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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Scholasticus on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Didn’t Christ Write Anything?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/whether-christ-should-have-committed-his-doctrine-to-writing-117685f9d7d2?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2025 07:22:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-29T14:36:09.375Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*G8SEVJdT2vdVm5Q3.jpg" /><figcaption>Painting by <strong>Carl Heinrich Bloch: “</strong>The Sermon on the Mount”</figcaption></figure><p>The instruction of Christ was intended to be the most permanent of all, as He Himself attests: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.” And given that writing was the ordinary means by which a teaching is preserved for posterity, a question arises concerning the Lord’s own method. Why did Christ, the supreme Teacher, not commit His own instruction to writing?</p><p>Once again, the <em>Angelic Doctor</em> demonstrates this perfectly in his <em>Summa Theologiae</em>:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Objection 1:</em> </strong>It would seem that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. For the purpose of writing is to hand down doctrine to posterity. Now Christ’s doctrine was destined to endure for ever, according to Luke 21:33: <em>Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away</em>. Therefore it seems that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Objection 2:</em> </strong>Further, the Old Law was a foreshadowing of Christ, according to Heb. 10:1: <em>The Law has a shadow of the good things to come</em>. Now the Old Law was put into writing by God, according to Ex. 24:12: <em>I will give thee</em> two <em>tables of stone and the law, and the commandments which I have written</em>. Therefore it seems that Christ also should have put His doctrine into writing.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Objection 3:</em> </strong>Further, to Christ, who came to enlighten them that sit in darkness (Luke 1:79), it belonged to remove occasions of error, and to open out the road to faith. Now He would have done this by putting His teaching into writing: for Augustine says (<em>De Consensu Evang</em>. i) that <em>some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote nothing, so that we have to believe what others have written about Him. Especially do those pagans ask this question who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and who ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wisdom. These say that the disciples made out the Master to be more than He really was when they said that He was the Son of God and the Word of God, by whom all things were made</em>. And farther on he adds: <em>It seems as though they were prepared to believe whatever He might have written of Himself, but not what others at their discretion published about Him</em>. Therefore it seems that Christ should have Himself committed His doctrine to writing.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Sed Contra: </em></strong>No books written by Him were to be found in the canon of Scripture.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>I Answer That:</em> </strong>It was fitting that Christ should not commit His doctrine to writing. First, on account of His dignity: for the more excellent the teacher, the more excellent should be his manner of teaching. Consequently it was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore it is written (Matt 7:29) that <em>He was teaching them as one having power</em>. And so it was that among the Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great excellence, were unwilling to write anything. For writings are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine in the hearts of the hearers.</blockquote><blockquote>Second, on account of the excellence of Christ’s doctrine, which cannot be expressed in writing; according to John 21:25: <em>There are also many other things which Jesus did: which, if they were written everyone, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written</em>. Which Augustine explains by saying: <em>We are not to believe that in respect of space the world could not contain them . . . but that by the capacity of the readers they could not be comprehended</em>. And if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears on the surface of the writing.</blockquote><blockquote>Third, that His doctrine might reach all in an orderly manner: Himself teaching His disciples immediately, and they subsequently teaching others, by preaching and writing: whereas if He Himself had written, His doctrine would have reached all immediately.</blockquote><blockquote>Hence it is said of Wisdom (Prov 9:3) that <em>she hath sent her maids to invite to the tower</em>. It is to be observed, however, that, as Augustine says (<em>De Consensu Evang</em>. i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ wrote certain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked miracles: which art is condemned by the Christian learning. <em>And yet they who claim to have read those books of Christ do none of those things which they marvel at His doing according to those same books. Moreover, it is by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert that these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in company with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were deceived by the painters: for as long as Christ lived in the mortal flesh with His disciples, Paul was no disciple of His</em>.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Reply to Objection 1: </em></strong>As Augustine says in the same book: <em>Christ is the head of all His disciples who are members of His body. Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning His deeds and words</em>.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Reply to Objection 2: </em></strong>Since the Old Law was given under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, which is <em>the law of the spirit of life</em> (Rom 8:2), had to be <em>written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart</em>, as the Apostle says (2 Cor 3:3).</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Reply To Objection 3: </em></strong>Those who were unwilling to believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art.</blockquote><p><strong><em>— Summa Theologiae III., Q. 42., A. 4.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=117685f9d7d2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Being]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/on-being-c05965b1dfa5?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[tomismo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thomism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metafisica]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[being]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2024 11:48:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-26T11:48:42.075Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*kop231Uf_27RvCr_9hiN7w.png" /><figcaption>Thomas Maria Zigliara (1833–1893) Summa Philosophica in usum scholarium Volumen I.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>ARTICLE I. <em>ON THE NATURE OF BEING</em></strong></p><p><strong>I.</strong> <strong>The notion of being.</strong> The most common notion of being is well-known to all, at least by a confused cognition; and by the name of being is commonly understood that which exists<em>, </em>or at least can exist. For those things that are intrinsically contradictory are in no way called beings. From this common understanding of the term “being,” we do not depart in its use.</p><p><strong>II. On real being and being of reason.</strong> Being, understood in this sense, is divided into real being and being of reason.</p><p><strong>REAL BEING.</strong> Since we have said that being is defined or described by its relation to existence, real being is said to be that which has or can have existence in the order of nature. In this sense, we say the world, humans, and God are real beings. It is subdivided into actual and possible. It is called actual if it actually has existence in the order of nature; it is called possible, however, if it does not actually have existence but can have it. Commonly, real is said of that which actually exists; but that which does not actually exist but can exist is called possible, and also ideal.</p><p><strong>BEING OF REASON.</strong> Being of reason is said in opposition to real being, and it is that which neither exists nor can exist in the order of nature, but has its entire being in the apprehension of reason, or it is that which has being objectively only in the intellect. This definition is explained by Goudin in his <em>Philosophy</em>, Part IV, Disp. II, Qu. IV, <em>Appendix</em>, Art. I: “Something can be in the intellect in three ways: subjectively, effectively, and objectively. Those things are in the intellect subjectively that adhere to it as accidents to a subject, such as habits and intelligible species<em>.</em> Those things are in the intellect effectively that are produced by it as vital motions proceeding physically from it; of this kind is the very act of understanding. But those things are in the intellect objectively that are purely apprehended by it. Therefore, being of reason is that which has only objective being in the intellect, that is, whose entire being consists in being apprehended. From this, it is inferred that it is not a mere extrinsic denomination, but something apprehended in the manner of a being.” — Hence, you rightly understand that the Scholastics hold that the formal object of Logic is being of reason. For Logic, especially Dialectics, is entirely concerned with arranging things so that they can be better perceived by the mind: which arrangement exists not in the things themselves but only in the mind.</p><p><strong>III. The distinction of <em>thing</em> from <em>being</em>. </strong>In being, we conceive two aspects, as in any concrete entity (L. 2, VII): namely, the subject affected by existence, and the form or the existence itself by which that subject is affected. The subject is called essence, or thing, or even substantive being, or taken nominally. The same subject, considered concretely, or as affected by existence, is called being taken as a participial term, and also simply being; for, as the Angelic Doctor (Aquinas) frequently teaches, <em>being is that whose act is to be</em>, namely to exist. This is the theoretical view: in practice, thing and being are used interchangeably, and this distinction is only introduced when the nature of the questions necessitates it.