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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Scott Beauchamp on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[When It Comes To U.S. Military Policy In Africa, Trump Is Just Following His Predecessor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arc-digital/when-it-comes-to-u-s-military-policy-in-africa-trump-is-just-following-his-predecessor-fc2917c75a48?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[barack-obama]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 May 2018 19:37:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-26T19:37:44.547Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>On Trump’s African inheritance</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fN57LA7IG-TOmqMfTwJfaQ.png" /></figure><p>One of the adjectives most often used to describe Trump and his administration is “unprecedented.”</p><p>What people perceive as the shock and horror of living in a country whose commander in chief regularly denigrates his own citizens and dehumanizes immigrants feels most perfectly articulated as a fresh aberration on the American scene.</p><p>Of course, it isn’t entirely true.</p><p>For all of his bluster about building a wall, Donald Trump is actually deporting <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/12/14/donald-trump-is-deporting-fewer-people-than-barack-obama-did">fewer immigrants</a> than Barack Obama. And many of the progressive accomplishments which occurred during the Obama administration, such as gay marriage, continue unabated. One of the most conveniently overlooked ways in which Trump has achieved a nefarious continuity with the Obama administration, however, is the continued militarization of Africa.</p><p>When four American soldiers were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/17/world/africa/niger-ambush-american-soldiers.html">killed in Niger</a> late last year, the response was a mixture of disgust and confusion.</p><p>What were American forces doing in Africa in the first place? The blowback of public opinion was so swift and agitated that a Republican-controlled Congress even deigned to hold <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/03/06/591266820/commander-of-u-s-forces-in-africa-testifies-before-house-armed-services-committe">hearings</a> on Trump’s “African strategy,” as if elected officials weren’t already well aware of the military sprawl they had been green-lighting legally and financially for decades.</p><p>This congressional exercise in feigning shock was another pathetic example of public servants pretending to share the same amnesiac response to the continuously sprawling Long War as their constituents. But the problem isn’t new.</p><p>As Nicholas Grossman put it in a piece for <em>Arc</em> last October:</p><blockquote>[the political move] to use Niger to weaken Trump would obscure the debate we should be having about global operations.</blockquote><p><a href="https://arcdigital.media/niger-benghazi-ff8579ac5379">Niger ≠ Benghazi</a></p><p>Certainly, Trump’s relationship with Africa seems tendentious (“<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946">shithole countries</a>,” anyone?), and the optics are made worse by what many Americans consider their president’s odious associations with racialized nationalism. But even as recently as right before the election, people were warning that then-candidate Trump was distracting from Obama’s African militarization.</p><p>In fact, Middle East analyst Daniel DePetris wrote as much for <em>Quartz</em>, citing Obama’s expansion of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) — which gives the president the right to use military action against al Qaeda and its affiliates — into use in Somalia in a <a href="https://qz.com/851136/osu-attack-president-obama-is-expanding-americas-war-on-terror-in-somalia-while-the-rest-of-the-world-is-distracted-by-trump/">piece</a> appropriately headlined “President Obama is quietly expanding the war on terror in Africa while the world is distracted by Trump.”</p><p>Obama’s creative interpretation of AUMF — as applying to any number of terrorist organizations around the globe — played a major role in expanding America’s military footprint in Africa. It provided flimsy but real legal cover for Obama to do things such as <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/20/558757043/the-u-s-military-in-africa-a-discreet-presence-in-many-places">build a drone base</a> in Somalia and increase American troop presence on the continent by <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175823/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_america&#39;s_non-stop_ops_in_africa/">200 percent</a> between 2008 and 2014.</p><p><a href="https://arcdigital.media/the-problem-isnt-donald-trump-it-s-the-american-presidency-66f569970021">The Problem Isn’t Donald Trump. It’s The American Presidency.</a></p><p>Trump’s “African strategy,” if you can call it that, is bad. But it’s also an inheritance from his predecessor.</p><p>Journalist Nick Turse, <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175823/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_america%27s_non-stop_ops_in_africa">writing</a> about the uptick in military operations in Africa under Obama back in 2014, explained why, exactly, American troops were deployed to the continent:</p><blockquote>U.S. troops carry out a wide range of operations in Africa, including airstrikes targeting suspected militants, night raids aimed at kidnapping terror suspects, airlifts of French and African troops onto the battlefields of proxy wars, and evacuation operations in destabilized countries. Above all, however, the U.S. military conducts training missions, mentors allies, and funds, equips, and advises its local surrogates.</blockquote><p>In other words, in 2014, American troops were deployed to Africa to do the exact set of things that the soldiers recently killed in Niger were doing. The more things change, the more they stay the same.</p><p>Obama’s expansion of military activity in Africa didn’t go entirely unnoticed. As Anakwa Dwamena <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/138241/obamas-disappointing-legacy-africa">writes</a> in the<em> New Republic</em>:</p><blockquote>The Obama administration’s approach to Africa has also been colored by the issue that has dominated American foreign policy since September 11: counter-terrorism. Grieve Chelwa, the Harvard economist, notes that if Obama’s hands were tied early in his administration with regards to promoting African development, they certainly weren’t when it came to a huge ramping-up of the U.S. military presence in Africa via the U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM. Some of the U.S.’s closest counter-terrorism partners on the continent — governments in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Egypt — have made blatant power grabs and extended the terms of aging leaders, in direct contrast with Obama’s aspirations for Africa’s youth. A kind of Cold War framework of engagement remains in place, in which African countries are seen as dominoes to be protected in the War on Terror. And it’s hard to disentangle whether increased insecurity on the continent has come despite or because of the growth in the U.S.’s military presence.</blockquote><p>In other words, things like secret drone bases and an uptick in deployments and joint-military exercises most likely had the same destabilizing effect the public assumes Trump’s actions are having. A terrible continuity remains unbroken.</p><p>Even scarier than the prospect that Trump isn’t necessarily to blame for pioneering our military presence in Africa is that Obama isn’t responsible either.</p><p>After all, the U.S. Africa Command which Dwamena mentions was formed by the George W. Bush administration, as was the AUMF which continues to provide legal cover for military adventurism. In other words, Obama’s legacy may not even be his own, or only partially so.</p><p>A much more terrible scenario than any one single president making bad decisions is the possibility that between AUMF, AFRICOM, and a relatively pliant public easily distracted by the next sentence crawling across the news ticker, the American government has been taken hostage by the animating logic of constant low-scale, world-wide warfare: that the American military can and should be spread across the globe and that most geo-global issues have a military solution.</p><p>If it’s the case that we’ve backed ourselves into a perpetual war footing, then what’s most disturbing about Trump’s strategy is its continuity. A truly unprecedented position concerning the American military presence in Africa would come as a welcome relief.</p><figure><a href="http://arcdigital.media/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*gc_0xOQ53jBoANIl7LXrkQ.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc2917c75a48" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arc-digital/when-it-comes-to-u-s-military-policy-in-africa-trump-is-just-following-his-predecessor-fc2917c75a48">When It Comes To U.S. Military Policy In Africa, Trump Is Just Following His Predecessor</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arc-digital">Arc Digital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Korean War gave the president the power to take us into battle. It’s been that way ever since.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/the-korean-war-gave-the-president-the-power-to-take-us-into-battle-its-been-that-way-ever-since-bc751912cb8b?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Sep 2017 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-23T18:21:15.487Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A 60-year tradition that goes against the Constitution</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RJF8ydzwa6gs_7D7ISOZ9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>U.S. troops guard an artillery outpost on Korea’s west-central front on June 9, 1951. (AP/Robert Schutz)</figcaption></figure><p>At first glance, our ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and the growing tensions with North Korea might not have anything in common. One is a decade and a half-long part of the “global war on terror,” the other a response to a burgeoning autocratic nuclear power. But what they do share is a common historical root: combat actions that aren’t officially declared wars. In fact, Congress hasn’t officially declared a war since World War II. Our engagement in Korea, officially dubbed a “police action”, set a precedent that’s lasted to the present day. In many ways, it was the first version of what we now think of as war.</p><p>The Constitutional scholar Louis Fisher <a href="https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/425.pdf">states</a> it outright: “President Harry Truman’s commitment of U.S. troops to Korea in June 1950 still stands as the single most important precedent for the executive use of military force without congressional authority.” From 1905 until after World War II, the Korean Peninsula was occupied by Japan. With the end of World War II Korea was split between North and South, with the Soviet Union occupying the North and <a href="https://timeline.com/north-korea-truman-doctrine-3fa73eefddc2">American forces occupying</a> the South. In 1950, at the behest of Stalin, the North launched a full scale invasion of the South.