306">CDP</a>) protocols such as MakerDAO and Alchemix mint a stablecoin in return for an overcollateralized deposit. That stablecoin can then be sold to buy more of a risky asset, effectively a decentralized form of margin lending.</p><p>Liquidity provision in passive automated market makers are not only capital inefficient, but they generally expose depositors to <a href="https://finematics.com/impermanent-loss-explained/">impermanent loss</a> (IL). At the same time, borrowing and lending protocols often require so much overcollateralization that using the protocol can be uneconomic. Inflationary token rewards are used as incentives to compensate for capital inefficiency and sometimes even IL.</p><p>Managing these rewards can be complex, inefficient without scale, and time consuming. As a result, <strong>yield aggregators</strong>, “<a href="https://medium.com/@datnoid/how-to-auto-compound-a0d62fc7866e">autocompounders</a>” and so-called “<a href="https://docs.votium.app/general-information/why-votium">bribing</a>” protocols were developed to manage the optimization, “harvesting” and reinvestment of rewards.</p><p>Including bridging protocols that facilitate interoperability between chains, the four primitive <a href="https://medium.com/p/2f60b4e02c77">use cases</a> account for over 90% of all-chain DeFi, as measured by TVL.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*63uwQfF3pyjA8e-7" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>Any chain that wants to DeFi must have a diverse selection of such protocols. Avalanche, of course, is no exception.</p><h4><strong>The DeFi explosion on Avalanche</strong></h4><p>The Rush incentive program met its goals in bringing the big cross-chain DeFi protocols to the Avalanche network. But homegrown DeFi also developed alongside.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CdavWeSX91tI78Nd" /></figure><p>Other than a slight bias to borrowing/lending (45% versus 35% on Ethereum), Avalanche has replicated the DeFi primitives in much the same ratio as Ethereum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C63s1QGLs63hWGn4" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama. Note — One of the latest yield protocols, Vector , is not yet covered.</figcaption></figure><p>The keen-eyed will see that Trader Joe is the most successful native protocol on Avalanche, first among non-stableswap DEXs and third in borrowing/lending TVL.</p><h4><strong>Trader Joe as a case study: Incentives x innovation</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tQlR3W9f16HxXn-Z" /></figure><p>Before Avalanche Rush, most dismissed Avalanche’s Trader Joe AMM DEX as another Uniswap v2/Sushiswap fork. Then degens “aped” while the incentives were more than competitive with Ethereum DeFi.</p><p>As a result, Trader Joe was responsible for a significant amount of Avalanche’s total TVL rise as the Rush incentive program kicked off. At its highest in the fall of 2021, Trader Joe accounted for over one third of all TVL. Rush benefited Trader Joe, which benefited the Avalanche DeFi ecosystem.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WXv7iOiqge2WSE73" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>But TVL is far from the only story. In fact, Trader Joe is one of the <strong>highest-earning protocols in all of DeFi,</strong> for its LPs and for JOE token stakers. Trader Joe is currently tied for fourth highest grossing DEX with Sushiswap, with only Uniswap (Ethereum and layer 2s/Polygon), PancakeSwap (BSC) and Spookyswap (Fantom) ahead.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c-SJEFq33yDE9CPK" /><figcaption>Trader Joe 7-day moving average daily gross revenue matching Sushiswap. Source: Cryptofees.info</figcaption></figure><p>While Uniswap does not accrue fees at all, JOE tokenholders can stake on the platform to earn 0.05% of every swap. As a result, JOE stakers receive higher returns than all but three DEXs, and platform earnings put Trader JOE <a href="https://www.tokenterminal.com/terminal/metrics/protocol_revenue">just inside the top 10</a> in all of DeFi. Annualized at current levels, at today’s prices ( ~ $1) <strong>Trader Joe has a price-earnings ratio of 12x on a fully-diluted basis</strong>, almost unheard of in DeFi, and incredibly cheap for even a traditional growth company.</p><p>Trader Joe didn’t stop at being a fork of a traditional AMM, and has continued to innovate and grow. The solid earnings suggest that users enticed to Avalanche and Trader Joe for the incentives stayed for the use cases. In addition to dominating trading volumes on Avalanche and generating fees for LPs and stakers alike, Trader Joe is <strong>one of the top borrowing/lending protocols</strong>.</p><p>Trader Joe is also a launchpad, responsible for bringing some important tokens to market in just a couple of months. <a href="https://traderjoe-xyz.medium.com/rocket-joe-limitless-liquidity-launch-platform-on-the-trader-joe-5bdc8a7bce05">Rocket Joe</a> is on its fifth launch. An <a href="https://twitter.com/joepegnft">NFT marketplace</a>, JOEPEG, will be launched any day now.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*g9IMQ-3uS8ncr5cD" /></figure><p>In successfully integrating borrowing/lending and a launchpad, Trader Joe has pulled off what Sushiswap had intended: to offer all of the DeFi primitives on one platform.</p><p>Trader Joe has also <a href="https://traderjoe-xyz.medium.com/trader-joe-the-tokenomics-overhaul-9dee2db3766">innovated on its tokenomics</a>. The Sushiswap model of staking JOE for xJOE without locking served a purpose when incentives were high, but new staking began to fade late last year. In fact, JOE stakers were dumping their rewards, putting pressure on the JOE token. xJOE staking had leveled off in the 90 million tokens range for some time.</p><p>Additionally, the xJOE design was suboptimal from a UX perspective, as the contract prioritized gas saving. Avalanche does not have this same constraint, and sought to improve tokenomics without concern for the high gas fees on Ethereum.</p><p>So in February xJOE became sJOE, where protocol fees were paid in the USDC stablecoin rather than in JOE, and stakers could also earn rJOE, which offered access to new token launches on Rocket Joe. Finally, Trader Joe is about to introduce veJOE, which mirrors Curve’s <a href="https://resources.curve.fi/faq/vote-locking-boost">vote escrowed staking</a> tokenomics. veJOE earns boosted rewards for liquidity providers, and allows stakers to vote on which pools receive JOE incentives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1uhb09LqK9UeEXwq" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/0xgokek/status/1498897973736243205?s=11">Twitter</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>With all of this innovation — access to new launches, boosted LP rewards, voting and fees paid in stablecoins, JOE is accruing more value in more ways than ever. Though Trader Joe is now maturing, and other protocols have begun to drive new capital to Avalanche, it is hard to exaggerate the boost Trader Joe gave to the Avalanche ecosystem early in its DeFi journey.</p><p><strong>Avalanche — Some final observations</strong></p><p>DeFi on Avalanche is competitive and innovative. Cross-chain blue chips are major players, of course. Two of the biggest blue chips are very active on Avalanche, with Aave being the largest protocol in terms of TVL, followed by a strong showing by Curve, the dominant stableswapper. Alpha and Sushiswap are some way behind.</p><p>Drilling down, however, we can see some differences remain as compared to DeFi primitives on Ethereum. There are several native champions, as there are on most chains, with Benqi and of course Trader Joe being two of the largest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*do72vzJxaeE05T3h" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Stablecoins and stableswaps: </em></strong>CDP stablecoins on Avalanche are indeed tiny, and <a href="https://thedefiant.io/algorithmic-stablecoins/">algorithmic stables</a> are non-existent. While stablecoin protocols such as MakerDAO (DAI), Terra UST, Frax and Abracadabra (MIM) are some of the largest platforms in all of DeFi, only minute quantities of Avalanche native stablecoins H20, MIM and MAI exist.</p><p>Yet perhaps Avalanche doesn’t need to re-invent the wheel when other chains are already ahead. Bridged stables such USDC.e are already readily accepted and traded on Avalanche, while native fiat-backed stablecoins USDT and USDC appeared in Q4 of last year.</p><p>Curve leads stableswap TVL on both Ethereum and Avalanche, but competitor Platypus is catching up using similar veCRV tokenomics. With enhanced bribing but with less experimental stablecoins (MIM was recently deprecated), will Vector/Yield Yak/Echidna on Platypus be able to replicate the Ethereum “<a href="https://shows.banklesshq.com/p/-the-curve-wars-curvemarketcap?s=r">Curve Wars</a>” on Avalanche?</p><p><strong><em>Order-book DEXs: </em></strong>Somewhat surprising in the reliance of old-technology Uniswap v2 forks for market making on Avalanche. Trader Joe, using Uniswap’s v2, absolutely dwarfs Uniswap on Ethereum as a percentage of total DeFi.