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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Roger Valdez on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Roger Valdez on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Roger Valdez on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The War on Poverty 60 Years Later: Did It Improve Housing?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/the-war-on-poverty-60-years-later-did-it-improve-housing-1974ce4f0d3c?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1974ce4f0d3c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 02:06:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-18T12:13:54.867Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kKV7vkXJl4TLkW_pIJYWPg.jpeg" /><figcaption>By Cecil W. Stoughton — <a href="http://www.lbjlibrary.org/collections/photo-archive.html">http://www.lbjlibrary.org/collections/photo-archive.html</a> Serial number 225–9-wh64, Public Domain, <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=16021480">https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=16021480</a></figcaption></figure><p>While attending a <a href="https://yimby.town/">Yes In My Back Yard (YIMBY) conference</a> in late March of this year, I had a chance to visit <a href="https://www.lbjlibrary.org/">Lyndon Johnson’s Presidential Library</a> in Austin, Texas. I usually travel alone, because as a history geek of the first order since I was a child, I have made it a priority to visit as many presidential libraries as possible. Years ago, while in New York, I visited the vast <a href="https://www.fdrlibrary.org/">Franklin Roosevelt library and museum</a>, a building with exhibits that attempted to match the greatness of the man and his presidency. Up the road, is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Van_Buren_National_Historic_Site">Martin Van Buren historic site</a>. I’m almost certainly exaggerating, but in my memory, it was a comparatively small house somewhere off the highway.</p><p>As my fascination with the presidents and their libraries has matured, I’ve grown to appreciate the people who didn’t become president, too; I visited both <a href="https://henryclay.org/mansion-grounds/mansion-grounds-page/">Henry Clay’s Ashland in Lexington</a> and <a href="https://thehermitage.com/">Andrew Jackson’s Hermitage</a> just down the road outside Nashville. The two men represented a still present strain of conflict in American political and economic discourse, Clay advocating the American System of federal investment in local infrastructure and Jackson espousing a deep suspicion of public finance and banks. After visiting both, I drove back to Ohio <a href="https://www.seattleforgrowth.org/american-story-henry-clay-andrew-jackson-maysville-road/">on the Maysville Road</a>, a contentious project that Clay fought for and Jackson opposed. The road was eventually built.</p><p>Lyndon Johnson stands out as a president who had, in himself, the same contrasts as I found between Roosevelt and Van Buren, and Clay and Jackson. He was a man from the south, who aggressively pressed for civil rights reforms. He aspired to be like Roosevelt, a wartime president who reformed the economy, yet his efforts to win the war and impose order in cities with racial tension overshadowed his best intentions. His War on Poverty, part of his legacy, began 60 years ago, and 10 years ago, Congressmen Paul Ryan set out to assess, essentially, whether that war had been won.</p><p>Ryan’s efforts to quantitatively review the effort were predictably dismissed by the media at the time who argued that while poverty hasn’t gone away, people today are better off because of the effort. My review of Ryan’s critique is focused on housing. Mostly, I agree with Ryan; lots of money was spent with little effect and while the programs certainly helped people, they institutionalized a system of entitlements that has ensnared the federal government with a costly aversion to trying anything new.</p><p>Johnson himself wouldn’t have been bothered by Ryan’s review or mine. Harry Middleton, the director of the Johnson Library and Museum from 1971 when it opened until 2002 <a href="https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2008/summer/lbj.html">remembered that Johnson</a> “insisted that there be a prominent exhibit in the museum on the controversies of the time” and the former president produced a post card he had saved that read, “I demand that you as a gutless son-of-a-bitch resign as President of the United States.” Johnson’s ambition to end poverty was political but it was also practical and rational, and perhaps, even genuine. What follows was posted at Forbes in early 2023 and is a new look at the many housing programs that grew out of the war that was declared by Johnson 60 years ago.</p><p>You can find most, but not all, of Ryan’s material <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/waronpoverty50.pdf">on line here</a>. However, many of the links to some of the supporting documents are broken. But <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Paul-Ryan-War-on-Poverty-Housing-2014.pdf">I have created a link</a> to the 48 pages on housing programs and that’s what I’ll be referring here and in following posts.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/01/series-a-look-back-at-paul-ryans-critique-on-the-war-on-poverty/">A Look Back At Paul Ryan’s Critique On The War On Poverty</a></p><p>There are at least 20 distinct programs to address housing issues at the federal level that can be grouped as War on Poverty programs. Before taking a look back at <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-ryan-a-new-direction-in-the-war-on-poverty-1390607947">Ryan’s assessment and criticism</a> of the War on Poverty, and its housing elements, it’s worth looking at the origins and history of the war.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/02/series-are-we-using-a-poor-measure-for-poverty/">Are We Using A Poor Measure For Poverty?</a></p><p>One other stop we need to make before we delve into a look back at the War on Poverty and its housing elements at its 50th anniversary is a visit to the fundamental question about definition: what is poverty and how do we measure it. Almost nobody would say, today, that the measure of poverty is adequate. At the very least, the dispute would be between those that say that the definition includes those it shouldn’t and others that say it excludes too many it shouldn’t; is the bar for being poor set too high or too low? The definition of poverty is as set as any medieval church dogma, however, but any reformer must be schooled in that dogma first before proposing changes and reform.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/03/series-ryan-critique-of-poverty-programs-sparked-usual-battle-over-spending/">Ryan Critique Of Poverty Programs Sparked Usual Battle Over Spending</a></p><p>The world was a different place in 2014 when Congressman and recent Vice-Presidential candidate Paul Ryan emerged with his analysis and critique of the War on Poverty and the vast array of programs that emerged from it. What hasn’t seemed to change in the intervening decade is that the discussion over approaches to solving poverty still revolve around a dichotomy between approaches that rely on government programs and interventions and those that lean more on economic growth in the private sector</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/06/series-ryan-found-section-8-more-efficient-than-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit/">Ryan Found Section 8 More Efficient Than The Low Income Housing Tax Credit</a></p><p><em>Note: I have tried to find and remove every instance of the use of the word “program” in association with the Low Income Housing Tax Credit; the truth is, it isn’t a program at all in the usual sense of that word. The annual credit allocation is generated by a formula created in the tax code by congress and there is not a LIHTC office or director. It is an important distinction that should become clear in the following sections.</em></p><p>So far, this series has looked widely at the War On Poverty and Congressman Ryan’s critique of the general approach of the War and calling it a failure. What’s happened in the last decade since that review, especially with housing programs? Although it was created in 1986 as part of tax reform, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is the premier federal housing intervention. As I’ve pointed out before, the credit is extremely complex and difficult to use. First, let’s take a look at what Ryan found in his look at the credit. Then, in the next post, I’ll describe the challenges I faced to just find out answers to simple questions about the LIHTC like what entities have used it over the years, where, and how much has really been spent.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/07/series-low-income-housing-tax-credit-spending-difficult-to-track-measure/">Low Income Housing Tax Credit Spending Difficult To Track, Measure</a></p><p>It all started with a simple question from a colleague: “Last I checked about 70% of Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects were built by for profits. Do you have more up-to-date stats that such housing in recent years is now more than half built by nonprofits?” Hmmm. Good question. The LIHTC, the largest federal housing intervention, is available to both nonprofit and for-profit entities as well as local governments and housing authorities. What’s important for the credit is compliance with the rules and creating housing units that rent lower than the market for a long period of time. When I tried to answer this simple question, what’s the ratio between for-profit and nonprofit sponsors, I discovered that the answer is we just don’t know. And this is true for many elements of the LIHTC program.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/08/series-unwind-the-lihtc-create-tax-benefits-for-builders-and-families/">Unwind The LIHTC, Create Tax Benefits For Builders And Families</a></p><p>There is no doubt that over its 36-year life that the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) has housed many people. But how many? As my last post showed, there are many known unknowns about how and how well the LIHTC has functioned over those years. For example, a common number offered as an answer to the question, “how many units has LIHTC created over its 36 years?” the answer is often something like 29 million. Where does that figure come from? Column V in the LIHTC “database,” a column in the Excel spreadsheet that has 3,000 blanks and 1,500 cells with “0” as the answer. It is a challenge to reform a federal expenditure when no deep evaluation is possible for lack of good data. However, I’d like to close the LIHTC portion of the look back at Paul Ryan’s critique with some ideas for reform.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/09/series-a-brief-history-of-the-section-8-housing-voucher-program/">A Brief History Of The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program</a></p><p>Congressman Paul Ryan’s review of poverty programs at the 50th anniversary of the declaration of the War On Poverty included 20 housing programs, including the Low Income Housing Credit (LIHTC) which was the topic of my last few posts. Next to the LIHTC the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) often called Section 8 is the biggest workhorse in the barn of federal housing subsidies. The 2023 budget for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) includes more than $32 billion for the HCV program which pays for 200,000 vouchers. It’s worth covering the history of the program. Looking back, it’s clear that the effort to use existing rental housing in the market to help people with less money has always suffered from the same problem, finding the right balance between federal and local requirements on both tenant and housing provider and maintaining flexibility and portability of the voucher system.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/10/series-ryans-take-on-huds-section-8-housing-voucher-program/">Ryan’s Take On HUD’s Section 8 Housing Voucher Program</a></p><p>The Section 8 program was the first on Congressman Paul Ryan’s review of housing programs when he took a look at the War On Poverty a decade ago. Section 8 was the biggest federal housing program then and it is now; the program at more than $32 billion dollars is roughly three times bigger than the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. As I posted previously, the Section 8 program emerged out from a realization by the federal government that it would be far more efficient to subsidize households living in privately owned housing — even if that owner is a nonprofit — that to build and operate housing itself. Although Section 8 has housed many over the years, Ryan is critical of it for its failure to improve outcomes like employment and mobility.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/13/series-today-the-section-8-voucher-program-is-missing-opportunities/">Today, The Section 8 Voucher Program Is Missing Opportunities</a></p><p>Fifty years after it began and almost a decade after Congressman Paul Ryan reviewed the program, where is Section 8 today? Started as a program to help people struggling to pay rent but without building and managing housing, the Section 8 program, according to Ryan, was not successful. But that judgement was made largely on Ryan’s assessment that the program didn’t improve other the employment prospects, health, and education of participants. While his assessment that spending on vouchers increased and so did demand seems correct, it’s also true that many people were housed by the program. But why has the program continued to struggle to move people out of poverty and why is the program still so difficult for both housing providers and voucher holders to use. There are three reports that show the challenges the program still faces but also points to opportunities for improvement.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/14/series-the-key-to-tapping-the-promise-of-vouchers-is-trust/">The Key To Tapping The Promise Of Vouchers Is Trust</a></p><p>Now that we’ve looked at the history of the Section 8 program, Congressman Ryan’s critique of the program from a decade ago, and the program’s function today, we can consider ideas about how to improve the program in the future. The idea behind Section 8 — offer people help to pay rent in housing available in the private market — was born out of the recognition that buying land, financing, building, and operating housing is expensive, complicated, and risky. The idea behind the program was to let the private sector do all that, and help people with less money make choices about where they want to live without the government having to build and manage housing. It’s a good idea. But it isn’t working. Let’s look at why and what might come next.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/02/series-continuing-the-review-of-federal-housing-programs/">A Review Of Federal Housing Programs</a></p><p>Last month we looked at former House Speaker Paul Ryan’s critique of the War On Poverty, specifically his take on federal housing programs. The two programs I looked at most closely, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and the Section 8 Voucher program, haven’t evolved much since Ryan’s look; the LIHTC still spends billions of tax payer dollars with little accountability and the voucher program still struggles with unused vouchers. What can we say about the more than a dozen other programs Ryan looked at? Outside of the two biggest programs, can we point to any federal housing program that actually works? Before we look at those, let’s take a quick look at the programs I won’t be covering, and why. Unless otherwise noted or linked, references are to Ryan’s documents on housing programs.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/03/series-the-persistence-of-public-housing/">The Persistence Of Public Housing</a></p><p>It’s a name most people haven’t heard of, but one that resonates over the last almost century of housing policy, Catherine Bauer Wurster. When she wrote Modern Housing in 1934, she was Catherine Bauer, not yet married to San Francisco residential architect William Wurster. Bauer’s life before her book is fascinating enough for a post all by itself. She circulated with the famous and semi-famous writers and thinkers in salons in post-World War I Europe. What she took from those experiences certainly shaped the book and her contributions to the first major federal housing legislation that passed congress in 1937, The Housing Act of 1937 (the Act) or the Wagner–Steagall Act. To understand America’s obsession with and preference for “public” solutions to housing it’s important to start with Bauer, the legislation, and her role in it.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/06/series-private-activity-bonds-and-4-low-income-housing-tax-credits/">Private Activity Bonds And 4% Low Income Housing Tax Credits</a></p><p>Federal housing programs generally fall into one of two categories, those that provide a direct subsidy to people to pay for housing and those that use financial tools to facilitate the building of housing. Among financial tools, the most significant is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). This creature of the tax code monetizes a tax break for investing in affordable housing. But in the poverty programs reviewed by former Congressman Paul Ryan, there also exists an interesting but complex tool — the Private Activity Bond or PAB. The PAB allows local governments to sell tax exempt bonds on behalf of entities building projects that benefit the public, including housing. When paired with tax credits, PABs can be a powerful tool for builders looking to assemble capital for housing projects. But the complexity and costs are high.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/07/series-federal-housing-programs-for-the-elderly-and-disabled/">Federal Housing Programs For The Elderly And Disabled</a></p><p>Next, in our look at federal housing programs reviewed in former Congressman Paul Ryan’s critique of the War On Poverty, we’ll consider four smaller programs that I’ll call the “section” programs. I’ll cover these niched and focused programs in two posts. The programs contain a mix of incentives for housing built for particular populations, and offer both direct capital support and rental assistance.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/08/series-rural-rental-assistance-and-low-interest-incentives/">Rural Rental Assistance And Low Interest Incentives</a></p><p>We’re taking a look at what I call the “section” housing programs as part of former Congressman Paul Ryan’s in-depth examination of federal anti-poverty programs created or associated with the War On Poverty. As in the last post, I’ll offer some background and history, give Ryan’s assessment and make my own, along with some ideas of how these programs might be improved or repurposed.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/09/series-would-the-housing-trust-fund-be-better-spent-on-direct-assistance/">Would The Housing Trust Fund Be Better Spent On Direct Assistance?</a></p><p>Next up in our review of federal housing programs: the Housing Trust Fund (HTF) and the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME). These large programs allocate money for housing and housing programs through state level Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs). We’ll take a look first at the HTF, a program that was created but not yet funded at the time former Congressman Paul Ryan reviewed federal poverty programs as part of his critique of federal poverty programs and the War On Poverty. Then we’ll consider the formula-driven HOME program. Together, the two programs add hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the total federal expenditure on (mostly) new construction projects.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/10/series-home-program-favors-building-over-direct-assistance/">HOME Program Favors Building Over Direct Assistance</a></p><p>Next up in this series reviewing federal housing programs is the “HOME Investment Partnerships Act,” known as the HOME program. The HOME program was created in Title II of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990. Like the Housing Trust Fund, the HOME program seeks “to increase the number of families served with decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing and to expand the long-term supply of affordable housing.”</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/14/series-federal-housing-programs-emphasize-self-determination-but-still-fall-short/">Federal Housing Programs For Native Americans Emphasize Self-Determination But Still Fall Short</a></p><p>In my ongoing review of federal housing programs using former Congressman Paul Ryan’s review of War On Poverty programs, we’ve looked at some smaller housing programs targeted for specific populations. One of the most historically and culturally important of these is the Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG), a formula-based source of funding for housing programs for tribes across the country. Indigenous communities endured a century of extermination, relocation, and ultimately exile to reservations, land held in trust for them by the United States government. These lands represent not only that shameful legacy but also the hope that those lands might allow Native Americans to overcome the adversity many in those communities still face.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/03/15/series-additional-housing-programs/">Some Additional Housing Programs</a></p><p>Finally, I’m going to conclude the series — a look at federal housing programs reviewed 9 years ago by former Congressman Paul Ryan at the 50th anniversary of the War On Poverty initiative. This column addresses what I’ll call, loosely, ancillary housing programs. That term is apt because these programs are not big capital programs but, rather, programs that do a variety of things: i.e., grant flexibility to Public Housing Agencies (PHA) and some, limited flexibility for residents receiving rental assistance; a program that supports planning of subsidized housing; and, finally, a program that supports conversion and preservation of existing affordable housing.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1974ce4f0d3c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/the-war-on-poverty-60-years-later-did-it-improve-housing-1974ce4f0d3c">The War on Poverty 60 Years Later: Did It Improve Housing?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[State & Local Housing Reform: A Catalog of Ideas]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/roger-valdez-on-housing-ideas-for-states-b83d441db360?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 19:20:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-05T15:18:30.449Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>‘Yes-in-my-backyard’ reforms can increase the supply of housing and bring prices down.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uSz2JuuiB_tEBQ6b5nxALg.jpeg" /></figure><p>While there are sometimes genuinely new approaches to solving housing inflation, the best policy is always the simplest one: more housing. This might seem obvious, but too often, “affordable housing” policy involves offering subsidies to purchase or rent the scarce housing that already exists: a formula for yet more housing price inflation.