</p><p><strong>IV. Note I: The distinction of thing from being, well-known to the ancient philosophers. </strong>Genoensis, in his <em>Metaphysics</em>, Part I, Chapter I, § I, <em>Scholium</em>, after proving the distinction of thing from being, seems to assert that he was the first to introduce it into the sciences, with these words: “Since until now thing and being, whose notions we distinguish, have been used interchangeably by metaphysicians, it may perhaps be asked of us why we separated them. To which we respond that this was done to explain our thoughts more clearly, which is no small reason for a philosopher to introduce new definitions of terms.” But this assertion by Genoensis is minimally consistent with the facts. Indeed, in the <em>Disputed Questions</em>, <em>On Truth</em>, Question I, Article I, Thomas Aquinas says: “This term… thing… differs from being according to Avicenna, in that being is taken from the act of existing, but the name thing expresses the quiddity or essence of being.” And in I, Distinction XIX, Question V, Article I, he states: “Since… in a thing there is its quiddity and its existence, truth is founded more in the being of the thing than in its quiddity; just as the name being is derived from existence.” Aquinas elaborates on this further in Lecture II of the <em>Metaphysics</em>. Moreover, the very title of the treatise <em>On Being and Essence</em> clearly indicates this distinction.</p><p><strong>V. Note II: On the formal concept and the objective concept of being. </strong>It is opportune at this point to clarify the distinction between the formal concept and the objective concept of being, which is common to other concepts of the mind (L. 1, VII), and which greatly helps in avoiding the frequent confusions in abstract matters like these, not without significant detriment to the truth. Thus, the formal concept is the very mental conception by which the mind expresses a thing to itself through mental discourse, and in which it understands the thing itself. Hence, it is also called the word of the mind, just as that by which we outwardly manifest to others what is conceived by the mind is called the oral word. This concept is called <em>formal</em>, as Suarez rightly notes in his <em>Metaphysical Disputations</em>, Disp. II, Sect. I, §. I, either because it is the ultimate form of the mind, or because it formally represents the thing known to the mind, or because it is truly the formal term of the mental conception, which distinguishes it from the objective concept. The <em>objective concept</em>, on the other hand, is the thing itself, or the object, which is properly and immediately known and represented by the formal concept and through the formal concept. Hence, for example, a triangle, as expressed by and within the mind, is a formal concept; the triangle itself, as the term to which the formal concept refers, is the objective concept. It is rightly called <em>objective</em> because it is not the intrinsic form terminating the conception, as the formal concept is, but the matter around which the intellect revolves and towards which it is directed, as has been said, by the power of the formal conception. Thus, everyone understands the distinction that intervenes between the two concepts. “Formal,” Suarez himself says in the aforementioned place, “is always a true and positive thing, and in creatures, it is a quality inhering in the mind; but <em>objective</em> is not always a true positive thing: for sometimes we conceive privations and other things called beings of reason, because they only have objective being in the intellect (as mentioned above, Note II). Also, the formal concept is always a singular and individual thing because it is something produced by the intellect and inhering in it; however, the objective concept can sometimes be a singular and individual thing, insofar as it can be presented to the mind and conceived through a formal act; but it is often a universal or confused and common thing, as is the case with man, substance, and other similar concepts.” See Cajetan’s <em>Commentary on the Book of Being and Essence</em>, Chapter I, Question II, §. Second point: “It is well known in this treatise that being is taken according to the objective concept.”</p><p><strong>VI. The Attributes of Being or Thing. </strong>From the notion of being or thing that has been handed down, we can now understand the attributes by which a thing is distinguished. We enumerate the most principal and useful ones.</p><p><strong>First Attribute:</strong> Being is supremely transcendent. In fact, as we have already proven in Logic, by resolving all our objective concepts through analysis into species, genera, and ultimate genera, we reach being, beyond which we cannot proceed, because beyond being there is nothing, or negation. That which is the final terminus of the analysis of any of our objective concepts is the most transcendent.</p><p><strong>Second Attribute:</strong> Being is presented to the mind as something utterly simple. For analysis is a kind of division. But that which cannot even be divided mentally is rightly considered the simplest thing. However, being is the final terminus to which analysis leads, as stated above. Therefore, being is presented to the mind as something utterly simple.</p><p><strong>Third Attribute:</strong> Being is the most universal thing, namely included in all things — whether generic, specific, individual, or determined in any way — as their essential predicate. In truth, the individual is a being, the species is a being, the genus is a being; whatever is conceived as having some essence is a being. Take away being, and by that very fact you negate the individual, the species, the genus, and other determined beings, which are undoubtedly such because they are beings. This attribute properly belongs to being as it is a thing.</p><p><strong>Fourth Attribute:</strong> Being is properly neither a genus nor a species. This follows from the preceding attribute. For a genus is drawn toward a species by a difference distinct from itself, which is placed outside of what is understood in the nature of the genus. Otherwise, wherever there is a genus, there would also be a difference, which is false: for wherever animality is found, rationality is not always present. But no difference can be given outside of being, or which is not being, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, being is properly neither a genus nor a species. Cf. St. Thomas, <em>Contra Gentes</em>, Book I, Chapter XXV, and <em>Summa Theologiae</em>, Part I, Question III, Article V.</p><p><strong>Fifth Attribute:</strong> Being is not something univocal to genera, species, individuals, or things determined in any way, nor is it predicated of all these in the same sense (L. 3, VI). Scholastics proved this attribute of being against Scotus with many reasons; we will be content with this following one: a univocal notion is always generic or specific, in which species or individuals agree in the same sense, but differ through proper differences placed outside that univocal notion, as stated in the explanation of the fourth attribute. Therefore, since being cannot properly be called a genus or species, it cannot properly be called univocal either.</p><p><strong>Sixth Attribute:</strong> Being is not properly universal. This is a corollary of what has been said. In Logic (4, III), we divided universals into genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents, which are predicated univocally of their inferiors. If you remove the notion of univocation from a universal, you thereby destroy its nature. But we have stated that being is neither a genus nor a species, nor is it something univocal. Therefore, being is not properly a universal, as Aristotle rightly observed in <em>Metaphysics</em>, Book IV, whose teaching St. Thomas excellently illustrates in the same place, lecture IV. However, we often attribute universality to being, not in the sense of univocation as if it belonged to any category (L. 6, I and following), but because, as we have said, by reason of its supreme transcendentality, it is the essential predicate of all things.</p><p><strong>Seventh Attribute:</strong> Being cannot be defined by us with a proper definition. This is another corollary of the preceding points. For anything that is defined by a proper definition: 1) is composed of a genus and difference; 2) consequently belongs to some genus; 3) and therefore admits a difference distinct from its genus. These three conditions, which we have proven when discussing definition in Logic, are repugnant to being, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore, being cannot be defined by us with a proper definition, even though it is the most common and clearest concept to all.</p><p><strong>Eighth Attribute:</strong> Generic, specific, individual beings, or beings determined in any other way, are not distinguished from each other by differences external to being, but in so far as they express different modes of being, which are not expressed by being alone. This is likewise another corollary. For being is the most common reality, that is, the essential predicate of all things, and therefore it does not admit differences external to it. Thus, beings are not distinguished from each other by differences that are not beings themselves. However, they do differ. Therefore, they differ by being itself, more or less unfolded in them, just as two lights do not differ in the notion of light but in the intensity of the same light.</p><p><strong>Ninth Attribute:</strong> Hence, being, although it is not a genus, as we have said, and therefore not univocal, is still something analogous (L. 3, VI and VII) with respect to all things to which it is attributed. For being is not said equivocally (L. 11, I and II) of diverse things, but in so far as all these things, though not in the same way, agree in the common notion of existence. This suffices for the notion of analogy.</p><p><strong>Seventh Note:</strong> Concerning the third meaning of being. Up to this point, we have considered being either as signifying essence or as implying existence. But being is also taken in a third way, as it is the copula of a judgment or proposition (L. 18, I) and signifies the truth of that proposition. In this third sense, “anything of which an affirmative proposition can be formed can be called being, even if it does not posit anything in reality; in this way, privations and negations are called beings: for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye.” However, in the previous senses, “nothing can be called a being unless it posits something in reality,” and in this sense, “blindness and things of that kind are not beings.” St. Thomas, <em>De Ente et Essentia</em>, Chapter I.