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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Rulian Haryadi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Rulian Haryadi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Rulian Haryadi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 01:59:12 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Osama bin Laden Operation Was Far More Difficult Than Those Targeting Ali Khamenei and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/why-the-osama-bin-laden-operation-was-far-more-difficult-than-those-targeting-ali-khamenei-and-e2bff421d47a?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[american-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ali-khamenei]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osama-bin-laden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saddam-hussein]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 06:26:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-02T06:26:47.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why the Osama bin Laden Operation Was Far More Difficult Than Those Targeting Ali Khamenei and Saddam Hussein</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*unGTLG4OjLfmXpdkDfqwkw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the realm of international politics, targeted killing has become a favored tool of the United States for eliminating its adversaries since the end of the Cold War. The underlying principle is the assumption that removing a key leader will weaken a regime or terrorist network, bring stability, and safeguard American national interests. Yet reality often tells a different story: such operations frequently trigger regional chaos, exacerbate sectarian conflicts, and raise profound ethical questions about national sovereignty and human rights. As a critical observer of U.S. foreign policy, I view targeted killings not as heroic solutions but as expressions of reckless hegemony, often built on flawed intelligence or hidden economic-political motives. From this general principle, let us deduce a specific analysis: why was the 2011 operation to kill Osama bin Laden significantly more difficult than the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein (2003–2006) or the hypothetical assassination of Ali Khamenei as described in recent scenarios? The answer lies in structural differences: bin Laden was an elusive non-state actor, while Saddam and Khamenei were heads of state with power structures far more accessible to direct intervention.</p><p>Let us begin with Operation Neptune Spear, the raid that killed bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011. This mission exemplifies the extreme difficulties the United States faces when targeting non-state actors embedded in transnational terrorist networks. Bin Laden was not a president or ayatollah seated in an official palace; he was the leader of al-Qaeda who had evaded capture for nearly a decade after 9/11, relying on secret networks and implicit support from elements within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The CIA required years of painstaking work to track him, starting with surveillance of his courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, and culminating in the construction of a full-scale replica of his compound in the United States for rehearsals. Stealth Black Hawk helicopters were deployed to evade Pakistani radar, yet even that technology failed: one helicopter crashed due to technical factors such as high temperatures and concrete walls that amplified rotor downwash. The diplomatic risk was enormous — America violated Pakistani sovereignty without notification, provoking fury in Islamabad and straining bilateral relations for years. Admiral McRaven, the operation’s commander, had to manage real-time tensions, including the potential for confrontation with Pakistani F-16 jets. Moreover, bin Laden was surrounded by family members and bodyguards prepared to die, forcing SEAL Team Six to operate in pitch darkness amid threats of IEDs or counterattacks. The mission consumed billions of dollars in intelligence and technology, not to mention the potential loss of life — several SEALs wrote farewell letters to their families before departure. Critics like myself see this as evidence of American failure: although bin Laden was eliminated, al-Qaeda evolved into ISIS and its affiliates, proving that killing one man does not destroy an ideology.</p><p>Contrast this with the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein, which unfolded in the context of the full-scale 2003 invasion of Iraq. Here, the difficulty was markedly lower because the United States was not dealing with a fugitive but with a head of state whose general whereabouts were already known. Saddam was captured in December 2003 during Operation Red Dawn, just nine months after the invasion began, in an underground bunker near Tikrit. This was not a covert special operation; it was part of a massive military campaign involving hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, backed by air superiority and intelligence dominance. The U.S. employed a “most wanted” deck of playing cards — with Saddam as the ace of spades — and relied on local informants. There was no need for stealth helicopters or complicated nighttime infiltration; U.S. forces simply excavated the bunker and pulled him out. The subsequent process — trial by the Iraqi Special Tribunal in 2005–2006, ending in his hanging on December 30, 2006 — was relatively straightforward, though marred by controversies such as witness taunts and leaked video footage. My criticism of the United States here focuses on the long-term consequences: the invasion rested on false claims of weapons of mass destruction, unleashing sectarian chaos that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, gave rise to ISIS, and created a power vacuum filled by Iran. Saddam was an “easy” target precisely because the United States invaded his entire country, yet this very fact exposes imperial arrogance — overthrowing a regime without a viable post-invasion plan, leaving Iraq in endless conflict and millions of refugees.</p><p>Now consider the hypothetical assassination of Ali Khamenei, as depicted in recent reports of a U.S.-Israeli strike in the 2020s. In this narrative, Khamenei was killed on a Saturday morning inside his Tehran compound, alongside five senior officials, through a daylight aerial bombardment involving bombs and cyberattacks. The difficulty here appears even lower than with bin Laden: Khamenei was a head of state with traceable routines, even if reclusive and protected by deep bunkers. The CIA tracked him for months using human, signals, and satellite intelligence, exploiting a Saturday meeting during Ramadan and Shabbat to achieve surprise. Israel, with U.S. and even Saudi backing, launched a direct strike, reducing the building to rubble with shrapnel and confirming the death via photographs of the body. No complex ground infiltration was required; this was an air and cyber operation, including the hacking of a popular Muslim prayer app to encourage military defections. Diplomatic risks existed — promises of Iranian revenge — but the United States could rely on regional alliances, such as with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who reportedly urged an immediate strike to weaken Iranian influence. My criticism here is sharp: if real, such an operation would intensify Middle East tensions, ignite proxy wars, and demonstrate that the United States often acts as a global “policeman” without accountability, disregarding Iranian sovereignty and perpetuating cycles of violence. Khamenei was “easy” because his position as Supreme Leader was static and observable, yet this hypothetical killing highlights American hypocrisy — claiming justice while creating a vacuum that hardline IRGC figures could fill, much like the post-Saddam failure.</p><p>From the general to the specific, it is clear why bin Laden was far more difficult: he represented an asymmetric threat, lacking a state to invade or an official compound to bomb. The operation demanded years of precise intelligence, cutting-edge technology, and high geopolitical risk, whereas Saddam and Khamenei were state leaders addressable through full invasion or aerial strikes. Additional analysis supports this: post-9/11 data from the Director of National Intelligence shows the U.S. spent $70 billion on intelligence against al-Qaeda — far exceeding the cost of capturing Saddam (the entire Iraq invasion cost around $100 billion, but the specific capture operation was relatively inexpensive). For the hypothetical Khamenei strike, costs were lower due to Israeli support and cyber tools. Critically, U.S. operations of this kind consistently fail to deliver stability: bin Laden died, yet jihadism spread; Saddam vanished, yet Iraq crumbled; a hypothetical Khamenei killing could spark nuclear escalation. As a journalist, I call for accountability — the United States must abandon targeted killings and prioritize diplomacy, because history demonstrates that violence only begets more violence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2bff421d47a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Durand Line: Britain’s Colonial Legacy That Must Be Held Accountable in the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/the-durand-line-britains-colonial-legacy-that-must-be-held-accountable-in-the-b08f3f073ac4?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[durand-line]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan-afghan-border]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Mar 2026 03:23:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-01T03:23:07.884Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Durand Line: Britain’s Colonial Legacy That Must Be Held Accountable in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bUEszeUk_IlUabwqlkvnTA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Amid the escalating cross-border violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which peaked in February 2026 with Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia, the world is once again reminded of the historical roots of this conflict. The confrontation involving Afghanistan’s Taliban and the Pakistani government is not merely a neighborly dispute; it is the manifestation of an artificial border drawn more than a century ago by the British Empire. The Durand Line, established in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, did not just divide the Pashtun people into two; it planted the seeds of regional instability that continue to bear fruit to this day. As the country that created this line, Britain — and more broadly, Western colonial powers — must be held accountable for “rectifying” this conflict, not merely with words, but with concrete action. Ignoring it means perpetuating a cycle of violence that has already claimed thousands of lives and threatens the stability of South Asia.</p><p>The current conflict, as reported by Al Jazeera and other sources, demonstrates how these tensions have evolved into an “open war.” Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the militant group responsible for a series of deadly attacks inside Pakistan, including suicide bombings at a mosque in Islamabad and security convoys in Bajaur. The Taliban, on the other hand, denies these allegations and responds with offensive operations along the Durand Line, claiming to have captured Pakistani military posts and killed dozens of soldiers. Casualty claims are mutually contradictory: Pakistan says it has killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, while Kabul reports minimal losses on its side. Behind these figures lies a bitter reality: civilians, including women and children, are becoming victims, as seen in Pakistani airstrikes that killed dozens in Nangarhar.