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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rudy Adrian on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rudy Adrian on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Rudy Adrian on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Managing Someone Who Has Worked Longer Than You Have]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/first-time-manager-playbook/managing-someone-who-has-worked-longer-than-you-have-e320e0e050a4?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1679/1*8NZsWb--z4Us0IsdGuTpvA.png" width="1679"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">How first-time managers can earn trust while respecting a team member&#x2019;s experience.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/first-time-manager-playbook/managing-someone-who-has-worked-longer-than-you-have-e320e0e050a4?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2">Continue reading on First Time Manager Playbook »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/first-time-manager-playbook/managing-someone-who-has-worked-longer-than-you-have-e320e0e050a4?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[leadership-skills]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[first-time-manager]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 02:59:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-09T02:59:49.115Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Shopee ROAS Looks Good. But Something might be Wrong?]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/your-shopee-roas-looks-good-but-something-might-be-wrong-e715466b6cb0?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1400/1*RodiMgio6HVqV3B5kcsjEg.png" width="1400"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">A strong Checkout ROAS can hide declining payment completion, leaving brands to scale advertising that produces attractive GMV but weaker&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/your-shopee-roas-looks-good-but-something-might-be-wrong-e715466b6cb0?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2">Continue reading on The Ecommerce Catalyst »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/your-shopee-roas-looks-good-but-something-might-be-wrong-e715466b6cb0?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 05:57:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-30T05:57:32.930Z</atom:updated>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[5 Metrics You Should Understand to Grow with TikTok LIVE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/5-metrics-you-should-understand-to-grow-with-tiktok-live-c6633534f4de?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 05:57:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T05:57:37.864Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This beginner’s guide based on my experience to turn TikTok LIVE Shopping into a familiar sales funnel, helping commercial teams identify what to fix before adding hours, discounts, or advertising.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C8c6KxWyy8Stpd_-u2b2Ew.png" /></figure><p>The Official Store has just finished an eight-hour TikTok LIVE session. Thousands of people entered. The comment section looked active. The host kept talking until midnight. Yet GMV remained far below target.</p><p>The immediate reactions are predictable.</p><p>“We need a better host.”</p><p>“We need a bigger discount.”</p><p>“We need more viewers.”</p><p>“We should go LIVE longer.”</p><p>Any of those actions might help. They could also waste money because management has not identified where the sales funnel is breaking.</p><h3>LIVE Shopping follows familiar sales logic</h3><p>For Sales Directors and offline commercial teams, TikTok LIVE can look complicated.</p><p>There are impressions, viewers, hosts, operators, product cards, vouchers, algorithms, and dozens of dashboard metrics.</p><p>But the commercial logic is familiar.</p><p>In a physical store, we might look at:</p><blockquote><strong><em>People passing → Store entry → Product interest → Purchase → Basket value</em></strong></blockquote><p>In TikTok LIVE, I would translate this into:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Enter → Stay → Click → Buy → Spend</em></strong></blockquote><p>Each stage has one primary metric:</p><ol><li>Enter Room Rate (ERR%)</li><li>Average Viewing Duration</li><li>Click-Through Rate</li><li>Click-to-Order Rate</li><li>Average Order Value</li></ol><p>The simplified commercial equation is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Impressions × ERR × CTR × CTOR × AOV = GMV</em></strong></blockquote><p>Average Viewing Duration influences how well viewers move from entering to clicking and buying.</p><p>When GMV is weak, management should locate the leak before prescribing the solution.</p><h3>Metric 1: Enter Room Rate</h3><p>Before someone enters a LIVE, TikTok may show a preview of that LIVE in the person’s feed.</p><p>This creates three different traffic numbers:</p><ul><li><strong>Impressions</strong> show how many times the LIVE preview appeared.</li><li><strong>Views</strong> show how many times people entered the LIVE room.</li><li><strong>Viewers</strong> show the number of distinct people who watched during the session.</li></ul><p>Enter Room Rate, or ERR%, measures how effectively impressions become LIVE entries.</p><p>TikTok defines it as:</p><blockquote><strong><em>ERR = LIVE views ÷ LIVE impressions × 100%</em></strong></blockquote><p>TikTok describes ERR as the percentage of people who see the LIVE through different traffic sources and then enter the room. (<a href="https://seller-us.tiktok.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3175988075644686&amp;lang=en">TikTok Shop Academy</a>)</p><p>For offline sales teams, the analogy is simple:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Impressions are people passing the store.<br>ERR is the percentage who decide to enter.</em></strong></blockquote><p>Imagine that TikTok gives a personal-care LIVE 100,000 impressions.</p><p>If 3,000 of those impressions become LIVE views, the ERR is 3%.</p><p>The team should not immediately decide whether 3% is good or bad based on another brand’s number. Category, account maturity, traffic source, product, promotion, timing, and audience can all affect the result.</p><p>The first task is to compare the store against its own previous sessions under similar conditions.</p><p>A low ERR may indicate that the first impression is weak.</p><p>Possible causes include:</p><ul><li>an unclear LIVE title;</li><li>a cover that does not show the product or offer;</li><li>an opening visual that looks inactive;</li><li>a host who takes too long to begin;</li><li>poor product visibility;</li><li>a mismatch between the preview and the audience receiving it.</li></ul><p>Suppose someone sees the LIVE preview while scrolling.</p><p>The host is looking down at a phone.</p><p>The product is outside the frame.</p><p>The title only says, “Brand Official LIVE.”</p><p>There is no visible reason to enter.</p><p>Now imagine a different opening.</p><p>The host holds two deodorants and says:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“Which one leaves fewer white marks on dark clothes? Let’s test both.”</em></strong></blockquote><p>The second version gives the viewer a reason to enter.</p><p>The management question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>When TikTok shows our LIVE to someone, what makes that person stop scrolling and enter?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Metric 2: Average Viewing Duration</h3><p>A high ERR gets people through the door.</p><p>The next question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Do they stay long enough to understand the product and offer?</em></strong></blockquote><p>Average Viewing Duration, or AVD, measures the average time viewers spend inside the LIVE.</p><p>TikTok’s LIVE Traffic Playbook describes higher average viewing duration as a sign of stronger audience retention, which creates greater potential for engagement and conversion. (<a href="https://seller-us.tiktok.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3175988075644686&amp;lang=en">TikTok Shop Academy</a>)</p><p>Imagine a viewer entering a personal-care LIVE.</p><p>The host spends the first minute greeting people, reading usernames, and waiting for the audience to become larger.</p><p>The viewer sees no demonstration.</p><p>She hears no product benefit.</p><p>She leaves after ten seconds.</p><p>The ERR may look healthy because she entered. But the LIVE did not earn enough attention to create interest.</p><p>In an offline store, a salesperson cannot ignore a shopper for two minutes and expect her to remain.</p><p>The first few seconds of a LIVE should quickly communicate:</p><ul><li>which product is being discussed;</li><li>which customer need it addresses;</li><li>what the host is about to show;</li><li>whether there is a relevant offer;</li><li>why the viewer should continue watching.</li></ul><p>For example:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“If deodorant usually leaves marks on dark clothes, stay for this quick test. I’ll compare two variants and show which bundle is available today.”</em></strong></blockquote><p>That opening gives the viewer a visible reason to stay.</p><p>The team can improve AVD by:</p><ul><li>shortening greetings and inactive moments;</li><li>starting demonstrations quickly;</li><li>rotating products and selling moments;</li><li>answering repeated customer questions;</li><li>changing the visual activity regularly;</li><li>giving viewers a reason to wait for the next demonstration.</li></ul><p>The management question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>What does a viewer see or hear in the first few seconds that earns the next minute of attention?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Metric 3: Click-Through Rate</h3><p>A viewer may enter, stay, and enjoy the LIVE without showing any buying interest.</p><p>The next stage is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Did the viewer click a product?</em></strong></blockquote><p>TikTok defines LIVE Click-Through Rate, or CTR, as:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Product clicks ÷ LIVE views × 100%</em></strong></blockquote><p>It measures how effectively the LIVE converts room entries into product interest. (<a href="https://seller-us.tiktok.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3175988075644686&amp;lang=en">TikTok Shop Academy</a>)</p><p>For an offline commercial team, a product click is similar to a shopper taking a product from the shelf to inspect it.</p><p>A low CTR can indicate that:</p><ul><li>the product benefit was unclear;</li><li>the wrong product was pinned;</li><li>the host discussed one variant while another appeared on screen;</li><li>the call to action came too late;</li><li>the offer was difficult to understand;</li><li>too many product cards created confusion;</li><li>the demonstration entertained viewers without moving them towards the product.</li></ul><p>This metric depends heavily on coordination between the host and operator.</p><p>If the host discusses a brightening serum while the operator pins a body wash, the customer journey breaks.</p><p>If the host says, “Click the product below,” while several product cards are visible, the viewer must search for the correct item.</p><p>Every extra step creates friction.</p><p>The team can improve CTR by pinning the product at the right moment, repeating its exact name, showing a visible demonstration, comparing variants clearly, and giving one specific reason to click now.</p><p>The management question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>After watching the product demonstration, does the viewer know exactly which product to click and why?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Metric 4: Click-to-Order Rate</h3><p>Suppose CTR is healthy.</p><p>Many viewers open the product card, but few place an order.</p><p>The problem has moved beyond attracting attention.</p><p>Click-to-Order Rate, or CTOR, measures:</p><blockquote><strong><em>SKU orders ÷ Product clicks × 100%</em></strong></blockquote><p>TikTok describes CTOR as the efficiency of converting product clicks into product orders. (<a href="https://seller-us.tiktok.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3175988075644686&amp;lang=en">TikTok Shop Academy</a>)</p><p>A low CTOR after a healthy CTR may indicate:</p><ul><li>the final price is unattractive;</li><li>the voucher is difficult to claim;</li><li>shipping costs are too high;</li><li>the preferred variant is unavailable;</li><li>ratings or reviews create doubt;</li><li>the product page does not match the host’s explanation;</li><li>the offer is stronger in another channel;</li><li>the checkout process creates friction.</li></ul><p>This is where LIVE Shopping becomes a cross-functional business.</p><p>The host creates interest.</p><p>The operator pins the product.</p><p>But Commercial, E-commerce, Supply Chain, Finance, and Brand teams influence whether the customer completes the purchase.</p><p>Imagine the host telling viewers:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“Buy two and receive a free travel-size product.”</em></strong></blockquote><p>The shopper opens the product card.</p><p>The gift is not mentioned clearly.</p><p>The eligible bundle is difficult to identify.</p><p>The shopper cannot tell whether the gift will be added automatically.</p><p>She leaves without ordering.</p><p>The host performed her role. The transaction design failed.</p><p>The management question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Once viewers show buying intent, what prevents them from completing the order?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Metric 5: Average Order Value</h3><p>A LIVE can generate a healthy number of orders and still miss its GMV target.</p><p>The fifth question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>How much does each completed order contribute?</em></strong></blockquote><p>Average Order Value, or AOV, is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>GMV ÷ Number of orders</em></strong></blockquote><p>Imagine that many shoppers buy one Rp45,000 item.</p><p>CTOR looks healthy, but GMV remains limited because the average basket is small.</p><p>The common response is to push a more expensive product. That may not match the audience’s needs.</p><p>A better approach is to design the basket.</p><p>For personal care, this could include:</p><ul><li>products used in one routine;</li><li>practical multipacks;</li><li>a hero product paired with a complementary item;</li><li>gift thresholds slightly above the current AOV;</li><li>clear comparisons between single products and bundles.</li></ul><p>Instead of saying:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“Please add another item to receive the gift,”</em></strong></blockquote><p>the host could say:</p><blockquote><strong><em>“If this deodorant is for daily use, the two-pack covers a longer usage period and qualifies for today’s pouch. Open product number three to compare the value.”</em></strong></blockquote><p>The second version connects the larger basket with a customer need.