</p><p>Even though Avalanche technology permits the popular central limit order book (CLOB) system for matching orders, GMX (for perps) and soon Dexalot are the only up and comers in the space. Who will be the innovators that optimize for Avalanche’s high throughput and fast finality?</p><p><strong><em>Yield aggregators: </em></strong>Avalanche has a significant number of bribing, yield optimization, leverage and autocompounding platforms. Whereas Ethereum is dominated by Yearn (autocompounding and managed yield strategies) and Convex (adding bribing), Avalanche has six protocols in the top 20. Two of these are exclusively bribing protocols, even though there are few bribing opportunities in the current market. None of these yield protocols are particularly significant to the DeFi ecosystem.</p><p>Alpha offers leveraged farming, leaving <a href="https://yieldyak.com/">Yield Yak</a> as the dominant aggregator, yet with only less than 3% of DeFi TVL. So there are lots of small competitors in a small market. Is a shakeout due, or will the market grow into Avalanche’s yield aggregation capabilities?</p><h4><strong>Final Thoughts</strong></h4><p>Based on our recent early stage investments and the exciting new opportunities we are seeing at AventuresDAO, we expect Avalanche devs to build on the existing primitives to expand the DeFi ecosystem. While some incumbents look well-entrenched (e.g., Trader Joe), others such as Platypus for stableswaps are starting to reveal their potential.</p><p>Next week I will highlight where the gaps and opportunities lie, and what the future holds for the Avalanche DeFi.</p><p>Some useful tools and news sources</p><p><a href="https://www.weekinavalanche.com/p/this-week-in-avalanche-march-2nd?s=r">https://www.weekinavalanche.com/</a></p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/">https://snowtrace.io/</a></p><p><a href="https://explorer.avax.network/">https://explorer.avax.network/</a></p><p><a href="https://avascan.info/">https://avascan.info/</a></p><p><strong><em>About Rasheed</em></strong></p><p>Rasheed Saleuddin, PhD CFA is an ex-hedge fund manager and experienced crypto angel, currently investing and advising with AventuresDAO, TheBoringDAO and the Cosmic Cartel. He also researches digital assets at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School (CCAF), where he was a finance post-doc.</p><p><strong><em>About AVentures</em></strong></p><p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aventuresdao.io/&amp;sa=D&amp;source=editors&amp;ust=1645302342490326&amp;usg=AOvVaw2L65V0JTpOzEtB4x9_hu61">AVentures</a> is an investment DAO composed of OG Avalanche community members on a mission to support the ecosystem. The team boasts multiple successful blockchain developers and project owners, content creators, advisors and domain experts that have come together to channel our expertise to support the Avalanche ecosystem.</p><p>AVentures DAO:</p><ul><li>Provides advisory and marketing support to new Avalanche projects</li><li>Supports Avalanche projects by investing in seed/private rounds</li><li>Incubates new projects via mentoring</li><li>Publishes technical analysis on DeFi projects</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5fe98d5bb5f8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/aventures/an-avalanche-of-defi-5fe98d5bb5f8">An Avalanche of DeFi</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/aventures">AVentures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Finance, but Decentralized]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threepoint0/finance-but-decentralized-2f60b4e02c77?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f60b4e02c77</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:31:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-09T00:21:44.446Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A DeFi investment thesis, part one</h3><p>In this series of blogs, I set out my long-term investment thesis for decentralized finance (DeFi) — finance on the blockchain. I end with a hopeful call to arms: To truly recreate (all of) “finance, but decentralized”.</p><p>It starts out as a bit of a sad tale, however. Which might surprise many, as on the face of it DeFi has had a blockbuster year and a half, since “DeFi summer” 2020.</p><p>A DeFi Cambrian explosion emerged from the primordial soup of Ethereum smart contracts in the ecosystem drove a 4x increase in capital (measured by “total value locked”, or <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/glossary/total-value-locked-tvl">TVL</a>) in the last year alone:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ieQ_4r2invpl7Yv5" /><figcaption>Source: Defi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>More than 70 chains have some amount of DeFi occurring on them. A few of the top 10, including Terra, Avalanche and Fantom, are now hosting tens of billions of DeFi TVL, up from next to nothing a year ago.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-9xj1rrb9N5Nn0yR" /><figcaption>Source: Defi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>There are many success stories. Protocols founded in the early days thrive even without spending on user acquisition and retention, such as Uniswap v3, MakerDAO, Aave, Compound, and wrappers and bridges such as renBTC.</p><p>Yet the gains in TVL and users as well as the increasing number of developers building on an increasing number of layer 1 blockchains mask a potentially fatal problem in DeFi.</p><p>Devs and users alike have been spoiled by (1) the ease and speed in which crypto traders have adopted the on-chain infrastructure needed to replace rickety and dangerous centralized exchanges of the past, as well as (2) the rise of governance tokens to incentivize protocol usage and “<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/UniSwap/comments/jgjitg/liquditiy_mining_pool_2_what_is_meant_by_this/">pool 2</a>” liquidity, in the face of extremely poor capital efficiency. Token incentives did well in the DeFi bull from DeFi summer until spring 2021. Not so well since.</p><p>The rise of DeFi on other L1s and indeed same chain forks, as well as the launch of new yet uneconomic use cases, has generally resulted in a never-ending battle to secure what almost always turns out to be temporary users. But the current DeFi ecosystem, built to support trading and speculation, cannot easily scale beyond its current uses. Growth is needed, and that won’t come from the same old use cases. And inflationary tokens do nothing to remedy this problem.</p><p>What token incentives do accomplish is to create an elite class of rentiers who use insider knowledge and crypto-native abilities to earn “passive” income on their capital by being early to the latest incentive bazaar. We do not appear to be shedding oursleves from a reliance on these rewards. The new new thing as of March 2022:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Lcaogy-CddX07cat" /></figure><p>We have ended up with a hyper-capitalist ecosystem, where nobody is incentivized for the long run. Not VCs, who can often begin cashing out day 1. Not teams, who may not have the fortitude and incentives to build lasting companies. And certainly not users, looking for the latest and highest yields (APY) or whitelists or airdrops to get tokens before the masses arrive. Then dumping as soon as they can.</p><p>Rather than focus on highly inflationary token incentives and/or disappointing iterations on the same original themes of borrowing/lending, DEXs, interoperability and farming, I call on developers and VCs to pivot away from speculative financial plumbing and inflationary token rewards, and towards a DeFi that reinvents (all of) finance, for all.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*V1QSfeT6i8EEPlD0" /></figure><p>In this blog, I trace DeFi’s development, culminating in the bull market in so-called DeFi 1.0 tokens that ended in the spring of 2021. I show that DeFi replicated much-needed basic tools for on-chain speculation, and that several excellent use cases were the result. But token rewards used to compensate for capital inefficiency resulted in extremely poor token performance once the token rewards faded, and users, VCs and teams sold their cheap tokens. Everybody moved on, quickly.</p><p>In part two I explain how the current state of DeFi was a direct result of earlier disappointments, and a failure to own up to the mistakes of the past. DeFi remains obsessed with chasing extraordinary yet temporary APYs, or the newest pre-launch. These early farmers and pump-and-dumpers have gotten very rich. Is this what we want DeFi to be?</p><p><strong>But I do not come to bury DeFi, I come to praise it. </strong>I believe that DeFi can be the source of new hope: for the unbanked, for the retail crypto or traditional investor, and for those who don’t want to wait three-five days for their bank transfer to go through. In the final blog I explain why I remain so bullish, and how we can build and invest for the future.</p><h3><strong>Part 1: The Dawn of DeFi</strong></h3><h4><strong>The perils of early crypto trading</strong></h4><p>Though now in some circles thought of as largely irrelevant boomer projects, the earliest DeFi pioneers were really battling a dark empire. Not that of traditional finance, however, but of crypto exchanges.