</p><p>Because my writing appears in multiple outlets, this living document is designed to serve as a comprehensive repository of my most useful writing on the topic of how states and localities can increase housing supply. The links lead to the complete post or article addressing the topic in the paragraph.</p><p><a href="https://freopp.org/affordable-housing-in-the-21st-century-8f9921d79ef9">Affordable Housing in the 21st Century</a></p><h4><strong>More housing supply is always the solution</strong></h4><p>Housing inflation is always and everywhere a phenomenon created by a lack of supply combined with rapid increases in demand due to population and job growth. This is the immutable principle that guides the best approach to housing: <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/04/11/series-the-cure-for-rising-housing-prices-is-always-more-housing/?sh=14506d7e27ef">the cure for rising housing prices is always more housing</a>, not more money. This is why I say, “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2018/07/16/we-dont-need-more-affordable-housing-we-need-more-housing-so-it-will-be-affordable/?sh=2130d69c15aa">We don’t need more affordable housing, we need more housing so that it is affordable</a>.”</p><h4>State legislatures can make a difference</h4><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2018/02/28/it-is-time-for-states-to-start-making-local-housing-and-land-use-policy/?sh=286f35494331">It is time for states to start crafting local housing and land use policy</a>. For most of the last 100 years, state governments have typically left housing policy to local governments. Courts have largely deferred to locals as well. But increasingly, state governments are expressing their frustration with local governments. Most haven’t move ahead by leaps and bounds however. When states do get engaged, here are some principles to keep in mind.</p><ul><li>Measure what matters; cost burden isn’t a good planning metric.</li><li>Require local governments to reform local zoning and housing laws.</li><li>When zoning is reformed, don’t include inflationary affordability requirements.</li><li>Condition state funds and LIHTC allocation on measurable reductions in regulations.</li><li>Preempt local governments from passing inclusionary mandates and price controls.</li><li>Simplify and consolidate tenant/landlord laws.</li><li>Base state funding on need (e.g., poverty rates, vacancy rates) rather than political clout or population.</li><li>Allow use of debt for projects that capture value and deliver cost savings.</li></ul><h4>Measure what matters</h4><p>The old rule of thumb that housing should cost no more than 30 percent of gross pre-tax monthly income is arbitrary. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/08/03/a-better-measure-of-housing-affordability/?sh=55d94c293b41">Residual income cost burden</a> — the measure of whether a household has enough money for housing after paying other essential expenses — is a more realistic indicator of affordability. There is too much expectation placed on the rule of thumb, as if the housing price problems in the country would be over if every household sorted perfectly into units of housing that were exactly 30 percent of monthly income. Some people pay more and are fine, some people pay less and still struggle. Along with redefining poverty measures, affordability needs a closer look.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/11/01/cost-burden-should-not-define-housing-policy/?sh=6dfd0dba4799">Measuring housing cost burden — the amount a household pays over the 30 percent threshold — in isolation is no way to plan for the future and should not define housing policy</a>. The Census data that informs cost burden is at best a snapshot in time. The amount above 30 percent might be from housing price increases or loss of a job or changes in wages. And assuming that the number of people paying more than 30 percent means a city should build exactly that many units at huge costs doesn’t follow. Maybe those families need modest help with their rent payments or with day care or other costs. Measures of affordability need to include the full picture of household expenses and income.</p><h4><strong>End traditional zoning</strong></h4><p>There is a cheap and easy way to add more housing supply: <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/07/04/lets-declare-our-independence---from-zoning/?sh=5393bdb820d8">declaring independence from zoning</a>. Since the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_of_Euclid_v._Ambler_Realty_Co."><em>Euclid</em> decision</a>, a Supreme Court decision from hundred years ago, segregation of uses has led to <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/zoning-laws-need-to-go/">segregation of people</a>, pushing them apart from each other with some living in sprawling suburbs and others in dense apartment zones. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/05/16/zoning-is-a-20th-century-solution-to-a-19th-century-problem-lets-end-it/?sh=17e3bb429dfa">That’s why zoning is a 20th century solution to a 19th century problem</a>. Work and life have changed in the last century, and people want to live in dense, walkable neighborhoods that provide easy travel between their jobs, leisure, and home. Building codes that ensure safe housing should be maintained, but zoning laws add unnecessary complexity, and limits on density which can make housing scarce and expensive.</p><h4><strong>When the market fails, use fast, efficient, cash subsidies for housing</strong></h4><p>Subsidies for housing are important when markets fail to provide sufficient options without substitutes. Today, funds to help families with housing follow a long, inefficient, and overly complicated path that doesn’t lead to housing for people who need it now. Worse, those funds usually wind up with government agencies, non-profits, for-profit lawyers, accountants, contractors, and developers. Policymakers should understand that <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/01/28/efficiency-is-compassionate-markets-dont-solve-housing-problems-people-do/?sh=1ccf5c51ec30">efficiency is compassionate and people can solve problems</a> when given the right tools. State and local governments need to reform zoning and land use laws to allow the maximum production of housing. This means solutions <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2018/12/03/smaller-units-mean-more-efficiency-and-affordability-if-local-government-allows-them/?sh=2f53cf1c7209">like smaller apartments</a>, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/09/10/the-share-economy-can-help-lower-housing-prices-if-we-let-it/?sh=46b4395830da">flexible uses</a>, using <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/08/19/modular-can-help-increase-housing-supply-if-we-let-it/?sh=5e44ef074ae7">modular construction components</a>, and building on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/10/10/am-i-dreaming-community-land-trust-model-could-be-part-of-housing-solution/?sh=48d562555a43">community land trusts</a>.</p><p>If all of those fail to provide housing for people who don’t earn enough money to pay rent that covers the costs of financing, construction, and operations, then subsidies make sense. But those subsidies should be fast and easy to get and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/07/06/finally-the-left-is-coming-around-on-cash-for-rent/?sh=6976889f6583">in the form of cash</a>. Reviews of cash-based programs during the COVID pandemic show that providing <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/08/03/cash-for-housing-better-than-more-building-alone/?sh=3c96ce9e3364">cash for housing is better than adding more building alone</a>. The Housing Choice Voucher program — more commonly known as Section 8 — <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/09/series-a-brief-history-of-the-section-8-housing-voucher-program/?sh=7dba7291511f">was devised to act like cash</a>, limiting big capital costs for government like buying land and construction. But today, the program needs reform because its voucher rules stifle <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/13/series-today-the-section-8-voucher-program-is-missing-opportunities/?sh=64fb123d4df7">genuine opportunities to help people</a>.</p><h4><strong>The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit needs reform</strong></h4><p>For almost 40 years, the single largest housing intervention from at federal level is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), a complex scheme that allows private companies and individuals to avoid taxes. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/10/11/non-profit-tax-credit-housing-if-youre-not-mad-youre-not-paying-attention/?sh=5c25dcc12e4e">The program is expensive and hard to use</a>. In 2023 alone, the program will forgo more than $13 billion in federal revenues which will be allocated to state housing finance agencies to build rental housing with rent restrictions. Total development costs per unit are rising to shocking levels, as much as <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/08/02/1-million-for-an-apartment-we-could-get-that/?sh=51c7437850a0">$1 million per unit in California</a>.</p><p>I’ve previously written about the LIHTC’s <a href="https://blog.freopp.org/the-unintended-consequences-of-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit/">unintended consequences</a>, specifically that it ends up subsidizing bad local housing policy. When local governments add regulation, fees, and exactions to the production of market rate housing, prices go up. This creates an artificial “housing crisis” which the LIHTC offsets with a flood of tax credit equity. This is inflationary and inefficient, since the private sector gets the blame for the prices and the answer to the pain for people with less money is expensive LIHTC units with long waiting lists.</p><p>The federal government <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/02/08/series-unwind-the-lihtc-create-tax-benefits-for-builders-and-families/?sh=17c48d837b35">needs to unwind the LIHTC program</a>, making it <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/08/19/what-if-we-simplified-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit-program/?sh=82bf81d5e0be">much easier to use for developers and individuals</a>. For example, a developer could get a tax benefit if she builds a 100-unit apartment building and restricts rents in half the units to 50 percent of Area Median Income. After the building is in service, she can get back the difference between what she charged for rent and what the market would bear every year for 12 years. She could also borrow all that money up front and claim the interest as well. This gives her a capital infusion at the beginning of the project and tax benefits. At the same time, the community gets 50 units of subsidized housing. And individuals could claim a deduction for any rent they pay above 30 percent of their monthly income. While this next best solution is also inflationary, it is nowhere near as inflationary as $1 million dollar apartment units.</p><h4><strong>Eviction, fair housing, and housing as a ‘right’</strong></h4><p>Fortunately, in the United States, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/03/28/there-is-no-eviction-epidemic-just-bad-data-and-poor-reporting/?sh=27d6f6891540">there is no eviction epidemic</a>. When we took a closer look at one city, Cincinnati, we found that <a href="https://www.dispatch.com/story/opinion/columns/guest/2021/06/04/roger-valdez-landlord-feudal-outdated-term-help-paint-housing-providers-villians/7476076002/#:~:text=This%20is%20a%20dangerous%20loss,rental%20units%20in%20the%20city.">less than one percent of 160,000 rental housing units</a> actually experienced a complete eviction. When eviction does happen, it is often necessary and unfortunate — but not economic. Sometimes people behave in unsafe ways. And when it is because a household is struggling, the best intervention is to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/11/03/hud-study-pay-the-rent-today-to-prevent-homelessness-tomorrow/?sh=5c5a792d667f">just pay for that family’s rent</a>! Cash for rent is the fastest, and most efficient and compassionate solution.</p><p>Everyone should have a safe, decent, and reasonably priced place to live. The reality in the United States is that poverty disproportionately affects people of color. That’s why on the 50th anniversary of the passage of the Fair Housing Act, FREOPP argued that <a href="https://freopp.org/freopps-comments-on-the-fair-housing-act-d365d9d155d1">expanding housing supply is a civil rights issue</a>. We said that:</p><blockquote>Funding from the [HUD Community Development Block Grant] program should be exclusively given to local jurisdictions that measure housing issues using established Fair Market Rent and market data to analyze price trends, the impact that regulation has on prices, establish serious efforts to roll back and eliminate regulation that limits supply, and proposes models for subsidy dollars that are not reliant on capital expenditures but investment in reducing poverty and creating improved access to economic opportunity for families.</blockquote><p>The best thing the federal government can do to advance fair housing and eliminate the persistent racial gaps is to demand accountability from local governments and require measurable improvements in supply.</p><p>Some advocates base their policy suggestions on the idea that housing is a right, and should therefor be an entitlement, available to everyone regardless of ability to pay. But <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/05/27/series-1/?sh=5f173b6754ac">housing is not a “right”</a> in the traditional sense of the word. But supposing that if it were, and policymakers endeavored to guarantee 500 square feet of housing to every person in America, someone would have to find land, figure out how to pay for it, build it, and then operate it. With state and local laws being what they are, people who need housing would still face disutility of long waits because of rationing. I’ve said over and over that people expect housing policy to be <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/11/07/housing-solutions-series-fairness-efficiency-and-more-supply/?sh=65e1a2b59b24">fair, efficient, and that there should be more</a>.</p><h4><strong>Homelessness</strong></h4><p>It is too simple to say that housing is fundamentally an economic issue, or a drug issue, or a function of mental illness. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/03/12/homelessness-part-2-the-problems-with-reductionism/?sh=5a379e2b39ef">It is all these things in a complex</a>. The sooner we step away from ideological frameworks and blame, the sooner we can recognize that most <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/04/13/series-unhoused-people-need-more-than-an-apartment-key/?sh=99115a224b43">homeless people need more than just an apartment key</a>. If we allowed market production to achieve its maximum benefit and subsidized households with cash where the market reaches its limits, we could turn resources to provide not just housing, but comprehensive services to support recovery and self-sufficiency. In <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2016/09/27/utahs-strides-on-chronic-homelessness-rely-on-better-definitions-and-data/?sh=e7d70645010f">Salt Lake City</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2016/10/17/massachusetts-tries-a-new-solution-for-chronic-homelessness/?sh=6fbe1a7e28db">Boston</a>, efforts to relieve people living on the street were successful when the problem was carefully defined and resources adequately brought to bear, specifically with intensive case management.</p><p>In Memphis, Tennessee, the answer to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/07/07/tennessee-law-on-encampments-on-public-land-forces-hard-choices/?sh=a6fbabf10a8a">growing encampments on public land </a>was a combination of enforcement with asking the practical question, “Is there any place you’d rather be?” Local leadership realized that many people living outside simply don’t want to live in a congregate shelter and they took this seriously. They responded with more individualized shelter options that warranted the tradeoff of the freedom of living outdoors with the benefits of being safer and healthier. They found that homelessness is, for the most part, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/07/10/tennessee-encampments-this-is-a-solvable-problem/?sh=7f702b333281">a solvable problem</a> with the enough proper resources.</p><p>Where can those resources come from? Value capture works. In Seattle, people who were using fortified alcohol purchased from local convenience stores were getting injured and arrested. <a href="https://www.sightline.org/2009/04/03/housing-first-contributes-to-urban-livability/">A program of “wet housing”</a> was offered; residents could drink in their units. Arrests and emergency visits fell, and so did costs. And eventually many of the residents sought treatment. An instrument called a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/04/07/addressing-chronic-homelessness-using-value-capture/?sh=5d64eed02651">social-impact bond</a> could be used to borrow money to make big interventions and the debt retired from real savings; again, this is efficient and compassionate.</p><h4><strong>Rural housing challenges</strong></h4><p>There is a conundrum in rural communities in America; housing is cheap and rents are low, so there is no incentive to invest in new housing. But people in those areas still need more housing. So, vacancy rates drop down to almost zero, and rural workers and families find themselves in a real bind, facing lower wages and rising housing costs. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2018/03/26/washington-states-housing-funds-arent-reaching-rural-workers-most-in-need/?sh=2e4c905e14bb">But an analysis I completed</a> found that in Washington state, subsidy funds weren’t making it to rural counties. They were consumed by urban areas with restrictive land use and zoning policies. Wealthy, urban counties receive <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/09/06/lihtc-in-washington-state-white-wealthy-and-woke-means-more-money-for-housing/?sh=7ad238b367cd">billions of dollars in LIHTC</a> while poorer areas with housing scarcity get little. Congress should review and consider expanding the <a href="https://medium.com/515%20Rural%20Rental%20Housing%20Program,%20and%20the%20Section%20514%20and%20516">514, 515, 516, and 521 rural rental housing programs, and the 236 program</a> which incentivizes low interest home loans. But more attention is needed to address this ongoing disparity.</p><h4><strong>What not to do: Mandatory inclusionary zoning and rent control</strong></h4><p>Local governments are leaning on market rate developers with demands that they include rent-restricted housing in their developments; if they don’t, the local jurisdiction will extract fees to leverage LIHTC for subsidized housing projects. This is inflationary: the fees get paid by renters in the buildings and is a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/10/01/esta-es-mordidamandatory-inclusionary-zoning-is-bribery/?sh=60e852fc4704">form of enforced bribery</a>. In many cases, laws passed <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/01/12/series-will-a-constitutional-challenge-of-mandatory-inclusionary-zoning-work/?sh=6d898bb47103">might be unconstitutional</a>. In any event, the best thing local governments can do is resist the urge to indulge in these policies , despite their popularity, particularly from groups on the populist left. When feasible, states should <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2023/01/13/series-resist-mandatory-inclusion-in-state-houses-and-change-public-opinion/?sh=64dc1dbe6456">preempt local governments from passing these measures</a>.</p><p>Legislatures should also do what Ohio recently did and preempt rent control. Every single jurisdiction that has rent control has skyrocketing rents. That’s because rent control is inflationary and has a net negative effect on housing supply, harming people who need housing the most: those with less money. At FREOPP, I <a href="https://freopp.org/rent-control-paper-f565f84517c5">published a primer on why rent control doesn’t work</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b83d441db360" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/roger-valdez-on-housing-ideas-for-states-b83d441db360">State &amp; Local Housing Reform: A Catalog of Ideas</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Affordable Housing in the 21st Century]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/affordable-housing-in-the-21st-century-8f9921d79ef9?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f9921d79ef9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[home]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[real-estate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mortgage]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Sep 2022 14:13:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-26T19:14:10.565Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By restoring a market with organic supply and demand, we can reduce the cost of living for tens of millions of Americans.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fHqRed6yOlhXW-CUXlit_Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@efro247?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Eric Froehling</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>By </em><a href="https://freopp.org/the-freopp-brain-trust-roger-valdez-f56803713a07"><em>Roger Valdez</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://freopp.org/the-freopp-scholar-jon-hartley-e0e9666ac942"><em>Jon Hartley</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://freopp.org/the-freopp-founders-avik-roy-53719dfcaf05"><em>Avik Roy</em></a></p><h3>Executive Summary</h3><p>Despite a century of government-led efforts to improve the affordability of American housing, U.S. homeownership rates have barely budged in the last five decades. Four-fifths of Americans making less than $30,000 struggle to afford a home to rent. And Americans’ incomes have dramatically declined in relation to home prices. In 2008, the median after-tax household income was 37 percent of the median home price. In 2022, it was 18 percent.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11079208/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1c546795d1de1a940dddfeae0bb74c82/href">https://medium.com/media/1c546795d1de1a940dddfeae0bb74c82/href</a></iframe><p>The core problems are that federal policy has artificially increased demand for housing by encouraging excessive borrowing. On top of that, many policies at the federal, state, and local levels have artificially constricted the supply of housing. Constrained supply alongside subsidized demand equals higher prices.