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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ryan Lewis on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ryan Lewis on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ryan Lewis on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[COVID-19 Closes Tuckahoe Schools Indefinitely]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/covid-19-closes-tuckahoe-schools-indefinitely-37306ae13ec2?source=rss-52c87fae2530------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/37306ae13ec2</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryan Lewis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2020 15:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-01T15:53:00.402Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>COVID-19 Closes Tuckahoe Schools Indefinitely</p><p>TUCKAHOE, NY April 1, 2020</p><p>by Margaret Scialonetti</p><p>Tuckahoe schools district Superintendent Joseph Cossaleone announced Wednesday morning that Tuckahoe schools would remain closed for the remainder of the 2019/2020 school year. The announcement follows an extension of the district’s original temporary closures spurred by the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus across the state of New York and Westchester County.</p><p>“It’s not the decision we were hoping for, but we are committed to placing the safety of our children, teachers and staff above all else, and it is the decision we feel is necessary to accomplish that goal,” Cossaleone said in a written statement to Tuckahoe school district staff and students. This decision comes as schools across Westchester County, the state of New York, and the country at large, coming face-to-face with the realities of COVID-19, are increasingly choosing to keep kids home until the fall.</p><p>“The school year will continue on its original timetable. School facilities will remain closed, but instructors will continue to provide self-directed coursework to students online and through external resources,” said Brunella Cheng, a Tuckahoe school district spokeswoman. “Our teachers have been responding to this fluid situation with flexibility and ingenuity and students will not be disadvantaged by this unprecedented turn of events.” Cheng emphasized they importance of parental involvement in their children’s coursework to ensure that children do not fall behind. “We know that many full-time parents are also full-time workers and now, suddenly, full-time school teachers. We commend you and applaud your efforts. Your work in the home with your children over this trying time is essential to their continued growth and education.”</p><p>When asked if Tuckahoe schools will be providing parents with additional instructional resources, Cossaleone confirmed that an emergency $45,000 expense had been authorized to provide Tuckahoe parents with access to online instructional coursework from HomeSchool.org, a non-profit organization offering instructional content for parents in homeschooling their children. The free services are set to commence in mid-April.</p><p>While the school district scrambles to ensure the remainder of the school year goes as smoothly as possible, officials cautioned residents about several potential disruptions.</p><p>Larry Walpole, Director of Facilities for the Tuckahoe School District, cautioned students and parents that Tuckahoe school facilities would undergone a level three decontamination to ensure that all biological agents would be neutralized before allowing students and staff to return. “With the help of the National Guard, we are going classroom by classroom sanitizing our schools to the highest standards prescribed by the National Health Service,” Walpole told reporters Friday morning. Level three decontamination calls for the decontamination of all fixtures, furniture and surfaces, and the destruction of all non-essential, moveable objects. This includes all school supplies, books, papers, crafts, clothing and bags left at the school by students last month. “Unfortunately, it all has to go. These items will gathered and incinerated. We apologize for the severity of these measures, but we are committed to our children’s safety.” School district officials informed parents that local drug stores would be offering additional school supply packs beginning May 1st to allow parents to replace items purchased in the fall.</p><p>School officials also cautioned that attendance and participation on online and self-directed coursework would be closely monitored. “Our Tuckahoe students are the best and the brightest and we have confidence that students and parents will be diligent over this remote education experience,” Cossaleone said. “But we must also hold our students accountable. Students who do not complete their assigned coursework with sufficient attendance or to a satisfactory degree will be required to undertake remedial on-line coursework in the summer months. Students who still fail to meet expectations should not expect to advance to the next grade upon returning to school in the fall, or to graduate, as the case my be.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=37306ae13ec2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/covid-19-closes-tuckahoe-schools-indefinitely-37306ae13ec2">COVID-19 Closes Tuckahoe Schools Indefinitely</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research">Uinta Blockchain Research</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[In re Trulia and Cyan, Inc.: Will Cyan Undo the Progress of Trulia?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ryanlewisglobal/in-re-trulia-v-cyan-inc-will-cyan-undo-the-progress-of-trulia-96236b537f3a?source=rss-52c87fae2530------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/96236b537f3a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[securities-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[litigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryan Lewis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2018 20:28:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-27T21:41:20.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By Ryan Lewis</strong></p><p>Last year the Delaware Court of Chancery handed down a landmark opinion in the fight against abusive class-action merger litigation. Chancellor Bouchard held in <a href="https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=235370"><em>In re Trulia</em></a> that strike suit litigation settlement approvals will have to meet a higher standard to pass muster, with the intended result, which was in fact supported by statistical evidence, that the plaintiff’s bar would stop bringing claims that were clearly frivolous. All in all, I consider <em>Trulia a </em>win, but the Supreme Court of the United States just handed down a ruling earlier this week in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/15-1439_8njq.pdf"><em>Cyan, Inc.</em></a> that has the potential to undo the policy gains achieved in <em>Trulia</em>. While <em>Cyan</em> seems to me to be soundly reasoned, and even properly held, it will truly be unfortunate if <em>Cyan</em> reopens the floodgates for meritless strike suits. Hopefully the limits of the <em>Cyan</em> holding will prevent this outcome.</p><p><strong><em>Trulia</em>: A Delaware state corporate law decision with Federal securities law implications.</strong></p><p>Earlier this year I published a note in the <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3103&amp;context=lawreview">BYU Law Review</a> arguing that <em>Trulia</em> is more about abusive federal securities law litigation than it is a question of the state corporate law of the State of Delaware. The general line of the argument goes like this:</p><p>In the early days, class action securities litigation was easy to bring (both because the laws were very permissive and because public disclosure by reporting companies give the plaintiff’s bar easy access to fuel for litigation), and as a result, fell prey to abuse. Plaintiff’s lawyers would hastily draft a complaint and certify a class of shareholders which they would use as leverage to reach a settlement with corporate managers eager to avoid bad publicity and delay to operations and acquisitions.</p><p>Congress stepped in in 1995 with the PSLRA, a law that applied substantive reform to state and federal securities law actions, and procedural reform to federal securities law actions. Plaintiffs chose to avoid the substantive reforms by filing securities class action under state securities law, and the problem persisted, albeit aided by the now inescapable procedural reforms applicable in all fora.