</p><p>The management question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>How can we increase basket value through relevance and assortment without depending only on deeper discounts?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Reading the complete funnel</h3><p>Consider a hypothetical personal-care LIVE with:</p><ul><li>100,000 impressions;</li><li>3% ERR;</li><li>5% CTR;</li><li>8% CTOR;</li><li>Rp85,000 AOV.</li></ul><p>The simplified funnel becomes:</p><p>100,000 impressions generate 3,000 LIVE views.</p><p>Those views generate 150 product clicks.</p><p>At an 8% CTOR, those clicks produce 12 orders.</p><p>At an AOV of Rp85,000, the LIVE generates approximately Rp1.02 million in GMV.</p><p>Now the team can diagnose the problem.</p><p>If impressions are low, the LIVE may have a distribution problem.</p><p>If ERR is low, the preview, title, opening visual, or audience match may be weak.</p><p>If AVD is low, viewers enter but do not find enough reason to stay.</p><p>If CTR is low, the content fails to turn attention into product interest.</p><p>If CTOR is low, the offer, stock, product page, or checkout may be stopping the sale.</p><p>If AOV is low, the assortment and bundle strategy need attention.</p><p>Management can now act on the specific constraint instead of asking every function to “increase GMV.”</p><h3>Do not push every metric at once</h3><p>Changing everything in one session makes the next result difficult to interpret.</p><p>If ERR is the main problem, test the title, cover, opening frame, or opening statement.</p><p>If AVD is weak, improve the session structure and product demonstration.</p><p>If CTR is weak, improve product pinning and calls to action.</p><p>If CTOR is weak, inspect the offer and buying journey.</p><p>If AOV is weak, redesign the bundle and assortment.</p><p>Choose the weakest stage.</p><p>Change one or two major variables.</p><p>Then compare similar sessions using the same definitions.</p><h3>Use GPM as an output, not the diagnosis</h3><p>TikTok also reports two useful productivity metrics.</p><p><strong>Show GPM</strong> measures GMV generated per 1,000 LIVE impressions.</p><p><strong>Watch GPM</strong> measures GMV generated per 1,000 LIVE views.</p><p>These metrics summarize how efficiently the complete funnel generates GMV. They are useful for comparing sessions, products, and traffic quality.</p><p>But GPM alone does not tell management where the problem sits.</p><p>A weak Show GPM could come from low ERR, CTR, CTOR, or AOV.</p><p>That is why the five-metric funnel remains important.</p><p>GPM shows the result.</p><p>The funnel shows what to fix.</p><h3>GMV still needs commercial guardrails</h3><p>These five metrics explain how LIVE sales happen.</p><p>They do not prove that the sales are profitable.</p><p>Management should also monitor:</p><ul><li>GMV per LIVE hour;</li><li>contribution after discounts and platform costs;</li><li>cancellation and return rates;</li><li>stock availability;</li><li>host and production costs;</li><li>affiliate commissions;</li><li>advertising spending;</li><li>ROAS when paid traffic is introduced.</li></ul><p>A LIVE generating Rp20 million over ten hours may be less productive than one generating Rp8 million over two hours.</p><p>GMV can also increase because the brand uses deeper vouchers that damage contribution.</p><p>The funnel metrics improve execution.</p><p>Commercial guardrails determine whether that improvement creates useful growth.</p><h3>Where paid traffic should enter</h3><p>Paid traffic can help scale a LIVE after the organic funnel is understood.</p><p>TikTok currently provides tools such as LIVE GMV Max. Some eligible accounts can also use Creative Boost to add budget behind selected videos supporting a LIVE campaign. (<a href="https://ads.tiktok.com/resources/help/article/how-to-set-up-live-gmv-max-creative-boost?lang=en">TikTok Business Help Center</a>)</p><p>The management principle is simple:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Advertising can increase impressions. It cannot repair every leak after the impression.</em></strong></blockquote><p>If ERR is weak, buying additional impressions may send more people past a store they still do not want to enter.</p><p>If viewers leave quickly, avoid the product cards, or abandon checkout, paid traffic can make the same weakness larger and more expensive.</p><p>Understand the funnel first.</p><p>Then decide whether paid traffic deserves a role.</p><h3>Closing thought</h3><p>TikTok LIVE is not a mysterious performance managed only by hosts, creators, or platform specialists.</p><p>It is a sales funnel.</p><p>People see the room.</p><p>Some enter.</p><p>Some stay.</p><p>Some inspect a product.</p><p>Some buy.</p><p>Each order creates a basket.</p><p>When GMV is weak, resist the temptation to demand longer hours, bigger discounts, or more traffic immediately.</p><p>Follow the customer through the five stages and identify where the movement stops.</p><p>For Sales Directors and offline commercial teams, the dashboard may be unfamiliar: <strong>The commercial questions are not.</strong></p><h3>TL;DR</h3><p>TikTok LIVE Shopping should be managed through five connected metrics: ERR, AVD, CTR, CTOR, and AOV. Together, they explain how impressions become room entries, attention, product interest, orders, and GMV.</p><ul><li>Use ERR to measure whether impressions become LIVE entries.</li><li>Use AVD to understand whether the session earns attention.</li><li>Use CTR and CTOR to separate product-interest problems from purchase problems.</li><li>Use AOV to improve GMV through assortment and basket design.</li><li>Diagnose the organic funnel before using paid traffic to scale it.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6633534f4de" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/5-metrics-you-should-understand-to-grow-with-tiktok-live-c6633534f4de">5 Metrics You Should Understand to Grow with TikTok LIVE</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Beginner’s Guide to Setting ROAS for GMV Max in Tiktok]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/a-beginners-guide-to-setting-roas-for-gmv-max-in-tiktok-e0a880102bc3?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e0a880102bc3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ti̇ktok]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 09:20:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-18T09:24:28.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Yoc_C2dg7MGFda48Zdp5hA.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>The first ROAS benchmark should come from your product economics, category, and growth objective, not from one number suggested by the platform.</em></blockquote><p>You are setting up TikTok Product GMV Max for the first time. The account manager recommends a target of 4. Your team enters the number, approves the budget, and waits for GMV. The campaign starts delivering. The dashboard looks healthy.</p><p>But one basic question was never answered:</p><p><em>Does a ROAS of 4 make commercial sense for your product?</em></p><h3>TikTok says ROI, but this article uses ROAS</h3><p>Before setting a benchmark, we need to clarify the language.</p><p>TikTok may label the setting and performance metric as <strong>Target ROI</strong>. It is generally calculated as:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Attributed GMV ÷ Advertising Cost</em></strong></blockquote><p>In marketing language, this calculation is closer to <strong>ROAS</strong>, or Return on Ad(vertising) Spend.</p><h3>ROAS measures advertising revenue efficiency</h3><p>The basic formula is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>ROAS = Attributed revenue or GMV ÷ Advertising spend</em></strong></blockquote><p>If GMV Max spends Rp10 million and reports Rp40 million in attributed GMV:</p><blockquote><em>Rp40 million ÷ Rp10 million = </em><strong><em>4x ROAS</em></strong></blockquote><p>Every Rp1 spent on advertising is associated with Rp4 in GMV.</p><h3>ROI measures the return after considering wider costs</h3><p>ROI, or Return on Investment, should consider the financial return after the relevant business costs.</p><p><strong>A simplified marketing ROI </strong>calculation could be:</p><blockquote><strong><em>ROI = Contribution after advertising ÷ Advertising investment</em></strong></blockquote><p>Suppose the campaign generates Rp40 million in GMV from Rp10 million in advertising.</p><p><strong>Its ROAS is 4x.</strong></p><p>But assume the brand also incurs Rp28 million in cost of goods, platform fees, discounts, affiliate commissions, fulfilment, and expected returns.</p><p>The remaining contribution after advertising is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp40 million − Rp28 million − Rp10 million = Rp2 million</em></blockquote><p>The simplified marketing ROI is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp2 million ÷ Rp10 million = </em><strong><em>20%</em></strong></blockquote><p>The campaign therefore has:</p><ul><li>4x ROAS;</li><li>Rp2 million in contribution after advertising;</li><li>20% simplified marketing ROI.</li></ul><p>A campaign can have an attractive ROAS while producing a small profit or even a loss.</p><p>That is why this article will use <strong>ROAS</strong> when discussing GMV divided by advertising spend. When referring to the TikTok interface, remember that the platform may label the same type of ratio as <strong>Target ROI</strong>.</p><p>Using ROAS keeps the commercial conversation clearer:</p><blockquote>ROAS tells us how much GMV the advertising generated.<br>ROI tells us whether the wider investment created financial value.</blockquote><h3>First, understand what GMV Max attributes</h3><p>TikTok describes Product GMV Max as an automated advertising solution that optimizes the total-channel return of selected TikTok Shop products.</p><p>The system can use available brand content and authorized affiliate content. It selects creative assets, audience settings, and placements to generate additional GMV.</p><p>TikTok also states that orders for products promoted through Product GMV Max can be attributed to the campaign, including orders associated with organic content and affiliate activity. This means the number shown in GMV Max may cover a wider sales pool than the paid-ad attribution used in a traditional advertising campaign. (<a href="https://ads.tiktok.com/resources/help/article/about-product-gmv-max?utm_source=chatgpt.com">TikTok Business Help Center</a>)</p><p>The reported calculation may appear simple:</p><blockquote><strong><em>GMV Max reported return = Attributed GMV ÷ Advertising cost</em></strong></blockquote><p>But it does not automatically deduct:</p><ul><li>cost of goods;</li><li>platform fees;</li><li>brand-funded vouchers;</li><li>affiliate commissions;</li><li>fulfilment support;</li><li>cancellations and returns;</li><li>product samples;</li><li>content-production costs.</li></ul><p>The reported ratio describes GMV efficiency against advertising cost.</p><p>It does not prove profitability.</p><h3>The platform benchmark answers one side of the question</h3><p>A TikTok account manager may suggest that your campaign should begin at a particular target.</p><p>The recommendation can be useful. TikTok has platform data, campaign signals, and experience with delivery behaviour. The suggested number may give the system enough flexibility to spend and learn.</p><p>But the platform and the brand manage different outcomes.</p><p>The platform is trying to help the campaign deliver GMV at scale.</p><p>The brand needs to protect contribution, cash flow, stock, channel relationships, and sustainable demand.</p><p>The account manager may be answering:</p><blockquote><em>“What target could help the system deliver?”</em></blockquote><p>The brand still needs to answer:</p><blockquote><em>“At what ROAS does this GMV make commercial sense for us?”</em></blockquote><p>Accepting the recommendation without doing the second calculation creates a one-sided decision.</p><p>The same problem appears when a team asks another brand:</p><blockquote><em>“What ROAS do you normally use?”</em></blockquote><p>Even when the other brand shares an honest answer, its product economics may be completely different.</p><h3>A smartphone and personal-care product need different benchmarks</h3><p>Imagine two hypothetical products.</p><p>The first is a personal-care product selling for Rp100,000.</p><p>After cost of goods, platform fees, voucher funding, affiliate commission, fulfilment support, and expected returns, the brand has Rp18,000 available before advertising.</p><p>The maximum advertising cost per order is Rp18,000 if the brand wants the first order to break even.</p><p>Its break-even ROAS is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp100,000 GMV ÷ Rp18,000 advertising cost = </em><strong><em>5.6x ROAS</em></strong></blockquote><p>Now consider a smartphone selling for Rp5 million.</p><p>The transaction value is much higher, but its percentage margin may be thin. After cost of goods, platform charges, promotions, fulfilment, and an allowance for cancellations and returns, assume that only Rp165,000 remains before advertising.</p><p>Its break-even ROAS is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp5,000,000 GMV ÷ Rp165,000 advertising cost = </em><strong><em>30.3x ROAS</em></strong></blockquote><p><strong>These numbers are illustrative. They are not category benchmarks. Just trying to make the sense out of it.</strong></p><p>They show why selling price cannot determine the right ROAS by itself.</p><p>One smartphone sale produces high GMV. The dashboard can look impressive after only a few conversions. Yet the product may tolerate very little advertising cost relative to its selling price.</p><p>Personal care may have a lower transaction value. But the product could have a healthier margin, higher buying frequency, and measurable repeat-purchase potential.</p><p>Even within personal care, one benchmark may not work for every product.</p><p>A hero product with strong existing demand is different from a new variant.</p><p>A single item is different from a bundle.</p><p>An affiliate-led product is different from one sold mainly through the brand’s own content.</p><p>“Personal care should use ROAS X” remains too broad to guide investment. As mentioned, this is not about benchmarking, more about how to make this as your benchmark.</p><h3>Use the FIRST framework to set the benchmark</h3><p>Your first GMV Max ROAS should be treated as a commercial hypothesis.</p><p>The FIRST framework provides five decisions for developing and testing that hypothesis.</p><h3>F: Find the commercial floor</h3><p>Begin with the amount left before advertising. For each product or product group, calculate:</p><p>Selling price minus:</p><ul><li>cost of goods;</li><li>platform and transaction fees;</li><li>vouchers or discounts;</li><li>affiliate commission;</li><li>fulfilment subsidy;</li><li>cancellation and return allowance;</li><li>other variable selling costs.</li></ul><p>The amount left is the maximum affordable advertising cost if the first order must break even.</p><p>Then calculate:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Break-even ROAS = Selling price ÷ Maximum affordable advertising cost</em></strong></blockquote><p>This creates the commercial floor.