</p><p>In this paper, we review the history of U.S. housing policy since the 1920s, and offer six key recommendations for increasing the number of Americans who can afford to live in a community that will help them expand opportunities for themselves and their families:</p><ol><li><strong><em>Reform zoning laws to encourage housing supply. </em></strong>Zoning is a 20th century solution to 19th century problems. Localities should relax or eliminate zoning restrictions and other rules that constrict the growth of housing supply. Building codes can keep housing safe and healthy without the complexities and costs of zoning regulations.</li><li><strong><em>Tie federal aid to local governments to reforms that increase supply. </em></strong>The federal government should focus its housing assistance on localities that have done the most to reduce the underlying cost of housing in their jurisdictions.</li><li><strong><em>Migrate away from building subsidized housing and towards Section 8 rental assistance.</em></strong> The federal government should more proactively assist families and move away from publicly funded housing projects and favor more flexible Section 8 housing vouchers that allow people to live close to their families or their workplaces. Publicly funded housing is expensive and reduces social mobility.</li><li><strong><em>Simplify the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program.</em></strong> Make it easier and less costly for developers to expand the supply of housing available to low-income renters.</li><li><strong><em>Reduce the systemic risk caused by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.</em></strong> Today, government agencies like Fannie and Freddie dominate the secondary mortgage market. Because the market assumes that the government-sponsored enterprises will be bailed out by taxpayers, their assumption of mortgage default risk increases housing inflation and decreases the stability of the financial system.</li><li><strong><em>Reexamine the role of the Federal Reserve in creating housing bubbles</em>. </strong>Near-zero interest rates, imposed by the Fed, created an incentive for large financial institutions to buy up residential real estate, increasing prices and decreasing affordability for low- and middle-income homebuyers. They also led to speculative buying by individual investors.</li></ol><p>Ensuring that every American can afford a place to live comes down to two basic principles: increasing supply, and reducing artificial inflators of demand.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The need for shelter is fundamental to the human condition, and to America’s economic aspirations. <a href="https://www.bankrate.com/pdfs/pr/20220330-march-fsp.pdf">One recent survey</a> found that 74 percent of respondents associated homeownership with the American Dream, a higher proportion than those who felt the same way about being able to retire (66%) or having a successful career (60%).</p><p>American policymakers have long sought to expand the ranks of homeowners, and of those who can afford a place to live. “True individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence,” asserted Franklin Roosevelt a 1944 speech proposing a “<a href="https://billofrightsinstitute.org/activities/franklin-roosevelt-second-bill-of-rights-1944">second Bill of Rights</a>” which, he said, should include “the right of every family to a decent home.” In 1965, Lyndon Johnson <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-signing-the-housing-and-urban-development-act">declared</a> that “every family [should have] the shelter and the security, the integrity and the independence, and the dignity and the decency of a proper home.” In a 2003 speech, George W. Bush <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-signing-the-american-dream-downpayment-act">said</a>, “We want more people owning their own home. It is in our national interest that more people own their own home. After all, if you own your own home, you have a vital stake in the future of our country.”</p><p>This bipartisan consensus about the value of homeownership and of subsidizing shelter has led to hundreds of federal, state, and local initiatives, including hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies for rental assistance, housing construction, and mortgages over nearly a century.</p><p>Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the policies we have adopted have worked. In 1965, at the dawn of the Great Society, the share of Americans who owned their own home was 63 percent. In 2022, the share is 66 percent.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11080081/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f56aef2422637a7426f9d160f19dbcbf/href">https://medium.com/media/f56aef2422637a7426f9d160f19dbcbf/href</a></iframe><p>While a dramatic expansion of government involvement in housing policy has been unable to meaningfully increase the share of Americans who own their home, we have seen a substantial increase in the <em>price</em> of U.S. homes. In 1961, the median U.S. household income after taxes of $5,557 represented 32 percent of the median home price of $17,361. In 2020, the median after-tax income of $74,949 represented just 22 percent of the median home price of $337,500. In 2022, the median home price is $440,300.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11079010/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/927c161cd3ef56e9e2f1aade535f522d/href">https://medium.com/media/927c161cd3ef56e9e2f1aade535f522d/href</a></iframe><p>Housing has long been — and continues to be — the single greatest contributor to Americans’ cost of living. For the median U.S. household, housing represents 35 percent of consumer expenditures. For families in the bottom quintile, housing represents 43 percent of consumption: a greater share than food, health care, and clothing <em>combined</em>.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/9482709/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/495de3db1e3974ecfad39603c5dbc575/href">https://medium.com/media/495de3db1e3974ecfad39603c5dbc575/href</a></iframe><p>The past century of government housing policy can be classified into seven categories:</p><ol><li><strong><em>Zoning and permitting. </em></strong>Restrictions on the placement and construction of residential housing, through local ordinances, slowed the growth of new housing construction and housing renovation.</li><li><strong><em>Public housing.</em></strong> Beginning with the New Deal, the federal government began building government-owned and operated apartment buildings to house those who otherwise could not afford it.</li><li><strong><em>Rental assistance. </em></strong>In the 1960s, the federal government significantly increased its efforts to subsidize the cost of renting housing by administering vouchers through local authorities.</li><li><strong><em>Civil rights legislation. </em></strong>The Fair Housing Act, a component of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, barred discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing based on race, religion, and national origin. Provisions barring discrimination on the basis of gender, family status, and disability were later added.</li><li><strong><em>Subsidies for housing construction. </em></strong>Programs like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, or LIHTC, established in 1986, subsidize the construction of housing rented at below-market rates.</li><li><strong><em>Subsidies for borrowing the money to purchase homes. </em></strong>Through various government-sponsored entities, like the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the federal government heavily subsidizes the ability of Americans to borrow money to purchase a home. These subsidies do not take the form of cash payments, but rather by insuring mortgages from the risk of default, thereby incentivizing banks to lend more money at lower interest rates.</li><li><strong><em>Federal interest rate controls. </em></strong>The U.S. Federal Reserve has long had the power to influence the interest rates that drive borrowing throughout the financial system, including in the housing market. These powers expanded after the 2008 financial crisis. Since 2008, the has Fed kept interest rates at historic lows, encouraging real estate borrowing.</li></ol><p>Of these seven categories, five — zoning and permitting, rental assistance, subsidies for housing construction, mortgage subsidies, and federal interest rate controls — have had a significantly inflationary effect on housing prices. Zoning and permitting restrictions make it harder and costlier to build new housing. The Fed’s unusually aggressive low-interest-rate policies since 2008 have driven housing prices to new highs. Fannie and Freddie were <a href="https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/fannie-freddie-and-the-crisis">incentivized to backstop risky mortgages</a>, knowing that taxpayers would eventually be liable for bailing them out. And while helping low-income Americans afford a place to live is a worthy cause, the specific design of federal rental assistance and LIHTC effectively rewarded localities for making their housing markets more expensive.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11082060/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/11e227c6b5725915610647a407ae1aec/href">https://medium.com/media/11e227c6b5725915610647a407ae1aec/href</a></iframe><p>In 2018, according to the <a href="https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/cost-burdens-rise-middle-income-households-most-metros">Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies</a>, nearly half of all renting U.S. households were paying over 30 percent of their income for rent, with one-quarter paying over 50 percent of their income for rent. The burdens were even more severe for those making less than $30,000 per year.</p><p>At a time of high inflation, there are few problems more important to examine than the decline in the affordability of renting and homeownership. In this paper, we examine the past 100 years of U.S. housing policy and identify opportunities for reform.</p><h3>Part I: A Century of U.S. Housing Policy</h3><h4>The birth of zoning</h4><p>Euclid, Ohio, named after the Greek mathematician, is today a suburb of Cleveland on the shores of Lake Erie. <a href="https://www.cityofeuclid.com/history">It was one of the first towns created</a> in what was called the Western Reserve, an area of what would become the state of Ohio owned by the state of Connecticut. Largely agricultural, at the beginning of the 19th century, the city began to grow, increasing in population and interest from railroad investors.</p><p>By the beginning of the 20th century, the notion of growth, outside investors, and the future of the town would come to a head when the city created regulations to limit the development of land owned by the Ambler Real Estate Company to prevent the railroad. Ambler sued, and the resulting legal battle and 1926 Supreme Court decision, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_of_Euclid_v._Ambler_Realty_Co.#:~:text=influenced%20other%20countries.-,Village%20of%20Euclid,Ambler%20Realty%20Co.&amp;text=The%20Court%20held%20that%20the,thus%20it%20was%20not%20unconstitutional."><em>Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.</em></a><em>, </em>forms the basis of <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/365/">today’s local zoning laws</a>.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11110203/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f3c0b2d7bd8023e733bc1db97dadcaa4/href">https://medium.com/media/f3c0b2d7bd8023e733bc1db97dadcaa4/href</a></iframe><h4>Regulating the use of private land and the suburb</h4><p>It might seem surprising that an almost century-old legal decision would still have such a strong effect on urban planning, land use, and ultimately housing policy. But the decision solidified two central ideas, each dependent on the other. First, local governments have the power to decide the use of private land, including how much and where housing can be built. This means that a small group of elected officials can determine the supply of housing in a city, a decision that has a profound effect on price when demand rises. Second, segregation of uses — housing here, industry there, and retail and commercial over there — required a subsidized transportation system.</p><p>One might think of Robert Moses as the father of the suburb, an urban form of two- or three-bedroom houses on big lots linked by “free” public roadways. However, together with government backed mortgages, it was really zoning that enabled post-war Americans to aspire to owning their own home with a mortgage, a job they would drive to in the morning, and drive back to at the end of the day. Importantly, the value created by inflation over time meant that owning a home like this was building wealth. When the family got bigger or older, it could be sold for a profit, money that could be used for a new, bigger home or a home for children.</p><p>Taken together, government control of when and where and how housing was built, along with accessible financing for otherwise out of reach capital construction, formed an economic entitlement system; Americans felt that if they worked and saved, they should be able to buy their own home, ensuring the welfare of themselves and their children. By the latter half of the 20th century, home ownership became associated with American way of life. Politicians campaigned on homeownership as on a par with mom and apple pie, something that every American should aspire to.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11110421/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/65c99d85c46086e4d57378166012693f/href">https://medium.com/media/65c99d85c46086e4d57378166012693f/href</a></iframe><h4>Segregation of use becomes segregation of people</h4><p>It is important to note that with government financing through what was called the Home Owners Loan Corporation, or HOLC, came requirements and risk assessments about what loans would be backed and which would not. The HOLC favored suburban housing and made specific assessments based on race, designating white areas as eligible for loans for housing and Black areas ineligible, setting up <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/027046768600600420">what would be known as “redlining</a>.” Covenants were also established and attached to title in many communities preventing the sale of a home to Black families. These interventions by the federal and local governments were reinforced by zoning which tended to concentrate more dense development in urban cores. The segregation of the use of land became, through zoning, the segregation of people by race.</p><h4>Sprawl, growth management, and planning</h4><p>During the 1970s and 1980s, when awareness and concern about the environmental impacts of increasing population and growth began to rise, so did opposition to what came to be called “sprawl,” a new name for what had generally been called, in a positive way, suburbs. The opposition to sprawl, like so many relationships between advocates in housing, brought together single-family neighbors worried about their investment and environmentalists worried about the impact of new growth on water and air quality.</p><p>Together both groups urged the government to limit when and where housing could be built. But as long as jobs and population were on the rise the problem was where would housing go to meet the need, especially in growing cities. The professional planner began a renaissance in America; the answer to addressing the conflict between new growth and the desire of existing homeowners to preserve the value of their asset would come through planning, especially plans that used zoning.</p><h4>The birth of NIMBYism</h4><p>Without a doubt, the single most important reason that existing homeowners resist the construction of new housing, even miles from their own home, has to do with their worries about the impact of new housing construction on the value of their asset. The pattern is typical. A proposal that would change zoning to allow more housing is set forth, and neighbors angry about the changes show up and make a few common arguments:</p><ol><li>Not being properly informed or included;</li><li>The problems that will be created with parking;</li><li>Impacts on things like tree canopy or views; and</li><li>People who oppose new housing almost always argue they are against it because it is too expensive.</li></ol><p>Occasionally, early in this cycle, concern about asset value will be stated openly, as it is on the website of a group called <a href="https://www.lowdensityoh.org/faqs-1">Low Density Ohio</a> that opposed modest increases in the number of housing units in Cincinnati through changes in zoning: “Single-family homes provide the resident with a greater sense of ownership, and real responsibility to maintain one’s property. With home ownership, you are owning a piece of your, city, state, and nation!”</p><p>Thus, most such proposals fail, largely because people opposed to new housing have time, money, and most importantly, vote. Changes to zoning codes inspire tremendous controversy and local elected officials desiring to avoid that, usually end up favoring the people who have the time and resources to show up and press them not to make changes.</p><h4>The New Deal and the birth of federally backed mortgage finance</h4><p>The massive unemployment of The Great Depression — peaking at nearly 25 percent in 1933 — also resulted in mass mortgage default and foreclosures where a significant number of American households lost their homes.</p><p>In response, in 1938, through various amendments to the National Housing Act, the Federal National Mortgage Association (or Fannie Mae) was established to guarantee mortgages through buying mortgages from depository institutions, principally savings and loan associations, which encouraged more mortgage lending and effectively insured the value of American mortgages by the U.S. government.</p><p>In the aftermath of the Great Depression, when the federal government undertook dramatic reforms to limit foreclosures and stabilize the housing market, the government attempted to overhaul property appraisal practices, establishing in 1933 the Home Owners Loan Corporation.</p><p>The HOLC drew maps for over 200 cities as part of its City Survey Program to document the relative riskiness of lending across neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were classified based on characteristics like housing age and price, as well as on non-housing attributes such as residents’ race, ethnicity, and immigration status. The lowest-rated neighborhoods (which also happened to have large fractions of African-American residents), where borrowers were denied access to credit, were drawn in red — a practice now called “redlining.” Academics like<a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20190414"> Aaronson, Hartley, and Mazumder (2021)</a> have found that the HOLC redlining maps reduced home ownership rates, house values, and rents and increased racial segregation in later decades.</p><h4>The Great Society transforms U.S. housing</h4><p>Federal housing policy was transformed by a series of laws enacted under the “Great Society” initiatives of President Lyndon Johnson. These laws — the Housing Act of 1964, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Housing Act of 1968 — continue to define the federal housing policy landscape today.</p><p>Prior to the Great Society legislative fusillade, federal housing policy had been defined by the Housing Act of 1937, sometimes called the Wagner-Steagall Act, which authorized the federal government to fund public housing built by local government housing agencies. This emphasis on local control enabled many localities to restrict access to public housing for racial minorities, especially in the Jim Crow South, in combination with the “redlining” phenomenon described above.</p><p>Just as consequentially, in order to respond to concerns that public housing would compete with private housing, only the poorest of the poor were eligible for such housing. The end result was that the conditions in New Deal housing projects became as bad as in the slums that President Roosevelt had aimed to wipe out.</p><p>Housing, then as now, was seen as a major driver of economic and social inequality. As immigrants and African Americans moved into large cities before and after World War II, the condition of urban housing also became a factor in racial inequality. In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy had been developing a housing agenda in close collaboration with Robert Weaver, whom Kennedy had appointed to run the U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA). In this role, Weaver became one of the most impactful Black policymakers of the 1960s.</p><p>But Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. Five days later, Johnson — his successor — vowed to preserve and advance Kennedy’s policy priorities, including housing, declaring that “today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to all my fellow Americans, let us continue.” In March of 1964, Johnson went further, calling for “total victory” in a “national war on poverty,” with the goal of enabling every American to afford a decent home. After the 1964 presidential election, Johnson was sent back to the White House with Democratic supermajorities — a 155-seat majority in the House of Representatives, and a 68–32 majority in the Senate — giving him the opportunity to enact this agenda.</p><h4>The debate over rental assistance</h4><p>Influential activists and stakeholders were divided on the White House’s housing agenda. Left-wing activists, building on the New Deal legislative tradition, sought to expand the role of government-owned and operated housing projects. Private sector developers, on the other hand, saw public housing projects as encroaching on their role in building housing that low-income Americans could afford.</p><p>Johnson and Weaver were eager to overcome those divisions by subsidizing private-sector housing, in particular by advancing “rent certificates” that low-income Americans could use to obtain affordable housing. Rent certificates were first proposed in the 1930s by trade associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The National Association of Real Estate Boards, and the National Association of Home Builders, who saw rental assistance as a more economically and socially effective alternative to public housing projects. (It was also clearly in their economic interests to support private-sector-oriented housing assistance, if the clear alternative was public housing projects that would crowd out their own.)</p><p>The left-wing activists, in turn, were hostile to private-sector involvement in housing assistance, and argued that rental assistance would benefit slumlords at the expense of the poor. As African Americans migrated to cities, southern Democrats feared that housing aid would geographically integrate Black Americans into the broader population. And Republicans saw rental assistance as socialistic; then-House minority leader Gerald Ford described one Johnson initiative as a “radical revolutionary rent-subsidy gimmick.”</p><p>Despite all the opposition to rental assistance from both the left and the right, Johnson continued to push for it, and in 1965, Congress narrowly passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, which contained rental assistance provisions, albeit ones that had been watered down by the bill’s congressional skeptics. After the midterm elections of 1966 narrowed Johnson’s majorities, Congress significantly reduced appropriations for rental assistance.