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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Karan Saini on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Karan Saini on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Karan Saini on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@saini?source=rss-ccce2d2c281------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[What to expect from the security track at Rootconf 2019]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rootconf-blog/what-to-expect-from-the-security-track-at-rootconf-2019-a65806750861?source=rss-ccce2d2c281------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a65806750861</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[networking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[servers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rootconf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Saini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:31:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-20T08:44:21.946Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Rootconf 2019: What to expect from this year’s security track</h3><p>Interested in security? Here is what you can expect from the first set of confirmed talks for the security track at Rootconf 2019. The latest iteration of Rootconf, which is taking place in Bangalore, will feature several talks as part of the security and development operations track. This blog post covers confirmed talks under the security track.</p><h3>Getting a home server up and running</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UiCKZx5J6sKD8K3tiULi-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/4h0HqC3K4-c?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Martijn Baudoin</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/server?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://captnemo.in/">Abhay Rana</a> will be presenting a talk on getting started with setting up a small multiple purpose server at home (or anywhere else). The driving idea behind the talk emphasizes self-sufficiency, resourcefulness, and trying something new. Should you use a single board computer — or should<em> </em>you<em> </em>instead opt for a custom CPU build in order to get that sweet extra processing power? What would the networking and services infrastructure for a home server need to look like? What software should be deployed? Among other issues, what about the bandwidth, logistical, security and or privacy considerations that are associated with operating your own server?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*Q0eU52yQT4CpUv6S.jpg" /><figcaption>Photo by Abhay Rana</figcaption></figure><p>This talk is as much an ode to the joy of self-hosting as it is an elucidation of the complexities involved with setting up and managing your own infrastructure. Abhay’s talk will explore the various facets of what one might need to consider when thinking about setting up an independent home server.</p><p><strong>Read the talk proposal here: </strong><a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/learnings-from-running-my-home-server-and-why-you-ctdadStRfnu2gAn2xQWNfS">https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/learnings-from-running-my-home-server-and-why-you-ctdadStRfnu2gAn2xQWNfS</a></p><p><strong>Access the code repository here:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/captn3m0/nebula">https://github.com/captn3m0/nebula</a></p><h3>Scaling server access with SSH certificates</h3><p><a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/ssh-certificates-a-way-to-scale-ssh-access-WDAL3yH2bH3HyzW4aEFckY">Pulkit Vaishnav</a> will be presenting on the benefits of using SSH certificate-based authentication for the purpose of providing scalable and secure access to servers. The talk will cover the pitfalls which may arise when public key authentication is used for providing secure shell access, along with how SSH certificates could be used to better serve the purpose of authentication. How can you provide efficient and secure access to multiple servers, for hundreds of users, at scale? How can you make the process of providing rule and role-based access easier? Pulkit’s talk will cover the functioning of SSH certificates and why they may be a better authentication option for some remote server architectures.</p><p><strong>Read the talk proposal here: </strong><a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/ssh-certificates-a-way-to-scale-ssh-access-WDAL3yH2bH3HyzW4aEFckY">https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/ssh-certificates-a-way-to-scale-ssh-access-WDAL3yH2bH3HyzW4aEFckY</a></p><h3>Is Internet routing registry based filtering effective?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3eHvH9qLGa9oTYL6fDJr0g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/h3vT1Kp0FxA?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Thomas Jensen</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/internet?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/anuragbhatia21/">Anurag Bhatia</a> will be delivering a talk through which he will provide an overview of the current state of global routing security. The talk aims to provide a broad overview of modern Internet routing architecture while diving into techniques for route filtering. Anurag’s talk touches upon several aspects of modern Internet routing security — including discussion about Internet routing registry based filtering, the effectiveness of the resource public key infrastructure, autonomous systems and more.