</p><p>The calculation may still exclude overhead, agency fees, taxes, and content-production costs. Management should decide which costs must be included before describing the result as profitable.</p><p>A shop-level benchmark can also hide differences between products.</p><p>A high-margin bundle may subsidize a low-margin hero product. The total dashboard looks healthy while one part of the portfolio quietly loses money.</p><p>Ask:</p><blockquote><em>How much advertising cost can this product absorb before the order destroys contribution?</em></blockquote><h3>I: Identify the campaign objective</h3><p>The break-even ROAS does not automatically become the campaign target.</p><p>The target also depends on what the business is trying to achieve.</p><p>An established product may be expected to generate profitable volume.</p><p>A product launch may temporarily accept weaker first-order economics to generate trials.</p><p>An ageing product may prioritize stock movement.</p><p>A hero product may attract customers who add other products to the basket.</p><p>A personal-care brand may accept a first order below break-even if it can measure repeat purchases and show that later orders recover the acquisition cost.</p><p>That condition matters.</p><p>“Customers will probably buy again” is an assumption.</p><p>The brand should support it with cohort data, reorder behaviour, or another defensible source.</p><p>Ask:</p><blockquote><em>Are we buying profitable orders, new customers, product trials, stock movement, or short-term GMV?</em></blockquote><h3>R: Read the starting evidence correctly</h3><p>A first GMV Max campaign may still have historical evidence.</p><p>Review:</p><ul><li>previous advertising performance;</li><li>organic product GMV;</li><li>affiliate-generated GMV;</li><li>product-page conversion;</li><li>average order value;</li><li>promotion periods;</li><li>cancellation and return rates;</li><li>available content;</li><li>inventory availability.</li></ul><p>Check whether every comparison uses the same revenue and attribution definitions.</p><p>Suppose the product historically generates Rp30 million per week through organic and affiliate activity.</p><p>After GMV Max starts, the dashboard reports Rp60 million in attributed GMV from Rp10 million in advertising.</p><p>The reported ROAS is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp60 million ÷ Rp10 million = </em><strong><em>6x ROAS</em></strong></blockquote><p>But total GMV only increased by Rp30 million against the previous baseline.</p><p>A simple incremental view would show:</p><blockquote><em>Rp30 million additional GMV ÷ Rp10 million advertising cost = </em><strong><em>3x incremental ROAS</em></strong></blockquote><p>This does not prove that GMV Max caused exactly Rp30 million in additional sales. Promotions, seasonality, stock, content quality, campaign dates, and competitor activity can also affect demand.</p><p>But it exposes an important difference:</p><blockquote><em>Reported ROAS can be 6x while the estimated incremental ROAS is only 3x.</em></blockquote><p>Ask:</p><blockquote><em>How much of the attributed GMV would probably have happened without the advertising?</em></blockquote><h3>S: Set a controlled test with guardrails</h3><p>The first target is a test setting. It should not become a permanent benchmark after a few good days.</p><p>Test products with reasonably similar margins and commercial roles.</p><p>Define in advance:</p><ul><li>opening ROAS target;</li><li>daily and total budget limits;</li><li>test duration;</li><li>products included;</li><li>minimum stock;</li><li>promotion conditions;</li><li>acceptable contribution;</li><li>review dates;</li><li>conditions for increasing, reducing, or stopping investment.</li></ul><p>Avoid changing the target every time one day looks weak.</p><p>TikTok’s general budget guidance advises advertisers to limit the size and frequency of budget adjustments to support stable delivery and optimization. (<a href="https://ads.tiktok.com/resources/help/article/budget?lang=id&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com">TikTok Business Help Center</a>)</p><p>The platform needs enough time and activity to optimize.</p><p>The brand still needs a financial limit. “The system is learning” should never become an open-ended reason to continue spending.</p><p>Ask:</p><blockquote><em>What result would make us continue, change, or stop the test?</em></blockquote><h3>T: Track commercial quality and dependency</h3><p>Once GMV Max begins delivering, reported ROAS is only the first metric.</p><p>Review it with:</p><ul><li>net sales after cancellations and returns;</li><li>contribution after variable costs;</li><li>advertising cost;</li><li>affiliate commission;</li><li>content-production cost;</li><li>new versus returning buyers where measurable;</li><li>product and category mix;</li><li>performance before and after budget increases;</li><li>sales when spending remains stable or declines.</li></ul><p>This last comparison helps identify dependency.</p><p>GMV Max can amplify the brand’s own content and affiliate content. Both create additional costs.</p><p>For brand-owned content, the business may pay for production, advertising, discounts, and platform fees.</p><p>For affiliate content, the business may pay commission, advertising to amplify the video, samples, discounts, and platform fees.</p><p>A video may begin as organic or affiliate content. Once the brand pays to distribute it, the resulting sales depend partly on paid media.</p><p>That can still be a good investment.</p><p>The brand needs visibility into the complete cost.</p><h3>Average ROAS can hide weakening marginal ROAS</h3><p>The platform may recommend increasing the budget after the campaign begins generating GMV.</p><p>Before accepting the recommendation, compare average and marginal performance.</p><p>Average ROAS measures the whole campaign:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Total attributed GMV ÷ Total advertising cost</em></strong></blockquote><p>Marginal ROAS measures the result of additional spending:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Additional GMV after the budget increase ÷ Additional advertising cost</em></strong></blockquote><p>Suppose the campaign initially spends Rp10 million and reports Rp60 million in GMV.</p><p>The average ROAS is 6x.</p><p>The brand then adds Rp5 million in advertising. Total attributed GMV increases to Rp70 million.</p><p>The new average ROAS becomes:</p><blockquote><em>Rp70 million ÷ Rp15 million = </em><strong><em>4.7x</em></strong></blockquote><p>But the additional Rp5 million generated only Rp10 million in additional GMV.</p><p>The marginal ROAS is:</p><blockquote><em>Rp10 million ÷ Rp5 million = </em><strong><em>2x</em></strong></blockquote><p>The total campaign still shows 4.7x ROAS.</p><p>The latest budget increase produced only 2x.</p><p>That difference matters because the platform may continue identifying opportunities to spend. The brand needs to decide whether the newest investment still meets its commercial requirement.</p><p>Ask:</p><blockquote><em>What additional contribution did the latest budget increase create?</em></blockquote><h3>More investment can create platform dependency</h3><p>A possible pattern looks like this:</p><p>Advertising increases.</p><p>Attributed GMV increases.</p><p>The platform recommends additional spending.</p><p>The brand raises the budget.</p><p>Paid amplification becomes increasingly responsible for maintaining sales.</p><p>This does not mean the platform recommendation is wrong.</p><p>The platform benefits when advertising activity and transaction volume increase. The brand benefits when the additional investment creates contribution and commercially useful demand.</p><p>These incentives overlap only while the marginal economics remain healthy.</p><p>Before increasing the budget again, ask:</p><p>How much additional contribution came from the previous increase?</p><p>How much attributed GMV would likely have happened through organic or affiliate activity?</p><p>Can the content still generate sales without continuous paid amplification?</p><p>What happens when the budget is held steady for a period?</p><p>The answers may remain imperfect. Product-level comparisons, stable-budget periods, controlled tests, and careful before-and-after analysis can still provide direction.</p><p>Imperfect evidence is safer than allowing total attributed GMV to become the complete commercial answer.</p><h3>Your first benchmark should change with the evidence</h3><p>A first-time advertiser will not know the perfect GMV Max ROAS.</p><p>The goal is to create a defensible starting point.</p><p>Begin with product economics.</p><p>Adjust for the campaign objective.</p><p>Read existing demand.</p><p>Run a controlled test.</p><p>Then replace the starting assumption with evidence from contribution, incremental ROAS, marginal ROAS, and dependency.</p><p>Over time, the brand may need several benchmarks.</p><p>A personal-care hero product may have one.</p><p>A new variant may have another.</p><p>A bundle may support a different advertising cost.</p><p>A low-margin smartphone may require a much higher ROAS despite generating much larger GMV per transaction.</p><p>The benchmark should follow the business case.</p><h3>My Closing Remarks</h3><p>When an account manager recommends a target of 4, immediate agreement and immediate rejection create the same problem: the brand still has no independent benchmark.</p><p>Ask what the recommendation is designed to achieve.</p><p>Then return to the product economics.</p><p>Can the margin support 4x ROAS? Which costs sit outside the dashboard? How much GMV is incremental? What happened after the last budget increase? Would sales survive if paid amplification stopped?</p><p>GMV Max can generate sales.</p><p>ROAS tells us how efficiently advertising generated GMV.</p><p>ROI tells us whether the wider investment created financial value.</p><p>The brand needs both answers before investing again.</p><h3>TL;DR</h3><p>TikTok may label its GMV-to-ad-spend metric as Target ROI, but the calculation is closer to ROAS. ROAS measures attributed GMV against advertising spend, while ROI considers the wider financial return after relevant costs.</p><ul><li>Calculate break-even ROAS from each product’s actual economics.</li><li>Compare reported ROAS with contribution, incremental ROAS, and marginal ROAS.</li><li>Include affiliate commission and content-production costs in the commercial review.</li><li>Use TikTok’s recommended target as an input, not the final benchmark.</li><li>Check whether growing GMV is creating healthy demand or increasing dependence on paid amplification.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0a880102bc3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/a-beginners-guide-to-setting-roas-for-gmv-max-in-tiktok-e0a880102bc3">A Beginner’s Guide to Setting ROAS for GMV Max in Tiktok</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dilemma: Do Double-Date Campaigns Really Acquire New Shoppers?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/dilemma-do-double-date-campaigns-really-acquire-new-shoppers-51a7ded8afef?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51a7ded8afef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[online-sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-transformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 02:36:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-17T02:38:23.908Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A large GMV spike may hide trader purchases, early stock-up, and sales shifted away from general trade.</em></p><p>At midnight, the campaign dashboard begins to move. Orders rise quickly. GMV reaches the target. Everyone celebrates the result. But several weeks later, general trade orders decline and some of the discounted products appear in reseller stores. The campaign delivered GMV. The harder question is whether it created genuine consumer demand.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GoMMOtuNkC5CM4IlTs_tig.png" /></figure><h3>A Successful Campaign May Be Hiding the Wrong Success</h3><p>Double-date campaigns such as 9.9, 10.10, 11.11, and 12.12 have become important events in Indonesian e-commerce.</p><p>Brands prepare special prices, vouchers, free gifts, bundles, advertising, live sessions, affiliates, and platform visibility. Some also move inventory into fulfilment centres and increase operational capacity.</p><p><strong>The expected result is usually clear: high GMV.</strong></p><p>When GMV increases, the campaign is considered successful. The team may report strong growth, better rankings, and a high number of orders.</p><p>But GMV only tells us how much merchandise moved through the platform. It does not automatically tell us who bought it, why they bought it, or what happened to sales in other channels.</p><p>This matters because a large marketplace order can represent several different activities.</p><p>An end shopper may be trying the brand for the first time.</p><p>An existing customer may be buying three months of stock because the price is unusually low.</p><p>A reseller may be purchasing inventory for a store.</p><p>A trader may be buying discounted products and selling them again after the campaign.</p><p>All four purchases create GMV.</p><p>Only the first purchase clearly represents shopper acquisition.</p><h3>Who Is Really Buying?</h3><p>A campaign can attract at least four types of buyers.</p><h3>New shoppers that is end-consumer</h3><p>These customers have never purchased the brand before. The campaign reduces the barrier to trial.</p><p>This is the buyer many brands hope to acquire.</p><p>However, a first transaction is only the beginning. The brand still needs to know whether the customer uses the product, buys it again, and remains when the discount disappears.</p><h3>Existing shoppers buying early</h3><p>These customers already know the product. They use the promotion to purchase earlier or buy a larger quantity.</p><p>The campaign creates a sales spike, but it may not create additional consumption.</p><p>For example, a household that normally buys one pack every month may purchase three packs during 11.11. Campaign GMV rises, but the same household may not purchase again for the next three months.</p><p>The brand has moved future demand into the present.</p><h3>Resellers buying stock</h3><p>Some marketplace buyers are small retailers, online sellers, community sellers, or store owners.</p><p>They may discover that the consumer promotion gives them a better purchase price than their normal trade source. The voucher, cashback, bundle, and free gift create an attractive margin.</p><p>The transaction may be commercially useful if the brand wants to support small resellers. But it should not be reported as consumer acquisition.</p><p>It is a form of indirect trade selling through a consumer channel.</p><h3>Opportunistic traders</h3><p>These buyers purchase because they see a temporary price gap.</p><p>They may split orders across accounts, collect platform and brand vouchers, receive free gifts, and resell the products through other marketplaces, social media, or physical stores.</p><p>The brand funds the discount. The trader captures part of the value.