</p><p>Congress eventually revived rental assistance under President Richard Nixon, enacting the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which created what is now known as “Section 8” housing assistance, by amending Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937.</p><p>On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. Riots erupted in over 100 U.S. cities. Soon after, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Titles VIII and IX of which comprised the Fair Housing Act, prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing. A second law, the Housing Act of 1968, established subsidies for private developers to build low-income housing.</p><p>In total, the effect of the Great Society legislation was to dramatically expand the federal role in subsidizing housing for low-income Americans, primarily by increasing subsidies for rental assistance. Prior to the Great Society, federal housing assistance for low-income Americans was primarily in the form of subsidizing public housing. Afterwards, the federal government focused increasingly on rental assistance.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/12258882/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2201ab273cc37007f617563e953e19f1/href">https://medium.com/media/2201ab273cc37007f617563e953e19f1/href</a></iframe><h4>Federal housing subsidies today</h4><p>Today, there are over two dozen major federal programs that subsidize housing for low-income and vulnerable populations, amounting to $68 billion in non-COVID housing assistance, aiding 4.3 million households, including 3 million on Section 8 assistance:</p><p><strong><em>Tenant-Based Rental Assistance Program (2021 spending: $25 billion).</em></strong> Tenant-based rental assistance, also known as Tenant-Based Section 8, is the largest federal housing program, enabling low-income households to gain subsidies for private rental housing, after they pay 30 percent of their income for rent. Section 8 vouchers are administered by local Public Housing Authorities.</p><p><strong><em>Project-Based Rental Assistance Program (2021 spending: $14 billion).</em></strong> Project-based rental assistance, also based on Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, works similarly to tenant-based assistance, except for the fact that the subsidies are sent by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) directly to the landlord or property owner. Congress ceased issuing new project-based contracts in 1983, but grandfathered in existing units.</p><p><strong><em>Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (2021 spending: $11 billion).</em></strong> The bipartisan Tax Reform Act of 1986, passed by a Democratic House and a Republican Senate under President Reagan, established the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, or LIHTC, which has become one of the largest federal housing programs.</p><p><strong><em>Public Housing (2021 spending: $4 billion). </em></strong>Under Section 9 of the Housing Act of 1937, the federal government helps to subsidize local government-owned and operated housing. Tenants pay 30 percent of their income to the housing operator, and HUD picks up the rest. HUD also supports capital improvements in public housing projects. Today, approximately 970,000 households live in public housing, managed by 3,300 local housing agencies. <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34591">More than half</a> of public housing tenants are elderly, disabled, or both.</p><p><strong><em>HOME Investment Partnerships Program (2021 spending: $1.5 billion). </em></strong>The HOME program, first authorized under the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, provides block grant funds to states and localities to fund production of new housing units, housing rehabilitation, homeownership assistance, and time-limited rental-based assistance.</p><p><strong><em>Other federal programs ($14 billion).</em></strong> The federal government also subsidizes a smattering of smaller, usually sub-$1 billion-per-year programs, including the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, the Rental Assistance Demonstration, the Housing Counseling Assistance Program, Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly, Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities, the Section 521 Rural Rental Assistance Program, the Section 236 Rental Housing Assistance Program, the Section 236 Rental Assistance Payment Program, the Rent Supplement Program, the Housing Trust Fund, the Private Activity Bond Interest Exclusion, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, the Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity Program, Homeless Assistance Grants, the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS program, Native American Housing Block Grants, Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grants, the Affordable Housing Program, the Section 235 Mortgage Insurance and Assistance Payments for Homeownership Program, and Rural Housing Assistance Grants.</p><h4>The GSEs: Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac</h4><p>The United States remains virtually the only country in the world to have a residential mortgage system where 30-year maturities are the dominant norm, largely thanks to institutional government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).</p><p>The GSEs insure mortgages against borrower default, effectively subsidizing the interest rates with which banks can lend to real estate borrowers. (Banks charge higher interest rates to those with higher default risk, and lower interest rates to those with lower default risk; if GSEs — and thereby taxpayers — are insuring the loans, banks face lower risks of default.) Despite the 30-year fixed rate mortgage norm, most mortgages in the U.S. do not last for 30 years (i.e., they do not reach maturity), as many households move to new homes before 30 years have elapsed, and must pay off their old mortgage loan using the proceeds of their sale. As a result, the average mortgage loan is outstanding for approximately 7 years.</p><p>In 1968, to increase home ownership and the availability of mortgage finance, Fannie Mae — the New Deal creation — was split into two entities: the current version of Fannie Mae and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). In 1970, Congress then established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In 1968 and 1970, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac respectively became public companies by issuing public stock.</p><p>Shortly after Fannie and Freddie became public, the mortgage market was becoming securitized. In the 1970s and 1980s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued their first mortgage-backed securities which enabled mortgage pass-through through mortgage bonds that could hold mortgages diversified by maturity, region and prepayment.</p><p>These actions seemed modest at the time, but over time they came to dominate the way Americans purchase homes — and much more.</p><h4>The mortgage market after the 2008 financial crisis</h4><p>The vast majority of U.S. homebuyers today require a mortgage to finance their home (only ten to 12 percent buy with no debt), and in the 21st century almost all U.S. mortgages are backed by the GSEs.</p><p>The housing crisis of 2008 left a noticeable mark on the U.S. mortgage market. The decline in real estate prices put many overextended households into insolvency and foreclosure, resulting in the insolvency of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were nationalized by the federal government. This put most of the country’s mortgages on the balance sheet of the federal government. In addition, private-label, non-agency mortgage-backed securities almost entirely disappeared, along with various other types of exotic mortgages securities, as exposure to several mortgage derivatives and mortgage-back securities put investment banks like Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy. Other banks became insolvent to the point where they were ultimately sold to larger commercial banks: Merrill Lynch and Countrywide acquired by Bank of America, Wachovia acquired by Wells Fargo, and Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual acquired by J.P. Morgan.</p><p>As the real estate market slowly recovered in the aftermath of the Great Recession, household balance sheets also began to recover and regain lost ground. Meanwhile, a Democratic Congress and President passed and signed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, establishing minimum capital requirements (e.g., the solvency ratio and liquidity coverage ratio) and annual stress testing (D-FAST) for banks. These regulatory actions ultimately reduced leverage significantly on the part of banks and arguably prevented banking crises from happening again when the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted financial markets in 2020.</p><h4>Trends in the price of U.S. housing relative to income</h4><p>Unfortunately, most rental housing price data is proprietary and difficult to find in the public domain. The data used for this analysis was gathered from<a href="https://ipropertymanagement.com/research/average-rent-by-year#average-rent-by-year"> iPropertyM</a>anagement, <a href="https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/">Zumper</a>, <a href="https://willowresearch.com/">Willow</a>, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, commonly referred to as <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/searchresults/?st=housing">FRED</a>. Over the last 20 years, housing prices have tracked steadily upward, rising about an average of five percent year-over-year, with two big exceptions: the period of 2007 through 2011 and in 2021. In the first period, as discussed above, there was a serious housing-related recession and many homes that were purchased with risky mortgages were lost. The burst of demand for housing in 2021 is still something of a mystery, with the pandemic probably playing a role, perhaps encouraging people who were in quarantine to find more space or to relocate.</p><p>For ten out the 20 years from 2000 to 2020, rent inflation outpaced wage inflation. The relationship was uneven, with the biggest gap in 2010, when rent inflation was 2.28 percent and wage inflation was -1.51 percent. This gap was also the result of the recession. Median income in the country increased about nine percent, rising from $61,553 in 2000 to $67,521 in 2020. Even though average rents doubled from $592 to $1,164 during that time, most households were paying, on average, less than the normative 30 percent of gross monthly income on housing.</p><p>So, what accounts for the housing crisis that is so often mentioned in the media, by advocates, and politicians? First, housing prices are distributed unevenly — generally by geography. In Topeka, Kansas, for example, the average household income is about $50,000 and average rents for a one-bedroom apartment are near $600. In 2020, homes sold for about $120,000, well within the range of what might be considered “affordable.” Meanwhile, in Seattle, median income for a household is about $52,000, but average rents for a one-bedroom apartment approach $1,700. That is $300 more than the 30 percent of monthly income generally considered “affordable.”</p><p>Second, averages are deceptive as an indicator of people’s relationship to price. Often, affordable-housing advocates tout a particularly sympathetic job title like teacher, cite the average income of a teacher in the area, then point to the gap between the average rent and those wages. The problem with that, of course, is that some teachers earn more and some less than the average and not all apartments or living arrangements are priced the same. Also, new housing — just like new clothes or a new car — is usually more expensive than existing, older housing. A burst of new housing construction, which ultimately alleviates price pressures on existing housing, can temporarily mean higher average prices.</p><p>Third, affordability is a <em>qualitative</em> relationship to price. That is, whether something is affordable or not depends on how an individual feels or manages to pay for something. A recently graduated college student might be doing well spending half her pay check on housing because she has very few expenses, while a single mom with two kids might be paying 29 percent of her income and still be struggling. If the two women in question were earning the same amount of money and living in the same census tract, the college student would show up as “cost burdened” while the mom would not.</p><p>Finally, people in markets make choices. Even families earning less money might choose to live in a suburb and commute to work because they like the schools. This family might be managing housing costs well, but see big opportunity costs from the commute.</p><p>All of this is not helped by a continual effort to make the problem seem even worse than it is. Every year, the National Low Income Housing Coalition releases a report that shows the gap between some worker’s wages and <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/searchresults/?st=housing">the cost of rent for a two-bedroom apartment</a>. This kind of selective use of data does not help clarify the problem but does adds a sense of panic to the discussion. U.S. Census survey data by itself also does not help. If gaps between wages and housing costs get wider, is it because housing got more expensive or because <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2022/05/05/pulse-survey-is-no-substitute-for-real-accountability-on-bungled-rent-relief/?sh=75eaf02640eb">wages went down</a>?</p><p>“Cost burden” methodology is deeply flawed, taking survey data, extrapolating it to regions, then taking the resulting figures and designating them as the “affordable housing gap.” For example, in Cincinnati, this method has led to the claim that the city needs to build 44,000 units of subsidized housing, a number that is absurd: The entire Metropolitan Statistical Area, and areas encompassing numerous jurisdictions, permitted 64,000 of housing — all typologies, public and private — from 2010 to 2020. Cincinnati has a total of only 300,000 people. Building 44,000 units there would be enormously expensive, take a long time and, in the end, be a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2021/11/01/cost-burden-should-not-define-housing-policy/?sh=91c0a5d4799d">disproportionate use of resources</a>.</p><p>We need <a href="https://freopp.org/the-way-to-solve-rising-housing-prices-is-with-more-housing-bcf090fc3cc4">better measures</a> of housing costs in the United States, ones that take into account other costs that households have to pay, and also whether or not housing permitting and production is keeping up with population growth.</p><h3>Part II: Policy Recommendations</h3><h4>1. Encourage growth in the supply of housing</h4><p>While the Supreme Court’s <em>Euclid </em>decision established a reasonable test for land use — we shouldn’t let the pigs into our parlor — the formulation is no longer adequate for the world we live in. With an economy based in technology not industry, environmental concerns, a global pandemic, and an uncertain future, zoning straitjackets the ability of local economies to respond to growth with more housing quickly. By empowering incumbent property owners with process, arcane rules, and long permitting times, zoning advantages people who are already have homes, rather than making room for new people.</p><p>A growing number of housing advocates are embracing the concept of “yes in my backyard,” or YIMBY, as a framework for reforming single-family zoning mandates and other rules that prevent the growth of multifamily homes and apartments. <a href="https://www.theurbanist.org/2022/06/22/to-meet-housing-and-sustainability-goals-seattle-must-streamline-land-use-code/">Prudent building codes ensure health and safety</a> and are important to maintain. But otherwise, neighborhoods can and should be a diverse mix of density and typology driven by need, more than by aesthetics or the desire of single-family property owners to keep their property values high at the expense of others in the community. Prudent building codes keep buildings safe, whereas zoning mostly drives up costs in a way that segregates people and complicates transportation.</p><h4>2. Tie federal aid to local governments to reforms that increase supply</h4><p>The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution established that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Accordingly, land use and zoning, which impact housing development, construction, and operation are outside of federal control. States generally have devolved almost all land use and zoning authority to city and county governments, with the exception of some environmental statutes that affect land use. Since the <em>Euclid</em> case, most courts have deferred to local land use decisions, affirming the power of local governments to determine when and how housing gets permitted and built. Efforts to challenge these laws on the basis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments — typically called property rights challenges — have mostly failed.</p><p>As a result, over the last century, critical land use and zoning laws have been made in patchwork fashion reflecting highly localized political and economic interests. The federal government’s ability to influence all these localities is limited primarily to tying strings to funding for housing subsidies or other federal funds. Both the Trump and Biden administrations sought to do just that, with little success. The White House recently touted $6 billion in transportation funding it suggested was tied to “location-efficient housing.” But upon closer examination, the new rules are <a href="https://blog.freopp.org/biden-proposal-more-money-supply-not-housing/">incremental in nature</a>.</p><p>What, specifically, could the federal government influence by way of its significant funds and tax credits? It could condition federal housing and transportation assistance to state and local governments on regulatory reforms for efficient land use, such as:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Significantly reducing land use restrictions for new housing. </em></strong>This would include local audits and assessments of permitting times and costs, as well as how those could be reduced to generate savings for consumers.</li><li><strong><em>Preempting Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning (MIZ).</em></strong> States should prohibit their localities from imposing fees on the production of market-rate housing for the purpose of generating fees for non-profit subsidized housing. MIZ policy penalizes the production of market rate housing, boosts costs for consumers, and is inflationary; it is also a kind of “pay to play” scheme <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/10/01/esta-es-mordidamandatory-inclusionary-zoning-is-bribery/?sh=44f309d04704">that is inappropriate</a>.</li><li><strong><em>Preempting rent control. </em></strong>Price controls in housing have the opposite effect as intended — they end up raising prices. To get federal funds, states that allow rent control should roll it back, and those that do not <a href="https://freopp.org/rent-control-paper-f565f84517c5">should prevent local governments from imposing it</a>.</li><li><strong><em>Reducing tenant-landlord laws that increase risk. </em></strong>Regulations that try to tip the scale in favor of consumers end up creating more risk for people renting their private property; the only way to offset these additional risks is by increasing rents. Interventions like banning credit scores, eliminating screening, and banning eviction in the winter all increase risks and costs which end up raising prices or eliminating supply when smaller housing providers can no longer manage the risks.</li><li><strong><em>Reducing land use and building code restrictions.</em></strong> Local jurisdictions should be required to review and eliminate impediments to the kind of innovation that results in lower costs housing. For example, jurisdictions that eliminate rules to allow more backyard cottages, smaller apartments, and more infill development in single-family neighborhoods should be rewarded.</li><li><strong><em>Reducing or eliminating parking requirements in new housing. </em></strong>Parking adds cost to housing, and if consumers want to pay for it, developers will include it. When consumers don’t demand parking, it shouldn’t be required. Currently millions of dollars are wasted building parking that is required but not asked for by consumers, and that means higher housing costs.</li><li><strong><em>Reducing or eliminating public design reviews. </em></strong>Housing production is too important to be governed by boards fretting over fenestration and the color of Hardy panels. No federal funding should flow to any jurisdiction that requires design review for the development of new housing.</li><li><strong><em>Phasing down the reward for local home price inflation.</em></strong> Because Section 8 housing assistance is tied to one’s income relative to the local price of housing, localities that drive up housing prices through supply restrictions end up receiving taxpayer subsidies to do so (because the higher cost of housing is offset by higher Section 8 subsidies). Congress should consider migrating Section 8 assistance to a flatter model, in order to reward low-cost housing markets over high-cost ones.</li></ul><p>Taken together, these kinds of changes would result in more market supply of housing, faster response by housing producers to surges in demand, and ultimately, to more stable prices for consumers. This would mean fewer subsidies would be needed and those subsidies could go further and deeper for those with greater needs.</p><h4>3. Move away from building publicly funded housing to Section 8 rental assistance</h4><p>For the programs and resources that the federal government does directly control, it is worth reconsidering where federal aid is most successful at increasing the number of Americans who can afford to rent or own a home.