</p><p><strong>FINIS.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Adoro te devote,<br>latens Deitas,<br>Te, coram me,<br>et reconditum<br>ex te, pretioso,<br>tuorum, vera et bona<br>sacramentum.<br>Quod non ad vera<br>meruit communio,<br>neque sit corum<br>plenitudinis.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Amen.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c05965b1dfa5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On The Distinctions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/on-the-distinctions-9e0abe18a7e3?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[distinction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[distinctione]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 12:18:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-18T09:34:35.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/1*J2zs7p35jP_vW6iUUs4MRA.png" /><figcaption>Summa Philosophica Tomus I. Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1833 - 1893)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>VOLUMEN I.</strong></p><p><strong>METAPHYSICA</strong></p><p><strong>LIBER II.</strong></p><p><strong>CAPUT II.</strong></p><p><strong>ARTICULUS II.</strong></p><p><strong><em>On Distinction and Multiplicity.</em></strong></p><p><strong>I. The notion of distinction.</strong> Just as multitude is opposed to unity, so distinction is opposed to identity. Furthermore, the notion of distinction is very common and clear to everyone, but if you attempt to explain it, you make it obscure. We call distinct those things of which one is not the other; whence, taken abstractly, distinction can not incongruously be called <em>the absence of identity among many</em>. Moreover, there are several kinds of distinction, which, because they occur very frequently in the sciences, must therefore be examined individually.</p><p><strong>II. Real and rational distinction.</strong> This division of distinction into <em>real and logical or rational</em> is well known. — A <em>real</em> distinction is the absence of identity among many things independently and antecedently to the consideration of the mind, such as the distinction between two individuals, between soul and body, etc. — A <em>logical</em> distinction is the absence of identity attributed to things through the consideration of the mind alone and dependent on the consideration of the mind itself; thus, we distinguish animality and rationality in man through the mind as if they were two things, which nevertheless in man are not two things but one: for there is one vital principle, whence man is at once both animal and rational.</p><p><strong>III. Entitative, modal, and virtual distinction.</strong> Real distinction is subdivided into <em>major</em>, or <em>real-real</em>, or <em>real</em> simply, or <em>entitative</em>, into <em>modal</em> and <em>virtual</em>. The first is the distinction of a thing from a thing, whether such things are substances, as the distinction between soul and body, God and the world, etc., or whether things are substances and accidents, or accidents alone, as the distinction which is between a man and his doctrine or his color, and the distinction which is between the color and taste of an apple. Modal is the distinction of a thing from the manner by which it is affected, as the distinction of a line from its straightness or curvature, of a man from sitting or walking, etc. — <em>Virtual</em> is the distinction of a thing by reason of the power by which the thing itself is capable of providing many things, so that one existing thing supplies us with the foundation to distinguish many formalities within it according to the many things which the thing itself can provide. Thus, the human soul is one essence formally, namely rational, and yet triple in virtue, because it alone in man performs whatever other lower forms perform in brutes, plants, and bodies. Goudin rightly observes that this virtual distinction is not so much a distinction, as the foundation of distinction. <em>Metaphysics</em>. Disp. I, Qu. III, Art. II, §. I.</p><p><strong>IV. Distinction of reason reasoned and reason reasoning.</strong> A distinction made by the mind in some thing, provided that the thing itself does not <em>provide</em> the immediate foundation for such a distinction, is called a distinction of <em>reason reasoning</em>; for example, if we distinguish between the reason of the <em>subject</em> or the reason of the <em>predicate</em> in some thing. For such are entirely entities of reason. — But if a thing, although one and undivided in itself, nevertheless provides the immediate foundation for distinguishing several formalities within it, a distinction based on such a foundation is called a distinction of reason reasoned, and also <em>metaphysical</em>. Such is the virtual distinction in the soul, as stated above. — Note, however, that in the distinction of reason reasoning, the thing is not the immediate foundation of such a distinction, but the remote foundation: for, as Angelicus notes in I, Dist. II, Qu. I, Art. III, “from this that the intellect understands an animal in several species, it attributes to it the intention of a genus; and although the immediate foundation of this intention is not in the thing but in the intellect, the remote foundation is the thing itself. Hence, the intellect is not false, which invents these reasons.”</p><p>Finally, the distinction of reason reasoned is called either <em>major</em> or <em>minor</em>. <em>Major</em> distinguishes within a thing’s formalities, one of which does not include the other by itself, and therefore they can be separately found in different subjects, as <em>animality</em> and <em>rationality</em>. — <em>Minor</em> distinguishes formalities, one of which, although not formally different, by reason of the subject in which they are, includes the other and is inseparable from it, such as justice, e.g., formally considered is not formally mercy in God (and therefore between one and the other there is a distinction not only of reason reasoning but of reason reasoned), yet in reality and as in God, one is really the other and inseparable from it by reason of the most perfect divine simplicity.</p><p><strong>V. Distinction on the part of the nature of the known object.</strong> Besides the distinctions explained thus far, there is another division of distinction, which is immediately derived from the nature of the objects of our knowledge, and which St. Thomas briefly and clearly presents in I Dist. XIX, Qu. V, Art. I. “Of those things,” he says, “which are signified by names, a threefold diversity is found. For some are such that according to their whole existence they are complete outside the soul; and such are complete beings, like a man and a stone. Others, however, are such that they have nothing outside the soul, like dreams and the imagination of a chimera. Others, however, are such that they have a foundation in reality outside the soul, but their completion in reason, as far as that which is formal in them, is through the operation of the soul, as is evident in the case of the universal.”</p><p><strong>VI. NOTE. Scotistic distinction.</strong> The distinctions which we have given are commonly admitted by philosophers as true, and are especially necessary in order to, by distinguishing well, avoid confusion in our ideas and judgments. But Scotus, or as others prefer, the Scotists, devised another distinction, which they call <em>the actual formal distinction from the nature of the thing</em>. This Scotistic distinction, therefore, is neither real entitative, nor real modal, nor of reason; but it is <em>formal</em>, for example, between animality and rationality in man; it is <em>actual</em>, because it exists in things independently of the consideration of our mind; it is <em>from the nature of the thing</em>, because one formality does not include the other, as we said above regarding the <em>major</em> reason reasoned. However, this Scotistic distinction is now obsolete in the schools, and not without reason. For indeed, the distinction placed between formalities or metaphysical grades of a thing, either is of mere reason reasoning, as some wish, or more truly it is the same virtual distinction, by means of which we sufficiently distinguish in the thing those formalities, for which Scotus invented a new distinction. But enough about this: whoever desires more, let them consult Goudin <em>Metaphysics</em>. Disp. I, Qu. I, Article II, § II and III, where the most learned author discusses many things copiously and profoundly against the opinion of the Scotists, which perhaps was necessary in his time, but is now useless in ours.</p><p><strong>VII. On multitude.</strong> Just as unity arises from indivision, so from division arises multitude. Moreover, multitude, as St. Thomas teaches in accord with common human sense, is <em>that which is from ones, of which one is not the other</em>. I. Dist. XXIV, Qu. I, Art. III, ad 2. — In V <em>Metaphysics</em>, Lect. XV. — P. I, Qu. XI, Art. II.</p><p><strong>VIII. Opposition between one and multitude.</strong> From the given notion, it is inferred that multitude, as multitude, is opposed to unity as unity. For one, formally considered, is either viewed as the principle of number or as a transcendental (13, III and IV). But in both ways, one, as one, is opposed to multitude as multitude. For one, which is the principle of number, is opposed to multitude, which is number, as a measure is opposed to the measured: for such a unity measures number or multitude, because truly by the repetition of unity, multitude is measured. But the transcendental one, which is convertible with being (13, V), is opposed to multitude by way of privation, just as the undivided is opposed to the divided: for the aforementioned unity essentially implies the negation of division, and multitude essentially implies the affirmation of division. P. I, Qu. XI, Art. II.</p><p><strong>IX. NOTE. On unity and multitude in the same subject.</strong> I deliberately stated in the preceding proposition that one and multitude, not in any way but <em>formally</em> considered, are opposed to each other; for nothing prevents something from being one and multiple in a different sense. St. Thomas excellently explains this doctrine in the <em>loc. prox. cit.