</p><p>It didn’t seem like America would intervene at first. Combat troops had been removed the previous year and then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson had failed to mention Korea in a recent speech he’d given about America’s “security perimeter.” But as North Korean troops closed in on the city of Seoul, Truman ordered Navy and Air Force elements to intervene. Three days later he approved ground troops. When Truman asked Senator Tom Connally whether he would be able to order troops into combat without prior Congressional approval, the Senator <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8O7_AwAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA75&amp;lpg=PA75&amp;dq=%E2%80%9CIf+a+burglar+breaks+into+your+house,+you+can+shoot+him+without+going+down+to+the+police+station+and+getting+permission,%E2%80%9D&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=Buq5xH8h9k&amp;sig=OpH5Dn4QrWHQN9XckTCkISKg3dg&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwimn8yrhLnWAhXDNiYKHdS1C5kQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&amp;q=%E2%80%9CIf%20a%20burglar%20breaks%20into%20your%20house%2C%20you%20can%20shoot%20him%20without%20going%20down%20to%20the%20police%20station%20and%20getting%20permission%2C%E2%80%9D&amp;f=false">answered</a>, “If a burglar breaks into your house you can shoot him without going down to the police station to ask for permission. You might run into a long debate in Congress which would tie your hands completely. You have the right to do it as Commander-in-Chief and under the UN charter.”</p><p>And the rest is history. Our involvement in Korea turned into a bloody three-year war — euphemistically dubbed a “police action” — and Congress has never declared war since. As the journalist and activist Paul W. Lovinger <a href="http://warandlaw.homestead.com/files/50years.html">writes</a>, “Truman took his action without asking Congress for a declaration of war, contrary to what his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had done on December 8, 1941. Truman said a United Nations resolution gave him authority. But he had ordered armed forces to Korea before the U.N. acted. Moreover, the U.S. never made any agreement with the U.N. to provide armed forces. And anyway, how could Congress delegate away its lawful authority?”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TF-MWfgivZ4tRdUUUrs-vQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>President Harry Truman discuss the Korean War with Gen. Douglas MacArthur, left, in the backseat of an automobile in October, 1950. (AP)</figcaption></figure><p>The Constitution is pretty explicit about how wars should be declared. Congress, and not the President, should decide when and where we go to war. Article I section 8 of the Constitution enumerates the rights and responsibilities of the Legislature and, sure enough, <a href="http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/page/article-i-section-8">among these</a> are “To declare war.” Which means, in spirit, to initiate war. As Alexander Hamilton <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed69.asp">noted</a> in <em>The Federalist Papers</em>, the president is “nothing more than … first General and Admiral.” Meaning that the President’s role is to conduct the wars that Congress declares.</p><p>The main reason why the President <em>shouldn’t </em>have the power to unilaterally wage war is probably pretty obvious: It’s too important a decision to be placed in the hands of a single person. Congress, being the most representative body, better represents the will of the governed. But writer and theorist George Friedman <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/03/30/what-happened-to-the-american-declaration-of-war/#160882e3299e">points out</a> another important reason, that “by providing for a specific path to war, [the constitution] provides the president power and legitimacy he would not have without that declaration; it both restrains the president and empowers him. Not only does it make his position as commander in chief unassailable by authorizing military action, it creates shared responsibility for war. A declaration of war informs the public of the burdens they will have to bear by leaving no doubt that Congress has decided on a new order — war — with how each member of Congress voted made known to the public.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-aSaEwCjKUzfvVVE4-oTHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>U.S. soldiers secure the entrance to a cave in Afghanistan on July 29, 2002. (AP/Wally Santana)</figcaption></figure><p>That we haven’t had a formally declared war since World War II is often defended by saying that declarations of war require a formality that simply doesn’t exist in our current international climate. When President George W. Bush signed the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force into effect (after it was approved by both houses of congress), it couldn’t have been a formal declaration because our enemies weren’t countries but instead nebulous political entities which required a certain amount of political flexibility on our part in order to face. That might have been true at the time, but as we’ve subsequently seen, the same 2001 AUMF, which was voted on and approved on the same day without much, if any debate, has morphed into a catch-all excuse for a military sprawl that includes almost the entire Middle East and parts of Africa. Jack Goldsmith and Matthew Waxman <a href="http://time.com/4486572/forever-war-islamic-state-isis/">categorize</a> the current AUMF as an example of “executive unilateralism,” a boon for the executive in that it grants seemingly unending and nebulous powers and is convenient for congress because they avoid serious public debates.</p><p>In other words, it represents the very thing that the Constitution was structured in order to avoid, finding its modern antecedent in Truman’s Korean “police action.” Far from being outmoded in our contemporary world of nuclear powers and nonstate actors, formal declarations of war serve to hold Congress and the president responsible for the decision to engage in combat equally and unambiguously. It signals to American citizens that their country is engaged in combat, and so certain sacrifices will be asked of them. And, perhaps most importantly, it grants the president the explicit legal authority to use American troops to kill people, with the moral burden of those actions being born by all of our society collectively. Simply put, it <em>shouldn’t </em>be easy or a matter of course to send American troops into harm’s way, and by employing a rigorous political process to waging war there’s a greater hope that combat will be restrained or even avoided. As Friedman <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/03/30/what-happened-to-the-american-declaration-of-war/#4c9fc7e7299e">puts it</a>, “A declaration of war both frees and restraints the president, as it was meant to do.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc751912cb8b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/the-korean-war-gave-the-president-the-power-to-take-us-into-battle-its-been-that-way-ever-since-bc751912cb8b">The Korean War gave the president the power to take us into battle. It’s been that way ever since.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why does America stand up for South Korea anyway? Is it still a good idea?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/north-korea-truman-doctrine-3fa73eefddc2?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3fa73eefddc2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2017 11:46:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-19T16:27:10.217Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Our main geopolitical approach may be a “zombie doctrine”</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6_4RbVqHyaie5aGbxF_pbA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A South Korean soldier participates in joint U.S.-Korean anti-terror exercises in Seoul in 2012. (AP/Hye Soo Nah)</figcaption></figure><p>Despite causing untold damage and costing the lives of millions of people, mostly civilians, the Korean War is often referred to as “The Forgotten War.” What we’ve specifically forgotten is that it never officially ended, but instead stagnated into a stalemate with a contingency of American troops still stationed at one of the most heavily-militarized borders in the world. And now that Pyongyang threatens to move onto the list of <a href="https://timeline.com/north-korea-started-its-nuclear-program-because-it-wanted-to-be-friends-with-america-ec292b82fb9a">nuclear powers</a> with the capability to strike the United States, it’s worth asking how we got here. Why is America so militarily and politically invested in the Korean Peninsula?</p><p>The short answer is that, for better or worse, the entire thrust of America’s modern foreign policy comes out of the Korean crisis — including the formation of NATO.</p><p>When thinking about the Korean War, it’s important to remember that World War II ended with a lot of unresolved geopolitical tension. Yes, the major fascist German and Japanese empires were defeated, but the victors were divided among themselves. America and the Soviet Union, both of which came out of the war stronger than before, were deeply distrustful of each other. Each saw the other as not only representing a threat to their basic ideologies, individualist and capitalist versus collectivist and communist, but as greedy to make imperial land grabs.</p><p>You could make the argument that the Cold War began in earnest on March 12, 1947, when President Truman announced a foreign policy and military strategy based around containing Soviet geopolitical expansion to Congress. This strategy would consist of a mixture of financial aid to governments struggling against Soviet influence, sweetheart trade deals, and massive amounts of military assistance. It became known, predictably enough, as the Truman Doctrine and can be summed up in his <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=qqDA6OGvhmUC&amp;pg=PA194#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">own words</a> with: “…it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”</p><p>What the Truman Doctrine did was blend (some might say conflate) American values and American interests. And it signaled a dramatic break with foreign policy of the past. As historian James T. Patterson <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6sbzFbBH65EC&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=Patterson,+James+T.+(1996).+Grand+Expectations.+New+York:+Oxford+University+Press.&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjJ46iHhq_WAhVGOSYKHaqbCFUQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">writes</a>, “The Truman Doctrine was a highly publicized commitment of a sort the administration had not previously undertaken. Its sweeping rhetoric, promising that the United States should aid all ‘free people’ being subjugated, set the stage for innumerable later ventures that led to globalistic commitments. It was in these ways a major step.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DvOlBDNeStgq4xnCRGzMIQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Protesters burn an American flag during anti-U.S. rallies near the U.S. Army Base in Seoul in 2002. (AP/Ahn Young-joon)</figcaption></figure><p>Of course, all of these commitments are just empty promises unless America and her NATO allies are willing to make good on their rhetoric and actually defend foreign governments from communism. That’s exactly what happened on the Korean peninsula. During the Second World War, the USSR attacked the Japanese-occupied peninsula from the North and American troops occupied the south, each stopping at the 38th parallel. The two regions were split, each with their own separate government claiming to represent the whole of Korea. On June 25th, 1950, the North (assisted by China and the USSR) invaded the South.