</p><p>The least inflationary form of housing subsidy is rental assistance: the form of housing aid most meaningfully established by Lyndon Johnson. Rental assistance can be targeted to lower-income households, limiting its inflationary effects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i-eBhd1BzzKYtG4h1K5pww.png" /><figcaption><strong>Socioeconomic segregation hampers social mobility. </strong>Analysis of Facebook data by Raj Chetty and colleagues suggests that low socioeconomic status individuals with friends of above-median socioeconomic status enjoy increased social mobility. (Source: <a href="https://www.socialcapital.org/?dimension=EconomicConnectednessIndividual&amp;dim1=EconomicConnectednessIndividual&amp;dim2=CohesivenessClustering&amp;dim3=CivicEngagementVolunteeringRates&amp;geoLevel=county&amp;selectedId=06037">Opportunity Insights Social Capital Atlas</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Rental assistance, such as Section 8 vouchers, has other significant advantages over public housing projects. First, because rental assistance can be used with any participating landlord, it enables program participants to live closer to their extended families or to their workplaces, in contrast to public housing. Second, rental assistance can be used to live in older housing stock, whereas expanding public housing involves costly new construction. Third, public housing concentrates low-income individuals into an economically segregated community, diminishing their social capital. New research from <a href="https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/social-capital-i-measurement-and-associations-with-economic-mobility/">Raj Chetty</a> and <a href="https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/social-capital-ii-determinants-of-economic-connectedness/">colleagues</a> drives home the value of social networks that include both low- and high-income individuals. Concentrating poverty in public housing denies low-income individuals that opportunity.</p><p>As much as possible, policymakers should consider consolidate federal housing assistance to low-income Americans into Section 8 vouchers, and improve the utility of Section 8 by removing obstacles that disincentivize landlord participation, especially burdensome inspections. Vouchers should work like cash as much as possible, and once a household qualifies, they should be able to <a href="https://freopp.org/reform-make-vouchers-easier-faster-for-housing-providers-and-residents-d102e7ebe15d">use the voucher where that household is currently living and paying rent</a>.</p><p>One way to improve the reliability of the Section 8 program — and many other forms of federal assistance — is to use “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/lifestyle/magazine/biden-should/">stablecoins</a>,” blockchain-based versions of cash pegged to the U.S. dollar, for tenant-landlord transactions. Because stablecoins are traceable on a distributed ledger, the reduced risk of fraud would enable the federal government and local housing authorities to reduce the burdens of a traditional oversight regime.</p><h4>4. Simplify the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program</h4><p>The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, or LIHTC, is a well-intentioned program designed to incentivize developers to build housing that is rented to low-income individuals at below-market rates. If developers’ projects qualify for LIHTC, they receive tax credits which, in theory, enable them to offer the below-market rents.</p><p>Unfortunately, in reality, the LIHTC program is unwieldy and complex, limiting its potential and needlessly increasing the cost of developing LIHTC housing. For example, local governments can require that LIHTC developers pay <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2016/11/29/ideas-for-trump-to-drain-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit-swamp/?sh=33015cf413fb">above-market wages</a> for project workers, driving up project costs and reducing the incentive to build. <a href="http://www.commerce.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/HTF-Reports-Cost-Study-Report-Final.pdf">A study by the State of Washington</a> found that after construction costs, “costs associated with financing, permitting, impact fees and reserve requirements” ate up about nine percent of project budgets and that another four percent of project costs were “related to federal, state, or local government regulations such as prevailing wage, zoning, green building standards, and local government parking and design standards.”</p><p>Policymakers could make LIHTC easier to use for urban infill projects by for-profit developers. For example, credits could be applied to a project in exchange for a 20 percent set-aside of units for people earning less than 60 percent of area median income (AMI). This is a lower threshold of below-market units than is currently specified under LIHTC.</p><h4>5. Reduce the systemic risk caused by Fannie and Freddie</h4><p>The dominant role of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae gained widespread attention during the financial crisis of 2008. And yet, the three federal giants represent 93 percent of the mortgage-backed securities market today. While many believe that the GSEs have helped expand access to homeownership, the evidence suggests that the GSEs, by artificially stimulating housing demand, have also contributed to home price inflation, largely offsetting their ability to increase access to homeownership.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11082247/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7bf0ccaf6f57319ec983f19b0bc9f162/href">https://medium.com/media/7bf0ccaf6f57319ec983f19b0bc9f162/href</a></iframe><p>There have been several failed attempts to re-privatize Fannie and Freddie, most notably during the Trump administration. Policymakers have recognized that government conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac does not mean that taxpayers cannot suffer further losses and that the GSEs are not taking on risk. In fact, any losses that Fannie and Freddie now incur will be directly passed onto the taxpayer.</p><p>One widely perceived pre-condition to the re-privatization of GSEs is imposing capital rules on them as they have maintained fairly high debt levels since the financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank capital rules instituted in 2010, originally meant to limit leverage on the part of financial institutions, did not apply to GSEs but rather only to private banks (with a particular emphasis on global systemically important banks or “G-SIBs”).</p><p>At the outset of the Trump administration, Fannie and Freddie, with $6 trillion of mortgage assets on their combined balance sheets, had the ability to own $1,000 in assets for every dollar of equity on their balance sheets (only holding $6 billion in equity with $6 trillion of liabilities), implying a 0.1 percent capital ratio. By comparison, private U.S. banks have been required to meet standards of an 8 percent capital ratio (even before additional capital buffers).</p><p>The Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA), which since 2008 has overseen GSEs, in 2020 under the leadership of Trump FHFA appointee Mark Calabria<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-30/pdf/2020-11279.pdf"> proposed a GSE capital standard rule</a> that requires a capital ratio of 8 percent for GSEs, as well as a minimum leverage ratio of 2.5 percent and additional buffers. Some (like scholars at the<a href="https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102595/fhfa-capital-rule-is-a-step-backward_0.pdf"> Urban Institute</a>) have criticized the FHFA’s original capital plan for being procyclical and for discouraging the use of Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) securities, which shift the risk of borrower defaults on Freddie and Fannie to private investors (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-23/fannie-freddie-risk-bonds-threaten-big-losses-for-fund-managers">fund managers holding CRTs</a> in fact helped shield taxpayers from losses during the COVID-19 pandemic and related financial crisis).</p><p>The<a href="https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/Rules/Pages/Capital-Planning-and-Stress-Capital-Buffer-Determination--Final-Rule.aspx"> final rule now published in 2022</a> (under Biden FHFA appointee Sandra Thompson) requires GSEs to submit annual capital plans that includes prior notice for certain capital actions, estimates of projected revenues, expenses, losses, reserves, and pro forma capital levels under a range of scenarios, and discussion of planned capital actions, how maintain capital commensurate with the business risks and continue to serve the housing market; and expected changes to the GSE’s business plan that are likely to have a material impact on the GSE’s capital adequacy or liquidity. Overall, certainly is major progress on reducing GSE risk-taking.</p><p>One pathway to the complete re-privatization of the GSEs is the bipartisan Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act (PATH), originally introduced by former Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R., Tex.) in 2013. PATH would move to completely eliminate the role of taxpayers in backstopping the secondary housing finance market, by liquidating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Other, weaker proposals for reform would maintain taxpayer-funded guarantees for GSE mortgages, while ending the existing Treasury net worth sweep of Fannie and Freddie and returning them to private company status and taking them out of federal conservatorship.</p><p>Nonetheless, apart from the FHFA capital rule for GSEs, Congress has made little progress has been made on the re-privatization of GSEs. It is essential for policymakers to consider the systemic risk that necessarily follows from placing taxpayers on the hook for real estate defaults.</p><h4>6. Reexamine the role of the Federal Reserve in creating housing bubbles</h4><p>Policymakers at the U.S. Federal Reserve have long believed that lowering interest rates is beneficial for the housing market. Reduced interest rates, according to this view, make it easier for low-income Americans to borrow the funds needed to own a home. By increasing demand for mortgages, home prices increase, <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2010/low-interest-rates-have-benefits--and-costs">increasing the wealth</a> of those who already own their homes.</p><p>However, over the last decade, home prices have increased substantially in relation to average household after-tax income. The power of low interest rates to increase the incomes of lower- and middle-income households is not clear.</p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/11111585/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d267f7d378bf88367eb4f096af44e3fb/href">https://medium.com/media/d267f7d378bf88367eb4f096af44e3fb/href</a></iframe><p>On the other hand, low interest rates dramatically expand the ability of large financial institutions to borrow more money and use it to purchase housing. In 2021, Ryan Dezember of the <em>Wall Street Journal</em> <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-sell-a-house-these-days-the-buyer-might-be-a-pension-fund-11617544801">described the phenomenon</a> of “yield-chasing investors…snapping up single-family homes, competing with ordinary Americans and driving up prices.” In 2022, the private-equity firm Blackstone <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-puts-finishing-touches-on-record-real-estate-vehicle-11658349652">raised $24 billion</a> to invest in real estate, including rental housing.</p><p>In response to nine percent inflation, the Fed has signaled that it will continue to gradually raise interest rates from the near-zero levels it has maintained since the pandemic, and more broadly, since the 2008 financial crisis. As they do so, they should examine the role that low interest rates play in decreasing the affordability of housing. There are good reasons to believe that the extraordinary policy interventions of the Fed have made it harder for average Americans to afford a new home.</p><h3>Expanded Supply + Organic Demand = Affordable Housing</h3><p>For too long, policymakers have not considered how government-driven restrictions on supply and government-driven expansions of demand have caused housing prices to increase faster than household income. A 21st-century housing agenda should prioritize the opposite goals: phasing out the artificial subsidies for real estate borrowing; increasing the supply of housing; and carefully targeting rental and mortgage assistance to those who most need it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f9921d79ef9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/affordable-housing-in-the-21st-century-8f9921d79ef9">Affordable Housing in the 21st Century</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New Report Highlights Inefficiencies in Federal Housing Programs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/new-report-highlights-inefficiencies-in-federal-housing-programs-1c99f31fef47?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c99f31fef47</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2020 18:19:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-27T18:20:29.879Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The Senate Budget Committee recommends consolidating housing assistance so we can better help those in need.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2VpU5KvxeXv8BYGtLLQ_lQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The now-demolished Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, Mo. (Photo: Wikimedia)</figcaption></figure><p>Last week the United States Senate’s Budget Committee, chaired by Sen. Mike Enzi (R., Wyo.), released a report called <a href="https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Housing%20Report.pdf">Housing Programs: Under One Roof</a>. The report took a blue sky approach to housing programs run by the federal government: if you could start all over again, would you build the system we have now? The answer was “no.” The existing system of housing subsidies has lots of overlap and inefficiencies.</p><p>For example, federal subsidies send money to pay for construction of housing projects, fund subsidies for rent in those projects, and then also offer subsidies to people hunting for housing in the market in the form of vouchers. We’ve proposed ideas for how to reform the tenant voucher system:<a href="https://freopp.org/reform-make-vouchers-easier-faster-for-housing-providers-and-residents-d102e7ebe15d"> just give people cash to help pay the rent where they’re living now</a>. But taken together, there is lots of money but little focus and people who need housing solutions still can’t find them from federal programs easily.</p><p>I’ve posted at <em>Forbes</em> about the report and its findings. In the end, requiring local governments to regulatory overreach that lead to high development costs would help consumers in the market find housing they need whether it is market rate housing or subsidized.</p><blockquote>These two problems — excessive regulation and high costs — are related; reducing regulation would reduce costs across the sector, meaning market prices would fall and so would demand for subsidies. Cheaper housing would mean being able to take existing resources and provide more comprehensive support for people with the greatest needs.</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2020/10/26/senator-enzi-put-housing-programs-under-one-roof/#54b2585b76fd">You can read the full post at <em>Forbes</em></a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c99f31fef47" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/new-report-highlights-inefficiencies-in-federal-housing-programs-1c99f31fef47">New Report Highlights Inefficiencies in Federal Housing Programs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Chicago’s COVID Eviction Ban Made One Woman Homeless]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/the-real-human-impact-of-eviction-bans-d0fa47a505fc?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d0fa47a505fc</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2020 18:29:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-25T21:26:58.718Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Katrina Bilella lost a job and a home, thanks to coronavirus lockdowns and eviction bans.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Iy7Kb10CiHDPf8ZZ4z9RHw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo: Katrina Bilella</figcaption></figure><p>What happens when you move for a new job, rent out your condominium, and then a global pandemic strikes? Then the government imposes lockdowns that cause you lose your job, and your tenants lose theirs, and government imposes a ban on eviction? This story has played out all across the country.</p><p>But Katrina Bilella lived this story out in vivid terms. She didn’t do anything wrong, getting a new job in a different city and renting out her condominum in Chicago to cover the mortgage. The people who rented from her lost their jobs because Covid-19 shutdowns, then so did Bilella.</p><p>Now Bilella wanted to move back to her own apartment in Chicago, but not only had the couple she rented it to had stopped paying rent, but they refused to move. Bilella herself was now homeless.</p><p>Why didn’t government think through the consequences of shutting down the economy? And why were eviction bans the answer rather than fast relief to cover rent?</p><p>You can read about <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2020/10/05/the-real-human-toll-of-covid-19-eviction-bans/#57ecd7d010f2">Katrina Bilella’s story at <em>Forbes</em></a> where I write about the chain of events that led to her being without a place to live and more about the broader impact on the housing economy of ill advised eviction bans combined with no rent relief or programs that are too byzantine and arbitrary to help.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d0fa47a505fc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/the-real-human-impact-of-eviction-bans-d0fa47a505fc">How Chicago’s COVID Eviction Ban Made One Woman Homeless</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Rent Control Makes Housing Less Affordable]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/rent-control-paper-f565f84517c5?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f565f84517c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rent-control]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing-prices]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2020 18:03:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-17T02:39:13.199Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Market-based rents will increase housing supply, improving quality, expanding choice, and lowering costs.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9t7jwT8axUQuWdoH" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@4dgraphic?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Alexander Dummer</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Executive Summary</strong></h4><p>COVID-19 related job loss—and the resulting loss of income for many people—has spurred state and local governments bring back an old policy solution: the imposition of eviction bans and rent controls.</p><p>From a political standpoint, it’s not surprising. Price controls can be both popular and widely accepted in a crisis. However, what starts as a short-term intervention can become a medium-term expectation—and then a permanent, ossified mandate—with entrenched special-interest constituencies. Now, more than ever, we need to carefully consider how to make housing more affordable.</p><p>When people in the United States talk about the crisis in affordable housing, they’re really talking about the <em>price</em> of housing. That is to say, housing is too expensive for people who earn less money.</p><p>If we want every American to be able to afford a safe and healthy place to live, we need to understand why we haven’t gotten there yet. Barriers to the market for people who need housing — and high production costs that restrict supply— have led to higher housing prices.</p><p>The evidence is clear: enabling the private sector to produce as much housing in as many places as possible creates both more competition and innovation. That competition and innovation, in turn, improves quality, expands choice, and lowers costs.</p><p>To relieve housing insecurity for people with less money, we need to <em>expand the supply</em> of housing: more housing of all kinds in all neighborhoods for people of all levels of income.</p><blockquote>The evidence is clear: enabling the private sector to produce as much housing in as many places as possible creates both more competition and innovation. That competition and innovation, in turn, improves quality, expands choice, and lowers costs.</blockquote><h4>Introduction</h4><p>As local governments in growing metropolitan areas increase rules and regulations that limit housing production, <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191025005071/en/2019-USC-Casden-Real-Estate-Economics-Forecast">housing prices increase</a>.¹ Among the responses these local governments consider is controlling housing prices by legislative fiat. Rent control policies promise consumers frustrated with rising prices an end to inflation.</p><p>Central to this promise of rent control is the assertion that supply of housing has no effect on or relationship with its price; rent control advocates <a href="https://sawant.seattle.gov/rent-control-faq-2/">reject the basic economic principle</a> that price is a quantitative measure of supply and demand.² Instead these advocates view price arbitrarily set by people who develop and manage rental property.³ Rent control is a form of price control that attempts to solve inflation through legislation rather than increases in production.</p><h4>What is housing inflation?</h4><p>“Inflation is caused by too much money chasing after too few goods.” This <a href="https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/my-favorite-milton-friedman-quotes/">definition</a> is a good and efficient one. But for most people, inflation is simpler still: “Prices that are too high.” When it comes to housing, we could revise the definition to: “Housing inflation is caused by too many people chasing too few units of housing.” When five people want an apartment, and each makes an offer of tenancy, the person who can bid up the monthly rent will eventually “win” that apartment. People with less money will walk away and be forced to try again.</p><p>Stiff competition for rental housing between people who need it happens when demand outpaces production. When such a state exists, average prices rise as potential and existing tenants have to compete with each other for a scarce resource, housing. As demand for housing rises, more and more people who earn less money are “priced out.” This is how housing inflation works in growing cities, favoring people who earn more over those who earn less.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qb02qopW_8YhXm-uR1zA9A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*fRJ9hE9tHULtJGFutt3lfg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*adwuCZAI_Sr3jfhaOhHaLQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>The three Ps of housing inflation: population, permits, and price.</strong> There is a strong correlation between increases in demand from rising population, slow permitting, and housing prices. Housing inflation could be stemmed with increases in production that would follow from reducing barriers to the market which would also relieve pressures on local public budgets for more housing subsidies. (Sources: Compass; Bay Area News Group)</figcaption></figure><h4>A history of price controls</h4><p>A rational and reasonable person considering inflation and its obvious impacts on people with less money might conclude that the government should simply set or control prices, limiting the amount that sellers could ask. This idea has been around as long as people have. <a href="http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._8%3B_May_2011/14.pdf">Hammurabi’s Code</a> (c. 1792 — c. 1750 BCE), one of the earliest known legal documents, literally written in stone, had <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp">very specific price controls</a> (law 272,“If any one hire a cart alone, he shall pay forty ka of corn per day).