</p><p>Again, Congress stepped in, this time in 1998 with the SLUSA. The SLUSA did away with class action securities litigation in state or federal court for nationally listed securities where damages were sought on behalf of more than 50 people. It also provided for all securities class-action lawsuits brought in state court to be removed to federal court where they would be subject to dismissal. Or so we thought, but more on that later.</p><p>The effect of the PSLRA and the SLUSA (and to an extent, another piece of legislation in 2005 called the CAFA) was to make class-action securities litigation more costly, difficult, and time consuming. The plaintiff’s bar had a novel reaction. Coinciding with the passing of these three statutes was a migration of class-action litigation focusing on mergers by public companies away from Federal courts under federal securities law, and into state courts under state corporate law, primarily Delaware.</p><p>Delaware law allows class-action litigation when a board of directors breaches its fiduciary duties to shareholders. One example of this is by proposing and approving a merger without giving shareholders adequate or accurate information about the merger. The typical channel for directors to provide shareholders with information is through filings with the SEC pursuant to federal securities law. The plaintiff’s bar in Delaware began using public filings to fuel law suits following 95% of all merger announcements, often times within hours of the announcement being made, claiming that the securities filings contained misleading or incomplete information. What this all starts to add up to are claims that sounds exactly like those that used to brought as 10b-5 fraud actions under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, but are instead being brought as fiduciary claims under Delaware corporate law.</p><p>Last year’s decision in <em>Trulia</em> said that the Court of Chancery would no longer approve settlements (a requirement in class-action litigation) when the only thing the company was offering to the plaintiffs (in addition to attorney’s fees) was to provide additional information to correct the alleged deficit in the disclosures <em>unless</em> that additional information is “plainly material.” In the vast majority of cases, management had simply been providing shareholders with a few pieces of mostly useless information, but the new standard disallows this. Plaintiff’s lawyers now have a much harder job of getting settlements approved, and as a result, strike suit merger litigation has declined in Delaware (though to be fair, it had increased in other fora, but hopefully forum selection clauses in corporate charters will continue to be upheld, which could bolster Delaware as the primary venue for these actions).</p><p>In my note, I argue that <em>Tulia</em> represents a win against abusive securities law class-action litigation because the types of claims at issue in <em>Trulia</em> are really federal securities law claims masquerading as state corporate law claims. Unfortunately, in <em>Cyan</em>, the Supreme Court interpreted the removal provision in the SLUSA in a way that upsets traditional thinking about securities class-action litigation.</p><p><strong><em>Cyan</em> Court says that SLUSA <em>does</em> allow state courts to hear claims arising under the 1933 Act, and does <em>not</em> allow 1933 Act claims to be removed to Federal Court.</strong></p><p>The question at issue in <em>Cyan</em> is whether claims arising purely under the 1933 Act can be heard in state court at all, and if so, whether it can be removed to federal court.</p><p>In <em>Cyan</em>, plaintiffs brought claims against an issuer after buying shares in an IPO and then seeing the value of those shares drop significantly. The plaintiffs brought only claims arising under the 1933 Act, and no claims arising under any other federal law, or under any state securities law.</p><p>The Court held:</p><p>1. That the SLUSA does not limit a state’s authority to rule on claims under the 1933 Act; and</p><p>2. That the provision in SLUSA allowing removal of claims to federal court does not apply to claims under the 1933 Act.</p><p>Since the late 90’s when SLUSA was enacted, plaintiff’s lawyers have broadly assumed that any federal securities law class action suit brought in state court would either be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or removable to federal court where it would be either dismissed or subject to the both the procedural and substantive heightened requirements imposed by the PSLRA. This was the primary driver of the emigration from securities law claims to state corporate law fiduciary duty claims. Now it seems that the plaintiff’s bar was mistakenly over-cautious.</p><p><strong><em>Cyan</em> has potential to undue the positive effects of <em>Trulia</em>.</strong></p><p>The great success in <em>Trulia</em> was that, in a way, it represented a closing down of the final safe-haven for abusive securities litigation in the public merger context. These claims couldn’t survive under state securities laws, so they migrated to federal securities laws, and when that well dried up, they migrated to Delaware corporate law. When Chancellor Bouchard plugged that well, there was hope that illegitimate claims had run out of options.</p><p>Now it seems that state courts are again fora amenable to federal securities law claims. Could this undue the promise of <em>Trulia</em>? Potentially yes, but hopefully no.</p><p>Yes, a plaintiff’s bar looking to bring strike suit securities litigation in an effort to force a settlement may be emboldened to bring claims in state court. To the extent that this come to pass, <em>Trulia</em> is weakened.</p><p>However, <em>Cyan</em> is not so broad as to allow a return to the <em>status quo ante. </em>Keep in mind that the primary weapon in abusive securities litigation is the 10b-5 fraud action. This arises under the 1934 Act which means that <em>Cyan</em> does not put 10b-5’s back on the table. The 1933 Act applies to the original sale of securities by an issuer. Subsequent resale falls under the purview of the 1934 Act. In reality, this means that relatively few security sales (taken a percentage of total security sales) fall under the 1933 Act. The market for securities typically has issuers selling to a single underwriter, or perhaps a small group of underwriters, or to limited numbers of institutional investors, and to a much smaller degree, to individual accredited investors. The larger and more active the bank underwriter or investor is in the securities market, the less likely it will be to agree to join a class-action as plaintiff. This kind of behavior would erode issuer confidence and be disastrous to reputation. Hopefully, this market dynamic will serve as a natural limiter on the number of 1933 Act claims the plaintiff’s bar will serve up.</p><p>Additionally, keep in mind that while the PSLRA ultimately proved ineffective at stamping out strike suits, it did apply substantive reform to actions in both state and federal court. This means that plaintiff’s will still have to satisfy the heightened substantive requirements of the PSLRA for pleading, discovery, liability, class representation and fee and-expense awards.</p><p>Finally, <em>Trulia</em> is limited to settlement proposals involving additional disclosure in the public merger context. While this problem is huge (remember that before <em>Tulia</em>, public merger announcements were followed by litigation 95% of the time), it is by no means as expansive as the entire universe of abusive securities litigation. However, <em>Trulia</em> may still remain an effective deterrent to merger litigation to the extent that the facts of the merger in question do not implicate the 1933 Act. In an all cash merger, for example, where no shares are issued, it seems unlikely that a 1933 Act claim would be germane.</p><p><strong>Prognosis: Mostly optimistic</strong></p><p>The Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Cyan</em> comes as a blow to issuers. Beginning with the PSLRA in 1995 and culminating with <em>Trulia</em> in 2017, it finally seemed as though meaningful progress had been made towards stamping out meritless litigation, even if only confined to the public merger context.</p><p>Undoubtedly <em>Cyan</em> will encourage meritless litigation. Hopefully, the effect will be small. The combination of <em>Cyan’s </em>limitation to claims arising only under the 1933 Act, the unchanged procedural requirements of the PSLRA, and the ken of the public merger context in <em>Trulia</em> being often distinct from the reach of the 1933 Act will still allow <em>Trulia</em> to retain its bite.