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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Schwalm Steffen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Schwalm Steffen on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Schwalm Steffen on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trust is the true value of eIDAS and (qualified) trust services are the key — some anwers to FAQ to…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/trust-is-the-true-value-of-eidas-and-qualified-trust-services-are-the-key-some-anwers-to-faq-to-5b5f0ae4d26e?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[trust-service-provider]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rulebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-trust]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eidas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eudi-wallet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 15:15:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T15:15:19.000Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Trust is the true value of eIDAS and (qualified) trust services are the key — some anwers to FAQ to solve misconceptions</h3><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>eIDAS ensures since 2014 provable trust on digital transactions in Europe through notified eID and (qualified) trust services. With the new EUDI Wallet and new trust services like attestations of attributes it extends legal trust even on authenticity of content of data and promise comprehensive digital transactions while keeping privacy by design for personal identification data and related evidences.</p><p>23.12.2026 resp. Januar 2027 the EUDI shall be provided by Member states of EU and EFTA. While not all functionalities required by Art. 5a eIDAS will be present in January the first discussions occur if (qualified) trust services providers needed of non-qualified sufficient. Certain initiatives seemingly push non-qualified trust services mainly EAA with some misleading assumptions like:</p><ul><li>promises that with additional national measures those EAA may achieve same level of trust as QTSP</li><li>QTSP for QEAA lack of evidence that they are allowed to issue certain QEAA</li><li>QEAA expensive without additional value</li><li>Registrar or similar decides who can access ecosystem — a decision which may also include which (Q)EAA provider can issue what</li></ul><p>As (Qualified) Trust Services are the engine of eIDAS ecosystem without the EUDI remain empty pocket and recognizing the core aim of eIDAS to create a common European digital single market ensuring European digital sovereignity — some clarity seems necessa<strong>ry.</strong></p><p><strong>Which kinds of trust services exist?</strong></p><p><strong>Where`s trust in eIDAS coming from?</strong></p><p>EUDI:</p><ul><li>conformity assessment of EUDI Wallet Provider by accredited CAB acc. Art. 5c eIDAS</li><li>listed in List of Trusted Entities (EUDI Wallet Provider) of EU Commission</li><li><a href="https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/wallet/lists-of-trusted-entities/wallet-providers">https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/wallet/lists-of-trusted-entities/wallet-providers</a></li></ul><p>Qualified Trust services</p><ul><li>conformity assessment on QTSP by accredited CAB acc. Art. 20 ff. eIDAS</li><li>assessment needed ex ante so before they start their business</li><li>listed in Trust List acc. Art. 22 eIDAS</li><li><a href="https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/">https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/</a></li><li>full liability and burden of proof at QTSP</li></ul><p>Details: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9</a></p><p>This means the QTSP underlies the trust model of eIDAS as there´s no trust by default — only by proof by independent 3rd party. Fundamentally the eIDAS Trust Model is based on the fact that trust is not falling from the sky or comes out of miraculous technology — it can be only achieved by proof from trusted 3rd party. Trust and security in Europe is achieved by law and underpinning technical framework on which the technical proof is based.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*Bd_m0fB-xC0jlpTy.png" /></figure><p>Non-qualified trust services:</p><ul><li>no proven security</li><li>they shall fulfill same policy requirements acc. Art. 19a eIDAS as QTSP but there`s no conformity assessmemt proving it</li><li>actions by supervisory body are ex post, means they can start business without security proof</li></ul><p>What`s core difference between qualified and non-qualified trust services in general?</p><p>Table below shows main difference</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*Ke5hUQjyNhZiKiIA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Can non- service providers achieve same level of trust as QTSP?</strong></p><p>No as following subject missing:</p><ul><li>no conformity assessment so no proven security from beginning</li><li>no clear liability</li></ul><p>This can be seen also in fact that mandatory cross-border recognition applies for QTSP only.</p><p><strong>Can EAA achieve same level of trust as QEAA?</strong></p><p>no see question above as EAA</p><p><strong>Where`s core difference between EAA and QEAA?</strong></p><p>Following subjects apply for QTSP issuing QEAA only:</p><ul><li>proven security through conformity assessment (Art. 20 ff.)</li><li>full liability incl. burden of proof at QTSP so shifting of risk for Relying Party &amp; user possible (Art. 13)</li><li>obligations on cross-border recognition (Art. 24a)</li></ul><p>→ yes and EAA cannot be blocked because it`s EAA — but nobody is obligated to accept EAA from German issuer in Austria! In this case the justification for blocking is not the fact it`s EAA but it`s foreign EAA…</p><p>→ thinking about fact that eIDAS is mainly cross-border and unfolds its effect especially in regulated cases it becomes clear what´s key for scaling ecosystem…</p><ul><li>obligations for acceptance by an EUDI Wallet (Art. 5a, 2024/2979, 2026/</li><li>obligations to Member States for access on any authentic source for any QTSP issuing QEAA for validation of data to be attested (Art. 45e)</li></ul><p><strong>How to proof that TSP was allowed to issue EAA?</strong></p><p>This can be defined for example in a rulebook incl. the formats, schemes etc. A rulebook on other hand do not replace or add conformity assessment similar to Art. 20 ff. Means even with rulebook an EAA will never achieve same trust level as QEAA.</p><p>Depending on technology used for rulebook it also contains fundamental technical and performance issues. Currently they are mainly build on classical PKI provided by public authorities e.g. so called orchestrators without appropriate conformity assessment. Rulebooks acc. ARF resp. 2025/1569 exist for each Member State for each industry and bundled possibly on EC level. Let`s imagine:</p><ul><li>31 EU/EFA member states</li><li>n-industries</li><li>n rulebooks x 31 member states</li></ul><p>Can this work with sufficient performance? Especially since PKI as by definition vertical system can scale vertically only and those PKI not linked currently but since we don`t know by issuance how long the EAA needs to be provable this highly complex organism needs to be provided permanently de facto. Think about use cases like diploma, digital product passport birthday certificate which we need life-long — will this model with n-rulebooks x 31 member states work (even if we speak about 31 rulebooks for n industries…)? Especially since similar lists already reach their scalability and performance limit as we can see in TrustList.</p><p>Even the rulebook does not achieve EU Trust Mark as defined for QTSP acc. Art. 23 eIDAS.</p><p><strong>How to proof that QTSP was allowed to issue QEAA?</strong></p><p>Some people think that in case of QTSP it´s not proven if QTSP is allowed to issue something. Let`s look how QTSP gets a job to issue something:</p><ul><li>basically it`s fulfilment of Art. 45d and Annex V eIDAS, both do not contain any limit for QTSP to issue certain kind of (Q)EAA</li><li>conformity assessment against the standards mentioned in 2026/1735 resp. 2025/2162 which means basically ETSI EN 319 401, ETSI TS 119 471</li><li>Section 6.4 ETSI TS 119 471 requires the (Q)EAA Policy which exactly defines requirements basement why allowed to issue certain kind of (Q)EAA</li></ul><p>→ the Policy is part of conformity assessment and proven &amp; checked by CAB, means issues will be identified and blocked by CAB in conformity assessment</p><p>We remember: For non-qualified TSP issuing EAA no such proof exists before issuing EAA as proof is ex post acc. Art. 19a eIDAS.</p><p>A QTSP always acts same as TSP on behalf of its subscriber — means there must be subscriber agreement first before acting. On the other hand the data (Q)TSP attests as (Q)EAA not fallen from sky but coming out of authentic source (if Annex VI eIDAS) or other data sources. Means there must be certain agreement between data source provider and (Q)TSP to issue anything. Means also that data source provider will a) check if it`s (Q)TSP in case of authentic source so if conditions Art. 45e fulfilled b) if it`s allowed to get the data from the source. On the other hand we need to consider that QTSP always fully liable so it`s in personal interest of QTSP to issue only QEAA they are allowed to — in comparison to TSP where the user need to go the long way through instances to possibly get compensation after years.</p><p>Means in practical: If somebody wants to get e.g. diploma as QEAA from university:</p><ul><li>person goes to university</li><li>university engaged QTSP for QEAA first hand</li><li>person requires diploma as QEAA from university</li><li>university routes person to QTSP (fully transparent within the look and feel of university), QTSP requires identification acc. Art. 24 (1) eIDAS</li><li>user identifies</li><li>QTSP checks the request against (authentic) source = university if the person is known and has diploma there which is still valid</li><li>university confirms</li><li>QTSP issues 2FA for QEAA as required in ETSI TS 119 471</li><li>user does 2FA</li><li>QTSP issues diploma as QEAA</li></ul><p>So QTSP cannot act without university as data provider. QTSP relies upon the data source and the feedback if the data a) exist, b) valid, so QTSP will have agreement with university which defines responsibility of university for authenticity of data it provides to QTSP — exactly this will be also part of the (Q)EAA Policy of the QTSP which is part of conformity assessment by CAB.</p><p>Means also the case that QTSP issues something it`s not allowed to is de facto impossible — even in complex cases like e.g. driver license in German: Task is legally in hands of District and independent cities. So authentic source which is registry provided by Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA) is legally not allowed to issue directly. So a subscriber agreement KBA-QTSP will fail as KBA would block. In practice it would lead to: Municipality has contract with QTSP for issuance QEAA. QTSP may check against authentic source of KBA but QTSP issues on behalf of responsible municipality the user needs to request on. Process then similar to university.</p><p>It`s pretty much the case where subscriber (municipality) is not the EAA subject (Alice for its driver license) which is required to be checked and solved acc. Section 4.2.1.1 ETSI TS 119 471.</p><p><strong>What´s role of rulebooks?</strong></p><p>Rulebooks pretty much help to define how certain kind of (Q)EAA should be issued in terms of e.g.</p><ul><li>structure</li><li>format</li><li>semantics</li><li>…</li></ul><p>Article 3(2) and Article 8(3)(h) of Regulation 2025/1569, as amended — requessts compliance with registered schemes — means those schemes are registered in national rulebook and national one included in concluded one of EC and published. Currently no rulebook published.</p><p>Certain issue: Rulebooks apply in EUand EFTA only — difficult for international use cases as typical in B2B which is majority of (Q)EAA. Another issue worth considering: Why building semantics in rulebooks if with W3CVCDM JSON LD (or executed as JWT/SD-JWT as possible acc. W3C VCDM v2.0 spec) a (Q)EAA format exists which contains possiblity toi include or reference semantics by definition? Seems like reinventing the wheel with high complexity on rulebooks and creating interoperability/useability issues since rulebooks only relevant in Europe while VCDM useable worldwide. Understandable looking at pushing SD-JWT VC in Europe as Lluis Arino show in his well-grounded analysis:</p><p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/16112-European-Digital-Identity-Wallet-standards-and-technical-specifications-update-/F33373595_en">European Commission - Have your say</a></p><p>Issue for all ecosystem already implemented semantics such as Data Sharing (acc. Data Act) in industry, education, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive etc.</p><p>Rulebooks could also be used to define what a TSP is allowed to issue so practically an alternative to the trust list since TSP are not necessarily listed in the trust list (TSP can be listed while QTSP are always listed in trust list). As this is legally critical since not foreseen by eIDAS. The alleged solving of issue at QTSP where it allegedly not defined what QTSP is allowed to issue turns out to be a chimera as describe in question <strong>How to proof that QTSP was allowed to issue QEAA?.</strong></p><p>Beside this formal step rulebook might be used for defining who is allowed to issue what, but while rulebook in easy word defines what must be issued how and how it should be checked it also contains a trust framework. This framework use x509 identifier based on classical PKI and trusted lists — both have the property that they can scale on vertically. Will this work when EAA are majority and we may speak about 1 rulebook for each industry in each member state so n-rulebooks for 31 member states combined on EU Level which pretty much need to be immutable and provided permanently since issuer does not know how long user keeps its credential? And no, re-issuance not necessarily solution since often chain of custody legally needed… but this challenge is another story not covered today.</p><p><strong>What´s role of Registrar?</strong></p><p>The registrar acc. -Art. 5b eIDAS and 2025/848 is responsible for issuing Wallet Relying Part Access Certificates and Wallet Relying Party Registration Certificate to any Relying Party (RP) which wants to deal with the EUDI Wallet.</p><p>Worth to mention that:</p><ul><li>RP registers once in Member State it has its headquarter</li><li>one registration for dealing with ALL EUDI Wallet, no need to register in all Member States</li><li>identification of RP needed</li><li>RP needs to provide information which data mainly from PID needed for which use case</li><li>Certificates are basically x509 similar to signing certificates and follow ETSI TS 119 411–8</li></ul><p>The registrar checks not if the RP is allowed to get the data from EUDI Wallet — which would be also high risk for registrar especially if burden of proof requirements for RP touched and so liability risks occur — sinde liability for related failures of Registrar not covered anywhere yet.</p><p>Registrar can block registration only in defined cases, acc. to draft of German Digital Identity law (draft) this is only possible of there`s breach on Art 5b (2) Sentence 2 eIDAS — means following data not correct</p><p>“The registration process shall be cost-effective and proportionate-to-risk. The relying party shall provide at least:</p><p>(a) the information necessary to authenticate to European Digital Identity Wallets, which as a minimum includes:</p><p>(i) the Member State in which the relying party is established; and</p><p>(ii) the name of the relying party and, where applicable, its registration number as stated in an official record together with identification data of that official record;</p><p>(b) the contact details of the relying party”</p><p>Or Art. 6 2025/848 not fulfilled so required information mentioned below incorrect, invalid or manipulated:</p><p>1. Registrars shall establish easy to use electronic, and where possible, automated registration processes for wallet-relying parties.</p><p>2. Registrars shall process applications for registration without undue delay and provide a response to the application for registration to the applicant within the timeframe defined in the applicable registration policy, using appropriate means and in accordance with the laws and procedures of the Member State where the national register is established.</p><p>3. Where possible, registrars shall verify in an automated manner:</p><p>(a) the accuracy, validity, authenticity and integrity of the information required under Article 5;</p><p>(b) where applicable, the power of attorney of representatives of the wallet-relying parties drawn up and submitted in accordance with the laws and procedures of the Member State where the national register is established;</p><p>c) the type of entitlement or entitlements of the wallet-relying parties as set out in Annex I;</p><p>(d)the absence of an existing registration in another national register.</p><p>4. Registrars shall verify the information set out in paragraph 3 against the supporting documentation provided by the wallet-relying parties or against appropriate authentic sources or other official electronic records in the Member State where the national register is established and to which the registrars have access in accordance with the applicable national laws and procedures.</p><p>5. The verification of entitlements of wallet-relying parties referred to in paragraph 3, point © shall be carried out in accordance with Annex III.</p><p>6. Where the registrar cannot verify the information in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 5, the registrar shall reject the registration.</p><p>7. When a wallet-relying party no longer intends to rely upon wallet units for the provision of public or private services under a specific registration, it shall notify the relevant registrar without undue delay and request the cancellation of that registration.”</p><p>Those subjects do not contain the possibility to refuse the WRRAC/WRRC in any other case just to control the accesss to ecosytem, e.g. to refuse QTSP.</p><p>Means also: If a Spanish Bank is registered as RP in Spain it is allowed to access any EUDI Wallet for its use case even the German, Austrian, Estonian or Bulgarian EUDI.</p><p><strong>What`s role of orchestrator and can orchestrator replace CAB &amp; Supervisory Body?</strong></p><p>An orchestrator itself is not defined in eIDAS nor its implementing acts. The term comes a bit from German ecosystem where the DigitalIdentityLaw (Draft) defines in § 2 the option that the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and Government Modernization (BMDS) can entrust a private organization with tasks — meaning that this organization, under legal and technical supervision of BMDS, carries out specific state functions within the EUDI ecosystem in Germany. Exactly this is done with the orchestrator in Germany which is basically Common Codes. But this does not mean that the orchestrator replaces the subjects supervisors bodies acc. Art. 46a, b etc. eIDAS or the CAB (Art. 5c, 12, 20 ff. eIDAS).</p><p>see draft German Digital Identity Law <a href="https://bmds.bund.de/service/gesetzgebungsverfahren/digitale-identitaetengesetz">https://bmds.bund.de/service/gesetzgebungsverfahren/digitale-identitaetengesetz</a></p><p>Means also: The role of a gatekeeper is currently not foreseen for the orchestrator — not in eIDAS, not in its implementing acts, nor national law.</p><p><strong>What`s relationship between EUDI and (qualified) trust services?</strong></p><p>As defined in Art. 5a the EUDI shall at least allow user to gain (Q)EAA and enable digital signing. Additional functioanlities possible as long as main functions required in Art. 5a and related implementing act not interfered.</p><p>So basically the relationship between EUDI and (Q)TSP: It´s one possible client system dealing with the (Q)TSP. In comparion to other client systems special requirements apply for EUDI in terms of protocols, formats and additional (certfication) requirements for (Q)TSP with EUDI — not to forget the obligation for (Q)TSP to register as Relying party in the country in which TrustList they are. Details see:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/eaa-pubeaa-qeaa-lost-in-eidas-jungle-bef34482bff4">EAA, pubEAA &amp; QEAA — Lost in eIDAS jungle?</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9</a></p><p><strong>Shall any EUDI accept any QEAA?</strong></p><p>As long as the QEAA fulfills the requirements of implementing act 2024/2979 resp. 2026/1731 any EUDI shall accept any QEAA. Means in practical:</p><ul><li>if the technical requirements of mentioned IA fulfilled any EUDI must accept any QEAA from any European QTSP</li><li>the fulfilment of those requirements is part of conformity assessment of certain QTSP issuing QEAA by accredited CAB</li></ul><p><strong>Can we protect an EUDI against QTSP from other countries?</strong></p><p>No, as long as the QEAA of this QTSP fulfill the technical requirements of 2024/2979 resp. 2026/1731 which is proven in conformity assessment by CAB.</p><p>Not to forget the obligations for acceptance from 2028 acc. Art. 5f eIDAS which apply for especially for public authorities, transport, energy, banking, financial services, social security, health, drinking water, postal services, digital infrastructure, education or telecommunication</p><p>The obligations apply for any EUDI Wallet from all Member states!</p><p><strong>What could be the sense to push EAA instead of QEAA?</strong></p><p>Since QTSP shall be supervised by national supervisory body acc. Art. 46b eIDAS which is defined nationally — means pretty much the existing bodies remain — this objectively limits the new role of an orchestrator which may have the claim to control access and function of the whole ecosystem. But this claim is bit treacherous since also non-qualified TSP are under supervision of national supervisory body acc. Art. 46b and 19a eIDAS. Everbody who issues EAA to an open audience (so not within one company for company employees only) is TSP by definition acc. Art. 3 Nr. 16 eIDAS.