</p><p>In response, a United Nations contingency of troops, composed mostly of Americans, was deployed to turn back the invasion. The combat was particularly brutal, and each side saw dramatic back and forths which bloodied and devastated both countries. What began in the summer of 1950 as a successful push by the North, pinning down the South and allied UN forces and taking most of the peninsula, was dramatically reversed in September. As South Korean and UN forces pushed back, regaining and taking ground, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army came to the aid of the North — partially at the behest of Stalin. And although the Soviet Union wouldn’t intervene directly with ground troops, they did supply air cover and pilots. In fact, the war saw the first jet-to-jet air combat ever.</p><p>By the summer of 1951, the war had turned into a stalemate. Eventually an armistice, but not a peace treaty, was signed. Officially, the war <a href="https://timeline.com/these-photos-show-us-staring-across-the-dmz-at-north-korea-for-50-years-and-them-staring-back-d3f0040cf64d">never ended</a>. By the signing of the 1954 armistice, experts estimate that total troop casualties on both sides numbered 1.2 million. It’s also <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/asia/korean-war-fast-facts/index.html">estimated</a> that 600,000 North Korean and 1 million South Korean civilians were killed.</p><p>Okay, so if the Truman Doctrine was the reason we were in such a rush to defend the government of South Korea in the first place, why are American troops still there, long after the USSR has dissolved and South Korea has economically and militarily far outpaced its neighbor to the north? One theory is that America wants to maintain hegemony in the region despite the Cold War having ended and an American presence being provocative. But as some experts argue, throwing American troops into the mix would make any conflict even more dangerous. Cato Institute Senior Fellow Doug Bandow <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/its-time-for-america-to-cut-south-korea-loose-north-trump-nuclear-weapons/">writes</a>, “The Koreas are no longer a proxy battleground between superpowers. There was a time when U.S. withdrawal from a confrontation with a Soviet ally in Asia would have, analysts believed, signaled weakness a continent away in Europe. But the Soviets are long gone and the cause for American commitment with them. An inter-Korean war would be tragic and the body count enormous, but absent American involvement the fighting would largely be confined to the peninsula. The continued presence of U.S. forces, by contrast, virtually guarantees the spread of conflict.”</p><p>There are many theories, but what seems the case regardless is that the end of the Cold War didn’t fundamentally change American global <a href="https://timeline.com/north-korea-ec-121-shot-down-8e881ee50e86">military posturing</a> in the dramatic way that everyone expected. We’re still the number one benefactor of military aid in the world. We still have a military that’s spread over the face of the globe in a seamless network of troops and technology. And as a 2013 Congressional Research Service report <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf">says</a>, America continues to seek a “world-wide, continuous global military presence” in order to preserve the superiority it had at the end of the Second World War, despite being the remaining sole superpower. In other words, the Truman Doctrine has become a kind of zombie doctrine, outliving the specific historical circumstances from which it arose and staggering dangerously into the 21st century, provoking potential foes and lacking justification beyond solipsism.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fe.enpose.co%2F%3Fkey%3DdRXnS9Gplk%26w%3D700%26h%3D425%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fupscri.be%252F41530c%252F%253Fenpose&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href">https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3fa73eefddc2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/north-korea-truman-doctrine-3fa73eefddc2">Why does America stand up for South Korea anyway? Is it still a good idea?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The racial unrest of 1967 led directly to the militarization of local police forces today]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/police-militarization-race-1967-ae022323b7bc?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ae022323b7bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[police]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[black-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blacklivesmatter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Aug 2017 04:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-09T16:28:43.861Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>With Vietnam on the brain, departments across America armed up</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QScvh_gxPC4_R6QWaWGN1A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Police wearing riot gear attempt to disperse a crowd on August 11, 2014, two days after the police killing of 18-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. (AP/Jeff Roberson)</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="http://longhotsummer.timeline.com/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Z_utWoLlizndOny01ntjug.png" /></a></figure><p>In July of 1967, when African American cab driver John Smith was arrested and beaten by white police officers for allegedly driving in the wrong direction and using obscene language, a Newark already brittle with racial tension finally broke. News of the police brutality spread quickly, by both neighborhood word of mouth and through the radio chatter of other African-American cab drivers, and people took to the streets to protest the pattern of official discriminatory violence that seemed to have the blessing of then-mayor Hugh Addonzio. Whatever chance there might have been for a peaceful resolution of the friction completely evaporated when the National Guard was called in to suppress the demonstrations. Violent clashes with the Guard rocked Newark for five straight days. When something a calm finally settled again over the city, there were 26 dead and hundreds more injured.</p><p>Something similar happened in Detroit a couple weeks later when undercover police raided an unlicensed bar hosting a welcome home for returning Vietnam War veterans. President Johnson signed an Executive order bringing federal troops into the city and the violence escalated. Detroit was even worse than Newark, however, with over 40 dead and nearly a thousand injured. And while it’s easy to see in these violent events of the summer of 1967 a molding of sadly familiar patterns, it’s important to note that something new was happening then that would only continue to intensify into the present: police work was being militarized.</p><p>The military had been used to perform police duties before, of course. During Reconstruction after the Civil War, Federal troops had occupied the American South in order to enforce civil rights. But the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act effectively ended Reconstruction when it barred federal troops from enforcing laws. But the Act doesn’t apply to National Guard troops, and so the Guard has been used frequently in the past to quell things like the 1894 Pullman car strike and in 1957 to enforce integration in public schools in Arkansas.</p><p>But the modern militarization of police forces — the porousness of the conceptual border between civilian law enforcement and military tactics and equipment — began in earnest as a response to rising racial tension in the 1960s. It was because of the Newark and Detroit riots that President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. As political scientist David Schultz <a href="https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2014/08/long-powerful-history-how-we-militarized-police">writes</a>, “The Act created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which made available grants to local governments to develop and purchase military-type resources to suppress the riots. The money facilitated the development of SWAT and other heavily armored police forces which had developed in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and other cities to counteract so-called black insurgency.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JuEobFAjTh5DAYfgBch9WQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SInvWnVl30IJkQ353Sg9RQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>(left) Detroit policemen demonstrate steel body armor designed for combating riot crowds in 1958. (AP/Robert Jarboe) | A wall of police camera video feeds in New York, 2013. Previously unheard of levels of military-grade surveillance and weaponry have been implemented under the auspices of a war of terror. (AP/Mary Altaffer)</figcaption></figure><p>But police militarization is about more than the ability to spend money on military equipment. It’s also about using military tactics on civilian populations. It’s important to remember that this was all happening at the same time as the escalation of the Vietnam war, and so not only was military equipment being mass-produced and made easily procurable, but anti-guerrilla military strategies were also becoming popularized among a police force that more and more saw itself as a paramilitary organization. Los Angeles police chief Daryl Gates <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/bringing-it-all-back-home-the-roots-of-militarized-policing/">wrote</a> that “[W]e began reading everything we could get our hands on concerning guerrilla warfare. We watched with interest what was happening in Vietnam.” The military itself also came to see minority populations within the United States itself as a sort of test populations for their own nascent counterinsurgency techniques. Historian Joan Jensen writes in her 1991 book <em>Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980</em> that the Army sent a contingent of plainclothes officers “to develop counterinsurgency information on black communities similar to that collected on Vietnamese guerrilla organizations.” There was an open door between the military and civilian police worlds, and it was swinging both ways.</p><p>Militarization of the police continued unabated, of course, through the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s. Nixon and <a href="https://timeline.com/ronald-nancy-reagan-war-on-drugs-crack-baby-just-say-no-cia-communism-racial-injustice-fcfeadb3548d">Reagan’s war on drugs</a> kept up the pretense of an embattled country that required an internal, domestic army to protect it from itself, in the form of heavily armed local police departments. The racial overtones in this “war” remained obvious. But the war on drugs also emphasized civil forfeiture, the police confiscation of property allegedly used in crimes, which of course created a material incentive for those very same departments to keep the war hot. Upheld by the Supreme Court in a 1996, civil forfeiture would allow police departments to finance buying even more exotic military equipment to use on American civilians, almost always of color.