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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Screedwriter on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Screedwriter on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Continental Crust]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@screedwriter/continental-crust-8b1a3f4a254a?source=rss-c802682055d3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[polemics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[continental-philosophy]]></category>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2022 00:03:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-02T00:12:39.852Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a polemic against continental philosophy written by a continental philosopher. It should be noted, first and foremost, that “continental philosophy” is not a term used by philosophers on “the continent,” although it enjoys very wide usage in the continental US. When I use the term continental philosophy in this piece, I am not referring to the broad spectrum of post-Kantian, non-analytic European philosophers that comprises the privileged object of reference for most “continental philosophers.” They are for the most part dead; there are no currently generative philosophical projects in their lineage. Rather, I am referring to the tradition, mostly within American academia, of interpretation that has sprung up around these figures. This tradition, “continental philosophy,” is very much alive — it hires professors, organizes conferences, and trains graduate students. Whether or not this is a good thing is up for serious debate.</p><p><strong>Hoping and Praying</strong></p><p>If you’re familiar with continental jargon, you may have heard talk of “messianic time,” a more or less useless concept by which continental philosophers empower themselves to do what they were already doing anyway: sitting and waiting for something important to happen. It’s no problem if your only relationship to politics is a vague sense that you ought to put “feminism” down as an AOC, says the messianic philosopher, because it’s not even <em>time </em>for politics yet. It’s <em>messianic time </em>right now, the time of waiting. Soon the messiah will arrive, and revolution will come, and the masses will lift you off of your swivel chair and onto the barricades, and what a glorious day that will be.</p><p>“Continental philosophy” is in every way organized along the lines of “messianic time” in this sense. Of course, its politics, insofar as they exist (which they mostly do not), are explicitly messianic. We are constantly told that the work going on in understanding this or that thinker is important for future political movements or that it prefigures a world to come. The thought seems to be that one day, presumably when we’ve reached some sort of critical mass of knowledge-about-Germans, politics will happen, and then <em>everyone</em> will see. The future really <em>will </em>be Benjaminian, or Deleuzian, or Agambenian, or whatever. The job of philosophers on this picture is to sit around and wait for that blessed day to come. Certainly they’re not really doing anything else<em> </em>at the moment. In the meantime, we can engage in the no doubt crucial work of dead guy exegesis, and won’t that be fun for all of us.</p><p>Of course, it isn’t particularly surprising to anybody except perhaps the most deluded continental acolytes that Arendt interpretation will not save the world. But continental philosophy isn’t only waiting for a messiah in politics, it’s waiting for a savior in philosophy itself as well. Continental philosophy positions itself as the steward of the great tradition that came before it, namely the thinkers maligned by the analytic tradition (who are, in fact, increasingly less maligned, not that the continentals care to check). Continental philosophers’ favorite thing in the world to do is interpret guys. They interpret dead guys. They interpret interpretations of dead guys by other dead guys. They interpret one dead guy by way of interpreting another dead guy. On occasion they’ll even engage with an interpretation of a dead guy written by a living guy, or, god forbid, just read a living guy. But they would really rather not, and if the guy they’re reading really <em>must </em>be living, everyone would be much happier if they were at least very old or very European or, preferably, both. Here the legacy of the English departments so deeply interwoven into continental philosophy’s DNA is clear as day: those who can’t do, read.</p><p>Continental philosophy positions itself in the eternal moment immediately before philosophy resumes. Its abstracts and conclusions constantly insist that its scholarship is not mere scholasticism, but a necessary prelude to <em>philosophizing</em>. But the continental philosopher is stuck in a terrible dilemma here. Because, you see, <em>philosophizing </em>is what Foucault and Heidegger and Derrida and Nietzsche did, and <em>we </em>are not Foucault or Heidegger or Derrida or Nietzsche! <em>We </em>are too modern, too specialized, too <em>American</em> to do philosophy. Philosophy was something done by a rarefied group of Europeans, mostly dead now. It is our job, in this post-philosophical period, to tend to the legacy of these great thinkers and be their humble caretakers. Philosophizing is not for us. We are not up to the task. Our lot is simply to archive the manuscripts of these giants of the past, perform variously worse or better readings of their holy writ, and wait for our savior.</p><p>“Continental philosophy” is not a way of doing philosophy. It is a way of reading (some) philosophy, and of waiting for a <em>new </em>philosophy for which we are constantly preparing the ground, keeping everything neat and tidy for the day of its arrival. Continental philosophy looks to the past only in order to make bold philosophical gestures that it is constitutively incapable of following through on; waving its arms towards a path that it hopes somebody else, ideally somebody European, will head down, while it remains firmly planted where it is. Here is an idea that never crosses the continental philosopher’s mind: maybe, just maybe, if I have ideas about what philosophers should be doing, I should try doing a little philosophy <em>myself</em>.</p><p><strong>Continental Philosophers Try Doing a Little Philosophy Themselves</strong></p><p>As it happens, a bit over a decade ago, some continental types did in fact try to do a little philosophy in their own names. Unfortunately, because continental philosophy is a rotting corpse from which almost nothing could possibly be salvaged, the most charitable thing one could say about the attempt is that it went extremely poorly.