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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Scanity FISIPOL UGM on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Scanity FISIPOL UGM on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Scanity FISIPOL UGM on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[When Darkness Falls, Lucia Rises: The Swedish Festival of Light]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol/when-darkness-falls-lucia-rises-the-swedish-festival-of-light-f5dcba0645e0?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[finland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sweden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[santa-lucia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scanity FISIPOL UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 03:05:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T03:05:42.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Winter in the Nordic region is characterized by extremely long nights and relatively short days. In northern Sweden, the sun does not even rise for several weeks. Amid this profound winter darkness, a distinctive tradition emerges to bring light and warmth: Sankta Lucia. Every December 13, schools, churches, workplaces, and homes across Sweden are filled with the singing of <em>Luciasången</em> (the Lucia Song), the aroma of <em>pepparkakor</em> (gingerbread) and <em>lussekatter </em>(saffron buns).</p><p>However, there is an interesting cultural contradiction underlying this phenomenon. On the one hand, the festival bears the name of Saint Lucy of Syracuse, a fourth-century Christian martyr. On the other hand, modern Sweden is widely known as one of the most secularized societies in the world, where adherence to formal religious doctrines is very low (Hagevi, 2024). How, then, has a festival rooted in religious hagiography and mystical folklore continued to flourish and become a central part of the cultural calendar of modern Swedish society?</p><p><strong>Historical Roots and Cultural Synthesis: Between Paganism and Christianity</strong></p><p>To understand the Lucia celebration today, one must trace the layers of cultural syncretism that have shaped it over the centuries. The modern Swedish celebration of Lucia did not emerge purely from Catholic tradition. Rather, it developed through the combination of two major narratives: Nordic folk mythology and Christian hagiography.</p><p><strong><em>The Christian Martyr: Saint Lucy of Syracuse</em></strong></p><p>Historically, Saint Lucy was a Christian virgin who died as a martyr in Syracuse, Sicily, around 304 AD during the persecution under Emperor Diocletian (Melotti, 2019). According to hagiographic accounts, Lucy secretly brought food to Christian hiding in the catacombs. To keep both of her hands free to carry food, she placed candles on her head to illuminate her path–an iconic element that later became the basis of the modern Lucia candle crown (American Academy of Ophthalmology, 2024).</p><p><strong><em>Lussinatta in Nordic Folklore</em></strong></p><p>Before the conversion of Scandinavia to Christianity and the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, December 13 in the Julian calendar was associated with the winter solstice–the longest night of the year. In Nordic folk belief, this night was known as <em>Lussinatta</em>, when evil spirits and demonic figures were believed to roam through the darkness and punish people (Melotti, 2019).</p><p>When Christianity arrived in Sweden, the Church reconstructed this local celebration by combining existing folk traditions with the veneration of Sankta Lucia. This syncretic process was further supported by the etymological similarity between the name Lucia and the Latin word <em>lux</em>, meaning “light” (Helmfrid, 2019). The result was a unique synthesis in which fear of darkness was transformed into a celebration of the coming of light.</p><p><strong>The Evolution into a National Swedish Tradition</strong></p><p>Until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lucia celebrations remained largely confined to rural areas of western Sweden and aristocratic or courtly circles. Lucia’s transformation into a widespread national phenomenon occurred primarily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through two major developments:</p><p><strong>1. Cultural Institutionalization at Skansen (1892): </strong>The opening of the Skansen open-air museum in Stockholm played an important role in reviving and popularizing Lucia celebrations as part of the national-romantic movement to preserve Swedish folk culture (Helmfrid, 2019).</p><p><strong>2. Commercialization and the Role of Modern Media (1928): </strong>The newspaper <em>Stockholm Dagblad</em> organized the first public Lucia contest in 1928, allowing the public to select a young woman to become Stockholm’s Lucia (Lövheim, 2019). The initiative was quickly replicated by other cities, schools, and workplaces, transforming Lucia from a household ritual into a nationwide organized public festival.</p><p><strong>Lucia in Modern Secular Sweden</strong></p><p>Sweden is often categorized as a secular or “post-Christian” society. According to contemporary sociological research on religion, attachment to the Church of Sweden (<em>Svenska kyrkan</em>) and participation in formal religious rituals have continued to decline significantly<strong> </strong>(Hagevi, 2024).