</p><p>On the other hand eIDAS require certain subjects like EUDI interacting with any QTSP on signing and QEAA, any authentic source which need to be opened for any QTSP. This effort might especially in beginning after launch of first EUDI Wallets lead to the assumption that ignoring QTSP for a while could simplify the ecosystem building in the starting line. Also this argument is bit tricky since signing with qualified signature as well as storage of QEAA in EUDI are core functions acc. Art. 5a eIDAS — means EUDI without is legally no EUDI. So certain legal risks occur.</p><p>The argument on authentic sources is comprehensible but taking into account that interpretation of Annex VI eIDAS so what`s actually authentic source is still very broad between the member states. German Digital Identity Law defines currently only company registry as such…. so the actual effort to connect QTSP to authentic sources still open.</p><p>On the other hand EAA focus more on low regulated cases see also:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/eaa-pubeaa-qeaa-lost-in-eidas-jungle-bef34482bff4">EAA, pubEAA &amp; QEAA — Lost in eIDAS jungle?</a></p><p>But: Why using an EUDI for subjects like ticketing, boarding passes, library card or similar as those convenient cases already covered by existing solutions much less complex easier to integrate for Relying Party (since no Registration needed) and integrated on worldwide ecosystem — smart and easy for citizens. Yes maybe not so privacy friendly but let´s be honest: 95% of citizens wants to have 1 Click to get their service and amount of use of no privacy friendly solutions worldwide and in Europa speaks volumes…</p><p>Looking that most requirements for valid identity proof on LoA substantial or higher and accordingly the need for authentic evidences occur in higher regulated environments — the need and role for QTSP on QEAA or certificates/remote signing etc. becomes clearer. Exactly here the subjects like</p><ul><li>risk</li><li>liability</li><li>burden of proof, documentation requirements</li><li>business value on proven authentic data</li></ul><p>are core reason for using regulated and proven secure eID mean like the EUDI Wallet. But those cases need QTSP. Means if EUDI is aimed to be successful those regulated industries are the key — especially since subjects like PID not necessarily needed for ticketing nor library card…</p><p>And: Similar level of trust and legal value like QEAA not achievable with EAA — even with rulebooks since the clear legal differentiation is already set up in eIDAS.</p><p><strong>Who takes risk in case of EAA and QEAA?</strong></p><p>The user of the EAA as well as the Relying Party take the full liability risk.</p><p><strong>Who decides about TSP vs. QTSP resp. EAA vs. QEAA?</strong></p><p>The user and Relying Party shall decide based on legal, business and other requirements. Details and support could be find here:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9</a></p><p><strong>What`s risk of market interventions or blocking/delay of integrating QTSP into EUDI ecosystem by government bodies/orchestrators?</strong></p><p>The main focus of eIDAS regulation and EUDI can be seen at the obligations for acceptance of EUDI and QTSP as well as needs for clear identification, proven trust and security: regulated industries. For other ones there`s typically no legal need (and so no legal basement) for a PID/eID or why should I use my national ID to access a library, get a train ticket or car sharing?</p><p>Exactly to achieve privacy goals of eIDAS we need to decide carefully where EUDI and (qualified) trust services really brings added value — where legal, business or other risks matter — in regulated industries such as</p><ul><li>Public</li><li>Finance</li><li>Health</li><li>Industry</li></ul><p>In those environments a clear liability and proven security in whole EU/EFTA is essential — means even a national law which may apply for certain areas and defined in certain rulebooks in liability will never achieve same level of security and trust for any citizens nor company like the one given by a QTSP. Reason: the rules for QTSP defined in eIDAS on European level and valid all over Europe (EU/EFTA). Not to forget the obligations for acceptance which apply in case of trust services Europe wide also for QTSP only.</p><p>The attempt to keep QTSP out of the ecosystem or to limit there use can against this background be seen as an attempt to damage the whole eIDAS and EUDI ecosystem or in other words:</p><p>Trust is the most valueable currency for digital Europe — and QTSP one of its key creators.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5b5f0ae4d26e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[EAA, pubEAA & QEAA — Lost in eIDAS jungle?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/eaa-pubeaa-qeaa-lost-in-eidas-jungle-bef34482bff4?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bef34482bff4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 10:40:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-13T10:43:40.392Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>EAA, pubEAA &amp; QEAA — Lost in eIDAS jungle?</h3><p><strong>Attestations of attributes — kinds and possible differentiation</strong></p><p>Beside the EUDI Wallet and especially the EU Business Wallet the attestations of attributes are the most important subjects for the eIDAS ecosystem looking at the practically unlimited possibilities as described here: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-attestations-of-attributes-the-real-gold-of-eidas-2-0-fabac453da43">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-attestations-of-attributes-the-real-gold-of-eidas-2-0-fabac453da43</a></p><p>without attestations of attributes the wallet will remain an empty pocket for citizens or even companies.</p><p>eIDAS itself differentiates between following kinds of attestations of attributes:</p><ul><li>Attestations of attributes (non-qualified) = means an attestation in electronic form that allows attributes to be authenticated (see Art. 3 (44) eIDAS), so practically a non-quallfieid attestation of attributes</li><li>qualified attestations of attributes = means an electronic attestation of attributes which is issued by a qualified trust service provider and meets the requirements laid down in Annex V (and Art. 45d) Annex V see <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial</a></li><li>pubEAA = means a electronic attestation of attributes issued by or on behalf of a public sector body responsible for an authentic source’ means an electronic attestation of attributes issued by a public sector body that is responsible for an authentic source or by a public sector body that is designated by the Member State to issue such attestations of attributes on behalf of the public sector bodies responsible for authentic sources in accordance with Article 45f and with Annex VII.</li></ul><p>In this context we need to take into account Art. 3 (16) which defines that “<br>‘trust service’ means an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of any of the following:</p><p>(g) the issuance of electronic attestations of attributes;</p><p>(h) the validation of electronic attestation of attributes.”</p><p>This means that anybody issuing attestations of attributes for 3rd parties as a service is TSP by definition. Remind: If you issue attestions of attributes only within your organization you are no TSP because to have a closed user group.</p><p>But which kind of (Q)EAA to choose for certain use case and which requirements apply?</p><p>Main requirements on (qualified) trust services can be found here</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9</a></p><p>The decision on which kind of (Q)EAA apply for which use case basically depends on the relevant legal, business ,technical and other requirements resp. the risks they cause. Means a valid risk analysis is the key to define if EAA or QEAA or pubEAA is the solutions to be used. How such a risk analysis can be done and how it could be used to define the kind of attestation of attributes is described below.</p><p><strong>Risk Analysis für (Q)/pubEAA</strong></p><p>A well-tested approach is a risk analysis adapting the methodology from ISO 27005 as main standard with the ISO 27k family for information security management systems. Background is that ISO 27k focus on 360 degree view on an organization (or parts depending on scope) covering organizational, legal, technical, privacy and all other relevant aspects as information security is not only technical task.</p><p>The risk assessment focus on the typcial 3 main security goals:</p><ul><li>Integrity (including e.g. authenticity)</li><li>Confidentiality (including e.g. privacy)</li><li>Availability (including e.g. reliability)</li></ul><p>Means practically to define the relevant use cases including responsible person to ensure committment and related to them the applicable threats e.g.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/556/0*oUcvSyksxRZqTb0S.png" /></figure><p>The threats in the picture are examples and need to be adjusted before use</p><p>Depending on complexity of application area the use cases can be additionally categorized and threats assigned to related information asset.<br>Those threats will be analysed in next step regarding their probability of occurrence and amoung of damage including a score for each level e.g.:</p><ul><li>probability of occurence: low = 1 , medium =2 , high = 3</li><li>impact: limited =1, significant = 2, catastrophic = 3 (related to all 3 security goals)</li></ul><p>The logic basically means:</p><ul><li>What`s the probability that lack of compliance can happen and if it happens, what`s the impact i ncase confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of the data affected?</li></ul><p>Probability and impact will be weighted (e.g. using scores). Depending on risk assesssmen:</p><ul><li>Assessment of probability and impact of certain threat for certain use case of relevant organization (or group of organizations/state etc.) leads<br>in each case to a score e.g.:</li><li>Probability: 3 (high)</li><li>Impact: 3 (catastrophic)</li></ul><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*3UjRaAY5QWyjqONY.png" /></figure><ul><li>the risk exposure is basically the multiplication of overall score of probability &amp; impact, in our example: 9<br>→ done for each security goal (confidentiality, integrity, availability.</li></ul><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/854/0*rDw80gRofLKtPdpq.png" /></figure><p>The average of risk exposure for each security goal lead to the overall maximum risk per threat. Depending on the pre-defined risk matrix the average should be marked in colours e.g.</p><ul><li>green = average 0–2</li><li>yellow = average 3–5</li><li>red = average &lt; 5</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*5HYI8gAxivZvkocLAzo7tg.png" /></figure><p>The overall risk is now the result we need in order to define the kind of attestation we need for certain use case. It`s helpful to work with</p><ul><li>recommended max. kind (Q)EAA= oriented on the highest overall risk for certain threat of a use case (as a use case will always have more than only 1 threat)</li><li>recommended minimum kind of (Q)EAA = oriented on the majority of overall risks for all threats of certain use case</li></ul><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*04NcAiKYin3h9CbI.png" /></figure><p>Reason is to give the decision maker the whole picture before final verdict. Because depending on the actual situation of assessing organization or application area the choice which kind of (Q)EAA to be used for certain use case will cause financial, organizational and other efforts which may lead to the decision to focus on minimum kind of (Q)EAA also if this might mean to take some risks for those threats with highest overall risks acc. to risk assesssment.</p><p>Some recommendations when you make your risk assessment:</p><ul><li>be realistic but not don’t assume the exceptional worst-case scenario</li><li>think about how you would deal with those documents/evidence now without attestations of attributes</li><li>think about the actual process and use case so how it`s issued and what would really be possible impact today e.g.<br>→ if user does not get a certain legal right from the attestation, what should be the impact? (e.g. the right to park in certain area without the promise to get a parking space)<br>→ if student card is manipulated or used by unauthorized person today, what´s the today`s impact?<br>→ if ticket for local transport is manipulated today, what`s the today`s impact?</li><li>align it with your existing Information Security Management System nd risk management (if existing)</li></ul><p>Those recommendations are no final list, they also give no legal nor other assurance they may only help in decision making.</p><p>Some recommendations on how to deal with the result of risk assessment and how to choose the best fitting kind of (Q)EAA for certain application area:</p><ul><li>have a look on the section on misconceptions regarding Q)EAA here:<br><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9</a></li></ul><p>additionally:</p><ul><li>make decision focused on majority of use cases as the Cinderella principle (one kind of (Q)EAA per each use case) may lead to significant high effort<br>→ Check the legal requirements first if there`s legal need for certain kind of (Q)EAA</li><li>be pragmatic and keep your decision oriented on how you deal with those documents/data today, means if you issue them today without a QES/QSeal there`s no reason to build Fort Knox in case of (Q)EAA</li><li>Before you take a risk think about it`s real costs — same with the approach “Using a sledgehammer to crack a nut”.</li><li>if there was no liability or similar case in the last 10 years it`s not likely that they will increase only due to use of (Q)EAA<br>→ But if there were many liability and similar cases this won`t change either!</li><li>take your complete business model and/or digitization strategy into account as kind of (Q)EAA may determine it e.g.:<br>→ issuance of proven authentic data could serve business models from KYC to Digital Product Passport or data sharing etc.<br>→ if you already plan to become (Q)TSP it might influence kind of (Q)EAA to be issued</li><li>if you already use e.g. qualified signatures, seals or other (qualified) trust services etc. from (Q)TSP you may be able to use synergies when focusing on QEAA</li><li>QEAA are not necessarily more expensive than non-qualified EAA, it depends on the business model of the (Q)TSP, so good information may save costs and serve business models</li><li>choose the most appropriate kind attestation of attributes for your use case, business model, organization etc.</li><li>if you are public sector body responsible for registry and don`t want to issue more than stored in your registry it might be helpful to focus on pubEAA</li></ul><p>Those recommendations are no final list, they also give no legal nor other assurance they may only help in decision making.</p><p>Last but no least a secret advice: The same methodology can be used to define the Level of Assurance for any identification to onboard natural or legal entities on certain services too ;-)</p><p>But beside the possible methodology to choose relevant kind of (Q)EAA, some more details on EAA, QEAA and pubEAA. The short descriptions are not exhaustive but may help in understanding and use.</p><p><strong>Requirements on non-qualified TSP on EAA</strong></p><p>non-qualified TSP underly the requirements on Art. 19a eIDAS. Means in high-level: They need to establish necessary governance, processes and technical capabilities defined in the relevant European Standards acc. eIDAS (see <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a>). Means</p><ul><li>main governance ETSI EN 319 401</li><li>specifics for each kind of trust service in trust service specific standards (e.g. ETSI TS 119 471 for attestations of attributes)</li><li>in future rulebooks may apply, means ARF TS 11 discuss currently the future use of rulebooks which define requirements on authorization an, structure etc. of (Q)EAA managed by dedicated authorities; in ETSI ESI further standardization is already planned, but currently rulebooks are not standardized nor incorporated in the eIDAS or related national regulations; beside this it has to be stated that rulebooks for EAA are currently planned as voluntary</li></ul><p>In comparison to qualified trust services a non-qualified one won`t undergo a conformity assessment but in case of security breach they have similar obligation like information of Supervisory Body within 24 hours. The Supervisory Body can then start an investigation and possibly stop the business. So practically it´s the other way round: No conformity assessment to start business, but possibly harsh consequences &amp; investigation in case of breach.</p><p>Main advantages of EAA are e.g.:</p><ul><li>easy to implement</li><li>no high security requirements on infrastructure, components or governance</li><li>easy to scale</li><li>high flexibility as no dependency of scope of any certification</li><li>possibly more cost efficient depending on use case</li><li>in future possibly issued based on controlled rulebook</li><li>easy and fast adoption possible especially for EUDI Wallet for citizens, regarding companies depending on industry</li></ul><p>Issue of non-qualified TSP on EAA is that they</p><ul><li>won`t be listed in Trust List so the trustworthiness is not publicly provable</li><li>less evidential value as they do not contain QES/QSeal nor are qualified</li><li>don´t have benefit of obligation of acception in whole EU/EEA</li><li>no proven security and trust because investigation only done in case of breach</li><li>no allow shifting of liability and security risk for users, so user takes full liability and security risk</li><li>burden of evidence in case of damage lies always in hands of user — without no liability at TSP (which will foreseeably share the liability risk with authoritative source so that additional complexity for user to make evident that damage cause in issue for which TSP responsible for)</li><li>no legal access to authentic sources</li></ul><p>Examples for use cases of EAA are need to be differentiated between citizens and companies. The mentioned subjects are examples from experience of the author and do not replace a valid business analysis and risk management.</p><p>In case of B2C/G2C or wallets for citizens examples for EAA could be e.g.:</p><ul><li>ticketing, discount cards, boarding passes, hotel registration etc. so nearly everything in travel</li><li>membership cards</li><li>eReceipt of no special law apply (e.g. Narcotics Act in Germany)</li><li>insurance status or similar</li><li>student cards</li><li>access management if it`s no high security laboratory or similar</li><li>employee cards</li><li>most approvals by public authorities (because mostly based on pay to use approach)</li></ul><p>B2B, G2B e.g.</p><ul><li>insurance status</li><li>memberships</li><li>access management if it`s no high security laboratory or similar</li><li>data for data sharing not related to documentation requirements</li><li>Car sharing</li></ul><p>it needs to be stated that these are examples, means also if certain subjects mentioned here as example for EAA they could require QEAA in certain circumstances e.g. if in certain organization many cases of fraud known etc.</p><p>The decision should be done based on valid risk management focusing on relevant risks like political, financial, security, liability et.c subjects depending on affected organization. Also possible business models, affects on business processes, existing business relationships and solutions shall be taken into account.</p><p>In summary it could be stated that not in any case QEAA needed be default. But if user wants to shift liability and/or security risk, achieve high evidential value and/or gain full legal trust e.g. through proven secruity, the QEAA is only solution. On the other hand those advantages require a higher effort which should be well justified as is not necessary in any case and could lead to unnecessary costs and effort if the properties of QEAA not required.</p><p>As the world is not black and white also the starting point of the organization should be taken into account:</p><ul><li>if certain organization already manage certificates or similar using a PKI etc. it might be easier to start issuing EAA for their own without a TSP, because the technical effort to add EAA are typically manageable</li><li>if certain organization starts from scratch it might be meaningful to use a 3rd party provider which could be non-qualified TSP in the beginning, if this non-qualified TSP is already QTSP for other trust services than EAA, the upgrade (if needed) might be a development step later on</li></ul><p>For pubEAA there`s proven security but the liability not regulated in eIDAS so additional risk as national specifics may apply.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*H6SGdfDz5_yh3DIP" /></figure><p><strong>Requirements on Qualified Trust Service Provider on QEAA</strong></p><p>Any QTSP underly the requirements on Art. 20 ff. eIDAS as described here:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a></p><p>Means the only relationship a QTSP has (beside their users) are to the Supervisory Body and the Conformity Assessment Body. In Case interacting with EUDI Wallet also the Registrar comes in the game but only as one condition (getting Wallet Relying Party Access Certificate) within preparation for conformity assessment.