</p><p>This can also create problems after the campaign. The same products may appear in the market at prices below the brand’s intended level. Authorized sellers then have to compete with inventory that came from the brand’s own promotion.</p><h3>The Problem Is Not Reseller Participation</h3><p>Resellers and traders are not automatically the problem. The real problem is a mismatch between the campaign objective and the actual buyer behaviour. If the objective is to move inventory, expand product availability, or support small sellers, reseller participation may help.</p><p>But if the stated objective is shopper acquisition, reseller-heavy GMV creates a misleading result.</p><p>The brand believes it has acquired consumers. In reality, it may have created an alternative sourcing channel for the trade.</p><p>This distinction affects how the campaign should be measured.</p><p>A campaign designed for shopper acquisition should examine customer identity, household-level quantity, repeat purchase, and the quality of the acquired customer.</p><p>A campaign designed for reseller support should examine reseller productivity, resale behaviour, channel coverage, inventory health, and pricing discipline.</p><p>The same GMV number cannot prove both outcomes.</p><h3>Cannibalization Can Happen Across Time</h3><p>The first form of cannibalization happens between months.</p><p>A large November campaign may attract customers who would normally purchase in December or January. The November dashboard looks strong, while the following months look weak.</p><p>If the business only compares campaign day with a normal day, the campaign appears highly incremental.</p><p>A better comparison looks at a longer period:</p><ul><li>What was purchased before the campaign?</li><li>How much was purchased during the campaign?</li><li>What happened in the following one to three purchase cycles?</li><li>Did total consumption increase?</li><li>Or did customers only change the timing of their purchase?</li></ul><p>A strong campaign should be able to distinguish genuine growth from demand brought forward.</p><h3>Cannibalization Can Also Happen Across Channels</h3><p>The second form happens between channels.</p><p>Imagine a general trade retailer that normally buys from a distributor. During a double-date campaign, the retailer finds a lower effective price on a marketplace.</p><p>The retailer purchases stock from the marketplace instead.</p><p>The e-commerce team records additional GMV. At the same time, the distributor receives a smaller purchase order. The following month, the retailer may order less because it is still holding campaign inventory.</p><p>From the marketplace team’s perspective, the campaign worked.</p><p>From the general trade team’s perspective, demand weakened.</p><p>From the company’s total perspective, the business may have paid for the same inventory to move through a different route.</p><p>The company may also absorb several costs:</p><ul><li>brand-funded discount;</li><li>platform fees;</li><li>advertising;</li><li>affiliate commission;</li><li>free gifts;</li><li>fulfilment support;</li><li>possible channel claims;</li><li>weaker pricing discipline.</li></ul><p>Without a total-channel view, one team’s growth can hide another team’s loss.</p><h3>Five Tests for Double-Date Investment</h3><p>Before increasing campaign investment, brands can apply five tests.</p><h3>The Buyer Test</h3><p>Ask: <em>Who is buying, and what suggests that the buyer is an end shopper?</em></p><p>Useful signals may include:</p><ul><li>quantity per order;</li><li>repeated delivery addresses;</li><li>purchase frequency;</li><li>product combinations;</li><li>unusual bulk orders;</li><li>use of several accounts;</li><li>buying patterns associated with resale.</li></ul><p>The goal is not to block every large order. Some households buy in bulk. The goal is to understand the buyer mix.</p><h3>The Incrementality Test</h3><p>Ask: <em>Did the campaign create demand, or did it move demand from another time or channel?</em></p><p>Compare a wider period before and after the campaign.</p><p>Look at total company sales, not only marketplace GMV. Include relevant distributor and general trade orders where the data is available.</p><p>A campaign can produce record marketplace GMV while total demand remains almost unchanged.</p><h3>The Acquisition Quality Test</h3><p>Ask: <em>What happened after the first purchase?</em></p><p>A new buyer acquired through a deep discount may disappear when the normal price returns.</p><p>Track whether new buyers:</p><ul><li>purchase again;</li><li>move to another product in the portfolio;</li><li>remain active without the same discount;</li><li>generate a reasonable contribution after acquisition cost.</li></ul><p>The number of new buyer accounts is useful. Their behaviour after the campaign is what gives the number meaning. <strong>BUT, a big but, </strong>Marketplace never provide contactable data so you wouldn’t be able to tell if the shopper repeated since their data only show returning shopper from the last 3 months of purchase.</p><h3>The Channel Impact Test</h3><p>Ask: <em>What happened to distributors, general trade, modern trade, and authorized online sellers?</em></p><p>The brand should watch for:</p><ul><li>reduced purchase orders after the campaign;</li><li>complaints about marketplace pricing;</li><li>promotional products being resold below normal price;</li><li>authorized sellers losing competitiveness;</li><li>inventory shifting between channels.</li></ul><p>Channel cannibalization cannot always be avoided. But it should be visible and intentional.</p><h3>The Economic Test</h3><p>Ask: <em>After all campaign costs, what value did the brand actually create?</em></p><p>Do not stop at gross GMV.</p><p>Consider:</p><ul><li>net sales;</li><li>product margin;</li><li>brand discount;</li><li>platform subsidy and fees;</li><li>advertising cost;</li><li>affiliate commission;</li><li>gifts and samples;</li><li>operational cost;</li><li>returns and cancellations;</li><li>repeat value;</li><li>possible lost margin in other channels.</li></ul><p>A campaign can deliver high GMV and still create weak economics.</p><h3>When Double-Date Investment Still Makes Sense</h3><p>Double-date campaigns can remain useful.</p><p>They can create concentrated attention, encourage product trial, support a launch, activate affiliates, bring inactive customers back, and help a brand learn about online shopper behaviour.</p><p>They are especially useful when the brand has a clear objective.</p><p>For shopper acquisition, the offer can be designed around trial quantities, first-purchase mechanics, hero products, and a plan for repeat purchase.</p><p>For retention, the campaign can reward known customers without training everyone to wait for the deepest discount.</p><p>For a product launch, the brand can use the event to create visibility and collect early feedback.</p><p>For inventory movement, the brand can use the campaign to clear selected stock. The result should then be reported as inventory action, not new shopper acquisition.</p><p>For reseller support, the brand can create a separate mechanic with clear quantities, prices, and commercial conditions.</p><p>The campaign becomes dangerous when one promotion is expected to achieve every objective at the same time.</p><h3>What Managers Can Do Before the Next Campaign</h3><p><strong>First</strong>, agree on the primary objective.</p><p>Choose one main outcome: acquire new shoppers, increase repeat purchase, launch a product, move inventory, or support the trade.</p><p><strong>Second</strong>, define who the offer is designed for.</p><p>A consumer acquisition offer should not accidentally become the cheapest trade-buying option in the market.</p><p><strong>Third</strong>, create quantity rules based on product consumption.</p><p>A reasonable quantity for shampoo may be different from pet food, baby products, or household cleaning products. Use category behaviour when setting limits.</p><p><strong>Fourth</strong>, review performance across channels.</p><p>Bring marketplace, sales, finance, distributor, and category teams into the review. The campaign should be evaluated as a company event, not only an e-commerce event.</p><p><strong>Fifth</strong>, wait before declaring the result.</p><p>Campaign-day GMV can be reported immediately. Shopper acquisition and incrementality require observation after the campaign.</p><h3>Questions Worth Asking</h3><p>Before approving another large double-date investment, management should ask:</p><ul><li>How much GMV came from likely end shoppers?</li><li>How many buyers were genuinely new to the brand?</li><li>What quantity did each customer purchase?</li><li>How many new buyers returned at a normal or smaller discount?</li><li>Did distributor or general trade orders decline after the campaign?</li><li>Did discounted inventory appear in other selling channels?</li><li>What was the total company result across several months?</li><li>Would part of the campaign budget create stronger value through another activity?</li></ul><p>Double-date campaigns are highly visible. That visibility can create pressure to participate and to report a large number.</p><p>But the biggest number on campaign day may not represent the strongest business result.</p><p>A marketplace dashboard can show where the transaction happened. It cannot always show where the demand came from, who finally used the product, or which channel lost the next purchase order.</p><p>The question is therefore not whether double-date campaigns still work.</p><p>The better question is:</p><blockquote><strong><em>What type of demand are we paying to create?</em></strong></blockquote><h3>TL;DR</h3><p>Double-date campaigns can help brands acquire shoppers, but GMV alone cannot prove it. Part of the sales may come from existing customers buying early, resellers stocking up, traders using the promotion as a sourcing opportunity, or demand moving from another channel.</p><ul><li>Separate end shoppers from resellers and opportunistic traders.</li><li>Measure incremental demand across several months, not only campaign-day GMV.</li><li>Check whether marketplace growth reduces orders from general trade.</li><li>Decide whether the campaign objective is shopper acquisition, inventory movement, or trade support.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51a7ded8afef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/dilemma-do-double-date-campaigns-really-acquire-new-shoppers-51a7ded8afef">Dilemma: Do Double-Date Campaigns Really Acquire New Shoppers?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Your Price Elasticity Study Is Wrong (If You Used It Across MT GT ECOM)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/why-your-price-elasticity-study-is-wrong-if-you-used-it-across-mt-gt-ecom-eeff389607e3?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eeff389607e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 10:51:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-17T03:22:00.586Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>What works as a pricing insight in Alfamart does not work as a pricing decision on Shopee. The consumer is not the same. The decision is not the same. The risk is not the same.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CpSKAa2DATIrbzb7Rp3ZOA.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Assumption That Creates the Problem</strong></p><p>Price elasticity studies are expensive and time-consuming.</p><p>So when a brand commissions one, the natural instinct is to maximize its use. Apply it broadly. Use the coefficient across channels. Build pricing recommendations that span modern trade, general trade, and marketplace from a single data foundation.</p><p>The logic feels sound.</p><p>The consumer is the same person. The product is the same SKU. The price is the price.</p><p>But the consumer is not behaving the same way across channels.</p><p>The decision environment is different. The competitive context is different. The psychological triggers are different. The consequences of a price move are different.</p><p>And when elasticity data built for one channel environment is applied to another, the predictions don’t just lose accuracy.</p><p>They can actively mislead.</p><p><strong>Channel One: General Trade</strong></p><p>General trade in Indonesia, warungs, traditional kiosks, neighborhood stores; still accounts for the majority of FMCG volume. Traditional stores remain the largest sales channel for FMCG products in Indonesia.</p><p>Understanding how price elasticity behaves here is foundational, not because GT is the most sophisticated channel, but because it sets the behavioral baseline that everything else departs from.</p><p><strong>Decision trigger in GT:</strong></p><p>The consumer is physically present. Purchase is often immediate, habitual, and need-driven. A mother buying cooking oil at the warung near her house is not comparison shopping. She is completing a routine.</p><p>The trigger is availability and habit, not price discovery.</p><p><strong>Competitive visibility:</strong></p><p>Limited. The warung carries what the warung carries. If the brand is on the shelf, the consumer buys it. If it isn’t, they buy the alternative that is. Competitive pressure is indirect, through distribution, not through real-time price comparison.</p><p><strong>Price anchor:</strong></p><p>The consumer’s reference price is what they paid last time at the same warung. Or what they know the category generally costs in their neighborhood. The anchor is local, personal, and relatively stable.</p><p><strong>Promotion response:</strong></p><p>GT consumers respond to price promotions, but the mechanism is primarily volume loading. Buy more because the price is lower today. The promotion drives basket size more than it drives switching behavior.</p><p><strong>What this means for elasticity:</strong></p><p>GT elasticity tends to be moderate and relatively predictable. Price increases above a threshold trigger trade-down within the store’s limited assortment. Price decreases drive volume within the existing buyer base more than they attract new buyers.</p><p>The elasticity curve is relatively smooth. Small price moves produce proportional volume responses within a predictable range.</p><p>This is the environment most traditional pricing research is built for.</p><p><strong>Channel Two: Modern Trade</strong></p><p>Modern trade such as Indomaret, Alfamart, Hypermart, and organized retail formats, introduces a structurally different environment.</p><p><strong>Decision trigger in MT:</strong></p><p>The consumer enters a structured retail environment with broader assortment visibility. Purchase is still often habitual for core categories, but the modern trade layout, gondola placement, promotional ends, category adjacency, introduces deliberate choice architecture.</p><p>The trigger is still largely need-driven, but the environment is designed to intercept and redirect that need.</p><p><strong>Competitive visibility:</strong></p><p>High within the store. The consumer can see multiple brands, multiple sizes, and multiple price points in the same aisle simultaneously. Shelf placement and promotional mechanics compete directly for attention.</p><p>Price comparison happens at the gondola between options visible at the same moment, in the same physical space.