</p><p>After 9/11 the so-called “war on terror” provided yet another new bevy of military equipment and tactics for police departments to use against American citizens. The passing of the Patriot Act into law provided further grounds for police departments to treat civilians as a foreign enemy within its own borders, giving broad legal cover for police to conduct all types of surveillance (such as reading emails and texts and requesting records of library books) which would have previously been unheard of. And then there’s all of the new military-grade weapons. Frances Weaver <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/445062/militarization-americas-police">writes</a>, “Many small-town police departments now boast the same weaponry once wielded by U.S. military units in Afghanistan — including tanks with 360-degree rotating turrets, battering rams, and automatic weapons. Those weapons are today deployed against Americans suspected of crimes in their own homes.”</p><p>According to the American Civil Liberties Union <a href="https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police">report</a> “War Comes Home,” federal and state programs continue to “unnecessarily and dangerously” militarize local police departments, “the battlegrounds of which have disproportionately been in communities of color.” It’s a trend that started in full force 50 years ago this summer, as an overheated and wrongheaded response to communities in Newark and Detroit and many other American cities. The most cogent irony being that the riots were in response to police brutality and overreach in the first place. More guns and hyper-militarized SWAT tactics were always only going to exacerbate the problem and leave the root issues of inequality and government indifference unaddressed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae022323b7bc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/police-militarization-race-1967-ae022323b7bc">The racial unrest of 1967 led directly to the militarization of local police forces today</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[40 years ago this month, the Grateful Dead went from hippie holdovers to true stadium rockers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/grateful-dead-may-1977-2ca2e1acdc11?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ca2e1acdc11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rock]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 May 2017 14:31:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-24T14:31:12.300Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>May of 1977 transformed the group forever</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CMCs7H4aHEoQLMJ2hX-aAA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jerry Garcia performing with the Grateful Dead in Chicago on May 12, 1977. (Paul Natkin/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>By 1977, the Grateful Dead were in an odd cultural position. A band so one-of-a-kind that it blurred the distinction between relic and relevant, the hippie icons were nonetheless searching for their place in a new era of American music.</p><p>That was a strange, transitional year for America as well. One year after the country celebrated its bicentennial, it seemed stuck in a weird and fractured place. Despite the war in Vietnam finally being over, the utopian aspirations of the previous decade’s youth culture seemed to have fizzled out. <em>Star Wars </em>was released that year to became the highest-grossing film of all time. Crime was on the rise. Punk was in its infancy. <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/studio-54-gallery-1.1242582">Studio 54</a> and cocaine had replaced the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/jan14/human-be-/">Be In</a> and psychedelics. The whole hyper-materialist, well-coiffed, <em>Saturday Night Fever </em>(also released in 1977) feel of the times make it even more improbable that a band like the Grateful Dead — so closely associated with the ethos of the 1960’s — would be able to regroup and find a new register of its voice. In retrospect, it seems almost unbelievable that the band could peak in May of 1977, but according to <a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/the-grateful-deads-greatest-year-20130626">some</a>, that’s exactly what happened.</p><p>Despite their reputation as hippie goofs charging burnouts to listen to them noodle around, the Dead were serious students of musical tradition. More than most bands, they stood at the nexus between America’s cultural past and the promise of a wide open future. Lead guitarist Jerry Garcia had a background steeped in bluegrass and jug bands. Rhythm guitarist Bob Weir began as a kind of coffeehouse folk strummer while bassist Phil Lesh studied avant garde composition and played the trumpet. Original organist Rod “Pigpen” McKernan was a hard-drinking bluesman. All of these varied traditions melded together in the music of the Dead to create a kind of weird Americana wildly fluctuating along a spectrum between sorrowful “high and lonesome” country and the ecstatic liberation of free jazz.</p><p>The Dead were students of the past, but they were also at the forefront of a lot of things. The band earned their counterculture bona fides playing as the house band for Ken Kesey’s famous <a href="https://archive.org/details/gd1966-01-08.sbd.bershaw.5410.shnf">Acid Tests</a>. LSD chemist and band supporter Oswald Stanley pioneered his <a href="http://www.audioheritage.org/html/profiles/altec/vott.htm">Altec Voice of the Theater</a> sound system at the Tests, beginning what would turn out to be a seamless blending of pioneering both drugs and technology (usually simultaneously). They would go on to create the “<a href="http://www.dozin.com/wallofsound/">Wall of Sound</a>” in the early 70’s — a revolutionary behemoth stack of tube amplifiers that could push sound out up to half a mile completely free of distortion. Then, of course, there were also the ubiquitous “tapers” of Dead shows, creating a kind of free and underground economy of sharing media that in many ways anticipated the Internet itself.</p><p>But if America was in a strange place in 1977, so was the band. After the heights of Woodstock and the early 1970s, the band sort of burned out in 1974, going on a hiatus through most of ’75. Returning to the road in ’76, the Dead were still searching to reestablish their voice. Signing to a new label, Arista, in late ’76, they went into the studio at the beginning of ’77 to record a bunch of new material which would eventually become the album <em>Terrapin Station</em>. Keith Olsen, their new producer, cracked the whip and put the band through their paces. An apocryphal story has it that the studio door was even occasionally nailed shut. But the forced discipline worked. A band notorious for being slacker hippies forged an identity in the studio that was updated, cleaner, and harder rocking to fit the times. Their spring tour, especially the month of May, was the culmination of that project.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*tSc4For1IacXBhTElWezog.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/511/1*RGrGk4XCD28tE27bJrhQow.jpeg" /><figcaption>(left) Tapers’ section at Oxford Plains, Maine 1988. (Michael A. Conway/Grateful Dead Archive) / (right) Jerry Garcia and Phil Lesh in front of the Wall of Sound at the Iowa State Fairgrounds, June 16, 1974. (Greg Johnston/Grateful Dead Archive)</figcaption></figure><p>Ask any Dead Head what the band’s most famous show is and they’ll tell you (whether they agree it’s deserving or not) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3tNbjpaXG_k">Barton Hall</a>. Played at Cornell University smack in the middle of their Spring tour, the show is legendary among fans for offering what could be the Dead’s most consistent performance. The first set offers flawless renditions of classic Dead tunes such as “Jack Straw”, “Deal”, and “Row Jimmy”. But that second set. Howard Weiner describes it in his book <em>Grateful Dead 1977</em>, writing, “There are many signature moments in this Scarlet &gt; Fire (“Scarlet Begonias” into the reggae-inspired “Fire on the Mountain”), but when I hear this version…it’s easily identifiable by that blast off [of Lesh’s bass]. The tempo and timing are sublime.”</p><p>And maybe that was the main difference between the old, dead Dead and the new incarnation that fully blossomed in May of 1977: tempo and timing. Instead of the churning, cosmic cacophony of the late 60s or the mellow and meandering, seemingly endless sets of the early 70s, these shows were ebullient but tight. They sounded massive, but were still quirky and weird. There was more than a little bit of the energy of mid-70s stadium rock, mixed with the complex musicianship of the decade’s more accomplished progressive rock acts. The days of psychotropic exploration and soft stoned country rock were over. This was tight, brash, cocaine-fueled rock that fit the decade like a glove.</p><p>May of 1977 was a turning point for the Dead, but fans continue to debate whether it was the high water mark or just another waypoint to <a href="https://timeline.com/photos-grateful-dead-tour-5a0278525ea9">the weird, dark 1980s</a> (not a popular opinion, but personally my favorite era of the Dead) and clean, crisp, mega-show rebirth of the 90s.</p><p>And in a way, that evolution echoes the debates we continue to have about the course of American history from that time as well, which sort of keeps the Dead as relevant as ever.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fe.enpose.co%2F%3Fkey%3DdRXnS9Gplk%26w%3D700%26h%3D425%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fupscri.be%252F41530c%252F%253Fenpose&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href">https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ca2e1acdc11" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/grateful-dead-may-1977-2ca2e1acdc11">40 years ago this month, the Grateful Dead went from hippie holdovers to true stadium rockers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The U.S. has a habit of debuting new bombing technology on developing nations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/debuting-bombing-developing-nations-2a8dca779343?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a8dca779343</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2017 04:11:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-25T18:11:10.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The ugly legacy of colonialism persists in our military actions today</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ueQwjMh0oAtTcxppgiRyQw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hiroshima, Japan, remained devastated in 1948, three years after the US dropped an atomic bomb on the city. (AFP/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>When the Mother of All Bombs (known officially as the GBU-43/B MOAB) was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13294524">dropped</a> on a suspected underground ISIS bunker in Afghanistan this month, a number of people objected to the use of the particularly destructive weapon. The main criticism seemed to center around the size of the weapon itself, with the 21,000-pound bomb being called overkill by <a href="http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/mother-all-bombs-massive-overkill-and-wont-lead-peace">some</a>.</p><p>But the most interesting commentary probably came from former Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai, who <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/hamid-karzai-condemns-mother-bombs-170414124459611.html">tweeted</a> that “This is not the war on terror but the inhuman and most brutal misuse of our country as a testing grounds for new and dangerous weapons.”