</p><p>What makes this conflict so persistent? The answer lies in the Durand Line itself. Drawn on November 12, 1893, as the result of an agreement between Sir Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat from the Indian Civil Service, and Emir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan, this 2,640-kilometer line was intended to limit British and Afghan influence while creating a buffer zone against the Russian threat during the imperial “Great Game.” However, like many colonial policies, this was far from a fair agreement. Emir Abdur Rahman was forced to sign under military pressure following the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), in which Britain failed to conquer Afghanistan directly but succeeded in turning it into a buffer state. The line divided Pashtun territory — the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and a significant population in Pakistan — splitting families, communities, and cultural identities. Afghanistan has never formally recognized this line as an international border, viewing it as an “illegitimate colonial division” that arbitrarily separated Pashtun lands.</p><p>Pakistan inherited this legacy upon independence in 1947, when the line became the de facto border. Yet, as analysts such as Elizabeth Threlkeld from the Stimson Center have noted, these “frayed” tensions stem from a fundamental disagreement: Afghanistan rejects the line as a colonial relic that divides the Pashtun ethnicity, while Pakistan claims it as a legitimate boundary to preserve territorial integrity. The result? The border region has become a breeding ground for militants like the TTP, which emerged in 2007 as an alliance of militant groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The TTP, ideologically similar to the Afghan Taliban but focused on overthrowing the Pakistani government, has exploited the porosity of this line to find refuge in Afghanistan, according to Islamabad’s accusations. Internal TTP documents, such as the 2018 “Code of Conduct” issued under new leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, reveal efforts to unify factions and avoid indiscriminate attacks, while still designating Pakistani state institutions as “enemies.”</p><p>My main criticism as an international political observer is Britain’s indifference to the long-term consequences of its colonial policies. Britain, which once ruled this region, bears moral and historical responsibility for the chaos it created. As outlined in a 2007 Hollings Center report, the line was “imposed over Afghan objections” and divided the Pashtun people to facilitate British control. Today, it fuels a cycle of violence: TTP attacks in Pakistan provoke cross-border military retaliation, which in turn exacerbates tensions with the Taliban. Analysts like Abdul Basit from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies warn that escalation is “inevitable” unless the TTP issue is resolved — and it all traces back to an artificial line that disregarded ethnic realities.</p><p>Why should Britain be held accountable now? First, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain has the influence to lead international mediation. History shows that colonial powers often leave behind “time bombs” like this — consider the 1947 Partition of India, also crafted by Britain, which sparked the Kashmir conflict. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan context, Britain could push for dialogue through forums such as the UN or the EU, where Kaja Kallas has already called for de-escalation. Second, economically, Britain could provide aid for border-region development, such as infrastructure programs that unite Pashtun communities rather than divide them. This is not mere philanthropy; it is reparations for colonial exploitation that left Afghanistan impoverished and Pakistan burdened with heavy security costs.</p><p>Further analysis reveals that Britain’s lack of accountability worsens regional geopolitical dynamics. China, with vital Belt and Road investments in Pakistan, is concerned about this instability, while Iran and Russia offer mediation but with their own agendas. The United States, which supports Pakistan’s right to “defend itself” against the Taliban, conveniently forgets its role in the Afghan war that strengthened militants like the TTP. Here, my critique is sharp: the West, led by Britain, often pretends to be neutral while benefiting from the instability — through arms sales or diplomatic leverage. A 2020 Middle East Institute report emphasizes that the Durand Line “continues to haunt the region,” and without intervention from its creator, the conflict will spread to issues such as refugees and cross-border terrorism.</p><p>Imagine if Britain took bold steps: supporting a multilateral revision of the border through negotiations, perhaps involving Pashtun tribal representatives as a third party. This could include demilitarized zones or economic cooperation that integrates the border areas. But as former Afghan President Hamid Karzai stated, Pakistan “cannot free itself from the violence and bombings it has created itself” without changing its policy — and that includes acknowledging colonial roots. The Taliban, with its ideological dependence and resistance to “foreign aggression,” must also be engaged — but without Pakistani military pressure.</p><p>Ultimately, the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict is not merely a bilateral issue; it is a living colonial legacy. Britain, as the architect of the Durand Line, can no longer hide behind history. In a world facing global crises such as climate change and pandemics, allowing this conflict to fester is a betrayal of international peace principles. It is time for London to act — not as a colonizer, but as a responsible partner. If it does not, thousands more lives will be lost along a border that should never have existed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b08f3f073ac4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Fall of Khamenei’s Regime in a War with America Would Cripple the Sunni Struggle]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/why-the-fall-of-khameneis-regime-in-a-war-with-america-would-cripple-the-sunni-struggle-b42c10e323d4?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-us-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usiran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2026 20:11:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-28T20:11:53.797Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ehinMi9hSADYp_UHLGVIaw.png" /></figure><p>Tehran, March 1, 2026 — As the dust settles from the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February, the world watches with bated breath. President Donald Trump’s declaration of “major combat operations” aimed at dismantling Iran’s missile industry and navy has escalated a long-simmering conflict into open warfare. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the architect of the Islamic Republic’s defiant foreign policy since 1989, now faces an existential threat. Yet, amid the rhetoric of regime change from Washington and Jerusalem, a counterintuitive reality emerges: the collapse of Khamenei’s Shia-led regime could deliver a catastrophic setback to Sunni militant causes across the Middle East. Far from a victory for Sunni aspirations, it would unravel a fragile web of alliances that has sustained resistance against Israel and the United States, leaving Sunni fighters isolated, under-resourced, and vulnerable to co-optation or defeat.</p><p>This paradox stems from Iran’s pragmatic, if opportunistic, role as a patron of Sunni groups despite deep sectarian divides. Khamenei’s Iran has long transcended Shia-Sunni rivalries to forge an “Axis of Resistance” against common foes: Western imperialism and Israeli expansionism. Groups like Hamas in Gaza — a Sunni Islamist organization rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood — have relied on Iranian missiles, funding, and training to challenge Israel’s military dominance. If Khamenei’s regime falls in this war, the Sunni struggle, particularly the Palestinian cause, risks losing its most steadfast external backer, creating a vacuum that could empower moderate Sunni states or, worse, fragment the resistance into ineffectual factions.</p><h4>The Unlikely Alliance: Iran’s Investment in Sunni Resistance</h4><p>To understand the potential fallout, one must trace Iran’s evolution under Khamenei from a revolutionary Shia theocracy to a regional power broker willing to arm Sunni militants. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has viewed the U.S. and Israel as existential threats, a worldview codified in Khamenei’s doctrine of “resistance economy” and asymmetric warfare. This strategy, as detailed in recent analyses from think tanks like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, relies on proxies to extend Tehran’s reach without direct confrontation.</p><p>Hamas, founded in 1987 as a Sunni offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, exemplifies this cross-sectarian pragmatism. Despite Iran’s Shia identity, Tehran began supporting Hamas in the 1990s, providing rocket technology and financial aid estimated at $100 million annually before the 2023 Gaza war. This partnership peaked during the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, which Hamas credits to Iranian-supplied drones and missiles. Even after Iran’s setbacks in the June 2025 twelve-day war with Israel — where U.S. bombers struck Iranian nuclear sites — Tehran continued funneling resources to Hamas remnants, as per reports from the Stimson Center.</p><p>Other Sunni groups have benefited similarly. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), another Sunni faction in Gaza, receives direct IRGC training. In Yemen, the Houthis — Zaydi Shia but allied with Sunni tribes — have used Iranian-supplied drones to disrupt Red Sea shipping, indirectly aiding Sunni causes by drawing U.S. resources away from Israel. Even in Syria, before the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Iran coordinated with Sunni militias against ISIS, blending sectarian lines in pursuit of anti-Western goals.</p><p>This support isn’t altruistic. Khamenei uses Sunni proxies to encircle Israel and deter U.S. intervention, as outlined in Michael Eisenstadt’s recent paper on Iranian deterrence strategies. By arming Sunnis, Iran amplifies its “ring of fire” around adversaries, forcing them to fight on multiple fronts. The June 2025 war exposed vulnerabilities — Israel destroyed 80% of Hezbollah’s arsenal in a day — but it also highlighted Iran’s resilience in rebuilding Sunni allies like Hamas, which launched retaliatory strikes from Gaza.</p><h4>The Catastrophic Losses: A Vacuum in the Resistance</h4><p>If Khamenei’s regime crumbles under U.S. pressure — a scenario Trump has openly advocated, urging Iranians to “overthrow” their government — the Sunni struggle would suffer irreparable harm. First, the loss of military hardware would be immediate and profound. Iran’s IRGC Aerospace Force has supplied thousands of missiles to Hamas and PIJ, enabling barrages that overwhelmed Israeli defenses in 2024. Without Tehran’s factories and smuggling networks via Syria and Lebanon, these groups would revert to rudimentary weapons, as seen after the 2025 war when Hamas’s arsenal dwindled by 70%, according to Brookings Institution estimates.