</em>, Art. I, ad 2: “Nothing prevents, he says, that which is divided in one way from being indivisible in another; just as what is divided numerically is indivisible according to species: and thus, something can be one in one way and multiple in another. But if it is indivisible simply, or because it is divided according to what pertains to the essence of the thing, though it may be divided according to what is outside the essence of the thing, such as what is one in subject (L. 8, IV) and many according to accidents; or because it is indivisible in act and divisible in potency, as what is one in whole and many in parts; such a thing will be one simply, and many in a certain respect. Conversely, if something is indivisible in a certain respect and divided simply, as because it is divided according to essence and indivisible according to reason or according to principle or cause, there will be many simply and one in a certain respect; as things which are many in number and one in species, or one in principle.”</p><p><strong>X. Every multitude presupposes unity and is founded in unity.</strong> For multitude, as we have said, arises from the repeated occurrence of unity; therefore, if unity is abstracted, there is nothing from which multitude can result. Furthermore, multitude is what is divided into non-continuous parts. But the very notion of division is entirely opposed to the absence of something one that is either to be divided or has been divided. For this reason, St. Thomas rightly teaches, <em>loc. cit.</em>, that “<em>multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it were contained in some way under one</em>: and that which is not multitude does not participate in one: but those things which are many by parts are one by whole; and those which are many by accidents are one by subject; and those which are many in number are one in species; and those which are many in species are one in genus; and those which are many by processes are one by principle.” You also have in these words the divisions of multitude.</p><p><strong>XI. NOTE On the identity of indiscernibles.</strong> This is an opportune place to briefly note something regarding the well-known principle of the <em>identity of indiscernibles</em>, first conceived by Leibniz. This Author, justly renowned for the fame of his doctrine, held that it is not possible for two individuals to exist that are entirely similar in every respect, such that there is nothing in one that is not in the other to distinguish them, but only because one is not the other, and therefore they are two and not one. Leibniz argued that such beings could not exist because, as he claimed, there would be no sufficient reason; Clark opposed Leibniz. What I think should be concluded on this matter, I will briefly explain. This question, therefore, can be considered from two aspects: First, supposing that everything, whether essential or accidental, that is in individual A is also in individual B, not in any way but by absolute identity, that is, numerically identical. And in this hypothesis, it is entirely impossible for the two aforementioned individuals to exist: for they would be <em>two</em> under the same respect, as is supposed, and <em>one</em>, because by the force of absolute and universal identity, they would have no means by which they differ, and one would be the other, in the same way that A does not differ from itself. Second, supposing that everything in A is also in B not by identity, as in the first hypothesis, but by similarity. And in this second hypothesis, nothing prevents divine omnipotence from producing two perfectly similar beings, which would be <em>similar</em>, but not <em>identical</em>: for these similars, as everyone admits, carry with them the notion of <em>being</em>; and anything that is such can be produced by the omnipotence of God. As for what Leibniz adds, that such similars (which he abusively calls <em>identicals</em>, from which equivocation the question perhaps arose) are not indeed repugnant to omnipotence, but are repugnant to the wisdom of God, this is an empty evasion: for, absolutely speaking, God by His omnipotence cannot do what is repugnant to His wisdom; hence, Leibniz must admit that it is not repugnant to divine wisdom, that which even he concedes is not repugnant to divine omnipotence. But enough on this question.</p><p><strong>FINIS.</strong></p><p><strong>LAUS DEO.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e0abe18a7e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Metaphysical Notion of Being]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/the-metaphysical-notion-of-being-a7e1738c5429?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7e1738c5429</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2024 18:47:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-11T16:59:41.944Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The object of metaphysics, we have said, is being. This is true — truer, indeed, than appears on the surface. For, formally speaking, the object of metaphysics is not being considered as the first object of thought, or being whose conception is the first notion of the intellect. The object of metaphysics lies deeper, and to reach it the mind must have recourse to the third degree, the metaphysical degree, of abstraction, in which being is considered in utter separation from matter. Only then does the mind apprehend being formally; only then, that is, does the mind apprehend being as being, or being as such. And this is the object of metaphysics: being as being, or being as such, prescinded from this or that mode of it.</p><p>The distinction just made is capital; the distinction, I mean, between being as the object of metaphysics and being as the first and most universal object of thought. It takes a while, even a long while, to rise to this distinction, to the level of metaphysical being. By nature the human intellect inclines rather to the things of the sensible world; the utterly immaterial is not its connatural milieu. And though, as we have seen, it necessarily conceives of everything and hence of sensible things as beings, the being it first finds in them is not that of metaphysics, unparticularized and matter-free, but that of the physical kind, particularized and matter-bound. There is, to be sure, in this common knowledge of sensible things a rudimentary grasp and awareness of being, but not of being as being, since in this order of knowledge being is not yet prescinded, or lifted, from its particularities. In short, the experience of being that fashions routine thought, and bases even the sciences, is all on the prephilosophical (i.e. premetaphysical) level.</p><p>Closer, but only closer, to the metaphysical state of affairs is the concept of being that emerges from its universalization on the lines of logic. Go back to the familiar experience of being alluded to a moment ago, the objects of daily acquaintance. It is relatively simple to subsume these objects under notions that are more and more universal, as in the Tree of Porphyry, where we find the series: man, animal, living body, body, substance. As it stands, however, the series is still open; for there is something still more comprehensive than substance, namely being, which comprehends everything and hence closes the series. Thus the mind has arrived at the logical universal of being. What it has done is to make a “total” abstraction of being, which means the abstraction of a logical whole from its inferiors. The notion thus derived is both most universal and, for that reason, most undetermined, containing as it does, though but implicitly, all the differences of being in its endless variety.</p><p>Because of the abstraction involved in its formation, this generalized notion of being already implies a measure of philosophical reflection, but the reflection is still pitched to the level of common understanding. More important, the notion, because of its universality, is sometimes mistaken for the formal or metaphysical concept of being which we shall examine forthwith, a confusion fatal to the grasp of metaphysics in the traditional sense. That it is a confusion should be evident, if not from what has gone before, then from what is to follow; which is by way of saying that the foregoing considerations have been but preliminary to the point in hand, the metaphysical notion of being. Having dwelt on what this notion is not, we are more ready to set out what it is; and the exposition, in one form or another, will run the rest of the chapter.</p><p>A serviceable, though far from adequate cue can be found in the very name “being,’ which translates the Greek participial noun to on and its Latin derivative ens. Unfortunately, the English “being” does not do full justice to its Greek and Latin counterparts, at least in their metaphysical connotation. So that instead of “being,” it would be more exact to translate “the something which is.” This rendition points at once to two aspects of every being: a subject or receptor, “the something,” and the actuation or determination of the subject, indicated by “which is.” Metaphysically, the first aspect signifies essence (<em>essentia</em>); the second, existence (<em>existentia</em> or <em>esse</em>). Being, accordingly, is something whose actuality, or proper determination, is to exist.</p><p>The notion of being necessarily implies both aspects. Essence cannot be conceived except in relation to existence, and existence in turn calls for determination by essence. Still, it is possible when thinking of being to give attention more to one than to the other. This becomes clear when it is remembered that the word “being” serves both as noun and as verbal (participial noun). When being, the word, functions or is understood as a noun, its primary reference is to essence (<em>res</em>); what it says, in effect, is that being is what is,” yet not so as to exclude the relation to existence which, as we have indicated, is ever implied in the notion of being. As a verbal, on the other hand, being stresses existence; what it then tells, properly, is that being is “what exists, but again the other aspect is not eliminated, since existence is always correlative with essence, always the existence of something. So that, once more, being as we conceive of it comes forth as a composition of two inseparable aspects, essence and existence. However, the qualities of this composition together with its far-reaching implications are, at this stage of our study, far from told; we shall see to that later.