</p><p>He’s got a point. There is a dark history of Western military powers testing novel weapons and strategies on technologically overmatched non-Western (and non-white) populations. It’s a legacy that mixes the brutal arrogance of colonialism with the technological promise of an easy fix. There are of course numerous examples of this cruel dynamic at play in the centuries leading up to the 20th — conquistadors with dogs and swords, gunpowder in general — but the disparity that currently exists between the material advantages of Western countries and the technological capability of enemies abroad continues to be exploited in ways that conform to a recognizable pattern.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*N32879aA1zFzDtxbSsQSrw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Giulio Gavotti and his improvised bomber in 1911. (Wikimedia)</figcaption></figure><p>Western colonialism has always been facilitated in large part by technological superiority in war. This advantage has been put to use not only to destroy as many “enemy combatants” as possible, but also <a href="https://timeline.com/air-strikes-not-effective-140a5211a30c">to <em>perform </em>dominance in order to intimidate into submission</a>. And also to spare as many lives of Western combatants as possible. There’s a deep connection between the “shock and awe” of laser-guided bombs leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Italian pilot Giulio Gavotti performing the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13294524">first aerial attack</a> by dropping hand grenades out of his plane over Libya in 1911. Both were relatively safe (for the attackers) displays of technological superiority.</p><p>The strange combination of ruthlessness and a “hands off” attitude has been a common one throughout the history of Western militaries operating in colonized spaces. After taking control of what’s now Iraq in 1920, for instance, the British military took the approach of “control without occupation,” which meant an overreliance on technological superiority. In this case, air power. Nascent rebellion against their newly acquired colonial overlords (who were replacing the Ottomans) was met with novel air techniques developed precisely to quell armed rebellions of recalcitrant subjects. As Jonathan Glancey <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/19/iraq.arts">wrote</a> for <em>The Guardian</em>, “The British responded with gas attacks by the army in the south, bombing by the fledgling RAF in both the north and south. When Iraqi tribes stood up for themselves, we unleashed the flying dogs of war to ‘police’ them. Terror bombing, night bombing, heavy bombers, delayed action bombs (particularly lethal against children) were all developed during raids on mud, stone, and reed villages…During the period of direct British rule, Iraq proved a useful testing ground for newly forged weapons of both limited and mass destruction, as well as new techniques for controlling imperial outposts and vassal states.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PRpLH0D7V762koiLff6Xag.jpeg" /><figcaption>Royal Air Force planes conducting raids over Iraqi villages in the 1920s. (Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>Chemical weapons themselves were of course pioneered during WWI, but there’s a universe of difference between two relatively equal armies lined up along a determined front using similarly horrific weapons, and those same weapons being used against a mixed civilian-combatant population in a scenario where the battlegrounds can be anywhere. It’s telling that weapons developed for the eschatological scale of a “war to end all wars” was used rather casually to control civilian populations in colonial holdings. Even though it was probably Churchill who most famously advocated for their use when he said that he was “…strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes [to] spread a lively terror,” it was America who perfected their terrible use in Vietnam. As Jeffery St. Clair <a href="http://www.alternet.org/world/america-has-deployed-chemical-and-biological-weapons-philippines-puerto-rico-vietnam-china">writes</a>, “From 1966 to 1972, the United States dumped more than 12 million gallons of Agent Orange (a dioxin-powered herbicide) over about 4.5 million acres of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The government of Vietnam estimated the civilian casualties from Agent Orange at more than 500,000. The legacy continues with high levels of birth defects in areas that were saturated with the chemical.”</p><p>East Asian countries in particular experienced the wrath of Western coercive overkill. The atomic attacks on Japan are a much debated example. But less discussed are the Marshall Islands themselves, where from 1946 to 1958, 67 nuclear tests were conducted. Spread over time, that’s the equivalent of over one Hiroshima blast <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/11/27/a-ground-zero-forgotten/">every single day</a> during the testing period. A United Nations human rights council report <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/bikini-atoll-nuclear-test-60-years">defined</a> the situation on the islands as “near-irreversible environmental contamination” that has led to the “indefinite displacement” of former inhabitants. It might not be an instance of experimentation mixed with control of a rebellious population, but it does speak to a cavalier attitude about testing powerful military weapons in places the average American voter hardly ever thinks about.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/731/1*B3DH4RHa1cB18hdfc-Mq2Q.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tUtoHkFlGo1XxEnKEYSlvQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>(L) A large dome covers one of many nuclear blasts sites in the Marshall Islands, 1980. Native islanders were preparing to file claims for hundreds of millions of dollars to rehabilitate the former US nuclear test site and for the hardships experienced during 33 years of forced exile. (Giff Johnson/AFP/Getty Images) // (R) Radioactive debris contaminated by depleted uranium from the Gulf War in Iraq, 1998. (Photo by Scott Peterson/Liaison)</figcaption></figure><p>Because depleted uranium has a half-life of something like 4.5 billion years (about the age of our solar system), it’s a particularly insidious threat. America’s use of depleted uranium rounds in the first Gulf War — a total of 320 <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer211/gulf-war-battlefield-still-%E2%80%9Chot%E2%80%9D-depleted-uranium">tons used</a> — continue <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13623699.2013.765173">to cause</a> spikes in cancer rates and birth defects. But this is the kicker: we continue to use depleted uranium rounds in our air strikes on the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, despite knowing their dangers full well. Some have even <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-considine/us-depleted-uranium-as-ma_b_3812888.html">called</a> the use of depleted uranium “as malicious as Syrian chemical weapons”.</p><p>To be fair, it’s not just America. As Moustafa Bayoumi recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/14/military-weapons-history-the-west-bombs">wrote</a> in <em>The Guardian</em>, the Russians have also “…exploited its campaign assisting the Assad regime in Syria to test out 162 new weapons systems, including new cruise missiles and long-range bombers…Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu used the occasion of Vladimir Putin’s 63rd birthday to announce that Russia had fired cruise missiles at targets in Syria from the Caspian Sea, some 900 miles away.” But just because it’s the game of major world powers doesn’t make it right. Even if some experts claim that the MOAB was the right tool for the job in killing a few ISIS agents, Karzai’s tweet should give us pause to consider the broader socio-political blowback that using such a grandiose and novel weapon might cause — and how by repeating historical mistakes we could be inadvertently undermining our larger strategic goal of working with Afghanistan as an ally.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fe.enpose.co%2F%3Fkey%3DdRXnS9Gplk%26w%3D700%26h%3D425%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fupscri.be%252F41530c%252F%253Fenpose&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href">https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a8dca779343" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/debuting-bombing-developing-nations-2a8dca779343">The U.S. has a habit of debuting new bombing technology on developing nations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Air strikes are not an effective tactic of war, but we keep using them anyway]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/air-strikes-not-effective-140a5211a30c?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/140a5211a30c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Apr 2017 04:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-24T19:01:40.354Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Bombs over Baghdad? Largely ineffectual.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hqHgFWYOs6e7ihme-ZHSkg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aerial video still of a GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb striking an ISIS stronghold in eastern Afghanistan on April 13, 2017. (Department of Defense/Getty Images).</figcaption></figure><p>American military involvement in Afghanistan has been ongoing since 2001, making it the longest foreign war in American history. Maybe it’s because there doesn’t actually seem to be an end to hostilities in sight that Americans are prone to forgetting that, on any given day, we’re a country at war. We’re alienated from our wars by design. It takes the occasional extraordinary event, like the <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-drops-mother-of-all-bombs-in-afghanistan-marking-weapons-first-use/">recent detonation</a> of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (colloquially referred to as the Mother Of All Bombs) to, however fleetingly, hold our attention.</p><p>The MOAB is a 21-thousand pound, 30-foot long bomb carrying 11 thousand pounds of explosive ordnance. It’s the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in our arsenal. After being dropped from a plane like a C-130 Hercules, the MOAB is released from its drogue parachutes and is guided to target by GPS. The MOAB is an airburst weapon, which means that it detonates about six feet above ground, increasing the range of its lethality. <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/04/18/afghanistan-making-it-worse/">According to</a> the <em>New York Review of Books</em>, the MOAB’s blast radius “stretche[d] for more than a mile, and the blast waves knocked people to the ground and punctured ear drums five miles away.” It’s <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-fighters-killed-in-mother-of-all-bombs-moab-blast-2017-4">assumed</a> that something that catastrophic killed enemy combatants, but the exact number is almost impossible to pin down. And while the response to the attack can generally be categorized as a disgusted awe at the size of the weapon and the scope of its lethality, a much more insidious issue seemed to be overlooked: Bombings don’t win wars. And they make poor substitutes for actually having a strategy.