</p><p>Financially, the blow would be equally devastating. Iran’s annual subsidies to Sunni proxies exceed $200 million, funding everything from fighter salaries to tunnel networks in Gaza. A post-Khamenei Iran, potentially under a U.S.-backed transitional government, might redirect resources inward to rebuild its shattered economy — inflation hit 68% in February 2026 amid war preparations. As one analyst from the Henry Jackson Society noted in a 2025 report, “Regime collapse would dismantle the Axis, leaving Sunni jihadists without the logistical backbone to sustain operations.”</p><p>Strategically, the fallout could fracture the broader Sunni resistance. Khamenei’s regime has provided ideological cover, framing the fight as a pan-Islamic struggle against “Zionist aggression” rather than sectarian warfare. Without this unifying narrative, Sunni groups risk internal schisms. Hamas, already weakened by Israeli assassinations of leaders like Ismail Haniyeh, might splinter between hardliners and those seeking accommodation with moderate Sunni states like Egypt or Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood’s “Shia wing,” as described in a This is Beirut analysis, would evaporate, potentially strengthening Sunni purists in Turkey and Qatar — but at the cost of alienating global supporters who view Iran as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony.</p><p>Moreover, a U.S. victory could embolden Sunni monarchies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have normalized ties with Israel via the Abraham Accords. These states, wary of Iranian influence, might intensify crackdowns on Sunni militants sympathetic to the resistance. In Iraq, where Iran-backed Shia militias coexist with Sunni tribes, regime collapse could spark a Sunni insurgency — but one directed against lingering Shia forces rather than Israel, diluting the focus on the Palestinian cause.</p><p>From a broader geopolitical lens, the war’s escalation — with Iran retaliating against U.S. bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE — underscores the interconnectedness. Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, a mediator in pre-war talks, warned the U.S. against getting “sucked in,” highlighting regional fears of a power vacuum.</p><h4>Broader Implications: A Win for the West, a Loss for Unity</h4><p>Critics argue that Khamenei’s fall would liberate Sunnis from Iranian manipulation, allowing authentic grassroots movements to flourish. Yet, evidence suggests otherwise. Iran’s setbacks since 2023 — the degradation of Hezbollah and Hamas — have not unified Sunnis but exposed their dependencies. As the Hoover Institution’s December 2024 report states, Iran’s proxies are now “paper tigers,” mocked online for unfulfilled threats. Without Tehran’s backing, Sunni resistance could devolve into isolated uprisings, easily quashed by superior Israeli and U.S. forces.</p><p>International reactions reinforce this. The EU’s call for “maximum restraint” and China’s emphasis on Iran’s sovereignty reflect a global aversion to regime change, fearing it could ignite wider Sunni-Shia clashes. Even Sunni-led Pakistan condemned the U.S.-Israeli strikes, urging diplomacy to avert “dire consequences” for regional stability.</p><p>The last, the potential toppling of Khamenei’s regime in this U.S.-led war represents not a triumph for Sunni perjuangan but a profound setback. By severing the lifelines of arms, funds, and strategy, it would isolate groups like Hamas, fragment the Axis of Resistance, and invite exploitation by opportunistic actors. As the Middle East teeters on the brink, policymakers must weigh whether dismantling Iran’s theocracy truly advances peace — or merely reshuffles the deck in favor of enduring instability. The Sunni struggle, born of shared grievances against occupation and imperialism, may never recover from such a fracture.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b42c10e323d4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zohran Mamdani’s wave hits the old face of New York]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/zohran-mamdanis-wave-hits-the-old-face-of-new-york-4fe5a8f49b8b?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[new-york]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zohran-mamdani]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-york-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mamdani]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 19:02:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-04T19:02:29.016Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ooLHus6y97AuovyuhF8nZg.png" /><figcaption>Many people who knew Mamdani before his mayoral run confessed to some shock at his victory in the primary. “Zohran, I think, surprised himself,” an ally said.Photographs by Victor Llorente for The New Yorker</figcaption></figure><p>In a city where politics rarely sleeps and reputations turn on a soundbite, Zohran Mamdani has managed to do what few thought possible: transform a long-shot bid into the most talked-about campaign in New York. The 32-year-old state assemblyman from Queens, a democratic socialist and the son of Ugandan-Indian immigrants, has surged past his rivals in a race that has tested not just political strength, but moral endurance.</p><p>At first, his candidacy seemed symbolic — a gesture toward representation, perhaps, but not a serious threat to the city’s entrenched political machine. Yet within months, Mamdani’s campaign began to resemble something far larger: a referendum on what kind of politics New York, and by extension America, wants to claim as its future.</p><h3>The Return of Cuomo and the Politics of Fear</h3><p>That future collided headlong with the past in the form of <strong>Andrew Cuomo</strong>, the former governor attempting a political comeback after years in the wilderness. To many observers, Cuomo’s reemergence felt like an assertion of the old guard — the blunt, transactional style that once defined New York politics. He brought with him the same arsenal that had long protected his career: deep-pocketed donors, loyal operatives, and a mastery of hard-edged messaging.</p><p>When it became clear that Mamdani’s insurgent campaign was gathering real traction, Cuomo and his allies settled on a strategy that was both familiar and deeply divisive: turn Mamdani’s criticism of Israel into a wedge issue. “<strong>Anti-Zionism is antisemitism,</strong>” Cuomo declared, shortly after entering the race, vowing to expose what he framed as “extremism in disguise.”</p><p>A pro-Cuomo super PAC quickly circulated a mailer claiming that Mamdani “Rejects Jewish Rights.” The image — edited to make his beard darker and fuller — played into the ugliest caricatures of Muslim identity. The intent was obvious: to cast him as a threat rather than a candidate.</p><p>But Mamdani didn’t flinch. He recalibrated his tone, moving away from the rhetorical bravado of his early activism toward a more somber, humanistic language. Rather than mock Israeli military actions, he quoted Israeli scholars and leaders themselves — Holocaust historian Amos Goldberg, who has described the destruction of Gaza as genocide, and former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who condemned the war as “cruel and criminal.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6tQo10-Jy_aM0tODRSZi6w.png" /><figcaption>The primary campaign mobilized an unprecedented fifty thousand volunteers to canvass the city. Photo by New Yorker</figcaption></figure><p>For Mamdani, the point was not provocation but principle: the defense of international law and a shared humanity.</p><h3>The Colbert Moment</h3><p>Two weeks before the Democratic primary, Mamdani was invited to appear on <em>The Late Show with Stephen Colbert</em> alongside Brad Lander, the city comptroller polling in third place. The two had recently cross-endorsed each other under New York’s ranked-choice voting system, part of an anti-Cuomo effort coordinated by the Working Families Party and other progressive groups.</p><p>The appearance promised exposure — Colbert’s show reaches millions, especially in the affluent liberal neighborhoods that often decide city elections. But behind the scenes, it nearly turned into an ambush.</p><p>A few hours before taping, Colbert’s producers suggested adding a segment titled <em>“Thumbs Up or Thumbs Down.”</em> The prompts, they said, would include “Hamas” and “a Palestinian state.” Earlier that day, a group of prominent Jewish figures, including Elisha Wiesel, son of Elie Wiesel, had urged the show to press Mamdani on his views of Israel.</p><p>Mamdani’s aides were stunned. “You have the first Muslim candidate for mayor in New York City’s history,” said senior adviser Zara Rahim. “And that’s the question you want to ask?”</p><p>The producers eventually dropped the idea, but Colbert still asked whether Mamdani believed Israel had a right to exist. Mamdani paused, then replied calmly: “Yes, like all nations, I believe it has a right to exist — and a responsibility to uphold international law.”</p><p>It was a deft answer, but the repetition of that question — in debates, forums, and interviews — came to feel like an ideological gauntlet. “It’s Islamophobia in the way it’s framed and repeated,” said one Muslim leader close to the campaign.</p><h3>Building a Politics of Substance</h3><p>Amid the noise, Mamdani’s campaign held its course. While his opponents chased headlines, he doubled down on the city’s bread-and-butter issues: unaffordable housing, underfunded transit, and wage inequality. In community meetings across Queens and Brooklyn, he spoke less as an activist than as a listener — a rare quality in a city where every candidate seems permanently on broadcast mode.</p><p>That groundedness proved to be his greatest asset. His volunteers — many of them first-time organizers — built a disciplined grassroots network that merged idealism with practical efficiency. They knew which doors to knock, which streets to canvass, and which conversations could move undecided voters.</p><p>Mamdani also understood the symbolic stakes. When asked in June, on a right-leaning podcast, whether he would denounce the slogan “Globalize the Intifada,” he declined. “‘Intifada’ means ‘struggle,’” he explained, “and that’s a struggle for freedom.” Critics accused him of endorsing violence. But after the primary, buoyed by surprisingly strong support among Jewish voters under forty, Mamdani clarified that he would “discourage” supporters from using the phrase — a small but telling gesture of pragmatism.</p><h3>Beyond Identity</h3><p>The story of Mamdani’s rise is not just about identity, though identity shapes every corner of it. It is also about the ability to <strong>shift the narrative</strong> — to move a political conversation away from who someone is to what they stand for.</p><p>While Cuomo and others sought to reduce him to labels — Muslim, socialist, anti-Israel — Mamdani reframed himself as a candidate of moral coherence. He invoked Ed Koch, the city’s famously blunt former mayor: “If you agree with me on nine out of twelve issues, vote for me. If you agree with me on all twelve, see a psychiatrist.”</p><p>It was a line delivered with humor, but also with purpose. Politics, Mamdani seemed to say, is not a search for purity but for common ground rooted in principle.</p><h3>A Generation’s Turning Point</h3><p>When the votes were counted, the upset was undeniable. Mamdani had outperformed expectations, winning key districts long considered Cuomo’s strongholds. His victory was powered by young voters, immigrant workers, and progressive coalitions that bridged racial and religious lines — the very constituencies often dismissed as politically fragmented.