</p><p><strong>Price anchor:</strong></p><p>The consumer’s reference is the shelf set. What is the regular price of the leading brand in this category? What is the promoted price? The anchor is set by the category context, not just the individual product’s history.</p><p><strong>Promotion response:</strong></p><p>Modern trade promotions, shelf talkers, price flash, promotional ends, buy-one-get-one mechanics, drive switching behavior more directly than in GT. A consumer who habitually buys Brand A may switch to Brand B during a promotion if the price gap is large enough and both are visible simultaneously.</p><p><strong>What this means for elasticity:</strong></p><p>MT elasticity is higher than GT for the same product, because competitive substitution is visible and immediate at the point of decision. A price increase in MT carries higher risk of switching than the same price increase in GT, because the consumer sees the alternative right next to it.</p><p>Promotional response is also steeper, deeper discounts in MT can drive volume spikes that look dramatic but include significant switching behavior that reverses when the promotion ends.</p><p>MT elasticity studies capture this switching dynamic well, but only within the store environment. They do not capture what happens when the same consumer, same category, same purchase intent, opens a marketplace app instead.</p><p><strong>Channel Three: Marketplace Ecommerce</strong></p><p>This is where the departure from offline elasticity logic becomes most significant and most consequential.</p><p><strong>Decision trigger in marketplace:</strong></p><p>The consumer does not enter a marketplace the way they enter a warung or an Indomaret.</p><p>On Shopee or TikTok Shop, the trigger is frequently not need at all. It is discovery, impulse, or promotion awareness. A consumer who was not planning to buy shampoo sees a flash voucher, clicks, and considers a purchase they weren’t intending to make thirty minutes ago.</p><p>Or the trigger is active search but search on a marketplace is a fundamentally different act than walking down a GT aisle. The consumer types a keyword and receives a ranked list of every competing option simultaneously, sorted by the algorithm’s interpretation of relevance and value.</p><p>The decision environment is algorithmically mediated. Price is visible, comparable, and sortable before the consumer has even looked at a single product page.</p><p><strong>Competitive visibility:</strong></p><p>Total and immediate.</p><p>In GT, the consumer sees what the warung stocks. In MT, the consumer sees the gondola set. In marketplace, the consumer sees every SKU from every seller at every price point in the category, simultaneously, on the same screen, before making any commitment.</p><p>The competitive context in marketplace is not the aisle. It is the entire market, rendered in real time.</p><p>This changes elasticity fundamentally.</p><p>A price increase that would cause moderate switching in MT, because the consumer has to look left and see the competitor on the same shelf — causes immediate, frictionless switching in marketplace. The consumer doesn’t look left. They scroll down. Or they sort by price. The cheaper option is one tap away, and the algorithm may surface it before the consumer even asks.</p><p><strong>Price anchor:</strong></p><p>The marketplace consumer’s price anchor is dynamic and externally set.</p><p>It is not what they paid last time at the same warung. It is not the shelf price they saw at Alfamart yesterday. It is the lowest available price for an equivalent product in their current search results, updated in real time, influenced by vouchers, flash sales, and seller mechanics that fluctuate daily.</p><p>The anchor is not personal history. It is market price at this moment.</p><p>This has a critical implication: a price that feels fair in GT or MT may feel expensive in marketplace simply because the consumer’s reference point has been reset by what they see in the search results around it.</p><p><strong>Promotion response:</strong></p><p>Marketplace promotion response is structurally different from both GT and MT in two specific ways that offline elasticity research almost never captures.</p><p>First, promotion trains the price anchor downward permanently. In GT, a promotion ends and the consumer’s reference price returns to normal relatively quickly. In marketplace, the promoted price becomes the new anchor for a segment of buyers who discovered the product during the promotion. When the price returns to normal, those buyers experience it as a price increase, even if it is simply returning to the pre-promotion level.</p><p>This is the discount conditioning problem. Repeated marketplace promotions don’t just drive volume during the promotion. They systematically lower the perceived fair price for the product, reducing willingness to pay at normal price long after the promotion has ended.</p><p>Second, marketplace promotions attract deal-seeking behavior at a scale that GT and MT research doesn’t model. The buyer who purchases during a marketplace flash sale has a meaningfully different profile from the habitual GT buyer or the MT category shopper. They are more price-sensitive, less brand-loyal, and more likely to switch at the next promotion regardless of which brand offers it.</p><p>If elasticity research captures promotional response from GT or MT buyer pools, it is measuring the wrong population for marketplace conclusions.</p><p><strong>What this means for elasticity:</strong></p><p>Marketplace elasticity is higher, faster, and more asymmetric than GT or MT elasticity for most categories.</p><p>Higher; because competitive alternatives are immediately visible and switching is frictionless.</p><p>Faster; because the price comparison happens before purchase consideration, not during it. The consumer has already filtered by price before engaging with the brand.</p><p>Asymmetric; because price decreases attract deal-seekers who don’t build loyalty, while price increases drive immediate switching that is harder to recover from than in offline channels.</p><p>A single elasticity coefficient applied across all three channels will underestimate marketplace sensitivity, overestimate the recoverable volume after a price increase, and miss the long-term anchor damage that promotion depth creates online.</p><p><strong>The Five Risks of Getting This Wrong</strong></p><p><strong>Risk one: Applying an offline elasticity coefficient to an online price increase decision.</strong></p><p>The brand models a 5 percent price increase using MT or GT elasticity data. The model predicts a manageable volume decline. The price increase is approved.</p><p>On marketplace, the volume decline is steeper than predicted, because the consumer’s ability to find alternatives is immediate and frictionless in a way the offline model didn’t account for. Recovery is slower than expected because the algorithm deprioritizes a product with declining conversion rate.</p><p><strong>Risk two: Using blended channel data that masks channel-specific behavior.</strong></p><p>A study pools purchase data across channels to build a single elasticity curve. The average looks stable. The recommendation is applied uniformly.</p><p>But the average masks the fact that GT is inelastic in ways that offset marketplace’s high elasticity. The blended coefficient is too low for marketplace decisions and too high for GT decisions. Both conclusions are wrong.</p><p><strong>Risk three: Setting promotion depth based on GT or MT research and applying it to marketplace.</strong></p><p>The brand determines that a 20 percent discount drives acceptable volume uplift with manageable margin impact, based on GT panel data or MT promotional history.</p><p>The same 20 percent discount applied to marketplace attracts a buyer profile that GT research never measured. Volume spikes during the promotion. But the post-promotion price anchor is reset lower. Repeat purchases at full price decline. The elasticity of the promotion response was correct. The long-term price architecture damage was invisible to the research method that informed the decision.</p><p><strong>Risk four: Assuming price integrity holds across channels when it doesn’t.</strong></p><p>The brand maintains consistent pricing across MT and marketplace, correctly, from a channel management perspective.</p><p>But marketplace promotional mechanics, platform vouchers, cashback stacking, flash sale windows, create effective price points that are materially below the stated price. The consumer’s actual transaction price on marketplace is lower than what appears in the pricing architecture.</p><p>Offline elasticity research, which captures stated price response, does not model this effective price gap. The brand believes it is managing one price. The consumer is experiencing a different one.</p><p><strong>Risk five: Using marketplace elasticity data from a subsidized era to make decisions in a non-subsidized one.</strong></p><p>Historical marketplace price response data was generated in an environment where platforms co-funded promotions, free shipping removed price sensitivity from logistics, and cashback reduced the effective consumer cost.</p><p>That environment no longer exists in the same form. The elasticity curve built from 2021 or 2022 data reflects consumer behavior under conditions that the 2026 cost structure has structurally changed.</p><p>Historical marketplace elasticity data may be the most misleading of all because it looks like marketplace data but reflects a market dynamic that no longer operates.</p><p><strong>What A Better Approach Looks Like</strong></p><p>The solution is not to run three separate elasticity studies for every pricing decision. That is not practical for most organizations.</p><p>The solution is to build channel-specific assumptions into every pricing model, even when the underlying data is shared.</p><p>Three practical adjustments:</p><p><strong>First, segment elasticity analysis by channel from the start.</strong> Any pricing research that pools GT, MT, and marketplace data without channel segmentation should be treated as indicative only. Before applying findings to channel-specific decisions, the channel composition of the data needs to be understood.</p><p><strong>Second, build a marketplace-specific price sensitivity model that accounts for competitive visibility.</strong> This means understanding not just how volume responds to the brand’s own price moves, but how the competitive set’s pricing affects the brand’s conversion at different price points. Marketplace search data, category price distribution analysis, and conversion rate by price point provide inputs that offline research cannot.</p><p><strong>Third, track effective price separately from stated price on marketplace.</strong> The stated price is what the brand sets. The effective price is what the consumer pays after platform vouchers, cashback, and promotional stacking. Elasticity decisions made on stated price while consumers transact at effective price will systematically underestimate promotion dependency and overestimate price integrity.</p><p><strong>Closing: One Model For Three Markets Is Three Wrong Answers</strong></p><p>Price elasticity is not a number. It is a behavior and behavior is shaped by context.</p><p>The context of a warung purchase, an Indomaret gondola decision, and a Shopee search result are not variations of the same moment. They are fundamentally different commercial environments with different triggers, different competitive visibility, different price anchors, and different consequences for the brand when price moves.</p><p>In Indonesia, where all three channels coexist and serve overlapping consumer segments, the temptation to build one pricing model and apply it everywhere is understandable.</p><p>It is also one of the more expensive assumptions a commercial team can make.</p><p>In 2026, where marketplace margin is already under structural pressure from rising platform costs, the cost of a mispriced elasticity decision compounds faster than it used to.</p><p>Getting the channel wrong in the model means getting the price wrong in the market.</p><p>And in a marketplace environment where competitive alternatives are one scroll away and price anchors reset with every promotion, wrong pricing decisions don’t stay wrong quietly.</p><p>They show up in conversion rates, in post-promotion repeat purchase decline, and in a margin structure that keeps getting harder to explain.</p><p>One elasticity model for three channels is not efficient research.</p><p>It is three wrong answers dressed as one right one.</p><p><strong>TL;DR</strong></p><p>Price elasticity is not a universal constant. It is a channel-specific behavior. In Indonesia, general trade, modern trade, and marketplace ecommerce operate with fundamentally different decision triggers, competitive visibility, price anchors, and promotion response mechanisms.</p><ul><li>A GT consumer buys from habit in a limited assortment environment.</li><li>An MT consumer compares within a visible shelf set.</li><li>A marketplace consumer sees the entire competitive market simultaneously before engaging with a single product page.</li></ul><p>The elasticity curve is not the same across those three contexts. It cannot be.</p><ul><li>A price increase that holds in Alfamart may collapse conversion on Shopee.</li><li>A promotion depth that drives acceptable volume in GT may permanently reset the price anchor online.</li><li>One elasticity model applied across all three channels does not produce one answer. It produces three wrong ones.</li><li>In 2026, where marketplace margin is already under structural pressure, the cost of that mistake compounds faster than it used to.</li></ul><p><strong><em>References</em></strong></p><p>Traditional trade channel dominance in Indonesian FMCG (Statista data via Katadata Databoks). <a href="https://databoks.katadata.co.id/en/technology-telecommunications/statistics/6787b34c50531/traditional-indonesian-stores-become-the-largest-sales-channel-for-fmcg-products-in-indonesia">https://databoks.katadata.co.id/en/technology-telecommunications/statistics/6787b34c50531/traditional-indonesian-stores-become-the-largest-sales-channel-for-fmcg-products-in-indonesia</a></p><p>Marketplace traffic concentration in Indonesia (Similarweb). <a href="https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/indonesia/e-commerce-and-shopping/marketplace/">https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/indonesia/e-commerce-and-shopping/marketplace/</a></p><p>e-Conomy SEA 2025 report, Google, Temasek, Bain. <a href="https://economysea.withgoogle.com/">https://economysea.withgoogle.com</a></p><p>Bank Indonesia ecommerce transaction data, July 2025. <a href="https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html">https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eeff389607e3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/why-your-price-elasticity-study-is-wrong-if-you-used-it-across-mt-gt-ecom-eeff389607e3">Why Your Price Elasticity Study Is Wrong (If You Used It Across MT GT ECOM)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Toco Won’t Save You. But Your Thinking About It Might Be What’s Killing You.