</p><p>That is, the dawn of DeFi that launched a thousand protocols had one goal in mind at first: Make speculation in cryptoassets safer than on the unregulated centralized exchanges of the day. But why?</p><p>Bitcoin was the original crypto asset. And its rise is without precedent</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DN1ddy005hY4oIwB" /><figcaption>Source: Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>Yet in the mid 2010s, crypto exchanges operated in the financial market version of the Wild West, or at least the 1920s. At one point, Mt Gox, previously a platform for trading <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/company/mt-gox/">Magic The Gathering</a> collectibles, accounted for 70% of all Bitcoin trading. I think we all know what happened next. But Mt Gox was not an anomaly. The list of offenders is endless: Quadriga CX, Coincheck, Bitfinex are a few of the bigger headlines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C77NcUq0Ttzn_bw0" /><figcaption>Source: WIRED, Bitcoin.com, FT, Creative Commons</figcaption></figure><p>Traditional safeguards were largely absent in these pioneering exchanges. There was often little governance, proper segregation of funds, or checks and balances. One person could control all of the assets. “Rug pulls”, such as that at Canadian exchange Quadriga CX ($200 million) and Turkish counterpart <a href="https://news.bitcoin.com/turkish-crypto-exchange-exit-scam-ceo-flees-country-people-detained-users-cannot-access-2-billion-funds/">Thodex</a> ($2 billion), were often the result. Poor opsec resulted in many high-profile hacks, often measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The<a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-arrests-couple-allegedly-laundering-45-bln-crypto-tied-bitfinex-hack-2022-02-08/"> Bitfinex</a> funds are now worth almost $4.5 billion!</p><p>Of course, without legal separation between customer and exchange orders, front running and manipulation were rampant. Never mind that there were no disclosure requirements and no suitability checks.</p><h4><strong>DeFi “1.0”, an abridged history</strong></h4><p>Soon after Ethereum launched smart contracts, devs were in motion. And by the seventh day, DeFi had recreated all the tools needed for speculation. The first need was for borrowing/lending platforms that could recreate margin lending and facilitate short selling</p><p><em>Margin lending</em> — Beginning in March 2019, MakerDAO allowed ETH holders to lever up by depositing their tokens into an overcollateralized smart contract called a <a href="https://thedefiant.io/what-is-makerdao-and-how-does-dai-work/">CDP</a>, backing the minting of a new USD-pegged stablecoin, now called DAI. DAI could then be sold to buy more ETH, or any other token. Instant leverage. Of course, if ETH fell enough, the borrower either had to pay down some DAI debt, or deposit more ETH. Otherwise they would be liquidated, as in any margin loan.</p><p>It is worth noting that using DAI for debt explicitly made the <strong>USD</strong> the <strong>unit of account for DeFi</strong>. Debt was denominated in USD, just like US stock market margin debt.</p><p><em>Shorting </em>— MakerDAO’s stablecoin leverage was joined by platforms that matched borrowers and lenders, such as Aave and Compound. Overcollateralized borrowers of stablecoins could sell them to mimic margin lending as above, of course, but could also borrow riskier tokens to go short. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_(finance)">Short selling</a> increases the efficiency of markets by allowing traders to profit from price falls in assets that are considered overvalued. Another key component of markets was (re)created.</p><p><em>Exchanges</em> — Of course it’s impossible to speculate without trading venues, but recreating them on-chain required overcoming one major hurdle: The traditional exchange’s central limit <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_book">order book</a> (CLOB) system for broadcasting and filling orders could not scale on Ethereum. There were some false starts before Bancor and Uniswap developed a solution. Markets would be made <strong>passively</strong> in what is known as an Automated Market Maker (AMM) by liquidity providers (LPs) using a deceptively simple formula.</p><p>Using the <a href="https://research.paradigm.xyz/amm-price-impact">x * y = k</a> model, prices would be set equal to the ratio of the two tokens on the exchange. On its own the system was far from ideal. But arbitrageurs who could trade on centralized exchanges and other decentralized exchanges would help keep prices in line.</p><p>Together, <strong>DEXs and borrowing/lending protocols make up 71% of DeFi TVL</strong> (see chart below), testament to their use cases. They fill a need. The biggest dominate the DeFi space: Five out of the current DeFi top 10– Curve, MakerDAO Aave, Uni and Compound– account for 35% of all capital deployed in DeFi. These are hardy, useful and battle-tested protocols that have survived crashes such as March 2020, when ETH and altcoins fell 50% or more in 24 hours.</p><p>There was but one problem, and it was a doozy.</p><h4><strong>Capital inefficiency and impermanent loss: The rise of the token</strong></h4><p>The first problem is that passive liquidity providers on AMMs can lose money as markets move: As one token rises in price, the LPs end up holding less of it. If trading fees do not compensate for these losses, the LPs end up with an “<a href="https://finematics.com/impermanent-loss-explained/"><strong>impermanent loss</strong></a>” that can often turn permanent.</p><p>The second issue is that DeFi 1.0 is extremely capital inefficient. AMMs need to hold enough capital to cover all possible price changes: The LPs make prices all the way down to near zero on either token (and of course near infinity on the other). Borrowing/lending protocols, with or without stablecoins, also require overcollateralization. MakerDAO’s maximum loan to value (LTV) is 66%.</p><p>First Synthetix and then Compound found a solution, rewarding users with their own protocol “governance” token.</p><p><em>Yield aggregators</em> — As almost every protocol adopted a token, “harvesting” the token rewards became complicated and time-consuming. Iearn/Yearn was an early innovator, but now the space is full of so-called “yield aggregators” and bribing protocols (more on these in part 2) that maximize a user’s rewards. They have become very popular: The top 2 in this space account for about 10% of TVL.</p><p><em>Interoperability </em>— The last original use case is the result of a bug rather than a feature of original DeFi. Native BTC cannot be used in DeFi, so we end up with wBTC, renBTC, and a host of others to take advantage of the trading-based financial infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SY_PN4Krk0VMRhZe" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://curve.fi/pools">Curve.fi</a></figcaption></figure><p>Bridging complicates this: there is a wormhole and native version of many tokens on exchanges such as Avalanche, for example. Additionally there are a wide variety of stablecoins, each with their own supporters and risks. As a result, a good deal of exchange and borrowing/lending volume revolves around the trading of USD-pegged tokens, such as USDT, USDC, DAI, UST, USDP, SUSD, BUSD, FRAX, FEI, MIM and alUSD. Increased bridging looks to make these problems even worse.</p><p>So we can now total all of the capital that is being used to facilitate trading, as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*wxjgKKUFH_z5uxzQ" /><figcaption>Source: DeFi Llama</figcaption></figure><p>There are some observations from this chart and the data behind it:</p><ol><li>DeFi is very concentrated: The <strong>top 7 protocols account for just under half of all TVL</strong>. The top 50 protocols account for 90%.</li><li>DeFi is mostly explained by the four trading use cases above: Over <strong>90% of the top 50 are related to facilitating trading</strong>.</li><li><strong>True TVL on DeFi is overstated:</strong> Overlap abounds, with, for example, Convex (#4) and Yearn (#14) sitting on Curve (#1).</li><li><strong>Ethereum is barely holding a 50% market share</strong>, down from near 100% a year ago. The rise of new chains means that the same infrastructure has to be replicated many times: each chain needs a DEX or three (including one for stables), a borrowing/lending protocol, and a yield aggregator. Avalanche, for example, has Aave and Benqi as top borrower/lenders, Curve, Platypus and Trader Joe as top AMMs, and Yield Yak to farm yields.</li></ol><p>Now I won’t deny that within the broad categories above there is some real innovation occurring. And some of these earn real fees. Lido is one such protocol, providing liquid staking to those otherwise locked into ETH (until the Merge) or LUNA (21 days). I also would agree that there is a “long tail” of new DeFi that is innovating, but not yet in a position to dominate the top 50. <strong>Again, however, more than 90% of DeFi is in a DEX, lender/borrower, yield aggregator on top of the first two, or a bridging solution.</strong></p><h4><strong>DeFi 1.0 after the hype</strong></h4><p>So much for the landscape. What about performance? Well it’s been very disappointing.