</p><p>For many New Yorkers, the result was less about ideology than authenticity. “People aren’t looking for saviors,” said one young campaign volunteer. “They’re looking for someone who won’t lie to them.”</p><p>Mamdani’s appeal rests on that sense of moral clarity. In a political era dominated by cynicism, he speaks with a conviction that feels almost anachronistic — as if honesty itself were a form of radicalism.</p><h3>The Meaning of Momentum</h3><p>What comes next for Mamdani remains uncertain. His victory in the primary has already altered the city’s political map, forcing even moderate Democrats to reckon with a rising progressive generation. But his influence extends beyond municipal politics. By weaving global issues — Gaza, climate justice, economic inequality — into local governance, he’s articulated a politics that refuses to see the world in silos.</p><p>For his supporters, that worldview feels both urgent and overdue. For his critics, it’s naïve, even dangerous. But either way, it has shifted the conversation.</p><p>In a city long defined by its contradictions — wealth and poverty, progressivism and pragmatism — Mamdani represents a new synthesis: moral seriousness without sanctimony, conviction without performative outrage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V-F7vYJ-ZQSZdoGU2hbgiQ.png" /><figcaption>The primary campaign mobilized an unprecedented fifty thousand volunteers to canvass the city. Photo by New Yorker</figcaption></figure><p>He has shown that even in the theater of American politics, where everything risks being reduced to spectacle, substance can still break through.</p><p>And perhaps, for the first time in years, New York is being asked to imagine not just who can win, but what it means to win at all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fe5a8f49b8b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Role of the United Arab Emirates in the Sudanese Genocide]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/the-role-of-the-united-arab-emirates-in-the-sudanese-genocide-cd4d97c1f4f6?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd4d97c1f4f6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[darfur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rsf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 06:29:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-31T06:29:15.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*i5MHefD2Yx0pOXEj.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo offers condolences to UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the funeral of Al Nahyan’s brother, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in Abu Dhabi, UAE, May 15, 2022. (Ministry of Presidential Affairs photo by Abdulla Al Neyadi via AP Images).</em></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing war in Sudan, particularly the atrocities perpetrated in Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has drawn renewed attention to the geopolitical entanglements that sustain violence in the Horn of Africa. Among the most consequential external actors in this conflict is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose military, financial, and logistical support for the RSF has effectively enabled one of the gravest humanitarian crises in contemporary Africa. The war in Sudan is not merely the product of domestic rivalries; it reflects a broader regional configuration of power in which Gulf states, pursuing their own security and commercial interests, have become decisive players. The UAE’s role illustrates how the logics of counterrevolution, mercantile expansion, and strategic competition have converged to underwrite acts of mass violence and displacement in Darfur.</p><p>This essay examines the UAE’s involvement in Sudan’s conflict through three interrelated dimensions: first, the geopolitical motivations that drive Emirati engagement in the Horn of Africa; second, the material and institutional channels through which Abu Dhabi has supported the RSF; and third, the moral and legal implications of such support in the context of genocide. The analysis draws on public reports, testimonies, and documented patterns of arms transfers and financial flows, situating the UAE’s policies within its broader regional strategy since the Arab uprisings of 2011.</p><h3>The Geopolitical Logic of Emirati Engagement in Sudan</h3><p>The UAE’s foreign policy since 2011 has been guided by an expansive vision of security that conflates regime stability with regional order. Following the Arab uprisings, Abu Dhabi adopted an interventionist posture aimed at suppressing Islamist movements, countering revolutionary mobilization, and consolidating networks of allied military elites. Sudan occupied a pivotal position in this calculus. As a large, resource-rich country located at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Sahel, and the Nile Basin, Sudan offers strategic access to trade routes, ports, and hinterlands that connect East Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. For the UAE, control over these corridors represents both an economic opportunity and a buffer against perceived threats emanating from political Islam or Iranian influence.</p><p>This strategic rationale was institutionalised through a series of partnerships with local power brokers. During Omar al-Bashir’s presidency, the UAE maintained pragmatic ties despite his Islamist credentials, particularly as Sudan became a supplier of troops for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. The rise of the RSF and its commander, General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), provided Abu Dhabi with a more malleable partner — one whose authority was rooted in militia networks and commercial ventures rather than ideological affiliations. The RSF’s control over gold mines in Darfur and its capacity to deploy fighters abroad aligned neatly with the UAE’s preference for transactional, militarised relationships rather than institutional diplomacy.</p><p>Thus, the UAE’s engagement in Sudan was not an aberration but a continuation of a broader policy architecture visible in Libya, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. In each case, Abu Dhabi cultivated local proxies and invested in strategic infrastructure to secure influence. Sudan’s war merely exposed the human cost of this model when the instruments of external power projection became agents of mass atrocity.</p><h3>Material and Logistical Support for the Rapid Support Forces</h3><p>Evidence of Emirati support for the RSF has accumulated across multiple domains. Reports by the United Nations, investigative journalists, and humanitarian agencies indicate a steady flow of weapons, vehicles, and financial transfers from the UAE to RSF-controlled territories. These supplies have often been routed through intermediaries in Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic, or delivered via Emirati-operated bases in eastern Libya under the authority of Khalifa Haftar, a long-standing ally of Abu Dhabi. Such channels have allowed the UAE to sustain plausible deniability while maintaining operational continuity in its support network.</p><p>Material assistance has taken several forms. First, arms shipments — including small arms, ammunition, and drones — have been traced to Emirati sources. These deliveries have provided the RSF with technological superiority over Sudan’s regular army, particularly in urban warfare and surveillance. Second, financial assistance has been critical to sustaining RSF payrolls and procurement capacities. Gold exports from Darfur, facilitated through Emirati trading hubs, have served as both a revenue source for Hemedti’s forces and a mechanism of financial integration into the global market. Third, political protection has insulated the RSF from international sanctions and censure. Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic weight within multilateral institutions has often softened the scrutiny directed at its partners.</p><p>The UAE’s involvement has therefore been structural rather than episodic. It has provided the RSF with the resources necessary to maintain an autonomous war economy, effectively decoupled from the Sudanese state. This configuration resembles the logic of “militia governance,” in which violence becomes both a means of territorial control and a vehicle of resource extraction. The RSF’s consolidation of Darfur, culminating in the fall of El Fasher in 2025, exemplifies the outcome of this system: a militarised enclave sustained by external patronage and predatory accumulation.</p><h3>The Genocidal Consequences in Darfur</h3><p>The human consequences of this alliance are catastrophic. Since 2023, reports from Darfur have documented systematic campaigns of ethnic cleansing targeting non-Arab communities, particularly the Masalit and Fur populations. Villages have been razed, civilians executed, and women subjected to widespread sexual violence. Satellite imagery and survivor testimonies point to patterns of deliberate targeting consistent with the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Convention. The RSF’s conduct mirrors, and in some cases intensifies, the atrocities perpetrated by the Janjaweed militias two decades earlier — militias from which the RSF itself originated.</p><p>In this context, the UAE’s material support assumes legal and moral significance. By supplying arms and logistical assistance to the RSF despite credible evidence of genocidal practices, Abu Dhabi has arguably violated international norms governing the transfer of weapons to actors engaged in crimes against humanity. The United Nations arms embargo on Sudan, first imposed in 2005 and subsequently reaffirmed, prohibits any member state from supplying arms that could exacerbate violence in Darfur. Yet enforcement has been lax, and geopolitical considerations have often overridden legal obligations. The failure to impose meaningful consequences has emboldened both the RSF and its external sponsors.</p><p>The implications extend beyond Sudan. The Emirati model of proxy warfare — outsourcing coercive power to paramilitary clients while maintaining formal adherence to diplomatic conventions — undermines the international system’s capacity to regulate armed conflict. It erodes the normative boundaries between state and non-state violence, enabling a form of plausible complicity in atrocities. The RSF’s genocidal campaign thus represents not only a Sudanese tragedy but a symptom of a broader transformation in the political economy of war in the Middle East and Africa.</p><h3>The Political Economy of Complicity</h3><p>The economic underpinnings of the UAE-RSF relationship reveal an additional layer of complicity. Gold extracted from mines controlled by the RSF has flowed through networks of traders and refiners operating in Dubai, one of the world’s largest gold markets. Despite international calls for due diligence, the opacity of the gold trade has allowed conflict resources to enter global supply chains with minimal oversight. This trade has not only financed the RSF’s military operations but also integrated Sudan’s war economy into the circuits of global finance. The result is a feedback loop in which violence generates profit, and profit sustains violence.</p><p>Abu Dhabi’s authorities have repeatedly denied direct involvement, framing their actions as humanitarian or development-oriented. However, the persistence of illicit gold flows and the alignment between Emirati strategic objectives and RSF territorial control suggest a deeper structural connection. This nexus between commerce and coercion illustrates how modern conflicts are sustained less by ideological mobilization than by networks of accumulation that span borders and institutions.