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=96236b537f3a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blockchain: The Third Wave of Financial Disintermediation.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/blockchain-the-third-wave-of-financial-disintermediation-db1347a2d0e1?source=rss-52c87fae2530------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db1347a2d0e1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[distributed-ledgers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disintermediation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryan Lewis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2018 19:48:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-29T19:48:53.701Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Disintermediation is the rallying cry of blockchain initiatives across nearly every industry. Distributed ledgers and permissionless networks have the potential to dramatically reduce the cost of establishing the trust necessary for unfamiliar parties to interact. As a result, the role of central trust institutions under this paradigm is drastically reduced, if not, in some cases, entirely eliminated. One industry where the potential benefits of disintermediation seem particularly high is finance.</p><p>The financial sector operates on a business model of intermediaries, be it banks, brokerages, clearing houses, crowdfunding platforms, private equity funds, mutual funds, and on and on. But with the rise of blockchain, solutions are beginning to emerge to connect people who need capital directly to those who have it. The result is an impending financial disintermediation, where global financial markets are flattened, and middle men and the fees they charge are cut out.</p><p>If you’ve heard about this wave of financial disintermediation, you may think this is a welcome and unprecedented shift away from near-total reliance on centralized trust authorities (i.e. banks and other financial institutions). But it may surprise you to know that this is <em>not </em>the first wave of financial disintermediation. In fact, this is not even the second wave of financial disintermediation. Prior to the paradigm shift that we are currently experiencing, global financial systems have undergone two large-scale financial disintermediation events since the 1980s. Blockchain is ushering in the third wave of large-scale financial disintermediation in the history of modern finance. By studying the conditions that caused these prior shifts and the changes that emerged, we are better positioned to anticipate where the third wave of disintermediation may lead.</p><p><strong>The First Wave: Disintermediation of Banks and the Rise of Money Markets.</strong></p><p>Modern finance is built on banks. Before the 1980s, whether you were an individual looking to purchase a home or a corporation looking to fund operations for the next quarter, you were by no means spoiled for choice. You went to a bank and took out a loan. Of course, capital markets existed for corporations looking to raise money on a longer horizon, primarily through traditional debt or equity securities. But operational finance was the domain of the banks.</p><p>This all began to change in the early ’80s. In 1980, loans accounted for over 80% of bank balance sheets, but today they stand for less than 30%.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a> Over the last 35 years, non-bank financial institutions have risen in popularity and prominence as a source of institutional funding. This migration from bank borrowing to alternative lenders and money markets has reduced the role of banks in corporate finance. This shift away from bank borrowing was the first wave of financial disintermediation.</p><p>The seeds for the disintermediation of banks, at least in the US, were sown as early as the 1930s and 1940s. In the early days of the 20th century there were around 24,000 banks in the US.<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a> With the stock market collapse of 1933 and the dawning of the Great Depression, some 10,000 banks failed, leaving the total number of US banks relatively constant at around 14,000 until the mid-1980s when the first wave of disintermediation began.<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a> Since then, the number of banks has more than halved, with the FDIC reporting less than 5,000 banks operating in the US to date.<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a> The primary cause of this reduction was a wave of consolidations driven by banks struggling to remain competitive in a regulatory environment that increasingly gave non-bank financial institutions a competitive advantage.<a href="#_edn5">[v]</a> One of the key distinctions between these new financial institutions and traditional banks was the former’s ability to connect institutional borrowers directly with investors in what came to be known as the money markets. These borrowers benefited from the lower cost of capital that came through disintermediating traditional banks.</p><p>The groundwork for this shift was first laid at the time of the Great Depression. The US government responded to the stock market collapse of the 1930s by establishing multiple federal agencies to supervise the banking and finance industries, including the SEC, the OCC, the FDIC and the FHLB, as well as passing multiple pieces of legislation affecting banking and securities.<a href="#_edn6">[vi]</a> One of these new laws, The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), prevented banks from paying interest on deposits and forced banks to separate their commercial and investment banking practices.<a href="#_edn7">[vii]</a> As time went on, the GSA and other regulations limited banks’ ability to compete. With banks unable to entice depositors with interest bearing deposit accounts, and unable to combine commercial and investment banking offerings, alternative sources of funding began to emerge.</p><p>By the 1980s, the landscape of corporate finance had undergone a fundamental shift. Robust money markets and non-bank lending sources had developed. These bank-alternatives took on many shapes and sizes and began offering creative new products. For example, Government-Sponsored Enterprises (think Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) provided liquidity for residential mortgages. Asset-backed securities, including mortgage-backed securities, brought non-bank lenders into the fold by allowing originators to offload loans from their balance sheets. Mutual funds and insurance companies began to compete in the lending field.</p><p>For corporations, bank loan-alternatives for financing operations resulted in significant savings. Corporations began leveraging their high credit ratings to raise money on their own. They could do this at better rates than what banks, which often had weaker credit ratings than large corporates, could offer. Corporations would sell short-term debt called commercial paper directly to market, often with a financial counterparty backing the offering, but without relying on a bank to stand in the middle. Since 1980, outstanding corporate debt has risen from half a billion dollars, to nearly ten billion.<a href="#_edn8">[viii]</a> Many corporations even went one step further and formed their own lending arms to provide consumer financing. Many of the largest automakers, for example, developed financial subsidiaries that would provide the financing offered to car buyers, eliminating the automakers’ need to go to the bank for this money.</p><p>The rise of these short-term financing instruments, known as money markets, and their disintermediation of banks was not confined to the United States. Though the motivating conditions differ slightly from those in the US, Europe underwent its own financial disintermediation around the same time. In the 1980s, new markets began to emerge around the enormous amounts of US dollars held in Europe known as “Eurodollars.”<a href="#_edn9">[ix]</a> Eurodollar fixed rate bonds and Floating Rate Notes allowed European borrowers an alternative to traditional bank loans by giving them direct access to investors holding Eurodollars, effectively disintermediating major international banks.<a href="#_edn10">[x]</a> In addition to an emerging Euromoney market, a Eurosecurity market began to form in the mid 1980s, which gave issuers with strong credit the ability to raise short-term debt directly on capital markets.