</p><p>In case of QEAA the following standards are mainly relevant (see. CIR 2025/2162 <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502162">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202502162</a>)</p><ul><li>ETSI TS 119 471</li><li>ETSI TS 119 461 (identity proof)</li><li>ETSI EN 301 549 (accessibility)</li></ul><p>See also: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a>. QEAA</p><p>The main advantage of QEAA are:</p><ul><li>Proven security and trust of QTSP due to conformity assessment to be repeated every 2 years (if QTSP for first time, first re-certification after 1 year)</li><li>clear identification of holder</li><li>conformity assessment done by accredited Conformity Assessment Body so reliance on trusted 3rd party</li><li><strong>can issue from any data source </strong>so authentic source <strong>and</strong> any other data base (also if certain data sources can be accessed by certain public bodies only because QTSP will in any case act as 3rd party supplier only for the subscriber = Client = e.g. public authority)</li><li>QEAA are undeniable proven authentic data, so they allow process automatization and data driven business model</li><li>high evidential value due to use of QES/QSeal and qualified status</li><li>in case of breach obligation to mention it to Supervisory Body within 24 hours and possibility of extraordinary (independent from the 2 years period) re-certification (conformity assessment) by CAB</li><li>User/RP can shift security and liability risk to QTSP due to clear liability at QTSP acc. Art. 13 eIDAS (burden of evidence lies always in hands of QTSP)</li><li>Full recognition as QTSP in whole Europe and obligations for acception apply</li><li>rulebooks (see description of EAA( when they are present are planned to be mandatory</li></ul><p>Issues on QEAA depend on</p><ul><li>higher effort to issue as QTSP needed in case issuer does not want to become QTSP itself</li><li>less flexibility as depending on scope and design of qualification of QTSP any additional kind of attestion could require new (delta) certification</li><li>higher effort to scale</li><li>regulated approach for identification of holder limits flexibility</li><li>shifting of data to be attested to 3rd party (QTSP) in case issuer (e.g. university, bank etc.) issues EAA for themselves and only use for QEAA a trust service provider</li></ul><p>Examples for use cases of QEAA are need to be differentiated between citizens and companies. The mentioned subjects are examples from experience of the author and do not replace a valid business analysis and risk management.</p><p>In case of B2C/G2C or wallets for citizens examples for QEAA could be e.g.:</p><ul><li>any kind of diploma (school, university, approbation, vocational training certificate etc.)</li><li>attestations from civil registry</li><li>driver license</li><li>evidences in social security</li><li>documents for cars (license, registration etc.)</li><li>eReceipt which underly special law (e.g. Narcotic act in Germany)</li><li>insurance evidences which underly special law (e.g. BAFIN in Germany)</li></ul><p>B2B, G2B e.g.</p><ul><li>Digital Product Passport and Supply Chain evidences</li><li>data sharing acc. Data Act and any data sharing where documentation requirements apply</li><li>KYC/KYB</li><li>tax relevant data</li><li>approvals on machines, technical components, airplanes, cars, trains etc.</li><li>maintenance documents</li><li>evidences for ownerships</li></ul><p>Basically it could be stated: As higher regulated the industry and/or use case, as more requirements on burden of proof, evidential value, as higher the liability and/or security risks, as more proven authentic data determine, simplify or enable business processes and/or business models as more added value QEAA could achieve.</p><p>The decision should be done based on valid risk management focusing on relevant risks like political, financial, security, liability et.c subjects depending on affected organization. Also possible business models, affects on business processes, existing business relationships and solutions shall be taken into account.<br>As the world is also for QEAA not black and white also the starting point of the organization should be taken into account:</p><ul><li>if certain organization already use an identity platform connected to a QTSP for use of QES/QSeal it could be easier to use QEAA because it could be only to add additional service</li><li>if certain organization need to start from scratch it could<br>a) be depending on business case, amount of transactions, kind of data also a solution to become QTSP themselves<br>b) good to start with small solution focused on one PoC with the option to extend depending on business case or usage in future</li></ul><p>Unfortunately for (qualified) trust service providers it also could be stated that most application areas for QEAA lie in B2B and G2B and not necessarily in use cases related to citizens</p><p><strong>QTSP and authentic source</strong></p><p>An authentic source means basically a public registry (or private) which is notified by Member State to European Commission. Any public registry which is authentic source needs to be opened to any QTSP for verification on QEAA — means less could be more for Member States. Requires a public sector body (or on behalf) responsible for it. only source for pubEAA but not bound to them.</p><p>see also <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>According to Art. 45e eIDAS the Member States have to give all QTSP on QEAA access to authentic sources to validating the content of the attestation of attributes — so the actual data for driver license, diploma, registration certificates etc. “ wherever those attributes rely on authentic sources <strong>within the public sector</strong>.” at least those ones containing data acc. Annex VI eIDAS see:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial</a></p><p>This does not mean one interface per QTSP. <strong>This means ONE interface for ALL QTSP on QEAA </strong>provided by each Member State. Lucky Europe, we have standards for this:</p><ul><li>ETSI TS 119 478 exactly defines this interface</li></ul><p>It reuse for example the OOTS interface so that in simple words the access for QTSP on QEAA on the authentic sources can be done using the OOTS/NOOTS System to public registries. Means also in terms of registry automatization e.g. in Germany: Why defining new interfaces there if ETSI TS 119 478 exists.</p><p>Taking into account that Art. 45e defines ONE interface to all QTSP on QEAA, this means practically that a centralized service providing interface acc. ETSI TS 119 478 to provide accesss to all registries would be sufficient. This does not mean that the QTSP actually directly access the registry — it means that the QTSP on QEAA is “able to verify those attributes by electronic means at the request of the user, in accordance with Union or national law.”. So the access could go via proxy while the actual verification is technically done by an internal service of public sector independent from QTSP which provides the validation results to the QTSP. This approach would avoid that QTSP access registries directly which could cause security and complexity issues.</p><p>Following picture illustrates the option:</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*JD3lg84MjCJuB_4c.png" /></figure><p><strong>Requirements on pubEAA</strong></p><p>A pubEAA is a public Electronic Attestations of Attributes, issued by or on behalf of public sector body responsible for authentic source. Needs to undergo conformity assessment and will be listed in an own list provided by EU Commission.</p><p>Means pubEAA can be issued by public sector bodies or somebody engage by them and only from the related authentic source. This requires the existence of an authentic source</p><ul><li>notified by Member States</li><li>listed by EC</li></ul><p>the pubEAA Provider itself</p><ul><li>fulfils Annex VII see <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?postPublishedType=initial</a></li><li>successfully passed conformity assessment with foreseeably similar standards like QTSP</li><li>fulfils specifics on the qualified certificate for the QES/QSeal of the QEAA as defined in Art. 45 f (1b):<br>containing a specific set of certified attributes in a form suitable for automated processing and:<br>(i)indicating that the issuing body is established in accordance with Union or national law as the responsible for the authentic source on the basis of which the electronic attestation of attributes is issued or as the body designated to act on its behalf;<br>(ii) providing a set of data unambiguously representing the authentic source referred to in point (i) and:<br>(iii) identifying the Union or national law referred to in point (i).<br>Remind: for QEAA de facto any QES/QSeal can be used which fits to the attestation format (e.g. JAdES for JWT or CB-AdES-B-B for CBOR)</li></ul><p>This means that not any data base in a public sector body can or will become authentic source resp. pubEAA. Looking at the high amount of possible attestation in e-Government the question occurs:</p><ul><li>What the sense of pubEAA if for any data not stored in authentic source a separate issuing is necessary anyway?</li></ul><p>A pubEAA Provider could be TSP or QTSP at same time but then with nearly double effort in certification and operation, especially in case of QTSP — why becoming pubEAA provider if QTSP can issue from any data source?</p><p>Main advantages of pubEAA are:</p><ul><li>same as QEAA beside the liability as liability of pubEAA not regulated in eIDAS</li><li>easier to issue high regulated attestations for public authorities which already manage public registries as no necessary dependency on 3rd party provider but flexibility to use QTSP (which act “on behalf of public sector body responsible for authentic source”)</li><li>simplifies the consolidation of public infrastructure e.g. provision of centralized e-government services for issuance of attestations from public authorities as pubEAA</li></ul><p>Main disadvantages of pubEAA lie on the side of the provider because:</p><ul><li>is bound to exactly the related authentic sources only, so no issuance from other data sources possible (because in this case it would be (Q)TSP)</li><li>bound to notification of authentic source by Member States, means no authentic source, no pubEAA</li><li>effort similar to QTSP without the advantages of QTSP while having limited business model</li><li>unclear legal status in terms of recognition</li><li>no trust mark like QTSP</li><li>unclear supervision</li><li>unclear liability, means the liability risk seemingly lies always the user of pubEAA so no shift of risk possible like in dealing with QTSP (there`s nothing similar to Art. 13 eIDAS for QTSP)</li><li>higher effort for the QES/Qseal used for pubEAA as Art. 45 f (1b) requires specifics on the qualified certificate which do not apply for QTSP on QEAA</li><li>competition with QTSP which have right to access any authentic source related to Annex VI acc. Art. 45e eIDAS</li></ul><p>Examples for use cases of pubEAA could be e.g.</p><ul><li>attestations from civil registry</li><li>approvals for companies (e.g. complex technical machines, airplanes etc.)</li><li>driver license</li><li>car documents (license etc.)</li></ul><p>The decision should be done based on valid risk management focusing on relevant risks like political, financial, security, liability et.c subjects depending on affected organization. Also possible business models, affects on business processes, existing business relationships and solutions shall be taken into account.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The eIDAS contains several options to issue and verify the real gold of eIDAS ecosystem. The correct kind of attestation of attributes need to be decided based on valid risk management taking e.g. legal, political, business, cost, effort, security etc. subjects into account. For many use cases especially related to citizens EAA could be sufficient as for many use case the advantages of QEAA like higher evidential value or shifting of liability etc. risks not necessarily apply.</p><p>On the other hand for companies also data driven business models in B2B/G2B might need to be taken into account which could lead beside higher evidential value, shifting of risks etc. to the decision to use or possibly issue QEAA. Main rule could be: As higher regulated as more QEAA apply. In any case a valid risk management and business analysis is recommended.</p><p>While it`s understandable to have something additionally like pubEAA Provider so that public authorities do not need a (Q)TSP to issue attestations for the evidences the already provide since decades, the design of pubEAA Provider seemingly contains potential for optimization. Reason is that de facto the pubEAA Provider have similar effort like QTSP without the advantages of QTSP in legal and commercial terms.</p><p>Also the fact that authentic sources need to be announced, notified etc. and de facto limitation of possible Authentic Sources by law (because Annex VI is minimum list, looking at effort for implementing eIDAS 2.0 many Member States will struggle to achieve at least the minimum and won`t go further) — the establishment of parallel data sources is foreseen. Those data sources will foreseeably be in majority looking at possible use cases for attestations of attributes. Means in practice:</p><ul><li>majority: authoritative source (any source which is no authentic source) to be use by public sector bodies, companies for issuance and/or (Q)TSP</li><li>minority: authentic source with pubEAA Provider</li></ul><p>as mentioned: A pubEAA Provider could be TSP or QTSP at same time but then with nearly double effort in certification and operation, especially in case of QTSP — why becoming pubEAA provider if QTSP can issue from any data source? Why becoming QTSP: Because there`s need for proven authentic data in most regulated industries and this is exactly what qualified attestations of attributes are about — and when using right format the industry can only add the proof of authenticity to their existing data… (e.g. W3CVCDM as JWT/SD-JWT acc. ETSI TS 119 472–1).</p><p>Anway as the world is not black and white there are many more options thinkable than only the ones explicitely mentioned in the regulation so that synergies depending on concrete client situation possible. Just think about:</p><ul><li>identity platforms integrating (Q)TSP</li><li>IoT, ERP, business IT etc. or other solutions consuming (Q)EAA by integrating (Q)TSP</li><li>components integrating (Q)TSP (e.g. signature application components already connected to (Q)TSPissuing certificates for QES/Qseal)</li><li>Enterprise or Business Wallets containing issuance functionalities</li><li>…</li></ul><p>On the other hand for authentic sources we should not forget: the standardization around interfaces to access authentic sources for validation by (Q)TSP &amp; pubEAA Provider gives the chance to consolidate the Zoo of interfaces in public registries — why not reusing ETSI TS 119 478 in any case?</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>any abbreviation: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>Details on (qualified) trust services <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9?postPublishedType=repub">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9?postPublishedType=repub</a></p><p>Standards<br><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a></p><p>Certification &amp; acceptance<br><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bef34482bff4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[(Qualified) Trust Service Provider — proven security & trust for European digital sovereignity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-trust-service-provider-proven-security-trust-for-european-digital-sovereignity-1399792885b9?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1399792885b9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2026 13:19:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-13T11:06:48.841Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>(Qualified) Trust Service Provider — proven security &amp; trust for European digital sovereignity</h3><p>In many discussions the questions occur Why do we need qualified trust service providers? What`s their added value? Is a non-qualified TSP not sufficient? Do we need a a QTSP at any time?</p><p>Let´s look deeper.</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>eIDAS defines trust services in Art. 3 (16) means an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of any of the following:</p><p>(a) the issuance of certificates for electronic signatures, certificates for electronic seals, certificates for website authentication or certificates for the provision of other trust services;</p><p>(b) the validation of certificates for electronic signatures, certificates for electronic seals, certificates for website authentication or certificates for the provision of other trust services;</p><p>c) the creation of electronic signatures or electronic seals;</p><p>d) the validation of electronic signatures or electronic seals;</p><p>(e) the preservation of electronic signatures, electronic seals, certificates for electronic signatures or certificates for electronic seals;</p><p>(f) the management of remote electronic signature creation devices or remote electronic seal creation devices;</p><p>(g) the issuance of electronic attestations of attributes;</p><p>(h) the validation of electronic attestation of attributes;</p><p>(i) the creation of electronic timestamps;</p><p>(j) the validation of electronic timestamps;</p><p>(k) the provision of electronic registered delivery services;</p><p>(l) the validation of data transmitted through electronic registered delivery services and related evidence;</p><p>(m) the electronic archiving of electronic data and electronic documents;</p><p>(n) the recording of electronic data in an electronic ledger;</p><p>A qualified trust service means acc. Art. 3 (17) eIDAS a trust service that meets the applicable requirements laid down in this Regulation — so basically Chapter III eIDAS.</p><p>The trust service provider is the provider offering and legally running the trust service as service to the public — means anything offered within a company to a closed user group is no trust service.</p><p>Basically (qualified) trust services enable trustworthy digital transaction End-to-End — from signing/sealing or the time of receiving something to attestation to secure communication of the preservation and archivving for decades.</p><p><strong>Requirements on non-qualified trust service provider</strong></p><p>non-qualified TSP underly the requirements on Art. 19a eIDAS. Means in high-level: They need to establish necessary governance, processes and technical capabilities defined in the relevant European Standards acc. eIDAS (see <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a>). Means</p><ul><li>main governance ETSI EN 319 401</li><li>specifics for each kind of trust service in trust service specific standards (e.g. ETSI TS 119 471 for attestations of attributes)</li></ul><p>So the trust service has to implement similar governance including necessary documents such as</p><ul><li>Trust Service Practice Statement</li><li>Information Security Policy</li><li>Subscriber Agreement</li><li>Terms and conditions</li><li>specific policies/documents (e.g. certificate policy in case issuing advanced certificates)</li></ul><p>including their full organizational and technical implementation using systems accordingly like the qualified one. The relevant standards are pretty much similar coming from ETSI ESI and CEN. See Implementing Act on Art. 19a eIDAS (2025/2160). An for those ones referring to ETSI EN 319 401 which is mentioned in the IA only to possibly avoid some e.g. cryptographic or other requirements related to certain kind of trust service defined in specific standards: According to 319401 it defines on general subjects — details defined in trust service specific standards which apply implicitely. <br>In terms of the EUDI Wallet Holder it also makes no sense to lower the security in terms of non-qualified trust services by using national or no standards for its infrastructure and components. Just imagine having a high security certified EUDI Wallet in which EAA issued coming from flawed TSP with crytographic keys based on outdated algorithm and an environment easily attackabl — because in frastructure and components developed on self-made specifications— after the first breach the damage for European eIDAS and EUDI Wallet ecosytem is foreseeable.</p><p>In comparison to qualified trust services a non-qualified one won`t undergo a conformity assessment but in case of security breach they have similar obligation like information of Supervisory Body within 24 hours. The Supervisory Body can then start an investigation and possibly stop the business. So practically it´s the other way round: No conformity assessment to start business, but possibly harsh consequences &amp; investigation in case of breach. This means for TSP there´s formally speaken no proven security as requirement to start the service but they need to build up similar governance and security like QTSP — so trust coming from governance, security and supervision by Supervisory Body as well.</p><p>Regarding subjects like signatures, seals or attestations of attributes it`s worth to mention that there`s no unique or clear identification similar to Art. 24 eIDAS necessary. It can be seen e.g. for advanced signatures where Art. 26 requires that “it`s capable of identifying the signatory” but not concrete identification procedure defined.</p><p>In terms of liability it`s quite a bit critical for possible users. Art .13 eIDAS defines the liability of TSP &amp; QTSP. In terms of non-qualified Trust Service Providers Art. 13 (1) says the “trust service providers shall be liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to a failure to comply with the obligations under this Regulation. “ but “The burden of proving the intention or negligence of a non-qualified trust service provider shall lie with the natural or legal person claiming the damage”</p><ul><li>this means the TSP is not liable by default, but the allegedly affected person needs to make evident that the alleged damage caused in issues the TSP is responsible for. The TSP will have back to back contracts with 3rd party suppliers such as authoritative sources in case of attestations of attributes, data centres etc. It will also clearly define in subscriber agreement possible limitations on usage of its services</li><li>this means the liability will foreseeably a) be shared b) need to be made evident by the subscriber.