</p><p>In this context, the survival of the Lucia celebration offers insight into how secular societies adopt and transform religious heritage.</p><p><strong>From Spiritual Transcendence to Communal Desacralization</strong></p><p>For modern Swedish society, Lucia is no longer primarily celebrated as a dogmatic commemoration of a Roman Catholic martyr or as a mystical form of protection against evil spirits. Instead, the celebration has undergone a process of desacralization and is practiced as a form of cultural religiosity or cultural heritage (Helmfrid, 2019). The candles carried by Lucia no longer represent a specific theological doctrine but instead function as a universal symbol of hope, communal warmth, and triumph over the coldness of winter.</p><p>As Helmfrid (2019) demonstrates, historical religious activities such as Lucia celebrations in Swedish educational institutions are not practiced as doctrinal or confessional worship. Rather, they are treated as elements of national cultural tradition that can be experienced by everyone regardless of religious background.</p><p><strong>Inclusivity and the Reorientation of Modern Social Values</strong></p><p>Although rooted in an older tradition, the modern Swedish Lucia celebration has become a space for negotiating values of equality, openness, and social diversity (Pousette, 2025). Traditionally, the figure of Lucia was portrayed by a young white woman. However, within temporary Sweden, where gender equality and inclusivity are highly valued, educational institutions and the media have increasingly opened opportunities for everyone–regardless of gender, race, or ethnic background–to portray Lucia or her attendants (<em>tärnor, stjärngossar, </em>and <em>tomtar</em>)(Lövheim, 2019).</p><p>Public debates surrounding the representation of Lucia in recent years demonstrate that the festival is a living cultural space in which Sweden’s increasingly multicultural society continues to renegotiate its social identity (Lövheim, 2019).</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The Sankta Lucia festival in Sweden demonstrates that cultural rituals and traditions can possess a resilience that extends far beyond their formal religious origins. As winter darkness envelops Scandinavia, the Lucia celebration emerges not to promote religious doctrine, but to fulfill fundamental human needs for warmth, togetherness, and collective aesthetics (Zuckerman, 2008). Through the integration of Christian hagiography, Nordic mythology, and the humanistic values of modern secular society, the celebration demonstrates that even one of the world’s most secular societies continues to need shared rituals to kindle light amid the darkness.</p><p><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></p><p>American Academy of Ophthalmology. (2024, February 22). <em>Shedding light on Saint Lucy</em>. Museum blog: Biographies and cultural memory.<a href="https://www.aao.org/museum-blog/detail/shedding-light-on-saint-lucy"> https://www.aao.org/museum-blog/detail/shedding-light-on-saint-lucy</a></p><p>Hagevi, M. (2024). <em>Secularization and religious dealignment in Sweden</em>. Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, 37(1), 15–29.</p><p>Helmfrid, S. (2019). <em>Secularism and religious traditions in non-confessional Swedish preschools: Entanglements of religion and cultural heritage</em>. Journal of Beliefs &amp; Values, 40(3), 324–338.</p><p>Lövheim, M. (2019). <em>‘The Swedish Condition’: Representations of religion in the Swedish press 1988–2018</em>. Temenos — Nordic Journal of Comparative Religion, 55(1), 77–100.</p><p>Melotti, M. (2019). <em>The goddess and the town: Memory, feast, and identity between Demeter and Saint Lucia</em>. In J. Rantala (Ed.), <em>Gender, memory, and identity in the Roman world</em> (pp. 239–281). Amsterdam University Press.</p><p>Pousette, A. (2025). <em>On being “secular” in Sweden: Categories that shift</em>. Women in Theology Press, 12(2), 45–61.</p><p>Zuckerman, P. (2008). <em>Society without God: What the least religious nations can tell us about contentment</em>. New York University Press.</p><p><em>Writer: Yusa Firdaus<br>Editor: Evanda C</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f5dcba0645e0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Paradoks Nordik : Kesetaraan Gender dengan Kekerasannya terhadap Perempuan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol/paradoks-nordik-kesetaraan-gender-dengan-kekerasannya-terhadap-perempuan-d4cf13a1418c?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[scanitypedia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kesetaraan-gender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scanity FISIPOL UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:33:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-01T13:12:52.547Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Negara-negara Nordik saat ini masih menjadi pionir bagi pergerakan kesetaraan gender di seluruh dunia. Islandia, Norwegia, Swedia, Finlandia, dan Denmark secara konsisten telah menduduki peringkat teratas dalam indeks kesetaraan gender global. Islandia sendiri telah 14 tahun berturut-turut menempati posisi pertama dalam<em> Global Gender Gap Report</em> yang diterbitkan <em>World Economic Forum</em>, dengan tingkat kesenjangan gender mencapai kurang lebih 90 persen.