</p><p>The DeFi Pulse index that consists mostly of the original use case protocols have flatlined, in dollars or in ETH.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2hPAb0sEmMolIMsp" /><figcaption>Source: Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>It’s worth examining why prices have fallen, and there are many. Most have to do with the capital inefficiency of DeFi 1.0 — the base return for Curve’s largest <a href="https://curve.fi/3pool">pool</a> is just 0.22% — and the solution to incentive activity using inflationary mostly-worthless governance tokens.</p><p>Very few tokens accrue value from protocol activities, even as they are minted heavily to incentivize otherwise capital inefficient behaviour. COMP, AAVE and UNI offer no cash flow to their tokenholders. Some, like Sushi and Curve, have some value accrual through fee distribution. A select few others have buyback-and-burn tokenomics. Worse still, some of the biggest growth areas of the future may not result in value accrual to the token. For example, Compound Treasury’s (permissioned markets with KYC/AML) success will not benefit COMP.</p><p>In bull markets, those that receive and then sell the tokens (farm and dump) don’t impact the market much. VCs and the team are also less inclined to sell their allocations as prices are rising. But in a more uncertain market, farmers, VCs and teams will be incentivized to dump, causing a price spiral that has many serious effects.</p><p>Vesper Finance is a poster child illustrating how farm and dump plus unlocks puts pressure on a token. And, worse, how users don’t stay once rewards reduce. TVL was highly incentivized for three months, and otherwise unsustainable. But even before the May correction and TVL started to drop, the price fell significantly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*seUAP2R3P_KEtHaO" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://docs.vesper.finance/">Vesper,</a> Coingecko, DeFi Llama.</figcaption></figure><p>Price collapses also affect the future of the protocol. Not only do token incentives lose their luster (and eventually run out), but teams become uninterested in working for tokens worth peanuts. It could even be the case that the team, partner and community tokens run out, and selling more tokens to new investors after a huge dip may not be feasible. Devs leave. Discords empty. Projects stop innovating, or even maintaining. Sushiswap and Barnbridge are two great examples of this phenomenon, but there are others.</p><p>I recently saw a secondary offering for a protocol’s token where the incentives had nearly ended and the team and VCs were unlocked. The product was almost there. PMF was a near certainty. But the devs had left and the remaining parties were mercenaries just looking for exit liquidity. Where does the protocol go from here?</p><p>One last issue is that, as a result of open source code and the rise of alternative layer 1s, we end up with many multiple versions of the same product, few of which gain much traction without inflationary incentives. How many fixed rate protocols does DeFi need, even cross-chain? How about DEXes?</p><p>There are <a href="https://defillama.com/forks/Uniswap"><strong>195</strong></a> forks or close copies of Uniswap v2 that have more than $100,000 in TVL. Because the newest must reward their users in inflationary tokens, it becomes a player-versus-player market. Sure, there is (temporary) market share growth, but little of the innovation that is needed to really grow the pie. Worse still, aggressive customer acquisition obscures who the true long-term winners might be. As Nic Carter pointed out on 27 February,</p><blockquote>It seems like we’re in a state of suspended reality where a lot of the liquidity has been enhanced due to the existence of the liquidity mining rewards. …We almost don’t know for now which are the self-sustaining protocols that have reached exit velocity.</blockquote><p>We can’t yet identify the winners. But for the losers, will users stay after rewards run out? In general they do not.</p><h4><strong>Centralization is winning crypto</strong></h4><p>Meanwhile centralized solutions have smartened up since the earlier Wild West, and are raking it in, from Coinbase to Binance DEXs and OpenSea for NFTs. Many are regulated, insured and offer unparalleled UX. As a result they dominate:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TGwYprIln33RFnKe" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non-custodial">The Block</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5AMwk_pKg4Q5QXYF" /><figcaption>Source: @rchen8 Dune.xyz</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Gartner Hype Cycle and DeFi 1.0 and 2.0</strong></p><p>So DeFi 1.0 clearly suffered from inflated expectations and then a steep decline, as predicted by the <a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/research/methodologies/gartner-hype-cycle">Gartner Hype Cycle</a>. But when will we bounce onto the plateau of enlightenment?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Y6TERWzTgcnWkmKs" /><figcaption>Source: Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>My view, for many of these projects, is never. Why would you stay to try to work out a failing protocol when all you have to do is dump your tokens and start a new run towards inflated expectations. Enter “DeFi 2.0”. As DeFi 1.0 names like Balancer (BAL, below) and SUSHI flatlined in the spring of 2021, a new crop of DeFi protocols arose, such as OlympusDAO (OHM, below), Wonderland, Rari, Abracadabra and Convex. A narrative shift was all it took to breathe new life into the space, for users, devs and investors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ObNRFpSH7WrBNr3r" /><figcaption>Source: Coingecko</figcaption></figure><p>Some major improvements have resulted from this early grand DeFi experiment, with the successful replication of the financial infrastructure needed for trading crypto: (1) exchanges, (2) shorting and margin lending, and (3) interoperability allowing the use of the top token risks on any DeFi platform (e.g. wrapped BTC).</p><p>Yet capital efficiency remains low, and growth in DeFi 1.0, except where it has been resurrected with “2.0” economics, has been stagnating since the late spring of 2021.</p><p>DeFi 2.0 was supposed to solve all of this. No more boring capital-inefficient protocols. No more farming and dumping for liquidity providers. Enter “permissionless pools” with higher TVLs (more capital efficiency, but more risk), “protocol owned liquidity” and “monetary premium”.</p><p>But in fact, there is not much new in 2.0. It was more of a much-needed narrative shift, diverting attention away from token and business model failures in early DeFi.</p><p>How are these faring? I’ll explain next week.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f60b4e02c77" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threepoint0/finance-but-decentralized-2f60b4e02c77">Finance, but Decentralized</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threepoint0">ThreePoint0 Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[IBC Over Troubled Waters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threepoint0/ibc-over-troubled-waters-a54c09965fd?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a54c09965fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cosmos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Feb 2022 16:42:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-10T18:39:39.166Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PEE7CCyo7jRbftAGOSysAA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vitalik_Buterin_TechCrunch_London_2015.jpg">John Phillips</a> under Creative Commons. Quote from <a href="https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/1479501366192132099?s=20&amp;t=jcowR6kzYPoJxoNUAqbE8w">Reddit</a></figcaption></figure><p>There are over 100 layer 1 blockchains, most with their own specialization. Flow is popular for low-value NFTs such as NBA Topshot. Ronin hosts Axie Infinity and its gamefi economy. Ethereum attracts high-value defi and NFT transactions, given its battle-tested security. Polygon offers EVM-compatibility but very cheaply. There is a data-storage focused layer 1 in Arweave. The list goes on.</p><p><strong>While Layer 1 blockchains are not generally meant to communicate with each other, </strong>users increasingly want to move value across to specialized chains. Unless they are using Cosmos Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC, more of which later) or one of less than a handful of similar solutions, however, interchain bridging (more <a href="https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/blockchain-bridges-5db6afac44f8">here</a>) turns out to be fraught with dangers. A handful of misbehaving multi-sigs could easily steal the assets on Polygon, and many other links between chains and L1s to L2s are rather centralized, and not completely trustless.</p><h3><strong>Bridges, Rekt?</strong></h3><p>Not only do many bridges rely on some degree of centralization to function, the complexities in operating across chains open the protocols and chains involved to third-party exploitation.</p><p>Thorchain’s cross-chain swap platform has been successfully hacked. More than once. It might have been an inside job, or someone with a chip on their shoulder, as the thieves took much less than they could have done.