</p><p>One point should, however, be cleared up now, namely, the metaphysical meaning of existence. If the being which the metaphysician studies includes the aspect of existence, obviously a thing must be affiliated with existence to come under the object of metaphysics. But what kind of existence? Primarily, “being as being” (the object of metaphysics) signifies existence (<em>esse</em>) in its immediate sense of real and actual existence: <em>ens</em> <em>actuale</em>, as the expression goes. But “being as being” is not limited to this; for also to be included is possible being: <em>ens possibile</em>, i.e. anything capable of entering the world of concrete existence. Thus, whatever has been, or is, or will be, or could really be, under whatever mode or manner, is comprised under the object of metaphysics, yes even that which is affined to the concrete order of things by way of privation or negation. One thing only is debarred, the being of reason (<em>ens rationis</em>), which is the subject of logic. The true being of reason does, no doubt, have a foundation in reality, yet its very nature is such that it cannot, as a being of reason, exist in reality; it can only exist in the mind conceiving it. Consequently, it fails of inclusion in the metaphysician’s domain, the order of concrete existence, actual or possible.</p><p>We come then to another side of the problem of being; but first, a word in passing. Examined so far in the present chapter have been being and its notion for their metaphysical meaning according to St. Thomas; that is to say, examined and defined has been the formal object of metaphysics. This is only one step in the study of being, but the step that sets the course for the whole of it. Thus, while there is indeed more to metaphysics than the settlement of its formal object, there is nothing more critical; for the formal object, or rather one’s view of it, shapes the rest of it. So that in committing ourselves to the view of being that emerges from the foregoing paragraphs, we have subscribed to a line of development for the whole of metaphysics. Also, further reflection, the exact determination of the formal (metaphysical) notion of being is not only a necessary preliminary to the science, but has always been a thorny problem for the philosopher. Sooner or later he must ask: what is being? and sometimes, perhaps often, he has answered inadequately if not erroneously. Contemporary thought, on the whole, while exploiting the concrete or existential side of things, is in general disdainful of essential being. Tending to the other extreme are philosophers of the not too distant past by whom being is all but identified, if not actually so, with essence, to the exclusion or neglect of existence. For St. Thomas, as we shall have frequent occasion to repeat, being is neither essence alone nor existence alone but a composite of the two: an essence actuated by its ultimate perfection, existence.</p><p>— H.D. Gardeil, O. P.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7e1738c5429" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On The Various Kinds of Distinctions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/on-the-various-kinds-of-distinctions-d537edd40192?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d537edd40192</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2024 18:29:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-12T15:53:30.322Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>First, a distinction is the absence of identity. There will be as many distinctions as types of identities. Here, I will list the basic types of distinctions that are essential for natural theology, metaphysics, etc. according to the mind of John of St. Thomas [<em>C.f Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus</em> part 2, q 2, art. 3), Zigliara (<em>Summa Philosophica</em> volume 1, book 2, chapter 2, art. 2), etc.</p><p>Distinctions can be perfect or imperfect; adequate or inadequate (there are more, but these are the essential):</p><p>It is <strong>perfect</strong> when there’s no inclusion-relation between the distinct things in a single substantial thing (which can be things that can transcend the categories, such as God, transcendentals, pure possibles, entia rationis, etc.], and <strong>imperfect</strong> otherwise.</p><p><strong>Adequate</strong>: when it’s between a whole and another whole which are not parts of each other. <em>Ex: Joe and John</em></p><p><strong>Inadequate</strong>:</p><ol><li>It is <strong>simply and immediately imperfect</strong> when it’s between a whole and its part because the part is immediately included in the whole. Ex: <em>Joe and his hand</em></li><li>It is <strong>simply and immediately perfect</strong> when it is between a part and another part of a whole which have no relation of inclusion. Ex: <em>Joe’s kidney and Joe’s stomach</em></li><li>It is <strong>relatively and immediately imperfect</strong> when it’s between a part and another part of the same whole which have some immediate relation of inclusion — it’s relatively imperfect on account of being parts of the same whole, immediately imperfect because the relation of inclusion is not mediated. Ex: <em>Joe’s intestine and the intestinal tissue</em></li><li>It is <strong>relatively and mediately imperfect</strong> when it’ s between a part and another part of the same whole which have some mediated relation of inclusion: Ex: <em>Joe’s body and joe’s intestinal tissue</em>.</li></ol><p><strong>The same classification of simple/relative and immediate/mediate perfection/imperfection can be applied to the adequate distinction.</strong></p><p>That said, let’s see the classical distinctions: real distinction x distinction of reason:</p><p><strong>Real distinction:</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Major Real Distinction or Real Distinction Simpliciter</strong>: that which is between two separate things [ <em>inter duas res</em> ]. Ex: <em>Joe and his cat</em></li><li><strong>Minor Real Distinction or Modal Distinction</strong>: that which is between a thing and its real mode [modes are minimal entities that cannot exist without its subject, but are really distinct from it]. Ex: <em>Joe and his sitting</em>, <em>red and its brightness</em>, <em>circle and its roundness</em>, etc. [there are many types of modal distinctions too, but you can gather from what I said about adequate/inadequate perfect/imperfect — <strong>modal distinctions are always asymmetrical because a mode can’t exist without a subject, but a subject can exist without the mode]</strong></li><li><strong>Virtual Distinction:</strong> this is actually a <em>real</em> distinction which serves as a <em>foundation</em> for the distinction of reason reasoned (as I’ll explain further on) — the virtual distinction is the eminential containment in one single formality of the different producible perfections/formalities that that single formality has the active power to effect: <em>the heating and drying power in the Sun’s light</em>.</li></ol><p>This said, we can say things like: between <em>esse</em> and <em>actus essendi</em>, there is an adequate imperfect major real distinction. Between <em>nature</em> and <em>hypostasis</em>, there is an inadequate imperfect major real distinction.</p><p>As for the <strong>Distinction of Reason or Rational Distinction</strong>.</p><p>There are two types. The <strong>distinction of reason reasoning</strong> (it’s called <em>ratiocinantis</em> because the intellect is <em>active</em> when performing it) and the d<strong>istinction of reason reasoned</strong> (it’s called <em>ratiocinatae</em> because the intellect is quasi-passive in performing it).</p><p>The <strong>distinction of reason reasoning can also be called purely rational distinction</strong>. It occurs when the intellect produces a distinction which does not correspond directly or indirectly to anything really distinct in reality and there’s no real foundation for it.</p><ol><li><strong>Major Distinction of Reason Reasoning</strong>: it is between (objective) concepts one of which contains synthetically what the other expresses analytically. That is, between a defined thing and its defining elements Ex: <em>man and rational animal</em> , <em>square and equally-sided quadrilateral</em>.</li></ol><p><strong>Attention:</strong> in the case above, we’re talking about the objective concept [man] and its <em>intelligible content</em> taken comprehensionally with what is included in it most <em>determinately</em> — the determinate objective concept of man just is the determinate objective concepts of animal and rational; the determinate objective concept of animal just is sensitive, animate and substance, etc. When this is taken in an indeterminate mode, though, we have a major virtual distinction as I’ll explain after.</p><p>‘’Man’’, considered contractedly <em>actually</em> contains all of its essential notes (from animal to substance and <em>ens</em> as name which are all taken already in the most contracted way — the animality, animation, corporeality, substantiality, etc. of man is <em>human</em> animality, animation, corporeality, etc.) and thus the species is more formal than the genus [hence, we only have a distinction of reason reasoning because the several genera just <em>are</em> the ultimate species].</p><p>But if each genus is considered intensively and its absoluteness, without contraction, in its universality as St. Thomas talks about [<a href="https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.Q18.A7.Rep3">https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.Q18.A7.Rep3</a>], then it is more formal than the species and it contains all its subgenera and species in explicit act and can’t be identical to any one of them taken separately because they’re contradictory… taken it all of its actual ontic richness, it is the result of the active capacity of a metaphysical grade to produce in our intellect the consideration of each genus as more universal than how they’re found when contracted individually (as we see it in reality, if we take Joe and distinguish his metaphysical grades — that is a major/perfect virtual distinction); — this will be important when talking about the divine attributes and the essence.</p><p><strong>2. Minor Distinction of Reason Reasoning</strong>: it is between two (objective) concepts which are just repetition of the same act of intellectual apprehension in distinct moments of time. Ex: <em>man and man</em> in ‘’man is man’’; or a purely nominal distinction. Ex: <em>The Angelic Doctor and St. Thomas</em>;</p><p>There’s a lot to be said about analycity, synonymity, meaning, etc. and conceptual infrastructure. But maybe in another post if someone asks. Again, we can use the adequate/inadequate perfect/imperfect mediate/immediate qualifiers for these distinctions too. Another interesting thing to talk about here would be about conceptual infrastructure/architecture and conceptual linkages. And to distinguish all of this from terminological distinctions [distinction between term and concept] — and also the distinction between formal and objective concepts, both in their entitative and intentional aspects.