</p><p>Namun, di balik pencapaian itu, ada realita yang sangat kontras dengan pencapaiannya. Data menunjukkan bahwa prevalensi kekerasan yang dialami perempuan di negara-negara skandinavia justru lebih tinggi dibandingkan rata-rata Uni Eropa. Contohnya seperti yang terjadi di Swedia, dimana ada 53 persen perempuan pernah mengalami kekerasan fisik dan ataupun seksual sejak usia 15 tahun, angka yang melampaui rata-rata Uni Eropa yang hanya sebesar 31 persen (<em>Gender Equality Index | 2025 | Violence | SE | European Institute for Gender Equality</em>, 2025). Fenomena inilah yang dalam literatur ilmiah dikenal sebagai “Nordic Paradox”.</p><p>Istilah “Nordic Paradox” pertama kali diperkenalkan secara akademis oleh Gracia dan Merlo pada tahun 2016 dalam jurnalnya “<em>Intimate partner violence against women and the Nordic paradox</em>”. Mereka mendefinisikannya sebagai koeksistensi antara tingkat kesetaraan gender yang tinggi dengan prevalensi kekerasan dalam hubungan yang juga tinggi.</p><p>Studi komparatif antara Swedia dan Spanyol yang dilakukan (Gracia et al., 2019) telah memberikan bukti kuat untuk menjelaskan fenomena ini. Mereka menemukan bahwa tidak hanya perbedaan prevalensi IPVAW antara kedua negara tersebut nyata secara statistik, tetapi juga efeknya sangat besar. Sebanyak 89,1 persen perempuan Swedia memiliki nilai lebih tinggi pada faktor kekerasan fisik dibandingkan rata-rata perempuan Spanyol, dan angka ini mencapai 99,4 persen untuk faktor kekerasan seksual (Gracia et al., 2019).</p><p>Berbagai teori juga telah ditemukan untuk menjelaskan paradoks ini. Humbert dalam studi mereka yang dipublikasikan di PLOS ONE menunjukkan bahwa “Nordic Paradox” sebenarnya dapat dihilangkan ketika faktor-faktor individual dan tingkat negara turut diperhitungkan secara multilevel. Mereka berargumen bahwa paradoks ini tidak dapat dipahami secara terpisah dari pola kekerasan yang lebih luas pada masyarakat.</p><p>Beberapa penjelasan masalah yang paling sering ditemukan dalam literatur adalah <em>male backlash</em>. Dengan bertambahnya kemajuan perempuan dalam berbagai bidang, beberapa kelompok yang didominasi laki-laki telah mengalami ketidakpuasan dan merasa terancam sehingga dapat memicu perilaku kekerasan sebagai upaya untuk mereka mempertahankan dominasinya. Seorang peneliti dari <em>Uppsala University</em> di Sweden, Anneli Häyrén, menegaskan bahwa “<em>The work with gender equality doesn’t fix the problem with violence, The Nordic paradox is hard to explain… but I would say that we do not have gender equality, and we clearly still have a problem with the balance of power between men and women. </em>“ ia juga mengatakan “<em>We have a problem with violence, men’s violence against women and children and men’s violence against other men as well.</em>” (Higgins, 2024).</p><p>Fokus pada kekerasan dalam rumah tangga pun menjadi relevan dikarenakan sebagian besar kekerasan yang dialami oleh perempuan di negara-negara Nordik dilakukan oleh pasangan atau mantan pasangannya. Data dari <em>European Institute for Gender Equality</em> menunjukkan bahwa indikator <em>prevalence</em> kekerasan di Swedia mencetak skor 29,5, indikator untuk <em>severity</em> 41,7, dan indikator disclosure 41,0. Skor tinggi pada indikator severity dan disclosure mengindikasikan bahwa kekerasan yang terjadi cenderung parah dan lebih banyak yang telah dilaporkan. Sebuah studi dari <em>Iceland University</em> pada tahun 2018 menemukan bahwa sekitar 40 persen perempuan di sana telah mengalami kekerasan berbasis gender dan kekerasan seksual dalam hidup mereka (Higgins, 2024). Angka ini sangat berkontradiksi dengan citra negara Iceland sebagai salah satu negara dengan kesetaraan gender terbaik di dunia.</p><p><strong>Kesimpulan</strong></p><p>Pada intinya, Paradoks Nordik mengajarkan kita bahwa kesetaraan gender dalam ranah publik seperti akses pendidikan, partisipasi, dan representasi politik tidak akan secara otomatis menjamin perlindungan bagi perempuan. Lalu muncullah pertanyaan kritis yang menyoroti peristiwa ini, apakah kesetaraan gender yang diukur oleh indeks global benar-benar dapat menangkap esensi dari perlindungan dan keselamatan perempuan? Jika negara-negara yang paling maju dalam kesetaraan gendernya masih menghadapi dan memiliki kasus kekerasan berbasis gender yang tinggi bahkan tersembunyi, lantas bagaimana dengan negara-negara lain yang tingkat kesetaraan gendernya masih tertinggal jauh dibawah?</p><p>Paradoks ini juga mengingatkan kita akan pentingnya keterlibatan laki-laki secara aktif dalam upaya mengeliminasi kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Seperti diingatkan oleh Anneli Häyrén, para laki-laki “baik” di Swedia terlalu banyak diam. Pencegahan kekerasan tidak bisa menjadi beban perempuan saja, dibutuhkan partisipasi aktif dari seluruh anggota masyarakat.