</li><li>Art. 13 (2) should not be forgotten which allows limitation of liability risks by TSP</li><li>Art. 13 (3) also keeps door open for national specifics</li></ul><p>In summary: In case of non-qualified TSP the user takes the full liability risk for any damages as the burden of evidence lies always at user. Similar with the security risk as there`s no proven security to to lack of conformity asessment As many TSP typically use 3rd party providers the TSP can easily share the risk with other parties to increase complexity for user.</p><p>In case of TSP issuing EAA it`s worth to mention that the rulebooks which are under development (see TS 11 ARF resp. ETSI ESI) aim to define rules on how EAA can be issued in certain ecosystems and may contain additional requirements or possible trust mechanism for TSP issuing EAA. On the other hand those rulebooks are currently planned as voluntary for non-qualified TSP and their legal basement is still unclear. But they can possibly ensure a more clear trust mechanism and so simplify the use of non-qualified TSP for issuance of EAA also in regulated environments.</p><p>In general it can be stated: Non-Qualified TSP contain fundamental trust and due to similar requirements on governance and in consequence security (as same standards apply) as qualified trust service providers.</p><p>The main risks non-qualified TSP contain are legal, liability and security risks in comparison to QTSP but it needs to be defined according to legal and business requirements as well as valid risk management if qualified trust service needed. examples could be:</p><ul><li>low or non-existing requirements on burden of proof</li><li>no high evidential value needed</li><li>low business risks</li><li>fundamental identification of EAA/QES/QSeal Owner/holder sufficient</li><li>preservation/archiving of invoices and documents with low retention periods</li><li>advanced signing/sealing of low risk contracts</li><li>typical day-to-day use cases like tickets, access management, discount cards</li><li>payment in low regulated environments</li><li>data sharing with low risk data etc.</li></ul><p>But let`s see which effort and value the QTSP contain.</p><p><strong>Requirements on qualified trust service providers (QTSP)</strong></p><p>Any QTSP underlies the conditions Section III eIDAS. Means:</p><ul><li>supervision by National Supervisory body (in German BNetzA)</li><li>obligation on collaboration with National Data Privacy Officers for National Supervisory Body</li><li>certified by independent Conformity Assessment Body (which is accredited by independent accreditation body) against European standards see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a></li><li>after successful Conformity Assessment any QTSP will be listed publicly in national trust list which is consolidated to List of the Lists (LOTL) from EC: <a href="https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/#/">https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/#/</a></li><li>periodical repetition of Conformity Assessment of any QTSP every 24 month, Remember: The National Supervisory Body can request additional Conformity Assessments if necessary (e.g. in case of security breach)</li><li>full liability for QTSP and burden of evidence at the QTSP</li><li>obligation to inform about any security or privacy breach within dedicated time to relevant authority by QTSP including affected person within 24 hours</li><li>obligation to fulfill all requests for change in case of non-conformities by QTSP</li></ul><p>Especially Art. 24 need to be taken into account. According this a QTSP has following obligations which will be checked during conformity assessment by independent CAB and supervised by independent Supervisory Body.</p><ul><li>inform the supervisory body at least one month before implementing any change in the provision of its qualified trust services or at least three months in case of an intention to cease those activities</li></ul><p>→ ensures compliance and security as Supervisory Body has chance to react or intervene. Depending on kind of change an extraordinary conformity assessment beside the regular ones needed</p><ul><li>employ staff and, if applicable, subcontractors who possess the necessary expertise, reliability, experience, and qualifications and who have received appropriate training regarding security and personal data protection rules and shall apply administrative and management procedures which correspond to European or international standard</li></ul><p>→ ensures proven and comparable competencies and capabilities of QTSP</p><ul><li>with regard to the risk of liability for damages in accordance with Article 13, maintain sufficient financial resources and/or obtain appropriate liability insurance, in accordance with national law;</li></ul><p>→ ensures that user can trust and shift risk to QTSP</p><ul><li>before entering into a contractual relationship, inform, in a clear, comprehensive and easily accessible manner, in a publicly accessible space and individually any person seeking to use a qualified trust service of the precise terms and conditions regarding the use of that service, including any limitations on its use;</li></ul><p>→ Terms &amp; Conditions + Subscriber Agreement<br> → ensures transparency on service to be proven by CAB</p><ul><li>use trustworthy systems and products that are protected against modification and ensure the technical security and reliability of the processes supported by them, including using suitable cryptographic techniques</li><li>use trustworthy systems to store data provided to it, in a verifiable form so that:</li><li>they are publicly available for retrieval only where the consent of the person to whom the data relates has been obtained,</li><li>only authorised persons can make entries and changes to the stored data,</li><li>the data can be checked for authenticity;</li></ul><p>→ proven security on organizational and technical level to be proven by CAB</p><p>additionally to NIS 2 which determines fundamental security requirements QTSP have appropriate policies and take corresponding measures to manage legal, business, operational and other direct or indirect risks to the provision of the qualified trust service, including at least measures related to the following:</p><ul><li>registration and onboarding procedures for a service;</li><li>procedural or administrative checks;</li><li>the management and implementation of services;</li></ul><p>→ Trust Service Practice Statement<br> → Information Security Policy<br> → Operations documentation<br> → specific policies depending on kind of qualified trust service<br> → organizationally and technically proven by CAB</p><p>QTSP also:</p><ul><li>notify the supervisory body, the identifiable affected individuals, other relevant competent bodies where applicable and, at the request of the supervisory body, the public if it is of public interest, of any security breaches or disruptions in the provision of the service or the implementation of the measures referred to in point (fa)(i), (ii) or (iii) that have a significant impact on the trust service provided or on the personal data maintained therein, without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of the incident<br> → includes option for extraordinary conformity assessment ordered by Supervisory Body</li><li>take appropriate measures against forgery, theft or misappropriation of data or, without right, deleting, altering or rendering data inaccessible <br>→ proven data protection, includes fulfilment GDPR</li><li>record and keep accessible for as long as necessary after the activities of the qualified trust service provider have ceased, all relevant information concerning data issued and received by the qualified trust service provider, for the purpose of providing evidence in legal proceedings and for the purpose of ensuring continuity of the service. Such recording may be done electronically<br>→ valid records management to fulfill burden of proof</li><li>have an up-to-date termination plan to ensure the continuity of service in accordance with provisions that are verified by the supervisory body <br> → ensures business continunity of user</li><li>in case of qualified trust service providers issuing qualified certificates, establish and keep updated a certificate database<br> → includes certificate transparency</li></ul><p>Especially for QTSP issuing qualified attestations of attributes or certificates for QES/QSeal Art. 24 (1a) need to be mentioned which clearly defines the possible options for unique identification of certificate/attestation holder. Only those ones are possible:</p><ul><li>EUDI Wallet or notified eID</li><li>QES</li><li>in person</li><li>“by using other identification methods which ensure the identification of the person with a high level of confidence, the conformity of which shall be confirmed by a conformity assessment body” <br> → procedure needs to be certified (!) against ETSI TS 119 461</li></ul><p>Also the rulebooks should be taken into account for QTSP issuing QEAA as they are currently planned to be mandatory for QEAA Provider but let`s see what will happen regarding this subject in future as it`s still work in progress.</p><p><em>Conformity Assessment &amp; Trust</em></p><p>As mentioned, all those requirements from Art. 24 will be organizationally and technically (!) checked during conformity assessment by independent CAB and supervised by independent Supervisory Body. Details on conformity assessment see: <br><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a></p><p>The conformity assessment includes, if required (see e.g. issuance qualified certificates) also check if certified components used e.g. HSM for key management (CEN EN 419 241 etc.) — to ensure comprehensive security.</p><p>The conformity assessment body itself is also not fallen from the sky but accredited by official accreditation body (e.g. DAKKS in Germany) — which means formal certification (organizationally &amp; technically) against ISO 17065/15408 and similar! It works under supervision of formal supervisory bodies (see Art. 46b eIDAS)— fully provable by independent courts. No other authorities will gain same trust. It needs to be clearly stated that eIDAS knows 2 different Supervisory Bodies</p><ul><li>Supervisory Body EUDI Framework → not related to (Q)TSP (Art. 46a)</li><li>Supervisory Body for Trust Services → relevant for (Q)TSP (Art. 46b)</li></ul><p>This means the QTSP underlies the trust model of eIDAS as there´s no trust by default — only by proof by independent 3rd party:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rIrHJ-M3YDrRqfgu.png" /></figure><p>Fundamentally the eIDAS Trust Model is based on the fact that trust is not falling from the sky or comes out of miraculous technology — it can be only achieved by proof from trusted 3rd party. Trust and security in Europe is achieved by law and underpinning technical framework on which the technical proof is based. In this context it needs to be clearly stated: the conformity assessment contains:</p><ul><li>Stage 1: document check</li><li>Stage 2: Technical onsite (!) check</li></ul><p>so clearly also and detailed technical analysis and approval.</p><p>In order to ensure comparability of conformity assessment as well as interoperability the eIDAS regulation underpinned by common technical standards: <br><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a></p><p>Many of them are referenced by implementing acts (IA). Beside the implementing acts it´s worth to dispel the prejudice that European standards only need to be followed in case they are referenced by IA. According to Art. 3 ff. of 1025/2012 the certification/conformity assessment of technical products or services — such as qualified trust services — against European regulation — such as eIDAS has to be done against European Standards. These are those ones from</p><ul><li>ETSI</li><li>CEN-CENELEC</li></ul><p>Beside 1025/2012 it needs to be taken into account that at least to fulfill burden of proof the fulfilment of state of the art technology necessary which is done by making evident compliance to European standards. Why not international ones? Because acc. European regulation European standards MUST be adopted in European and national standardization framework (see also Vienna Agreement) while international ones must be confirmed by European Standardization Bodies (ETSI/CEN), as long as not developed commonly (IEC).</p><p>See also Implementing Act on Art. 20 (4) eIDAS (2025/2162).</p><p>That`s reason why conformity assessment from CAB will always be based on European standards from ETSI and CEN. The positive side affect: European digital sovereignity.</p><p><em>Legal Trust and liability</em></p><p>Any QTSP is QTSP in Europe — means conformity assessment in one Member State — recognition as QTSP in whole EU &amp; EEA — a clear advantage in comparison to non-qualified TSP. It makes it also easy for companies using QTSP: You can choose anyone with same legal value and cross-border recognition as long as it is in TrustList. Any QTSP is listed in TrustList so that trust becomes provable:</p><p><a href="https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/">https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/</a></p><p>While in case of non-qualified trust service the subscriber or user takes the full risk in terms of liability &amp; security— in case of qualified trust services the QTSP takes the full risk for the user. Means in case of QTSP its user can shift the full risk to the QTSP as acc. Art. 13 eIDAS the QTSP is fully liable by definition and the burden of evidence lies always at the QTSP. The QTSP need to make evident that in case of issue it was not in the responsibility of the QTSP — so using qualified trust services brings a unique and clear business value especially in regulated environments .</p><p>In this context as it`s often mixed up: Liability means compensation typically in form of payments for certain damage. It has to be clearly differentiated from criminal law, a criminal case might lead also to liability subjects but both are regulated by clearly different legal areas and are handled clearly different.</p><p>In terms of legal trust it has to be stated that qualified trust services contain the highest legal trust on their services within eIDAS regulation. We can see this for example looking at qualified signatures which, in comparison to advanced ones, can legally replace handwritten signatures. Same with qualified attestations of attributes (QEAA) which are proven authentic data — something advanced ones cannot achieve as for them e.g. the qualified seal/signature, the clear identification of holder or the link to authentic source missing. Same e.g. for preservation services — only qualified ones allowed to preserve qualified signatues and achieve high evidence value for the documents, similar with qualified archiving or other trust services.</p><p><em>Typical use cases for QTSP</em></p><p>A QTSP is typically needed in case of (high) regulated enviromnents where also high evidential value and/or requirements on burden of proof or documentation against 3rd parties apply and provable authentic data could provide the most value. Some examples for QTSP could be</p><ul><li>(high) regulated enviroments with comprehensive legal requirements so high evidential value needed</li><li>(high) legal, business and other risks</li><li>use cases where undeniable proven authentic data needed or bring significant business value (e.g. KYC, KYB, Data Sharing, Digital Product Passport etc.)</li><li>cross-border recognition needed</li><li>data with a retention period &gt; 10 years</li><li>Authorizations of Public Sector in case (e.g. construction, complex admission procedures, complex planning processes for comprehensive investion projects)</li><li>Banking; KYC, KYB addtionally for example Payment in high regulated environments (e.g. anything affected by PSD3)</li><li>Insurance: Industry insurance subjects which underly supervision by relevant authorities</li><li>Aerospace Pharma, Automotive, Manufacturing: permission data relevant for production, SOP, DPP, Supply Chain evidences</li><li>Data Sharing Agreements acc Art. 35 Data Act</li></ul><p>These subjects are typical for business to business (B2B) or government to business (G2B) resp. government to government (G2G) transactions. But we should not forget that there also use cases wheree citizens involved (B2C/G2C) e.g. signing of contracts where handwritten signature required in case of QES.</p><p><strong>Relationship of qualified and non-qualified TSP to EUDI Wallet</strong></p><p>The relationship between EUDI Wallet and (qualified) Trust Services can be described in one sentence: The EUDI Wallet needs (qualified) Trust Services but no (qualified) Trust Service needs the EUDI Wallet. Reason:</p><ul><li>any Trust Service if qualified or not can interact with any IT-System</li></ul><p>There`s no exclusive binding between (qualified) trust services and the EUDI Wallet — or in other words: the EUDI Wallet is only one possible IT-System a (qualified) trust service is interacting with,</p><p>Beside this:</p><ul><li>Any (qualified) TSP interacting with EUDI Wallets needs to register at the National Registrar of the country where the (Q)TSP is located (Art. 5b)</li></ul><p>Keep in mind:</p><ul><li>The registration does not mean another certification and does not replace the conformity assessment by CAB in case of QTSP</li><li>The Wallet Relying Party Access Certificate (WRAC) is only needed for interaction of (Q)TSP with EUDI Wallet so</li></ul><p>a) identification (Art. 24 1a) and/or</p><p>b) issue in it in case of QEAA, QES, QSeal</p><p>Means that there`s no legally defined or required relationship between other (Q)TSP like eDelivery, Preservation or Archiving to EUDI Wallet.</p><ul><li>Registration means also that registrar only lists the PII the QTSP wants to get from EUDI Wallet — it`s de facto no check if those data needed for certain use case (although this would be great it would contain the liability risk for registrar in case of an error on his part)</li><li>Registrar issuing the WRAC can be also QTSP but in most case it won`t be at it´s not required by the eIDAS regulation</li><li>interesting in context of registrar is that IA on Art. 5b eIDAS 2025/848 on registration of [EUDI]Wallet Relying contains comprehensive requirements — but seemingly no conformity assessment or similar to proof the compliance</li></ul><p><strong>Special case pubEAA</strong></p><p>In case of Attestation of Attributes the eIDAS contains the pubEAA — means the possibility for provider of authentic source (or on its behalf) to issue pubEAA. pubEAA provider undergo similar conformity assessment as QTSP without gaining same rights as they are bound to the authentic source from which they issue. Any details see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/eaa-pubeaa-qeaa-lost-in-eidas-jungle-bef34482bff4">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/authentic-authoritative-sources-pubeaa-qtsp-synergetic-relationship-41f691a98ff6</a></p><p><strong>Comparison TSP vs. QTSP</strong></p><p>The following table shows high level comparison of non-qualified trust services vs. qualified ones alongside the typically relevant categories. The main rule can be set as: Choose the appropriate kind of trust service provider according to your needs. In many cases especially B2C or G2C this would be surprisingly non-qualified trust service as any use cases especially in B2C/G2C are not highly regulated. A different picture we typically see in B2B/G2B so where companies or governments involved.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5U3XjrxLEwgB2h_hn9FB2Q.png" /></figure><p>In any case the decision if TSP or QTSP used should be done based on comprehensive analysis and concept. Details see Section <em>Conclusion</em>.</p><p><strong>Misconceptions</strong></p><p>Some widely common misconceptions to be possibly solved:</p><ul><li>“TSP gain no legal Trust” — wrong, as any TSP is TSP by definition and its products can be denied only because coming from non-qualified TSP</li><li>“TSP are unsecure” — wrong, as any TSP need to provide valid governance and security based on European Standards</li><li>“(Q)TSP are expensive- wrong, it depends on use case, amount of use of (Q)TSP etc. — in many cases it´s more expensive to build it for your own instead of trusting experienced provider</li><li>“QTSP are always needed” — wrong, which kind of Trust Service Provider needed depends on legal, business and other requirements of the concrete application area and/or use case</li><li>“QTSP are governmental authorites” — wrong, QTSP as any (qualified) trust service can be provided by any legal entity, most are private companies and all are only under Supervision of independent Supervisory Body</li><li>“(Q)TSP ensure surveillance” — wrong, as governance and security exclude it, in case of QTSP proven by independent Conformity Assessment Body</li><li>“QTSP can only offer qualified trust service”- wrong, as QTSP you are TSP by definition as well — nobody forbids you to provide both services qualified and non-qualified in parallel</li></ul><p><strong>Benefit of (qualified) trust services</strong></p><p>Main benefit of (qualified) trust services are their legal legal anchoring in conjunction with European technical standards which serves European digital sovereignity. In case of QTSP also the conformity assessment by independent 3rd parties = CAB which ensures proven security &amp; trust need to be taken into account. In any case the supervision and provability by independent supervisory bodies or finally judges based on European law shall be mentioned.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Basically TSP and QTSP have same goal: Ensure trust in certain services needed for trustworthy E2E digital transaction from onboarding, signing, attestations up to communication, archiving and/or preservation. The main difference is the liability and conformity assessment — so the possibility for user to shift risk or simplify the fulfilment of burden of proof requirements or data driven business models where proven authentic data might be needed.