</p><p>In any event, Thorchain losses pale in comparison to the two largest hacks in DeFi, both bridges, where nearly $1 billion was stolen. Worse still, the eighth largest hack occurred on a bridge, Qubit Finance, less than a week before number 2, on Wormhole.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c8NfIPs3FuPyw5p2IqDpaw.png" /><figcaption>Source: Rekt.news</figcaption></figure><p>With more bridging comes more exploits?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y-2EH6oz90gjAAmz1lYcrQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: Author and Rekt.news</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Wormhole, Rekt</strong></h3><p>The largest of the latest of three most recent hacks, coming in only a 10 day span, Wormhole has focused the mind on the risks to cross-chain bridging, as reported in this Coindesk <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/02/04/a-bridge-too-far-does-the-wormhole-hack-mean-the-multi-blockchain-dream-is-dead/">article</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z6wa5n03FqFEQU_e2AAAmg.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/02/04/a-bridge-too-far-does-the-wormhole-hack-mean-the-multi-blockchain-dream-is-dead/">Coindesk</a></figcaption></figure><p>Wormhole bridges seven of the highest-value chains, with billions of dollars of bridging on each of Solana, Ethereum, BSC and Terra, so the exploit was huge news.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tDCRUZPxFs84OJQRTD-bfQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://wormholenetwork.com/explorer/">Wormhole</a></figcaption></figure><p>On February 2, a hacker was able to forge a signature to mint 120,000 wrapped ETH on Solana, worth $325 million wETH. Those fake wrapped ETH were swapped back to ETH via Wormhole, leaving a major deficit in ETH backing Solana’s We-WETH. Effectively, the backing for the tokens on Solana disappeared. That Jump Capital compensated all the victims fully (and all Poly hack funds were returned) does not in any way lessen security concerns.</p><h3>Is cross-chain bridging futile?</h3><p>The ideal bridge needs to be low-cost, scalable, trustless and bulletproof. Yet such bridge hacks reveal that interchain security is hard. Perhaps even futile. I mean, even Gandalf couldn’t defend the bridge from the evil forces at work in Moria.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*evFBzBp9O2NwQQq_LmWLPA.png" /></figure><p>In reporting on the latest exploit, affecting meter.io and Hundred Finance on BSC, <a href="https://rekt.news/meter-rekt/">rekt.news</a> is pessimistic in the short run, but holds out some hope that cross-chain bridging is somehow “solvable”, stating:</p><blockquote>…on-chain crime rarely has off-chain consequences, and it won’t be long until we see another attack of this type.</blockquote><blockquote>There will be more bridge attacks, and more users will lose money, but eventually someone will succeed in building a safe bridge.</blockquote><p>Vitalik Buterin disagrees, believing that bridges expose chains to undue vulnerabilities. He started out a recent <a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/rwojtk/ama_we_are_the_efs_research_team_pt_7_07_january/hrngyk8/">Reddit post</a> with</p><blockquote>The fundamental security limits of bridges are actually a key reason why, while I am optimistic about a multi-chain blockchain ecosystem, I am pessimistic about cross-chain applications.</blockquote><h3><strong>Effective bridging, now</strong></h3><p>But what if there is a middle ground? What if separate blockchains can be responsible for their own security and economic models and are otherwise independent from each other, but where bridging is fast, low cost, and secure? While Vitalik has Ethereum L2s in mind when supporting a multi-chain future that doesn’t have to cross chains, Avalanche, Polkadot and Cosmos have their own solutions for effective bridging.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lbBl1UQ2b6s0NOfdYNhjjg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Author</figcaption></figure><p>Polkadot allows the connecting of “parachains” through its relay chain, but Polkadot’s layer 1s are not only permissioned, but require the locking up of the native DOT token. The relay chain’s validator set is responsible for securing all the parachain transactions. If it goes down, they all go down.</p><p>Avalanche’s version of IBC uses <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/za/podcast/avalanche-subnet-deep-dive/id1584419349?i=1000546802258">subnets</a>. Subnets solve the problem of scaling by “horizontally” increasing the number of blockchains such that each application has its own chain (in this case an EVM) and the option of its own validator set. More transactions can be processed in parallel. Cross-asset transfer will be easy between subnets.</p><h3><strong>Cøsmos</strong></h3><p>Cosmos is the only ecosystem currently relying on the <a href="https://v1.cosmos.network/intro#connecting-blockchains-together-ibc">Inter-Blockchain Communication protocol</a> (IBC) for token transfer and, later, so much more. Unlike several competitors, IBC is live, already connecting 36 layer 1s built using the Cosmos software development kit (SDK). Each chain operates permissionlessly, and is responsible for its own security and data availability. Less than a year in, Cosmos IBC is handling over 2 million transfers per week:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*61l3O3S4-TXxqxRffPkkTg.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.mapofzones.com/?testnet=false&amp;period=168&amp;tableOrderBy=totalIbcTxs&amp;tableOrderSort=desc">Map of Zones</a></figcaption></figure><p>Cosmos was late in gaining the attention of the majority of non-ETH L1 enthusiasts, lagging far behind in price and market cap terms compared to 2021 darlings Solana (SOL), Terra (LUNA), Avalanche (AVAX, together sometimes known as Solunavax).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*of_VvBibWMh-AtqGNqY6_A.png" /><figcaption>Source: Messari</figcaption></figure><p>This might be because the founders of Cosmos have had a different vision than most. Fast and cheap finality on an EVM-compatible stand-alone blockchain was nojust as gas fees exploded just over a year ago.</p><p>Sure Matic and BSC gained a lot of users last year. And Solunavax have carried on from there. But Cosmos has always been focused on the long term.</p><p>Cosmos has been building its techstack for years and has moved slower than other blockchain ecosystems in shipping their product, with the goal of perfecting interchain security. In web2, developers move fast and try to break their system; but in web3, if you move too fast in your development and neglect the rigor in engineering, there’s a high chance of losing users’ money. “Testing in prod” attitudes favoured in DeFi by the likes of Andre Cronje can be fatal in the case of bridges such as Wormhole, that hold so much value and often have many potential attack vectors.</p><p>As co-founder of Cosmos and CEO of <a href="https://informal.systems/">Informal Systems</a> Bucky asked of layer 1 devs on a recent podcast,</p><blockquote>Are you trying to pump a token or are you trying to rebuild the entire internet and financial system, which is going to take a few decades?</blockquote><h3><strong>Bridging, solved</strong></h3><p>By now hopefully no-one needs reminding that Cosmos is not a blockchain. It is at its most basic level a blueprint and a toolkit (<a href="https://v1.cosmos.network/sdk">SDK</a>) for building layer 1 chains. What has so far been unique to Cosmos is its implementation of IBC for token bridging and, eventually, other interchain communications. Other chains are also working on implementing IBC. But, since April 2021, Cosmos is the only ecosystem that has token bridging between chains via IBC built into its SDK. Any L1 blockchain, or “Zone”, implementing the module can send tokens to another L1 with the same implementation.</p><p>The IBC protocol <a href="https://ibcprotocol.org/">website</a> describes IBC as analogous to TCP/IP.</p><blockquote>Just like TCP/IP is a messaging protocol to connect servers and computers with different hardware implementations, geographical locations and operating systems, IBC intends to connect blockchains with different consensus algorithms and state-machines.</blockquote><p>The protocol has a transport layer (TAO) and an application layer, which together standardizes the methods to establish secure connections with, and authenticate data packets between, two sovereign blockchains.</p><p>To further the internet analogy, communication is structured much like the internet, with no single point of failure. Instead the Cosmos Hub and potentially other chains optimized for token transfer act as the connectivity intermediaries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9uB1qmlSC--8b_Cz9Kqe1A.