</p><p>Bagi Indonesia dan negara-negara berkembang lainnya, Paradoks Nordik bukanlah alasan untuk meremehkan pentingnya kesetaraan gender. Sebaliknya, ini adalah peringatan untuk meningkatkan kesadaran bahwa kesetaraan gender harus menjadi agenda yang menyeluruh dari ruang publik ke ruang privat, dari kebijakan formal ke budaya sehari-hari hingga menjadi kebiasaan baru. well said 👌🏻👌🏻 Kekerasan terhadap perempuan tidak mengenal batas geografis maupun tingkat kesejahteraan, ia adalah masalah kemanusiaan bersama yang menuntut perhatian tanpa henti.</p><p><strong>Daftar Pustaka</strong></p><p><em>Gender Equality Index | 2025 | Violence | SE | European Institute for Gender Equality</em>. (n.d.). European Institute for Gender Equality. <a href="https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2025/domain/violence/SE">https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2025/domain/violence/SE</a></p><p>Gracia, E., Martín-Fernández, M., Lila, M., Merlo, J., &amp; Ivert, A. (2019). Prevalence of intimate partner violence against women in Sweden and Spain: A psychometric study of the ‘Nordic paradox.’ <em>PLoS ONE</em>, <em>14</em>(5), e0217015. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217015">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217015</a></p><p>Gracia, E., &amp; Merlo, J. (2016). Intimate partner violence against women and the Nordic paradox. <em>Social Science &amp; Medicine</em>, <em>157</em>, 27–30. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.03.040">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.03.040</a></p><p>Higgins, I. (2024, May 18). <em>In the “Nordic paradox”, high rates of gender equality does not equal safety for women</em>. ABC News. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-19/why-nordic-paradox-means-womens-equality-doesnt-equal-safety/103842754">https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-05-19/why-nordic-paradox-means-womens-equality-doesnt-equal-safety/103842754</a></p><p>Humbert, A. L., Strid, S., Hearn, J., &amp; Balkmar, D. (2021). Undoing the ‘Nordic Paradox’: Factors affecting rates of disclosed violence against women across the EU. <em>PLoS ONE</em>, <em>16</em>(5), e0249693. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249693">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249693</a></p><p>✍ Writer : : Raakan Ats T</p><p>🗄 Editor : Evanda Cika Setyoadi</p><p>🖌 Design by : Olivia Yosefin</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4cf13a1418c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Between Two Reefs: Neutrality, Non-Alignment, and the Art of Staying Independent]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol/between-two-reefs-neutrality-non-alignment-and-the-art-of-staying-independent-22c764bcc836?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scanity FISIPOL UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 04:36:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-22T18:21:10.749Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Christmas Eve in Skåne, I heard jets above the rooftops and looked up. A quick search revealed something unexpectedly charming: the Swedish Air Force had flown in the shape of a Christmas tree over southern Sweden, a tradition stretching back decades. I smiled at that, it seemed perfectly Swedish, this combination of military precision and seasonal warmth. But the search did not stop there. I found that months before I arrived, on Midsummer Eve, Gripen fighters had scrambled over Skåne specifically to monitor Russian aircraft in the vicinity, publicly described not as an exercise but as a deliberate signal toward Moscow. Then, while planning this essay, I found reports of an unauthorized drone flight over restricted Swedish airspace. Three incidents, one region, one year: a holiday formation, an interception, an intrusion. Layered together, they stopped feeling like separate news stories and started feeling like a single argument about where this country now stands.</p><p>I am from Indonesia, a country whose entire foreign policy identity rests on the opposite instinct. Where Sweden chose a shore, Indonesia still rows between the reefs.</p><p>That image belongs to Mohammad Hatta. In a September 1948 speech before Indonesia’s Working Committee of the National Committee, published as <em>Mendajung Antara Dua Karang</em>, Hatta argued that the nascent republic should navigate independently, as a subject rather than an object of world politics (Hatta, 1948). The doctrine he named that day, <em>bebas aktif </em>(free and active foreign policy), became the backbone of Indonesian statecraft. Yet the country hosting me formally joined NATO on March 7, 2024, bringing over 200 years of non alignment to an end(Högselius et al., 2026).</p><p>Two middle powers. Two encounters with the same fundamental problem: when the great powers set the terms, how do you endure without surrendering your independence?</p><p>Christine Agius and Karen Devine (2011) remind us that “neutrality” is an essentially contested concept, scholars count at least five distinct versions of it. What matters for this comparison is not the legal definition but the function: neutrality as a foreign policy posture, embedded to varying degrees in national law, elite opinion, and public identity. Jessica Beyer and Stephanie Hofmann (2011) show that whether a state ultimately revises or abandons its neutrality depends significantly on how the norm was originally institutionalised, whether de jure or merely de facto, and on whether the broader public had made it part of their own self understanding. This framework explains a great deal about why Sweden’s neutrality fell while Indonesia’s cognate principle endured.