</p><p>About 2,000 years later, the Roman Emperor issued an “<a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583&amp;context=clr">Edict on Maximum Prices</a>” which set very specific prices (best quality olive oil 30 cents) for goods and services to stop the “avarice that swells and grows with fierce flame” among merchants. What was the penalty for violating the edict? Death! But it was universally violated.</p><p>As recently as the 1970s the United States attempted a series of price and wage controls to tame rising prices. Like all the efforts before, <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2007-06-07-0706061080-story.html">the controls failed</a>, creating widespread shortages of basic items and food.</p><p>So why do politicians keep proposing orders and laws to halt prices by fiat? It’s good politics and it seems to provide the fastest and most compassionate solution. However, the evidence from the last 4,000 years shows us that efforts to control prices have the opposite effect: they discourage production, cause hoarding, and result in rationing of goods.</p><p>Most importantly, price controls don’t stop rising prices since scarce items still command high prices in uncontrolled black markets, and when those items do become available at the set price, their limited supply means that few people will ever get the item at lower cost.</p><h4>The history of rent control</h4><p>An older but still very useful history of rent control by John W. Willis, <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583&amp;context=clr"><em>Short History of Rent Control Laws</em></a>, shows that rent control is as old as other price controls or at least as old as the Roman Empire. Willis makes the case that throughout history war and disaster played a role in housing inflation that led to governments attempting to control housing prices. Often this was due to loss of income by tenants resulting in an inability to pay, but in every case looked at by Willis across Europe and Asia, it was scarcity of housing and the inelasticity of housing that drives the disequilibrium between supply and demand.</p><blockquote>Rent is an inflexible charge. If it goes up, the tenant has little choice but to pay more or to move to a less expensive lodging, and in times of housing shortages the latter alternative is an illusory one.</blockquote><p>And for landlords facing rent control the complaint then was familiar as the one we hear today.</p><blockquote>About all he can do is refuse to build new housing. Some invasion of the rights of the landlord is of course implicit in the idea of rent control.</blockquote><p>Willis also points out that, “If the history of rent control teaches any lesson, it is that once such controls have been imposed, they are difficult to remove.” Willis mentions Austria’s imposition of rent controls before World War II which through republican, authoritarian, and Nazi periods, that only ended when the national government “permanently assumed the responsibility for providing housing.</p><p>In the United States, rent control has always been controversial. As far back as the onset of World War II, when the federal government considered rent control, the National Defense Advisory Commission saw the relationship between low supply and high prices and recommended that controls only “be resorted to only when new construction is not sufficiently rapid and extensive to meet the need and where local communities can find no other means to check a disastrous rise in rents.”</p><p>Willis ends his history with an outline of arguments leveled at rent control up to the post war period, some valid in his view, and others “claptrap” and “spurious.” Those arguments are very similar to the ones we hear today. Rent control,</p><ul><li><strong><em>Stifles new construction.</em></strong> Controls create uncertainty about whether the costs of new construction will create enough return to recoup the costs of construction and operations.</li><li><strong><em>Drives existing housing off the rental market.</em></strong> Controls do this for the same reasons they stifle production. When revenues are low, and costs to operate rentals get too high, owners covert units into a use other than rental housing.</li><li><strong><em>Leads to large public housing programs.</em></strong> This warrants <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2017/03/06/in-defense-of-more-housing/#3d9c1c786474">further discussion</a>, but even in 1950 there was a sense that once rents are controlled, private business leaves the housing economy, and a situation like post-war Austria will arise: state ownership and management of all housing.</li><li><strong><em>Hoarding.</em></strong> “Tenants therefore continue to occupy apartments larger than they need after their families have decreased in number; this results in a form of hoarding of space.” Willis goes on to say that the criticism is that, while rent and eviction control may benefit those who have a place to live, it is of less assistance and may even be a hindrance, for the reasons just stated, to those who do not<strong>.” </strong>When tenants, rationally, don’t want to give up a controlled unit, supply is again suppressed and those with no place to go suffer.</li><li><strong><em>Represents a taking or theft of private property.</em></strong> Willis calls this a “specious” argument citing its makers as suggesting that since it results in a tenant living in his property without consent, rent control violates the basic notion that “thou shalt not steal.” We’ll see later, though, that takings law has evolved beyond this.</li><li><strong><em>Violates the bedrock legal principles of a contract.</em></strong> Willis, in his footnotes cites an important case at the time, one that went against landlords, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/256/135/"><em>Block v. Hirsh</em></a>. The dissent in the case written by Justice McKenna is one that articulates both the problem of taking property without due process and contract. As to taking, citing the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, McKenna found that at other times of economic distress, government “did not induce the relaxation of constitutional requirements nor the exercise of arbitrary power.”</li></ul><p>McKenna writes that the “Rent Law” from Washington DC being considered by the court in <em>Block</em>, “is contrary to every conception of leases that the world has ever entertained, and of the reciprocal rights and obligations of lessor and lessee.” The idea of a lease is that when it is over or violated, the contract is over. Rent control upends the ability of a lease to reflect a set of terms that if broken mean an end to tenancy. One party, the private owner of a rental unit, can no longer set the terms of the use of his property in a lease.</p><p>Throughout its long history, like all price controls, rent control has created controversy and mixed results. At times of great upheaval, when people have little or no money, housing has been destroyed, or suddenly demand has surged and supply of housing has not been able to keep up, prices rise and calls for rent control rise with them. The arguments and evidence against rent control and the frustration with housing inflation that spur the calls for it, have not changed over the intervening decade since Willis wrote his history.</p><h4>Why rent control is not a good housing policy</h4><p>First, if rent control was simply a dispute among economists there would be no question that rent control is a bad idea. One <a href="https://econjwatch.org/File+download/238/2009-01-jenkins-reach_concl.pdf?mimetype=pdf">survey of the economic studies</a> found that, “on the whole [it] may be fairly said to show that rent control is bad.” But rent control isn’t about economics, but about politics.</p><p>One doesn’t have to embrace the price system as described, for example, by Friedrich Hayek in <a href="https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/hayek-use-knowledge-society.pdf"><em>The Use of Knowledge in Society</em></a>, to agree with the idea that while sellers set an asking price, the final determination of price is established by interactions between buyers and sellers in a market.</p><p>However, the democratization of prices is an irresistible siren call for politicians and activists; who wouldn’t support the notion that what we pay for essentials shouldn’t be determined by the vagaries of a “free market,” but by a simple and direct vote, a consensus enforced by government. “How much is that gallon of milk?” someone asks. “It’s $1.89,” someone answers. “Why?” And the answer is, “Because we say so!”</p><p>Advocates of rent control attribute the asymmetrical power relationship between landlord and tenant favoring the landlord not the fact that housing supply is low, and the tenant has no other choice but to pay higher rent, but to the landlord’s greed. Landlords set prices based on how much they want to earn.</p><p>Worse, rent control advocates would say, landlords use price to decide what kind of person they want to live in their property; price can be used to discriminate against people because of their race or other characteristics. Taking away the ability of landlords and tenants to negotiate price puts the control of price to broader community consensus, protecting the consumer and ensuring fairness of the distribution of housing to those who need it at a price they can afford, regardless of class, race, or characteristics.</p><p>So the following discussion, a digest of what makes rent control a bad policy won’t persuade activists whose battle is in the streets and in the footnotes of empirical studies on housing economics, where they always <a href="https://www.housinghumanright.org/stanford-study-san-francisco-rent-control-flawed-and-misleading/">dispute the data</a>. However, it is important to establish that rent control does not accomplish the goals it sets out to achieve — better outcomes for people with less money — but it also creates more problems for people with less money who are in need of housing.</p><p>For this review, I am drawing on a <a href="https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf">survey of studies</a> completed by Lisa Sturtevant of the National Multifamily Housing Council’s Research Foundation. Sturtevant gathered and reviewed empirical studies conducted since 1972 conducted on rent control in the United States.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3169093%2Fembed&amp;display_name=Flourish&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3169093%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=flourish" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/497fbac3e224d1f35c894918ab9c2b89/href">https://medium.com/media/497fbac3e224d1f35c894918ab9c2b89/href</a></iframe><p>I’ve reviewed the primary sources and will cite some of them in the discussion below.</p><h4>Rent control reduces supply of existing rental housing</h4><p>Once a rent control ordinance is implemented the ability of a property owner to set prices to cover costs of operation, to maintain cash flow, and to pay taxes is impacted. This creates <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094119006000635">an incentive </a>to shift residential rental property to other uses that aren’t regulated. In <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181289">San Francisco</a>, “landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supplies by 15% by selling to owner-occupants and redeveloping buildings.”</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3041424%2Fembed&amp;display_name=Flourish&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3041424%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fpublished_thumbnails%2Fvisualisation%2F3041424%2Fb64aafa3cba87adb.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=flourish" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d0efecc3bcd51202d0bb0e68c9ce6520/href">https://medium.com/media/d0efecc3bcd51202d0bb0e68c9ce6520/href</a></iframe><p>And since “rent control incentivized landlords to substitute away from an older rental housing stock towards new construction rentals and owner-occupied condos,” the new units were much more expensive than older ones, eliminating housing options for people with less money.</p><h4>Increased prices for housing after rent control</h4><p>Once <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v75y1993i4p727-31.html">rent control is applied</a>, “excess demand caused by the controls spills over into the uncontrolled sector and increases rents,” in New York that meant rents went up as much as 25 percent. Once a unit is rent controlled, it is no longer on the market and thus people who would have been able to rent that unit before for more money must find other options. That demand then flows toward new construction or other units without rent control.</p><p>Additionally, worry about expansion of rent control incentivizes managers of rental property to more aggressively price their product. Rents usually are jagged in their rise and fall, and property managers worry about not being able to keep up with expenses and not being competitive, so pricing often reflects costs and demands. Worry about future limits encourages making increases sooner. Something like this is <a href="https://kval.com/news/local/rising-costs-felt-by-renters-in-oregon-following-passed-rent-control-bill">occurring now in Oregon</a>, where after statewide rent control passed, rents “skyrocketed.”</p><h4>Benefits of rent control accrue to the wealthy</h4><p>Because rent control ordinances do not means test residents, the benefits of lower rents often accrue to people that either earn more money or who earn more money over time. Additionally, the benefit of having rent lower than market rent may or may not help people that supporters intended to help. In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00153704">study of New York rent control</a> in the 1960s, found that the “benefits were higher for older tenants, richer tenants, and white tenants than for their counterparts,” and “the cost to landlords exceeded the benefits to tenants by about 75 percent.”</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3041251%2Fembed&amp;display_name=Flourish&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3041251%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fpublished_thumbnails%2Fvisualisation%2F3041251%2Fb1700093df67ab16.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=flourish" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d8ddfcfe45a4f0571de31526aaf02182/href">https://medium.com/media/d8ddfcfe45a4f0571de31526aaf02182/href</a></iframe><p>Even when apartments are price controlled, if they aren’t abundant, and one can’t pay more for them, then people must wait in line for them. Bread lines in the Soviet Union were symbolic of the fact that bread was cheap, but there wasn’t any bread to be had. Because of this, people with plenty of money to spend end up in rent-controlled apartments they won’t leave. One <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w6220">study of New York’s rent control scheme</a> found that, “20 percent of the apartments are in the wrong hands.” People with less money to spend can’t leave their location, and people with more money subsidize their lives with lower housing costs. In both cases, important utility is given up to hang on to a unit because all other housing costs are rising.</p><h4>Reduction of mobility due to hoarding</h4><p>This brings us to the next related problem, that of hoarding of the benefit once it is gotten. While landlords are incentivized by rent control to take their property off the market, tenants are similarly incentivized to keep their apartment to themselves by not moving. One interesting <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejuecon/v_3a58_3ay_3a2005_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a421-436.htm">study</a> was able to quantify this by looking at commute times: “The most restrictive [rent control] ordinances have the strongest effect on commute times.”</p><p>This isn’t surprising, but confirms other studies that found households, once paying below market rent, wouldn’t change their address even when other things in their life changed. The <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181289">Stanford study</a>, which looked at a period beginning in 1993, found that “tenants who receive rent control protections are persistently more likely to remain at their 1993 address relative to the control group.”</p><h4>Rent control leads to deferred maintenance and quality decline</h4><p>The problem with rents that don’t reflect anything other than an arbitrary determination by a government board extends to cost management. In New York, landlords are suing the Rent Governance Board (RBG) in part because rent control does not allow properties to keep up with costs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cKbrQukSYXARZfLSQ8r_iw.png" /><figcaption><strong>In New York City, landlords’ costs increased at double the rate of government-permitted rents. </strong>Under New York’s rent control schemes, housing price increases are strictly limited, but cost increases are not. As a result, rental revenues fail to keep up with costs, and there are no other sources of revenue in rental housing to cover costs other than rent. (Source: <a href="https://rsanyc.net/rsa-constitutional-challenge-complaint-07-15-19.pdf">Community Housing Improvement Program v. Rent Guidelines Board</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>This imbalance between costs and the ability to cover them with rent revenue should be obvious. But does it lead to the overall decline in building quality.</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf">Sturtevant’s review</a>, “there is no clear association documented in the empirical research between rent control and building quality.”</p><p>Why is this evidence lacking? One reason mentioned in the literature is the presence of other rules and codes that mandate upkeep. One other possibility not cited in the literature is that, as discussed above, many rent controlled units end up being taken off the market, so the issue never arises. Still, across the country, the ability of rental properties to stay rental properties depends on the ability of managers to cover costs, and the only way to do that is with rent revenue, and if it is locked, the business loses money, incentivizing conversion.</p><blockquote>Because a disproportionate number of poor people are people of color, the negative impacts of rent control are carried by people of color.</blockquote><h4>Coercive and inefficient subsidization</h4><p>For the last 100 years, since the <em>Block</em> case, courts have more or less maintained the precedent that rent control does not constitute a taking by the government of private property without due process. However, the legal case mentioned above is going to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/landlords-challenge-new-yorks-rent-control-law-in-federal-court-11563274921">test that precedent</a>. <a href="https://rsanyc.net/rsa-constitutional-challenge-complaint-07-15-19.pdf">The case</a> argues that rent control is:</p><blockquote>Arbitrary and irrational in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; they effect a physical taking of property in violation of the Constitution’s Takings Clause; and they constitute a regulatory taking of property in violation of the Takings Clause. The Rent Stabilization Laws are therefore facially unconstitutional.</blockquote><p>The study by Ault et al cited earlier, based its assumptions on the difference between controlled units and uncontrolled units and quantified that at 25 percent. In other words, if owners of rent-controlled properties could measure how much they are losing per month, it could be as much as 25 percent, or more.</p><p>As Justice McKenna pointed out (and so does the lawsuit) emergencies and crises, even when clearly established, should not, “induce the relaxation of constitutional requirements nor the exercise of arbitrary power.” That difference between what a unit could command on the market and the one set by, in this case, the Rent Guidelines Board is a model of arbitrariness and inefficiency. Rent control takes value away from a private asset without any process other than legislative fiat, then, as we’ve seen distributes it in a way that does not benefit the people it is supposed to help.</p><h4>There are better solutions</h4><p>Those who believe that price is a social construct manipulated by property owners for their benefit generally embrace price controls not because it is good economics or even good housing policy but because, ironically, it puts the power of price in only a few hands. In contrast, a market sets price when people negotiate, bargain, and innovate. A market disperses power through production and price; when there is scarcity, the seller has an advantage, if there is an abundance, the consumer wins more often. The following are ideas built on the principle of expanding the abundance of housing and choice the only thing that will truly reduce the suffering created by housing scarcity.</p><h4>More housing through regulatory reform</h4><p>“Regulation raises housing rents and values and lowers homeownership rates.” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24832860?seq=1">This statement</a> shouldn’t come as a shock if supply and demand are linked to price. There are three critical variables to consider when substantiating this, population, permits, and price.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/758/1*ndfy-MntPLbE3jVMKspV-Q.png" /><figcaption><strong>Population per permit vs. rent growth (2010–2016).</strong> Appealing cities like Seattle and San Francisco with lots of new jobs tend to attract more people, and as growth pressures increase, existing residents and homeowners resist new development. This disequilibrium between supply and demand pushes housing prices up. (Source: RentHop)</figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.renthop.com/studies/national/heres-why-rents-are-so-high">RentHop study</a> is worth quoting at length.</p><blockquote>Between 2010 and 2016, the counties (and their respective cities) with the highest pop/permit ratios are Sacramento, San Antonio, Riverside, and Fairfax (Washington Metro). Sacramento is especially underbuilt, with over 7.4 people per building permit. Construction in San Antonio, Riverside, and Washington have also not kept pace relative to population, with pop/permit ratios of 6.5, 6.0, 5.2 respectively. Cities in California seem particularly tight in general. While California (the most populous state) has six counties in the largest 30 national counties, all of them are in the top 50th percentile in pop/permit. This might not be very surprising, since California has often been associated with NIMBY behavior.</blockquote><p>While this kind of data is highly localized a review of average price compared with population growth is easy to do and the ratio of permits to people is a worthwhile index and useful predictor of price.