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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sam Warren Miell on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jean Claude Biette — The government of films]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@samwarrenmiell/jean-claude-biette-the-government-of-films-19701517eadc?source=rss-90240bc4276a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sam Warren Miell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2025 14:55:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-28T15:58:52.293Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Jean-Claude Biette — The government of films</h3><p>‘The government of films’ is one of a series of important texts Jean-Claude Biette published in <em>Trafic </em>in the 1990s. It is composed of three relatively independent parts: a lyrical opening, a discussion of the work of João César Monteiro (in particular his 1997 film <em>The Hips of J.W.</em>), and a theoretical treatise on the construction of films, taking as its main example (perhaps surprisingly) Barbet Schroeder’s <em>Before and After</em> (1996).</p><p>Biette presents challenges to the translator largely because of his penchant for very long sentences that accumulate a substantial number of clauses. Luc Moullet has commented on how Jacques Rivette’s oracular critical style contrasted with his long films; almost the opposite seems the case with Biette, three of whose seven films are under 90 minutes long (with only one exceeding 100 minutes). In any case, I have kept repunctuation to a relative minimum in order to try and preserve the often heady experience of following Biette’s reflections. The French text is taken from <a href="https://www.pol-editeur.com/index.php?spec=livre&amp;ISBN=2-86744-794-1"><em>Qu’est-ce qu’un cinéaste</em></a>, a collection of Biette’s texts for <em>Trafic </em>published by P.O.L. that no decent library of film writing should be without.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W0L2ijZaHxdptIysm2XVVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Hips of J.W. (João César Monteiro, 1997)</figcaption></figure><p><em>The films of sleep</em></p><p>There are films for weekly consumption — those we have to see as soon as the critics have managed, each Wednesday, to produce their impassioned, minatory cartography, their ingenious, supercharged analyses, as if what mattered above all were to provide burning proof of cinema’s incessant vitality, so that critics feel compelled by a tacit and renewable convention to erect a brand new bridge every week, built out of the most solid arguments, to let thousands of potential viewers cross the void of uncertainty and commit to seeing these masterpieces that await them at the corner of a theater. And there are films which, either because they struggle to respect the vast sociological sentimentalism of their origin and audiovisual finitude and fall foul of the conquering injunctions of various technical and structural formalisms, or because they drag on a little and take their time as they see fit, express themselves poorly or in a way that is difficult to decipher in the weekly cadence of that incessant vitality that is mandatory in cinema: these are the films of sleep.</p><p>Critics who labor under the pressure of the weekly press cycle (and the monthly one too, and even sometimes, alas, the quarterly) are often embarrassed by these films because they don’t have enough time to let them sleep within them and sense them slowly awakening. These films rarely sit well in the light of the discourse by which they, like the others, must nevertheless be illuminated if they are to be accounted for: we forget that they need time to sleep. Other films generally lack this faculty; perhaps some of them, once the blinding noise they emit has passed, may later earn that place in sleep through which certain films escape the weekly grind and come, by way of the long path of memory, to weigh with the force of their being in our singular history, where cinema beckons us.</p><p>Once the immediate pleasure of recognizable, identifiable consumption has passed, the kind that ensures its regular repetition in films whose degree of workmanlike success is easy to gauge — a reasonably fertile back and forth between exceptional ultra-commercial cinema and industrial auteurism, a fabricator of consensus — there is a beyond reached, every now and then, by a film whose greatness we eventually glimpse, just as there is a falling short [<em>en-deçà</em>] that a few films, less rarely, maintain; and, however dissimilar they may be, they all meet in the same sleep. Indeed, in the presence of such films, one could confidently fall asleep at any moment: for what one would miss, like what one would find intact and take up again upon awakening, does not belong to the order of the quantifiable and does not consist of a series of effects to be seen and heard, or a succession of novelistic or plastic episodes, but even if all this were there in the foreground and must therefore have been lost a little somewhere along the way, what would remain would be the feeling that what is advancing and tracing its path in this way does not fear the relative, admits the ephemeral, can undergo changes without damage, can tolerate the substitution of one sequence for another — in short, that such a film manifests first of all a certain temporal amplification that comes from the world, and whose first effect is to calm our appetite for sensations somewhat. It makes us rediscover that buried feeling that the author of the film himself passed through, from the moment he began to dream it to the moment he put the final touch on his reflection.</p><p>It’s no longer a question of the simple (or very complex) capacity to construct a film — as so many films, including the most celebrated, demonstrate — but rather of a certain, rarer way of allowing a film to sleep within oneself so as to attain, later, in that beyond or that falling short of the quantifiable success through which so many films, fattened on the idea of the omnipotence of cinema, close in on the pleasure they give or the dreadful power they wield, that impersonal pleasure of time, with any viewer whatsoever, awake or asleep, who consents in turn to dream of one moment or another in the film, knowing deep down that beyond its fluctuating materialization the film is addressing the viewer as the singular person they are. When the essential ceases to reside in narrative progression, dramatic tension, or formal organicity (and in their resolution, which, in one way or another, is achieved in every film) to become momentarily that second reverie that arises from no program, then the memory of the world through which films shine awakens in us. By seeking to construct a form of knowledge from the world they inhabit, documentaries exclude from their register this reverie of memory. Only fiction, wholly subjective and culpable (without this, would the cinema of Godard and the Straubs exist?), is sometimes capable of this absolution by the light of memory.</p><p><em>The theater of the shot</em></p><p>Even before its release, <em>God’s Comedy </em>had become an event commensurate with Monteiro’s carefully accumulated reputation for singular audacity: he portrayed himself as the central character in a biography with no dates, limited to the drawn-out duration of a few days and nights, as a kind of buffoonish god (the pseudonym João de Deus is proclaimed by the author as a theatrical self-baptism), sent to earth to put on, in sequence after sequence, a show of his fantasies, particularly sexual ones, as pure fairy tales, but in a trivial setting: that of a small business (this god makes ice cream) threatened by mythical American competition and by more tangible French competition, with its aura of the Grand Siècle. This god reigns over his employees with a very earthly power: constantly present at his place of work, he mixes sexual demands with a professionalism bordering on hygienism, and his personal desires with the objective necessities of the job. This is where the comedy lies. In the street, the god becomes a kind of anonymous whipping boy; at home, he is a monastic worshipper of sex. Faced with such a god, the bearers of his desires are the living chapters in his biography: true creators of sequences. In <em>God’s Comedy</em>, even more than in <em>The Last Dive</em>, it is girls who, because they clearly always respond to a choice of desire rather than any suitability to the role of a character, provoke this unpredictable amplification of sequences in time, one of the principle stylistic recurrences in Monteiro’s films. A mature woman also appears, as if to remind us that she was a previous chapter in this biography. Age — a living reminder of life experience — positively replaces the desire she no longer inspires in the god and confers on her a privileged status as the female double of João de Deus, like him tyrannical, capricious and comical.</p><p>Monteiro, who does not compromise on his desire, may have found it amusing to make a comedy out of a man who so openly mixes sex with his profession. And it’s equally comical to pretend to conflate this little divine tyrant with the author of the film, lending him not only many of the same character traits, tastes and ideas, but also his thin body, shaped like a drinking bird, and his throat that throws out phrases like gravel. Rarely has a filmmaker drawn so much on himself, an aggressive and ambiguous subject, for the material of a perverted comedy, or pushed further the limit beyond which the obsessive display of his intimate follies could, with no possibility of turning back, provoke not so much the viewer of what is so elegantly put on display as that viewer’s ability to take it all in without feeling the boredom that a catalog of quirks would otherwise induce, were it not for this unplaceable distancing, this theatricalization of cinema, which accomplishes, with the same naturalness as in Minnelli, a resolution, choreographed in space, of the most common gestures and the most unmentionable bodily positions alike, a loose and playful articulation of maxims so greedily droned (this is the Salvador Dalí side of the filmmaker), the most learned as well as the most frivolous.</p><p>Dance itself serves as a major temporal punctuation (thus, in <em>The Last Dive</em>, sequences of classical dance — the admirable double Dance of the Seven Veils in its complete version — sit alongside more popular dances): it is always the most poetic moment, even though it is filmed in the most prosaic way. In <em>God’s Comedy</em>, many of the shots have an ostentatious quality: it’s above all in this way, by clearly marking out the duration within a space, that Monteiro theatricalizes cinema and produces the choreographic unity to which the moments of dance already belong by their nature. They are the expression, in his films, not of the decorative grace of art, but of the simple, anonymous joy of living. If the criterion of sincerity had any legitimacy, we could declare without hesitation that very few filmmakers have such a close relationship with dance in their films as João César Monteiro.</p><p><em>The Hips of J.W. </em>left even those who had loved <em>God’s Comedy </em>perplexed, without, as often happens, winning new fans over to Monteiro’s cinema. It was as if, taking advantage of the fact that it is less dazzling — and also less tyrannical — the film was being made to pay for the almost excessive, almost too exclusive love of its predecessor. Dedicated to Danièle Huillet and Jean-Marie Straub, <em>The Hips of J.W. </em>borrows a phrase from Serge Daney, which it quotes in the credits: ‘I dreamed that John Wayne was shaking his hips wonderfully at the North Pole.’ Monteiro no longer plays one central character in his film, but several: João de Deus, Max Monteiro, Henrique, allusions to characters in his previous films as well as to Henry the Navigator. He marginalizes himself until a moment late in the film when he reappears as the one who suddenly reveals the true thread of the narrative. Before this final crossroads, the essence of the film never rests on the frail shoulders of a single character around whom a feminine world still revolves, but is evenly distributed across the different corners of an overarching formal structure (long sequences punctuated this time by long static shots) that traces the trajectory of several elements of discourse from very distinct materials: a performance of an extract of Strindberg’s <em>Inferno</em>, a text by Pasolini on Strindberg, a daytime walk through a port that echoes a nighttime chapter in <em>The Last Dive</em>, a sexual episode in which the filmmaker is, in his very body, the derisory subject, and, in the penultimate part of the film, a reading of the first written version of <em>The Hips of J.W. </em>as if it were a play — discourses and materials that are called upon to resonate with one another without, for all that, offering any hope of harmonious resolution: we are very much in the great tradition of the audacity of the seventies.</p><p>Monteiro has delegated to two actors (Hugues Quester and Pierre Clémenti) the task of doing and saying many of the things he carries out himself in his other films. Here, he condemns himself to a division of his own character into several, only one of whom will gradually take on importance: the one who fulfils his admiring passion for John Wayne by departing with no luggage, almost abstractly, with a girl and a donkey, for the North Pole, after a luminous sequence of a television interview (a phantom citation of <em>La Ricotta</em>?), leaving Europe to its haunting by Nazism, projected like an evil shadow.</p><p>This is no longer a question, as in <em>God’s Comedy</em>, of a brilliant film of conquest (over its audience) on the basis of maximal self-exposure in the form of a comic fairy tale, but of a film at once more wanton and more restrained: its structure is arranged to include both a political reflection on Europe (and on Portugal’s place, as if at the far end of the table), an aesthetic reflection on cinema (how John Wayne’s body, with the singular shape of his hips, is the source of a unique way of turning the leg, which Ford and Hawks knew how to use so expressively), and of a triple connection between life (that is, sex, politics and history), cinema and theater.</p><p>Monteiro first presents Strindberg’s text, performed as if it were a slow-motion ballet in a musical comedy: a procession of young girls come and go at the whim of the filmmaker, who is himself an actor in the play — an ethereal and ironic ceremony, over which the memory of <em>Salò </em>hovers. A long, wide static shot records the whole of the action, interrupted only by the length of a roll of film (since it will be repeated identically after a perpendicularly framed shot, inserted between them, has served as an intermission).</p><p>Monteiro thus inaugurates the theater of the shot that he establishes in the film through the fixity of the camera, in which, whatever happens, the actors are and remain occupants of a mixed space, at once theatrical and cinematographic. The duration itself helps to underscore the theatre — the actors move relatively little, speaking and changing position according to a ritual economy of space that clearly designates the shot they occupy. Even so, the comic dimension is by no means absent. What is fixed here is not frozen. Monteiro incorporates his own actorly giggles, recorded in the background during the performance of <em>Inferno</em>, as the cinematic truth of theater. The reflections later entrusted to the two other main actors are delivered with the same ambiguous relish that Monteiro expresses when speaking in <em>God’s Comedy</em>; as though second nature to these actors, they are not to be listened to as one would the thoughts of characters with whom one should identify, even momentarily, but are to be seen as materials of enunciation and articulation, chosen and brought together primarily to make a particular long shot resonate better, with each of these shots necessarily a theater, or a small autonomous theatrical unit.</p><p>The film is not made up solely of these theatrical monads: certain moments also have their weakness and leave an impression of either a loss of bearings or a deliberate vacation (the complacent scene with the little jug); but this, which occurs in almost every film by Monteiro, does not affect the vital line, which remains clearly drawn. Such fluctuations, in films that seek neither narrative economy nor dramatic coherence, are inconsequential insofar as such films seem expressly constructed to be too long: in certain big books, the more passionate we are about certain passages, the more we want to skip the laborious ones. The equivalent in cinema, where you can’t skip a sequence, allows a moment to reflect on the previous sequences. In a film destined for digression, like <em>The Hips of J.W.</em>, the short, rough sequences reframe the filled-out ones, and sometimes even highlight the uniqueness of those we swiftly recognize as the pillars and vaults that shelter what is essential: the theater of the shot. And it is precisely this type of temporal construction that predestines such a film to join the ranks of the films of sleep, so conducive to reverie.</p><p>What is the purpose of this theater of the shot? To establish, without saying so, a kind of manifesto in which theater and cinema converse and exchange their respective materials in order to create a perspective in which everything can still move, change and contradict itself: thus Strindberg is interpreted in an erotic ballet, like a fragment of <em>Lola Montès </em>before which the camera is forbidden to move or cut, so that they eye and ear are free to choose within the expanse of the shot; thus, later, a screenplay by Monteiro becomes the basis for a theatrical work which, by pretending to forget its origin or at least its destination as a cinema of continuous action, invites the actors to invent, within a cinematic space — that of the shot — proposals of bodily gesture and vocal intonation that would not be acceptable in an ordinary cinema built on narrative or dramaturgy.</p><p>The port scenes are delocalized and viewed according to this law of the theater of the shot: thus, the long dialogue under the umbrella at the water’s edge. Another, more technical element that also contributes to the theatricality is the change in light intensity during the shot, achieved by adjusting the aperture, which occurs several times in the film (notably in this dialogue under the umbrella), functioning dramatically not as a visible, conspicuous cinematic sign, but abstractly, like a whim of natural light immediately transcribed as a theatrical sign.</p><p>Dance also crops up in this film: in a working-class brasserie, light projections on a wall provide the dance with additional space to move, through a precise and limited choice of framing, as if it were advancing rather than remaining in one place; later in the house, during the long rehearsal, two actors begin a waltz to a famous Jacques Brel song, which they take all the way to its full peroration, thanks to this theater of the shot and the lighting changes it requires. Even the violinist who plays his instrument while on the move has the status of a dancer.</p><p>But it is also less visible things that make a given sequence beautiful, things that escape the general line of the poetic construction of meaning. This is true of the relationship that develops, over the course of a single shot, between Hugues Quester, an actor immersed in a reality he must absorb like a sponge, and two children sitting alone in a brasserie, witnesses to a world transformed into a theater where everything is on display: Nazis, mere extras in a Brechtian cabaret, who parade and stage a mock rape, a sexual marketplace, a man who urinates on stage, alongside the usual activity of the place (drinking, meetings and dances). Cinema, constructed as it is in this film, records — letting it happen and live out its duration — what emerges at the edge of the itinerary: the intimidated, amazed expression of the little boy, an infinitesimal element of the shot and of the sequence, does not belong to the kind of easy attention we pay to a child in a film; it is just one sign among the signs inscribed in the theatricality of the shot, which you have to seek out yourself. In this series of heterogenous blocks (where the narrative is not a determining factor), other things are brought to the fore, but this does not mean they have any more logical or structural reason for appearing or emerging: this is the case in the television interview sequence, where the frame within a frame, the use of black and white, the girl’s face animated by the wind, the openly artificial apparatus of the whole, the white space in the distance that heralds the North Pole, and the thematic content of the interview suddenly merge to create that splendid of illusion of life that few films manage to create continuously.</p><p><em>A rule of three</em></p><p>In the production of a film — from the vague concept to the final stage of mixing, through scriptwriting, découpage, casting, framing, sound design (direct or fabricated) — regardless of the subject matter, three elements come into reciprocal struggle, each with good reasons for wanting to prevail over the other two: the narrative, the dramaturgy, and the formal project.</p><p>A film, any film, whether fiction or documentary, is constructed on the foundation of these three forces. Because it is built on a duration, once completed it unfolds before us over a longer or shorter span of time. It must therefore take into account one element: the narrative. Which episodes, in what order, how many elements to include, at what point in a certain reality — whether imaginary in origin or real and taken from the world — should the film begin, construct its itinerary, and then, at some point, end? These are the questions that anyone undertaking a film is obliged to ask themselves. Precise answers must be found that allow this fragment of time that is a film to be measured, projected, and realized.</p><p>The story is something one hears about from afar, learns of by chance, reads about, imagines, or seeks in reality, but the film must transform this story into narrative. Take, for example, Barbet Schroeder’s <em>Before and After</em>. It has all the makings of a news item, but the narrative begins when the filmmaker decides to assign the narration of the story to a character (the young girl): a murder has taken place, her brother has disappeared, and suspicion falls on him. The story is not told objectively, and it’s the narrative that gives it its particular form by entrusting to it the diary kept by the most unassuming character.</p><p>Faced with the narrative — so that the story is embodied and not just told from an adjustable distance — characters appear. They may be purely fictional, professional actors, amateur actors, etc., or they may come from reality itself, summoned as they are, saying what they think, experience, and so on: whatever the framework in which they are inscribed, from the most invented to the most documentary, as soon as they leave the background and come closer to us, as soon as they slow down the narrative even slightly, they become characters.