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/toco-wont-save-you-but-your-thinking-about-it-might-be-what-s-killing-you-b5d40bb0a67c?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b5d40bb0a67c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 08:18:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T04:43:53.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7gDcCYzZE6a9GxEJ" /></figure><p><em>Marketplace costs are bleeding brands dry. A zero-commission alternative exists. And most brands are still waiting for it to become Tokopedia before they try it. That logic has a price.</em></p><p><strong>The Bleeding Is No Longer Gradual</strong></p><p>Twenty months ago, the cost of doing business on Indonesian marketplaces sat between 10 and 20 percent of GMV.</p><p>Uncomfortable for some categories. Manageable for most. Acceptable enough that leadership approved budgets without asking too many questions about what was underneath the topline number.</p><p>That range no longer exists for brands operating at meaningful scale.</p><p>In 2026, the real cost of selling on Shopee and TikTok Shop, when every layer is accounted for — regularly exceeds 30 percent. In campaign-heavy months with COD exposure, it reaches 50.</p><p>The layers are well established by now.</p><p>Platform commission fees on every transaction. Ad spend required to maintain visibility because organic reach has effectively been monetized away. Voucher and cashback contributions that brands co-fund to remain competitive during campaign periods. Affiliate commissions on TikTok Shop that run 10 to 20 percent per creator-driven transaction. COD failure costs — cancelled orders, rejected packages, reverse logistics — that sit across multiple budget lines without a single owner.</p><p>And starting May 1 2026, a new logistics service fee based on route and weight. Starting June 1, formal seller cost-sharing on failed deliveries and buyer-initiated returns — up to Rp5.000 per shipping direction.</p><p>Each announcement is framed as modest. Each cap sounds reasonable.</p><p>But the direction is unmistakable.</p><p>The platform subsidy era is closed. Every cost that platforms previously absorbed to drive seller and shopper participation is being systematically transferred — partially or fully — to sellers.</p><p>Margin is not being pressured. It is being structurally reassigned.</p><p>And most brands are still on these platforms because the alternative feels uncertain.</p><p><strong>What Toco Actually Is — And What It Isn’t</strong></p><p>Toco launched in August 2024. It was founded by Arnold Sebastian Egg, the same figure who previously built Tokobagus — which later became OLX. <a href="https://biteship.com/blog/toco-marketplace/">Biteship</a></p><p>The business model is built on a flat fee of Rp2.000 per transaction rather than a percentage cut from sales. Zero commission for sellers. No admin fees. The promise, signed personally by Arnold Sebastian Egg as CEO: zero commission forever. <a href="https://www.campaignindonesia.id/article/soroti-keresahan-di-marketplace-pendiri-tokobagus-kini-bangun-toco/1926110">CampaignindonesiaCampaignindonesia</a></p><p>The platform supports multiple payment methods — virtual accounts from major banks, digital wallets including OVO, DANA, GoPay and ShopeePay, QRIS, and COD in selected areas. It includes in-app chat between buyers and sellers, and a free online store feature called TocoFy designed for small businesses and online sellers. <a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=id.toco&amp;hl=en_US">Google Play</a></p><p>Toco combines a modern marketplace with a classifieds model, enabling Indonesians to buy and sell both new and preloved items across categories including fashion, electronics, vehicles, property, and services. <a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/toco-5a8b">Crunchbase</a></p><p>Critically for brands: Toco offers something the major marketplaces don’t; margin, simplicity, and openness. Including access to buyer data. The customer relationship on Toco is not owned by the platform in the same way Shopee and TikTok Shop lock brands out of their own buyer base. <a href="https://medium.com/@rudyadrian/why-toco-id-isnt-tokopedia-and-why-that-might-be-a-good-thing-6e4c061b311c">Medium</a></p><p>What Toco is not — and this matters — is a ready-made audience waiting to be harvested.</p><p>Its main weaknesses are the number of users, product selection, and feature completeness. There is no structured campaign dashboard equivalent to Shopee’s promotional tools. No GMVMax equivalent. No built-in affiliate creator ecosystem. <a href="https://kamusdigital.co.id/review-marketplace-toco/">Kamus Digital</a></p><p>For brands conditioned to plug into a platform’s existing demand infrastructure, Toco requires a different mental model entirely.</p><p>And that is exactly where most brands stop.</p><p><strong>The Traffic Objection — Examined Honestly</strong></p><p>The conversation goes the same way every time.</p><p>Someone raises Toco as an alternative. The cost argument is compelling. Zero commission is real margin recovery. Data ownership is a genuine strategic advantage. The founding team has credibility.</p><p>Then comes the objection.</p><p><em>“But the traffic isn’t there.”</em></p><p>And the conversation ends.</p><p>What nobody examines is the logic embedded in that objection.</p><p>Brands are bleeding 30 to 50 percent of GMV on platforms they claim they want to leave. They acknowledge the cost is structural and trending worse. They understand the platform owns their customer data and will never give it back. They see the fee announcements coming with increasing regularity.</p><p>And their response to an alternative is to wait until that alternative has already solved the problem they refuse to help solve.</p><p>This is not commercial caution. It is the logic of someone who complains about rent while refusing to look at properties because none of them are already furnished.</p><p>Shopee did not have millions of buyers when it launched in Indonesia. TikTok Shop did not have a creator affiliate ecosystem on day one. Every mature platform started with low traffic and required seller participation — and seller investment — to build the demand that makes the platform valuable.</p><p>The brands waiting for Toco to reach Shopee-level traffic before committing are waiting for an outcome they are not contributing to. And while they wait, they continue paying 30 to 50 percent cost-of-doing-business on the platforms they claim are unsustainable.</p><p>The traffic objection is real.</p><p>It is also circular.</p><p>Toco will not get traffic without brands. Brands will not come without traffic. Someone has to move first. And the brands with the most to gain — those bleeding the most on existing platforms — are the ones with the most incentive to be early.</p><p><strong>What Brands Are Actually Losing By Waiting</strong></p><p>The cost of not engaging with Toco is not neutral.</p><p>It has three specific prices.</p><p><strong>The first price is margin.</strong></p><p>Every month a brand delays building on a zero-commission platform is another month paying 5 to 10 percent commission on every transaction to a platform that is simultaneously increasing fees elsewhere. At meaningful GMV scale, that commission differential compounds into a number that would have funded the Toco investment several times over.</p><p><strong>The second price is data.</strong></p><p>Every transaction on Shopee and TikTok Shop is a customer the platform knows and the brand doesn’t. Purchase history, contact information, behavioral data — it belongs to the platform. The brand gets the GMV. The platform gets the relationship.</p><p>On Toco, that dynamic is different. Brands can build direct customer relationships — the foundation of CRM, retention, and lifetime value work that is impossible to do when the platform sits between the brand and its buyer.</p><p>Every transaction on a platform that locks out buyer data is a missed opportunity to build the asset that makes alternative channels viable over time. As discussed in the alternative channel piece, the audience needs to be built before the channel can work. Toco is one of the few marketplace environments where that audience-building is structurally possible.</p><p><strong>The third price is negotiating leverage.</strong></p><p>Brands that are entirely dependent on Shopee and TikTok Shop have no credible exit option when those platforms announce new fees.</p><p>The June 2026 logistics cost-sharing announcement landed. Brands noted it, calculated the impact, and continued selling because where else would they go?</p><p>That is the answer platforms are counting on.</p><p>A brand with meaningful volume on Toco — even 10 to 15 percent of total GMV — has a different conversation internally when the next fee announcement comes. The alternative exists. The infrastructure is proven. The migration path is real.</p><p>Without that, every fee increase is absorbed because the cost of leaving is perceived as higher than the cost of staying.</p><p><strong>The Right Way to Think About Toco</strong></p><p>The mistake most brands make is evaluating Toco as a Shopee replacement.</p><p>It is not. Not today. Probably not for several years.</p><p>The right frame is Toco as a margin recovery and data ownership investment — a channel that costs dramatically less per transaction, gives brands access to their own customers, and builds the direct relationship infrastructure that makes long-term ecommerce health possible.</p><p>That frame changes the evaluation criteria entirely.</p><p>The question is not <em>“can Toco deliver the same GMV as Shopee?”</em></p><p>The question is <em>“what is the value of recovering 5 to 10 percent commission margin on a portion of our volume, while simultaneously building a buyer database we actually own?”</em></p><p>At that question, the traffic objection becomes secondary.</p><p>Because the goal is not to replace Shopee traffic with Toco traffic.</p><p>The goal is to migrate a portion of existing loyal buyers — high repeat purchasers, community members, direct CRM contacts — to a channel where the brand captures the full economics of the transaction and owns the relationship.</p><p>That migration does not require Toco to have millions of new buyers.</p><p>It requires the brand to have a list of existing buyers worth migrating.</p><p>Which brings everything back to the same foundational point: the brands best positioned to use Toco effectively are the ones that have been building direct customer relationships all along.</p><p>And the brands least positioned are the ones that gave every transaction — and every customer — to the platform for the past five years.</p><p><strong>What To Do — In Sequence</strong></p><p>For commercial leaders ready to move beyond the conversation, the sequence matters.</p><p><strong>First, calculate the real commission recovery.</strong> Take last quarter’s fulfilled GMV from Shopee and TikTok Shop. Apply the commission differential — what you currently pay versus the Rp2.000 flat fee on Toco. That number is the annual margin recovery available if a meaningful portion of volume migrated. Make it concrete. It changes the investment conversation.</p><p><strong>Second, identify the buyer segment worth migrating first.</strong> Not cold traffic. Existing repeat buyers. High-frequency purchasers. Loyalty program members if they exist. Community participants. These are buyers who already have a relationship with the brand and need a reason — not an introduction — to purchase through a different channel.</p><p><strong>Third, build the migration mechanic before the channel.</strong> Post-purchase communication. Packaging inserts. WhatsApp broadcast to opted-in contacts. The message is not <em>“we have a new store on Toco.”</em> The message is <em>“buy directly with us and here is what you get that you can’t get on Shopee.”</em> Exclusive SKU. Better price because the commission saving is passed through partially. Earlier access to new products. A loyalty mechanic that rewards direct purchase.</p><p><strong>Fourth, measure Toco on the right metrics.</strong> Not GMV versus Shopee. Contribution margin per transaction. Buyer data captured. Repeat purchase rate from migrated buyers. Cost per retained customer. These are the metrics that reflect the strategic value of the channel — not its raw volume.</p><p><strong>Fifth, commit to a timeline that reflects reality.</strong> Year one is migration and testing. Year two is building. Year three is meaningful contribution. Judge it on that timeline or don’t start.</p><p><strong>Closing: The Platform Is Not Your Partner. It Is Your Landlord. Toco Is Not Your Solution. It Is Your Leverage.</strong></p><p>The brands bleeding 30 to 50 percent cost-of-doing-business on Shopee and TikTok Shop are not trapped by the platform.</p><p>They are trapped by the belief that no alternative is viable until the alternative looks exactly like what they’re trying to leave.</p><p>Toco is not Shopee. It will not become Shopee. It does not need to become Shopee to be useful.</p><p>It needs to be viable enough to recover margin on migrated volume, give brands access to buyer data they currently don’t own, and create a credible alternative that changes the internal conversation when the next fee announcement lands.</p><p>On those three criteria, Toco is already useful today.</p><p>The rock in the returned COD package is a problem worth solving.</p><p>The 30 to 50 percent cost structure is a problem worth solving.</p><p>The platform that owns your customer data while charging you to reach them is a problem worth solving.</p><p>Toco won’t solve all of it. But waiting for Toco to become Tokopedia before trying it will solve none of it.</p><p>The brands that move first build the advantage.</p><p>The brands that wait for proof will find that proof came with someone else’s name on it.</p><p><strong>TL;DR</strong></p><p>The cost of doing business on Shopee and TikTok Shop has risen from 10–20% to 30–50% over the past 20 months. Platform fees, ads, vouchers, COD failures, packaging write-offs, and now formal logistics cost-sharing from June 2026, the compounding is structural, not cyclical.</p><p>Toco launched in August 2024 with zero commission forever, a flat Rp2.000 buyer fee, and something the major platforms will never offer: access to your own buyer data.</p><p>Most brands have heard of it. Almost none have committed. The reason is always traffic. But Shopee didn’t build its traffic without seller investment. Neither will Toco. The brands waiting for proof before investing are the same brands bleeding margin on platforms they claim they want to leave. That is not caution. It is a trap with a comfortable name.