</p><p>It depends on use case or application area which kind of Trust Service Provider fits most in business, legal or other requirements. This means that first steps before making decision if TSP or QTSP used in any organization are roughly:</p><ul><li>well-grounded requirements analysis focusing on legal, business, technical, strategic or other requirements</li><li>analysis of existing services and/or components</li><li>market analysis and assessment of requirements against it</li><li>valid risk management focusing on relevant risks like political, financial, security, liability et.c subjects depending on affected organization. following picture shows such a matrix adapted from <br>ISO 27k</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/844/1*5HYI8gAxivZvkocLAzo7tg.png" /></figure><ul><li>business model to be served</li><li>cost, effort, time estimation</li><li>make or buy decision (if you already issue attestations why not becoming qualified yoursealf?)</li><li>development of at least 3 different possible solutions</li><li>thinking not about black/white solution but possible comprehensive one so e.g. TSP &amp; QTSP as most providers are QTSP but provide non-qualified trust services as well</li></ul><p>Only after those or additional steps make your decision. And keep in mind: There`s no one fits all solution — but any trust services ensures trust and digital sovereignity in Europe.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>any abbreviation: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>Certification requirements &amp; acceptance: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a></p><p>eIDAS Regulation <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014R0910-20240520#tocId14">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014R0910-20240520#tocId14</a></p><p>Implementing Acts on eIDAS <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/spaces/EUDIGITALIDENTITYWALLET/pages/915931811/The+European+Digital+Identity+Regulation?filters=adopted&amp;all=1#sec-6-regulations">https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/spaces/EUDIGITALIDENTITYWALLET/pages/915931811/The+European+Digital+Identity+Regulation?filters=adopted&amp;all=1#sec-6-regulations</a></p><p>ARF: <a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/architecture-and-reference-framework-main.md">https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/architecture-and-reference-framework-main.md</a></p><p>QEAA/EAA/pubEAA: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/authentic-authoritative-sources-pubeaa-qtsp-synergetic-relationship-41f691a98ff6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/authentic-authoritative-sources-pubeaa-qtsp-synergetic-relationship-41f691a98ff6</a></p><p>Standards: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554</a></p><p>EU Business Wallet: <a href="https://medium.com/spherity/eubw-draft-nov-19-2025-what-to-expext-and-why-this-is-very-important-4f8676e60d93">https://medium.com/spherity/eubw-draft-nov-19-2025-what-to-expext-and-why-this-is-very-important-4f8676e60d93</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1399792885b9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Annexes relevant for (Q)/pubEAA and aut]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/annexes-relevant-for-q-pubeaa-and-aut-3f96299408b2?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f96299408b2</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 10:01:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-05T10:01:31.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Annexes relevant for (Q)/pubEAA and authentic sources</h3><p><strong>QTSP for QEAA: Annex V</strong></p><p>Qualified electronic attestation of attributes shall contain:</p><p>(a) an indication, at least in a form suitable for automated processing, that the attestation has been issued as a qualified electronic attestation of attributes;</p><p>(b) a set of data unambiguously representing the qualified trust service provider issuing the qualified electronic attestation of attributes including at least, the Member State in which that provider is established and:</p><p>(i) for a legal person: the name and, where applicable, registration number as stated in the official records;</p><p>(ii)for a natural person: the person’s name;</p><p>c) set of data unambiguously representing the entity to which the attested attributes refer; if a pseudonym is used, it shall be clearly indicated;</p><p>(d) the attested attribute or attributes, including, where applicable, the information necessary to identify the scope of those attributes;</p><p>(e) details of the beginning and end of the attestation’s period of validity;</p><p>(f) the attestation identity code, which must be unique for the qualified trust service provider and, if applicable, the indication of the scheme of attestations that the attestation of attributes is part of;</p><p>(g) the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal of the issuing qualified trust service provider;</p><p>(h) the location where the certificate supporting the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal referred to in point (g) is available free of charge;</p><p>(i) the information or location of the services that can be used to enquire about the validity status of the qualified attestation.</p><p><strong>Authentic Source: Minimum List of Attributes to provide QTSP access for validation acc. Art. 45e:</strong></p><p>Pursuant to Article 45e, Member States shall ensure that measures are taken to allow qualified trust service providers of electronic attestations of attributes to verify by electronic means at the request of the user, the authenticity of the following attributes against the relevant authentic source at national level or via designated intermediaries recognised at national level, in accordance with Union or national law and where these attributes rely on authentic sources within the public sector:</p><ol><li>Address;</li></ol><p>2. Age;</p><p>3. Gender;</p><p>4. Civil status;</p><p>5. Family composition;</p><p>6. Nationality or citizenship;</p><p>7. Educational qualifications, titles and licences;</p><p>8. Professional qualifications, titles and licences;</p><p>9. Powers and mandates to represent natural or legal persons;</p><p>10. Public permits and licences;</p><p>11. For legal persons, financial and company data.</p><p><strong>pubEAA: Annex VII to be fulfilled</strong></p><p>An electronic attestation of attributes issued by or on behalf of a public body responsible for an authentic source shall contain:</p><p>(a) an indication, at least in a form suitable for automated processing, that the attestation has been issued as an electronic attestation of attributes issued by or on behalf of a public body responsible for an authentic source;</p><p>(b) a set of data unambiguously representing the public body issuing the electronic attestation of attributes, including at least, the Member State in which that public body is established and its name and, where applicable, its registration number as stated in the official records;</p><p>c) a set of data unambiguously representing the entity to which the attested attributes refer; if a pseudonym is used, it shall be clearly indicated;</p><p>(d) the attested attribute or attributes, including, where applicable, the information necessary to identify the scope of those attributes;</p><p>(e) details of the beginning and end of the attestation’s period of validity;</p><p>(f) the attestation identity code, which must be unique for the issuing public body and, if applicable, an indication of the scheme of attestations that the attestation of attributes is part of;</p><p>(g) the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal of the issuing body;</p><p>(h) the location where the certificate supporting the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal referred to in point (g) is available free of charge;</p><p>(i) the information or location of the services that can be used to enquire about the validity status of the attestation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f96299408b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Standards related to trust services acc. eIDAS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/standards-related-to-trust-services-acc-eidas-66323ee65554?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66323ee65554</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2025 09:44:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-15T09:44:16.848Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The eIDAS Regulation defines the legal framework for digital identities so EUDI Wallet for citizens containing PID based on notified eID Scheme as well as EU Business Wallet (with Legal PID) and trust services in Europe. It`s underpinned by Implementing Acts as required in nearly all articles which mostly refer to technical standards. As defined in 1025/2012 the European Standardization Bodies ETSI and CEN-CENELEC have main responsibility to define technical framework for European regulations. This means that eIDAS is not only regulatory framework but also contains and determines comprehensive related technical framework. Those technical standards determine the concrete implementations of EUDI- and consequently other wallets but especially (qualified) trust services and are main basement for the conformity assessments of EUDIW and (Q)TSP through confomity assessment bodies under supervision of national supervisory bodies.</p><p>While the Architecture and Reference Framework mainly focus on EUDI Wallet the question often occurs: Which standards are mainly relevant for which kind (qualified) trust services? Who develops what?</p><p>While former article described the main certification requirements <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6</a> including the fundamental procedures to get certified (or better to go through a conformity assessment) the aim now is to give a short overview on relevant standards on (qualified) trust services.</p><p>Why it`s not the EUDI Wallet which is mainly focused? Because a wallet without (qualified) trust services issuing or verifying something will remain an empty pocket. The eIDAS ecosystem stands and falls with the success of (qualified trust services as described here: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-attestations-of-attributes-the-real-gold-of-eidas-2-0-fabac453da43">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-attestations-of-attributes-the-real-gold-of-eidas-2-0-fabac453da43</a></p><p>The overview is intended as introduction for people not familiar with the subject in detail. It`s not intended to provide comprehensive overview so there are much more standards under development or published. So if I missed something important please contribute.</p><p>Any abbreviation can be found here:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p><strong>Kinds of (qualified) trust services</strong></p><p>According to Art. 3 (16) eIDAS ‘trust service’ means an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of any of the following:</p><p>(a) the issuance of certificates for electronic signatures, certificates for electronic seals, certificates for website authentication or certificates for the provision of other trust services;</p><p>(b) the validation of certificates for electronic signatures, certificates for electronic seals, certificates for website authentication or certificates for the provision of other trust services;</p><p>( c ) the creation of electronic signatures or electronic seals;</p><p>(d) the validation of electronic signatures or electronic seals;</p><p>(e) the preservation of electronic signatures, electronic seals, certificates for electronic signatures or certificates for electronic seals;</p><p>(f) the management of remote electronic signature creation devices or remote electronic seal creation devices;</p><p>(g) the issuance of electronic attestations of attributes;</p><p>(h) the validation of electronic attestation of attributes;</p><p>(i) the creation of electronic timestamps;</p><p>(j) the validation of electronic timestamps;</p><p>(k) the provision of electronic registered delivery services;</p><p>(l) the validation of data transmitted through electronic registered delivery services and related evidence;</p><p>(m) the electronic archiving of electronic data and electronic documents;</p><p>(n) the recording of electronic data in an electronic ledger;</p><p><strong>Overview on standards regarding (qualified) trust services</strong></p><p><em>General remarks</em></p><p>Please take the level confidence of the different publication types which are similar in ISO.</p><ul><li>EN = European Norm, normative in terms of standardization, needs to be integrated in National Framework</li><li>TS = Technical Specification typically defines technical specifics, normative in terms of standardization</li><li>TR/SR = Technical or Special report, just show the current state of art technology on certain subject, only informativ in terms of standardization</li></ul><p>Most standards are developed by ETSI ESI see: <a href="https://portal.etsi.org/TB-SiteMap/esi/esi-activities">https://portal.etsi.org/TB-SiteMap/esi/esi-activities</a></p><p>CEN-CENELEC is responsible for</p><ul><li>technical details such as cryptosuites and crypto components (e.g. HSM) so CEN Tc 224</li><li>standards on (qualified) archiving so CEN Tc 468</li><li>and ledger services CEN JTC 19</li></ul><p>see <a href="https://standards.cencenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN:105::RESET">https://standards.cencenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN:105::RESET</a>::::</p><p>Beside this also ETSI ESI &amp; CEN-CENELEC (Tc 224) develop standards regarding the EUDI Wallet.</p><p>The advices in the tables are my own opinion only.</p><p>The versioning follows the principles of the standardization organization:</p><ul><li>ETSI: numbering starting from 1.0</li><li>CEN: year of publication similar to ISO</li></ul><p>It`s worth to mention that according 1025/2012 conformity assesssments and certification of components or services acc. to European regulations will be done using European standards so from ETSI or CEN-CENELEC. This does not mean that international standards are not taken into account. Relevant international standards will be referenced in normative (mandatory of implementation of standard) or informative references of European standards and so included. Means any relevant ISO, IEC, ITU, OIDF, IETF etc. standard can be found looking in the references of related European standard. Will be further work to make those references more transparent.</p><p><em>Relation to ARF and Implementing Acts</em></p><p>The ARF defines fundamental framework for EUDI but is currently not legally mandatory it only needs to be taken into account in case of update of Implementing Acts. The IA define the basement for EUDI and trust services so what needs to be accepted by affected authorities but the conformity assesssment of (Q)TSP and pubEAA (Art. 45f) might contain much more requirements and standards as referred by IA.</p><p><em>Relation to Standard overview on EUDI</em></p><p>While the standard overview on EUDI <a href="https://github.com/orgs/eu-digital-identity-wallet/projects/29/views/2">https://github.com/orgs/eu-digital-identity-wallet/projects/29/views/2</a> gives a detailed inside in related international standardization the given description below focus on (qualified) trust services only. The idea is to give short and compact overview I was also always looking for.</p><p><em>Fundamentals and basic reports (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/718/1*Hy58TM762G6qGsCfB04nvw.png" /></figure><p><em>Standards relevant for identification for issuance of qualified signatures, seals, website authentication certificates and attestations of attributes (ETSI ESI)</em></p><p>Beside the standards on (qualified) certificates or (qualified) attestations themselves we need to take the ETSI TS 119 461 v2.1.1 or higher into account. This TS defines the requirements for identification procedure in order to get (qualified) certficate or QEAA which falls e.g.under <br>Art. 24 (1a) c</p><p>( c ) by using other identification methods which ensure the identification of the person with a high level of confidence, the conformity of which shall be confirmed by a conformity assessment body;</p><p>The conformity assessment will foreseeably be done against <br>ETSI TS 119 461.</p><p><em>Standards on (qualified) certificates of signatures, seals and QWACs (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1012/1*zlIBCVNoTLAVKIAZUUejVQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Signature-/Seal formats (ETSI ESI)</em></p><p>Keep in mind, that especially main CAdES, XAdES, PAdES, ASiC Formats affected by the obligations for acceptance by public sector bodies acc. Art. 27 eIDAS and 2015/1506.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iKtWIDnZ9_peu-VH3ohQoQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Signature creation (incl seal), (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1018/1*Tz2YiXh4vN9wY7jzdDeRcQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Crytographic Suites and details (CEN Tc 224 &amp; ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cPdA2V0vJ_L0RZEIzUYQfQ.png" /></figure><p><em>(Qualified) timestamps</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RgRWcm0vvgCYXOGaIK9C1g.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) validation of signatures, seals and timestamps (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7MDZpaCUTt6b_mGswTwpyw.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) preservation of (qualified) signatures, seals and timestamps</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S5yvCq6_fIMQMQhR1WPjoA.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) attestations of attributes (ETSI ESI)</em></p><p>The specific requirements different formats for (Q)EAA and pubEAA contains ETSI TS 119 472–1 based on the international standards such as ISO 18013–5 for ISO mDL).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j_mfbv9tsT4udZV2X5zy7g.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified Management of Secure signature Creation devices (ETSI ESI)</em></p><p>Beside the ones on cryptographic suites and related subjects as well as e.g. signature formats following should be taken into account</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AB_lE2vrNG7Sf4wgaCoDUQ.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) Archiving (CEN Tc 468)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ncfVber2m9kazQFqgUFJzw.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) Ledger (CEN JTC 19)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dXIvr53JK4gCJjmVXZjZUg.png" /></figure><p>other standards in CEN JTC 19 possibly related to trust services:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lFAqeRdv3VvWMLvV_DvrRw.png" /></figure><p><em>(qualified) electronic delivery and registered mail services (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/762/1*t73eimxkE4V47hVqvkRHJA.png" /></figure><p><em>Other relevant standards (ETSI ESI)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xBWWj0SOg_N6j4-n1E2ORw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile</a></p><p><a href="https://standards.cencenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN:105::RESET">https://standards.cencenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN:105::RESET</a>::::</p><p><a href="https://portal.etsi.org/TB-SiteMap/esi/esi-activities">https://portal.etsi.org/TB-SiteMap/esi/esi-activities</a></p><p>1025/2012: REGULATION (EU) No 1025/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66323ee65554" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Certification and obligations for acceptance in eIDAS 2.0]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/certification-and-obligations-for-acceptance-in-eidas-2-0-d4d1eaf53ec6?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4d1eaf53ec6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Apr 2025 13:43:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-18T15:13:51.383Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>eIDAS defines several kinds of certifications (or better conformity assessments) and level of acceptance for certain subjects which sometimes lead to confusion. The text is intended as introduction not for experts.</p><p><strong>Conformity Assessment</strong></p><p>The eIDAS regulation contains several requirements for conformity assessments of certain components or services:</p><ol><li><em>EUDI Wallet</em></li></ol><p>According to Art. 5c (1) eIDAS “the conformity of European Digital Identity Wallets and the electronic identification scheme under which they are provided with the requirements laid down in Article 5a(4), (5), (8), the requirement for logical separation laid down in Article 5a(14) and, where applicable, with the standards and technical specifications referred to in Article 5a(24), shall be certified by conformity assessment bodies designated by Member States.”.</p><p>The certification requirements are curently under development.</p><p><em>2. Qualified Trust Services</em></p><p>Any qualified trust services provider needs to undergo a conformity assesssment for each qualified trust service acc. Art. 20 ff. eIDAS. So precisely it`s not certification but conformity assessment. The conformity assessment is done by accrediated Conformity Assessment Body (see <a href="https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/browse/notification/cab-nab">https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/browse/notification/cab-nab</a>).</p><p>The new challenge under revised eIDAS is that the cybersecurity requirements are coming from NIS2 Directive, means (Q)TSP become part of critical infrastructure. The NIS 2 requirements covered in ETSI EN 319 401 so the fundamental standard for each (Q)TSP.</p><p>Fundamental requirements on QTSP see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d</a>.</p><p>The conformity assessment has to be repeated after 1 year in case it was first one, afterwards every 2 years or by request of Supervisory Body also independently from the periodical repetition.