<a href="#_edn11">[xi]</a></p><p>As a result of institutional borrowers shifting away from bank financing, by the 1990s, non-bank lending had surpassed bank lending by a significant amount.<a href="#_edn12">[xii]</a> By disintermediating banks, the cost of borrowing declined. However, with the exception of the few corporations that established their own financing arms, as with the automotive industry, the first wave of disintermediation did not eliminate the need for financial institutions. Instead, it led to greater specialization.</p><p>Non-bank financial institutions rose to prominence by developing niche products and expertise. Institutional borrowers benefited in several ways. For example, non-bank financial institutions would often facilitate, and even guarantee, financing directly between borrowers and investors. This reduced the high transaction costs imposed by a true middle man, as with bank financing, but still provided added credit comfort to borrowers. Institutional borrowers also benefited from the efficiencies created through more diverse, and thus customizable, financing options. The ability to tailor the characteristics of financing raised to the intricacies of the underlying need for financing made corporate treasury departments more efficient, and thus more profitable.</p><p>The first wave of financial disintermediation lead banks to cede ground to non-bank financial institutions that they are unlikely ever to recover. Given the choice, institutional borrowers prefer the lower cost and greater customization afforded by direct access to investor capital over the traditional bank lending model. But while disintermediation brings many advantages, the benefits of the first wave remained largely confined to institutional borrowers able to raise capital in the money markets. It wasn’t until the second wave of disintermediation that investors gained access to the benefits of flattened financial markets.</p><p><strong>The Second Wave: Disintermediation of Private Equity and the Rise of Direct Investment.</strong></p><p>One of the most popular structures used by institutional investors to deploy capital is the private equity fund. In this model, investors make contributions to a central fund. The fund deploys its capital through investments and delivers a return to investors. The private equity fund stands as an intermediary between investors and investment opportunities. The fund ultimately controls the timing and scope of investment opportunities. For its services, the fund collects a management fee independent of return, typically around 2% of assets under management, as well as a percentage of the fund’s investment profits, known as “carry,” typically 20%.<a href="#_edn13">[xiii]</a></p><p>Beginning in the early 1990s and accelerating rapidly in the mid 2000s, investors are circumventing private equity funds and disintermediating institutional investing.<a href="#_edn14">[xiv]</a> One explanation for this is that a boom in private equity in the years leading up to the mortgage crises drew high levels of scrutiny to fund management compensation levels. This was overlaid with fund performance metrics that struggled to outpace public market benchmarks, and led to dissatisfaction with intermediaries and a desire to boost investors’ rate of return on invested capital.</p><p>In response, investors began taking a different approach: direct investing. Direct investing is just what it sounds like. Investors cut out private equity funds entirely and deploy their capital directly in the target of their investment. The appeal of direct investment is that it eliminates the drain on return of paying rent to an intermediary, but it is not without its drawbacks. In fact, the data on direct investment suggests that private equity funds do in fact add value, but whether this value makes its back into investors’ wallets is more difficult to predict.</p><p>Data collected between 1991 and 2011 shows two interesting trends. First, intermediated investments by private equity funds produced similar net returns to investors as direct investment.<a href="#_edn15">[xv]</a> This suggests that that funds often produce greater gross returns that investors can produce on their own. However, whatever advantages the funds gain by virtue of their position as intermediary is offset by the management fees that investors must pay.</p><p>The second pattern that emerged is that the advantages of intermediation are more pronounced in information-poor environments, or in other words, strong performance of direct investment depends on the ample availability of high-quality information.<a href="#_edn16">[xvi]</a></p><p>One explanation for this is that the level of skill required to identify quality investments rises with the difficulty of ascertaining information about the investment. As funds generally attract high-skilled investment professionals, they are often better positioned than investors to analyze investment quality. For example, an investor looking to put money into large-cap publicly traded equities can easily access financial statements and analyst reports to help select an investment target. But if that same investor wants to invest in an emerging or niche industry or in privately held companies, it is much more difficult to acquire enough information to make an informed investment decision. In this scenario, a private equity fund presents real value as funds typically attract top investment talent and have the resources and ability to develop niche expertise and conduct due diligence where direct investors may not.</p><p>Given that net returns to investors are roughly the same between direct investment and fund investment, and given the advantages that funds provide in information-poor environments, this second wave of disintermediation is remarkable. In fact, in 2014, 52% of investors surveyed said that they planned to increase direct investment,<a href="#_edn17">[xvii]</a> and 77% of individual investors with a net worth over $1 billion said they preferred direct investment to private equity.<a href="#_edn18">[xviii]</a> Beyond disenchantment with paying sizeable management fees for similar net returns, what could be driving the disintermediation of private equity?</p><p>One convincing response is control. Investors have very little control over investments placed with private equity funds. Through direct investment, they regain this control. Funds exercise control over investor dollars which produces agency problems that often play out to investors’ detriment in a variety of ways. These include growing fees at the expense of returns, investing heavily in inflated markets with only modest expectation of returns, and exiting sound investments prematurely to free up capital for raising new funds. <a href="#_edn19">[xix]</a></p><p>The desire for control seems to be a key force behind the disintermediation of private equity.</p><p>While the disintermediation of private equity eliminates management fees and gives investors control over their investment opportunities, it leaves other problems unsolved. One such problem is how to overcome information asymmetry and the complexity of managing what inflow of information there is. The high costs associated with this help explain a second unresolved issue: the second wave of financial intermediation is confined to institutional investors and high-net worth individuals and does not benefit everyday investors. The third wave of financial disintermediation is poised to flatten financial markets not just for institutional borrowers, and not just for institutional investors, but for everyone with access to the internet.</p><p><strong>The Third Wave: Disintermediation of Capital and the Rise of Blockchain.</strong></p><p>The third wave of financial disintermediation goes beyond banks and private equity firms and presents the potential to flatten our entire global financial system. It has the ability to connect capital needs, however great or small, to capital supply, regardless of geography and without traditional financial intermediaries. The manifestation of this process is the blockchain.</p><p>The first calls for wide-spread financial disintermediation began in the early 1990s amongst groups of cryptographers known as “Cypherpunks.”<a href="#_edn20">[xx]</a> The Cypherpunks challenged the need for trust institutions and called for privacy and anonymity through cryptography. The movement came to a head following the financial turmoil of 2008 when the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto published a whitepaper proposing a cryptographic solution for private, anonymous, trustless, and immutable digital interactions: Bitcoin.