</p><p>Local governments control permits and, in the end, control price. When regulations limit permits in the face of rising population growth, prices rise. If we’re concerned about rents, then local government needs to speed up the permitting of new housing by reducing regulation.</p><p>Producers of housing can meet most of the demand in the economies of urban and rural areas if government allows it. Here are some practical ideas of where to start pruning away the overgrowth of housing regulation.</p><ul><li>Encourage more mixed-use multifamily housing</li><li>Allow smaller units with shared kitchens and common areas</li><li>Eliminate design review and restrictions</li><li>Eliminate all height, bulk, and scale limits</li><li>Eliminate redundant and excessive utility requirements (including impact fees)</li><li>No parking minimums or requirements</li><li>Incentivize the speedy processing of permits</li><li>Require annual review of building and land use codes</li><li>Eliminate all rules, restrictions, code requirements not benefiting health or safety</li><li>Require consumer cost impact for all existing and new rules or regulations</li></ul><h4>We already control rents with incentive programs</h4><p>There are already programs that cap rents and are far more efficient than rent control. For example, in Seattle the Multifamily Exemption (MFTE) Programs has created thousands of units with rent restrictions in for-profit market rate buildings. In addition, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program and the voucher program supported by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have created thousands more units with lower rents. <a href="https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2015/05/we-dont-need-rent-control-may-2015">How many?</a></p><blockquote>There are already 36,000 [in Seattle] that are rent restricted, meaning the rents of those units are locked in — controlled if you like — for anywhere from 12 to 40 years. Those 36,000 units, roughly 44 percent of all the units at those levels of income are set by government agencies and covenants; they are a mix of units paid for by government grant, the city’s housing levy, through the city’s Multifamily Tax Exemption (MFTE) program, or vouchers issued by the Seattle Housing Authority.</blockquote><p>If politicians and activists want to control rents in privately managed apartments, then they can pay for that control by becoming an investor. Programs like the MFTE are very efficient because they buy down rent in 20 percent of new units in a new building by freeing the developer of a portion of property tax for 12 years. And this is possible without having to buy land, build, pay for financing, or operations of that building.</p><p>This program could be expanded to include existing construction. Again, the advantage to the taxpayer’s investment is that there is very little risk and very high return on exchanging the deferred tax to create the benefit of lower rent. In addition, this creates the integration of race and class that so many advocates say is needed by including lower income people in market rate apartments. The <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/mfte-levy-efficient-linkage-tax/">MFTE program</a> far outpaces other efforts to create this kind of inclusion.</p><h4>Cash for rent</h4><p>As long as the normative standard for housing costs is 30 percent of gross monthly income, buy down the “cost burden” with direct cash payments for rent rather than building new subsidized housing. Cost burdened households don’t need a unit years from now — they already have one — they’re just paying more than the normative standard today. Most cost burden could be eliminated quickly and efficiently with cash payments.</p><p>We’ve already explored this option, and it is far more efficient and compassionate than building new units of housing.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3169267%2Fembed&amp;display_name=Flourish&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fvisualisation%2F3169267%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.flourish.studio%2Fpublished_thumbnails%2Fvisualisation%2F3169267%2Ff1716cb1159d2f45.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=flourish" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3e30fbe885922a9d1728a5e77d668d4d/href">https://medium.com/media/3e30fbe885922a9d1728a5e77d668d4d/href</a></iframe><p>The savings achieved by buying down “cost burden,” the amount a household pays above 30 percent of their gross monthly income, is enormous. And more importantly, it <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2016/12/12/give-cash-payments-to-families-for-housing/#75203263742d">solves a real problem</a> fast without having to take the risk and expense of buying land, and building, financing, and operating units.</p><h4>Reform and improve the Section 8 voucher program</h4><p>The Housing Choice Voucher program, usually called “Section 8,” is a well-intended program that aims at getting people with less money for housing into market rate apartments. The problem is that the program is complicated and subject to many limitations imposed by local housing authorities and governments. It’s time to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/10/02/hud-beyond-vouchers-and-toward-cash-for-rent/#12d1ed6d6493">move beyond vouchers</a> — something that requires too many strings — and toward cash. There are a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/09/09/what-do-people-struggling-to-pay-rent-need-cash/#68c2566b7a46">growing number of proposals</a> for direct cash benefits as a more efficient and compassionate way of helping people. State and local governments should explore this idea as well.</p><h4>Other Ideas</h4><ul><li><strong><em>End zoning.</em></strong> Zoning is a 20th century solution to a 19th century problem and premised on the notion that separating use is good planning; it isn’t. Allowing many uses — manufacturing, retail, and residential, for example — closer together is more sustainable and efficient that separating uses. Zoning also creates geographic differences in typology that heighten scarcity of housing choices. Zoning also segregates people, limiting their opportunities.</li><li><strong><em>Incentivize density.</em></strong> It is efficient to have more people living on less land and it is more sustainable. Tax incentives should be structured to allow fewer people on more land but with incentives for people who live in greater concentrations.</li><li><strong><em>Encourage impact investing.</em> </strong>People with less money with needs that they can’t meet create costs to the broader community. These costs can be identified and if they can be reduced through intervention, that intervention has a value that can be monetized. Providing low- or no-barrier shelter and housing along with case management and other services is a short-term cost, but if it is effective those <a href="https://www.sightline.org/2009/04/03/housing-first-contributes-to-urban-livability/">costs can be paid back</a>, with interest, when savings to government budgets are realized.</li></ul><h4>Conclusions</h4><p><strong><em>Housing inflation is caused by a lack of housing</em></strong>. The three Ps are critical: Population, Permits, and Price. When local governments overregulate housing, they benefit incumbents by increasing the value of their asset and increase housing prices. This is especially true when population surges because of new jobs and prosperity in a city or region, and is the real cause of “skyrocketing” prices.</p><p><strong><em>Rent control helps few people, and harms many more</em>.</strong> Although people lucky enough to win the rationing game find themselves in a cheap apartment, everyone else bears the burden of even higher prices for housing. The notion that even more complete control of prices will solve this problem is yet untested, but expansion of rent control beyond existing housing to new housing and eliminating options for property owners would ensure more conversion and complicate an already complex regulatory environment.</p><p><strong><em>More housing, not more rules, is the answer</em>.</strong> As long as housing is scarce, tenants will have to compete with each other for housing rather than landlords competing for tenants with lower prices or <a href="https://www.triplemint.com/blog/your-guide-to-rental-concessions-in-new-york-city/">rent concessions</a>.⁴ When vacancy rates are low, and supply is limited, consumers see their money buy less. Allowing builders and developers more freedom to build ameliorates and solves housing price issues.</p><p><strong><em>There are more effective ways to help people</em>. </strong>Programs that invest public resources in offsetting costs of rent restrictions and that get cash into the hands of people who need rent money are the best way to help people. For people who need even more complex services and support, programs that invest private dollars for public benefit offer <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2016/10/17/massachusetts-tries-a-new-solution-for-chronic-homelessness/#1670a16228db">an opportunity</a> to save money and lives.</p><h4>Footnotes</h4><p>¹ For example, in California prices are rising and real estate analysts believe this is due to regulation, “Housing is more affordable in places where land is cheaper and developers face fewer regulatory and legal barriers that, in California, delay construction and drive up legal and consulting fees.”</p><p>² “Let financial speculators and corporate developers determine new construction, let the supply of market-rate rental apartments increase. And at some point, magically, rents will come down and create housing affordability.” <a href="https://sawant.seattle.gov/rent-control-faq-2/">Rent Control FAQ</a>, Seattle City Councilmember Kshama Sawant, April 2019.</p><p>³ “Rent and rent increases are determined by the relative balance of political power between renters and the real estate ruling class.”</p><p>⁴ “A concession is a reduced rent price or comes in the form of a gift that has a certain value. The most common concessions right now are no-fee apartments, one month of free rent, two months of free rent, or amenities like a free gym membership.” <em>Your Guide to Rental</em> <em>Concessions in New York City</em>, Julep, January 8, 2018.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f565f84517c5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/rent-control-paper-f565f84517c5">How Rent Control Makes Housing Less Affordable</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quality, Choice, and Lower Costs: FREOPP’s Approach to Housing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/quality-choice-and-lower-costs-freopps-approach-to-housing-311d1ba51d30?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/311d1ba51d30</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2020 23:03:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-07T23:03:39.017Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When I first read FREOPP’s mission statement, that “All FREOPP research considers the impact of public policies and proposed reforms on those with incomes or wealth below the U.S. median,” I knew there was alignment there with my work in housing. High housing costs hurt people with less money more than anyone else, yet national and local policy has aimed not at increased housing production but subsidies. As a Visiting Fellow, I want to share our approach to housing research and how it fits into the FREOPP mission.</p><p><strong>The FREOPP Approach to Research on Housing</strong></p><p>The Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity bases its housing research on finding out what the impact of public policies and proposed reforms will have on people and families with incomes or wealth below the median in the United States.</p><p><strong>Equal Opportunity for Housing</strong></p><p>In a regular survey of American values, the <a href="https://www.people-press.org/values-questions/q40c/society-should-ensure-all-equal-opportunity-to-succeed/#party">Pew Research Center</a>consistently finds an enormous consensus across party, region, and demographics that everyone in this country “an equal opportunity to succeed.”</p><p>When it comes to housing, we think that means everyone in our country needs a safe, healthy place to live. But barriers to the market for people who need housing and high production costs have led to inflation in the housing market.</p><p>When people in the United States talk about a “housing crisis” or “affordable housing,” they’re really talking about the <em>price</em>of housing: it’s too expensive for people who earn less money. To relieve housing insecurity for people with less money, what is needed is an expansion of the supply of housing: more housing of all kinds in all neighborhoods for people of all levels of income.</p><p><strong>What Would an Equal Opportunity Agenda for Housing Look like?</strong></p><p>The goal of our research is to find the most efficient way to ensure that every American can afford a place to live. The evidence is clear that enabling the private-sector to produce as much housing in as many places as possible creates both more competition and innovation that improves quality, expands choice, and lowers costs.</p><p>When it comes to people with no income, or those who struggle with mental health and addiction, our work is aimed at programs and policies that can reduce harm and providing an efficient path toward recovery and sustainability, and housing is part of that. Public resources should be used to support people who need help achieving sustainability quickly and based on evidence and outcomes.</p><p><strong>Housing as Part of an “Equal Opportunity to Succeed”</strong></p><p>FREOPP’s research work will use historical perspective, data, and narrative to support policies that help communities experiencing the greatest housing challenges to overcome them as soon as possible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=311d1ba51d30" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/quality-choice-and-lower-costs-freopps-approach-to-housing-311d1ba51d30">Quality, Choice, and Lower Costs: FREOPP’s Approach to Housing</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Making Housing Vouchers Easier and Faster for Tenants and Landlords]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/reform-make-vouchers-easier-faster-for-housing-providers-and-residents-d102e7ebe15d?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d102e7ebe15d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equal-opportunity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2020 17:14:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-07T19:13:54.708Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Section 8 reform is a key to helping low-income Americans afford a place to live.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*imqU25Xd6AbC1i3V" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@matthewlejune?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Matthew LeJune</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Housing Choice Voucher Program, often referred to as “Section 8,” is a well-intended and often successful program that provides people with a rent subsidy for available housing in the market without waiting for new construction. Section 8 would benefit from some key reforms to improve and expand its efficiency, and thus its ability to contribute to providing housing to people who need it quickly. However, households are having to wait to qualify for the program, then qualify but can’t find a provider that takes vouchers, and are paying higher rents than they can afford according to the standard. Meanwhile, while holding their voucher, other households are qualified on a waitlist for vouchers.</p><p>Reforms to the program could include:</p><ul><li>Qualify participants on current cost burden, not just income;</li><li>Provide immediate cash assistance to households that qualify in their current housing arrangement;</li><li>End the current inspection requirements; and</li><li>Create an incentive program to repair older, lower rent housing.</li></ul><h4><strong>Long waiting lists</strong></h4><p><a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=70bf96a38b1b34bc390bf139b18bef57&amp;mc=true&amp;node=se24.4.982_11&amp;rgn=div8">The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program</a>, more commonly known as the “Section 8 Program,” is a housing intervention intended to provide a monthly housing subsidy to qualified households who rent housing in private, market rate housing units. While the program has had success in housing people, it is faced with long waiting lists and when people qualify for a voucher, they often can’t find housing in the market because prices are too high even with a voucher.</p><p>A household must qualify for a voucher based on income compared to local Area Median Income (AMI) standards established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and must be able to find a unit that charges Fair Market Rent (FMR).</p><p>For example, in King County Washington, a single person earning 40 percent of the local AMI of $68,880 would be able to pay up to $1,601 in rent. If a qualified resident found a one-bedroom apartment for $1,260 monthly rent, she would qualify for $727.00 in rental assistance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*3bVc16JLlHTRNO71zDmiJA.png" /></figure><p>On their website, the <a href="https://www.kcha.org/about/programs">King County Housing Authority (KCHA</a>) explains how this works:</p><p>“Tenant-based Section 8 vouchers help approximately 11,400 households with low incomes rent homes on the private market. With a voucher, tenants pay at least 28 percent, but generally not more than 40 percent, of their household income for rent and utilities. KCHA pays the difference between the tenant’s portion of the rent and the amount requested by the landlord.”</p><p>So while the example cited is not typical the subsidy can be significant and lower rent costs below the normative standard of 30 percent of income before taxes. In some cases, though, the payment might be higher but still shields the resident from some of the costs above the 30 percent standard.</p><p>Part of the intent of the program is to encourage people of lower incomes to live in areas with higher rent encouraging “geographic choice.” The advantage in terms of cost for the Public Housing Agencies, called PHAs, is a savings on capital costs from construction and operating costs. Does the subsidy seem like a lot? Well, if local governments put their foot on the supply chain with regulation, prices go up and thus, so do subsidies.</p><h4><strong>Many people qualified for assistance can’t get it</strong></h4><p>While many people get assistance, there are also many more who may qualify but simply can’t enter the program because it doesn’t have enough money. The KCHA has almost 2,000 people on a closed waiting list — they are not accepting any new applications. And when people do have vouchers they often can’t find a place to use them because rents are too high; KCHA noted <a href="https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/KingCoFY18Report.pdf">in a 2018 report</a> that it took 240 days of looking to find a unit in 2018.</p><p>And what is the demand beyond the closed waiting list? It isn’t easy to say, but most local governments measure housing price problems based on cost burden using census data. Cost burden is defined as monthly housing costs above the normative standard of 30 percent. A report by the Regional Affordable Housing Task Force suggested that there are 156,000 cost burdened households in King County, not surprisingly the most cost burden is at the lowest levels of income.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/366/1*cqG8i2srxS7JUlFR_d9Afg.png" /></figure><p>In a study of issues on the private provider side of the program, <a href="https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Urban-Landlords-HCV-Program.pdf">a HUD study</a> found that many providers don’t want to participate or find participating a challenge. Taking a voucher might provide a more secure stream of income for smaller, providers with few units and a more hands on approach. But many of these providers who often have the lowest rents and older, less well-maintained buildings are skeptical of the program.</p><p>“We find that most nonparticipants rejected the program not because of a lack of market fit but because of negative experiences with the program. These experiences generally consist of the following dynamics: (1) inspections, (2) a general frustration with the bureaucratic aspects of participation, and (3) a tenant conflict.”[ASAR6] In addition, lease terms are often only 3 months, while most regular leases run as long as 12. The uncertainty of voucher income <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2018/11/19/texas-affordable-housing-vouchers-assistance-blocked/">is a big disincentive for housing providers</a>.</p><h4><strong>Ideas for Section 8 reform</strong></h4><p>Here’s a broad outline of the kinds of reforms that can make Section 9 work better:</p><p><strong><em>Enable cost-burdened households to qualify, not just those with low absolute incomes.</em></strong> Clearly if a household is cost burdened it is paying rent somewhere in a market rate unit of housing. It is grossly inefficient for a family to qualify for the voucher, keep paying a large portion in rent, and then have to find a qualifying unit.</p><p><strong><em>Facilitate direct deposit. </em></strong>Upon establishing cost burden using a recent rent receipt and pay stub, deposit the difference between qualifying Fair Market Rent and the level of subsidy immediately into the households bank account for use in paying current rent; <a href="http://helpmewithrent.com/">This can work on a phone app or online</a>. Along with this change should come at least a 12-month commitment for the subsidy to support longer leases.</p><p><strong><em>End the current inspection regime. </em></strong>The inspection program is discouraging participation, adds time to the process of qualifying willing providers.</p><p><strong><em>Incentivize the repair of older buildings. </em></strong>The HUD study found that most of the willing participants operate housing units on the margins of the rental housing market. Often the lower rents in those units derive from deferred maintenance. The program shouldn’t inspect buildings and then wait for compliance; it should invest in those buildings as an incentive.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>For the program to build on its success — and for many households work their way out of the program — it must focus on providing immediate assistance to the most obvious households in need, those with the highest existing cost burden. Part of this must include some program that uses resources to expand potential qualifying inventory by improving lower cost housing for qualifying households.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d102e7ebe15d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/reform-make-vouchers-easier-faster-for-housing-providers-and-residents-d102e7ebe15d">Making Housing Vouchers Easier and Faster for Tenants and Landlords</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Unintended Consequences of COVID-19 Eviction Bans]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/government-response-to-covid-19-housing-issues-is-uneven-and-counter-productive-465d97e70d5?