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://cryptoseq.medium.com/cosmos-an-early-in-depth-analysis-at-the-ecosystem-of-connected-blockchains-part-two-2d5a9886166">Seq</a> via <a href="https://messari.io/article/cosmos-ibc-unlocking-the-blockchain-multiverse">Messari</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>There are several methods for bridging between layer 1 blockchains as described <a href="https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/blockchain-bridges-5db6afac44f8">here</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/bkiepuszewski/status/1490988562866913280?s=11">here</a>. IBC is a trustless efficient light client protocol, which prioritizes security over speed. There is no need for a trusted multi-sig: The security of the sending and receiving chains together determine the safety of the bridge. Relayers, who are unable to alter any interchain communication, constantly monitor for outbound relay packets.</p><p>When a user submits a cross-chain transaction, the source blockchain establishes a standardized handshake with the receiving chain, allowing mutual authentication. The next step in an IBC token transfer is for the sending chain to lock the original tokens. The relayer then sends the standardized packet to the receiving chain. The receiving chain mints an equal number of representative “voucher” tokens native to this second chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9ahbyiMChU-U3-CIEpB1Vg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Cosmos</figcaption></figure><p>This is a slow process, but Cosmos prioritizes state over speed. On one call, a dev admitted that , even“if the system has to go down to preserve safety, preserve safety.” Additionally, the Cosmos IBC was tested by both internal devs, collaborating to attempt to break the system, and external auditing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mZd-vY5KOMJdSbALIYlTUg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Splitting ATOM YouTube, 3 February 2022</figcaption></figure><p>All of this is why, according to Jack Zampolin, core Cosmos Hub contributor and founder of <a href="https://www.strangelove.ventures/">Strangelove Ventures</a>, a Wormhole-like disaster is much less likely to occur on IBC: Cosmos will “pick safety over liveness, every time”.</p><h3><strong>Ease of movement = fewer moats, happier customers</strong></h3><p>With low cost, safe and seamless flows between chains, we could see brutal competition. If it’s easy to switch chains, layer 1s who compete for users in such products as DEXs will have to offer more than just the (easily-breachable) moat around their blockchain. Gravity DEX on Cosmos Hub, Junoswap (on Juno) and Osmosis will all need to compete on UX: speed, price and reliability.</p><p>This could cause frictions within the Cosmos community, and there have been some nasty-ish “PvP” <a href="https://twitter.com/fekunze/status/1487181627562369024">arguments on crypto Twitter</a> between competing projects. On the other hand, many founders agree that healthy competition will improve the user experience and therefore benefit the entire Cosmos ecosystem. As Gregory Landau from Cosmos L1 Regen Network recently stated, “We have to out-collaborate the competition”.</p><p>No matter how the community behaves, customers should benefit.</p><h3><strong>Final thoughts</strong></h3><p>According to Vitalik, we will live in a multi-chain world but where cross-chain bridging might make little sense. Layer ones will operate mostly in isolation. But there will be exceptions. Ethereum will scale with L2s, and perhaps eventually with sharding. Avalanche will have DApp-specific subnets. Polkadot has its parachains. And Cosmos has IBC.</p><p>With L2s still primarily in the development stages, Avalanche yet to launch subnets and Polkadot late to launch the first parachains, Cosmos has the opportunity to lead in DApp-specific multi-chain L1 connectivity.</p><p>IBC allows each chain to optimise its own parameters in its own community, but create outsized network effects that are difficult to compete with, by offering seamless and frictionless inter-blockchain interaction.</p><p>IBC can actually be implemented on any chain with finality, which currently only excludes PoW chains like Bitcoin. Soon, therefore, there may be IBC bridging between non-Cosmos chains. But in the meantime, the Cosmos ecosystem will be maximizing its first-mover network effects.</p><p>Cosmos is already truly both cross-chain and multichain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a54c09965fd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threepoint0/ibc-over-troubled-waters-a54c09965fd">IBC Over Troubled Waters</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threepoint0">ThreePoint0 Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Before and Beyond Bitcoin, Part One: Lessons from 18th century fintech]]></title>
            <link>https://rsaleuddin.medium.com/before-and-beyond-bitcoin-part-one-lessons-from-18th-century-fintech-e281eb13407c?source=rss-1f119565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e281eb13407c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[currency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasheed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Feb 2021 18:54:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-10T14:38:24.322Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A little-known history of a highly-successful 18th century private currency might provide clues as to where Bitcoin is headed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g3TYk14Xuk2M9qQ9mvu6kQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Quick take</strong></h3><p>How will Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies evolve and what state responses will ensue?</p><p>Private tokens and ledgers that have popped in and out of existence since the beginning of recorded history may offer some important lessons for the future of cryptocurrency. To understand Bitcoin’s potential future, it may be useful to understand what came before.</p><ul><li>For much of Britain’s post-Roman history, there was a lack of small coinage for marketplace transactions, which required market transactions to be necessarily local, and based on seller trust and credit.</li><li>An economy based on local credit and personal trust could not provide a monetary basis for the nascent industrial revolution, where small anonymous payments were required by employers and workers, alike.</li><li>The world’s first successful fintech solved a government failure in 19th century Britain by providing adequate small change for the new industrial working classes to be paid in and to pay for provisions.</li><li>Private token coins were used in place of official money at times, but before the 1780s tokens were easy to copy, while it was illegal to copy official coinage.</li><li>A new technology, the steam press — solving the usually overwhelming problem of establishing trust in money — was used to provide mass-produced small token coins to be used to pay wages and to provide for the new industrial working class, successfully mitigating a potential disaster for millions of wage-earning Brits and their employers.</li><li>Private enterprise addressed a state failure with entrepreneurship and technology with the state looking on as observer.</li><li>As the private sector’s efforts gained in popularity, the solution and the underyling technology were both eventually monopolized and adopted by the state, and live on to this day as the British copper penny.</li><li>Will history repeat?</li></ul><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>The sovereign state almost always exercises a monopoly on the issuance of currency. Throughout history, however, there are many instances of states failing to provide a useful medium of exchange, store of value or unit of account. This failure could be due to ignorance, but more often the state gets captured by economic elites who benefit from currency problems. In other cases, failures are due to the limitations of metallic or fiat money. State actions that can limit the scope and/or effectiveness of state-issued currency or, worse still, directly harm a state’s citizens include:</p><ul><li>Surprise devaluations, redenominations or wholesale changes in the currency of the state that could quickly render money used by the average citizen worthless. India’s 2016 demonetization is a very recent example of this.</li><li>Over-issuance of money creating a near-worthless currency with immense costs to holding local fiat cash due to (hyper) inflation. Basic financial transactions are no longer possible. The poor whose main asset is cash suffer more than elites who own real assets at home, and both financial and real assets abroad. Recent action in 2000s Zimbabwe, 1990s Argentina and the 1920s German Weimar Republic offer cautionary tales.</li><li>Governments and their citizens can fall prey to global currency hegemons, who place sanctions on the use of their currency in, for example, international trade and finance. Such sanctions hurt the poor the most in, for example, 1990s Iraq.</li></ul><p>Currency-related state failures could be catastrophic. Hyperinflation, for example, completely shuts down all aspects of commerce and finance, as currency cannot be used at all as a (stable) unit of account or a store of value, and only wheelbarrows of cash allow for its use as a medium of exchange. Barter becomes preferable if possible, though many market transactions are impossible.