</p><p>Ever since the first aerial attack <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13294524">in history,</a> when Italian pilot Giulio Gavotti dropped four hand grenades out of his plane while flying near Tripoli on November 1st, 1911, the dream of bombing from the air has been something of an El Dorado for militaries. And, on paper at least, it offers a compelling alternative to slogging it out on the ground. Bombing is supposed to be (relatively) cheap and safe (for our side, at least). It’s almost like by waving the magic wand of technology we can simultaneously win wars and save lives. But the reality has always been very different.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nLX6fgG83shdsevCM_LMtg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Five-hundred pound bombs are dropped from a United States Army bomber onto an oil refinery at Leghorn, Italy, in 1944. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>Although it was explored and augmented during WWI, aerial bombardment as we think of it today didn’t really come into its own until WWII. This was total war, with little regard for civilian casualties, and with cities such as Hamburg and Dresden almost entirely obliterated. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed by American bombing in both Germany and Japan, with a total of something like one-and-a-half million tons of bombs dropped on <a href="http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm">Germany alone</a>. And did it win the war? Historian Robert Pape <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=xHZnTAPQFc8C">argues in</a> <em>Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War </em>that it wasn’t civilian losses or destruction of infrastructure that led to German surrender, but territorial loss from advancing ground armies. In fact, Pape argues quite radically, aerial bombings didn’t have an effect on when the war ended at all. A <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1061.html">RAND study</a> funded by the Air Force and conducted mainly in order to refute Pape was forced to admit that, although the United States Air Force “ha[s] scored some notable successes, the record is mixed” on aerial bombing.</p><p>It’s a tepid endorsement of an expensive and counterproductive way of waging war. As writer and historian Ian Buruma <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-strategic-bombing-doesnt-seem-to-work/article19928220/">writes</a>, “The problem with strategic bombing is that it never seems to have worked, with the possible exception of Rotterdam (but by then Holland had already been defeated). Rather than breaking popular morale in London, Berlin, Tokyo or Hanoi, it usually strengthened it. Confronted by a common deadly threat, civilians rally around the only leaders who can do anything to protect them, even if those leaders are widely disliked.”</p><p>Buruma mentions Hanoi, which presents an even more compelling argument against the efficacy of bombing than the already mind boggling WWII experience. America dropped twice the tonnage of bombs on Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as it dropped during the entire Second World War. There was so much ordnance dropped that it altered the landscape. In his book <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PeFK5dkYZsEC&amp;amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;amp;dq=Nick+Turse+Vietnam&amp;amp;hl=en&amp;amp;sa=X&amp;amp;ved=0ahUKEwjMzsq41MXKAhVEsIMKHfX_A28Q6AEIHDAA"><em>Kill Anything That Moves</em></a>, the author Nick Turse quotes the ecologist Arthur Westing as writing during a wartime visit to Vietnam, “Never were we out of sight of the endless panorama of craters.” So many defoliants were dropped from American planes that between 1945 and 1980 forest cover in Vietnam <a href="http://e360.yale.edu/features/in_war-scarred_landscape_vietnam_replants_its_forests">declined by half</a>. There are 78 million <a href="http://legaciesofwar.org/resources/books-documents/land-of-a-million-bombs/">unexploded bombs</a> currently still littering the landscape of Laos. And despite the overkill, America lost the war. Bombing, even with “creative” weapons like Agent Orange and Napalm, simply didn’t work. As Nick Turse writes, “Overkill was suppose to solve all American problems, and the answer to any setback was just more overkill.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wNkXQmfp4xFdemvsLsHdDQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Impact craters left after a U.S. B52 bombing strike north of Dai Teng, Vietnam, in 1968. (Tim Page/Corbis via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>The precision bombing technologies developed during the 70s and more recent drone technologies were supposed to be the end of overkill. From now on, America would only kill bad guys, quickly and efficiently. But technology isn’t perfect, as our <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/04/19/u-s-bombed-mosque-syria-killing-dozens-civilians-investigators-conclude/">recent bombing</a> of Syria has shown. Innocent people are always killed in wars, no matter the steps taken to mitigate it. So bombing remains as counterproductive as ever. As Institute for Policy Studies Middle East expert Phyllis Bennis <a href="http://www.ips-dc.org/bombing-eradicate-terrorism-produces-opposite-effect/">said in an interview</a>, “You can’t bomb terrorism out of existence.” You can destroy buildings and kill people, and perhaps you’ll kill a terrorist in the process, but that’s not a strategy to <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/precision-guided-diminishing-returns-why-airpower-alone-can%E2%80%99t-win-america%E2%80%99s-small-wars">win wars</a> or end terrorism. Rather, it only causes “more terrorism, antagonism, and violence.” And history tends to support that idea.</p><p>So why do we keep doing bombing — especially using a weapon as extreme as the MOAB — even though we know it doesn’t “work”? Ian Buruma thinks it has to do partly with a desperate desire to wreak vengeance, but that that “cannot be the only, or perhaps even the main, reason.” A better explanation might be morale — not hurting the morale of the enemy, but lifting the flagging morale of a home front that is stuck somewhere between complete resignation and cynical frustration.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2F41530c%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fe.enpose.co%2F%3Fkey%3DdRXnS9Gplk%26w%3D700%26h%3D425%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fupscri.be%252F41530c%252F%253Fenpose&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href">https://medium.com/media/8c602844c91c921597ed114939b75685/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=140a5211a30c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/air-strikes-not-effective-140a5211a30c">Air strikes are not an effective tactic of war, but we keep using them anyway</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Riffing on ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ is a controversial and thoroughly American tradition]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/star-spangled-banner-history-dd6476fc6e6b?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd6476fc6e6b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rock]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2017 21:36:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-02T22:29:42.758Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>From exiles to immigrants to rock gods, we make the song our own</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*POL9MbklgVXLzCYGOQJmRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Comedian Roseanne Barr plugged her ears as she scream-sang the national anthem at a San Diego Padres game in 1990. (AP Photo/Joan Fahrenthold)</figcaption></figure><p>The national anthem is the closest thing our country has to a secular hymn. Because of that, public performances of the song can be loaded events, with both artist and audience playing their own ideas of what it means to be American off of each other. In a democracy as large and messy as ours, the anthem is a kind of living document always open to change and interpretation, and that can make for some pretty electric performances.</p><p>The first <a href="http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/6957582/the-history-national-anthem-sports-espn-magazine">recorded confluence</a> of “The Star-Spangled Banner” and pro sports was in Chicago during the 1918 World Series. It’s probably not a coincidence that American forces had joined World War I just a little over a year earlier, with over 100,000 American dead at that point, and that the struggle for organized labor had reached such a violent fever pitch that the International Workers of the World set off a bomb in the Chicago Federal Building the day before the series began.</p><p>These things were more than just backdrops to the performance of the song. They were the very issues that the song was being performed in reaction to. From its earliest 20th century public performances, the “Star-Spangled Banner” was more than just a somber anthem to be reverently performed in cookie-cutter fashion with hand over heart. It’s been something more like a barometer, changing with the mood and course of the nation. A radically democratic canvas that has been tweaked and altered by a succession of performers who each contributed a unique vision of their country.</p><p>To be perfectly honest, “The Star-Spangled Banner” isn’t a great pick for a public song or National Anthem. For one, there are too many lyrics. The song’s too long. Most people, if they have any of the anthem memorized, usually stick to the first few verses. Even <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ZcN04U-gM4">professionals</a> have trouble remembering the words.</p><p>And the music is too complicated as well. Well, not exactly complicated, but definitely out of range for most amateur singers. The Kennedy Center website <a href="http://artsedge.kennedy-center.org/students/features/story-behind-the-song/star-spangled-banner.aspx#Lyrics">says</a>, “Some Americans complain that it celebrates war and should be reserved for military ceremonies. Others simply grumble that it is too hard to sing with a range that is out of reach for the average vocalist. Suggested replacements have included ‘America the Beautiful,’ ‘God Bless America,’ and ‘This Land is Your Land.’” A complicated, weird song that’s difficult to perform note for note is just begging to be reinvented, even without the political weight behind it.</p><p>Such reinventions began early. Storied American bandleader John Philip Sousa kicked off the tradition <a href="http://www.therestisnoise.com/2012/12/star-spangled-wagner.html">by rearranging the tune</a> in what <em>New Yorker </em>music critic Alex Ross calls “the manner of [Wagner’s] the <em>Tannhäuser</em> Overture.” Kind of an odd way to remold the anthem — to filter a popular song through the aesthetics of a German Romantic and then back into popular brass band — but as Sousa said in 1899, “Wagner was a brass band man, anyway.