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/465d97e70d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2020 05:18:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-07T22:22:27.892Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How should government best help those struggling to pay rent?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*H6s4TyAT9Bwya1H0" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@thedotter?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Dimitri Karastelev</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Everyone is trying to keep pace with the hour-by-hour changes in news about the spread of COVID-19. But the quality of government’s response to the crisis — at all levels — has been mixed.</p><p>So-called tenant advocates have even called for rent strikes, rent control, or rent holidays, and some localities have imposed eviction bans on housing providers. But while eviction bans may appear to help tenants, they create a huge income problem for housing providers, ultimately leading to higher rents for those who struggle to afford housing.</p><p>Eviction bans don’t help. In order to get the policy response right, we need to bring providers, residents, and lenders to the table, and develop loans and forbearance to get through the next 90 days.</p><p><em>Author’s note: Almost every day, the government at some level issues a new order related to housing and COVID-19. I’ll update this article with significant changes as they emerge. Also, in subsequent posts this week, I’ll be elaborating on these issues in more detail.</em></p><p>There are so many actions from all levels of government on eviction and COVID-19, and so many changes ongoing with those proposals and new ones every day that it’s difficult to accurately list them all. But <a href="https://www.fool.com/millionacres/real-estate-market/articles/cities-and-states-that-have-paused-evictions-due-to-covid-19/">Million Acres</a> has a good, regularly updated list.</p><p>Here is a more general summary of COVID-related housing policy activity, from the federal level down to the local level.</p><h4><strong>Federal level: No evictions; some forbearance</strong></h4><p>Interestingly, the Federal Government has been the most measured and sane with its directives affecting the program it controls, offering forbearance on loans in exchange for no evictions, and offering increases in subsidies for people who’ve lost income.</p><p><strong><em>Housing choice vouchers and public housing agencies.</em> </strong><a href="https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/COVID19_FAQ_PIH_Final.pdf">Recent communication</a> from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) “encourages [Public Housing Agencies] PHAs and Owners to prevent the displacement of families through eviction which significantly increases the risk of homelessness and overcrowding.”</p><p>Since decreases in income can lead to higher subsidies in both the voucher program and PHA-operated facilities, most people receiving assistance should not have a long term problem, although if their income drops to zero, voucher recipients would not be able to pay the difference between the voucher and Fair Market Rent (FMR). There hasn’t, apparently, been any new guidance on this in the last two weeks.</p><p><strong><em>Mortgages. </em></strong>The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) <a href="https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Suspends-Foreclosures-and-Evictions-for-Enterprise-Backed-Mortgages.aspx">issued a statement about two weeks ago</a> directing “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) to suspend foreclosures and evictions for at least 60 days due to the coronavirus national emergency. The foreclosure and eviction suspension applies to homeowners with an Enterprise-backed single-family mortgage.” This is relevant to single-family residents but also to others who might be renting that housing.</p><p>For multifamily properties with loans from the Enterprises, <a href="https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Moves-to-Provide-Eviction-Suspension-Relief-for-Renters-in-Multifamily-Properties.aspx">the FHFA announced</a> that it “will offer multifamily property owners mortgage forbearance with the condition that they suspend all evictions for renters unable to pay rent due to the impact of coronavirus. The eviction suspensions are in place for the entire duration of time that a property owner remains in forbearance.”</p><h4><strong>State level: Eviction bans; no forbearance</strong></h4><p>States have been rapidly issuing moratoriums and orders prohibiting eviction based on emergency powers.</p><p><strong><em>California. </em></strong>In California, for example, Governor Gavin Newsom initially <a href="https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/03/16/governor-newsom-issues-executive-order-to-protect-renters-and-homeowners-during-covid-19-pandemic/">issued an order</a> allowing local governments to stop evictions and collection of utility payments, and then followed it with <a href="https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/03/27/governor-newsom-takes-executive-action-to-establish-a-statewide-moratorium-on-evictions/">another more prescriptive order</a> “banning the enforcement of eviction orders for renters affected by COVID-19 through May 31, 2020. The order prohibits landlords from evicting tenants for nonpayment of rent and prohibits enforcement of evictions by law enforcement or courts.” Residents have to produce some kind of declaration in writing that their lack of payment is caused by COVID-19 response, although they don’t have to share that with the landlord.</p><p><strong><em>Washington state. </em></strong>In contrast, Washington <a href="https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-19%20-%20COVID-19%20Moratorium%20on%20Evictions%20%28tmp%29.pdf">Governor Jay Inslee’s order</a> doesn’t require any documentation at all but simply bans action on evictions for a 30 day period ending April 17th. His order allows eviction for “nuisance or commission of a crime on the premises.” Neither California nor Washington have sought relief for housing providers who will still have to pay their own mortgages, property taxes, and other costs even while rent revenues drop. California did manage <a href="https://calmatters.org/health/coronavirus/2020/03/california-coronavirus-mortgage-payment-relief/">a voluntary 90 reprieve</a> from some larger banks for single-family mortgages, but not multifamily or commercial mortgages.</p><p><strong><em>Ohio. </em></strong>Ohio has one of the most egregious proposals offered by <a href="http://www.ohiohouse.gov/david-leland">State Representative David Leland</a> and 23 other Democratic legislators, <a href="https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA133-HB-562">House Bill 562</a>, not only bans eviction but stipulates that housing providers “shall not be entitled to rental amounts that went unpaid during the state of emergency.” Again, as in every state I have surveyed, there is no concomitant mandate for mortgage and loan relief for housing providers, nor is there any relief for property taxes.</p><p><strong><em>New Jersey. </em></strong>Finally, there is New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy. New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy threatens his constituents.</p><h3>Governor Phil Murphy on Twitter</h3><p>To every landlord - now is a time to show some compassion, and to work with your renters to ensure they stay safe. You cannot evict anyone at this time. If you try to, we&#39;re not going to take that lightly, and we will make an example out of you for violating the law.</p><p>“We’ll make an example of you,” says Governor Murphy, ignoring the fact that hard-working housing providers in his state are just as much in need of compassion as everyone else being hit by the impact of COVID-19.</p><h4><strong>County level: Efforts extend property tax relief, enforcement confusion</strong></h4><p><strong><em>Property taxes. </em></strong>Counties are often the jurisdiction that collect property taxes and disperse them to the state and other local governments. Because of the loss of income faced by many individuals and businesses, Counties are scrambling to respond. If the tax revenue doesn’t come in, it will harm many local governments that provide services. But for housing providers, if rents don’t come in, paying property taxes will also be difficult if not impossible. Many counties are trying to find ways to delay due dates or defer late charges and interest.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.kcchronicle.com/2020/03/25/kane-county-treasurer-proposes-measure-to-offer-property-tax-relief-during-covid-19-crisis/a12zr2r/">Kane County, Illinois</a>, County Treasurer David Rickert has proposed legislation to waive interest and penalties for late payments if they are received by September 1, 2020. In King County, Washington, Assessor John Wilson <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6811370-Governor-Inslee-First-Half-Property-Tax-Final.html">has asked Governor Inslee</a>, to use his “authority to delay any payments for residential and commercial taxpayers in hardship situations and waive any penalties and interest.” In California, San Luis Obispo County has already initiated such a program, and <a href="https://abc30.com/6043558/">Fresno county is considering the same thing</a>.</p><p><strong><em>Enforcement and the courts. </em></strong>Contrary to what some might think, finalizing an eviction is difficult, requiring a court proceeding, an order, and then follow through by local law enforcement to remove residents if necessary from private property. The COVID-19 response has created a mix of reactions from courts and sheriffs departments, each of which have a fair amount of discretion over when and how to complete eviction orders.</p><p>In North Carolina, the response is mixed. A story <a href="https://www.wbtv.com/2020/03/20/mecklenburg-sheriffs-office-suspends-eviction-enforcement-during-covid-outbreak/">on local television station WBTV</a>, found different reactions ranging from a decision not to carry out any evictions in Mecklenburg County to Gaston County where the sheriff there is executing evictions already ordered. In Washington state, King County Sheriff Mitzi Johanknecht said she was suspending evictions “<a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/king-county-sheriffs-office-wont-serve-enforce-evictions-during-coronavirus-crisis/">until further notice</a>,” and the superior courts there would not be hearing any more eviction cases until the end of March.</p><h4><strong>Cities: Piling on during a crisis</strong></h4><p>As far as cities go, Oakland seems to be leading the way in opportunistic attacks on housing providers with Seattle not far behind. A story in The Mercury News <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/27/coronavirus-oakland-passes-law-that-bans-evictions-freezes-rents-until-may-31/">chronicled the decision</a> by the Oakland City Council to <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/wp-admin/upload.php?item=8106">ban eviction and freeze rents</a> until May 31st with no late fees or penalties for unpaid rent. Rent would still be due when the emergency is passed, but residents don’t have to pay until it’s over (making Ohio Democrats more radical than the Oakland City Council). The Council ignored the pleas of housing providers who explained that they had mortgages and bills to pay as well.</p><p>Not to be outdone, the Seattle City Council is preparing legislation that would extend it’s 60 ban on evictions to <a href="http://seattle.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4399894&amp;GUID=54DE0CF8-CB2B-446A-B20F-46E3E529D3A2&amp;FullText=1">6 months beyond the “end of the emergency,”</a> and require a 12 month no penalty, no fee, and no interest allowance for residents to make a <a href="http://seattle.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4399898&amp;GUID=B3BE0CE9-24E0-42BC-9780-797CA4287B20&amp;FullText=1">payment plan</a> for unpaid rent during the period of emergency and the following 6 months. Keep in mind that Seattle’s winter eviction ban begins in November and runs through the end of January. It seems likely that Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan will extend the emergency beyond the end of April, but even if she doesn’t, the proposal would allow tenants, without even the minimal documentation required by California, to not pay rent without any concern about eviction for 8 months.</p><p>At least Oakland’s legislation, almost as an afterthought, said that Oakland</p><blockquote>Hereby requests and urges banks and financial institutions to suspend mortgage payments, foreclosures, and late fees for low-income homeowners and landlords, with immediate forgiveness, and encourages financial institutions to provide zero-interest emergency unsecured loans and grants to small businesses and non-profits within Oakland that are unable to meet rent, mortgage, or other fixed operating costs.</blockquote><h4><strong>Eviction under COVID-19: What’s the right answer?</strong></h4><p>Oakland, in spite of its overreach, at least got something right. While it is absolutely true that many people will be facing very difficult months ahead without jobs and income, banning eviction won’t solve the problem if they still owe it. And worse, if Ohio Democrats get their way and forgive everyone’s rent, housing providers could be broke and foreclosed. Already, anecdotally, many smaller owners of single-family properties are selling to owner occupiers, a trend that was already well underway.</p><p>What efforts by “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/02/28/housing-is-a-right-means-an-end-to-private-rentals/#2a212afa225e">housing is a human right</a>” activists and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/03/28/there-is-no-eviction-epidemic-just-bad-data-and-poor-reporting/#6e0182d41540">the Eviction Lab</a> sought to accomplish, COVID-19 is completing almost over night: the end of private rental properties. If, that is, we let this current trend continue. My next post will give advice about what providers can and should do as this unfolds. First, housing providers must remember they are not bad people for owning and operating rental property. Next, local governments must take a broader approach, and ask banks and financial institutions to partner with residents, providers, and others to bridge the gap until this crisis subsides.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=465d97e70d5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/government-response-to-covid-19-housing-issues-is-uneven-and-counter-productive-465d97e70d5">The Unintended Consequences of COVID-19 Eviction Bans</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rent Control Helps Few People, and Harms Many More]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/freopp/housing-price-control-popular-but-dangerous-6ece28159166?source=rss-59cb75cc117c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ece28159166</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rent-control]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cost-of-living]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affordable-housing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Valdez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2020 22:07:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-28T18:51:05.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Housing price controls are a dangerous and ineffective temptation.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ba2LSy_KuPAvQ8yO" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jonathanrados?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jonathan Rados</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>As local governments in growing metropolitan areas increase rules and regulations that limit housing production, <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191025005071/en/2019-USC-Casden-Real-Estate-Economics-Forecast">housing prices increase</a>. Among the responses these local governments consider is controlling housing prices by legislative fiat. Rent control policies promise consumers frustrated with rising prices an end to inflation.</p><h4><strong>What is rent control?</strong></h4><p>Central to this promise of rent control is the assertion that supply of housing has no effect on or relationship with its price; rent control advocates reject the basic economic principle <a href="https://sawant.seattle.gov/rent-control-faq-2/">that price is a quantitative measure of supply and demand</a>. Instead these advocates view price arbitrarily set by people who develop and manage rental property. Rent control is a form of price control that attempts to solve inflation through legislation rather than increases in production.</p><h4><strong>What causes housing price inflation?</strong></h4><p><a href="https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/my-favorite-milton-friedman-quotes/">Milton Friedman said</a> that inflation is “caused by too much money chasing after too few goods.” He also said that production is just <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/11/14/housing-inflation-zoning-restrictive-land-use-is-like-printing-more-money/#7052b15b3bdd">a bit player in the drama of inflation</a>. But when it comes to housing inflation, local policies play the same role as a central bank, using land use and housing policy to stoke inflation by both limiting production as demand rises and then urging more taxes for subsidies when prices rise. There is a strong relationship between what I call the three Ps, permits, population, and price. When there are fewer permits issued, prices go up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/383/1*ZuUIYWFH0iHuyMKYE4byOg.png" /><figcaption><strong>When permits decline, and population goes up, so do prices. </strong>(Graphic: <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/08/01/permits-for-new-bay-area-homes-apartments-drop-sharply/">Bay Area News Group</a>; Source: <a href="https://www.ppic.org/blog/new-housing-permits-decline-statewide/">Public Policy Institute of California, 2019</a>.)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Do price controls work?</strong></h4><p>Price controls never achieve the intended outcome, lower prices. From <a href="http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._8%3B_May_2011/14.pdf">Hammurabi’s Code</a> to Emperor Diocletian’s “<a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583&amp;context=clr">Edict on Maximum Prices</a>” to similar efforts during the <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2007-06-07-0706061080-story.html">Nixon administration</a>, price controls lead to limited production, scarcity, and more inflation.</p><h4><strong>Do measures to control rent work?</strong></h4><p>Rent control has the same impact on the housing economy as price controls in other sectors: it creates scarcity, higher prices, and rationing. The following are from a review of <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Rent-Control-Analysis-Ver1-Complete.pdf">numerous studies of rent control over several decades</a>.</p><p>Rent control:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Limits new construction</em>.</strong> Because of uncertainty about whether the costs of new construction will create enough return to recoup the costs of construction and operations.</li><li><strong><em>Causes the loss of existing housing</em></strong>. When revenues are low, and costs to operate rentals get too high, owners covert units into a use other than rental housing.</li><li><strong><em>Leads to hoarding</em></strong>. Residents of rent controlled units, rationally, don’t want to give up a controlled unit, supply is again suppressed and those with no place to go suffer.</li><li><strong><em>Requires rationing</em></strong>. As long as demand exceeds supply, and without price signals, government must allocated limited housing based on its own criteria, meaning that even though prices are low, there is no housing available.</li><li><strong><em>Incentivizes deferred maintainance</em></strong>. Without the ability to adjust prices to recover investment in improvments, buildings decline and the quality of housing suffers.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/719/1*peBhkD64-nUT3sLH5i8u8g.png" /><figcaption>From <em>Community Housing Improvement Program v. Rent Guidelines Board</em>.</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong><em>Leads to coercive subsidization</em></strong>. When rent control measures fail to yield promised relief from scarcity and high prices, governments resort to more and more limits on the use of private property to ensure people with less money get housed. Of course, this exacerbates all of the problems above and leads to the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogervaldez/2019/12/06/seattle-eviction-ban-are-we-headed-to-the-end-of-private-property-rentals/">commandeering of private property for public use</a>.</li></ul><h4><strong>Summary</strong></h4><p>To read the complete analysis of the history of rent control and why it doesn’t offer a solution for rising housing prices, <a href="http://www.seattleforgrowth.org/rent-control-comprehensive-analysis/">see the full document here</a>. Here is the summary:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Rent control isn’t about economics; it is about power</em>.</strong> In a free market, prices aren’t set by one group or committee, but by people trying to meet each other’s needs. Rent control takes that away and puts prices under the control of the government and advocate groups.</li><li><strong><em>Housing inflation is caused by a lack of housing</em></strong>. The three Ps are critical: Population, Permits, and Price. When local governments overregulate housing, they benefit incumbents by increasing the value of their asset and increase housing prices.</li><li><strong><em>Rent control helps few people and harms many more</em></strong>. Although people lucky enough to win the rationing game find themselves in a cheap apartment, everyone else bears the burden of even higher prices for housing.</li><li><strong><em>More housing, not more rules, is the answer</em>.</strong> As long as housing is scarce, tenants will have to compete with each other for housing rather than landlords competing for tenants with lower prices or rent concessions.</li><li><strong><em>There are better, more efficient ways of helping people</em></strong>. Programs that invest public resources in offsetting costs of rent restrictions and that get cash into the hands of people who need rent money are the best way to help people.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ece28159166" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/freopp/housing-price-control-popular-but-dangerous-6ece28159166">Rent Control Helps Few People, and Harms Many More</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/freopp">FREOPP.org</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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