</p><p>The following picture shows the basic logic of the conformity assessment:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DMa_PziMS-rCkhwdm-udng.png" /><figcaption>Fundamental logic of conformity assessment of QTSP</figcaption></figure><p>In preparation of the conformity assessment several documents have to be provided by the possible QTSP. They are defined basically in ETSI EN 319 401 and the trust service specific standards.</p><p>The conformity assessment can be done in an EU/EFTA country with any accredited CAB. The QTSP will become QTSP — valid in any EU/EFTA country. Means you can do conformity assessment e.g. in Ireland but offer your QTSP business also in Slovenia, Germany or Greece.</p><p>Beside the conformity assessment it`s worth to be noted: As QTSP especially for issuance of certificates interact with EUDI Wallet — they are Relying Parties and need to register at registrar acc. Art. 5b eIDAS.</p><p>A bit special role have pubEAA so authorities responsible for authentic sources but issuing EAA using those sources. There will be a certification procedure for them too which is currently not finally designed.</p><p><em>3. Identification procedure acc. Art. 24 (1a) 1c</em></p><p>According to Art. 24 (1a) the QTSP has to identify the applicant for issuance of certificates for QES, QSeal, QWAC, QEAA. Beside EUDI Wallet, notified eID, QES or in person the identification can also be done “by using other identification methods which ensure the identification of the person with a high level of confidence, the conformity of which shall be confirmed by a conformity assessment body” see Art. 24 (1a) 1c.</p><p>Means the identification procedure has to be proven by CAB in conformity assessment. The technical requirements are defined in ETSI TS 119 461 which might be also referenced by Implementing Act on Art. 24. So any QTSP for issuance certificates needs this conformity assessment for identification procedure acc. Art. 24 (1a) 1c as pre-condition for conformity assessment as QTSP for issuance of certificates itself. In case QTSP use only EUDI Wallet, notified eID, QES or identification in person, no such additional conformity assessment for certain identification procedure needed. <br>This new europe-wide certification for alternative identification procedures beside EUDIW, eID, QES or in person avoids the race to the bottom and fragmentation we experienced in eIDAS 1.0.</p><p><em>eIDAS Trust Model at a glance</em></p><p>The following picture shows the whole logic of the eIDAS Trust Model. Main rule: There´s no trust by default — only by proof by independent 3rd party:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T6cvmKgfLVXt5A_-syaL1A.png" /><figcaption>eIDAS Trust Model</figcaption></figure><p>Fundamentally the eIDAS Trust Model is based on the fact that trust is not falling from the sky or comes out of miraculous technology— it can be only achieved by proof from trusted 3rd party. Trust and security in Europe is achieved by law and underpinning technical framework on which the technical proof is based.</p><p>In case of QTSP this means: QTSP will be assessed in Stage 1 (documents) Stage 2 (technically) by independent CAB accredited by independent accrediation body which is accredited by law, supervised by democratically legitimated supervisory body, provable via TrustList provided by democratically legitimated EC — and fully provable by any independent court — based on laws defined by democratically legitimated parliaments and European Standards developed by independent European experts in standardization bodies legitimated by democratically decided law (1025/2012).</p><p>The technical standards allow and the conformity assessment requires complete technical proof — so not only governance as some people still believe.</p><p>Against this background stated that QTSP (or similar EUDI Wallet provider) are Single Point of trust within a coherent, comprehensive and provable European Trust Framework.</p><p><strong>Relationship between EUDI Wallet and Qualified Trust Services</strong></p><p>The relationship between EUDI Wallet and Qualified Trust Services can be described in one sentence: The EUDI Wallet needs (qualified) Trust Services but no (qualified) Trust Service needs the EUDI Wallet. Background: Any (qualified) Trust Service can interact with any IT System, also any QES/QSeal/QEAA (same for AES/AESeal/EAA/pubEAA) can be issued in any system.</p><p>This means for QTSP and providers of components for QTSP (e.g. issuance, verification, preservation, infrastructure):</p><ol><li>Your business starts now!</li><li>Your business does not depend on existence on an EUDI Wallet</li></ol><p>only requirement:</p><ul><li>Follow European standards related to eIDAS.</li><li>Do your Must Haves, recognize some advices and scale your business.</li></ul><p>We won`t scale eIDAS ecosystem if we rely on EUDI Wallet only — especially in B2B we need the integration in and interaction with Business IT and currently no organizational EUDI Wallet exists. (See also: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/theses-for-success-of-eidas-2-0-part-1-0780e695063a">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/theses-for-success-of-eidas-2-0-part-1-0780e695063a</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uaqoSxQSGsmbzZXSWFZFkQ.png" /></figure><p>This means also: There`s no need for separate infrastructures also in cases eIDAS does not explicitely mentioned QTSP in regulation like e.g. issuance of certificates fon access and authorization for Relying Parties to EUDIW acc. Art. 5b eIDAS. QTSP issuing certificates are technical proven for the needed security &amp; legal subjects. As it´s always a question of trust — QTSP contains this per default with clear liability.</p><p>It remains open why some experts or Member States still think about using subjects like webPKI or similare.g. relying party certificates) which are non-European infrastructures without any proven security, not liability, nor European legal control, nor even covered by eIDAS — such an approach seems like elementary security and strategic risk for Europe and European Digital sovereignity.</p><p><em>Role of ARF</em></p><p>For everybody who ask about the role of ARF and why it`s not mentioned here: The ARF is legally not mandatory. Conformity Assessment will take European standards from ETSI &amp; CEN-CENELEC into account.</p><p>The ARF is basically a collection of recommendations and show possible solutions. Acc. IA on Art. 5a eIDAS the EC should take it into account for improvement of Implementing Acts in future — nothing more, nothing less but it`s not legally mandatory. Mandatory: Standards mentioned in Implementing Acts and European standards (via 1025/2012).</p><p><strong>Obligations for acceptance</strong></p><p>Basically we need to differentiate between:</p><ul><li>Obligations to accept EUDIW</li><li>Obligations on QTSP</li></ul><p><em>Obligations to accept EUDIW</em></p><p>Any organization falling under the categories in Art. 5f eIDAS have to accept EUDIW — by voluntary request of the user — means if no user requests it, there`s practically not obligation to accept EUDIW — reason is that EUDIW is voluntary. Categories are:</p><ul><li>Public sector in case “electronic identification and authentication to access an online service” requested by law (e.g. OZG in Germany)</li></ul><p>Any parties that “are required by Union or national law to use strong user authentication for online identification or where strong user authentication for online identification is required by contractual obligation (so especially banks), including in the areas of</p><ul><li>transport</li><li>energy</li><li>banking and financial services</li><li>social security</li><li>health</li><li>drinking water</li><li>postal services</li><li>digital infrastructure</li><li>education</li><li>telecommunications”.</li></ul><p>Timeline: 36 month after entry into force of IA on Art. 5a and 5c — so appr. 2027.</p><ul><li>Very large online platforms so basically Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon etc.</li></ul><p>So GAFA has to accept EUDIW too.</p><p>The most important part “ by voluntary request of the user”. In consequence: if there´s no user requesting, there`s no need to accept the EUDI Wallet or clearer:</p><p>The obligation to adopt the EUDI Wallet decreases proportionally the more complex, difficult to use, and useless the EUDI Wallet becomes for citizens and businesses for their needs, their ecosystem, and their applications. Technical perfection must therefore take a back seat to pragmatic solutions for businesses and citizens.</p><p>As EUDIW is voluntary this means practically also that all the mentioned industries have to deal with EUDIW and have to provide access for other solutions — to avoid discrimination or obligation for EUDIW through the back door.</p><p><em>Obligations to accept subjects from QTSP</em></p><p>Public Authorities have to accep (means also validation) any:</p><ul><li>at least advanced signature coming from QTSP</li><li>any QEAA from any QTSP</li></ul><p>Browsers have to accept any QWAC and integrate in their RootStores</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Trust is not fallen from the sky or coming out of technology by default — it needs to be proven by trusted 3rd parties regularly under clear supervision of democratically legitimated independent parties. The proof is always on documents and technical based on international and in Europe European standards. Exactly this combination and interaction of legal and technical requirements creates the legal trust of eIDAS.</p><p><strong>Abbreviations:</strong></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4d1eaf53ec6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[(qualified) Attestations of Attributes — the real gold of eIDAS 2.0,]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-attestations-of-attributes-the-real-gold-of-eidas-2-0-fabac453da43?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fabac453da43</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 08:00:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-14T14:42:56.835Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>(Qualified) Attestations of Attributes — the real gold of eIDAS 2.0 or the only limit is the sky or our doubts (Thesis Part 4-n)</h3><p>Just had some discussion with other experts where are the use case limits of Qualified attestations of attributes. Some people mentioned that QEAA limited and e.g. Digital product passport not possible. Let´s analyse the subject further.</p><p><strong>Digital Product Passport</strong></p><p>The Digital Product Passport (DPP) documents the origin and authenticity of any part of certain product in high regulated industries. It´s required by European law e.g. for batteries in BEV (EU Battery regulation). What do we basically need for DPP:</p><ul><li>Identification of companies within the supply chain (Org-Wallet with LPID)</li><li>DPP issued by QTSP for QEAA</li><li>Issuance of each credential of DPP as single (Q)EAA in supply chain</li><li>Issuance whole DPP which contains all parts issued within the supply chain as micro credentials</li><li>combination to whole DPP for final product</li></ul><p>beside this any step of supply chain can be recorded into a (qualified) ledger to ensure also compliance to national or international supply chain regulations and since Ledger</p><p>Any details for practical examples of DPP see <a href="https://trace4eu.eu/">https://trace4eu.eu/</a></p><p>Any details of qualified ledger see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9</a></p><p><strong>Legal analysis</strong></p><ol><li>A (Q)EAA or pubEAA has to be clearly differentiated from PID.:</li></ol><ul><li>PID in hands of Member States and based on eID Scheme notified on LoA high see Art. 5a eIDAS</li><li>Bound to EUDI Wallet</li></ul><p>(Q)EAA/pubEAA (see Section 9 eIDAS)</p><p>- not bound to EUDI Wallet, can be issued in any wallet</p><p>- not limited to certain use cases or semantics</p><ul><li>(Q)EAA = issued by (qualified) trust service provider acc. Art. 19/19a and 45b (non-qualified) resp. Art. 20 ff and 45b, 45d</li><li>pubEAA = issued by authority responsible for authentic source see Art. 45f)</li></ul><p>Acc. Art. 5a eIDAS the Member State has to issue EUDI Wallet to organizations too, containing a PID for Legal Entities (Art. 5a Par. 11). The LPID could be e.g. by following update of following directive <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500025">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500025</a> (company certificate). There´s more under discussion currently.</p><ol><li>Art. 24 only defines how to identify for (Q)EAA (for which you do not need EUDIW necessarily) and says nothing about which kind of (Q)EAA issued. Section 9 eIDAS defines requirements on (Q)EAA. Nothing in Section 9 limits the semantics of a (Q)EAA to certain use cases.</li></ol><p>Acc. Art. 45 b legal effect</p><p>“1. An electronic attestation of attributes shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings on the sole ground that it is in electronic form or that it does not meet the requirements for qualified electronic attestations of attribute”</p><p>Art. 45 d QEAA have to fulfil:</p><p>1. Qualified electronic attestation of attributes shall meet the requirements laid down in Annex V.</p><p>2. The evaluation of compliance with the requirements laid down in Annex V shall be carried out in accordance with the standards, specifications and procedures referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.</p><p>3. Qualified electronic attestations of attributes shall not be subject to any mandatory requirement in addition to the requirements laid down in Annex V.</p><p>4. Where a qualified electronic attestation of attributes has been revoked after initial issuance, it shall lose its validity from the moment of its revocation and its status shall not in any circumstances be reverted.</p><p>Annex V defines:</p><p>Qualified electronic attestation of attributes shall contain:</p><p>(a) an indication, at least in a form suitable for automated processing, that the attestation has been issued as a qualified electronic attestation of attributes;</p><p>(b) a set of data unambiguously representing the qualified trust service provider issuing the qualified electronic attestation of attributes including at least, the Member State in which that provider is established and:</p><p>(i) for a legal person: the name and, where applicable, registration number as stated in the official records;</p><p>(ii)for a natural person: the person’s name; a set of data unambiguously representing the entity to which the attested attributes refer; if a pseudonym is used, it shall be clearly indicated;</p><p>(d) the attested attribute or attributes, including, where applicable, the information necessary to identify the scope of those attributes;</p><p>(e) details of the beginning and end of the attestation’s period of validity;</p><p>(f) the attestation identity code, which must be unique for the qualified trust service provider and, if applicable, the indication of the scheme of attestations that the attestation of attributes is part of;</p><p>(g) the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal of the issuing qualified trust service provider;</p><p>(h) the location where the certificate supporting the qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal referred to in point (g) is available free of charge;</p><p>(i) the information or location of the services that can be used to enquire about the validity status of the qualified attestation.’.</p><p>Acc. Art. 45 d it`s forbidden to define further requirements on QEAA beyond Annex V. Not Art 45 d nor Annex V limits the QEAA concerning UseCases.</p><p>Also Art. 45f does not limit the kind of pubEAA.</p><p>From the regulation there seems no limitation on what (Q)EAA could cover so also DPP possible.</p><p><strong>Technical Analysis</strong></p><p>Let`s look in European Standards which acc. Implementing Act on Art. 5a (which reference 1025/2012) have to be taken into account:</p><ul><li>Not ETSI TS 119 471 nor ETSI TS 119 472–1 relevant for (Q)EAA Provider limit the use cases or semantics of (Q)EAA</li></ul><p>Why we need to look into European standards?</p><ul><li>1025/2012</li><li>QTSP certified (conformity assessment) done against European Standards so: ETSI EN 319 401 and Specific standard for certain kind of QTSP</li></ul><ol><li>How will (Q)EAA very roughly issued?</li></ol><ul><li>Identification acc. Art. 24 (1) only for QEAA</li><li>QTSP Access Authentic or Authoritative Source (yes Authentic Source is not only option and data source, MS have to provide them but eIDAS does not forbid the provision of additional sources and e.g. the database of a university or a certain company will never be Authentic Source but can be Authoritative Source to be used by QTSP à QTSP only need CAB which approves this in conformity assessment and btw we currently have a European Client exactly doing this with approval by certain CAB &amp; Supervisory Body à and the QEAA has to be accepted across Europe, also Germany acc. Art. 45b ff. eIDAS)</li><li>QTSP generates (Q)EAA</li><li>Ready</li></ul><p>2. Concerning the well-known ledger discussion</p><ul><li>Nothing in eIDAS nor the relevant European standards relevant for certification defines the infrastructure of EUDIW in a way which forbids ledger</li><li>Means the PID is the only subject where Member States can define their own rules but a DPP will never be a PID but always (Q)EAA</li><li>Nothing in Section 9 nor Annex nnor the relevant European standards relevant for certification limits the infrastructure for (Q)EAA/pubEAA provider to classical PKI only</li><li>Means also: Any member state (also my country which does not like Ledger) has to accept an (Q)EAA and pubEAA issued from any (Q)TSP or pubEAA provider independently if the issuer used a ledger as decentralized PKI or not</li><li>Section 11 eIDAS defines a qualified trust service for electronic ledger and the ledger definition fits for DLT, centralized ledger or Blockchain</li><li>Standards for qualified ledger services developed in CEN JTC 19 which will become legally mandatory via at least 1025/2012</li></ul><p>Any details by example for the EBSI: <a href="https://www.ebsi-vector.eu/en/publication/role-of-ebsi-within-eidas-3/">https://www.ebsi-vector.eu/en/publication/role-of-ebsi-within-eidas-3/</a></p><p><strong>Technical issues</strong></p><p>As described the parts of a DPP are typically issued as single credentials which will build whole DPP at the end of the supply chain. means the DPP is basically a container of credentials. This require e.g. micro credentials. On the other hand there are existing data models and exchange formats in the industry — to avoid high adoption effort it should be possible to reference them within the credential format. Those rough requirements are possible using W3CVCDM v1.1 or 2.0.</p><p>While for use cases with natural entities privacy is fundamental for organisations so B2B2G use cases other requirements are interesting like:</p><ul><li>legally compliant identification for legal entities which is useable worldwide so e.g. LEI/vLEI from GLEIF, EU Company Certificate as (Q)EAA or similar.</li><li>avoidance of changes on exchange formats (as this would mean complex change is business IT)</li><li>high performance and scalability requirements on credential exchange between several relying parties in a process e.g. supply chain</li><li>issuer are typically always relying party</li><li>combination of LPID, (Q)EAA and transaction needed</li><li>combination of identity and objects so e.g. company and its machines</li></ul><p><strong>Identity for Legal entities and the EU Business Wallet</strong></p><p>Against the background that acc. Art.5 ff. eIDAS the EUDI Wallet shall be useable for companies and citizens it seems necessary to update the technical framework according to industry specific use cases in general and the EU Business Wallet in particular as also written by Carsten Stoecker: <a href="https://cstoecker.medium.com/the-european-business-wallet-a-strategic-pillar-for-digital-identity-and-industrial-3f9983f7b299">https://cstoecker.medium.com/the-european-business-wallet-a-strategic-pillar-for-digital-identity-and-industrial-3f9983f7b299</a></p><p>With regard to European Digital Sovereignity those standardization shall be done in Europe as it will foreseeably contain requirements on European legal identification. (Q)TSP, pubEAA and Relying parties. This does not mean that international standards shall be avoided, they needed to be taken into account especially LEI/vLEI from GLEIF for LPID, EU Company Certificate as required by law (Directive (EU) 2017/1132, most recently amended by Directive 2025/25) or TaxID.</p><p><strong>Technical Framework for attestations in B2B</strong></p><p>The mentioned requirements seemingly lead to different technical framework for organizational wallet and related attestations in comparison to use cases focused on natural entities. Not to forget: In industry we have widely established exchange formats those change or additional schemes would lead to high preparation effort before attestations of attributes can be used e.g. EMREX/ELMO in education, LOTAR in aerospace, NeeS/VNeeS in Pharma, XOEV in public where W3CVCDM with its easy referencing of exgternal exchange formats is deeply meaningful</p><p>The current attestation formats as favored e.g. in ARF does not allow the mentioned functional requirements in the same easy way as W3CVCDM (v1.1 and 2.0). W3CVCDM allows the easy reference of external schemes/formats using linked data (e.g. “context” element) so that no change in existing exchange formats needed and easy use of potentials of eIDAS 2.0 in general and (Q)EAA in particular possible. Same with micro credentials in W3CVCDM which makes it easier e.g. to implement use cases like Digital product passports where the final attestation is developed step by step according to certain process (e.g. supply chain) and contains the parts as micro-attestation in container.</p><p>The current drafts of ISO mDL or SD-JWT VC requires additional effort per each exchange format which may limit adoption. Linked data like in W3CVCDM can be security risk but exactly for this we have the European standardization on QTSP in ETSI to define appropriate measures which fit in eIDAS ecosystem. Security risk is no argument to avoid certain functionality or do we stop driving cars because there could be an accident?