</p><p><strong>This is all important for rigorous procedures in all main areas of natural and sacred theology</strong>.</p><p>Now, <strong>the distinction of reason reasoned is the most significant for the thomist because it is the one most used in theological matters</strong>. It is oftentimes called a ‘virtual distinction’ (the virtual distinction is more properly the foundation for the distinction of reason reasoned, but it is already customary to use this term for the distinction made by our intellect based on this foundation):</p><p>This distinction has a double root — one is the virtual distinction related to the eminentiality of a thing, as explained above; another is the debility of our intellect which can’t intellectually apprehend the real unity of eminential being without having to decompose it in order to better understand it.</p><p><strong>The big question is: WHY BOTHER ABOUT ALL THESE DISTINCTIONS?</strong></p><p>Well, if you’re delving into dogmatic theology and dealing with divine simplicity, all of this will have <em>enormous consequences</em> for topics such as predestination, triadology, christology, mariology, etc. Knowing the anteriority or posteriority of nature, eminence, perfection, etc. help us better understand how this is all tied together. And this is a valuable tool for dogmatic theologians.</p><ol><li><strong>Major Virtual Distinction or Distinction of Reason Reasoned with a Perfect Foundation</strong>: it is a distinction between two concepts which don’t mutually implicate each other so that one can occur without the other. That is, one is not contained in the same ‘substantial thing’ necessarily. Ex: <em>animal and rational taken as metaphysical grades</em> — we have animals that don’t have intellects and we have creatures with intellect that don’t have sensibility. Animality and rationality stand to each other as genus and difference, differences are potentially contained in genera and stand in relation to them as what actualizes logical matter [genera].</li><li><strong>Minor Virtual Distinction or Distinction of Reason Reasoned with an Imperfect Foundation</strong>: it is a distinction between two concepts which necessarily implicate each other.</li></ol><p><strong>a. Inadequate imperfect minor virtual distinction</strong>: you should know this already — inadequacy means a whole-part or part-part relation.</p><p><strong>a. 1.</strong> <strong>Inadequate imperfect minor virtual-logical distinction in the predicamental order</strong>: So if a concept includes each other as genus and species, and the genus is taken in its absoluteness and universality [as opposed to its contracted state in the thing itself], or, as we say, <em>ex modo concipiendi</em>, it is virtually distinct from the other metaphysical grades that are in a relation of genus-species. Ex: <em>man and animal as metaphysical grades of a substance</em>. This is also called a virtual distinction with an imperfect foundation in a determinate mode [c.f Raymaeker, <em>Metaphysica Generalis</em> part 1, section 2, chapter 1, art. 2).</p><p><strong>a. 2.</strong> <strong>Inadequate imperfect minor virtual-eminential distinction in the transcendental order</strong>: the distinction between the transcendentals (<strong>res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum</strong>) and <em>ens</em> as the transcendental whole in which they’re contained.</p><p><strong>a. 3.</strong> <strong>Inadequate imperfect minor virtual-eminential distinction in the purely divine order</strong>: between an eminential perfection and its formal parts. Ex: <em>divine love and divine mercy</em>, <em>divine will and divine decrees</em>; <em>divine essence and all its attributes</em>;</p><p><strong>3. Adequate imperfect minor virtual distinction</strong>: no part-whole relation</p><p><strong>a. 1. Adequate imperfect minor virtual-logical distinction</strong>: these are not conceptual parts of each other. Ex: <em>dog and man</em></p><p><strong>a. 2. Adequate imperfect minor virtual-eminential distinction in the transcendental order</strong>: between distinct transcendentals themselves. Ex: <em>truth and goodness</em></p><p><strong>a. 3.</strong> <strong>Adequate imperfect minor virtual-eminential distinction in the divine order</strong>: between distinct divine attributes which are not immediate eminential parts of each other. Ex: <em>divine mercy and divine will</em></p><p><strong>Finis.</strong></p><p><strong>Credits: Hypernoematon</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d537edd40192" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theses Intensivae Thomisticae (ex Cornelio Fabro)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@scholasticus/theses-intensivae-thomisticae-ex-cornelio-fabro-4481bc39e95f?source=rss-33f6844a4cc0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4481bc39e95f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scholasticus]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2024 14:02:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-01T18:27:51.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/0*htVTy6wBCDfYylpc" /><figcaption>Rev. Fr. Cornelio Fabro CSS (1911–1995)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Foundations of the intensive thomistic metaphysics of <em>ens</em>:</strong></p><p><strong>I.</strong> Potency and act are the constitutive principles of finite <em>ens</em>; potency as receptive capacity, and act as entitative act, in the various orders or planes of reality: prime matter and substantial form in the constitution of material essence, essence and <em>esse</em> as actus essendi in the entitative order, substance and accidents in the operative order.</p><p><strong>II.</strong> The essence of spiritual beings is simple in the essential order, since it is constituted by pure form; in the operative order it has the faculties of intelligence and of will at its disposal; in the entitative order — insofar as the created spirit is in se finite — it is composed of essence (as potency) and of participated <em>esse</em> (as ultimate act); by which, all that exists in the world, both material and spiritual, is called <em>ens</em> as that which as <em>esse</em> by participation.</p><p><strong>III.</strong> The relationship of potency and act in the three compositions of matter and form, substance and accidents, essence and <em>esse</em>, do not have a univocal meaning, but rather an analogous one: prime matter is pure potency, the substance produces its own accidents, and essence gives being. This is because it is by means of the form, which is the constitutive act of the species or nature, that <em>ens</em> is enabled to have/receive participated <em>esse</em> (<em>actus essendi</em>).</p><p><strong>IV.</strong> The <em>esse</em>, i.e., participated <em>actus essendi</em>, that with the essence constitutes <em>ens</em> in act as transcendental synolon, is thus the first act both of the predicamental <em>synolon</em> of matter and form in bodies, and of the operative synolon of substance and accidents in finite beings and of the transcendental <em>synolon</em> of essence and <em>esse</em> (<em>actus essendi</em>).</p><p><strong>V.</strong> Therefore, while in classical thought act indicates the essence and the form, which has no origin and constitutes the proper and first <em>esse</em> of material beings and also of intelligent and intelligible beings, in Thomistic thought act pertains first of all and above all to <strong><em>esse</em></strong>, such that every form (essence, perfection) has actuality insofar as it participates in <strong><em>esse</em></strong>.</p><p><strong>VI.</strong> “Ens”, therefore, is the “primary semantic term”, both in the static order (which implies the composition of real essence with <strong>actus essendi</strong>) and in the dynamic order as the primary foundation of the substance in operation, such that the act of operating is by participation in the act of <em>esse</em>, which is the first act of the substance.</p><p><strong>VII.</strong> “Ens” can be said, then, as the participle of <em>esse</em>, to be the “totalizing semantic term”, insofar as it indicates the plexus of reality in its first (fundamental) and ultimate (realized and realizing) concreteness; thus “<em>ens</em>” is more concrete than “lion” and “this lion” (Simba), than “man” and “this man” (Andrew): since only esse places in act both the essence in its precise characteristic and the individual connotations of the same species. This is the <strong><em>intensive</em></strong> meaning of <em>ens</em> which, as the omni-comprehensive, reigns over the other determinations of the real, both categorical (essences) and transcendental (perfections).</p><p><strong>Foundations of the intensive thomistic gnoseology and the apprehension of</strong> <strong><em>ens</em></strong>:</p><p><strong>VIII.</strong> <em>Ens</em>, then, insofar as it is the originary semantic term which indicates “that which has the act of being”, is the semantic term of the first and ultimate concreteness of reality in act, within which all the other determinations of the real are actuated as its participations. <em>Ens</em> is the “transcendental founding” semantic term with respect to any determination of the real: it avoids all logical determination (of genus and species…) insofar as it is not found on the slope of constitutive, formal concepts, but is placed as the first plexus of the first act (<em>esse</em>) at the foundation of the reality of all forms and acts that constitute the concrete <em>in se</em>, outside of thought and of mere possibility.</p><p><strong>IX.</strong> <em>Ens </em>is the first, originary noetical plexus (<em>primum cognitum</em>) which is constitutive of knowledge in the strong sense: i.e., it operates and is presented to the confluence of all the functions of consciousness both cognitive and tendential, both sensible and spiritual: for this reason, it transcends both (sensible) intuition and (intellectual) abstraction, since it sustains both. In the semantic term of the plexus <em>ens</em> the first structure of essence (<em>id quod</em>) and act (<em>esse</em>) is distinguished: “<em>Nomen entis imponitur ab esse, et nomen rei a quidditate</em>” (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4; cf. Ibid., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3).</p><p><strong>X.</strong> <em>Ens</em> indicates the whole in act of the real in its ultimate and proper reality in act: <em>esse</em> as proper act of <em>ens qua ens</em>, that is, insofar as it indicates the real that has overcome both the empty abyss of nothingness as the empty categorial multiplicity of the possible; it is not the act revealed by thought in judgment [against existential and transcendental thomism], but rather the act that is given to thought and that renders active and operating the actuating itself of thought itself in its original composition of essence and <em>esse</em>, and therefore of substance and operations and of subject and perfections.