</p><p>Both strategies date themselves to moments of crisis, but fundamentally different ones. Indonesia’s is inseparable from the colonial wound. When 29 Asian and African leaders gathered at Bandung in April 1955, Sukarno declared that colonialism had merely changed its dress, taking new forms of economic control and intellectual control by alien interests(Timossi, 2015). The meeting was an assertion that the formerly colonized would define their own place in the international order.</p><p>Washington read the same event through a different lens. An NSC briefing classified Top Secret, dated April 27, 1955, noted that the most remarkable aspect of Bandung was “the effective role played by aggressive anti-Communist delegations”(Central Intelligence Agency, 1955). For the CIA, Bandung was a Cold War arena where anti-Soviet forces had prevailed. For Sukarno, it was a civilizational declaration of independence. Both frames were reading the same four days, and that gap tells you why Indonesian non-alignment was never merely tactical. It was an identity claim.</p><p>Sweden’s neutrality grew from nothing so charged. Fägersten and Jerdén (2018) trace the strategy’s roots to 1812, when Sweden’s new crown prince began steering the country away from great power conflicts that had exhausted it militarily and territorially. Over time this solidified into a policy of “freedom from alliances in peacetime, aiming for neutrality in case of war”, pragmatic in origin, never tied to anti-imperialism, never born of humiliation (Dalsjö, 2014).</p><p>Indonesia never separated its foreign policy from its sense of self. Edward Aspinall (2015) documents how the preoccupation with <em>martabat bangsa </em>or national dignity runs through</p><p>Indonesian political culture as a live current, resurfacing in every generation. The anxiety about foreign interference is not irrational; it is the emotional residue of a colonial experience that lasted three and a half centuries. <em>Bebas aktif </em>carries that history in its grammar. Abandoning it would feel, to many Indonesians, like a second conquest.</p><p>Sweden’s equivalent identity, what Fägersten and Jerdén (2018) call being <em>en moralisk stormakt </em>(a moral great power), was always a performance as much as a conviction. Sweden used non-alignment as a platform: criticizing superpower military interventions, championing peace mediation, positioning itself as a clean-handed broker. It was credible and often effective. But it was never constitutionally entrenched. As Beyer and Hofmann (2011) show, Swedish elites were far more willing than the public to revise the norm’s meaning whenever conditions warranted, precisely because it was never locked in <em>de jure</em>. The public believed in it more than the government actually practiced it.</p><p>Indonesia has evolved its approach considerably. Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2020) shows how Jakarta operates as a Kantian middle power, drawing on de Swielande’s typology of middle powers derived from Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy, not by balancing great powers militarily, but by building the architecture of dialogue that great powers are then invited into. Indonesia’s authorship of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, formally adopted at Bangkok in June 2019, illustrates the method: Jakarta defined the regional framework, used ASEAN to legitimise it, and positioned itself as the indispensable convener. Tellingly, Indonesia continues to refuse foreign military bases on its territory, since this would directly contradict bebas aktif doctrine (Anwar, 2020).</p><p>What this looks like in practice is captured by Ali Maksum (2024): China is Indonesia’s largest export destination and a dominant investor in its special economic zones, while the United States and Japan remain the preferred partners for advanced defense technology and military training. Under President Prabowo, who made China his first foreign visit as president-elect and described Beijing as a key partner for regional stability, the relationship with China is deepening further. This is partial multi-alignment: neither subordination nor exclusion, but strategic simultaneity built around the country’s own interests (Wicaksana &amp; Yakti, 2025).</p><p>Sweden’s own pre-2022 adaptations ran along parallel lines: publicly declaring non-alignment while secretly preparing for NATO cooperation during the Cold War (Dalsjö, 2014), and</p><p>deepening Finnish-Swedish defense cooperation to a near-alliance level by 2015 (Brommesson et al., 2022). What broke in February 2022 was not the strategy but the fiction that informal arrangements were sufficient. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demolished the assumption that flexible, credible neutrality could keep Sweden out of catastrophic conflict. The Social Democrats reversed course in May 2022. Stockholm applied for membership days later (Brommesson et al., 2022). Friis and Tamnes (2024) demonstrate that this accession has reshaped Northern European defense through new joint command structures, transforming dispersed bilateral arrangements into a coherent, treaty-bound framework.