</p><p>Same with e.g. combination of DPP with recording of steps in supply chain in a ledger (reference done e.g. using DID) or similar use cases where identity/attestation of attributes combined with transactions (e.g. evidence and trade of intellectural or other properties see: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day">https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day</a>) as SD-JWT VC does not include DID but extension points. On other hand the interoperability of DID methods and related protocols still open subjects. These subhects are part of European standardization e.g. in CEN JTC 19.</p><p>In order to ensure smooth and efficient transactions especially in machine-to-machine communication where (Q)EAA could provide added value e.g. in data sharing, smart meter etc. also discussion about additional protocols like DIDComm recommended — as covered by European standardization.</p><p>A comprehensive technical framework for B2B2G cases similar to the one for citizens including organizational identities and wallets as well as (Q)EAA/pubEAA for manufacturing, chemical, pharma, banking, insurance and other industries seems to be essential to unlock the potential of eIDAS for European companies and organisations.</p><p><strong>Issuers always relying parties and relying parties always issuer</strong></p><p>In B2B(2G) the role of the organization holding attestations and/or LPID depends on the business process. Means depending on the step in the process the holder will become relying party or the relying party becomess issuer. As the example DPP shows:</p><ul><li>issuer of certain attestation for part of product may issue the attestation but to fulfill the whole supply chain every participant in the supply chain holds its part of the product but issues evidence for its part to next one</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tyw4rBuJ5cVMZObyZMc2Mg.png" /><figcaption>Example DPP by Seafood (Source: <a href="https://trace4eu.eu/">https://trace4eu.eu/</a>)</figcaption></figure><ul><li>similar in data sharing use cases where the one issuing attestation for use of data to 3rd party may also hold attestations to use the data from the 3rd party</li><li>another example could be KYB, smart meter, master data management etc.</li></ul><p>This means the differentiation between holder, issuer and verifier becomes more complex. An organizational wallet which will be in many case a cloud wallet may contain also issuance and verification components resp. will foreseeably be part of complex ( C)IAM where issuance, verification and holding will be logically differentiated functional parts of one system.</p><p><strong>High performance needed</strong></p><p>As eIDAS allows with wallet, attestation and trust services on ledger the combination of identity and transaction on one hand and especially attestations of attributes can automatize industry processes such as:</p><ul><li>KYB and master data management through proven data from trusted authentic or authoritative sources</li><li>data sharing through issuance an revocation of authorizations in real time</li><li>access management</li><li>digital documentation so check of maintenance and certification of machines, airplanes, trains, ships in real time</li><li>evidence of ownership and trade of properties in tokenization, Web 3.0</li></ul><p>a high performance and scalability of infrastructure needed together with high resilience for wallet, infrastructure on attestations but also infrastructure for transactions themselves requirements which in case of combination transaction and identity lead to subjects lik qualified ledger as in this case also the liability issue solved.</p><p><strong>Identity means also identity of objects — real and virtual</strong></p><p>As attestations of attributes are not limited they can also represent a company car to be fueled at gas or charging station and owned by company — leased to employee — a (Q)EAA shall also be able to represent the car together with the ownership and leasing. So in our example:</p><ul><li>LPID = company</li><li>PID = employee</li><li>car = attestation in wallet of company and employee</li><li>leasing = attestation in wallet of company and employee</li><li>gas/charging station = attestation in wallet of gas/charging company</li></ul><p>Similar could be done with any machine in industry which might have authorization to share data with other machine in production process or to buy material up to certain budget (as machine always related to legal entity there´s no legal issue). It could be also done with any virtual object in any augmented or virtual reality as André Kudra and me show in paper: <a href="https://metaversechair.ua.es/metaverseua-chair-research-paper-4-decentralised-digital-identity-in-the-metaverse-under-eidas-2-0/">https://metaversechair.ua.es/metaverseua-chair-research-paper-4-decentralised-digital-identity-in-the-metaverse-under-eidas-2-0/</a>).</p><p><strong>Qualified or non-qualified Attestation</strong></p><p>The decision about qualified or non-qualified depends on use case. Bascially the idea of eIDAS is to push the qualified trust services (see Recital 47, 52, 61) which can be seen in the fact that security, liability, governance etc. are comprehensively regulated in eIDAS (see <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9)</a>. Means also the integration of NIS2 so that security requirements determined by NIS2 only apply for QTSP which become critical infrastructure in this case. The advantages on proven security and clear liability (always at QTSP) can be used only in case of qualified trust services. For non qualified there´s only the obligation to mention security issues to supervisory body — but no punishments in case of non-compliance.</p><p>Looking at the fact the EUDIW shall fulfill LoA “high” and any Relying Party which wants to interact with needs to be registered it seems not comprehensible to lower the security just for the case where main business for eIDAS lies in B2B2G with its highly regulated use cases like KYB, data sharing, documentation, KYC, contract management etc. Why should companies take the risk if they can shift liability and security risk to trusted 3rd party?</p><p>Also looking at some technical challenges e.g. that some attestation formats which currently struggle to use the common JSON signature format JAdES in full extension it seems not comprehensible to focus EAA to allegedly avoid qualified signatures using JAdES. When our cars didn`t protect properly against accidents we developed airbags not stopped driving cars!</p><p>Cryptographic signatures and so e.g. JAdES needed in any case a PoE or Proof of origin needed, also in case advanced signatures used. As QEAA as well as pubEAA ensure full legal trust including clear liability at QTSP or pubEAA provider, the focus on non-qualified EAA seems critical as it shifts the whole risk to the user.</p><p>Since EUDIW shall fulfill LoA “high” as well as high requirements on privacy it seems not comprehensible why we should limit the security level and increase risk for user just for the subject which is mostly used — our driver license, diploma, tickets, access, product passports, boarding passes, legal confirmations etc — so attestations of attributes. The main use case in eIDAS is not to identify ourselves (PID), but to use our digital evidences = (Q)EAA.</p><p>The potential costs seem also no valid argument as issuance and verfication EAA are not for free anyway and effort in many parts similar to QEAA/pubEAA (but without the legal value and trust), similar for integration of EUDIW and PID. Means it shall be decision of user (legal or natural entity) and use case. In order to use the potential of QEAA and pubEAA the necessary preparation work needs to be done now so e.g.:</p><ul><li>governance, processes for issuance and verification of (Q)EAA and pubEAA</li><li>interaction with authentic and authoritative sources</li><li>Data structures and schemes</li><li>test of issuance and verification</li></ul><p>Against the background it´s recommended that qualified attestation or in case of public sector body responsible for authentic source a pubEAA should be the choice as intented by eIDAS to shift the liability and security risk to trusted 3rd party. Similar for B2C as especially e-government, banking, health will be the main application areas here. PubEAA will have similar status as also certain certification needed and liability clearly at member states. The homework so e.g. access to authentic and authoritative sources, communication between them and QTSP etc. must be done anyway for (Q)EAA and pubEAA but shouldn`t hinder to start now and set standards.</p><p>Means: if we are in regulated environments with burden of proof and documentation requirements and/or liability and business risks QEAA or pubEAA should be the choice. As regulated environments are the typical playing field of EUDI Wallet and (qualified) trust services — due to need for legal trust, proven security and clear liability — QEAA (same as QES/QSeal etc.) and pubEAA will foreseeably be key for success of eIDAS 2.0 in general and EUDI Wallet in particular. Because: Why to register as Relying Party for EUDIW (as needed to issuance/verification) if you only want to issue or verify entrance in your house or provide ticket for the disco in your village?</p><p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>Basically there are no limits for (qualified) attestations of attributes. The only limit are national or international law which may explicitely forbid the use of (qualified) attestations of attributes for certain use cases. Currently no such laws are known to the author.</p><p>On the other hand (qualified) attestations of attributes can be mentioned as the “real gold of eIDAS”. In most case we do not identify ourselves or our company but we use our driver license, KYC/KYB Data, Master data, diplomas, applications, documentation, contracts. construction data — require access, travel or pay or want to fuel our company car — means we use (qualified) attestations of attributes. With their proven authenticity (as they are signed) (Q)EAA they allow e.g.</p><ul><li>full automatization of KYB/KYC or master data management</li><li>full automatization of production and audit processes as well as government processes</li><li>easy proof of origin of products (DPP) including their supply chain</li><li>easy proof of ownership and its trade</li><li>proof of business authorizations any entity e.g. power of attorney, approbations etc.</li><li>digital identities for legal entities (LPID, also if LPID is legally no attestations :-)), natural entities (beside the PID as identity of lower LoA) and objects (attestation of attributes)</li><li>access management and so protection of properties, machines, objects</li><li>easy fraud prevention in HR, cultural heritage, industry &amp; beyond</li><li>easy travel through passport, ticket, boarding passes all over the world as similar technical framework used</li></ul><p>the following picture shows the dimensions in rough overview</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nV_Dhnishh829EVVY0WNwQ.png" /><figcaption>UseCases (Q)EAA</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Pre-Conditions</strong></p><p>The only preconditions:</p><ul><li>Technological neutrality — there are no preconditions in eIDAS on any technology, only the business needs matter</li><li>Business need in scope — the business needs shall be analysed in detail and based on this together with next condition the strategic roadmap should be developed</li><li>Regulation as key for business models — eIDAS defines the framework, to be transferred into the concrete business needs</li><li>Security is a need no burden — security decrease risk but shall be identified as chance for resilient and sustainable business models</li><li>Privacy needs useability or won´t work — the GDPR needs to be fufilled within the business other regulative needs</li><li>ARF is not legally mandatory — only implementing acts and European standards from ETSI and CEN matter</li><li>Implementing Acts only define the minimum — business models are built on European standards.</li><li>Last but not least: QTSP allow concentration on main business and shifting of risk and liability to trusted 3rd party.</li></ul><p>Let´s be creative, flexible and pragmatic — the only limit eIDAS defines is the sky the only subject which limits us are our doubts!</p><p><strong>Selected Bibliography</strong></p><p>Abbreviations: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>[1025/2012] Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance, see:<strong> </strong><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1025/oj/eng">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1025/oj/eng</a></p><p>[ALStScTh24a] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S., Stoecker, C., Thiermann, R.: Qualified Ledgers: Bridging the Gap between Blockchain Technology and Legal Compliance. 2024. see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9</a></p><p>[ALStScTh24b] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S., Stoecker, C., Thiermann, R.: Qualified Ledgers — Breakthrough for proven security and legal trust in DLT through eIDAS2?. OpenIdentitySummit 2024. Porto 2024.</p><p>[ARF] <a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework">https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework</a></p><p>[BITKOM25] White Paper Organisationsidentitäten. BITKOM. Berlin 2025: <a href="https://www.bitkom.org/sites/main/files/2025-01/bitkom-whitepaper-organisationsidentitaeten.pdf">https://www.bitkom.org/sites/main/files/2025-01/bitkom-whitepaper-organisationsidentitaeten.pdf</a></p><p>[EBSI Ecosystem Day] <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day">https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day</a></p><p>[EBSI2025] The role of EBSI in eIDAS. EBSI VECTOR Project 2025. <a href="https://www.ebsi-vector.eu/en/publication/role-of-ebsi-within-eidas-3/">https://www.ebsi-vector.eu/en/publication/role-of-ebsi-within-eidas-3/</a></p><p>[eIDAS] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014<strong> </strong><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:32014R0910">on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC</a> (OJ L 257 28.8.2014, p. 73) Amended by: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:32024R1183">REGULATION (EU) 2024/1183 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 April 2024</a></p><p>[ETSITS119471] ETSI TS 119 471. Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI). Policy and Security requirements for Providers of Electronic Attestation of Attributes Services</p><p>[ETSITS119472–1] ETSI TS 119 471–2. Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Profiles for Electronic Attestations of Attributes; Part 1: General requirements</p><p>[EUCompanyCert] Directive (EU) 2025/25 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU) 2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company law (Text with EEA relevance).<strong> </strong><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500025">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500025</a></p><p>[KuSc24] <a href="https://metaversechair.ua.es/metaverseua-chair-research-paper-4-decentralised-digital-identity-in-the-metaverse-under-eidas-2-0/">https://metaversechair.ua.es/metaverseua-chair-research-paper-4-decentralised-digital-identity-in-the-metaverse-under-eidas-2–0/</a></p><p>[LEI]: <a href="https://www.gleif.org/de/about-lei/introducing-the-legal-entity-identifier-lei">https://www.gleif.org/de/about-lei/introducing-the-legal-entity-identifier-lei</a></p><p>[NIS2] DIRECTIVES DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)</p><p>[Sc23b] Schwalm S.: QWAC or not QWAC is that the question? <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d</a></p><p>[SD-JWT VC] <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc/</a></p><p>[Stoe25] <a href="https://cstoecker.medium.com/the-european-business-wallet-a-strategic-pillar-for-digital-identity-and-industrial-3f9983f7b299">https://cstoecker.medium.com/the-european-business-wallet-a-strategic-pillar-for-digital-identity-and-industrial-3f9983f7b29</a></p><p>[TRACE4EU] <a href="https://trace4eu.eu/">https://trace4eu.eu/</a></p><p>[vLEI] <a href="https://www.gleif.org/de/vlei/introducing-the-verifiable-lei-vlei">https://www.gleif.org/de/vlei/introducing-the-verifiable-lei-vlei</a></p><p>[W3CVCDM] v1.1.: <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/</a><br>v2.0: <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fabac453da43" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theses for success of eIDAS 2.0 (Part 3)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/theses-for-success-of-eidas-2-0-part-3-75850ec243fa?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/75850ec243fa</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 18:48:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-01T18:48:30.452Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Signed data protect user privacy</strong></p><p>In Germany (as always) the discussion occured if the PID data should stored as signed data in the EUDIW or should the authenticated channel be used as done with current eID smart card. In case of authenticated channel the authenticity of the data will be basically proven during presentation in communication between wallet (eID Client) and eID server (PID Provider). The advantage of authenticated channel can be seen in the postulate that no signed data are shared so that in case of MiM attack during the presentation the attacker won`t get provable authentic identification data . The plain eID Data might be PII but can`t be proven as authentic. A submission of PID without EUDIW is not possible but the PII will foreseeably be accepted as authentic — as no counter-evidence possible because they are not signed.</p><p>On the other hand this approach is unique in Europe, technically highly complex and the only aim of using the PID is to identify its holder against a 3rd party in non-repudiable manner as requested by law like AML, TKG, OZG, eGovG, SGB V etc. In order to meet those legal requirements with German eID before the EUDIW occur the so called digital docket was developed — a file where all data created during identification were collected, signed with qualified timestamp and submitted together with eID data from Geman eID card to the Relying Party. Means the Relying Party needs the non-repudiation to fulfill its burden of proof.</p><p>In eIDAS 2.0 we have to keep in mind that QEAA will be signed with QES/QSeal by definition (Annex 5 letter g eIDAS 2.0). This means that EUDIW will definitely contain signed data. Additional requirements beyond eIDAS are forbidden acc. Art 45 (d) Nr. 3 eIDAS 2.0<br>The deletion of the QES/QSeal from QEAA before storage in EUDIW would mean to manipulate the QEAA so that the liability of issuing QTSP (Art. 13 eIDAS) won´t apply anymore. The user will anyway present signed data to the Relying Party in case of QEAA. Technically QEAA and PID are similar as same formats and protocols used. Against this background the utilization of authenticated channel and not signed data for PID seem like disproportionate high effort. This applies especially if EUDIW user presents PID and QEAA where the signed QEAA would e.g. be submitted as attachment within the authenticated channel. The Relying Party will then get a) unsigned data with the mentioned effort to achieve non-repudation and b) signed data. All this effort would be for one EUDIW only as all other Member States use signed data in PID.</p><p>From privacy point of view the signed data protect the user. If an attacker might grab PID or QEAA during presentation the user can always request the revocation of PID and QEAA in real-time from PID Provider and/or QTSP. In this case the PII become worthless for the attacker as their invalidity can be clearly verified. The argument that signature won`t become invalid is misleading. As majority in Europe use shell model for signature validation where the certificate has to be valid at the time of validation this exactly ensures that the invalidity of the signature can be proven in real time by any Relying Party. Means it`s time for Germany to put the good old chain model into the archive for historical reason just to show how signature validation shouldn`t look like.</p><p>In case of unsigned data the attacker can assume the data as valid until the counter-evidence done — which is quite difficult without signed data. <br> Identity theft seems also more theoretically as identification is done via eID, Videoident etc. or in future EUDIW not by submitting randomly identity data by mail or similar. Means to do Identity theft it`s more needed than only grabbing the identity data but e.g. forgery of eID or similar. If this is possible it would mean that whole key management, holder binding etc. is compromised. In this case the signed data are not the core issue as such threats would allow to overtake the whole wallet and present PID independently if signed or not. At the side of Relying Party the vulnerability of CIAM might cause attacks and e.g. grabbing identity data or using them for identity theft or fraud. The issue are in this case also not the signed data but in case of signed data the user has to chance to revoke the certificate — so that the invalidity is provable in real-time.</p><p>Long Story short: for eID itself the authenticated channel might have been a feasible approach in 2010 when German eID occured. On the other hand its technical complexity can be seen as one reason why it took 14 years for establishment of German eID. In case of EUDIW signed data will be in any case used as QES/QSeal mandatory for QEAA, parallel utilization of authenticated channel for PID only leads to technical complexity for wallet and Relying Party. Beside the practical stuff it has to be stated that signed data provide the undeniable advantage that their holder can revoke the signature certificate as well as the PID itself and in case shell model used the invalidity can be proven in real-time by any Relying Party.</p><p>The fact that signed data for governmental eID/PID is established in Europe without known successfull attack or harm it should be seen as success story and the amount of users for European eID approves it.