</p><p><strong>XI.</strong> The apprehension of <strong>ens</strong>, therefore, is a <em>prius</em> which is initial and constitutive at the same time, i.e., it is the object as transcendental and illuminating: therefore, strictly speaking, it cannot be called “determined” or “object” in a proper sense, but rather transcendentally objectifying. Only St.Thomas — not Parmenides, who opened the way, not Hegel, who closed it; not Rosmini, who unified the real and the possible in “ideal <em>ens</em>”; not Heidegger, who destroyed it — has grasped the founding, cognitive (speculative) priority of the plexus of <em>ens-esse</em>.</p><p><strong>XII.</strong> Consequently, to the plexus of <em>ens-esse</em> also belongs the cognitive (speculative) priority which founds: a) all the transcendental notions (one, true, good) which refer to <em>ens</em> and depend on it; b) all the other notions which refer to the essence as the proper “content” of <em>ens</em> or <em>quod est</em>, which is the substance (simple or composed).</p><p><strong>XIII.</strong> Once the mind is actuated to knowledge by the apprehension of <em>ens</em> as the object which places the mind itself in act, <em>ens</em> is affirmed in the mind itself on the fundament of <em>esse</em> which is its act. Since <em>esse</em> is the act of <em>ens</em>, <em>ens</em>, if it is, must be in act: thus, the actuation of the intellect follows the presentation of <em>ens</em> to the intellect. Thus, it is in virtue of the total passivity of the [possible] intellect with respect to the positing presentation of <em>ens</em> that the presence in act of <em>ens</em> itself is imposed on the intellect, and it should affirm it as imposing in an absolute way. It is the principle of non-contradiction, the first principle of knowledge, founded on the initial apprehension of <em>ens</em>.</p><p><strong>The intensive thomistic doctrine of the transcendentals:</strong></p><p><strong>XIV. </strong>Therefore, one should not speak of a transcendental “deduction”, nor of a transcendental “induction” in Thomas, but rather of a transcendental implication on two levels (or degrees, if you prefer): the absolute plane, with <em>ens-essentia-aliquid-unum</em>; and the relative plane, with <em>verum-bonum</em>. The absolute attributes regard <em>ens ut ens</em>: by being understood as <em>id quod est, id quod habet esse</em>, it should be <em>in se</em> something real (<em>id quod, essentia</em>), incommunicably determinate (<em>aliquid</em>), and thus, one <em>in se</em> (<em>unum</em>, undivided and indivisible, i.e., unified and compact <em>in se</em>). The unification is given by <em>esse</em> insofar as it is act of all acts, the most intimate act, the first and ultimate act.</p><p><strong>XV.</strong> If the grasping of <em>ens</em> is the first and fundamental act of knowing, insofar as it gives <em>esse</em> and makes it present, <em>ens</em> which becomes the object of knowing is “true”: true, then, is the intellect that conforms to <em>ens</em>, i.e., which attests to the content of <em>ens</em> (essence) and the actuality of being (<em>esse</em>). The originary and founding principle of the actuation of knowing in the apprehension of <em>ens</em> is thus in agreement with the absolute dependence of knowing on the givenness of <em>ens</em> itself. Thus, <em>ens in anima</em>, <em>verum</em>, is derived, i.e., founded on <em>ens in se</em> which is <em>extra animam</em>. In other words, the <em>veritas formalis mentis</em> of man depends on (should be conformed to) the real <em>veritas entis</em>.</p><p><strong>XVI.</strong> As convenience (adequation) of the intellect to <em>ens</em> constitutes the true, thus convenience of <em>ens</em> to the tendential faculty (and especially to the universal tendency of perfect happiness, which is the will) constitutes the good. It indicates <em>ens</em> insofar as it is perfect and perfective: thus, the first requirement or fundament is that it be real, i.e., that it have <em>esse</em>. The good, then, indicates that which is and should be at the summit of the scale of values and expresses the perfection of the real (the object) which is able to perfect the subject: in both moments it is presupposed that it is <em>ens</em>, and thus <em>esse</em>, the first act of <em>ens</em>, is also the act of all perfections: thus, it is called <em>perfectissimum omnium</em>, and God is the <em>ipsum esse</em> (with this He is also the <em>Summum Bonum</em>, as <em>ultimus finis</em>). […] It is easy to understand that, in spite of their respective transcendental difference, <em>verum</em> and <em>bonum</em> belong to one another necessarily: in fact, the true becomes a good, and a founding good, just as the good should be true and not illusory (otherwise it would be a deception and, instead of giving us perfection and bringing us happiness, it damages us).</p><p><strong>XVII. </strong>Therefore, <em>ens</em> is the real plexus of essence and <em>esse</em>: <em>ens</em> is something, namely, this thing and not another (a horse and not a stone, since it has the essence of horse and not of stone). Thus, the essence as principle of distinction of <em>entia</em> always entails a limitation of the perfection of <em>esse</em>, it [the created essence] is not <em>esse ipsum</em>. but rather something that “participates” in e<em>sse</em>, the first act, the act of all acts. St. Thomas says: “To participate is like taking a part, and therefore when something receives in a particular way that which belongs to another in a universal way it is said to participate in it”. The text continues, illustrating univocal predicamental participation: “As man is said to participate in animal, since it does not have the notion of animal according to all its community; and in the same way, Socrates participates in man; and in a similar way the subject participates in the accident and matter in form”. Shortly afterwards, St. Thomas speaks of transcendental participation: “It is impossible that <em>ipsum esse</em> participates in something according to the first two modes […]. But <em>ipsum esse</em> is most common: hence it is participated in by others, but does not participate in something else” (In lib. De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2).</p><p><strong>XIII.</strong> <em>Predicamental participation</em> is actuated in the sphere of the univocal perfections, i.e., those perfections which, although presenting themselves diversely in diverse participants, attest to a basic, common nature; for example, the various breeds of horses are of different stature and capacity, but are always horses, and the diversity of stature and capacity pertain to the common equine species. More complex is the univocal participation of man, due to the great richness which man can unfold in the twofold order of his nature, corporeal and spiritual: thanks to his spirituality, man realizes his “participation of emergence” (as pure spirit). St. Thomas writes: “But an individual in the lowest part of the world which contains beings that are subject to generation and corruption is found to be perfect from the fact that it has whatever pertains to itself, according to its own individual character, but not whatever pertains to its own specific nature, since its own specific nature is also found in other individual beings” (De Spirit. Creat., a. 8). “Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual in the species” (Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 32).</p><p><strong>XIX.</strong> Univocal <em>predicamental participation</em> attests to the real irreducibility of the participants — species to genera, individuals to species… — to the genera or species that regards them: the genus is real in the species insofar as it is realized in the expansion of the species, and still more, the material species are real in the multiplication of the individuals. The genus (for example, animality, and so also for all genera) in the metaphysical sense indicates <strong>a plexus of perfections that are divided diversely into various species</strong>, which are the various orders of living things which populate the earth in a marvelous progression from vegetables, amebas, protozoa… up to mammals (including man). And in man, insofar as he is an incarnate spirit, and much more so in pure spirits, every subject is diversely endowed and can be realized not only diversely [but also] in opposite directions: by truth and error, by good and evil. In predicamental participation, the following principle is valid: in the formal order (of the essence) the participants are all “equal”, <strong>while in the real order — namely in the way of having the essence — are different (species towards genus) and diverse (individuals towards species)</strong>.</p><p><strong>XX.</strong> The reality of predicamental “participation”, insofar as it verifies, in the logical-ontological order, the formal identity of participants in their respective participated — the genus by the species and the species by the individuals: thanks to the multiplicity-diversity of the participants — reveals the emergence of the first participated which is <em>esse</em>: every other commonness (both of specific perfections and individual characteristics) takes on meaning and foundation from <em>esse</em>. This means that the consideration of the unifiying moment of the concept, as intelligible plexus of predication of the participants, is preceded by and is followed by the different reality-in-act and multiplicity of the participants. It is true that such diversity and multiplicity, in the universalizing ontological reflection, is involved in and unified in a common plexus of participants (identical in formal content), yet such unifying reflection in the plexuses of genera and species is possible starting from multiplicity-diversity, and at the same time, finds fulfillment in the reference to the primary founding plexus of “<em>ens</em>” (<em>id quod participat esse</em>).</p><p><strong>XXI.