</p><p><strong>Prior reading:</strong></p><p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271">RFC 4271: A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</a></p><p><a href="https://blog.apnic.net/2018/01/10/bgp-in-2017">BGP in 2017: APNIC</a></p><p><strong>Read the talk proposal here:</strong> <a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/lets-talk-about-routing-security-GFkVZHGEDn3NyavwLhwVgN">https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/lets-talk-about-routing-security-GFkVZHGEDn3NyavwLhwVgN</a></p><h3>Building reproducible Python applications for security-critical environments</h3><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/kushal-das-5a655b8/">Kushal Das</a> will be presenting a talk and case study on building reproducible Python applications for security-critical environments. How does one make sure that source or dependencies for a particular project have not been tampered with to perform malicious actions? As part of his talk, Kushal will be exploring the subject matter at hand through the SecureDrop application — which is an application that is used by news organizations around the world to securely receive sensitive files from whistle-blowers and at-risk sources— as a sample case for his talk.</p><p><strong>Read the talk proposal here:</strong> <a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/building-reproducible-python-applications-for-secu-cyprfnoPePmii2SjQHCEkB">https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/building-reproducible-python-applications-for-secu-cyprfnoPePmii2SjQHCEkB</a></p><h3>Content security policy: The great browser-side firewall</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1Y026B8It7Uw2Gs2Iy3Gbw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/eNzH7lx4eS4?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Viktor Forgacs</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/firewall?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/lavakumark/">Lavakumar Kuppan</a> will be presenting a talk on implementing and managing the content security policy. The talk will cover various aspects involved with implementing the content security policy, starting with an introduction to the modern browser security standard while also touching upon types of attacks which CSP can help mitigate. As part of his talk, Lavakumar will cover the Magecart attack as a case study for demonstrating the utility of client-side mitigations.</p><p><strong>Read the talk proposal here:</strong> <a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/deploying-and-managing-csp-the-browser-side-firewa-DGam5vKqX5iPVUG2z9YSw7">https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/proposals/deploying-and-managing-csp-the-browser-side-firewa-DGam5vKqX5iPVUG2z9YSw7</a></p><p><em>Join the #Rootconf community on Slack. Participate in the online AMA (Ask Me Anything) sessions. Contribute articles to the Rootconf blog. Propose topics for meetups. Speak at Rootconf meetups around the year.</em></p><p><strong><em>Slack</em></strong><em>:</em><a href="https://friends.hasgeek.com/"><em> https://friends.hasgeek.com</em></a></p><p><strong><em>Mailing list:</em></strong><a href="http://eepurl.com/cygsfr"><em> </em>http://eepurl.com/cygsfr</a></p><p><em>Rootconf 2019 will be held on June 21 and 22, 2019, at the NIMHANS Convention Centre, Bangalore. For information about the conference, talk schedule and tickets, visit: </em><a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/"><em>https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/2019/</em></a></p><p><em>To speak at future iterations of Rootconf — which will be taking place both this and the next year in Pune, Hyderabad and Delhi — submit a proposal here: </em><a href="https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/rootconf-round-the-year-proposals-2019/"><em>https://hasgeek.com/rootconf/rootconf-round-the-year-proposals-2019/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a65806750861" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rootconf-blog/what-to-expect-from-the-security-track-at-rootconf-2019-a65806750861">What to expect from the security track at Rootconf 2019</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rootconf-blog">Rootconf Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Extracting personal phone numbers linked to Aadhaar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/karana/extracting-personal-phone-numbers-linked-to-aadhaar-801d4802c0c8?source=rss-ccce2d2c281------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/801d4802c0c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Saini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 May 2018 16:39:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-08T16:39:38.918Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Fk9VAEbfQw7vCzf7." /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the personal phone number linked to any given Aadhaar can be extrapolated due to problems in implementation of the text-based authentication mechanism which websites offering Aadhaar authentication rely on.</p><p>Websites which make use of text-based (OTP) Aadhaar authentication display to the user only the last four digits of the phone number linked to the provided Aadhaar. This is ostensibly a privacy safeguard put in place by the <a href="https://uidai.gov.in/">UIDAI</a> to limit personally identifiable information from being revealed prior to authentication.