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Abbreviations: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>[AlSc22] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S.: Self-Sovereign-Identity &amp; eIDAS: a Contradiction? Challenges and Chances of [eIDAS2]. European Review of Digital Administration &amp; Law — Erdal2021, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 89–108</p><p>[ArchGER23] <a href="https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept-v1">https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept-v1</a></p><p>[ARF24] <a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md">https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md</a></p><p>[BSI23] Basics of Digital Signature Techniques and Trust Services Designation: Legal Framework Technical Aspects. Federal Office for Information Security. 2023: <a href="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6">https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6</a></p><p>[BSI eID] <a href="https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche-Verwaltung/Elektronische-Identitaeten/Online-Ausweisfunktion/eID-Infrastruktur/eid-infrastruktur_node.html">https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche-Verwaltung/Elektronische-Identitaeten/Online-Ausweisfunktion/eID-Infrastruktur/eid-infrastruktur_node.html</a></p><p>[eIDAS2] 2024/1183. REGULATION (EU) 2024/1183 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework</p><p>[ETSIEN319102] Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures; Part 1: Creation and Validation</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=75850ec243fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theses for success of eIDAS 2.0 (Part 2)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/theses-for-success-of-eidas-2-0-part-2-e0b883decb1b?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e0b883decb1b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2024 09:28:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-08T12:04:35.480Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Privacy matters — as long as someone cares about and pays for it</strong></p><p>Art. 5a eIDAS clearly define that the EUDIW shall enable the user, in a user-friendly user manner to use privacy subjects like</p><ul><li>Selective disclosure</li><li>unlinkability</li><li>Zero Knowledge Proof</li><li>anonymous use of EUDIW</li><li>full control and decision which PII user shares with Relying party</li><li>generate pseudonyms and store them encrypted and locally within the European Digital Identity Wallet;</li><li>access a log of all transactions carried out through the European Digital Identity Wallet via a common dashboard</li><li>signing with EUDIW</li></ul><p>We have to keep in mind the words “<strong>shall enable</strong>” — means the functionalities have to be available within the EUDIW. This does not mean that the user has to be able to use them in any case at any Relying Partiy without any possiblity for the Relying Party to control its service and to decide which requirements need to be fulfilled to access certain service.</p><p>The liability of a certain service is first of all at the Relying Party. Same with burden of proof and documentation requirements. The Relying Party is liable for fulfilling its legal obligations like e.g.</p><ul><li>KYC</li><li>age limited access to certain services</li><li>evidence which natural/legal entity requested application based on which data and when</li><li>evidence for its transactions</li></ul><p>Means Relying Party is liable to make the authenticity, integrity, reliability of its transaction evident against 3rd parties acc. to the applicable proof obligations (e.g. AML, KYC, eHealth, MiCAR, EASA, FDA, GxP, eGov Laws etc.) in a transferable manner using its authoritative records. This leads to the fact that Relying Party defines the conditions on how its service can be accessed by EUDI Wallet or other wallet users. Only option: Member States or EC take full liability for Relying Parties.</p><p>Acc. Art. 5b eIDAS any Relying Party which has or wants to interact with EUDIW has to be listed in public list mentioning the PII they need from user to access a service incl. justification and possibility for user to appeal to Privacy Officers in case of probable or alleged breaches. This obligations sounds great from user point of view. Basically it´s the fundamental risk for success of EUDIW. If the hurdle for Relying Party is too high incl. the risk for Relying Parties for</p><ul><li>a) liability because of breaching eIDAS or</li><li>b) risking its burden of proof in case their requests are questioned and limited</li></ul><p>the Relying Parties obligated to accept the EUDIW will limit its use of to the absolutely necessary minimum. Those ones without obligation to accept EUDIW will ignore it. The majority of use cases will apply for any other wallets and as (Q)EAA can be issued in any system, (Q)EAA also be used for identification purposes and LoA “high” is necessary only in limited cases, the risk for this scenario is not low. Also keep in mind the scenario to use eID card for identification on LoA “high” and wallet for presentation (Q)EAA — in this case EUDIW not needed anytime.</p><p>The arguments on Zero Knowledge Proofs e.g. evidence for age proof are technically correct — but in which national law of evidence a ZKP is mentioned or a judge forced to accept this evidence? For qualified signed documents we already have those rules (see §§ 371a, 415, 416 ff. ZPO in Germany). Why should Relying Party trust in such unsecure, non-regulated technology and be liable just in case? Evidence-laws will remain national law same with requirements on burden of proof.</p><p>Long Story short: If Relying Parties take those risks as mentioned above they will foreseeably calculate them in the prices for fees for credits or other bank business, fees for service of public administrations, pricing for insurance contracts etc. If the user is willing to pay the system works. But:</p><ul><li>Why should user pay if majority currenly use Google and Apple for payment, their mail accounts for communication with insurance companies or banks as well as public administrations and already interact digitally with Relying Parties?</li><li>How do we convince the user of added-value of increasing privacy if this would foreseeably mean that also the costs for user would increase?</li><li>Will the user care about and willing to pay for more privacy or will citizens remain in Google and Apple or other existing wallet solutions as the enable citizens to access the services they need without additional costs?</li><li>Will the privacy functions not limit the useability of the wallet and services?</li><li>Will Relying Parties go the way to be listed to interact with EUDIW also if they are not obligated to accept and those with the obligation will they limit the acception to less cases?</li><li>How do we handle Relying Parties which ignore their obligations for acceptance since eIDAS does not contain any punishments (like e.g. GDPR)?</li></ul><p>Increasing privacy works if user and Relying Party care and willing to pay for changes in processes, infrastructure and it-systems (RP) resp. fees for services/contracts etc. (user). In parallel related regulations and standardization framework especially on burden of proof needs to be changed accordingly so that e.g. ZKP will be accepted by court or audit authority . This process needs time and patience as EUDIW may enable user with privacy friendly functionalities which might not be possible to use from the beginning.</p><p>The risks that utilization of other wallets than EUDIW will decrease privacy for citizens and companies can`t be deny as the features like unlinkability, selective disclosure etc. as well as the certification formally acc. eIDAS apply mandatorily for EUDIW only. This risk is eIDAS inherent — so as much as we increase privacy requirements for Relying Parties we also risk the limitation of use for EUDIW by limitation of services for EUDIW.</p><p>On the other hand acc. Art. 24 eIDAS identification for QEAA or QES etc. can be done also “by using other identification methods which ensure the identification of the person with a high level of confidence, the conformity of which shall be confirmed by a conformity assessment body” — means there`s a certification of alternative wallet already integrated in eIDAS. An increasing success of EUDIW will also set the pressure for alternatives to follow and so achieve harmonisation in Europe. Means if alternative wallets follow same technical framework (protocols, formats etc.) of EUDIW, the only advantage of EUDIW is de facto the risky privacy.</p><p>Basically there´s no possiblity to force RP to use EUDIW also not for those ones with obligations for acception as eIDAS does not contain any punishments for ignorance of Art. 5 l. It does also not contain any measure to force RP to avoid other wallets. As EUDIW in voluntary any pressure will forseeably lead to non-acception by user. Means: Privacy matters — as long as someone cares about and pays for it — this should be the goal. If we set the hurdle in Art. 5b eIDAS for Relying Parties too high we end up in decreasing the privacy for everybody as basically nobody needs or can be forced for EUDIW. eIDAS gives us a chance — let`s use it wisely</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Abbreviations: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>[AlSc22] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S.: Self-Sovereign-Identity &amp; eIDAS: a Contradiction? Challenges and Chances of [eIDAS2]. European Review of Digital Administration &amp; Law — Erdal2021, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 89–108</p><p>[ArchGER23] <a href="https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept-v1">https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept-v1</a></p><p>[ARF24] <a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md">https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md</a></p><p>[BSI23] Basics of Digital Signature Techniques and Trust Services Designation: Legal Framework Technical Aspects. Federal Office for Information Security. 2023: <a href="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6">https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekSignatur/esig_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6</a></p><p>[EA20] EASA: Part 21 — Airworthiness and Environmental Certification. <a href="https://www.easa.europa.eu/acceptable-means-compliance-and-guidance-material-group/part-21-airworthiness-and-environmental,">https://www.easa.europa.eu/acceptable-means-compliance-and-guidance-material-group/part-21-airworthiness-and-environmental,</a> accessed: 30/03/2020.</p><p>[eIDAS2] 2024/1183. REGULATION (EU) 2024/1183 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework</p><p>[ETSITR119476] ETSI TR 119 476 Analysis of selective disclosure and zero-knowledge proofs applied to Electronic Attestation of Attributes</p><p>[GDPR] Regulation (EU) 2016/ 679 of the European Pariament and of the Council — of 27 April 2016 — on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/ 46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation). GDPR, 2016.</p><p>[ISOTR24332] ISO DTR 24332. Information and documentation — Blockchain and DLT in relation to authoritative records, records systems, and records management</p><p>[Ko20] Korte, U. et. al.: Criteria for trustworthy digital transactions — Blockchain/ DLT between eIDAS, GDPR, Data and Evidence Preservation. OpenIdentity Summit 2020. Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI). Proceedings. Bonn 2020 p. 49–60</p><p>[Ko21] Korte, U. et. Al.: Records Management and Long-Term Preservation of Evidence in DLT. In: Roßnagel, H., Schunck, C. H. &amp; Mödersheim, S. (Hrsg.), Open Identity Summit 2021. Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.. (131–142)</p><p>[Ko22] Korte, U. et. al.: Langfristige Beweissicherheit und Vertrauenswürdigkeit digitaler Unterlagen (qualifizierte) Bewahrungsdienste nach eIDAS, ETSI und TR-ESOR. January 2022. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/journal/Datenschutz-und-Datensicherheit-DuD-1862-2607?_sg=EEtdLT1eGyxHjNRc9c1CCs1puoJsVZlFTUc-wglwq6Eb8aHfsfRfV9S-kzuQS4O0Bn_7e_h9hMuw6hId72jS6jrhAifFcg.OUAay2Np_yRUGTfUDSsiS_0v1XCIvbWpdQeQ9gEw3jMiiciNaZSSg5dUaWbWSKWN-7Z_ZOYjui3E8pb-SISB-w&amp;_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHVibGljYXRpb24iLCJwcmV2aW91c1BhZ2UiOiJwcm9maWxlIiwicG9zaXRpb24iOiJwYWdlSGVhZGVyIn19">Datenschutz und Datensicherheit — DuD</a> 46(1)</p><p>[KoScKuDHEn24] Korte, U. et. al.: Elektronische Bewahrung und Archivierung gemäß eIDAS. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2024.</p><p>[Ku24] Kühling/Buchner, DSGVO. Kommentar 2024.</p><p>[Sc22] Schwalm. S.: The (not only) social impact of the eIDAS 2.0 digital identity approach in Germany and Europe. In: CRYPTOASSETS, DEFI REGULATION AND DLT: Proceedings of the II Token World Conference 2022. p 23–38</p><p>[Sc23b] Schwalm S.: QWAC or not QWAC is that the question? <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qwac-or-not-qwac-is-that-the-question-80b7a145db9d</a></p><p>[UN17] UN United Nations Commission on International Trade: UNCITRAL model law on electronic transferable records. United Nations, New York, 2017.</p><p>[We18] M. Weber, T. Vogt, W. Krogel, S. Schwalm: Records Management acc. ISO 15489. Introduction and Guideline. Berlin 2018</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0b883decb1b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theses for success of eIDAS 2.0 (Part 1 of n)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/theses-for-success-of-eidas-2-0-part-1-0780e695063a?source=rss-64590f625e6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0780e695063a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Schwalm Steffen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Oct 2024 17:57:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-07T08:42:15.141Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The following assumptions are meant as thoughts based on experiences from several projects and standardization activities to build up a comprehensive eIDAS 2.0 ecosystem. The theses shall provoke and lead to further discussion.</p><p><strong>1. Nobody needs the EUDI Wallet — for now</strong></p><p>The EUDI Wallet seems to be the core of eIDAS 2.0. Actually it`s not. According to Art. 5a (15) of the regulation “The use of European Digital Identity Wallets shall be voluntary. Access to public and private services, access to the labour market and freedom to conduct business shall not in any way be restricted or made disadvantageous to natural or legal persons that do not use European Digital Identity Wallets. It shall remain possible to access public and private services by other existing identification and authentication means.”<br>This means basically we can`t assume that everybody will have an EUDI Wallet. The EUDI Wallet will contain the eID so personal identification data based on eID Scheme which is notified on LoA “high”. This is great but in how many cases to we need LoA “high”? According to a comprehensive analysis I did we have:</p><ul><li>80–85% LoA “substantial”</li><li>10–15 % LoA “low”</li><li>5–10 % Loa “high”</li></ul><p>Means, in most cases no LoA “high” needed. On the other hand it`s possible to use a Qualified Attestation of Attributes also for identification purposes as long as the Relying Party does not replace the EUDI Wallet.</p><p>But how often do we need to identify and how often do we use our tickets, driver licenses, payment cards etc.? A (qualified) attestation of attributes so exactly tickets, payment cards etc. can be issued in any wallet or system not exclusively to the EUDI Wallet. The requirements for issuance of QEAA are the same independently if EUDI Wallet or another system is the receiving system. Means as long as the QTSP for (Q)EAA follows the policy and security requirements as well as formats/protocols defined in European Standards (ETSI TS 119 471 and 472) the (Q)EAA is useable within eIDAS ecosystem.</p><p>The majority of user will foreseeably use (Q)EAA as tickets, boarding passes, e-Receipts, payment, driver license, car rental etc. (citizens) or digital product passport, secure data sharing etc. (legal entities) much more often used than the identification of the company or citizens itself.</p><p>Also the binding of a certain (Q)EAA to a PID which might be possible in EUDIW only is no valid argument, as the EUDIW is voluntary so alternatives foreseeable as discrimination forbidden. This means the binding to a person has to be possible also for users of other wallets, not only EUDIW.</p><p>This does not mean that the EUDIW is unnecessary but as it`s mandatory at least 2027 it`s necessary to enable Relying parties, Qualified Trust Service providers and the users now to deal with decentralized identities within the eIDAS ecosystem. This means to prepare the parties organizationally and technically so that the EUDIW can be integrated easily instead of starting in 2027 without any sustainable use cases nor working infrastructure or governance of parties participating in the ecosystem.</p><p>As somebody said in one of the conferences: “If the only added value of EUDIW is a technical harmonization of protocols, interfaces, formats — it would have achieved something great.” Yes definitely but requires also hat the technical framework shall recognize existing ecosystems to ensure broad adoption instead of long migration or ignorance of EUDIW…</p><p><strong>2. The real business cases lies in QEAA</strong></p><p>In the consequence of 1) the (Q)EAA will ensure the scaling of the eIDAS ecosytem as such verifiable credentials are already used by several ecosystems worldwide so e.g.</p><ul><li>EBSI in Europa (<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day">https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/display/EBSI/EBSI+Ecosystem+Day</a>)</li><li>Catena-X, GAIA-X</li><li>Industry on Digital Product Passports</li><li>Web 3</li><li>Travel (e.g. IATA Travel Passport)</li></ul><p>As long as the European Standardization Framework covers those ecosytems so achieve harmonized technical framework on one hand and existing solutions integrate the protocols and formats from eIDAS the eIDAS will boost the utilization of digital credentials and international transactions not only in Europe. Technically this means:</p><ul><li>SD-JWT VC, ISO mDL but also W3CVCDM and x509 or others</li><li>OID4VCI and VP and e.g. DIDComm as OID4VCI/VP not meaningful in machine-machine communication which is needed e.g. for Digital Product Passport subjects</li></ul><p>An early adoption and utilization of (Q)EAA within existing ecosystem and new ones will enable users, issuers and Relying Parties to adjust their devices, tools and components acc. to eIDAS so e.g.:</p><ul><li>use of wallets using the technical framework of eIDAS</li><li>use of IAM/CIAM using the technical framework of eIDAS</li><li>dealing with wallets and other systems as well as the protocols and formats acc. eIDAS for issuance</li></ul><p>In the end the ecosytems will be established step by step before the EUDIW occurs in 2027. This approach ensures a smooth integration or EUDIW as Relying Parties, QTSP etc. will be already enabled and also covers the fact that EUDIW is voluntary and not all cases (e.g. access to public swimmingpool or public library) may require EUDIW. Keep in mind: also a slight pressure to use the EUDIW only will foreseeably end up in the rejection by users.</p><p>For building a sustainable eIDAS ecosystem we should also remember that any Relying Party which wants to interact with the EUDIW has to be registered including listing the PII they need for certain service from the holder of the EUDIW (Art. 5b eIDAS). This is a high hurdle a Relying Party has to take beside its improvement to interact with the EUDIW reg. protocols (OID4VCI/VP), formats (ISO mDL, W3CVCDM, SD-JWT VC), processes. To start now with (Q)EAA will give the Relying Party the chance to clearly define where the EUDIW is really needed and to prepare for registration and interaction with it.</p><p>On other hand we have to keep in mind that EUDIW shall be issued also to organizations. Beside the Legal PID rulebook from EWC there`s currently no standard on how a EUDIW for Legal Entities or a PID for Legal Entities may look like — the focus on broad adoption of (Q)EAA in any wallet or systems will also give time to solve those open challenges like Organizational Identities.</p><p>The implementing acts defining the requirements on (Q)EAA will be published by November 2024 resp. in parts begin 2025. The building of eIDAS ecosystem concrete use cases using the European technical framework defined in ETSI/CEN resp. ARF starts now. If we wait for EUDIW the eIDAS Ecosytem will occur 2030 or never.</p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Abbreviations: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/collection-of-eidas-identity-related-terms-and-abbreviations-d14eada34364</a></p><p>[ALStScTh24a] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S., Stoecker, C., Thiermann, R.: Qualified Ledgers: Bridging the Gap between Blockchain Technology and Legal Compliance. 2024. see: <a href="https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9">https://medium.com/@schwalm.steffen/qualified-ledgers-bridging-the-gap-between-blockchain-technology-and-legal-compliance-c08d24a68db9</a></p><p>[ALStScTh24b] Alamillo, Dr. I., Schwalm S., Stoecker, C., Thiermann, R.: Qualified Ledgers — Breakthrough for proven security and legal trust in DLT through eIDAS2?. OpenIdentitySummit 2024. Porto 2024.</p><p>[ArchGER25] <a href="https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept">https://gitlab.opencode.de/bmi/eudi-wallet/eidas-2.0-architekturkonzept-v1</a></p><p>[ARF24] <a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md">https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/main/docs/arf.md</a></p><p>[eIDAS2] 2024/1183. REGULATION (EU) 2024/1183 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0780e695063a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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