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GzOoDBHOEx1SiEy3-twmcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Russian composer Igor Stravinsky prepared to conduct his own arrangement of the Star Spangled Banner with the Boston Symphony in 1944. (AP Photo/Abe Fox)</figcaption></figure><p>For Igor Stravinsky, one of the most talented avant-garde composers of the 20th century, messing with tradition was in his bones. And so when he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1taQl-wOmo">arranged the anthem himself</a> in 1944, he couldn’t resist adding his own idiosyncratic touch — a dominant seventh chord. The change might be subtle to the amateur ear, but there were definitely repercussions for Igor, who composed the arrangement while he was conductor of the Boston Symphony. As Dan Coleman of <em>Open Culture</em> <a href="http://www.openculture.com/2015/07/stravinskys-illegal-arrangement-of-the-star-spangled-banner-1944.html">explains</a>, “the Boston police, not exactly an organization with avant-garde sensibilities, issued Stravinsky a warning, claiming there was a law against tampering with the national anthem. (They were misreading the statute.) Grudgingly, Stravinsky pulled it from the bill.”</p><p>Decades later in 1968, blind Puerto Rican American folk singer José Feliciano performed the song during the World Series in Detroit. It’s a beautifully warm and heartfelt rendition, conveying a deep love that, frankly, doesn’t exist in the song as it exists on paper. As Feleciano himself <a href="http://the1968exhibit.org/reflections/singing-national-anthem-world-series-jose-feliciano">explained</a>, “I had set out to sing an anthem of gratitude to a country that had given me a chance,that had allowed me, a blind kid from Puerto Rico — a kid with a dream — to reach far above my own limitations.” Unfortunately, an immigrant kid putting his own personal spin on the anthem was too much for some people. After the performance Feleciano learned that “a great controversy was exploding across the country because I had chosen to alter my rendition…. Veterans, I was being told, had thrown their shoes at the television as I sang; others questioned my right to stay in the United States.” His <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1ZQawbo4Mo">beautiful rendition</a> was unintentionally controversial.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nOIBYeB4QGfoy2jT9dSXAQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>José Feliciano performed in 1968. (David Redfern/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>The single most famous national anthem performance is probably Jimi Hendrix’s psyche-out feedback-laced rendition performed at Woodstock. It isn’t just one of the most iconic performance of that particular song — it’s one of the most iconic performances of any song, ever. Channeling the spirit of Walt Whitman, Hendrix seems to gesture wildly in two directions at once, containing all the contradictions between deep sorrow and profound joy. It sounds like America screaming at itself. Every note at once a tear, a laugh, and an apology. As the rock critic Greil Marcus <a href="https://greilmarcus.net/2015/05/20/woodstock-25-years-later-0794/">writes</a>, “At the very least, Woodstock was proof that America was still big enough to contradict itself on the grandest scale — to stage its best possible spectacle as if to cancel its worst. On those almost instantly legendary three days, there were nearly as many Americans at Woodstock as there were in Vietnam.” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKAwPA14Ni4">Hendrix’s anthem</a> was the perfect synecdoche for that moment in time — a new generation laying claim to their America.</p><p>Though not as beautiful as Hendrix’s performance, Roseanne Barr’s 1990 butchering of the “Banner” is also an important moment for the song. Sung at an untelevised San Diego Padres game, her version was what <em>The Washington Post</em> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/07/23/roseanne-on-the-day-she-shrieked-the-star-spangled-banner-grabbed-her-crotch-and-earned-a-rebuke-from-president-bush/?utm_term=.88e2385e9533">called</a> “the most viral moment of the pre-viral age,” with her off-key belting, fingers in ears, and crotch grabbing garnering a condemnation from then-President George H.W. Bush himself.</p><p>Roseanne <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5Od4kyjW_g">claims</a> that she intended to sing the song straight, but started in too high a register so doubled down on making it funny. She is a comedian, after all. She called the event a watershed moment, from when she went from being a universally loved figure to completely despised by the public. “I started too high,” Roseanne told <em>The</em> <em>Washington Post</em>, “I knew about six notes in that I couldn’t hit the big note. So I just tried to get through it, but I couldn’t hear anything with 50,000 drunk a — — booing, screaming ‘you fat [expletive],’ giving me the finger and throwing bottles at me during the song they ‘respect’ so much.” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkhbpeL-8sY">Roseanne’s performance</a> is interesting for what it reveals not just about her politics but about how the blowback from a performance is just as much a form of political theater. Just ask Colin Kaepernick.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd6476fc6e6b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/star-spangled-banner-history-dd6476fc6e6b">Riffing on ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ is a controversial and thoroughly American tradition</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[This 1983 test proved a ‘limited’ nuclear strike doesn’t exist.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/proud-prophet-nuclear-strike-1d4ee88fdbe2?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d4ee88fdbe2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Dec 2016 05:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-22T19:42:46.719Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>This 1983 test proved a ‘limited’ nuclear strike doesn’t exist. But the Obama administration still pursued it</h3><h4>Code named Proud Prophet, the exercise changed our whole strategy</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aRK4qzDHYrLbIOMnrtJmIw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The first Soviet nuclear bomb, tested in 1949, in a museum in Sarov, Russia. (Alexander Nemenov/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure><p>Things are contentious again between us and Russia — our only serious nuclear rival, and the only country that has the ability to destroy, not just America, but life on Earth as we know it. A growing number of<a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-nuclear-war-becoming-thinkable/"> security</a><a href="http://fpif.org/may-greater-risk-nuclear-catastrophe-cold-war/"> analysts</a> are saying that the threat of nuclear war is steadily increasing, and that it might actually be higher now than it was at the height of the Cold War. In 2015 the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists even moved their Doomsday Clock, a representation of how close the world is to nuclear armageddon, to <a href="http://thebulletin.org/clock/2015">three minutes to midnight</a>.</p><p>One of the main reasons for the alarming movement of the clock’s minute hand is “…the United States and Russia [embarking] on massive programs to modernize their nuclear triads-thereby undermining existing nuclear weapons treaties.” Basically, we’ve been developing smaller, sleeker, and more precise nuclear weapons that<a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/no-longer-unthinkable-should-us-ready-for-limited-nuclear-war/"> some critics</a> say make the concept of a “limited nuclear war” more thinkable.</p><p>The problem is that a 1983 war game already definitively proved that there can’t be such a thing as a “limited” nuclear war: Any nuclear war would trigger an armageddon scenario.</p><p>When Ronald Reagan was elected president in the early 1980s, the Cold War was still very much threatening to go hot. Our nuclear deterrence consisted of a triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. At the root of our strategy for avoiding nuclear conflict with the Soviets was mutually assured destruction (MAD), which basically ran something like “let’s make the idea of a nuclear exchange so unappealing, so definitively an end-of-the-world scenario, that no one would be crazy enough to actually engage in it.”</p><p>However, there was also a sort of counter-tradition running parallel to MAD within the Pentagon, best captured by a double-speak catchphrase of the time: “escalate to de-escalate”. To understand the thinking of defense planners who advocated for this type of nuclear engagement, imagine a scenario where the USSR invaded an American ally in Europe. Rather than engaging them with conventional forces, or launching a complete nuclear armageddon, America uses smaller nuclear weapons to destroy the invading force and demonstrate our willingness to “go all the way.” This line of thinking assumes that a such thing as a “limited nuclear strike” is possible.</p><p>But 1983’s war game Proud Prophet obliterated that thinking.</p><p>War games aren’t new, and they certainly weren’t new in 1983 when Reagan decided to conduct Proud Prophet. Military exercises and simulations have been around since the beginning of recorded history — they’ve just grown more complex as our technology has advanced, moving from cavalry games of capture the flag to computer simulations crunching massive amounts of data. During the Cold War, war games entered a previously unheard of level of sophistication, made possible by the post-World War II revolution in cybernetics and communications technology.</p><p>Proud Prophet itself was a revolution within a revolution. As Yale Political Science professor Paul Bracken explains in his book <em>The Second Nuclear Age</em>, instead of using CIA and think tank staffers to play the role of American defense leadership during war game scenarios, Proud Prophet actually used the higher level people who would be the ones making snap-decisions in the event of a nuclear exchange. Bracken writes, “Proud Prophet was the most realistic exercise involving nuclear weapons every played by the government during the Cold War.” Previous games had been almost like highly regimented drills, with participants going through what amounted to checklists. Think of the script of a telemarketer and you’re not too far off. These practiced scenarios lacked the freeform movement, the give and take, of an actual game. All that changed with Proud Prophet.</p><p>Proud Prophet was played in real time over the course of two weeks with hundreds of military officers taking part. National Command Authority, the chain of command from the president to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to make choices, think outside of the box, and communicate with people playing their Soviet counterparts. Perhaps the most innovative part of the exercise was that for the first time ever the <em>actual </em>Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs participated. And the results of the exercise, according to Bracken, revealed “…many of the strategic concepts proposed to deal with the Soviet Union…to be either irresponsible or totally incompatible with current U.S. capabilities and immediately thrown out.” The most stunning lesson learned was that there’s no such thing as a limited nuclear war.</p><p>Rules only work if all sides agree to them. The logic of the Soviet forces, their national goals, principles, and animating logic, were very different from America’s. Proud Prophet explored a bunch of scenarios, but what was most surprising was that <em>any </em>limited nuclear engagement inevitably descended into a nuclear holocaust.