</p><h3>Accountability and the Future of International Norms</h3><p>The question of accountability remains central. As of late 2025, calls have intensified for the international community to enforce the UN arms embargo on Sudan and to investigate the UAE’s role in enabling war crimes. Human rights organizations and policy institutes, including the Center for International Policy, have urged the United States and European partners to impose targeted sanctions on Emirati entities involved in arms transfers and gold trading linked to the RSF. Whether such measures will materialize depends on the willingness of powerful states to confront a wealthy ally whose investments and partnerships span the global economy.</p><p>Beyond immediate policy debates, the Sudan case raises fundamental questions about the durability of international humanitarian law in an era of asymmetric patronage. If states can facilitate genocidal violence through proxies without consequence, the architecture of global governance loses its deterrent force. The genocide in Darfur is not only a failure of Sudanese politics but also a failure of the international order to enforce its own norms against those who violate them indirectly.</p><h3>Moral and Responsibility</h3><p>The UAE’s role in the Sudanese genocide illustrates the intersection of ambition, impunity, and moral disengagement that defines much of contemporary regional politics. What began as a calculated effort to secure influence in the Red Sea corridor has culminated in complicity with mass atrocity. The RSF’s rise, sustained by Emirati arms and finance, has turned Darfur into a landscape of devastation reminiscent of its darkest chapters.</p><p>To understand the tragedy unfolding in Sudan is to recognize that genocide does not emerge in isolation. It is the outcome of networks — of trade, diplomacy, and security — that tie the fates of civilians in El Fasher to decisions made in Abu Dhabi and beyond. Holding the perpetrators and their enablers accountable is not merely a matter of justice for Sudan; it is a test of whether the international system retains the moral coherence to confront violence that is both profitable and proxied.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd4d97c1f4f6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Sudan Genocide]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/the-sudan-genocide-b57bac1b73e7?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b57bac1b73e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[darfur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2025 13:31:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-31T06:29:57.152Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gawruu8xY_ExJLqR4eHnrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>CHERO KASI, SUDAN — SEPTEMBER 7: An armed Sudanese rebel from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) arrives at the abandoned village of Chero Kasi less than an hour after Janjaweed militiamen set it ablaze in the violence plagued Darfur region.</figcaption></figure><p>In the land once called the “heart of Africa,” history repeats itself with bitter familiarity. In Sudan — a country once seen as a bridge between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa — the fires of civil war have rekindled into the flames of genocide. In the city of El-Fasher, at the heart of Darfur, the world once again bears witness to a grim theatre that might have been lifted straight from the early 2000s: mass killings, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, and the collapse of civilian life by human hands.</p><h3>A Long History of Violence</h3><p>The violence in Darfur did not erupt overnight. It is the culmination of decades of discrimination, marginalisation, and war over identity. Since the early 1980s, western Sudan has been gripped by tension between so-called “Arab” pastoralist tribes and “non-Arab” farming communities such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. Competition over land — exacerbated by climate change and government policies that favoured one group over another — turned Darfur into fertile ground for ethnic hatred.</p><p>When, in 2003, a rebellion broke out among non-Arab groups against the government of President Omar al-Bashir, the regime responded with a campaign of annihilation. It armed and unleashed Arab militias known as the Janjaweed — the “devils on horseback”. Ostensibly tasked with crushing the insurgency, they waged a campaign that quickly became a project of ethnic extermination.</p><p>Within a few years, more than 300,000 people were killed, 2.5 million displaced, and hundreds of villages burned to ash. The world called it the Darfur Genocide, and in 2009 the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet even that historic verdict failed to halt the spiral of violence that, two decades later, has returned in an even more complex and devastating form.</p><h3>The Birth and Transformation of the RSF</h3><p>After their brutal effectiveness in Darfur, the Janjaweed were institutionalised in 2013 as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the command of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. With a calm demeanour that belied his ruthlessness in the field, Hemedti became the new face of Sudanese militarised power.</p><p>Officially, the RSF was created to integrate rogue militias into the state and prevent further chaos. In practice, it remained loyal not to the nation, but to its commander; its methods continued to rely on coercion and terror rather than law.</p><p>The RSF soon became a regional actor. At the request of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), its fighters were deployed to Yemen as part of the anti-Houthi coalition. There they fought as mercenaries, paid in money, weapons, and legitimacy. Hemedti used the wealth from those operations — combined with profits from Darfur’s lucrative gold mines — to expand his political and military empire. He built a network of businesses spanning mining, logistics, and foreign trade, cultivating ties with Russia, Turkey, and the UAE.</p><p>Ironically, this international empowerment laid the groundwork for Sudan’s present catastrophe. A force created to stabilise the state had become a quasi-independent army capable of challenging it.</p><h3>The 2023–2025 Crisis: From Power Struggle to Renewed Genocide</h3><p>The confrontation between Hemedti and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s regular armed forces (SAF), erupted into open war in April 2023. The two men had once been allies, co-conspirators in the 2021 coup that ousted Sudan’s civilian transitional government. But their alliance fractured over who would rule and when the RSF would be integrated into the army.</p><p>What began as an elite rivalry spiralled into a national war. In just two years, more than 40,000 people have been killed, 14 million displaced, and over 25 million face famine. Major cities, including Khartoum, have been reduced to rubble. But nowhere has the devastation been more absolute than in Darfur.</p><p>In October 2025, El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, fell to the RSF after an 18-month siege. During the blockade, 1.2 million civilians were trapped in famine, surviving on leaves and animal feed. When the city finally fell, testimonies from survivors described unmitigated horror:<br> RSF fighters executed patients in their hospital beds, burned civilians alive, and raped women fleeing the city. Witnesses like nurse Nawal Khalil recounted seeing paramilitaries shoot patients in the South El-Fasher Hospital.</p><p>Satellite imagery analysed by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab revealed earth disturbances consistent with mass graves. The Sudanese Doctors’ Network reported more than 1,500 deaths in the first few days following the city’s fall; Sudanese military sources put the number above 2,000.</p><p>The UN Human Rights Office has stated that there is “credible evidence” of ethnically motivated violence — specifically targeting non-Arab groups. In other words, the genocidal logic of the early 2000s has returned.</p><h3>The Trail of Arms and Foreign Complicity</h3><p>Amid the carnage, evidence has surfaced linking global powers to Sudan’s killing fields. Documents reviewed by the UN Security Council show that British-manufactured military components — including light weapons targeting systems and armoured vehicle engines — were found at RSF positions in Sudan.</p><p>These items had been exported to the United Arab Emirates, which many accuse of serving as the RSF’s primary arms supplier. Though the UAE denies it, multiple reports indicate a consistent pattern of weapons transfers from the Gulf to Darfur through air and overland routes.</p><p>Researcher Mike Lewis, a former UN panel expert on Sudan, has stressed that the United Kingdom and other Western states have a legal obligation to halt arms exports when there is a clear risk of their use in war crimes. Yet export licences continued even after evidence of UAE involvement emerged.</p><p>On 29 October 2025, Nancy Okail, president of the Center for International Policy, denounced this as “a betrayal of international norms.” She urged the United States and its allies to suspend all arms transfers to the UAE and to impose sanctions for its role in “arming genocidal forces in Darfur.”</p><p>In other words, the blood in Darfur is not only spilled by men pulling triggers in the desert — it flows through the global arms trade that equips them.</p><h3>A Country Divided</h3><p>With El-Fasher’s fall, the RSF now controls the entirety of Darfur and much of Kordofan, while the SAF retains the east and north, including Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The country is, in effect, split in two.</p><p>Hemedti has announced a parallel government in the territories under his control, styling himself as a unifier who will “restore Sudan under true democracy” — a bitter irony as his forces execute civilians and burn hospitals.</p><p>Analysts warn that Sudan is on the verge of de facto partition, echoing the secession of South Sudan in 2011 after decades of war. This time, however, the fracture is not between north and south, but between east and west — between two armed powers, both drenched in civilian blood.</p><h3>A Silent World</h3><p>The international response has been lethargic and insufficient. The UN Security Council has failed to agree on meaningful enforcement of the arms embargo, paralysed by the competing interests of Gulf states and the influence of Russia and China in Africa.</p><p>The African Union and Arab League have issued calls for ceasefire, but without enforcement mechanisms. Mediation efforts led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt — known as the “Quad” — have produced no tangible progress.</p><p>In reality, Sudan has become a proxy battlefield: the UAE backs the RSF, while Egypt supports the SAF. Turkey, Iran, and Russia reportedly supply drones and ammunition to both sides. In this geopolitical game, the Sudanese people are collateral damage — driven into famine, rape, and death without reprieve.</p><h3>A Genocide Renewed</h3><p>What is unfolding in El-Fasher is not merely a civil war; it is genocide in contemporary form — a crime carried out with new technology but an old logic: the ethnic erasure of entire communities.</p><p>Evidence indicates that the RSF is systematically targeting non-Arab groups such as the Fur and Masalit. Women are raped to “erase bloodlines”, while men are executed or held for ransom. Mass graves have appeared around the city; the stench of death has seeped even into diplomatic chambers far from the desert.