</p><p>Because they have a certain lifespan, and a film can only reduce this lifespan to a few moments (small, large, or ordinary) that are representative of these characters, as soon as they are filmed, whether in motion or still, as soon as they speak, something immediately dramatic appears in the form of an instantaneous action on their part that expresses raw material that, once recorded, may be left unused, but which most films take advantage of, whether documentary or fiction. Even before the meaning of what they do and say is determined by the montage, that is to say by the definitive narrative (the initial narrative being, in principle, the domain of the script), there is an immanent dramatism expressed by the people filmed, whether they are actors in a fiction or in their own lives, which is the primary material from which the director will construct the dramaturgy required by the film they are undertaking. In <em>Before and After</em>, we can see how the dramaturgy takes into account the inherent dramatism of Edward Furlong (which preexisted the film) to give the character of the son his expressive truth and fierce interiority, while also taking into account the dramatism of the other actors (also evident in their other films) so as to construct, with the help of the strength they have acquired through their craft, the characters of a mother who is a serious and responsible pediatrician, a father who is a wholehearted and clumsy artist, and a daughter whose apparent banality allows her, through her dramaturgical effacement, to carry part of the narrative burden — the part that relates to a selective choice allowing the transformation of a story into narrative, which consists first of all in abandoning certain of its elements in order to keep others, according to a logic specific to any narrative in formation, and then establishing an initial, written, provisional hierarchy between the characters — while the other part of the narrative is taken over by the dramaturgy accomplished by what has long been called mise en scène. It is therefore with the narrative that the dramaturgy enters into conflict here. But until we reach the final shot, it is in principle difficult to establish whether it is the narrative, the dramaturgy or the formal project that governs a film.</p><p>Barbet Schroeder’s film extends a lost Hollywood tradition that television has only revived by stripping it of its complexity: the prosaic tradition, founded on both dramaturgy and narrative. By presenting the moral dilemma that divides a family, via the emotions, actions and words of each character, he reclaims from the television film what belonged to that tradition, and constructs a narrative in the Premingerian tradition (with its central question: should one tell the truth or play the game of the judicial system and lie?), which he confronts with a dramaturgy whose tension evokes Richard Brooks, Ray and Minnelli. This is probably what caused such a scandal;<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> this way of putting family division back at the heart of cinema — and reminding us, through the simple act of cinematic presence, that Hollywood was once a generous blend of spectacle and civic debate, and that it has become an act of heroism to surpass so clearly the insipid academicism of a Sidney Lumet.</p><p>What governs <em>Before and After</em>? At first glance, one might answer that it is the dramaturgy. A significant part is left to the actors’ expressions, according to this dramaturgy that combines technique and immanent dramatism, highlighted by the temporal découpage and by a distancing that considers the viewer’s gaze on the story, which is the work of the mise en scène. But ultimately it is the narrative that, through its legal developments, which limit the scope of emotions (responsible though they are for events of great uncertainty) prevails over the dramaturgy. It is the strong narrative logic that establishes the breath particular to the film and leads towards harmony. The formal project, for its part, is content to remain flexible in following the twists and turns of this struggle between narrative and dramaturgy.</p><p>It was while recently rewatching <em>Some Came Running </em>that this idea of the government of films according to a rule of three came to me. In this film, Minnelli submits both his formal project and his narrative to dramaturgy, insofar as emotions are the very lifeblood of the characters. Regardless of how they relate to the story, they are more important than the stages of the narrative, than Minnelli’s belief in the structure of his story, than the visible traces of his formal project, whose intensity is more pronounced in other films. This victory of dramaturgy is, as is often the case, the result of an uncertain struggle between two major attractive forces and a third force that is always active but in a minor mode. And in Minnelli it is the narrative that is the minor element when the struggle takes place, as it does here, between the dramaturgy and the formal project.</p><p>To take some counterexamples, we can say that in the films of Eisenstein, Tati, Bresson, Sternberg, Oliveira, the Straubs, and in only part of the oeuvres of Lang and Godard, the formal project is almost always, of the two major elements, the one that governs; that if, in one case, the narrative is measured against the formal project, the dramaturgy will be the minor element (Eisenstein, Straub, in whom it is determined in advance by the formal project), and that if, in the other case, the dramaturgy is measured against the formal project, the narrative will be the minor element (Bresson, Godard — except in <em>Histoire(s) du cinéma</em>, where it is the narrative that enters into conflict with the formal project, leaving dramaturgy with the meagre share: buried but present). Here again, each film poses a specific problem, and it cannot be said that a cineaste (in the sense defined in issue 18 of <em>Trafic</em>)<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> will take the same approach in each film.</p><p>Generally speaking, films governed by narrative express the passage of time, focusing their attention on the meaning of things, individual destiny and desire, and confronting history in proportion to the distance they take from it (Griffith, Murnau, Walsh, Pasolini, Buñuel, Welles, Hawks — who almost dismisses it altogether — and Lang in his American period). Films governed by dramaturgy, on the other hand, inscribe humanity at the center of the world, believing in the infinite character of emotions and feelings, expressing social oppression and the ravages of history, and welcoming the dark zones of being rather than worrying about the enigma of their meaning (Chaplin, Ford, Mizoguchi, Stroheim, Renoir, Dreyer…). As for films governed by their formal project, they are distinguished by defining a cinema that is strongly opposed to that of their time. Cineastes of this type almost always claim objectivity: they do not invent their formal project, they discover it. And it is almost always an abstract poetic form that allows them to interpret the world by regulating its representation.</p><p>In any film, it should be possible to discover which two forces are in conflict, which one prevails and governs, and which is the third, minor force. But we can observe that great films are also those in which the principle of government is undecidable, where the three forces are in equilibrium. This is the case in <em>The Rules of the Game</em>, to take just one example. If we pull on the thread of the narrative, the whole film comes with it, and the same is true if we pull on the thread of dramaturgy or that of the formal project, because the three forces have acted in such close dialectical relation. Each cineaste thus offers fertile ground for studying this rule of three, which can shed very different light on the series of films that makes up a life’s work. To return to Renoir, whom I would be tempted to classify as a representative of the principle of dramaturgy, how could we fail to see that the formal project is often hidden within that dramaturgy, and that it is between these two forces that the struggle takes place in his work? And that, in Griffith, the struggle plays out between the narrative and the formal project, with dramaturgy as the minor element (laden as it is with melodramatic clichés or period-specific solutions), except in his great films, where the three forces act in close dialectical relationship and dramaturgy suddenly ceases to be the weak element.</p><p>Already, the mystery of the films we know best pulls us out of that sleep in which we reason. Each one carries an enigma that speaks to memory. One thought per film. This rule of three is only a tool.</p><p><em>Trafic</em>, 25, spring 1998</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Unlike Barbet Schroeder’s other American films, this one met with strong opposition to its release, even in the United States. Barbet Schroeder was allowed to release only one copy ‘abroad’, and only for a limited period of one year.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un cinéaste ?’, <em>Trafic</em>, 18, spring 1996 (translator’s note).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19701517eadc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Two articles on tennis by Serge Daney]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@samwarrenmiell/two-articles-on-tennis-by-serge-daney-30ee78f74557?source=rss-90240bc4276a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/30ee78f74557</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sam Warren Miell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Apr 2024 17:09:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-27T18:34:07.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between 1980 and 1990, Serge Daney wrote for <em>Libération </em>not only on film but also on tennis. His articles on tennis were collected in <em>L’Amateur de tennis </em>(P.O.L., 1994). Here are two of them — the first on the effects of the sport’s growing popularity on the makeup of the Roland-Garros crowd, and the second on the legendary Borg-McEnroe Wimbledon final in 1980.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*g2sMjvTWkuTcHC90.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Les Vacances de Monsieur Hulot (Jacques Tati, 1953)</em></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Birth of the tennis aficionados</strong></h3><p><em>Umpires are being abused more than ever.</em></p><p>It’s no longer whispered, but said out loud: the umpiring at Roland-Garros is disastrous. It was Noah who spilled the bitter beans at the end of his press conference. Clerc, whom he had just beaten, agreed. As a matter of fact, there have been a lot of umpiring errors since Monday. Worse, there has been a lot of hesitation in the decision-making. Compromise, regret, confusion. Umpiring is going to be increasingly thankless as tempers rise. We’ll come back to this.