<a href="#_edn21">[xxi]</a></p><p>Whatever role Bitcoin itself may ultimately play in the third wave of financial disintermediation, the architecture underpinning Bitcoin is proving transformative. This architecture is known as blockchain. As people became increasingly interested in removing trust institutions (think banks, private equity funds, brokerages, insurance providers, and so on) from their financial interactions, the need for digital assets, including digital currency, increases. But digital asset ownership is problematic because everything that is digital can be duplicated. Another way of boiling down the problem is this: if I send you a digital dollar, you can cut and paste the dollar into a different transaction or account, and now you’ve taken one and made two, a problem known as double spend.</p><p>Blockchain emerged as the first viable solution to the problem of digital double spend. A blockchain creates a record, or ledger, of all transactions that occur within the network of users on that blockchain. This record is distributed, meaning that every user on the network has a copy of every transaction. People commonly refer to blockchain solutions as “trustless” because it removes the role of central trust institutions as the keepers of transaction ledgers.</p><p>For example, in a traditional payment model, a series of trust institution (banks, credit card processors, merchant account brokers, etc.) stand between the purchaser and the seller. The seller is willing to hand over merchandise or provide services because she trusts that the intermediaries will ensure that she gets paid. With a blockchain-based payment system, such as Bitcoin for example, there is no central trust institution. The buyer and seller publish their transaction to the blockchain and their digital assets are exchanged immediately. The entire network sees, records, and remembers that transaction. So, while blockchain does not prevent someone from duplicating a digital asset, because all transactions are known to all parties, digital double spending would be apparent and the community would reject these transactions.<a href="#_edn22">[xxii]</a> In other words, you can cut and paste your Bitcoin all you like, but everyone knows about it, and no one will accept it.</p><p>So, in this respect, blockchain technology does not <em>eliminate</em> the need for trust, nor does it create truly “trustless” transactions. Rather, the decentralized nature of the blockchain <em>distributes</em> the trust between all parties within a given network, reducing or eliminating the need for centralized trust institutions. With a blockchain transaction, the seller in our previous example does not have to trust a bank or credit card company to know that she will receive payment. She only has to trust the distributed network of users that the digital assets that the purchaser wants to use as payment are valid and have not been duplicated.</p><p>The creation of double-spend proof digital assets is the foundation of the third wave of disintermediation. As money and assets are reduced to digital form, the barriers to accessing capital disappear. In the 1980s, corporate finance departments realized savings by disintermediating banks and accessing investors directly through money markets. In the 1990s and 2000s, institutional investors and high net worth individuals took back control of their investments by cutting out private equity funds through direct investment. With blockchain, any person with access to the internet can potentially enter into any type of financial transaction allowed by law without the need to use a bank, a broker, a credit card, or any other financial intermediary.</p><p>The Andrew-Debreu economic model helps explain the third wave of financial disintermediation. This model envisions efficient transactions where supply is matched directly to demand without an intermediary. In its purest form, this model sees no need for financial intermediaries where there is a perfect flow of information.<a href="#_edn23">[xxiii]</a> Indeed, blockchain technology connects suppliers of capital directly with consumers of capital in a way never before seen.</p><p>Any blockchain user can borrow or lend digital currency. Any user can buy, sell, or leverage digital assets or digital manifestations of tangible assets. Beyond the limitations and safeguards imposed by a user’s legal regime, there is no end to the creativity and customizability of financial products and services available. And unlike the benefits of the first and second wave of financial disintermediation, the benefits of blockchain are available to everyone, from the wealthiest corporation to the poorest subsistence farmer.</p><p>While this third wave of financial disintermediation brims with exciting potential, it is still only just beginning to take shape. It is far from certain at this point what a financial model influenced by blockchain will ultimately look like. However, by applying the observations we can make about the first and second waves, we can perhaps develop a general idea about what some of its major features will be.</p><p><strong>The Future of Blockchain-based Financial Systems.</strong></p><p>First and foremost, the ability to entirely remove financial intermediaries does not presuppose the inevitability, or even desirability, of a world without them. Indeed, financial intermediation offers certain undeniable benefits. First, think back to the Andrew-Debreu model. Remember that this model seen no need for financial intermediaries <em>only</em> when there is a perfect flow of information. While blockchain presents many opportunities to improve the flow of information, at this point it is difficult to imagine a world where everyone has access to perfect financial information. Financial intermediaries may continue to play an important role as brokers of information. <a href="#_edn24">[xxiv]</a> Moreover, most people are not trained in finance, and are well served by relying on trusted advisors to help them make sage financial decisions.</p><p>Another benefit that financial intermediaries play is risk reduction. When multiple investors pool their assets with an intermediary, they can share the costs that go into analyzing and executing investments thereby reducing transaction costs.<a href="#_edn25">[xxv]</a> We saw with private equity firms in the second wave of financial disintermediation that this benefit can easily be outweighed by fees and agency problems. But in a more perfect form, intermediaries can provide an undeniable advantage.</p><p>A third benefit that financial intermediaries play is the ability to develop specialized bodies of knowledge and expertise. An individual looking to borrow or lend a small amount of money is unlikely to have the expertise to be able to create a novel financial product that will maximize value and reduce risk to both parties. However, an intermediary that attracts top financial professionals and is exposed to huge amounts of transaction data may be able to suggest just such a financial product.</p><p>Blockchain will almost certainly reduce the role of financial intermediaries. But what is perhaps more difficult to predict is what that remaining role will look like. First of all, the financial intermediaries within a blockchain financial system need not be centralized institutions. They may instead be decentralized autonomous organizations, or associations of otherwise unaffiliated individuals. These institutions may still play an intermediary, or centralized role, albeit to a lesser degree. They will be able to bring the benefits that financial intermediaries are capable of adding, as discussed above, but they themselves will potentially be built on decentralized principles. In theory, their decentralized nature could minimize the deleterious effects that otherwise centralized intermediaries are prone to impose, without eliminating the positive contributions that financial intermediaries can make.</p><p>Another role that financial intermediaries will continue to play in a decentralized world is to provide meeting places for people to connect. While blockchain may allow a farmer in Lesotho to borrow money from a power provider in the Czech Republic, the farmer and power provider have to find each other before either of them sees any benefit. In this regard, platforms and protocols to bring parties together and provide a common technical language for them to speak are essential to extracting value from blockchain. These platforms and protocols do not emerge spontaneously, but are established and maintained by intermediaries. Again, these intermediaries may be intrinsically decentralized to varying degrees, but they are nonetheless playing a vital role intermediating blockchain financial networks.