</p><p>This privacy safeguard can be circumvented using websites which poorly implement text-based Aadhaar authentication, specifically, through websites which allow the user to input both the Aadhaar number as well as the verified phone number linked to the same.</p><p>If the provided phone number doesn’t match the verified phone number linked with the corresponding Aadhaar; the user is notified and has the ability to try again.</p><p>This flaw in implementation introduces a surface for computer-aided guessing and enumeration attacks which can be abused to reveal the entire phone number linked to a given Aadhaar.</p><p>Several websites were analyzed and tested for this article out of which three were found to be vulnerable to enumeration attacks which could be used to retrieve the complete phone number linked to an Aadhaar.</p><h3>Obtaining the last four digits</h3><p>The <a href="https://digilocker.gov.in/">Digital Locker</a> website reveals the last four digits of linked phone number prior to successful authentication. This means that a user would simply have to input an Aadhaar number when signing up for digital locker and the last four digits of the linked phone number would then be displayed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/666/1*S9IA0Kq2rX7UWWHNkkMQZQ.png" /><figcaption>Digital Locker Website</figcaption></figure><p>Digital Locker is one of many websites which can be used to retrieve the last four digits of the Aadhaar linked phone number.</p><p>Another website which was found to share the characteristic of disclosing the last four digits was <a href="http://nfsm.gov.in/dbt/aadhaarverification.aspx">nfsm.gov.in</a> — where after entering an Aadhaar number the last four digits of the phone number linked to it were displayed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/0*Rlpm2CmFcsH9JIYO.png" /><figcaption>nfsm.gov.in</figcaption></figure><p>While most sites were found to have properly implemented text-based Aadhaar authentication, several other websites — both in the public and private sector — were found to be susceptible to the implementation flaws and vulnerabilities mentioned earlier.</p><h3>Obtaining the first six digits</h3><p>The Indian mobile telephone numbering system defines that the first digit of a mobile phone number can currently only be one of the following: nine (9), eight (8) or seven (7).</p><p>This information will prove to be immensely useful during the enumeration process as it allows for eliminating the entire number space for numbers 1–6 when going through combinations of possible phone numbers.</p><p>Let us say that the following partial phone number is retrieved from Digital Locker or any other website which performs Aadhaar authentication:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/262/0*5tpylBx5-w3lUbxC.png" /></figure><p>Here, the digits which are not currently known are represented using <strong>X</strong>, and the digits which are known are represented using <strong>Y</strong>.</p><p>Simply for the sake of convenience; the enumeration process should ideally begin from the 9XXX series of phone numbers, as it is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_telephone_numbering_in_India">most populated mobile telephone number series</a> in India.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/270/0*OPFqDp58Qz4fTEBv.png" /></figure><p>Discovery of the five unknown digits can be automated with the use of a script, or through an intercepting proxy such as the <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project">OWASP ZED Attack Proxy </a>— which features a tool to send automated requests to a web server with a given set of payloads.</p><p>(In this context, the term payload refers to the entire five digit number space which contains <a href="https://github.com/karsaini/enumerate-list/blob/master/files/5_digits_00000-99999.txt">all numbers ranging from 00000 to 99999</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/823/0*t-K-oqw6ZRdrRgmN.png" /></figure><p>To reiterate; the script or tool would query any of the vulnerable websites repeatedly to extract the full phone number pertaining to any given Aadhaar.</p><p>The video below demonstrates this process through the use of Burp Suite — which is another intercepting proxy capable of sending automated requests.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FobbJEvy6h0M%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DobbJEvy6h0M&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FobbJEvy6h0M%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b5eb3db97208ac2fa3378e422dbbbeaa/href">https://medium.com/media/b5eb3db97208ac2fa3378e422dbbbeaa/href</a></iframe><p>In the video above, the valid phone number combination can be distinguished on the basis of its response length. A response length of 8081 signifies a match, as opposed to a response length of 1389 or 1375 which signifies an authentication failure.</p><p>If no valid results are found in the 9XXX series of phone numbers, enumeration could then be carried out on the 8XXX and 7XXX number series respectively — until a match has been found.</p><p>In most cases — a positive match should be found in the 9XXX series simply due to its size — but this ultimately depends on several factors such as the state where the phone number in question was issued, cellular carrier (as well as whether the number has been ported to another carrier) and others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*-HmA20KHURjkTv-g.png" /></figure><p>An attack like the one described in this post would take around 17 minutes for each number series — given that there are 100 requests each second, or 6000 per minute. It would take 17 minutes in total for each number series to be exhausted with 99,999 possible combinations in each.