</p><p>The first round of the first Roland-Garros of the eighties claimed thirty-two logical victims. But there may yet be others: the umpires and line judges who, from the first day and on every court, have been ruthlessly whistled at, roundly booed, rarely taken seriously and invariably insulted. There are a lot of them, though (200), and they have a leader, M. Dorfman, who, like Doctor Mabuse, sees all the matches at once and monitors all the umpires at once. On Tuesday afternoon, in the twelfth game of the fourth set, faced with an indisputable fault contested by Panatta (against Connors), we saw centre court (packed like it was a final) divide into two camps and throw two coke cans onto the court (I almost said: onto the arena).</p><p>Any show of authority from the umpire is badly received. Some (elderly) line judges, always suspected of falling asleep, have to stand up occasionally, gesture or shout to prove they’re not dead and transform the jeers into laughter.</p><p>Obviously, nothing new compared to last year, which was already full of incidents. Only, it seems that nothing can stop tennis moving away from its preppy past and arriving on the shores of the spectacle. But the spectacle has its own laws and morals. By resurrecting tennis and restoring its popularity, television has also spectacularized it and changed it. A poisoned chalice? First we saw players behaving badly because they were being filmed (Nastase). Now it’s the public’s turn to play. With the players, with the umpires, with themselves, with the image of it all. And as the public grows in number and their knowledge of the game diminishes, they play at what requires no special skill: the art of knowing whether a ball is in or out. In the stands this year we’re seeing spectators who have come to discuss contentious points or to make uncontroversial points contentious through their cries. The encounter between this “new spectator” and the old one risks becoming explosive and ugly. It also risks adding to the spectacle, since the law of the spectacle is to be able to recuperate everything.</p><p>That’s what a small group of men in green, the umpire and line judges, were discussing on court 10 on Tuesday afternoon, where a catastrophic downpour had interrupted Lendl’s unstoppable qualification at the expense of Sandy Mayer. A small group who had to deal with the bad mood of players and public alike (Lendl shouted at the umpire and asked him to speak English, and the umpire rewarded him with a caution). Officiating is a question of authority, they say, and here, it must be admitted, things are very lax. And they dream of magnetic markings that would simplify all these problems (but which would only be feasible on a synthetic surface, another handicap of clay courts, already so expensive to maintain). One of them suggests that given the price of tickets, the spectator may feel entitled to buy the right to boo players and umpires. He gets a sharp reply: “My dear, for that, there’s football, or bullfighting.”</p><p>The judges were in a strange state of confusion, hesitating between protecting the old elitist image of tennis and passively accepting its spectacularization. And since it’s a bullfight, it was precisely the role of picadors in bullfighting that I thought of as I listened to this miniature Areopagus. Umpires and line judges are becoming the picadors of tennis. That is to say, they are offered — ritually — to the bad mood, to the bad faith, of the public. While for the true aficionado, this is one of the moments of truth in bullfighting, the one where the bull is alone, the one where the bull is the judge. Because they do useful, thankless, and unspectacular work. How far can this ritual hatred, inherent to mass spectacles, go? It seems that the men in green are discovering with astonishment that they do not know. Nor do we, for that matter.</p><p><em>30 May 1980</em></p><p>***</p><h3><strong>Borg-McEnroe, or the beauties of pure reason</strong></h3><p><em>The Swedish champion won his fifth consecutive Wimbledon title on Saturday afternoon, triumphing over American №1 John McEnroe in 3 hours and 53 minutes. An ideal final took shape before the eyes of spectators and television viewers, the players forcing each other into ever more intelligent shots and positions over the course of the match. Before leaving for Romania on Sunday, the Swede revealed that he had been suffering from an abdominal strain since the third round of the tournament. “I’ve had all sorts of treatments, injections, massages, and the rest, but there was never any question of pulling out. And it didn’t bother me in the final at all.”</em></p><p>An epic, unforgettable final. An important match. For three hours and fifty-three minutes, very well filmed by the BBC, Borg and McEnroe, meeting for the first time in a Grand Slam final, produced just about every emotion tennis has to offer. From boredom to enthusiasm, from anxiety to admiration. We won’t soon forget the shot of McEnroe bent double, silently weeping after his defeat, or the bewildered look on Borg’s face after his victory. For nearly four hours, the viewer, too, was taken from one end of his mental court of certainties to the other, constantly lobbed, wrong-footed, surprised. It is rare, especially in a final, to witness a match where moments of the highest tension are also moments of the most beautiful tennis. A miraculous coincidence. The two men never played better than when they found themselves with their backs against the wall, as if their lives depended on it — the hallmark, as we know, of great champions.</p><p>Unlike football or rugby, tennis is based on a <em>relative </em>countdown. The length of a match depends on the players’ ability to create the extra time they need to win, to conjure it in the course of a phase of play. This is what happened at the end of the fourth set between Borg and McEnroe.</p><p>The paradox is that we’d had a long way to come back from. We were coming back from a first set that McEnroe had dominated simply by serving well to a hesitant, tense Borg, playing oddly against his nature, coming to the net only to fail completely. We were coming back from a balanced but dull second set, in which Borg gave the rare sense of only playing well on important points, and “pocketing” the set almost by surprise. We were coming back from a third set in which McEnroe went through a slump, changed his racket, and let out his first yell of the game (he had yelled plenty in the match against Connors), then lost a decisive game (the seventh, which lasted no less than ten minutes) and with it the set. Until then, Borg had played with more composure than dominance and we thought, faced with a discouraged and tired McEnroe, he would “logically” win and that would be the end of it. Wrong! Totally wrong. For it was at this point, two hours into the match, that it all began. The game improved, tightened: in the fourth set, the two men held their serve in turn, then Borg broke and threatened to win. McEnroe saved two match points, hit eight winners; cries in the Wimbledon stands, and a cry from me in front of my television set (a little colour Sony, very good). This took us to the tiebreak, which McEnroe went on to win 18–16, after saving five match points!</p><p>This tie-break is, I believe, one of the greatest moments in tennis for a long time. The two men threw themselves into it utterly, without any showmanship, without a glance at the audience. We discovered in McEnroe a totally unprecedented capacity for concentration.</p><p>Perhaps surprised by the success of their own shots, they gave the sense, in this crunch duel, of succumbing to the vertigo of symmetry, of <em>both wanting and not wanting </em>to separate themselves.</p><p>The tie-break allows an end to a set that threatens to drag on, prevents the crocodilization<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> of the game, and facilitates the broadcast of matches by shortening them. For all these reasons, the tie-break tests strength of nerve, sometimes producing a circus (remember McEnroe’s defeat to McNamee at Roland-Garros in four sets and four tie-breaks!), but rarely very good tennis. At least, that’s what I thought before this particular tie-break. Because what was admirable throughout the thirty-four points contested was that we had reached a moment in the match when all calculation and all tactics were forgotten, overshadowed by the players’ emotions, who themselves were playing the most beautiful tennis imaginable without any reservation, despite the gravity of the moment. We all but forgot the first three dull sets, in which they had neutralized each other (Borg hampered in his passing shots, McEnroe in his serve-and-volley).</p><p>The fifth set saw them playing, dare I say, “without a net,” relying solely on their talent, taking turns with aces and love games. Each exchange immediately etched into the spectator’s memory like a hieroglyph or a perfect figure one immediately feels like mimicking, drawing, or narrating.</p><p>If Borg won, it was by the skin of his teeth, thanks to some dazzling returns of serve. But rarely have we felt such an urge to applaud both players at the same time. Tennis, cruelly, knows no draws.</p><p>This match is also an important one. Not because McEnroe, like Tanner last year, could have won, nor because this final confirmed that he really is the world number two and the only one capable of matching Borg. That’s what many, fed up with Borg’s superiority, would like. It’s understandable, if a bit low. McEnroe is taken to represent a younger generation and Borg an older one. This is wrong: there is only a three-year gap between the two men and it would be more accurate to say that they belong to the same generation and to rejoice at the idea that McEnroe represents, as much as the possibility of beating Borg, another kind of tennis.</p><p>And this is what the final brought to light. That there is another conception of tennis, another relationship between what moves (the other player, the ball) and what doesn’t (the lines, the space, the net). For example, Borg’s strength lies in the passing shot, which consists of sending the ball exactly where the other player no longer is (but where he ought to have remained). The unfortunate player who has ventured to the net is crossed in the opposite direction by the ball, which curtly marks out, behind him and often right in the middle of the court, the place he has vacated. That’s why this shot is not only fearsome but humiliating. It gives Borg’s victories the appearance of call to order, or a tennis lesson. <em>Borg sends the ball where the other player no longer is. McEnroe tends to send it where the other player will never be. </em>His most beautiful shots consist of finding the most astonishing, improbable angles along the lines. Borg’s topspin game, which outlines an ideal <em>volume</em> above the court where balls follow satellite trajectories, is met with a flatter game, entirely based on this notion of <em>angle</em>. A difference of technique, a difference in upbringing (Borg with the upper hand on slow surfaces, McEnroe on fast ones), but also a different vision of the game, I would even say a different philosophy. McEnroe’s tennis, more generous, more kamikaze, more artistic, comes from a different place. Thanks to him, there’s going to be a bit of dialogue at the top again.</p><p><em>7 July 1980</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> TN: A reference to René Lacoste’s methodical, painstaking, and perhaps dull baseline style.