</p><p>When Nawal Khalil limped away from the hospital with a bullet wound in her leg, and Adam Yagoub described seeing twenty-two bodies left near a trap well, they were not merely witnesses — they were living proof of crimes the world had vowed would never happen again after Rwanda, Bosnia, and the first Darfur genocide.</p><h3>Reflections: The World at a Crossroads</h3><p>The 2025 Sudan Genocide exposes two enduring truths about our modern order. First, the failure of the international system to learn from history. Embargoes, sanctions, and moral appeals mean little when profit and politics outweigh conscience. Second, it reveals how the global arms trade connects factory floors in Wales or Manchester directly to massacres in Darfur.</p><p>For the civilians of El-Fasher — those walking barefoot toward Tawila, weak from starvation — the phrase “international community” must sound like cruel irony. The world knows, the world sees, and the world remains silent.</p><p>History will record this genocide not only as the crime of its perpetrators, but as a collective failure of those who chose not to act.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b57bac1b73e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Motaz Azaiza and the Gaza Narrative]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/motaz-azaiza-and-the-gaza-narrative-08a35a88ab77?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/08a35a88ab77</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gaza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[motaz-azaiza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 09:45:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-15T09:47:56.682Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EXFwR-VqrwPS31AeuGZ1PA.png" /><figcaption>Motaz pin up Instagram post 23 Oktober 2023</figcaption></figure><p>From late 2023 through 2024, Motaz Azaiza became one of Gaza’s most recognizable figures. His face appeared on international television, across Instagram feeds, X posts, and even on global award stages. He was hailed as “the eye of Gaza” — a young man documenting devastation with a simple camera amid Israel’s bombardment that began on October 7, 2023, and dragged on for months.</p><p>Yet behind this global reputation lies a sharp internal debate within Gaza and across the Arab world: who exactly is Motaz Azaiza, and what does his narrative mean for the Palestinian struggle?</p><h3>Between Fact and Opinion in the Narrative of War</h3><p>As a public figure emerging from the ruins of Gaza, Motaz is often regarded as an independent journalist, though he is not affiliated with any formal media organization. This has sparked debate. In traditional journalism, reporters operate under editorial oversight, with verification processes and clear boundaries between fact and opinion. Motaz, however, is not bound by such structures. He is more accurately described as a citizen journalist — a civilian documenting reality without institutional backing.</p><p>As a result, many observers argue that his narrative is not entirely objective. Some praise him for highlighting Gaza’s humanitarian suffering; others criticize him for ignoring the political and armed dimensions that have long defined Palestinian resistance. As one Gaza analyst put it, <em>“It’s difficult to tell where Motaz’s opinion ends and where the facts begin.”</em></p><h3>Two Languages, Two Worlds: English on Instagram, Arabic on Facebook</h3><p>Motaz communicates strategically across different audiences. On Instagram, he writes mostly in English, sharing portraits of children, mothers, and daily life under bombardment. His message is universal — humanity beyond politics. He speaks to the world: Western audiences, human rights advocates, and international journalists.</p><p>But on Facebook, where most followers are Arabs and Gazans, he writes in Arabic — often with more explicit political tones. Here lies the controversy. In several posts, Motaz openly criticized Hamas, calling it an illegitimate authority in Gaza that divides the Palestinian cause. He even suggested that Gaza should be governed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, based in Ramallah.</p><p>These statements ignited anger among many Gazans and Hamas supporters. For them, such criticism echoed Western and Israeli narratives seeking to delegitimize armed resistance. In their view, at a time when Gaza was fighting for survival, attacking Hamas publicly was inappropriate and could easily be exploited by the occupiers.</p><h3>Executions and Local Backlash</h3><p>One of the most heated controversies arose when several families in Gaza — including the Dakmas, Abu Mungsaib, and Yasir Abu Syabab families — were executed after being accused of collaborating with Israel. Local reports indicated that Hamas and resistance factions suspected them of providing intelligence that helped Israel target strategic locations.</p><p>In the midst of this tense atmosphere, Motaz Azaiza wrote on Facebook that those executed were actually <em>“martyrs”</em> — a statement that triggered outrage across Gaza. Many residents, including pro-resistance journalists like Saleh Al-Jafarawi, condemned Motaz for being insensitive and divisive. They argued that such comments could deepen internal fractures in an already traumatized community.</p><h3>Finding a Position: Between Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Authority</h3><p>Motaz presents himself as a neutral humanitarian voice, but his statements are often perceived as sympathetic to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah, the faction led by Mahmoud Abbas. Since the Oslo Accords of 1993, relations between Hamas and Fatah have been strained, culminating in 2007, when Hamas seized control of Gaza through armed confrontation, leaving Fatah in charge of the West Bank.</p><p>For many Gazans who support armed resistance, calls to restore Gaza under the PA sound like a step backward — surrendering it to a government seen as overly conciliatory toward Israel. Thus, even though Motaz claims to speak purely for humanity, his narrative is interpreted by many as part of Palestine’s internal war of narratives: between those who see armed resistance as essential, and those who prefer diplomacy and institutional politics.</p><h3>The Indonesian Perspective: Empathy Without Interference</h3><p>The debate over Motaz Azaiza has also reached Indonesian social media. Some expressed disappointment with his stance, while others defended him in the name of humanitarian values. Within this context emerged a call for perspective: Indonesia must not get entangled in Palestine’s internal disputes.</p><p>As one commentator put it, <em>“We are Indonesians, not Gazans. Our duty is not to judge — but to help rebuild Gaza.”</em></p><p>This message matters. Palestine is a complex political entity. Like any nation, it contains diverse factions, opinions, and loyalties — supporters and critics of Hamas, sympathizers of Fatah, and independent activists. For outsiders far removed from Gaza’s lived reality, maintaining proportion and empathy is wiser than taking sides or passing judgment.</p><h3>Journalist, Citizen Journalist, and Protection in a War Zone</h3><p>A common misunderstanding concerns Motaz’s status as a “journalist.” He frequently wears a vest marked <em>“PRESS,”</em> but this does not necessarily make him part of a professional newsroom. In Gaza, countless civilians record events using phones or drones. They are citizen journalists — contributors reporting from the frontlines without editorial institutions behind them.</p><p>The “PRESS” vest worn by Motaz and others is primarily a protective measure, not a credential. With Israel’s strikes between December 2023 and January 2024 killing over 100 journalists in Gaza (according to the Federation of Arab Journalists), the vest has become a symbol of humanitarian protection, not institutional legitimacy.</p><h3>A Global Narrative and the Humanitarian Bias</h3><p>Motaz has mastered a narrative that resonates with global audiences: humanitarianism without politics. He avoids discussions of military strategy, ideology, or jihad. Instead, he focuses on dead children, destroyed homes, and shattered families. This makes him widely accepted in the West, where “resistance” narratives are often viewed with suspicion.</p><p>Yet this approach carries a dilemma. A purely humanitarian frame can erase the political roots of the suffering, turning Gaza’s tragedy into a natural disaster rather than a product of occupation and blockade lasting more than 17 years. Critics argue that in sanitizing his message for the world, Motaz dilutes the political reality of colonization in exchange for global sympathy.</p><h3>Sympathy Without Ownership</h3><p>The case of Motaz Azaiza reminds us that narrative is the second battlefield after weapons. In Gaza’s struggle, every word, post, and image becomes a bullet in the war of global opinion. Motaz wields a camera and English captions; Hamas wields rockets and underground strategy; the Palestinian Authority wields diplomacy and international recognition. Each fights in its own arena.</p><p>Globally, the lesson is to remain empathetic yet detached — to care without claiming ownership of their struggle. We must not romanticize one faction or vilify another as though we understand Gaza’s full reality. The politics of Palestine are layered with history, occupation, and trauma that no outsider can fully grasp.</p><p>The label “PRESS” on a vest does not define journalism, just as a viral video does not define truth. To consume information responsibly, we must move beyond headlines and influencer-driven storytelling — and remember that Motaz is Motaz, not an official correspondent.</p><p>To accuse him of being an informant or traitor is an oversimplification. Gaza — and Palestine as a whole — is far more complex than any single narrative, far deeper than what even academics have captured in their studies of Israel’s occupation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=08a35a88ab77" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[This Is Syria’s New Election]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/this-is-syrias-new-election-7ffbceff9cde?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7ffbceff9cde</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hayat-tahrir-al-sham]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ahmed-al-sharaa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 11:47:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-06T11:48:22.252Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*sroSK7X1BXCRVCAv" /><figcaption>President Ahmed al-Sharaa, left, visiting a polling station used by members of a regional electoral college. Sharaa will directly appoint one-third of MPs himself © Louai Beshara/AFP</figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary election held on Sunday, October 5, 2025, marks a new chapter for a nation that spent more than half a century under the shadow of the al-Assad dynasty. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the new government led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa faces a monumental task: rebuilding political legitimacy and reconstructing state institutions shattered by nearly fourteen years of war. In this context, the election is not merely a mechanism of representation but also a symbol of transition — from authoritarianism toward a system aspiring to be more inclusive and accountable.