</p><p>• Surprise devaluations, redenominations or wholesale changes in the currency of the state that could quickly render money used by the average citizen worthless. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-demonetization-policy-consequences-by-shashi-tharoor-2016-12">India’s 2016 demonetization</a> is a very recent example of this.<br>• Over-issuance of money creating a near-worthless currency with immense costs to holding local fiat cash due to (hyper) inflation. Basic financial transactions are no longer possible. The poor whose main asset is cash suffer more than elites who own real assets at home, and both financial and real assets abroad. Recent action in 2000s Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/weekinreview/the-world-for-argentina-inflation-and-rage-rise-in-tandem.html">1990s Argentina</a> and the 1920s German Weimar Republic offer cautionary tales.<br>• Governments and their citizens can fall prey to global currency hegemons, who place sanctions on the use of their currency in, for example, international trade and finance. Such sanctions hurt the poor the most in, for example, <a href="https://borgenproject.org/economic-sanctions-and-poverty/">1990s Iraq</a>.</p><p>Currency-related state failures could be catastrophic. Hyperinflation, for example, completely shuts down all aspects of commerce and finance, as currency cannot be used at all as a (stable) unit of account or a store of value, and only wheelbarrows of cash allow for its use as a medium of exchange. Barter becomes preferable if possible, though many market transactions are impossible.</p><h3><strong>“The want of small change”</strong></h3><p>The most common state failure in pre-modern times was a result of government unwillingness to provide smaller coinage needed for individual market transactions, such as purchasing a loaf of bread or paying a laborer for a day. Where all economic transactions are local, credit ledgers can be used to keep track of flows, mitigating some of the negative consequences of the lack of physical media. In ancient Roman markets, vendors kept the ledgers, as they personally knew their customers. Ledgers in this case were required as the long iron bars that passed for small change were not easy to cart about on shopping days! In the Middle Ages, British churches acted as centralized trustworthy ledger keepers. Unfortunately, ledger credit systems are useless for those without shared trust (in each other or with the ledger). Anonymous transactions become impossible without a shared medium of exchange.</p><p>The resulting “want of small change”, among other serious problems, limits the ability of labor to freely contract with employers. It is indeed difficult to imagine that the British industrial revolution could have occurred without a means to pay workers, and for those workers to pay merchants for food and other necessities.</p><p>A compelling example of the negative influence of the lack of small currency exists in plantation economies such as that of the post-bellum US South. Newly-freed slaves remained effectively tied to the land and without economic opportunities, a re-enslavement, as the lack of small change allowed companies and landowners to pay workers in scrip redeemable only at their own stores. This state failure tied sharecroppers to their land, resulting in a genuine restraint of trade and basic human rights, with catastrophic effects.</p><p>In modern times, private entrepreneurship continuously seeks new opportunity, and, unsurprisingly, private solutions to state failures involving small coins have been common throughout history. Some of these were patently illegal, such as counterfeiting. Other solutions included importing and using foreign coins (Spanish silver was commonly used in 19th century US, and Japan regularly used Chinese coins, especially at harvest time) or issuing private-use tokens good for the use at a single enterprise (e.g. railway or subway tokens).</p><p>When such tokens crossed over into general usage, however, their legal grounding became suspect. In some cases, states clamped down on currency entrepreneurs that attempted to compete with the state’s monopoly. At other times, the state initially felt unthreatened or were ignorant of the private solutions. As a result, privately-issued currencies have existed — and often thrived — in many eras and in many countries over the past few millennia, ranging from Ming Dynasty to 20th century China, ante- and postbellum US and a long Medieval to early modern period in Britain. Large swathes of society have often relied on private token currency as well as privately-held ledgers (more likely for those who shared a common location or culture) as media of exchange for goods and services.</p><p>Private sector attempts are inherently limited in their ability to fully compensate for state failures, generally because private issuers can rarely overcome distrust in the general populace. In more local settings, or where the alternative was bleak (e.g. during a war), private currency could function for a time, but these solutions were generally not scalable enough to be state-wide long-term solutions.</p><h3><strong>Bitcoin as private solution</strong></h3><p>For ardent followers, the adoption of Bitcoin is a direct result of government failures, addressing private concerns over hegemonic control (by states but also by the oligopolistic banking sector), privacy and inflation. What makes the solution scalable is the cryptographic trust mechanism that makes cryptocurrencies censorship-resistant, subject to rules on money growth, decentralized and reasonably private. Bitcoin can be thought of as both a token (so a unit of account, a store of value and a medium of exchange) and a ledger (a way of recording exchanges).</p><p>Bitcoin is, however, not the first, nor likely the last, private currency solution that relied on new technology as a trust mechanism to address problems with our monetary system, even if Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is revolutionary from a technological point of view. I suggest, therefore, that past experiences with Bitcoin-like solutions throughout history can offer some lessons and insight into the possible future of cryptocurrency. The rest of the essay covers but one example of a private solution that was allowed to evolve through England in the late 18th century.</p><h3><strong>1780s Britain and the world’s first fintech</strong></h3><p>From pre-Norman times to the early 19th century, post-Roman Britain, like many countries, had to function economically without small coins to use in market transactions. Its pre-industrialized economy was mostly non-market based and the few market transactions were local. Private centralized ledgers, dependent on trust between counterparties, took the place of coin.</p><p>Very small change was mostly non-existent for most of Britain’s history. Silver coins small enough to be used in everyday transaction were easy to lose, when they actually could be found in the first place. It was often in the interests of the rich to melt and/or export silver coins for much of this period. Weak demands by the poor for currency that they could use but that also could be exchanged for larger denominations were ignored by the elites and the British state who saw only gold, and occasionally silver, as useful money.</p><p>The Great Recoinage of Elizabethan Times finally destroyed the remaining inadequate stock of small-ish silver coin, upon which the factory owners, brewers, mines and their employees were reliant to grease the wheels of commerce. As a result, for small transactions between relative ‘strangers’, clipped old coins and foreign coins were all that was available.</p><p>A shortage would have been catastrophic for the industrial revolution, where former agricultural “smallholders” were forced from their lands, entered new workplaces and needed to be paid in small amount per week, and where they in turn need to buy provisions on an almost daily basis. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that “the coin shortage threatened to delay, if not halt, the process of industrialization.”</p><p>Patchwork solutions for the lack of small coin were many. Payment in kind (tools, factory output), or in tokens for use only in company stores or other affiliated suppliers (e.g. the local tavern) were used by the larger employers. Such pay methods often tied the workers to the mine or factory, with the fruits of one labour only available to be spent at restricted locations were credit or tokens issued by the employer were accepted. In other cases, employers would simply not be able to pay or pay only once the obligation was large enough to be paid with good silver coin of the realm, and workers resorted to criminal activity, including stealing inventory and finished products from their paymasters.</p><p>At many points in this history up to the late 1700s, private individuals and companies stepped in to produce their own small change, either as counterfeits or as so-called “evasions”, the latter not designed to accurately mimic official currency. Other tokens issued by merchants, taverns and brewers, could be of tin, copper or even paper. The provision of such private currency before the mid 1770s was highly localized. Brewers, for example, would issue tokens redeemable on demand at their establishment. They could not generally be used further afield then the one or two square blocks of London, or a small village. Whether by credit or with small tokens, transaction could only remain local.