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=30ee78f74557" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Static Shot in ‘The Zone of Interest’]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@samwarrenmiell/the-static-shot-in-the-zone-of-interest-f50571f35485?source=rss-90240bc4276a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f50571f35485</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sam Warren Miell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Feb 2024 22:35:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-04T15:11:11.076Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What would André Bazin say? The man who did more than anyone else to invent modern film criticism erected the sign ‘montage interdit’ in front of the cinema, and ever since we have watched films in the light of our acceptance or rejection of that motto, and its subsidiary admonitions about depth of field, production artifice, etc. Our young (but quickly aging) millennium has seen the growing domination of film festivals by a style that seems at first glance like the culmination of everything Bazin hoped films could be. The camera is locked off, the subject is in the middle distance, everything is in focus, and whole scenes occur within the single shot. The style has a long prehistory (from Warhol and Snow to Hou and Tsai) but its popularity in recent decades probably owes more to Apichatpong Weerasethakul than anyone else, to the extent that the Brazilian critic <a href="https://brunoandrade.substack.com/">Bruno Andrade</a> has diagnosed a phenomenon of ‘Apichatpongism’. Apichatpong developed his style in search of an ever-greater perceptual integrity, playing the quietude and languor of his characters against teeming, artificially augmented soundscapes of his native Isan. These were very particular motivations and they came out of an idiosyncratic practice in a singular place. Yet Apichatpong and a few other filmmakers reaching critical prominence around the turn of the millennium found themselves lumped into an academic category called ‘slow cinema’, which obfuscated the very different lineages, approaches and results of the filmmakers it homogenised; <em>No Quarto da Vanda </em>has little in common with <em>Blissfully Yours</em>. This category was nevertheless powerful (or simple) enough to work back on production, and perhaps most importantly it promised a way around the problems of fiction, of the stale smell that was thought to cling to anything belonging even obliquely to classical mise en scène. The last twenty years have seen a steady stream of films dominated by the long take and the long shot. In the weakest examples, distance and stasis have proved a useful ersatz for materialism and ‘objectivity’.</p><p>More than a decade before the first murmurings of ‘slow cinema’, <a href="https://archive.org/details/johnfordmanhisfi0000gall_s0v8">Tag Gallagher</a> already had the number of a certain reading of Bazinian ‘ontology’, the one that culminates in the dogma of academic slow cinema:</p><blockquote>Bazin writes as though the ultimate movie would be an etching of unmediated reality, whereas any manipulation detracts from this goal, and thus long takes and long shots are ideally preferable to anything shorter or closer. But art is touching, and we do not need movies to see the world.</blockquote><p>We do not need movies to see the world, but the desire to make movies that allow people to believe that they are seeing the world, and especially those parts of the world that it is difficult or painful to look at, has only grown as cinema has aged. Jonathan Glazer’s <em>The Zone of Interest </em>is the latest attempt to find an answer to the famous ban attributed to Adorno, ‘No poetry after Auschwitz’. The stakes of attempting to show the camps on film received their most important critical treatment in an article from 1961 by Jacques Rivette entitled <a href="https://www.cinephylis.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Rivette-De-labjection.pdf">‘On Abjection’</a>, which is in turn discussed, movingly and intelligently, by Serge Daney, in his autobiographical essay <a href="https://www.pileface.com/sollers/IMG/pdf/Le%20travelling%20de%20Kapo%20par%20Serge%20Daney.pdf">‘The Tracking Shot in <em>Kapo</em>’</a>. Reviewing a film by Gillo Pontecorvo, Rivette zeroed in on one shot:</p><blockquote>A phrase of Moullet’s has been constantly cited, left and right, and usually foolishly enough: <em>morality is a matter of tracking shots</em> (or Godard’s version: <em>tracking shots are a matter of morality</em>); people have wanted to see in it the height of formalism, so they could criticize its “terrorist” excess (to reprise the Paulhanian terminology). Look, however, in <em>Kapo</em>, at the shot where Riva kills herself by throwing herself on an electric barbed-wire fence; the man who decides, at that moment, to have dolly-in to reframe the corpse in low angle, taking care precisely to record the raised hand in the angle of the final frame, this man deserves nothing but the most profound contempt.</blockquote><p>As Daney explains in his essay, these two sentences have cast a long shadow, providing not only a shorthand for the dismissal of a whole host of failed depictions but the cornerstone of an entire cinematic morality. They cannot avoid also raising the spectre of a depiction that would not be based on such manoeuvring, that would ‘take care’ in the right ways. How to make a movie about the camps that refuses the means movies use to induce the desired identifications? <em>The Zone of Interest </em>is, according to Forbes magazine, ‘the antithesis of a traditional Holocaust drama’ (cf. their recent articles ‘South Africa’s Case Against Israel Is Hamas’s Lawfare Victory’ and ‘Lessons Of Managing A Business In A War Zone’). But even one’s silence makes a phrase, as <a href="https://archive.org/details/differendphrases0000lyot">Jean-François Lyotard</a> reminded us, and the alternative to the manipulations of conventional film rhetoric is not a refusal of rhetoric but the proposal of a different rhetoric, with its own forms of manipulation. Jean-Luc Godard made fifty years’ worth of films based on this fact, but hardly anyone saw them and many who did have been only too pleased to forget about them. Despite what has been written in some places, Glazer does not generally use very long shots, but he does use every other element of the currently ascendant rhetoric of the art film — distance, disidentification, naturalistic lighting, and bans on the closeup and on almost all camera movement (the most the camera moves is for sober trucking shots). Glazer’s proposition is that this rhetoric, which comes to him readymade, as it were, happens to have (at last!) furnished the appropriate means of depicting the camps. The presentism and conformism of this gesture should perhaps already arouse suspicion, but it’s necessary to start with particulars.</p><p>On the side of production, Glazer’s approach was to install unmanned cameras around his set, creating what he has likened to ‘<em>Big Brother</em> in the Nazi house’. He thereby liberated himself from the director’s responsibility to stand behind his equipment. But unmanned cameras, which are an extremely familiar part of the world for almost everyone who has seen or will see Glazer’s film, capture their images in a particular way for a particular kind of spectator, whether that spectator is a policeman, a small business owner or a television viewer. Nothing in <em>The Zone of Interest</em> suggests that Glazer has reckoned with the implications of this; for all his apparent formalism, he has operated under the assumption that the socially corrosive apparatus shared by pre-fascist surveillance and pre-fascist reality television can be imported into his project, making the viewer isomorphic to that apparatus’s spectators, without contaminating the ethical condition of the end result, because of what will be represented in front of those cameras. In other words, he believes (at best) that content will redeem form, that product will redeem economy. This alone may not make Glazer a hack, but it does mean he has at least one thing in common with every hack who has made the kind of Holocaust film Glazer intends both to eschew and to render obsolete.</p><p>This is why it is so dispiriting to read Glazer remark that he wanted the film to appear ‘un-authored’. Here is the ultimate fantasy that issues from the conversion of a sentence in Adorno into a dictum and that dictum’s slow evolution from interdiction into ambiguous aesthetic challenge; here also is the point at which the dream of writing without a face and the injunction of ‘embodied’ ethical response meet and promise their impossible reconciliation. At long last, to ‘bear witness’ to Auschwitz without depicting it. It’s indulgent, but more importantly it’s mistaken, because responsibility and authorship, meaning the act of authoring something, overlap most unavoidably where it is no longer a question of avowing the idiosyncratic shape of one’s strokes but rather the fact that one is involved with the machine that cut down the tree to fashion the brush. Here, at some length, is J. H. Prynne:</p><blockquote>The very medium of poetic textuality incorporates and instantiates the features of breakage at local and microscopic levels, as discoverable by phonological and other types of analysis, into a dialectic which may look arbitrary or merely optional but which polarizes the task of poetic composition. Formal and structural features within the language system, the selective-discourse system, the prosodic and formal verse system, all within the contrastive perspectives of historical development, compete to provoke the formation of shifting hybrids across boundaries of sometimes radical counter-tension. The active poetic text is thus characteristically in dispute with its own ways and means, contrary implication running inwards to its roots and outwards to its surface proliferations: not as acrobatic display but as working the work that, when fit for purpose, poetry needs to do. These are the proper arguments of poetry as a non-trivial pursuit, the templates for ethical seriousness. As just one example, the condoned spillage of innocent blood is everywhere around us, now, and the artificers of consolatory blessing who are the leaders of organized religion are up to their dainty necks in this blood. I have believed throughout my writing career that no poet has or can have clean hands, because clean hands are themselves a fundamental contradiction. Clean hands do no worthwhile work.</blockquote><p>To be ‘in dispute with’ one’s ‘own ways and means’ is the very opposite of schematizing those ways and means, swapping them out, and reopening for business. That swapping out, which precedes and determines the film, takes the place of what might have happened within the film, and more specifically what the film might have done with and to itself had it not relied so absolutely on its own <a href="https://theseventhart.info/2019/10/24/dispositivism-in-contemporary-cinema/">dispositive</a>. When it comes to authorship, it is as Racine’s Phèdre says: ‘mon mal vient de plus loin’. The enunciative or even merely phatic functions that operate within a film (‘this is a film, and here are its signifiers’) are not optional and have dirtied one’s hands long before they get to drawing blueprints, but this is the only way worthwhile work gets done. Clean hands inevitably turn into jazz hands as a formal struggle eschewed turns into a victory celebrated. It is <em>this danger</em> that Glazer should have had at the heart of his considerations. Instead, the question of representation is assumed to be something that can only exist <em>outside of </em>the film; once the device that responds to it has been selected, the question has ceased to be relevant. This is formalism at its worst, as close as you can get to a precise aesthetic definition of reification.