</p><h3>Why Syria Needed a New Election</h3><p>After over five decades of dynastic rule and more than ten years of civil war, the October 2025 parliamentary election marks a defining moment in Syria’s modern political history. It is the first since Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and represents a shift from authoritarianism toward a more participatory structure. The transitional government under President <strong>Ahmad al-Sharaa</strong> sees the vote as the first step toward national reconciliation and as a way to rebuild post-conflict legitimacy.</p><p>Yet, the rationale behind holding elections goes far beyond symbolism. The country faces deep social fragmentation, institutional collapse, and widespread public distrust of centralized power. Since the war’s end, much of Syria has been governed by autonomous local authorities and militias that once fought against the old regime. Thus, the election is intended to serve as a tool to reunify Syria’s fractured political landscape through a representative mechanism — however limited it may still be.</p><p>The international community, meanwhile, views this process as an early test of whether the transitional government can manage a responsible and credible democratization process. Against a history of repression and violence, this election stands as a sign of political realignment — an attempt to bridge the interests of Syria’s diverse ethnic, sectarian, and ideological communities in the post-Assad era.</p><h3>How the Election Was Conducted</h3><p>Syria’s parliamentary election on October 5, 2025, unfolded in a format far removed from conventional democratic practice. The transitional government described it as an “indirect election”, since most citizens did not cast ballots directly. Instead, the vote took place through electoral committees established across 62 districts, all overseen by the Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections — an eleven-member body appointed by President Ahmad al-Sharaa in June 2025.</p><p>Each district subcommittee selected between 30 and 50 individuals to form electoral colleges, which were tasked with electing members of parliament. These electors were chosen based on professional qualifications, social influence, and inclusion of minorities and people with disabilities. In total, around 6,000 to 7,000 electors participated in choosing 121 members of the People’s Assembly from among their own ranks.</p><p>The remaining 70 seats will be filled through direct appointments by President al-Sharaa once the vote concludes on October 7, 2025. Authorities justified the indirect system by citing the logistical and security challenges of organizing a nationwide vote, given that millions of Syrians remain displaced or undocumented. Despite criticism over limited public participation, the process is viewed as a cautious first step in re-establishing a national political framework after the Assad regime’s collapse.</p><h3>The Electoral System</h3><p>Syria’s 2025 electoral system adopts an indirect model — a compromise between the need for political stability and the pursuit of democratization after years of conflict. Citizens do not vote directly; instead, electoral colleges in each district select representatives based on proportional population and local security conditions. The new People’s Assembly holds 210 seats, forty fewer than during Bashar al-Assad’s final parliament.</p><p>The colleges were designed to reflect professional diversity and social engagement, requiring at least 20 percent female representation and including individuals with disabilities and former political prisoners. From 1,570 approved candidates, 140 seats were contested through the electoral colleges’ internal vote, while 70 were appointed directly by President al-Sharaa.</p><p>This model was intended to avoid sectarian tensions and ensure cross-community representation, particularly in unstable regions like Suwayda, Raqqa, and Hasakah, where elections were postponed for security reasons. Still, analysts such as Aron Lund of <em>Century International</em> argue that the system leaves significant room for presidential dominance, as all election-related institutions are appointed from the top down. Thus, Syria’s new system reflects a delicate balance — an attempt to legitimize political power while maintaining transitional control.</p><h3>Are Minorities Represented?</h3><p>The question of minority representation has become central to debates surrounding Syria’s first post-Assad election. Historically, the al-Assad regime maintained its grip on power through a sectarian network centered on the Alawite community, marginalizing Druze, Kurdish, and Christian groups. After Assad’s fall in December 2024, President Ahmad al-Sharaa sought to project inclusivity — but the new system has raised doubts about how genuine that representation really is.</p><p>Officially, the High Election Committee stated that al-Sharaa would use his 70 appointed seats to ensure representation for women and minorities, according to <em>Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA)</em> reports in early October 2025. Yet in practice, key regions — Suwayda (Druze-majority) and the Kurdish-held Raqqa and Hasakah — did not participate due to political and security disputes, leaving 32 parliamentary seats vacant.</p><p>This has drawn criticism from civil society groups who describe Syria’s electoral structure as “centralized and elitist.” Analysts like Haid Haid of the <em>Arab Reform Initiative</em> warn that without direct minority participation, the new parliament risks becoming merely symbolic. Thus, while normative progress has been made in the discourse of inclusivity, the actual practice of representation remains constrained by structural and social fragility.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Syria’s 2025 election embodies a paradox between stability and transformation. On one hand, it appears to be a political formality aimed at preserving national order and winning Western recognition. On the other, it raises a deeper question: is this a pragmatic gesture toward legitimacy, or a genuine ideological shift within the new ruling elite — including groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, now seeking international acceptance? If this election is merely about stability without substance, then Syria’s democracy remains illusory. But if it signals a willingness to open up and evolve, it may well mark the beginning of a long and painful redemption after dictatorship.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7ffbceff9cde" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hamas’s Future Beyond the Ceasefire]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/hamass-future-beyond-the-ceasefire-c5272302daeb?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c5272302daeb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hamas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ceasefire]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2025 10:29:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-04T10:29:58.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1UFMO0NlyEruprNrao0TPQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>GAZA CITY, GAZA — JULY 20: Palestinian Hamas militants are seen during a military show in the Bani Suheila district on July 20, 2017 in Gaza City, Gaza. For the past ten years Gaza residents have lived with constant power shortages, in recent years these cuts have worsened, with supply of regular power limited to four hours a day. (Photo by Chris McGrath)</figcaption></figure><p>Last night, reports have surfaced that Hamas in Gaza has agreed to the ceasefire proposal put forward by U.S. President Donald Trump. This proposal has immediately stirred controversy, as it contains several clauses deemed unacceptable to the people of Gaza and the broader Palestinian resistance. At least three major points have drawn objections from Hamas.</p><p>The first concerns the formation of a transitional council for Gaza after the war, intended to establish a new, nonpartisan administration. The model envisions a government composed of individuals unaffiliated with political parties, similar to technocratic appointments in some countries. However, Hamas strongly objected to the provision that candidates for the council would be vetted by a board chaired by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Hamas has firmly rejected this clause, asserting that the future governance of Palestine is the sole right and responsibility of the Palestinian people and must remain free from foreign interference.</p><p>The second controversial point is the disarmament of the Gaza resistance factions. Hamas has rejected this clause, recalling the historical precedent of the PLO under Yasser Arafat in 1984, when Palestinian forces were disarmed and the leadership was forced to relocate its base to Tunis, Tunisia. Hamas has reiterated that armed resistance remains a legitimate means of struggle until a fully sovereign Palestinian state is established — one that possesses a national army and defense force, not merely scattered militias. The group has stated that it is only willing to surrender its weapons to a legitimate Palestinian state, not to Israel or any foreign power.</p><p>The third point concerns the exclusion of Hamas from the future Palestinian government. Hamas has rejected this notion, insisting that it must remain politically represented as a key component of the Palestinian movement — especially given its sacrifices and role in defending Gaza.</p><p>In a press conference held by Hamas spokespersons Usama Hamdan and Musa Abu Marzuk, the group also made references to Fatah, highlighting the ongoing political tension between Palestinian factions. Hamas emphasized that both the United States and Israel, represented by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly violated their own commitments. Therefore, according to Hamas, this ceasefire must operate under a three-tiered mechanism to ensure accountability and fairness.</p><p>Before explaining these layers, it is necessary to understand the diplomatic chronology leading to this moment. Following a recent UN forum, where Arab nations met with President Trump, reports suggest that an informal deal was reached. The U.S. is believed to be eager to end the war because American military funding and weapon stockpiles are depleting. Frustrated with Netanyahu’s inability to produce a solution, Trump reportedly decided that the U.S. — not Israel — must take the lead in halting the conflict.</p><p>The proposal was first submitted to Israel, which offered no strong objection, before being passed to Hamas through three mediators: Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt. These mediators are believed to have provided assurances that persuaded Hamas to accept the ceasefire conditionally. The world now waits to see whether Israel will agree and how other Palestinian factions — such as Fatah, the PLO, or Mahmoud Abbas — will respond.</p><p>From an outsider’s perspective, it is important to remember that we do not endure the same suffering as the people of Gaza. Hence, Hamas’s decisions must be viewed through the lens of their lived reality and sacrifices. The current move, in the author’s view, resembles the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in early Islamic history — a truce that initially appeared to favor the adversary but later proved strategically advantageous. Many observers mistakenly interpret Hamas’s acceptance of the ceasefire as a defeat, without examining the stringent conditions Hamas placed before the United States in agreeing to it.</p><p>At the time this analysis was written, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had halted all aerial and ground operations in Gaza, suggesting that the ceasefire may indeed take effect. However, its implementation depends on several layers of negotiation.