</strong> One can say then that the predicamental participation of the species in the genus and of the individuals in the species is “in ascension” toward the transcendental participation of beings (be these material or spiritual) in <em>esse</em>, in the act of being as the absolutely first founding act […]. For this reason, <em>ens in quantum ens</em> — or rather, the plexus of <em>id quod habet esse</em> — constitutes the object of radical reflection. The participation in every level of being requires the real composition of the participant (as subject-potency) and of participated (act limited by potency): matter limits the form in bodies; accidents, although operative and perfective, are limited by the form both in bodies and in spirits. Finite <em>ens</em> is <em>operans</em> by participation and not by essence, i.e., it passes from potency to act in action since it is composed of essence and act of being, or rather, since it is in act by participation in <em>esse</em>.</p><p><strong>The intensive thomistic metaphysics of participation II: TRANSCENDENTAL PARTICIPATION</strong></p><p><strong>XXII.</strong> As the first notional plexus is that of <em>ens</em> which founds and sustains the meaning of every concept and meaning that follows, so also the first real transcendental plexus of essence and <em>esse</em> (<em>actus essendi</em>) founds and sustains the reality both of the pure perfections and of the other acts in being and in action. Consequently, the finite spirits (including man) are <em>entia per participationem</em>, and therefore are also known by participation: “<em>Ens</em> means that which finitely participates in <em>esse</em>, and it is this which is proportioned to our intellect, whose object is some “that which is,” as it is said in Book 3 of On the Soul. Hence our intellect can grasp only that which has a quiddity participating in <em>esse</em>” (In Librum De Causis, lect. 6). We are intelligent by participation also in a subjective sense, insofar as our intellect is a participation of the divine light: “man’s natural light, which is what makes him intellectual, is from God” (Compendium theologiae, I, ch. 129).</p><p><strong>XXIII.</strong> Thus, <em>ens</em> is the semantic-term of the real insofar as it includes both essence (<em>id quod</em>) and indicates <em>esse</em> as the first, emergent act which confers reality, both onto the essence when it is placed in act and onto the various operations and activities when they pass into act. The first placing in act of <em>ens</em>, then, is the passage of <em>ens</em> from nothing to being: which is not properly a “passage”, but the primary constitution of <em>ens</em> which emerges over nothing thanks to the participated act of <em>esse</em>: “<em>Ex hoc quod aliquid est ens per participationem, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio</em>” (I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1). From this we have the complete formula of creation as participation (passive in the creature and active in God): “It must be said that every <em>ens</em>, in whatever way it is, is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. […] [But] God is the subsisting <em>esse</em> itself <em>per se</em>; […] [and] subsisting <em>esse</em> must be one. Therefore, all other things apart from God are not their own <em>esse</em>, but participate in <em>esse</em>. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, […], are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly” (I, q. 44, a. 1).</p><p><strong>The intensive metaphysics of</strong> <strong><em>esse</em></strong>:</p><p><strong>XXIV.</strong> <em>Esse</em> is, <em>per se</em>, the act of <em>ens</em> that is (insofar as it has the act of being and is an <em>ens</em> as all finite realities are). It is in the foundation of the actuality of <em>ens</em> that it elevates itself to <em>esse</em> as act in Aristotle’s sense, for whom act is perfection that is <em>in se</em> and precedes potency. Thus, <em>ens</em> is the primary semantic-term with respect to one, true, and good, insofar as <em>esse</em> is the primary originary act from which unity, truth, and goodness proceed. In fact, it is in virtue of <em>esse</em> that the component principles of the substance (matter and form, substance and accidents) pertain to each other in unity; consequently, ens maintains the “truth” of its nature insofar as it has <em>esse</em> (according to the level of being that belongs to it). Therefore, good and perfection as well emerge on the foundation of <em>ens-unum-verum</em>, and therefore is actuated by <em>esse</em>.</p><p><strong>XXV.</strong> The elevation of act to <em>esse</em> as first act unchains the act from the conditioning of the potency, such that <em>esse</em> confers (or realizes) act in its purity or absolute emergence. It is the Aristotelian concrete [notion] of “act” that promotes <em>esse</em> to first emergent metaphysical perfection; but at the same time, there is the real emergence of <em>ens-esse</em> that realizes the reality of act in its originary purity. Thus, the two instances of act and of <em>esse</em> are complementary according to a constitutive pertaining to each othe, such that <em>ens-esse</em> is the <em>primum reale</em>, and for this reason is the first intelligible in the resolution of the foundation: “<em>illud per quod aliquid cognoscitur per similitudinem lumen dici potest; probat autem Philosophus in IX Metaph. [1051 a 29] quod unumquodque cognoscitur per id quod est in actu; et ideo ipsa actualitas rei est lumen ipsius</em>” (In Librum De Causis, prop. 6). <strong>Light</strong>, in the order or sphere of essence, is <strong>the form</strong>; in the sphere of actuality <strong><em>it is esse (actus essendi)</em></strong>, whereas <em>ens</em> is the <em>primum cognitum</em> as the foundation of every difference and duality of <em>ens</em> and of every form and difference of knowledge.</p><p><strong>XXVI.</strong> Thus a metaphysics of act and of potency — which in Aristotle is closed in the immanence of “Thought of thought” — passes to a dialectic of participation, which begins in the transcendence of ens over thought and in the absolute emergence of uncreated <em>Esse subsistens</em> over created, material or spiritual beings. Essentialism is that philosophy that speaks of multiple “contents” referred to the diversity of forms (medieval) or of the multiplicity of modes, phenomena… referred to the unity of consciousness as unique substance, monad, transcendental <em>Ego</em>, absolute Spirit, genera (modern thought). In both directions of thought, even though they are formally opposed (since the first expresses the exaggerated realism of the direct correspondence between planes of thinking and degrees of the real, while modern immanence identifies being with consciousness, being and thought), the couplet of essence and existence, the <em>content </em>of <em>ens</em> and the <em>fact</em> of being is at work. And thus, as for the Anti-Thomistic Scholastics, <em>ens</em> demands the real identity of essence and existence (the real is the realized essence, i.e., it has passed from possibility to reality), for the moderns self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness (Hegel), “existence precedes essence” (Sartre), etc. In the first case, the essence is always given as a Whole which covers man, in the second case even the essence is always given as the phenomenon of the inexhaustible fact of the essence.</p><p><strong>XXVII.</strong> Thomistic realism founds the principle of the unity of the form on the act of the <em>esse</em> of <em>ens</em>: if matter and form (for example, body and soul) are between themselves as potency and act, form and <em>esse</em>, although both are acts, are as potency and act between each other, as well, <em>esse</em> and operation are as act and act. Yet, because the orders in which they are found are diverse, the essence, with respect to <em>esse</em> falls to receptive potency of <em>actus essendi</em> which is participated in it. On the other hand, <em>esse</em> and <em>operari</em> are both maintained at the level of act and are related, that is they co-pertain to each other as first act and second act, as founding act and founded act: <em>operari sequitur esse</em>. So, according to the diversity of natures (material or spiritual), one verifies the diversity of operations: some are bound to the condition of matter, although in diverse forms or degrees (for example, in atoms and in molecules, and finally, in superior animals, up to the human body); others are independent of matter, or rather, emerge over the body, such as understanding and willing, which are properly spiritual acts.</p><p><strong>XXIII.</strong> The hierarchy of the real is articulated, then, within the dialectic of participation, according to the tension of participant as potency and participated as act. In St. Thomas, the two couplets — which in Plato and Aristotle were opposed and excluded each other — are brought back together and integrated with each other: “Everything participated is compared to the participant as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist <em>per se</em>, must have <em>esse</em> by participation; for ‘even life’, or anything of that sort, participates in <em>esse’</em>, as Dionysius says (<em>De Divinis Nominibus,</em> Ch. 5). Now participated esse is limited by the capacity of the participant; so that God alone, Who is His own <em>esse</em>, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated <em>esse</em>. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that ‘whereby they are’ and that ‘which they are’; for <em>esse</em> itself is that by which a thing is” (I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4).</p><p><strong>XXIV.</strong> Thus, thought does not close itself in a circle (or circular movement) in the tension of matter and form (Augustinianism), of particular and universal (Averroism), of consciousness and self-consciousness (immanentism), but always remains open in a movement that ascends helicoidally, from act to act: from the formal acts in the essence, first accidental and then substantial, to found themselves on <em>esse</em>, the participated transcendental in <em>ens</em> of every form and nature, up to the <em>Esse per essentiam</em>. It is always the dialectic concerning act as perfection: “For in a created spiritual substance there must be two [principles], one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first <em>ens</em>, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being (<em>plenitudinem essendi</em>), not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very <em>esse</em> must not be an <em>esse</em> that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own <em>esse</em>, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own <em>esse</em>” (<em>De spiritualibus creaturis,</em> a. 1).</p><p><strong>Credits: Jason A. Mitchell, L.C.; Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection according to Cornelio Fabro</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4481bc39e95f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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