</p><p>For example, say Soviet forces launched a small land invasion in Europe and America attempted to “de-escalate by escalation” through launching a limited nuclear strike on the invading troops. In keeping with their own political and strategic doctrine, the Soviets interpreted a nuclear attack on their forces as an assault against all of the Soviet Union and her culture. They would inevitably respond with massive retaliation, which America would then match.</p><p>Five hundred million people were projected to die in the initial salvo, and the entire Northern Hemisphere was rendered uninhabitable. There was simply no way to conduct a strategic nuclear exchange with another nuclear power.</p><p>Proud Prophet profoundly changed the way American leaders thought about nuclear war. After the exercise there was no more bombastic nuclear rhetoric emanating from the US leadership. As Bracken writes, “Launch on warning, horizontal escalation, early use of nuclear weapons, tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges — these were banished conceptually and rhetorically.” Nuclear exchange was traded for meeting Soviet forces conventionally and head on.</p><p>But now it seems that we’ve forgotten the wisdom of cold war-era exercises and have reverted to a pre-Proud Prophet nuclear posture. A chilling example is the Obama administration’s development of the B61–12 nuclear bomb, which (besides also being the<a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/nuclear-weapon-obama-most-expensive-ever"> most expensive</a> bomb ever developed) has a “dial-a-yield” feature and incredibly advanced targeting systems, meaning that it’s functionally a battlefield nuke, meant to be used in a limited and strategic way. <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-most-dangerous-nuclear-weapon-americas-arsenal-13433">According to Zachary Keck</a> writing in <em>The National Interest</em>, this makes it “the most usable nuclear bomb in America’s arsenal.”</p><p>But as Proud Prophet taught us more than 30 years ago, there really are no “usable” nuclear weapons—which is a potentially catastrophic lesson to forget.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d4ee88fdbe2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/proud-prophet-nuclear-strike-1d4ee88fdbe2">This 1983 test proved a ‘limited’ nuclear strike doesn’t exist.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Top Gun at 30: Aerial warfare has gone from combat cowboys to joystick jockeys]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/timeline/top-gun-at-30-aerial-warfare-has-gone-from-combat-cowboys-to-joystick-jockeys-da962bfbf9e7?source=rss-eee8fc143c5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da962bfbf9e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[movies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Scott Beauchamp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 May 2016 19:15:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-12T19:15:05.973Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Dogfighting has now been replaced by drones</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XJ1QWZI3MTJaaIp3y4z2lg.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>© Paramount Pictures</em></figcaption></figure><p>Today marks a special celebration on the liturgical calendar of cinematic events: it’s the 30th anniversary of the release of the movie <em>Top Gun</em>.</p><p>On the one hand, <em>Top Gun</em> is a film completely deserving of its reputation as a quasi-idiotic Tom Cruise vehicle with a guilty-pleasure soundtrack (“Highway to the Danger Zone”, anyone?), a highly quotable 1980s powerhouse as much about beach volleyball as about fighter jets. But <em>Top Gun </em>is also an important film, not for being well made or revolutionary, but for being simultaneously the culmination, as well as the death knell, of the fighter pilot film.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rEF5yclPGbUhEEOSinn9Aw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>© Paramount Pictures</em></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty years on and the sexiness and glamour of aerial combat is dead, killed by technological advances that render the dogfight obsolete. The flying gladiators of the sky, courageously welcoming danger, have been replaced by the technocratic expertise of the drone pilot comfortably ensconced in an air-conditioned trailer.</p><p>You could probably guess the plot of <em>Top Gun</em> (or at least something close to it) from the VHS cover alone: a young hotshot Naval pilot with a wild streak, a chip on his shoulder, and daddy/authority issues overcomes all obstacles to become a badass fighter pilot. There’s also the obligatory love interest, played by the tough anti-ingénue Kelly McGillis.</p><p><em>Top Gun </em>might have been the end of a tradition, but it definitely still fits snugly within that tradition. Flight and motion pictures developed almost concurrently, so it’s not all that surprising that the first classic fighter pilot movie, <em>Wings</em>, wasn’t released until 1927, nearly a decade after the end of the World War I, in which it’s set. The plot itself was conventional though: two young men of different socio-economic classes compete for the love of a single woman while simultaneously becoming bad ass fighter pilots. It won two Oscars and kicked off a tradition of rowdy, lovelorn patriots (usually American, but sometimes British) who are irascible, airborne heroes. The planes they operated, it would seem, were merely extensions of their untamed egos.</p><p>The heyday of these types of films (and the heyday of fighter pilots “dog-fighting”) came in the wake of World War II, naturally enough. From the late 1940s through the early 1960s, big budget Hollywood films were churned out at a prodigious rate. Some of them were even good. John Wayne stared in a slew of them, including <em>Flying Tigers </em>(1942), <em>Flying Leathernecks </em>(1952), <em>Island in the Sky </em>(1953), <em>The Wings of Eagles </em>(1957), <em>Jet Pilot </em>(1957). The thing to remember is that all of these movies were about relatively contemporaneous events, wars that were either occurring or had just occurred. These weren’t historical retrospectives, but flattering portraits of current fighter pilots as patriotic action heroes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PFx4gzP-FgmaqwVsQl-yeg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wopv36fPDCgZSSMOB9lwpg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Left: Lieutenant Colonel Blakeslee returns from a mission escorting bombers over Germany. He has earned the distinction of being the first allied fighter pilot over Berlin. ©Fox Photos/Getty Images Right: American Volunteer Group aircraft, known by the Chinese as ‘flying tigers’, flying in tight formation on the Far Eastern front, where they are aiding the Chinese Army against the Japanese. ©Three Lions/Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>And then something happened. For brevity’s sake, let’s call that something the Vietnam War. With the long, unpopular, and destructive slog in Southeast Asia came a shift in American culture. No longer the simple glorification of our boys overseas, but a cynical, ironic take on the entire enterprise of war. No longer gratuitous celebrations of patriotic resolve, Vietnam movies such as <em>Apocalypse Now</em>, <em>The Deer Hunter</em>, and even <em>Rambo: First Blood Part II</em>, emphasized insanity, amorality, and betrayal. The films were echoing, and occasionally even signal boosting, the prevailing attitudes about the war, the country, everything. This sort of cynical take came to be known as Vietnam Syndrome, a collective rumination over unhealed wounds and national failures.</p><p>And then in 1986 <em>Top Gun </em>was released. As historian Andrew Bacevich writes in <em>The New American Militarism</em>, “Whereas <em>First Blood Part II </em>picked at old wounds, <em>Top Gun </em>magically made those wounds disappear. Instead of old resentments, it offered a glittering new image of warfare especially suited to America’s strengths. It portrayed this new version of warfare and those who waged it against a political backdrop shorn of messy ambiguities, and it invested military life with a hipness not seen even in the heyday of World War II propaganda movies.” Film critic Pauline Kael called the movie a “commercial” in the <em>New Yorker</em>, saying that it was a “recruiting poster that isn’t concerned with recruiting but with being a poster.” It became the biggest movie of 1986, making over $176 million at the box office. It was the high water mark of jet fighter movies.</p><p>The thing about high water marks is that they are necessarily followed by an ebb. There were fighter movies made in the 90’s, but they were mostly nostalgia trips about World War II. It was the same in the oughts.</p><p>And now — both in war and on screen — we’ve moved past piloted planes altogether, on to the messy political and moral ambiguities of drones with movies like the recently released <em>Eye in the Sky</em> starring Helen Mirren as a middle-aged Colonel directing a complex terrorist-capturing operation from a control center in Hertfordshire, England. The drama of the film comes from the very thing that fighter pilot movies took for granted: the moral efficacy of the military operation itself. And the drones, flying over Kenya, are remotely piloted from an Air Force base in Nevada. The mystique and allure of the danger of aerial combat was replaced with precision-guided munitions, “bunker busting” bombs, and stealth bombing technology. The dogfight is a thing of the past.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8m5PW1GVh3Q6PORyCELS4A.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a0mnZECfpFPvhLOXqeErUg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The modern day drone pilot looks more like a hardcore video gamer than a hot shot flyboy. Left: © US Navy, Right: © Getty Images</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*roXCiTAJ_nm99KEQmHqYSQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter © US Navy</figcaption></figure><p>In fact, the newest fighter we have, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, sucks at dogfighting. It is actually outmaneuverd by the much older F-16. The blog <em>War is Boring </em>noted that the F-35 “can’t turn or climb fast enough to hit an enemy plane during a dogfight or dodge the enemy’s own gunfire”. It sounds alarming, but here’s the thing: the F-35 isn’t mean to dogfight. The most sophisticated plane (and most expensive weapon) ever built is meant to intercept and destroy enemy targets well outside of visual range. In other words, there won’t be anymore dogfights because the F-35 will destroy the enemy before it even arrives. It’s technologically impressive, to be sure, but it isn’t very compelling material for a movie. And that’s why <em>Top Gun </em>will be the last of its kind. All future fighter pilot movies will be exercises in nostalgia, like films about cavalry attacks and wooden warships — the romantic image of an Iceman and Maverick high-five permanently seared into a cellulose acetate sunset.</p><figure><a href="http://eepurl.com/bErIAj"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*khRyONPMnu9LfRblW1E5lw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da962bfbf9e7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/timeline/top-gun-at-30-aerial-warfare-has-gone-from-combat-cowboys-to-joystick-jockeys-da962bfbf9e7">Top Gun at 30: Aerial warfare has gone from combat cowboys to joystick jockeys</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/timeline">Timeline</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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