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p>Toco marketplace platform and zero-commission model. <a href="https://toco.id/">https://toco.id</a></p><p>Toco founder Arnold Sebastian Egg background and business model details. <a href="https://www.campaignindonesia.id/article/soroti-keresahan-di-marketplace-pendiri-tokobagus-kini-bangun-toco/1926110">https://www.campaignindonesia.id/article/soroti-keresahan-di-marketplace-pendiri-tokobagus-kini-bangun-toco/1926110</a></p><p>TikTok Shop and Tokopedia cost-sharing policy, May and June 2026. <a href="https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041">https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041</a></p><p>Bank Indonesia ecommerce transaction data, July 2025. <a href="https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html">https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html</a></p><p>e-Conomy SEA 2025 report, Google, Temasek, Bain. <a href="https://economysea.withgoogle.com/">https://economysea.withgoogle.com</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b5d40bb0a67c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/toco-wont-save-you-but-your-thinking-about-it-might-be-what-s-killing-you-b5d40bb0a67c">Toco Won’t Save You. But Your Thinking About It Might Be What’s Killing You.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Alternative Channel (Web D2C) Problem: Why Brands Stay Trapped on Platforms They Can No Longer…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/the-alternative-channel-web-d2c-problem-why-brands-stay-trapped-on-platforms-they-can-no-longer-20103a3b562c?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20103a3b562c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[performance-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 06:27:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T04:44:05.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Alternative Channel (Web D2C) Problem: Why Brands Stay Trapped on Platforms They Can No Longer Afford</h3><p><em>Everyone knows marketplace costs are rising. Everyone talks about building alternative channels. Almost nobody does it. Here is why and what the thinking process should actually look like.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Or5MDWIRef2DUEHCsEJc6w.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Conversation That Goes Nowhere</strong></p><p>It starts the same way in almost every commercial team.</p><p>Marketplace costs come up in a review. And lately, the numbers are uncomfortable. Fees are higher. Campaign contributions are heavier. COD failures are adding a cost line that didn’t exist before. Margin is thinner than the GMV number suggests.</p><p>Someone says what everyone is thinking.</p><p><em>“We need to look at alternatives. Website. WhatsApp commerce. Something we actually own.”</em></p><p>The room agrees. It feels like a breakthrough moment.</p><p>Then the questions start.</p><p><em>“What about traffic? How do we get people to the website?”</em></p><p><em>“Who maintains it? Do we need a developer on retainer?”</em></p><p><em>“How long before it generates meaningful volume?”</em></p><p>The energy shifts. The conversation gets complicated. Nobody has clean answers. The meeting ends with a vague commitment to explore it further.</p><p>Three months later, the same conversation happens again.</p><p>Same starting point. Same questions. Same outcome.</p><p>Meanwhile, the platform budget gets approved for another cycle because at least that delivers numbers even if the economics are getting harder to justify.</p><p>This is not a technology problem.</p><p>It is a thinking problem.</p><p>And it has two layers that need to be separated before anything practical can happen.</p><p><strong>Layer One: The Mindset Trap</strong></p><p>The first layer is how brands compare channels.</p><p>When someone proposes a brand website or WhatsApp commerce as an alternative to Shopee or TikTok Shop, the mental comparison that happens, “usually unconsciously “ goes like this.</p><p>On one side: Shopee. Millions of active buyers. Built-in search. Established trust. Instant traffic on day one. Proven conversion mechanics. A channel that has been operational for years with known performance patterns.</p><p>On the other side: a brand website. Zero organic traffic at launch. No built-in buyer pool. Requires marketing investment to drive visits. Conversion rates lower than a mature marketplace. Unknown timeline to meaningful volume.</p><p>The comparison feels obvious. The platform wins.</p><p>But the comparison is fundamentally unfair.</p><p>Shopee was not built in a day. TikTok Shop did not have millions of buyers at launch. Every mature channel started with zero traffic and required years of investment, platform-side investment, seller-side investment, and consumer habit formation, <strong>before it became the default</strong>.</p><p>Comparing a new channel at day one against a mature platform at year five and concluding the new channel doesn’t work is like hiring a new sales person on Monday and firing them on Friday because they haven’t hit the annual target yet.</p><p>The timeline is wrong.</p><p>The metric is wrong.</p><p>And the conclusion that follows is wrong.</p><p>This is the mindset trap. And until it is named explicitly, every alternative channel conversation will end the same way with the platform budget getting approved because at least it delivers something measurable today.</p><p><strong>Layer Two: The Sequencing Problem</strong></p><p>The second layer is the order in which brands try to build alternative channels.</p><p>The typical sequence looks like this.</p><p>Step one: Decide to build a website or WhatsApp commerce. Step two: Build the channel, develop the website, set up the commerce infrastructure, create the catalog. Step three: Launch. Step four: Wait for traffic. Step five: Traffic doesn’t come. Step six: Conclude the channel doesn’t work.</p><p>The sequence is wrong.</p><p>The channel was built before the audience was built.</p><p>A website without an audience is a warehouse without customers. The infrastructure exists. The product is ready. But nobody knows it’s there — and nobody has been given a reason to go there instead of opening Shopee.</p><p>The correct sequence is the reverse.</p><p>Build the audience first. Build the channel second.</p><p>This sounds counterintuitive. But it reflects how every successful direct channel actually develops.</p><p>The audience: email subscribers, WhatsApp broadcast contacts, loyal repeat buyers, community members; is the asset that makes the alternative channel viable. Without it, launching a website is an act of hope. With it, launching a website is an act of activation.</p><p>The question is not <em>“how do we get traffic to our website?”</em></p><p>The question is <em>“where are our most loyal customers right now, and how do we build a direct relationship with them before we ask them to change where they buy?”</em></p><p>That is a different question. And it has a different answer.</p><p><strong>The WhatsApp Commerce Reality</strong></p><p>WhatsApp commerce deserves specific attention because it is consistently underestimated.</p><p>The typical objection is scale. WhatsApp feels personal and manual. It doesn’t feel like a scalable commerce channel.</p><p>But in Indonesia, WhatsApp is where customer relationships already live.</p><p>Customer service conversations happen on WhatsApp. Post-purchase follow-up happens on WhatsApp. Repeat order inquiries happen on WhatsApp. Brand communities for skincare, nutrition, baby products, premium categories are frequently managed on WhatsApp.</p><p>The relationship infrastructure already exists.</p><p>What most brands haven’t done is convert that relationship infrastructure into a commerce infrastructure.</p><p>WhatsApp Business API, catalog integration, broadcast messaging to opted-in contacts, order confirmation and tracking via chat, these are not experimental tools. They are operational in Indonesia at meaningful scale for brands that have made the investment.</p><p>The traffic problem on WhatsApp is not a traffic problem. It is a contact ownership problem.</p><p>Brands that have been selling on Shopee and TikTok Shop for years have generated millions of transactions but the platform owns the buyer data. The brand knows the GMV. The platform knows the customer.</p><p>Every transaction that happens on a marketplace without a mechanism to capture customer contact is a missed opportunity to build the audience that makes alternative channels viable.</p><p>This is why the sequencing matters so much.</p><p>The time to start building direct customer relationships is not after the platform costs become unbearable.</p><p>It is now, while the platform volume still provides the raw material.</p><p><strong>The Website Traffic Problem but Reframed</strong></p><p>The traffic concern about brand websites is legitimate but frequently misdiagnosed.</p><p>The question brands ask is: <em>“How do we drive traffic to our website?”</em></p><p>The implicit assumption behind that question is that the website needs to compete with Shopee for cold traffic, strangers who have never heard of the brand, searching for a product category, and choosing between multiple options.</p><p>That is the wrong battle to fight.</p><p>A brand website does not need to win cold traffic from Google to be commercially meaningful. That battle requires SEO investment, content infrastructure, and years of domain authority building. It is winnable but slow.</p><p>What a brand website can win immediately is warm traffic, buyers who already know the brand, already trust it, and are given a reason to buy directly.</p><p>Warm traffic comes from:</p><p>Existing customers who are communicated with directly, via WhatsApp broadcast, email, or social content; and offered something the platform doesn’t provide. Exclusive products. Better pricing without platform fee overhead. Early access to new launches. A loyalty mechanic that rewards direct purchase.</p><p>Community members who have been engaged over time and have a relationship with the brand beyond transactional.</p><p>Repeat buyers who are high lifetime value and worth the investment of a direct relationship.</p><p>None of these require competing with Shopee for cold search traffic.</p><p>They require owning the customer relationship well enough that the customer chooses to come directly when given a compelling reason.</p><p>That is not a traffic problem.</p><p>That is a relationship problem.</p><p>And relationship problems are solved with sequencing and patience; not with developer budgets and SEO campaigns.</p><p><strong>The Cost Comparison Done Honestly</strong></p><p>The perception that website commerce is expensive deserves honest examination.</p><p>Yes, a brand website requires investment. Development, hosting, payment gateway integration, maintenance. These are real costs.</p><p>But compare them against the full cost of platform dependency in 2026.</p><p>Platform fees on every transaction. Ad spend required to maintain visibility. Voucher and cashback contributions during campaigns. Affiliate commissions on TikTok Shop. COD failure costs. Logistics cost-sharing starting June 2026. And the structural reality that every cost in this list is trending upward with no floor in sight.</p><p>The platform feels cheap because the costs are distributed across transactions and campaign budgets rather than appearing as a single infrastructure line item.</p><p>A website feels expensive because the cost is visible upfront.</p><p>But the fully-loaded cost comparison, platform dependency over three years versus direct channel investment over three years; rarely favors the platform as clearly as the initial perception suggests.</p><p>The brands that have made the transition to meaningful direct channel volume did not do it because they found a cheap way to build a website.</p><p>They did it because they finally did the honest math on what platform dependency was costing them and decided that investing in an alternative was worth the short-term discomfort of building from zero.</p><p><strong>The Thinking Process That Actually Works</strong></p><p>For commercial leaders who want to move beyond the loop, here is the sequence worth following.</p><p><strong>Step one: Stop comparing the alternative to the mature platform.</strong> Define success for the alternative channel on its own terms and its own timeline. Year one is audience building. Year two is channel activation. Year three is meaningful volume. Judging it against Shopee GMV in month three is not evaluation, it is sabotage.</p><p><strong>Step two: Start capturing direct customer relationships today, inside the platform.</strong> Every marketplace transaction is an opportunity to initiate a direct relationship. Post-purchase inserts with WhatsApp contact invitations. QR codes on packaging. Customer service conversations that migrate to direct channels. The platform transaction is the beginning of the direct relationship, not the end of it.</p><p><strong>Step three: Build WhatsApp commerce before the website.</strong> WhatsApp has lower infrastructure cost, faster deployment, and higher engagement rates than a website for warm audiences. It is the right first step for most Indonesian brands not because the website doesn’t matter, but because WhatsApp builds the audience and proves the direct commerce thesis before the larger website investment is made.</p><p><strong>Step four: Use the website for what it does best.</strong> Brand credibility. Product education. SEO for category searches over time. Loyalty program home base. The website is not a Shopee replacement. It is a brand asset that serves a different function in the customer journey.</p><p><strong>Step five: Gradually shift campaign investment toward direct channel activation.</strong> Not all at once. Even redirecting 10 to 15 percent of platform campaign budget toward direct audience building changes the trajectory over 12 to 18 months.</p><p><strong>The Platform Is Not the Trap. The Thinking Is.</strong></p><p>Shopee and TikTok Shop are not going away.</p><p>They remain the largest, most active commercial ecosystems in Indonesian ecommerce. For most brands, they will remain the primary volume channel for the foreseeable future.</p><p>The argument is not to leave the platform.</p><p>The argument is to stop being only on the platform and to start building the alternative while the platform still provides the volume and customer base that seeds it.</p><p>The brands that will navigate the next three years well are not the ones that abandon marketplaces when costs get uncomfortable.</p><p>They are the ones that used the marketplace years to build something the platform can never take away.</p><p>A direct customer relationship. A contact list they own. An audience that chooses to come back — not because the algorithm served them an ad, but because the brand earned that return.</p><p>The traffic problem is real.</p><p>But it is solved by building the audience before building the channel.</p><p>And the time to start building the audience was last year.</p><p>The second best time is now.</p><p><strong>TL;DR</strong></p><p>Platform costs on Shopee and TikTok Shop are rising structurally: fees, ads, vouchers, COD failures, and now logistics cost-sharing starting May and June 2026. Margin is under pressure. Profitability is a distant conversation. The logical response is to build alternative channels: a brand website, WhatsApp commerce, a direct customer relationship that the platform doesn’t own.</p><p>But most brands don’t. Not because the alternative is impossible. Because the mindset comparing a new channel at day one against a mature platform at year five makes every alternative look like it doesn’t work before it gets a real chance.