</p><p>Agius and Devine (2011) asked in 2011 whether neutrality was a dead concept. For Sweden, the answer arrived in 2022: yes. For Indonesia, the cognate principle survives, and Beyer and Hofmann’s (2011) framework explains why. Swedish neutrality was voluntarily adopted and primarily de facto, its continuity dependent on elite consensus rather than constitutional bedrock. When that consensus broke under existential pressure, the norm revised rapidly. Indonesia’s <em>bebas aktif </em>has a different anchor: it is woven into post-colonial national identity and the <em>martabat bangsa </em>that Aspinall (2015) describes as genuinely felt across Indonesian political culture, not only calculated at the foreign ministry.</p><p>Geography completes the picture. Sweden shares a regional security environment with a revisionist great power willing to use military force across borders, the same environment that produces Christmas tree flights, Midsummer interceptions, and drone intrusions over Skåne. Indonesia sits at the maritime intersection of the Indian and Pacific oceans, surrounded by contested waters rather than contested frontiers (Anwar, 2020). The US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific is intense, but it plays out across vast maritime distances. The threat geometry is simply different.</p><p>From Yogyakarta in 1948, Hatta asked whether Indonesia must choose between Washington and Moscow, or whether there was another position. There was. From Skåne in 2022, Sweden faced a different version of that question, under very different conditions, and gave a different answer. What separates the two is not sophistication or naivety, courage or its absence. It is the difference between a doctrine that was a foreign policy response to external conditions and one that was, from the moment Hatta first articulated it under Dutch blockade in 1948, an act of self-definition.</p><p>Reference</p><p>Agius, C., &amp; Devine, K. (2011). ‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ A reprise. <em>Cooperation and Conflict</em>, <em>46</em>(3), 265–284. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711416955">https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711416955</a></p><p>Anwar, D. F. (2020). Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. <em>International Affairs</em>, <em>96</em>(1), 111–129. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz223">https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz223</a></p><p>Aspinall, E. (2015). The new nationalism in Indonesia. <em>Asia &amp; the Pacific Policy Studies</em>, <em>3</em>(1), 72–82. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.111">https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.111</a></p><p>Beyer, J. L., &amp; Hofmann, S. C. (2011). Varieties of neutrality: Norm revision and decline. <em>Cooperation and Conflict</em>, <em>46</em>(3), 285–311. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711416956">https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711416956</a></p><p>Brommesson, D., Ekengren, A.-M., &amp; Michalski, A. (2022). Sweden’s policy of neutrality: Success through flexibility? In C. de la Porte &amp; others (Eds), <em>Successful Public Policy in the Nordic Countries </em>(pp. 283–306). Oxford University Press. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856296.003.0014">https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856296.003.0014</a></p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (1955, April). <em>Bandung Conference Summary</em>. Dalsjö, R. (2014). The hidden rationality of Sweden’s policy of neutrality during the Cold War. <em>Cold War History</em>, <em>14</em>(2), 175–194. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.765865">https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.765865</a> Fägersten, B., &amp; Jerdén, B. (2018). En moralisk stormakt i post-neutral tappning: Svensk utrikespolitik 2011–2018 [A moral great power in post-neutral guise: Swedish foreign policy 2011–2018]. <em>Internasjonal Politikk</em>, <em>76</em>(4), 343–354. <a href="https://doi.org/10.23865/intpol.v76.1370">https://doi.org/10.23865/intpol.v76.1370</a></p><p>Friis, K., &amp; Tamnes, R. (2024). <em>[Title to be verified before submission]</em>.</p><p>Hatta, M. (1948). <em>Mendajung Antara Dua Karang: Keterangan Pemerintah</em>. Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia.</p><p>Högselius, P., Nilsson, D., &amp; Vikström, H. (2026). Conclusion: Understanding Swedish colonialism in the industrial age. In <em>Neutrality’s Empire: Swedish Colonialism in the Industrial Age </em>(pp. 217–226). Berghahn Books. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/9781836951599">https://doi.org/10.3167/9781836951599</a></p><p>Maksum, A. (2024). Indonesia’s responses to “de-risking” China vis-à-vis the United States and its allies: The nexus of domestic and international interest. In <em>Unpacking “De-risking” China in the Indo-Pacific Region</em>. Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003633891-">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003633891-</a> 10</p><p>Timossi, A. J. (2015, May). <em>Revisiting the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference and its legacy</em>. <a href="https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian">https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian</a> african-conference-and-its-legacy/</p><p>Wicaksana, I. G. W., &amp; Yakti, P. D. (2025). Indonesia’s new partial multialignment strategy: A conceptual and e</p><p>This article was written by Muhammad Reza Magistra and published by Scanity FISIPOL UGM.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22c764bcc836" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MANUVER NORDIK TERSEBAB KREMLIN]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scanity.fisipol/manuver-nordik-tersebab-kremlin-30770c85f162?source=rss-c14213ef7a2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/30770c85f162</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nordik]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scandinavian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lausunto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scanity FISIPOL UGM]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 04:29:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-22T18:20:15.030Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>MANUVER NORDIK TERSEBAB KREMLIN</strong></p><p>Ketika kita mendengar kata Nordik atau Skandinavia, apa yang akan terbesit dalam pikiran kita? Pasti sekumpulan negara yang maju, peduli dengan rakyatnya, serta kawasan yang netral nan damai. Selama beberapa dekade, status itu melekat pada mereka. Namun identitas kenetralan negara-negara Nordik saat ini sedang menghadapi ujian. Apa ujian terhadap kenetralan tersebut dan bagaimana strategi negara-negara Nordik dalam menghadapinya?</p><p><strong>Nordik dan Status Netral</strong></p><p>Secara tradisional, dalam berdekade lamanya, negara-negara Nordik telah memilih status netral dan tidak terlibat perang sebagai politik luar negeri mereka. Keadaan ini bisa ditelusuri lewat sejarah. Denmark, akibat kalah perang dari Austria dan Prusia pada tahun 1864, akhirnya menjalankan politik luar negeri yang netral. Kemudian, pada tahun 1905–1940 Norwegia melaksanakan kebijakan netral. Namun, ketika terjadi pertempuran Inggris dan Jerman pada Perang Dunia Pertama dimana kedua negara berperang di daerah pesisir Norwegia, menjadikan Norwegia ikut mendukung Inggris. Setelah perang selama dua bulan, Norwegia akhirnya ambruk dan dijajah Jerman selama lima tahun dan Raja Haakon VII sempat mengungsi ke London. Setelah Perang Dunia Kedua, Norwegia kembali menjalankan politik luar negeri tradisionalnya lagi, yaitu netralitas. Posisi tersebut berbuah pada dukungan mereka terhadap perdamaian dan menteri luar negerinya Trygve Lie, menjadi Sekretaris Jenderal Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (Macridis, 1989).</p><p>Negara Nordik lainnya, Swedia bahkan bertindak lebih lanjut dengan menjalankan sistem isolasionisme. Kebijakan tersebut didukung oleh beberapa faktor, antara lain sistem ekonomi dan militer yang kuat serta sumber daya alamnya yang unggul. Pada Perang Dunia Kedua, Swedia menjalankan politik netral tapi dengan beberapa kompromi: mengizinkan tentara Jerman untuk melintas di wilayahnya dan memfasilitasi kembalinya penerbangan sekutu yang terdampar setelah misi di wilayah musuh. Seusai Perang Dunia Kedua, negara negara Nordik membentuk Scandinavian Defence Alliance, dengan sokongan Swedia yang kuat. Namun ketika Denmark dan Norwegia bergabung ke North Atlantic Treaty Organization</p><p>(NATO), Swedia kembali menjalankan politik lamanya, yaitu netralitas. Formula atau logika yang digunakan oleh Swedia adalah: bebas aliansi di masa damai dan netral di masa perang. Kebijakan ini tak goyah dan didukung publik karena terbukti menyelamatkan negara dari tahun 1814 (Macridis, 1989).</p><p>Status netral negara-negara Nordik ini sebenarnya tidak sepenuhnya sempurna dan penuh ujian. Seperti yang telah disebutkan, Norwegia pada akhirnya ikut terseret Perang Dunia Pertama karena mendukung Inggris. Kondisi netral ini juga mulai bisa dipertanyakan ketika Denmark dan Norwegia bergabung dengan NATO pada 1949. Namun dinamika keanggotaan kedua negara tersebut di NATO cukup unik. Denmark terkenal sebagai anggota NATO yang kurang antusias dan kurang mendukung aliansi. Disisi lain, Norwegia adalah anggota aliansi yang cukup teguh, karena kedekatan geografisnya dengan Rusia yang menjadikan Norwegia membutuhkan dukungan negara-negara Barat. Tapi Norwegia sendiri menolak adanya pangkalan militer NATO dan kehadiran senjata nuklir di wilayah mereka</p><p>(Macridis, 1989).</p><p>Dengan demikian, bisa dikatakan bahwa status netralitas menjadi suatu identitas politik luar negeri negara-negara Nordik. Tapi status itu juga penuh dengan ujian. Hanya Swedia dan Finlandia yang teguh tetap netral, hingga tahun 2024 tiba dan mengubah status itu.</p><p><strong>Dalam Ancaman Rusia</strong></p><p>Invasi Rusia ke Ukraina tahun 2022, yang masih berlangsung hingga saat ini, mengubah tatanan regional maupun global. Invasi menyeret negara-negara di Eropa kepada krisis multidimensi dari energi hingga pertahanan. Krisis tersebut membutuhkan perubahan konfigurasi kebijakan. Perubahan akibat invasi tak terkecuali juga dilakukan oleh negara</p><p>negara Nordik.