</p><p><strong>Looking Ahead.</strong></p><p>For those of us who grew into financial literacy within the last 40 years, disintermediation is all we know. The first wave showed us that as banks lost the ability to compete for deposits and borrowers, they were replaced by more efficient and specialized forms of financing that connected institutional borrowers more directly with sources of capital. The second wave showed us that when institutional investors were given a choice to control their investments and avoid management fees, they increasingly chose to remove private equity firms from between themselves and their investments. The third wave of financial disintermediation, the rise of blockchain, is taking everything that we have learned from the prior waves and expanding it to every corner of the financial markets, making it available to every person on the planet. By flattening financial markets and connecting the global supply of capital, blockchain-based financial markets are poised to create the fairest, most efficient, and most inclusive financial system that we have ever seen. If nothing else, the next few years of blockchain adoption will forever change the narrative of finance in the twenty-first century.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> Celine Choulet &amp; Yelena Shulyatyeva, <em>History and Major Causes of US Banking Disintermediation</em>, BNP Parisbas (Jan. 2016), available at <a href="http://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/Views/DisplayPublication.aspx?type=document&amp;IdPdf=27450">http://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/Views/DisplayPublication.aspx?type=document&amp;IdPdf=27450</a>; <em>see also</em> Hal B. Heaton, <em>Commercial Banking Regulation</em>, BYU Marriott School 16 ex. 6 (2013).</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> Gary Richardson, <em>Banking Panics of 1930–31</em>, Federal Reserve HIstory (Nov. 22, 2013) <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_panics_1930_31.">https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_panics_1930_31.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> <em>Number of Institutions, Branches and Total Offices FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks US and Other Areas,</em> FDIC (2018), available at <a href="https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp.">https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> <em>Id</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> Hal B. Heaton, <em>Commercial Banking Regulation</em>, BYU Marriott School 6 (2013).</p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> <em>Historical Timeline</em>, FDIC (last updated Jan. 2, 2014), <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/timeline/">https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/timeline/.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> Choulet, <em>supra</em>, n. i.</p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> Hal B. Heaton, <em>Arapahoe Corporation</em>, BYU Marriott School 16 ex. 11b (2013).</p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> <em>See generally, </em>Hal B. Heaton, <em>The Euromarket</em>, BYU Marriott School (2013).</p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> <em>Id</em>. At 9.</p><p><a href="#_ednref11">[xi]</a> <em>Id</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref12">[xii]</a> <em>Id.</em></p><p><a href="#_ednref13">[xiii]</a> Lily Fang, <em>et al.</em>, The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct Investing in Private Equity, NBER Working Paper Series 7, working paper 19299 (Aug. 2013), available at <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w19299.">http://www.nber.org/papers/w19299.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref14">[xiv]</a> <em>Id.</em> at 36.</p><p><a href="#_ednref15">[xv]</a> <em>Id.</em></p><p><a href="#_ednref16">[xvi]</a> <em>Id.</em></p><p><a href="#_ednref17">[xvii]</a> Victoria Ivashina, The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct Investing in Private Equity, J. of Fin. Econs. <em>forthcoming</em> 1 (Sep. 3, 2014).</p><p><a href="#_ednref18">[xviii]</a> Mark Tosczak, <em>Weighing Private Equity and Direct Investments</em>, Conversations (Mar. 2017), <a href="https://privatebank.wf.com/conversations/article/weighing_private_equity_and_direct_investments.">https://privatebank.wf.com/conversations/article/weighing_private_equity_and_direct_investments.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref19">[xix]</a> Ivashina, <em>supra</em>, n.xi, at 2.</p><p><a href="#_ednref20">[xx]</a> Eric Hughes, <em>Cypherpunk’s Manifesto</em> (Mar. 9, 1993), available at <a href="https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html.">https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref21">[xxi]</a> Satoshi Nakamoto, <em>Bitcoin: A peer-toPeer Electronic Cash System</em> (Nov. 2008), available at <a href="https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.">https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref22">[xxii]</a> For example, $500 million of NEM digital tokens stolen from the exchange CoinCheck have now been branded as “Do Not Accept.”</p><p><a href="#_ednref23">[xxiii]</a> <em>Id</em>. at 1.</p><p><a href="#_ednref24">[xxiv]</a> Fang, <em>supra</em> n.x, at 1.</p><p><a href="#_ednref25">[xxv]</a> <em>Id.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db1347a2d0e1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/blockchain-the-third-wave-of-financial-disintermediation-db1347a2d0e1">Blockchain: The Third Wave of Financial Disintermediation.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research">Uinta Blockchain Research</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Compliant ICOs: U.S. Securities Law Notes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/how-to-do-a-safe-and-compliant-ico-what-weve-learned-so-far-9b006fd56415?source=rss-52c87fae2530------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b006fd56415</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[securities-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token-sale]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryan Lewis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Dec 2017 22:15:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-29T22:32:13.430Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2017 has been a big year for ICOs. So much so, in fact, that it is difficult to keep up. With so many entrepreneurs entering into the fray, regulators are beginning to worry about investor safety. The SEC, which is the primary regulator of securities offerings, has expressed concern that most ICOs may be violating securities laws in one form or another. They have come out with formal actions against a few token sales and telegraphed to the community that they will be analyzing ICOs on a case-by-case basis using tried and true criteria that have been around for over 80 years. This has many people in the industry searching for the formula for a safe and compliant initial token offering. In this article, we’ll summarize a few of the most popular and promising proposals, as well as some helpful criticisms to see where we are on the road to a trouble-free token sale.</p><p><strong>SAFT</strong></p><p>The first attempt at a securities-law compliant framework to gain traction was the <a href="https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2017/2017-10-24-saft-project-whitepaper">SAFT</a>. Released in October, the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, or SAFT, was created by Marco Santori of Cooley, NY, in connection with Protocol Labs. The SAFT uses a two-step approach that relies on two key assumptions about tokens and securities laws. First, it assumes that the level of functionality a token offers is one of, if not <em>the</em>, key factors that implicates whether a token is a security, and triggers securities laws filing or exemption requirements. The second assumption is that a token with little functionality is a security, but once sufficient functionality is built in, it ceases to be so.