</p><p>Of course, continental philosophers would never just up and do philosophy — they’re <em>continental philosophers </em>after all. So, as always, the first ingredient necessary to do anything in continental philosophy was… a French guy. And not just any French guy; this French guy was the doctoral student of one Monsieur Alain Badiou — hey, we <em>know </em>him! Quentin Meillassoux — our savior from the old country, the leading light of the “movement” that would come to be known as “speculative realism,” had a big, big idea: what if Kant was wrong? Meillassoux did not have any particularly good <em>reasons</em> for thinking that<em> </em>Kant was wrong, but he was very French, so it didn’t really matter. What Meillassoux wanted was to be able to say that the objects of math and science were <em>real</em>. Why did he want this? The simple answer is that French people love math and science (seriously!), but the more important answer is that it doesn’t really matter, because American humanities types do <em>not </em>like math and science, and so they discarded this aspect of Meillassoux almost immediately. What was left to retain from Meillassoux after this was a vague sense that <em>something </em>was <em>really out there </em>and that, for some reason, this was <em>very important</em>.</p><p>And so, “speculative realism” was born. Matter, objects, and things were the order of the day, though nobody could quite tell you why, aside from vague gesturing towards the idea that philosophers since Kant had unfairly discounted or maligned this stuff in some way or another. Of course, this wasn’t true (perhaps they all simply forgot to read the third critique?), but who wants to read a whole book by Kant? Those books are long and boring and the word “multiplicity” isn’t in them even once. The speculative realists quickly tacked a murky and poorly thought-through politics onto their murky and poorly thought-through ontology, as continental philosophers are wont to do, and it was off to the races. Blogs abounded, a few artists (but no philosophers) took notice, and one or two people got some book deals out of the whole ordeal (good job Graham!).</p><p>It became clear as the online hype died down, though, that there had never really been any content to this pretended philosophical “movement” other than a desire to do <em>something </em>in philosophy, and that, while admirable, this vague compulsion to do something new was not really what we in the business of philosophizing would call “a philosophical idea of any kind.” Not only this, nobody had even gotten any <em>jobs </em>out of it — as it turned out, time in grad school spent writing blog posts and fighting about Laruelle in comments sections was time wasted. Who’d’ve thunk?</p><p>Of course, most continental philosophers are not, and were not, speculative realists, so all this may seem dated and irrelevant. I’ve singled out speculative realism, though, because the sad truth is that it is the closest continental philosophy has ever come to thinking for itself. The philosophical “innovations” of continental “movements” never leave the ambit of dead-guy horse-beating any more than speculative realism did, and, as with speculative realism, their political stances never amount to anything more than empty academic posturing. What else could possibly be said to be happening in continental philosophy? Phenomenology? The beating of a dead Husserl. Hegel-by-way-of-Brandom? Dead-horse beating by way of live-analytic-philosopher-beating that’s just a twitter cult/SR offshoot anyway. Perhaps continental philosophy would like to steal some credit for black or decolonial thought just because they aren’t analytic?</p><p>The fact of the matter is that continental philosophy is completely devoid of content or life. Speculative realism was a vague philosophical interest in stuff-and-things dressed up with vague political grandstanding and expounded in vague blog posts and a very few vague books. It was short lived, and nobody ever really cared that much about it, and it was pathetic. It was the best that continental philosophy could muster.</p><p><strong>The End</strong></p><p>The state of continental philosophy is not a problem with thought, or with “our current conjuncture,” or modernity. It is a problem with the continental “philosophers” themselves and with the institutions in which philosophy is done. Continental philosophers have spent so long reading and writing about other philosophers that their capacity to do any philosophy for themselves has atrophied completely. When they try, all that comes out is vague, posturing dreck that, at its very best, rises (just barely) to the level of competent cultural commentary. Say what you want about analytic philosophers (and there is plenty to say), but at least they’re trying to <em>do philosophy</em>. They identify problems that they feel to be important and unresolved and set out to resolve those problems themselves. The same cannot be said for their continental counterparts.</p><p>Really, continental philosophers have nothing to say at all. At best, they can read dead philosophers, and perhaps use their analysis of them to analyze something else too — a novel maybe, or a film. At the end of it all they will make a vague, sweeping gesture towards a political relevance that is not and could never be relevant to anything at all. But nobody cares about that, because everybody understands that this is simply the way you play the game. You say things that make you sound radical, both politically and philosophically, safe in the knowledge that your bluffs will never be called. You, the American professor, or graduate student, or whoever, will never be called upon to do philosophy. That sort of thing isn’t done anymore.</p><p>History of philosophy is obviously important, and it plays an important role in spurring new philosophy, but the Cult of Genius Europeans that is continental philosophy has long outlived whatever usefulness it may have had, if it ever even had any. Perhaps it is time that we began to address the topics that our favorite philosophers addressed — not through interpretations of them, but in our <em>own</em> names, as peers of these figures in our own right. If this seems conceited, it is only because continental philosophy has taught us that we could never measure up to those we study, but the very idea of this is absurd — every great philosopher started out as simply a person who liked philosophy. At the end of the day, pretending that dead French guys are still alive will not make us relevant. Confining ourselves to cultural criticism will not make us relevant. Turning our great powers of interpretation towards analytic philosophy will not make us relevant — they have their own problems. I am convinced that we can do philosophy without constant, painstaking recourse to a handful of Great Thinkers, and I am hopeful that many of us will. But when we do, the philosophy that we produce will not be “continental.” After all, no philosophy ever has been.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8b1a3f4a254a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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