</p><p>By the mid 1780s, entrepreneurship and invention joined forces to solve the severe country-wide problem of the lack of small coins. The owner of the largest copper mine had the metal but not the currency to pay his workers. Using the crude methods of the day, the company minted enough coins for its own use, but there was such a pent-up demand that they quickly circulated widely across England, and once again there were shortages at the source. To truly meet the needs of the population, token production needed to be both scalable and trustworthy.</p><p>Enter the steam press, new technology for minting coins invented by Matthew Boulton. Such tech allowed for the fast production of standardized size and weight coins — with edges — that were difficult to counterfeit. With the steam press ensuring scalability and uniqueness, the Parys Mine Company of Anglesey Wales, and several large competitors were able to supply all the tokens needed for the industrialized economy to function. Millions of coins such as the one shown here were minted: One issuer minted three hundred tons, at 600+ coins per minute.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PPbIuIyQHYzCwqtiPczS2Q.png" /><figcaption>Copper token issued by the Parys Mine Company, Anglesey held by the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge. Photo by author.</figcaption></figure><p>Where was the government during all of this private encroachment on the state monopoly? As a perfect illustration of the initial lack of government interest in new technology, the British state actually refused to get involved with either small change or the steam press when explicitly offered the opportunity. Instead, the British parliament adopted a laissez faire approach to the private issuers, as the private actions did not threaten elites nor the government. The result was a true private and parallel currency, with the small privately-manufactured change not generally exchangeable for state-issued money. The private solution was far from perfect. Token holders were never sure of their rights of exchange and the value of the holdings — they could (and did — eventually) become worthless over time.</p><p>After monitoring the market but maintaining a laissez faire attitude to innovation, the government finally had to do “something”. While there were the consumer protection issues as the tokens were often unexchangeable at source, there is seigniorage in coinage: it’s cheaper to make token coins (cheaper by ‘weight’) then they are worth at their stated fair value. The state wanted control of that profit.</p><p>Under this guise of consumer protection, attempts were made at restricting the private tokens without providing any replacement. Eventually, however, the state had to replace the private solution with their own. It was simple for the government to monopolize the issuance of small coins: They eventually simply hired Boulton’s mints and his competitors to make official small coins. The tokens minted by Boulton and others were simply replaced by a state-sanctioned equivalent. This new official British copper penny that survived into the 21st century fixed all the flaws of the private equivalent. Exchangeability for other coins and for goods and services was now guaranteed.</p><h3><strong>Key takeaways</strong></h3><p>The history of 18th century private copper token coinage is in itself an interesting and informative case which demonstrates how entrepreneurship and technological innovation can together solve failures of the state, while also offering an example of how states respond to such private solutions. The most important lesson here is perhaps that a state cannot be relied on to provide critical tools for the economic health and wealth of its citizenry. The poor had to suffer for years before the government caught up to demand. Needs were ignored and, once the private solution grew “too popular”, maintaining the state monopoly was more important than meeting critical needs of the people.</p><p>There are similar histories from other times and in other countries with similar parallels as regards state failures, private innovation and state response. In part 2 of this series I show that such private currency solution can be fit into a more general model of public failure and private trust. Bitcoin, itself, can be fit into this model.</p><h3><strong>Beyond Bitcoin?</strong></h3><p>Like 18th century tokens, BTC utilized the latest technology to mitigate government and market failures. Bitcoiners do not trust the state to provide an inflation-proof stable currency. They do not trust the state with the power to seize assets, or the power to permit or deny access to the international financial system at their whim.</p><p>Can the history of copper token coinage provide any insight into the possible future of cryptocurrencies and their regulation? Obviously, “history may not repeat, but it does rhyme”. The parallels seem more than coincidental, as is shown in the Figure below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*og7ktjB3vcauN-IIAOjrwA.png" /><figcaption>Source: Author.</figcaption></figure><p>If you find such parallels convincing, then you probably agree that governments have the following possible responses to BTC:</p><ol><li>continue to monitor and control only the interaction of crypto with the traditional monetary system;</li><li>over-regulate or (attempt to) ban the use of cryptocurrencies; and/or</li><li>create their own crypto or increasingly digital variant of current fiat.</li></ol><p>If BTC follows the evolution of private solutions similar to the case study above, domination by Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) and over-regulation by national governments are the likely outcomes. Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein recently said “If I were a regulator I would be kind of hyperventilating at the success of [crypto] at the moment, and I’d be arming myself to deal with it.” Even if a ban is not possible, governments can throw up a number of high hurdles, especially in the crypto/fiat on and offramps. At the same time, we can see central bankers strongly hinting that, while the revolutionary technology of Bitcoin is “here to stay”, CBDC operating using the new tech will likely replace BTC in the near future.</p><p>If and when BTC truly threatens state monopoly and power, is there any chance that the states will not respond?</p><h3><strong>About</strong></h3><p>This essay is based on ideas the author first explored in Chambers, Saleuddin and MacMahon “Alternative finance: An historical perspective” (2019) Financial History Review and in an upcoming chapter in Rau, Wardop and Zingales, Handbook of Technological Finance (2021). Those interested in the historical details can find them there and in the references at the end of each paper.</p><h3>Further reading and references</h3><p><em>Good money: Birmingham button makers, the Royal Mint, and the beginnings of modern coinage, 1775–1821</em> (2008) is George Selgin’s excellent and very readable history of 18th and early 19th century British private tokens. Private enterprise triumphs in the face of state failures, until remonopolization.</p><p>Thomas Sargent and Francois Velde in <em>The big problem of small change </em>provide a history and formal explanation of the shortage of smaller-denomination currency and the effects it might have had in Europe between 1300 to 1850. There is very little focus on private currencies, however, and the analysis is not extended to Asia or America.</p><p>Chambers, D., Saleuddin, R. and Mcmahon, C., 2019. Alternative finance: a historical perspective. Financial History Review, 26(2): 109–126.</p><p>Davos 2021. Resetting digital currencies. <a href="https://www.weforum.org/events/the-davos-agenda-2021/sessions/resetting-digital-currencies.">https://www.weforum.org/events/the-davos-agenda-2021/sessions/resetting-digital-currencies.</a></p><p>De Roover, R., 1953. L’évolution de la lettre de change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles. Paris: Armand Colin.</p><p>Kuroda, A., 2005. Copper-coins chosen and silver differentiated. Acta Asiatica, 88: 65–86.</p><p>Lurvink, K., 2014. Strapped for cash: Non-cash payments on Louisiana cotton plantations, 1865–1908. Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis, 11(3): 123–151.</p><p>Muldrew, C., 1998. The economy of obligation. London, Macmillan.</p><p>Selgin, G., 2003. Steam, hot air, and small change: Matthew Boulton and the reform of Britain’s coinage. Economic History Review 56: 478–509.</p><p>Timberlake Jr, R.H., 1981. The significance of unaccounted currencies. Journal of Economic History: 853–866.</p><p>Williamson, G.C., 1889. Historical evidence and information gathered from the traders’ tokens of the Seventeenth Century and from the minor currency. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4: 171–196.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e281eb13407c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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