<br> The first layer concerns the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from designated areas.<br> The second involves prisoner exchange negotiations — specifically, how many Palestinian detainees will be freed for each Israeli captive.<br> The third addresses reconstruction responsibilities: who will rebuild roads, markets, schools, hospitals, and public facilities destroyed during the war. Will it be the United States, Israel, or a third party such as the European Union?</p><p>Another issue concerns interim security: whether Gaza’s internal brigades will maintain order or if a neutral peacekeeping force composed of Turkish, Qatari, Egyptian, and American troops will be deployed. Many analysts argue that Hamas’s acceptance of the ceasefire is a tactical move — a humanitarian pause aimed at giving Gaza’s population relief while placing moral and political pressure on Israel. If Israel refuses, the global narrative will shift, portraying Israel — not Hamas — as the party responsible for prolonging the war and the suffering of civilians.</p><p>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now faces severe political pressure. Even if he accepts the ceasefire, he remains unable to shed his image as a war criminal who failed to achieve his objectives:</p><ol><li>to destroy Hamas,</li><li>to displace the people of Gaza, and</li><li>to secure a decisive military victory.<br> Even his short-term promise — to rescue the Israeli hostages — has largely failed. Out of approximately 250 hostages captured by Hamas, only four to ten have been freed through military operations, representing a success rate of less than 0.1 percent.</li></ol><p>Attention is now shifting toward humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts. These efforts should focus primarily on food delivery and rebuilding Gaza’s infrastructure — including mosques, hospitals, markets, and public facilities. Despite immense losses and the martyrdom of several senior leaders, Hamas remains intact as an organization. Most fallen leaders were from the older generation, while younger cadres continue to survive and prepare for the next phase of struggle.</p><p>It is estimated that over 66,000 Gazans have been martyred. Among them are thousands of young men who lost their families and have vowed to continue the fight. For them, joining Hamas’s military brigades represents both a path of resistance and a personal commitment to reclaim their homeland. As such, the ceasefire will likely be celebrated across Gaza — a moment of relief after two relentless years of war against one of the most powerful militaries in the world.</p><p>The war has seen cutting-edge weaponry, including explosive-laden robots and AI-guided firearms, tested on Gaza’s population. Yet the people of Gaza have endured without surrender. Even attempts to create proxy conflicts within Gaza — by empowering certain families to collaborate with Israel — failed miserably, as these collaborators became despised and ultimately expelled from Gaza after the war.</p><p>Looking ahead, the key question remains: Will Israel honor its commitments, and can the negotiations proceed smoothly? It must be noted that Hamas has not yet accepted the full terms of the ceasefire; it has merely agreed in principle, on the condition that all military operations cease before negotiations continue.</p><p>In essence, this truce is not the end of the struggle but rather the beginning of a new phase — one focused on reconstruction, reconciliation, and redefining sovereignty for the Palestinian people. The world now watches to see whether Israel and its allies will act in good faith or once again repeat the cycle of broken promises.</p><p>Rulian, 4 Oct 2025</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c5272302daeb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Persian Language Revival under the Abbasids]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@rulianhp/persian-language-revival-under-the-abbasids-c22ede8dcc48?source=rss-2b9f2586ddea------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c22ede8dcc48</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abbasid-caliphate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[persian]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rulian Haryadi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Aug 2025 05:43:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-08T05:43:51.041Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e7zCggZP5NKSmyEsFyduag.png" /><figcaption>Penjikent murals, detail, banquet, 5th-8th century, Panjakent, Ancient Sogdia</figcaption></figure><p>The case of the Abbasid government’s openness toward non-Arabic languages in administration and knowledge became evident with the rise of the Persian-oriented Samanid dynasty, which for the first time successfully governed under the Caliphate’s banner. Yet the figure who most clearly rekindled Persian pride was Ya‘qub Layth al-Saffar, the first Iranian to instill a consciousness of the Persian language among Iranians.</p><p>According to <em>Tarikh-i Sistan</em>, when Ya‘qub conquered Herat, a poet praised him in Arabic. Ya‘qub replied:<br> <em>“Why are you saying something I do not understand?”</em><br> This prompted his secretary, Muhammad ibn Wasif, to praise him in Persian:</p><blockquote><em>ای شاه، که همه شاهان این جهانند، بنده و خدمتگزار تو، سگ و مطیع تو هستند<br> </em>“O king, to whom all the kings of this world are but slaves and servants, dogs obedient to you!”</blockquote><p>And Muhammad ibn Mokhallad Sagzi continued:</p><blockquote><em>حوا نزایید و آدم نکاشت جز تو، همچون شیر در دل و خوی<br> </em>“Eve bore none, and Adam planted none but you, like a lion in heart and nature!”<em> (Mocin, 1954: 3)</em></blockquote><p>Saman Khuda, originally a Zoroastrian, converted to Islam during the governorship of the Umayyad-appointed Asad ibn Abdallah al-Qasri in Khurasan (largely Transoxiana), naming his eldest son Asad ibn Saman in the governor’s honor (Nelson, 1975: 147). Given the large number of garrisons in Khurasan, local political tension for rebellion was high. Many uprisings were sparked by Governor Ali ibn Isa ibn Mahan (780–811), appointed directly by Caliph Harun al-Rashid (766–809), whose harsh exploitation and oppressive fiscal policies incited resentment among the local elite, leading to open rebellion (Kennedy, 2004: 144).</p><p>In such a climate, local revolutionary fervor against the Abbasids made it inevitable to seek a middle ground between independent local governance and the Caliphate itself. The first bright spot in Islamic history for local politics came with the suppression of the rebellion led by Rafi‘ ibn al-Layth ibn Nasr ibn Sayyar (d. 809). In 819, the governor of Khurasan, Ghassan ibn Abbad, rewarded the four grandsons of Saman Khuda for their help against Rafi‘ ibn al-Layth: (1) Nuh ibn Asad received Samarkand; (2) Ahmad ibn Asad received Farghana; (3) Yahya ibn Asad received Tashkent; and (4) Ilyas ibn Asad received Herat (Nelson, 1975: 136).</p><p>It was Saman Khuda’s great-grandsons who initiated the integration of Persian culture and language into Islamic scholarship. The most notable example is the great Persian poet Rudaki, a Qur’an memorizer and master poet of Persian, often requested to play the <em>chang</em> — a Persian musical instrument — by the prominent musician Abu’l-Abak Bakhtiar (Epinette, 2022). Nasr ibn Ahmad ibn Asad ibn Saman (906–943), a ruler of the Samanids, actively promoted Persian culture. Following the first complete translation of the Qur’an into Persian in the 9th century, the population under Samanid rule began to embrace Islam in significant numbers (Dillon, 2004: 11).</p><p>According to principles of language planning, there is a stage of “codification” where dictionaries, grammar works, and literature are developed to standardize a language. The Samanids undertook extensive efforts to achieve two main goals: first, to collect and stabilize orally known literature; second, to encourage Iranian poets to produce new works. They welcomed philosophers seeking refuge in Iran during the Abbasid era, granting generous patronage to scholars and poets. As a result, records mention 11 scholars from Samarkand and 100 others from Khurasan who produced literary works during this period (Mocin, 1954: 4).</p><p>Progress was visible in early prose works such as <em>Tarikhnama-yi Bozorg</em>, the earliest known Persian prose book written by Muhammad Bal‘ami, marking the vitality of the local language under the Samanids (Hillenbrand, 2013: 33). Persian prose emerged about a century later than poetry, initially in literary works, but gradually expanded to include geography, religion, history, and more. Significant examples include Persian translations of <em>Tafsir-i Tabari</em> and <em>Tarikh-i Tabari</em>. Historical records state that the history written by Abu Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari was translated into Persian by Abu Ali Muhammad ibn Muhammad Bal‘ami, on the orders of Mansur ibn Abd al-Malik. In the introduction to <em>Tafsir-i Tabari</em>, it is noted:<br> <em>“They brought this book from Baghdad. It consisted of forty essays in Arabic. They presented it to [the Samanid ruler] Amir Mansur ibn Nuh ibn Nasr. Because it was difficult for him to understand, he ordered it translated into Persian. He gathered scholars from Transoxiana and asked whether it was permissible to translate the book into Persian. They said: Reading and writing Qur’anic commentary is permissible for those who do not know Arabic.”</em> (Matini, 1973: 44).</p><p>Notably, the four Samanid brothers’ rule in the local tongue was not without challenges. By many accounts, Avicenna created over 1,000 terms in medicine and the natural sciences, while al-Biruni was the first to write separate books on geometry, algebra, and astronomy, coining many new terms in his works. Lists of such terms can be found in Homa’i’s introduction to <em>al-Tafhim</em> (Matini, 1973: 443) and in works by Mocin and Matini. For examples:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*942PLWs3nlMpy-geWcs5Ow.png" /></figure><p>Avicenna and al-Biruni were not the first to coin technical terms — some appear in <em>Hidayat al-Muta‘allimin fi al-Tibb</em>, written half a century before Avicenna’s books (Matini, 1973: 439).</p><p>From this, we see why the development of local languages in the East has been more vibrant up to the present than in the Middle East to Morocco. In other words, the strengthening of Arabic as the primary language has often displaced local tongues.</p><p>Bibliografi:</p><p>Dillon, Michael. 2004. <em>Xinjiang: china’s muslim far northwest.</em> Routledge Curzon</p><p>Hillenbrand, Robert. 2013. <em>Ferdowsi, the Mongols and the History of Iran: Art, Literature and Culture from Early Islam to Qajar Persia</em>. Bloomsbury Publishing</p><p>Kennedy, Hugh. 2004. <em>The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century</em> (Second ed.). Harlow: Longman</p><p>Matini, J. 1973. <em>Hodūd-e ebtekār-e Abū-Reyhān e Bīrūnī dar sāxtan-e loġāt-e ʿelmī. Maǧalle-ye Dāneškade-ye Adabiyyāt-e Dānešgāh-e</em> Mašhad,1352/1973.</p><p>Mocin, M. 1954. <em>Lughat-e Farsi-ye Ibn-Sina va Ta‘thir-e Anha dar Adabiyyat. Majalle-ye Daneshkadeh-ye Adabiyyat-e Daneshgah-e Tehran</em>, 1333S/1954M</p><p>Nelson, Richard. 1975. <em>The Cambridge History of Iran</em>. Cambridge University Press</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c22ede8dcc48" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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