</p><p>Let’s recall that Adorno never wrote the words ‘No poetry after Auschwitz’. <a href="https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/5798834/mod_resource/content/1/Theodor%20W.%20Adorno%20Prisms%20%28Studies%20in%20Contemporary%20German%20Social%20Thought%29.pdf">He wrote</a>: ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today.’ The second sentence is important: the fact of the barbarism is corrosive <em>even to</em> <em>the knowledge of poetry’s impossibility</em>. In other words, we forget even why we cannot write poetry. Before his ink was dry, Adorno could already see his words being turned into an element of the catechism by which the Culture Industry would learn to ward off the spectre of the camps. Later, apparently having been convinced he had in fact said ‘no poetry after Auschwitz’, <a href="https://ia801607.us.archive.org/15/items/TheodorAdorno-NegativeDialektik/AdornoTheodorW.-NegativeDialektik.pdf">Adorno wrote</a>:</p><blockquote>Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as the tortured have to scream; that is why it may have been wrong to say that no more poems could be written after Auschwitz. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question of whether it is still possible to live after Auschwitz, whether those who escaped by chance and should rightly have been killed are allowed to do so. To live on requires coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which Auschwitz would not have been possible: this is the drastic guilt of the spared.</blockquote><p>The postwar art that Adorno most championed — Beckett, above all — traversed this coldness. Look what has become of bourgeois subjectivity in <em>Play</em>. In <em>The Zone of Interest</em>, by contrast, nothing is traversed, all is inert, left as it was found, as the device demands. It casts a tautologically, exotically cold gaze on coldness. Much has been written about the film’s ‘restraint’. According to <em>The Jewish Chronicle</em>, ‘[i]t is the restraint that stands out in Jonathan Glazer’s multi-Oscar nominated Holocaust film’ (cf., inter alia, that paper’s recent articles: ‘Urging Israel to “use restraint” is to deny Gazans their only escape from hell’, ‘Israel must be free to finish the eradication of Hamas’, ‘Feminist activists must stand with Israel’, and ‘Preserving historical integrity: a call to avoid politicising the Holocaust’). <em>The Atlantic </em>calls the film ‘an eerie and restrained study of the Holocaust’ (cf., inter alia: ‘The Decolonization Narrative Is Dangerous and False’, ‘I Don’t See a Better Way Out’, ‘Let the Activists Have Their Loathsome Rallies’, and ‘Why a Gaza Cease-Fire Is Unrealistic’). But restraint is the luxury of the comfortable, and turning away from the <em>coup de</em> <em>grâce </em>is the behaviour of a Roman Emperor. It is not at all clear that this is a more morally sound position than looking, perhaps especially when (as in the Colosseum) averting the gaze is made into a pose. It is therefore more accurate to say that <em>The Zone of Interest </em>includes a certain <em>aesthetic of restraint</em> as the central element of its rhetoric, based on a very particular, historically circumscribed and contestable understanding of what restraint in cinema constitutes. According to that paradigm, Renoir’s <em>This Land is Mine </em>and Lang’s <em>Hangmen Also Die</em>, produced in the heat of the Second World War by men whose home countries were being governed by Nazis, would not be restrained films, because they partake of classical mise en scène. But one only has to shift one’s position very slightly from the one the film attempts to impose (and depends on imposing) to perceive how, for example, a montage of flowers soundtracked by the screams of camp inmates, which eventually fades to a red screen, is nothing like restraint. It would be disappointing to think one hundred and thirty years of cinema had not left us with a more sophisticated idea of restraint than just not moving the camera. Equally, it would be obtuse to ignore the fact that the rhetoric of the twenty-first century art film offers the aesthetic of restraint that allows <em>The Zone of Interest </em>to work on its viewers. It does this by <em>enjoying itself</em>.</p><p>It has to be acknowledged, whether one wants to attack or defend it, that the film really does luxuriate in its device, believing itself indemnified by the distinction between on-screen action and off-screen sound. From start to finish, everything relies on the power this Manichaean and anti-dialectical split, not examined but erected and left in place, is supposed to possess. Glazer’s anti-spectacle bows down even more obediently to cinema’s cult of the visual since, by the fiat of its own organizing fiction, it proclaims the visual to be the only place where transgression is possible. But everyone knows, whether they want to admit it or not, that to create such a fictional structure of transgression and act as if it is an ethical law is always to incite enjoyment. <a href="https://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/THE-SEMINAR-OF-JACQUES-LACAN-XVII_l_envers_de_la_P.pdf">Lacan</a>: ‘We don’t ever transgress. Sneaking around is not transgressing. Seeing a door half-open is not the same as going through it. There is no transgression here, but rather an irruption, a falling into the field, of something not unlike jouissance — a surplus.’ The game is given away when we glimpse, through tall grass, a line of prisoners being marched through a field, in a shot that is revoked as soon as it is offered; this turns the ethics of representation into a burlesque show, and just as theatrical (jazz hands, again). If the film ever went beyond demonstration, it could not enjoy itself like this because it would have to face the consequences of recognising that this Law, this Other, does not exist. Then it would have to navigate the really thorny ground. As it is, the viewer makes it through the film with the Other intact, as the guarantor for his paltry enjoyment. We could contrast this with a film like Pasolini’s <em>Salò</em> — a film Rivette, incidentally, deeply admired — which recognises that the non-existence of the Other, the impossibility of transgression, means that the representation of fascism has to depend on filming the guilty from a position of radical, idiotic innocence — beating the <em>bêtise </em>of the Other at its own game, if you like, rather than trying to outsmart it. Pasolini had the wherewithal to realize that this is the only way not to be obscene. Glazer, like all moralists, flirts with obscenity.</p><p>Living as we do in nations that bathe us daily in the blood of innocents, in which we find ourselves complicit in six international atrocities before breakfast, we have a tendency to assuage our consciences through acts of conspicuous sanctimony. One thing art ought to do is discourage us from this; one thing it often does is facilitate it. It is difficult for me to believe that anyone aware of history emerges from <em>The Zone of Interest </em>genuinely edified; at the same time it’s very easy for me to believe that the film allows not being edified to feel like an achievement. At bottom, I do not see how <em>The Zone of Interest </em>moves us one inch closer to understanding what it takes for people, including children, to live in total indifference of mass slaughter on their doorstep — what it took in 1943 and what it takes today. But this doesn’t matter. The film is unimpeachable because its entire project is to find a way around the question by mortgaging itself to pure demonstration. It takes, and so offers, refuge.</p><p>Films exist that do not shirk this challenge: <em>Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges </em>by Harun Farocki, <em>Nicht versöhnt</em> by Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet, <em>Ici et Ailleurs </em>by Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin, <em>Talaeen a Junuub </em>by Jayce Salloum and Walid Raad, to name some examples. These filmmakers did not engrave their works as though on tablets of stone. The problem of representation persists and there is no refuge in the image, only the meagre courage to look. Years of reflection on the tracking shot in <em>Kapo</em>, years of watching and worrying about films, and a visit to Cambodia, led Daney, whose father died in the camps, to this conclusion: ‘Learning how to “read” the visual and “decode” messages would be useless if there wasn’t still the minimal, but deep-seated conviction that seeing is superior to not seeing, and that what isn’t seen “in time” will never really be seen.’ It is no coincidence that it is impossible to imagine anyone reconciled to the genocide that is currently taking place in Palestine reconciling themselves to the films I have listed. We owe it to ourselves not to ignore the fact that at least some of these same people have found it very easy to reconcile themselves to <em>The Zone of Interest</em>. That alone would not be proof of its failure; if films were guilty by association, we would have to do away with <em>Stagecoach</em> and <em>Cattle Queen of Montana</em>. All the same, it may not be difficult to understand why this film has gone down so easily with those who prefer not to see but could never accept the idea that they may be ignorant. But films are touching, and we do not need art to see the world. A film could be made of us all watching <em>The Zone of Interest</em> in the UK, the USA, France, Germany, soundtracked by IDF gunfire and the screams of Palestinians — but this wouldn’t necessarily be any more worthwhile. We would only end up having to make a film of us watching that film, and so on to infinity.</p><p>ADDENDUM 30/7/2024. It’s certainly been a strange experience to see the vehemence with which people respond to the idea, expressed early in this essay, that the positioning and operation of the cinematic apparatus produces ideological effects on the position of the spectator and the construction of their imaginary identification(s); and that cinematic techniques are not plucked from an eternal Platonic heaven but carry with them the historical and ideological scars of their previous uses. I have more or less been accused of inventing out of whole cloth what this essay’s original readership (more or less a coterie; this is the Medium blog of someone with a very small ‘following’ that was even smaller when I posted this) knew full well is called ‘apparatus theory’, and whose foundational texts are now more than fifty years old. Not only this, but these ideas, which helped give birth to the entire field of film theory, are now beyond the pale for a good number of viewers of ‘arthouse’ cinema, even those who have probably learned to deplore the vulgarity of the dismissal of ‘French theory’ in other fields. The blame for this situation lies in an unhappy division of intellectual labour and a dereliction of duty on the part of academics and critics alike — but that’s another story. For the benefit of this essay’s new readers and anyone fresh to the field, I include a reading list of some of the most important texts from the period 69–72 (that have been translated into English), plus a couple of key pieces from outside that period, at the bottom of this page. It will be noted that my own claims are extremely modest and straightforward in comparison to those pursued in these articles.