</p><p>Setelah setahun sebelumnya Finlandia bergabung ke NATO, pada tahun 2024, Swedia resmi bergabung ke aliansi pertahanan tersebut dengan suatu seremoni di Washington D.C, Amerika Serikat (VOA, 2024). Beberapa negara Nordik seperti Norwegia dan Denmark sudah bergabung ke dalam aliansi pertahanan tersebut sejak 1949. Norwegia juga saat ini</p><p>mengambil pendekatan pertahanan yang aktif. Pada tahun 2025, Norwegia telah menyetujui kesepakatan senilai 10 miliar poundsterling untuk kapal perang anti-kapal selam yang akan dibangun di Inggris. Kebijakan tersebut sejalan dengan rencana Norwegia dan Inggris yang akan melakukan operasi gabungan di Eropa Utara untuk menghadapi peningkatan aktivitas Rusia (Sweney, 2025). Ketika dulu Norwegia menolak kebijakan nuklir, sekarang pendapat itu berubah. Baru-baru ini Perdana Menteri Norwegia Jonas Gahr Støre menandatangani perjanjian dengan Presiden Emmanuel Macron yang mencakup bergabungnya Norwegia dalam inisiatif senjata nuklir yang dipimpin oleh Prancis (Reuters, 2026).</p><p>Bergabungnya Swedia dan Finlandia ke NATO serta pendekatan Norwegia yang lebih aktif dan asertif ini bisa dikatakan sebagai respon terhadap apa yang sedang terjadi di Kawasan Eropa dan meningkatnya aktivitas militer Rusia yang berbahaya. Dalam pandangan neorealisme, menurut Stephen Walt (dalam Dugis, 2018, hlm 97), negara akan memilih beraliansi ketika muncul persepsi ancaman yang sama dengan negara lain untuk mengimbangi besarnya ancaman (<em>threat</em>) yang dilakukan lawan (Dugis, 2018).</p><p>Selain itu, terkait pendekatan Norwegia yang setuju untuk bergabung dalam inisiatif nuklir Prancis bisa dipahami sebagai strategi agresif untuk mencegah terjadinya agresi. Hal ini sejalan dengan argumen yang dikemukakan oleh Van Evera (1999) (dalam Dugis, 2018, hlm 97) bahwa pada titik tertentu negara harus mengambil strategi yang agresif untuk mencegah terjadinya agresi di masa yang akan datang. Kemudian menurut Van Evera, argumen tersebut cocok bila dijalankan oleh negara yang tidak secara alami mempunyai wilayah geografi yang mampu melindungi dari serangan negara lain (Dugis, 2018). Dalam kasus Norwegia, negara tersebut memiliki perbatasan darat secara langsung dengan Rusia di daerah utara sehingga motivasi kerjasama pertahanan bisa dipahami sebagai pencegahan dari berbagai aktivitas militer Rusia di daerah tersebut.</p><p><strong>Penutup</strong></p><p>Setelah berdekade berupaya menjaga teguh status netralnya, akhirnya Swedia dan Finlandia bergabung dengan NATO. Meningkatnya aktivitas militer Rusia yang berbahaya termasuk serangan ke Ukraina menjadi sebab paling utama bergabungnya dua negara Nordik</p><p>tersebut ke NATO. Negara Nordik lainnya, yaitu Norwegia juga aktif meningkatkan kemampuan militer dan menjalin kerjasama dalam bidang nuklir.</p><p>Melalui paham neorealisme, strategi yang diambil oleh Swedia, Finlandia, dan Norwegia dapat dipahami sebagai respon negara atas persepsi ancaman yang dilakukan oleh Rusia, upaya untuk mengimbangi kekuatan lawan (Rusia) dengan mengumpulkan kekuatan besar melalui kerangka aliansi, dan pencegahan agresi di masa depan dengan mengambil strategi agresif di masa kini. Dengan adanya faktor ancaman dari Rusia, maka pilihan untuk menanggalkan status netral dan mengambil tindakan yang lebih aktif secara militer tak terelakkan.</p><p><strong>Referensi:</strong></p><p>Dugis, V. (2018). <em>Teori Hubungan Internasional ; Perspektif-Perspektif Klasik </em>(Issue February). Airlangga. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Vinsensio">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Vinsensio</a> Dugis/publication/321709080_Teori_Hubungan_Internasional_Perspektif Perspektif_Klasik/links/5a7f16a80f7e9be137c71dbb/Teori-Hubungan-Internasional Perspektif-Perspektif-Klasik.pdf</p><p>Macridis, R. C. (Ed.). (1989). <em>Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions </em>(7th ed.). Prentice Hall.</p><p>Reuters. (2026). <em>Norway to join France’s nuclear deterrence initiative, says PM Stoere</em>. Reuters. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/norway-will-come-under-frances-nuclear">https://www.reuters.com/world/norway-will-come-under-frances-nuclear</a> umbrella-says-pm-stoere-2026–05–27/</p><p>Sweney, M. (2025). <em>Norway signs £10bn deal for anti-submarine warships built in UK</em>. The Guardian. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/aug/31/norway-signs-10bn">https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/aug/31/norway-signs-10bn</a> deal-for-anti-submarine-warships-built-in-uk</p><p>VOA. (2024). <em>Resmi Bergabung, Swedia Jadi Anggota NATO ke-32</em>. VOA Indonesia. <a href="https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/resmi-bergabung-swedia-jadi-anggota-nato-ke">https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/resmi-bergabung-swedia-jadi-anggota-nato-ke</a> 32/7518339.html</p><p>This article was written by Farid Helmi Maulana and published by Scanity FISIPOL UGM.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=30770c85f162" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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