</p><p>The trap is not the platform. The trap is the thinking. And the way out is not a technology decision. It is a sequencing decision, building the audience before building the channel, and measuring the alternative on a timeline that reflects reality, not impatience.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p>TikTok Shop and Tokopedia cost-sharing and logistics fee policy, May and June 2026. <a href="https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041">https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041</a></p><p>WhatsApp Business API commerce capabilities in Southeast Asia. <a href="https://business.whatsapp.com/">https://business.whatsapp.com</a></p><p>e-Conomy SEA 2025 report, Google, Temasek, Bain. <a href="https://economysea.withgoogle.com/">https://economysea.withgoogle.com</a></p><p>Bank Indonesia ecommerce transaction data, July 2025. <a href="https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html">https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-july-2025.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20103a3b562c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/the-alternative-channel-web-d2c-problem-why-brands-stay-trapped-on-platforms-they-can-no-longer-20103a3b562c">The Alternative Channel (Web D2C) Problem: Why Brands Stay Trapped on Platforms They Can No Longer…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[COD Is Getting More Expensive & Most Brands Haven’t Done the Math]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/cod-is-getting-more-expensive-most-brands-havent-done-the-math-90df59a83090?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1400/1*82Vec_8Bn5Jq2Fow9ZpOMQ.png" width="1400"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">You knew COD had a problem. You probably didn&#x2019;t know what that problem actually costs. Starting June 2026, the platform will make sure you&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/cod-is-getting-more-expensive-most-brands-havent-done-the-math-90df59a83090?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2">Continue reading on The Ecommerce Catalyst »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/cod-is-getting-more-expensive-most-brands-havent-done-the-math-90df59a83090?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90df59a83090</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[performance-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 04:11:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T04:44:18.021Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Era Is Over: Platforms Used to Burn Money for You. Now You’re Burning Money for Them.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/the-era-is-over-platforms-used-to-burn-money-for-you-now-youre-burning-money-for-them-3833f943eec7?source=rss-fac5b7fe6940------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3833f943eec7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rudy Adrian]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 09:11:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T04:44:33.185Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D_8RWikaX9U-DeVs0RSgkQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>There was a time when ecommerce was the most exciting line on the P&amp;L. Now it’s becoming the most uncomfortable one.</strong></p><p><strong>The Conversation That Started the Realization</strong></p><p>It didn’t start with a spreadsheet.</p><p>It started with a conversation.</p><p>Someone on the commercial team was presenting campaign results. GMV was up. Sell-out was strong. The numbers on the slide looked the way leadership wanted numbers to look.</p><p>Then came the question nobody had prepared for.</p><p><em>“What did it actually cost us to get here?”</em></p><p>Not the ad spend. Not the voucher budget. The full cost. Everything. Platform fees. Affiliate commissions. Cashback contribution. Packaging. COD rejections. Returns.</p><p>The room went quiet in the way rooms go quiet when the answer isn’t ready.</p><p>That conversation led to a post-mortem. The post-mortem led to a P&amp;L review. And the P&amp;L review produced a number that didn’t match the growth story on the slide.</p><p>Cost of doing business: above 30 percent.</p><p>For a campaign that was called a success.</p><p><strong>What 10–20% Felt Like</strong></p><p>To understand how much has changed, you have to remember what it felt like when it worked differently.</p><p>In the early growth phase of Indonesian ecommerce roughly 2018 to 2022, platforms were in acquisition mode.</p><p>They were acquiring sellers. Acquiring shoppers. Acquiring market share from offline retail.</p><p>To do that, they subsidized everything.</p><p>Free shipping was platform-funded. Cashback came from platform budgets. Major campaign moments like Harbolnas were co-invested. Even advertising costs were manageable because organic reach still existed at scale.</p><p>For brands, the math was clean.</p><p>Cost of doing business sat between 10 and 20 percent of GMV. That range was understood, budgeted, and accepted by finance. Leadership looked at ecommerce as the growth engine with a reasonable cost structure.</p><p>Bosses were happy. Teams were rewarded. Ecommerce felt like the future arriving on schedule.</p><p>What nobody fully accounted for was that the subsidies were temporary. The platforms were building infrastructure, building habits, building dependency. And once the dependency was established, the economics would shift.</p><p>They have shifted.</p><p><strong>What 30–50% Actually Means</strong></p><p>The number didn’t jump overnight. It crept.</p><p>First, platform fees increased. Seller commissions that were once minimal became structured and tiered.</p><p>Then, free shipping subsidies began transferring to sellers. What platforms once absorbed, brands now contribute to.</p><p>Then, advertising became non-negotiable. Organic visibility declined. Paid placement became the only reliable way to maintain traffic. ROAS looked stable. But the baseline spend required to maintain position kept rising.</p><p>Then came affiliate commerce. TikTok Shop accelerated creator-driven selling at scale. Affiliate commissions typically 10 to 20 percent of transaction value per creator became a new cost layer on top of existing structures.</p><p>Then, vouchers and cashback. To remain competitive during campaign periods, brands began co-funding mechanics that platforms once funded alone.</p><p>And then came COD.</p><p>Cash on delivery expanded reach. It also expanded cancellation rates, rejection rates, and return rates. Every failed delivery is a logistics cost. Every returned package is a reverse logistics cost. Every COD rejection is inventory that moved without revenue.</p><p>Now, starting May 1 2026, TikTok Shop and Tokopedia are introducing a logistics service fee based on route and package weight — a direct charge that previously didn’t exist for sellers.</p><p>And from June 1 2026, sellers will share the cost of failed deliveries and buyer-initiated returns. Up to Rp5.000 per shipping direction. Per order. Per failure.</p><p>At low volume, Rp5.000 sounds trivial.</p><p>At 10.000 failed deliveries per month, that is Rp100 million in new cost. Monthly. That didn’t exist before.</p><p>Add it all together, fees, ads, vouchers, affiliates, COD failures, return contributions and the cost of doing business in 2026 regularly clears 30 percent. In campaign-heavy months with high COD exposure, it reaches 50 percent.</p><p>The platforms are no longer subsidizing your growth. They are charging for the infrastructure you are now dependent on.</p><p><strong>The Structural Flip</strong></p><p>This is not a complaint about platforms. It is an observation about a business model transition.</p><p>Platforms in their growth phase behave like investors. They put capital in through subsidies, through traffic, through co-funded campaigns to build a user base and transaction volume. The return on that investment is market dominance and long-term monetization.</p><p>Platforms in their maturity phase behave like landlords. The infrastructure is built. The traffic exists. The shoppers have habits. Now the platform charges for access to that traffic and those shoppers. Fees, placements, logistics, programs, all of it has a price.</p><p>This is not unique to Indonesia. It is what happened to Amazon sellers in the United States. It is what happened to brands on Alibaba in China. It is the natural arc of marketplace evolution.</p><p>What makes Indonesia’s moment distinct is the speed.</p><p>The shift from investor-mode to landlord-mode has happened faster here than many brands anticipated. And because the early ecommerce years felt so generative, growing GMV, growing teams, growing ambition; many organizations didn’t recalibrate their assumptions as the economics quietly changed underneath them.</p><p>The 2021 playbook is still running in a 2026 cost structure.</p><p>That gap is where margin disappears.</p><p><strong>What Leaders Are Still Getting Wrong</strong></p><p>The most common mistake is treating rising costs as a temporary problem.</p><p><em>“Costs are high this quarter because of the campaign.”</em> <em>“COD returns will improve once we fix the operations.”</em> <em>“Platform fees are increasing but our volume will offset it.”</em></p><p>These are not wrong observations. They are incomplete ones.</p><p>Because the structural direction is clear: the cost of selling on these platforms will not return to 2021 levels. The subsidy era is not paused. It is closed.</p><p>The second mistake is measuring success on GMV while costs accumulate below the surface.</p><p>GMV growth can coexist with margin erosion. In fact, in 2026, they frequently do. A brand can grow topline by 20 percent while contribution margin declines because every incremental GMV point is being purchased at a higher cost than the last.</p><p>The third mistake is not separating platform economics from brand performance.</p><p>When cost of doing business rises from 15 to 35 percent, the question is not only <em>“how do we reduce cost?”</em> The question is <em>“which part of this cost is building something: customer relationships, brand equity, repeat behavior and which part is simply the price of staying visible?”</em></p><p>Rent is not investment. But it can look like one if you don’t examine it carefully.</p><p><strong>What the New Math Requires</strong></p><p>Brands that are navigating this well have made one foundational shift.</p><p>They have moved from GMV thinking to contribution margin thinking.</p><p>Not as a finance exercise. As an operating discipline.</p><p>This means:</p><p>Every campaign is evaluated on net contribution, not topline. Every affiliate program is measured on fulfilled GMV, not checkout GMV. Every COD order carries an assumed failure rate built into the margin model. Every platform fee increase is reflected in the pricing and promotional architecture before the next cycle.</p><p>It also means having a harder conversation internally.</p><p>Ecommerce growth that costs 40 percent to generate is not the same as ecommerce growth that costs 18 percent to generate. They look the same on a GMV slide. They do not look the same on a P&amp;L.</p><p>Leadership that only sees the GMV slide is operating with incomplete information.</p><p><strong>The Wake-Up Number</strong></p><p>Here is the question worth bringing into your next commercial review.</p><p>Take your last major campaign. Add up every cost associated with it — platform fees, ad spend, voucher contribution, affiliate commission, packaging, logistics, COD failure rate, return handling.</p><p>Divide by GMV.</p><p>If the number is below 20 percent, your model is healthy.</p><p>If it’s between 20 and 30 percent, you are in transition and need to watch the trend.</p><p>If it’s above 30 percent, the platform is not your growth partner.</p><p>It is your largest cost center.</p><p>And the question is no longer how to grow faster.</p><p>It is whether the growth you are generating is worth what you are paying for it.</p><p><strong>The Boxes Still Need to Move. But Now You’re Paying for the Door.</strong></p><p>The era of platforms burning money for sellers and shoppers is over.</p><p>What replaced it is not bad. It is just different. And it requires different thinking.</p><p>The infrastructure is real. The traffic is real. The consumer habits are real. Ecommerce in Indonesia is not retreating, Bank Indonesia recorded transaction values reaching Rp44.4 trillion in July 2025. The market is large and it is active.</p><p>But access to that market now has a price that compounds across every transaction, every failure, every campaign, every return.</p><p>Brands that understand the new cost structure will make better decisions — about which products belong on which platforms, about which campaigns are worth running, about how COD exposure is managed, about what growth actually costs.</p><p>Brands that don’t will keep celebrating GMV while quietly wondering why the P&amp;L never quite recovers.</p><p>The boxes still need to move out of the warehouse.</p><p>But now you’re paying for the door.</p><p><strong>TL;DR</strong></p><p>For most of the early ecommerce era in Indonesia, platforms subsidized growth. Free shipping, cashback, platform-funded campaigns, the cost of doing business sat comfortably between 10 and 20 percent. Leaders celebrated GMV. Finance approved budgets. Everyone grew together.</p><p>That era is over. In 2026, the true cost of selling on Shopee and TikTok Shop when you include platform fees, ads, vouchers, affiliate commissions, COD returns, and now the new logistics cost-sharing announced for May and June 2026 regularly exceeds 30 percent. Sometimes 50 percent when campaign mechanics and return rates compound.</p><p>The platforms are no longer burning money to grow with you. They are charging you to stay visible on the infrastructure they built. Brands that haven’t recalibrated their assumptions are not being aggressive. They are operating on a financial model that no longer exists.</p><p><em>References</em></p><p>TikTok Shop and Tokopedia logistics fee announcement, effective May 1 and June 1 2026. <a href="https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041">https://seller-id.tokopedia.com/university/essay?knowledge_id=3039885401655041</a></p><p>Bank Indonesia ecommerce transaction data, July 2025 (Rp44.4 trillion). <a href="https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-journey-2025.html">https://www.ibai.or.id/news/item/8098-bi-records-e-commerce-transactions-reaching-idr-44-4-trillion-as-of-journey-2025.html</a></p><p>e-Conomy SEA 2025 report, Google, Temasek, Bain. <a href="https://economysea.withgoogle.com/">https://economysea.withgoogle.com</a></p><p>Word count: approximately 1,750 words.</p><p>Ready for the TL;DR card and LinkedIn teaser when you are.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3833f943eec7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst/the-era-is-over-platforms-used-to-burn-money-for-you-now-youre-burning-money-for-them-3833f943eec7">The Era Is Over: Platforms Used to Burn Money for You. Now You’re Burning Money for Them.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-ecommerce-catalyst">The Ecommerce Catalyst</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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