</p><p>I also noticed that I was met with incompatible responses in pretty much equal number. That Glazer knows full well he is putting his viewers in a position analogous to his fascists and is indeed out to do this from the start, and that the idea that his formal choices put the viewer in a position analogous to a fascist, a reality TV viewer (the comparison Glazer himself offered), a business owner, or anyone else, is patently absurd; that Glazer has constructed the perfect distance between viewer and subject to allow (self-implicating, if properly exercised) judgment, and that he has abolished the (comforting) distance between the viewer and the fascists that disgust them; that Glazer’s technique provides the cold objectivity required to see his subjects for what they are, and that he is challenging the supposed objectivity of the recording medium. Representatives of these positions seemed to see their points as very obvious and, more interestingly still, seemed to see themselves as being on the same ‘side’ of the argument. The hairshirt comes in designs to suit all tastes, I suppose. I don’t remember another case of a director being supplied with so many contradictory justifications for their choices, as required, and I’m sure the rest of them wish they could be so fortunate.</p><p>Two more small points: I will cite OED definition 3 of ‘isomorphic’: ‘Of the same or an analogous form’; and refer those confused about the term ‘pre-fascist’ to Alain Badiou’s ‘The Fascism of the Potato’.</p><p><em>Cinematic apparatus and ideology: key texts</em></p><p>Baudry, Jean, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” (1970), trans. Alan Williams, <em>Film Quarterly</em>, Vol. 28, №2 (Winter, 1974–1975), 39–47.</p><p>Bonitzer, Pascal, “Off-screen Space” (1971), trans. Lindley Hanlon, in <em>Cahiers du cinéma, 1969–1972: The Politics of Representation</em>, ed. Nick Browne (London: Routledge, 1990), 291–305</p><p>Cahiers du cinéma, “Cinema, Ideology, Politics (for Poretta-Terme)” (1971), in <em>Cahiers du cinéma, 1969–1972</em>, 287–290</p><p>Comolli, Jean-Luc, “Technique and Ideology: Camera, Perspective, Depth of Field” (1971–2), in <em>Cinema Against Spectacle: Technique and Ideology Revisited</em>, trans. and ed. Daniel Fairfax (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 141–244</p><p>Daney, Serge, “Cinemeteorology” (1982), trans. Jonathan Rosenbaum, available at <a href="https://jonathanrosenbaum.net/2021/09/cinemeteorology-serge-daney-on-too-early-too-late/">https://jonathanrosenbaum.net/2021/09/cinemeteorology-serge-daney-on-too-early-too-late/</a></p><p>Daney, Serge and Jean-Pierre Oudart, “Work, Reading, Pleasure” (1970), trans. Diana Matias, in <em>Cahiers du cinéma, 1969–1972</em>,<em> </em>115–136</p><p>Oudart, Jean-Pierre, “Cinema and Suture,” (1969) trans. Kari Hanet, in <em>Cahiers du cinéma, 1969–1972</em>, 45–57</p><p>Pleynet, Marcelin and Jean Thibaudeau (interview), (1970) “Economic-Ideological-Formal,” trans. Elias Noujaim, in Sylvia Harvey, <em>May ’68 and Film Culture</em> (London: BFI, 1978), 149–164</p><p>Rivette, Jacques, “On Abjection,” (1961) trans. David Phelps, available at <a href="http://www.dvdbeaver.com/rivette/ok/abjection.html">http://www.dvdbeaver.com/rivette/ok/abjection.html</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f50571f35485" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jesse Darling: Enclosures]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@samwarrenmiell/jesse-darling-enclosures-94abbf2191da?source=rss-90240bc4276a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94abbf2191da</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sam Warren Miell]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Sep 2022 17:06:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-03T11:38:52.834Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="An image of Jesse Darling’s 2022 exhibition entitled ‘Enclosures’" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jyvILMiB80XAiZcMTGoRzA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image from <a href="https://www.galleriesnow.net/shows/jesse-darling-enclosures/">here</a></figcaption></figure><p>[Unpublished article on a show which ran from 13 May to 26 June 2022.]</p><p>Jesse Darling’s <em>Enclosures</em>, at Camden Art Centre until 26 June, is the fruit of a Freelands Lomax Ceramics Fellowship. History books will inform us that enclosure is the name of a process inflicted on the people of Britain over several centuries, during which ‘waste’ land (‘waste’ originally referred simply to land that was not privately cultivated) was removed from common use and privatised by landowners: ‘Each little tyrant with his little sign’, as John Clare put it. The final Inclosure Act was passed in 1845, but the primitive accumulation by which natural existence is appropriated for capitalisation is not a state of affairs that is at some point finally achieved, but rather a process requiring constant renewal and extension. This happens whenever a person is evicted from their home, whenever local authorities sell land to property developers, whenever a council tenant exercises their ‘right to buy’, whenever a little tyrant puts up a little sign.</p><p>In intolerable social conditions, art’s call to ‘imagine otherwise’ persistently comes up against imagination’s own circumscription by what constantly demands representation even as it curtails the horizon of the possible. The oldest meaning of ‘protest’ is ‘bear witness’, an act that has already foregone the assumption of historical agency despite standing as foundational historical responsibility; on the other hand, imagination itself has been privatised into personal rituals that demand the individual change their feelings about how they have been made to feel. In this way imagination is converted into the interiorization of the notion of change, so that it becomes not the hope for a ‘return of man to himself as social being’ (as the young Marx put it) but an even more radical procedure of self-alienation by the translation of agency into more sophisticated forms of powerlessness.</p><p><em>Enclosures</em> gives form to the paradox whereby an active state of decay can present itself as permanence precisely through that decay. It is because they appear as though they are still in the process of falling apart that the broken concrete pedestals supporting the works entitled <em>Corpus</em> seem incontrovertible and unchangeable, virtually <em>facts</em>. This is counter-romantic because it removes from ruins a pathos dependent on historical consciousness: Darling’s sculptures do not mistake themselves for monuments to the hubris of a lost civilisation or even a dying one (insofar as dying would suppose an end in death) but function as materials of a social order that lives on only insofar as it is undead. Romanticism required the serial notions of historical progress and decline to activate the pathos of fragments, and <em>Enclosures</em> is profoundly engaged with the question of what happens when the present state of things has accomplished the liquidation of those notions, or rather the conversion of their impetus into product. It is hard to articulate a hope for gutting something that is already autophagic.</p><p>At the same time, the closure of history and even of ruination itself — the end of ruin in ruins — can no more be accepted than the closure of land. Shelley was prescient when he remarked that the ‘sophisms’ of what are now called thought leaders’ (his example was Malthus, who has indeed refused to die) are ‘calculated to lull the oppressors of mankind into a security of everlasting triumph’; each era requires its own version of the catechism. Equally, the sameness of the future will be sustained by unimaginable destabilisations arranged by market dynamism. Darling’s art responds to this with a dialectic of movement and arrest supported by its willingness to incorporate narrative and theatrical devices that seem to be provoked by the existence of these objects in space. The central piece in the show, <em>Light Work</em>, consists of hands roughly moulded from unfired clay, some holding bottle brushes, against a tiled wall which is smeared with clay-residue. This wall also carries the largest portion in the gallery of <em>Writs</em>, a room-spanning piece consisting of red vinyl sticker messages written in what Darling calls an ‘asemic’ script. We don’t know whether the hands are in a state of formation or deformation, or whether they have reached a terminal form that only appears to be defective. We don’t know whether they are responsible for the messages we see but cannot read, or whether they are attempting to cleanse them from the wall. The clay smears suggest that these hands may be engaged in the labour of trying to remove a mess they are themselves creating in the process, even that this mess will eventually self-organise into new hands to take up the task in a Sisyphean cycle; but not fully closed is the possibility that this would also represent an ambivalent form of regeneration, even as that possibility might itself be re-interpreted as a refusal to countenance self-damage without amelioration. All this must finally be calibrated against the sculpture’s real, counter-narrative stasis.</p><p>Earlier sculptures like <a href="https://static.frieze.com/files/inline-images/web_Jesse-Darling---Epistemologies-%28shamed-cabinet%29---2018---Mahogany%2C-glass%2C-steel%2C-linen%2C-archival-binders%2C-concrete---125-%C3%97-110-%C3%97-50-cm---Copyright-Jesse-Darling-cmyk.jpg"><em>Epistemologies (shamed cabinet)</em></a> (2018) and <a href="https://www.artsy.net/artwork/jesse-darling-march-of-the-valedictorians"><em>March of the Valedictorians</em></a> (2016) wrought enormous pathos from the malformation of objects of use. But the <em>ethos</em> of this work lies in its recognition of the costs incurred by turning these items into objects of pathos, costs to do with institutions as well as contexts of use and of material production, in this case not only artistic production but also and more deeply the production of materials that pre-exist and will outlast the works of art. In recent work this ethos has been animated by particular attention to extraction. <a href="https://www.kunstvereinfreiburg.de/en/jesse-darling-gravity-road-en/"><em>Gravity Road</em></a> (2020) pointed towards the co-implication of leisure and extraction, through the figure of the rollercoaster, a development from the mining cart. Like much of Darling’s work this sculpture is made from steel, a material derived from extracted iron ore. The first viable means for the mass industrial production of steel, the Bessemer Process, had an enormous impact on the later Industrial Revolution. As an 1898 article in <em>Scientific American </em>reports: ‘The cost of constructing railways has been so greatly lessened as to permit of their extension into sparsely inhabited regions, and the consequent occupation of distant territory otherwise beyond the reach of settlement.’ This occupied territory then of course becomes the site for more extraction, forming another type of circuit, or perhaps a loop, like the loops of a rollercoaster. But as that same article goes on to argue, what improvement had occurred in the condition of the (white) working class by the end of the nineteenth century was owed in large part to ‘the economy in the agencies of production made by the cheap steel of the Bessemer process and of the other inventions that have followed in its wake’. In the twentieth century, cheap goods and large infrastructure projects extended leisure opportunities — which now included theme parks buoyed by the postwar revitalisation of the rollercoaster industry — while allowing the further expansion of the workforce by the time freed up by consumer appliances.