</p><p>Based on this assumption, in phase one, an entrepreneur using a SAFT will issue rights to acquire tokens at some future date. Because these rights have no current functionality, the authors of the SAFT assume that purchasers will be drawn to them for their speculative value, which means they are most likely securities. To comply with securities law requirements, this sale is made only to accredited investors in what is known as a Reg D offering, a common exemption under federal securities law. Once the token issuers have built out the token’s underlying functionality, presumably from the money raised in phase one, they enter phase two. At this point, the SAFTs sold in phase one convert into the proprietary tokens and can be freely traded. Presumably, at this point, consumers will be drawn to the token for its utility value, not its speculative value. Ergo, the SAFT framework assumes, the tokens are no longer securities and no longer need the protection of the Reg D exemption, so sales are opened up to the general public.</p><p>The advantage of the SAFT approach is that it offers issuers certainty in phase one because they are operating within the well-defined contours of the federal securities laws. There are, however, several drawbacks.</p><p>The assumption that a pre-functional token is <em>per se</em> a security is unsupported, and may prove overly-broad, thus unnecessarily deterring token issuers from accessing funds from non-accredited investors. Many pre-functional token sales closely resemble the pre-sale of goods are services that are not considered securities. For example, Kickstarter funding campaigns sell products in advance, then use the proceeds to develop and manufacture the pre-sold goods. These activities do not constitute securities.</p><p>The Cardozo Blockchain Project published a response to the SAFT proposal in November of this year. They identified several other potential drawbacks to the SAFT. First, they take issue with the way the SAFT addressed a prong in the securities law test focusing on the promoter’s efforts. In short, the SAFT says that a security must rely on the efforts of the promoter, and once the token is functional, the promoter’s efforts have been expended and are no longer needed. Thus, the token ceases to be a security at that point. The Cardozo response points out that in applying the test, courts have been persuaded by the <em>importance</em> of the seller’s efforts, not the <em>timing</em>.</p><p>The Cardozo response also worries that the SAFT draws dangerous attention to itself by emphasizing the investment-nature of the phase one sale. The argument goes that because the SAFT complies with federal law in phase one, it does not shy away from marketing itself as an investment opportunity. However, this might invite increased scrutiny from the SEC once the project moves to phase two, and it is by no means certain that a phase two token will survive this scrutiny.</p><p>Finally, the Cardozo response argues that SAFTs misalign issuers’ incentives and could harm consumers. They fear that SAFT issuers will seek only to profit from a short-term token sale and then “rush to market without sufficient technical development, business model ideation, or technical diligence.” This argument, however, seems overblown and unsupported. The results that the authors predict from the SAFT seem an accurate description of the concerns that currently beset the ICO model. It is unclear how a SAFT would be <em>less safe</em> than the status quo. Token sales that do not follow the SAFT model lack structural incentives to prevent short-term profiteering, and to ensure thorough functionality. It seems counterintuitive that issuers who are initially beholden exclusively to sophisticated and institutional investors will be incentivized to play fast and loose, while issuers selling to the general public will be compelled to act responsibly.</p><p>The SAFT model is clearly not without drawbacks or risk. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly more accepted as a path to a compliant ICO.</p><p><strong>Angel List and Republic</strong></p><p>Another framework to a compliant ICO takes a dual-track approach as proposed by Angel List and Republic. This approach involves bifurcating token offerings into two separate exemptions under the federal securities laws. Like the SAFT, the Angel List approach tailors a token sale to fit within the Reg D exemption, meaning that securities are only sold t accredited investors. Unlike the SAFT, this approach sells actual, pre-functional tokens instead of rights to acquire tokens at a future date. The second track, proposed by Republic, a subsidiary of Angel List, allows issuers to sell tokens to the general public under the crowdfunding exemption found in Section 3 of the JOBS Act. Section 3 permits the sale of unregistered securities to the general public through crowdfunding portals. Issuers must comply with several restrictions, such as only selling through a designated and registered funding portal. Additionally, they are limited to raining $1 million per year, and individual investors are limited in how much they can invest.</p><p>The Angel List/Republic approach offers several advantages over the SAFT. First, the question of whether the tokens are functional or pre-functional, or whether or not they are securities is moot, because all sale are made in compliance with regulatory exemptions. Second, while the SAFT reaches accredited and non-accredited investors, it does so sequentially, limiting participation in phase one to accredited investors only. The Angel List/Republic dual-track approach can operate simultaneously, allowing general investors to participate at the earliest stages.</p><p>On the other hand, this approach is limited by the stringent restrictions placed on crowdsale securities offerings. Issuers may have limited use for $1 million dollars per year and the cost of ensuring that their offering complies with Section 3 may outweigh the benefit.</p><p><strong>tZERO</strong></p><p>Unlike the SAFT and Angel List/Republic solutions which propose a framework for issuing tokens under exemptions to federal securities laws, tZERO offers an exchange where tokenized securities can trade. tZERO is registered with the SEC as an Alternative Trading System. This allows it to operate as an exchange for registered securities. This is the key difference between tZERO and the SAFT or Angel List/Republic. While the others try to create exempt securities offerings, tZERO offers issuers a blockchain-based exchange or registered equity tokens. This offers a blockchain-based alternative to issuers who would ordinarily access the capital markets through the sale of traditional registered stock certificates. These issuers can now issue digital equity as tokens, rather than shares of stock, and can do it on tZERO’s decentralized exchange. tZERO has stated its ultimate goal is to attract enough capital to make for a highly liquid tokenized equity exchange. In fact, a tZERO spokesman has stated that he hopes it will become the largest exchange in the world.</p><p>The one clear drawback to the tZERO approach is that issuers must comply with federal securities law requirements for registered securities. This means, among other things, corporate governance and regular financial reporting requirements that are both time consuming and expensive. For issuers prepared to shoulder this burden, a tZERO equity token sale, because it is registered like traditional equity securities, should be a known quantity that offers regulatory certainty. Perhaps the biggest advantage to the tZERO approach over the other frameworks is the liquidity that the exchange would offer if it reaches its stated potential. At present, liquidity in all but the largest cryptocurrencies is relatively thin across all exchanges. So while tZERO is still in its very early stages and appears to cater towards later-stage companies, it provides a potential path to a compliant ICO.</p><p><strong>What We’ve Learned So Far.</strong></p><p>The fact that there are multiple frameworks for safe and compliant ICOs is good news. As regulation begins to crystallize and market participants move to operate within the law, investor safety and confidence is bound to improve. The SAFT is a novel approach that gives accredited investors access to instruments that convert to tokens at a time when they become available for sale to the general public. Angel List and Republic offer a two-pronged approach to access both accredited and non-accredited investors, but significantly restricts participation from the latter group. Finally, tZERO eschews regulatory exemptions by registering tokens with the SEC and opening issuers up to the requirements that this entails.