</p><p>This means that exhausting all current number series (9XXX, 8XXX, 7XXX) would take around 51 minutes with the above-mentioned conditions.</p><p>NOTE: A text-message containing a one-time-pin for Aadhaar authentication is sent to the linked phone number as soon as a match is found.</p><h3>Possible fixes</h3><p>The masking scheme used in the authentication process could be strengthened by disclosing only the least number of digits needed to verify the correctness of the linked phone number.</p><p>An example of such a masking scheme could be something similar to this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/265/1*1USL-YGoMVdUVkch5OvUTw.png" /></figure><p>A masked phone number like the one displayed above would hinder attempts at enumeration and/or guessing while still allowing for verifying the correctness of the linked phone number.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>A new attack surface is introduced when websites which make use of Aadhaar authentication allow users to enter an Aadhaar number as well as the phone number linked to the same. Any website which shares this characteristic could potentially be abused in such a way which allows for accurate deduction of the phone number linked to a given Aadhaar.</p><p>The privacy implications of being able to map an Aadhaar number to its corresponding phone number are grave — as a lot can become known about a person given their phone number, such as their full name through a reverse lookup, their social media profiles through ‘Find your friends’ features on social media websites, and more information which one should not be able to glean from a 12 digit UID.</p><p>Additionally, knowledge of a phone number and the Aadhaar card number to which it is linked could be used by malicious parties to aid SIM swap attacks, phishing schemes and other illicit activities which require knowledge of the same.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=801d4802c0c8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/karana/extracting-personal-phone-numbers-linked-to-aadhaar-801d4802c0c8">Extracting personal phone numbers linked to Aadhaar</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/karana">Kaarana</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[WD Instagram Feed 1.3.0 — XSS Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@saini/wd-instagram-feed-1-3-0-xss-vulnerabilities-cve-2018-10300-and-cve-2018-10301-7173ffc4c271?source=rss-ccce2d2c281------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7173ffc4c271</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wordpress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Saini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2018 17:11:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-24T06:56:42.856Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Two cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in the <strong>WD Instagram Feed</strong> WordPress plugin allow attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by passing payloads through the bio of an Instagram profile or via comments on an Instagram post</p><p><strong>CVE-2018–10301:</strong></p><p>WordPress plugin <strong><em>WD Instagram Feed Premium</em></strong><em> </em>(version 1.3.0) is vulnerable to cross-site scripting via payloads passed through the comments section of an Instagram post.</p><p>The attack type for this vulnerability is remote — an attacker can exploit this by commenting an XSS payload on an Instagram post embedded by an instance of <strong><em>WD Instagram Feed Premium</em></strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1018/1*Y7bhew4DfgLZpQ7sQNuCBg.png" /><figcaption><strong>CVE-2018–10301 — Payload</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/857/1*AzdCi4UfMQQ8C1GJIS443A.png" /><figcaption><strong>CVE-2018–10301 — XSS</strong></figcaption></figure><p><strong>CVE-2018–10300:</strong></p><p>WordPress plugin <strong><em>WD Instagram Feed</em></strong> (version 1.3.0) is vulnerable to cross-site scripting via payloads passed through the bio of an Instagram profile.</p><p>The attack type for this vulnerability is remote, however — this vulnerability is harder to exploit than <strong>CVE-2018–10301</strong> as an attacker would require control of the Instagram page connected to an instance of WD Instagram Feed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*ETpNlv9O0DHZT-K-mpKVtg.png" /><figcaption><strong>CVE-2018–10300 — Payload</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3_9sUcKJMe_kT0Bi2-NLbg.png" /><figcaption><strong>CVE-2018–10300 — XSS</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Vendor URL:<strong> web-dorado.com</strong></p><p>Product name: <strong>WD Instagram Feed</strong></p><p>Product link: <a href="https://wordpress.org/plugins/wd-instagram-feed/"><strong>https://wordpress.org/plugins/wd-instagram-feed/</strong></a></p><p>Vulnerable version: <strong>1.3.0</strong></p><p>Date reported: <strong>April 22, 2018</strong></p><p>Patch deployed: <strong>April 23, 2018</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7173ffc4c271" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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