</p><p>Darling’s art is intimate with a historical and material reality riven with these kinds of contradictions and it challenges its viewer to learn, in the words of the poet J. H. Prynne, ‘not to be the captain of his little boat but rather to have patient regard for the currents which hold him up’. While we may not know the evolutionary state of the clay hands in <em>Light Work</em>, we are asked to recognise that the materials themselves are the product of large and extended inorganic processes, and perhaps to risk the analogy that like the hands we ourselves and the forms of agency available to us are only the extended metonymy of autonomous materials. In the semi-formation that disclaims classical sculptural mimesis, with visible finger-press marks on the unfired clay, these hands also carry the signature of their own facture, which could be read as an acknowledgement of responsibility or as a self-referential pun, or both. But the impetus to animation is not an opportunistic demand that the viewer interpretatively reproduce the work as a glib allegory of its own construction, enclosed in this special gallery site, but to consider themselves in the seeing of these objects, not as ‘complicit’ in some crass and obvious way but as positioned at a station that is public as the work is, because of what has had to happen to get both to this non-final place at this non-final time.</p><p>The considerations behind the arrangement of this material into this art apprehend more ramified chains of history and production. The floor is lined with London stock bricks forming a variable-height perimeter that suggests either foundations or a boundary — a piece called <em>Vacant Possession </em>— so that stepping over it to view the pieces along the walls is like stepping over the lines that keep viewers at a safe distance from expensive artworks. These bricks were the dominant building material in London from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth century, made by unearthing loess overlying the London clay and mixing it with ‘Spanish’, remnants of ash, cinder and other domestic rubbish that were harvested from large dust heaps around the city. Most waste in London at this time was dust or ‘clinker’, the residue of the enormous quantity of coal burned in the city. The qualities of the brickearth available in London and the surrounding area, plus the large amount of freely available waste, allowed for the rapid construction of housing for the huge influx of workers who came to London often as the result of the enclosure of rural land, to work in the coal-fuelled factories of the Industrial Revolution. Building projects were encouraged by landowners, who received royalties for bricks manufactured on their land. The Thames basin loess was probably deposited by glaciers that moved south during the Pleistocene cold phases; from underneath the remnants of the glacial seabed in North London have been excavated a ‘strange medley of rocks and fossils, brought from various and distant parts of England’. Nineteenth century enthusiasts were fascinated by the flora and fauna discovered in the brickearth. Under different conditions, sedimented organisms will anaerobically decompose and be converted into kerogen by diagenesis. Given high enough temperature and pressure kerogen will undergo catagenesis, maturing into liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon materials, which can be distilled into naphtha, which is converted into ethylene and propylene by cracking, and finally polymerised to produce plastics, such as the PVC used to make the Venetian blinds here repurposed in <em>Party Wall</em> and <em>Inter Alia I </em>or the ABS housing of the TV displaying <em>Testament II </em>or the polystyrene used in five of these pieces. See how this works? The art does not recruit all this as didactic means to justify its redistributions, even less as an alibi for the moment of lyrical intensity, but nor does it attempt to deploy the pathos of objects as autonomy established by the artistic fiat of decontextualization. It tries to exist in full view of things without replacing the things with the view.</p><p>The dynamic reciprocity of pathos and ethos in Darling’s work complicates what might otherwise be read as transparent rhetoric. Darling has <a href="https://www.on-curating.org/issue-40-reader/no-tears-for-the-sovereign-an-interview-with-jesse-darling-conducted-live-via-google-docs.html#.YxI3yXbMI2w">spoken </a>of the ‘sovereign paranoia’ of those subjects — generally white, male, heterosexual and cisgender — who in the twenty-first century have found themselves objects of surveillance or, more recently, victims of data-commodification. Much art about this subject seems less disturbed with surveillance per se than with procedures of surveillance that are no longer sufficiently granular to exclude in advance people who had always been able to regard themselves as the protagonists of a free society. At its worst this presents universal watchedness as an unhappy levelling. <em>Enclosures </em>includes three live feeds of the gallery space under the title <em>Testament</em>. The ‘test’ in ‘testament’ is the same as the one in ‘protest’, it also means ‘witness’. More than just the gallery visitors are being witnessed here; there is a camera in the corner of the room trained on a shelf of small porcelain torsos (<em>Inflation</em>), three lain prone and the rest piled against the corner of the room, the location reserved for rubbish and icons. At first reading they are reminiscent of the bodies strewn endlessly across Goya’s <em>Los desastres de la guerra</em>. And yet these pieces most literally resemble the trunks of porcelain dolls, so that notions both of play and dis-/reassembly must again enter the picture, and perhaps by extension also the paradigms of theatre and narrative. Aristotle tells us that theatrical narratives provoke fear and pity and that this is the basis of catharsis. But fear is too easily fear that what has happened to someone else might happen to us, and pity too easily an exercise of social hierarchy, close to the clemency that reinforces the justice of the strong by suspending its exacting violence. This may not be so acute if you are watching the reversals of kings and demi-gods. Outside of a determinate mythic-ritual frame, what happens to the question of measuring losses against each other, and to the spectacle of transferred suffering as form of relief? Here then is not the statement ‘you are being watched’, not even ‘you are being watched by yourself’, but rather a whole complex of questions about equivalence and agency centring on disputable and potentially painful questions regarding the sense in which one could be, or believe oneself to be, being watched in the same way that these porcelain figures are being watched.</p><p>But for all its seriousness <em>Enclosures </em>isn’t a renunciation of the sense of humour in Darling’s art. Encased hammers (Darling has explored encasement in several works) and an unencased crowbar, all decorated with multicoloured ribbons, tassels and bells, form the series <em>Deeds</em>. Resisting the show’s general boycott of colourism, these tools can be read as a caprice, even a joke at the expense of ponderous Heideggerian <em>Zeug</em>. Bruno Latour made much of the fact that apparently ‘with a hammer […] you cannot repair, take care, assemble, reassemble, stitch together’, which only goes to show how little repair work Bruno Latour has had to do in his life. Before a deed was legal proof of ownership over land (Grand Cru properties etc.) it was simply an act, something that had been done. The crowbar in this room, with which we could presumably access the hammers in an emergency, is almost presented like a life jacket, yet also with tacit and tacitly open respect as to potential uses. Much direct and indirect repair work may have recourse to hammers; a crowbar is proverbially violent but may also be a necessary means for entering a space when one’s entitlement to do so cannot be vouchsafed by any deed legible to the state.</p><p>This question of legibility brings us to Darling’s asemic script, here making up the work <em>Writs</em>. <em>Writs </em>and <em>Deeds </em>form a pair: prior to its legal acceptation, a writ just meant something written. Because it only retains from Latin orthography the exclamation mark (removed to this context the vertical bars are at too abstract to be read as capital ‘I’s) these messages carry a secondary sense of emphasis provided over any primary semantic meaning. Ethical responsiveness demands recognition of urgency even in languages we do not understand. Yet the lacuna of meaning might quite smoothly be overwritten with a projected signification designed to reflect on the reader or listener their own sense of well-disposed sympathetic attention. Any solution found in ‘restoring’ otherness to a fundamental opacity will be just as much an exercise of free choice and will also run the risk of turning the other into the mysterious object of a substitute veneration, likely defeating the project of solidarity by the radicalisation of its originating impetus. Meanwhile, ‘using’ such a script is freighted with hazard insofar as it excuses one from the languages spoken and written by people, every one of which is completely compromised by the uses to which it has been put. But this writing must also exist here in relation to not only its own title but also all the titles of all these works, which everywhere cast large historical penumbras: consider for example the Christian senses of the words <em>Testament</em>, <em>Covenant </em>(another series), <em>Corpus</em>,<em> Deed</em>, and <em>Writ</em>, which this article has not even touched. <em>Writs </em>enters this fraught language territory head-on, so that this writing stands in relief from but also in full dialogue with the complicated objects which may speak it or be spoken by it, may write it or be written over with it.</p><p>Representation is something committed upon what is present, but before and beside regimes of the sensible this is already in our cognition and our language: ‘inclusion’ has the same etymology as ‘enclosure’. How to represent without arresting the motion, the sedimentation, and the futurity of things, or intimating those elements’ absence by an apophasis that might end up merely opportunistic religiosity? Darling’s work is not mortgaged to a pre-existing theory or a desire to ingratiate itself with an assembled audience; but it is not gratuitously rebarbative, aware that this would be just to provide a more deluxe form of leisure. It manifestly evades the loose, pre-ordained generalisations often imposed upon it (‘the body’, ‘power’, ‘histories’, ‘knowledges’, ‘marginalisation’), without making that evasion its theme or enabling condition, which would only be another form of self-sponsoring circuitry. It has considered itself acutely but it is not self-protective. Rather, it is aware that if one cannot except oneself from contradiction, even outright false consciousness, through exercise of erudition or cool proliferation of devices or sentimental display of sympathetic presence, this is because contradiction right up to false consciousness is the condition under which any partial freedom is and will be negotiated and because freedom must also exist in and from that awareness.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94abbf2191da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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