</p><p>Each of these frameworks takes a different approach to the same problem: how to sell tokens within the requirements of the federal securities laws. It is important to note that none of these approaches has been embraced by the SEC. In fact, in a recent statement from SEC Chairman Clayton, he made veiled criticism of both SAFT-like products, and token trading platforms like tZERO.</p><p>What we have learned definitively is that the SEC is going to rely on fundamental principles of securities law as it approaches digital tokens. Here are a few key takeaways:</p><p><strong>Promises matter:</strong> The more an issuer touts a return on investment, such as through a profit sharing model, the more likely the token is a security.</p><p><strong>Functionality matters:</strong> While the SEC has not embraced the SAFT’s black and white distinction of non-functional = security and functional = not a security, they have indicated that a token with no functionality is likely to be a security.</p><p><strong>Marketing matters:</strong> In a cease and desist order to the issuers if the Munchee token, the SEC placed serious weight on the claims that the issuers made in marketing the token, namely that investors could expect the value of the token to rise. They also highlighted the plan of distribution, pointing out that tokens were only marketed to investors, not to people who would be interested in actually using the token.</p><p>2017 is just about in the rear-view mirror, and what a wild ride it was. While there is still much uncertainty, we have learned a great deal so far about what makes an ICO safe and compliant from a federal securities law perspective. 2018 will undoubtedly prove to be a banner year for the coming together of a cogent regulatory framework and innovations from participants on maximizing value while complying with legal requirements. To keep abreast of how events unfold, be sure to follow along with <a href="https://uintablockchainresearch.com/">Uinta Blockchain Research.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b006fd56415" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/how-to-do-a-safe-and-compliant-ico-what-weve-learned-so-far-9b006fd56415">Compliant ICOs: U.S. Securities Law Notes</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research">Uinta Blockchain Research</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are Cryptocurrencies and Tokens Securities? The Basics.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/are-cryptocurrencies-and-tokens-securities-the-basics-397f6d225180?source=rss-52c87fae2530------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/397f6d225180</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryan Lewis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 20:26:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-19T20:26:27.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you’ve been following cryptocurrencies and tokens in the news, you’ve probably heard about people getting in trouble with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Most recently it’s been the Munchee initial coin offering (ICO), which the SEC shut down earlier this month. Before that it was Canadians Dominic Lacroix and Sabrina Paradis-Royer for their involvement in PlexCoin. Before PlexCoint it was Maksim Zaslavskiy and his real estate and diamond backed tokens, REcoin and Diamond Reserve Club. And of course, the one that started it all, the DAO Organization and its much-publicized hack and eventual implosion.</p><p>But with the skyrocketing number of ICOs and players entering the marketplace, the SEC has indicated their intent to take a more hands-on approach. They are clearly watching this cryptocurrency experiment very closely and tamping down on the worst actors. In a recent statement, SEC Chairman Clayton, warned that the majority of ICOs implicate a sale of securities and are subject to federal securities laws. While the SEC has been relatively taciturn, they have given us a few useful insights into how cryptocurrencies might fit into the securities laws. For many though, both neophytes and insiders alike, there is still a lot of uncertainty around what makes a cryptocurrency or token a security in the first place.</p><p>As it turns out, the SEC is approaching cryptocurrencies and tokens the same way it’s been approaching hard to classify financial products for decades. By learning the basics of what constitutes a security, we can begin to formulate a general framework for thinking about cryptocurrencies and tokens.</p><p>The test for whether a cryptocurrency or token is a security has four-parts. There has to be (1) and investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profit, (4) based solely on the efforts of others.</p><p>The test seems straight forward, right? For some cryptocurrencies or tokens, it is. Take the DAO Token for example. Here was a token that pooled money from token sales and deployed it in various investments. Token holders were rewarded with profits from those investments. This passes the test with ease. Here’s the breakdown: (1) token purchasers bought in with money, (2) they all sink or swim together, (3) they expect their initial investment to grow, and (4) they all count on the folks running the show to pick winning investments.</p><p>After the DAO collapsed, the SEC issued an official report waking through this analysis and concluding that the DAO Token was, to no one’s surprise, a security. And while the DAO Report is helpful because it signals that the standard four-part test for securities is the tool the SEC will use, it’s not terribly useful when we want to know how to consider cryptocurrencies or tokens that are not so obviously securities.</p><p>For example, lots of tokens do more than just facilitate an investment pool, like the DAO. So-called “utility tokens” are tokens that act more like fuel for powering a product. For example, you might buy a cryptocurrency that lets you store files on a decentralized application, or access a distributed digital marketplace. Are these securities? This question is much harder to answer. But in his recent remarks, Chairman Clayton emphasized that the SEC won’t be persuaded by the labels a token is given: “Merely calling a token a “utility” token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.” And the same goes for cryptocurrencies, or tokens that are intended to act like a traditional currency, which is not a security. Chairman Clayton again emphasized that the SEC will examine the particular characteristics of each cryptocurrency to see if it meets the test for a security.</p><p>Most cryptocurrencies or tokens possess at least some of the key characteristics of a security. Almost all involve an investment of money. A common enterprise exists where investors’ fortunes are tied together, or to the founders’ efforts or fortunes. This seems more likely to exist where tokens are purchased primarily as a store of value or investment mechanism, and less likely where people intend to use up their tokens to access a product or service. This is also true of expectation of profits. The more functional a token is, and the more purchasers intend to use their tokens to get at the functionality it enables, the less likely it is that they are expecting to profit from their purchase. And finally, relying solely on the efforts of others to realize a profit seems more likely when a token’s usefulness depends on a future build-out of a product or service than when the token can be used up immediately.</p><p>This is just a superficial exploration of what a security is and how cryptocurrencies and tokens might fit into the framework. Being armed with this basic knowledge can help you be smarter about the products you are considering creating, selling, or buying. This knowledge is certainly not a substitute for diligent research or the advice of a securities lawyer, but it might be enough to help you know when you may be flirting with a potential problem. And who knows, it might just keep you from ending up a cryptocurrency headline for the wrong reasons.</p><p>For a deeper look at how cryptocurrencies and tokens may stand up under the securities laws, be sure to visit <a href="https://uintablockchainresearch.com/">Uinta Blockchain Research</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=397f6d225180" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research/are-cryptocurrencies-and-tokens-securities-the-basics-397f6d225180">Are Cryptocurrencies and Tokens Securities? The Basics.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/uinta-blockchain-research">Uinta Blockchain Research</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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