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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sports Finance Clinic on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sports Finance Clinic on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sports Finance Clinic on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Manchester City’s Appeal: The Final Whistle Hasn’t Blown]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/manchester-citys-appeal-the-final-whistle-hasn-t-blown-6281c64a166b?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:16:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T13:16:46.247Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Full-time? Not quite</strong></p><p>The referee has blown for full-time. The players are heading down the tunnel. Then someone announces that VAR is still checking the incident.</p><p>Manchester City’s financial case has reached something resembling that moment, except the review involves accountants, lawyers and approximately 7,000 pages of hearing transcripts. Even Howard Webb might ask for a tea break.</p><p>In September, an independent Premier League commission found serious financial breaches across nine seasons. City appealed in October. The findings are significant. They are not the end of the process.</p><p><strong>The dispute</strong></p><p>The commission found that City used sham commercial arrangements to inflate revenue, understate costs and conceal its true financial position. It concluded that the club breached Premier League and UEFA spending limits. Most allegations concerning failure to cooperate with the investigation were also upheld.</p><p>City rejects those conclusions. Its public statement says the decision contains material errors of law, principle and fact, and maintains that evidence supports its innocence.</p><p>That’s the dispute. Not whether City won trophies, or whether its football was brilliant. Whether the commission’s findings can withstand legal scrutiny.</p><p>Importantly, the detailed grounds of appeal are not public. Anyone confidently explaining precisely how the appeal will unfold is getting ahead of the evidence.</p><p><strong>The VAR problem</strong></p><p>Football VAR asks whether an on-field decision should be changed. This appeal is considerably more substantial.</p><p>Under the Premier League’s disciplinary rules, a three-member independent Appeal Board can dismiss the challenge, allow it or vary the commission’s decision. It is not a supporters’ phone-in where the loudest caller gets the final word.</p><p>Nor is an appeal automatically a complete retrial. The board must examine the decision through the applicable appeal rules, including the treatment of evidence and alleged errors.</p><p>Due process matters. Even where findings are severe, the accused club must have a meaningful opportunity to challenge them. Otherwise, football governance becomes punishment by announcement.</p><p><strong>Consequences</strong></p><p>There is another complication: the commission’s published findings concern liability, not punishment. Sanctions are being dealt with separately.</p><p>The rules permit a range of penalties, including fines and sporting sanctions. But a possible penalty is not an imposed penalty. Relegation, stripped titles and compensation claims make dramatic headlines; none should be reported as a settled consequence of this appeal.</p><p>If the findings survive, the league faces the difficult task of demonstrating proportionate, credible enforcement. If they are overturned or changed, the reasons will matter just as much.</p><p>Either way, other clubs will be watching. Financial regulation means little if nobody understands how it is applied.</p><p><strong>Who referees the referees?</strong></p><p>The Premier League investigates alleged breaches, but independent judicial bodies decide disciplinary cases and appeals. That separation is essential.</p><p>So is transparency. Hearings are confidential, and the published core decision is redacted. Confidentiality can protect evidence and procedural fairness. Yet it also leaves supporters trying to understand a case that has occupied football for years.</p><p>The original hearing lasted 42 days. Its transcripts ran to roughly 7,000 pages. That helps explain why this isn’t something to resolve between the Saturday lunchtime kick-off and Match of the Day.</p><p>Still, a system can be both thorough and accountable. Independence should be demonstrable, not merely asserted.</p><p><strong>Final whistle</strong></p><p>This trilogy began with football’s financial arrangements and moved to the rules governing competitive advantage. The appeal brings us to the question underneath both: can the game enforce those rules fairly?</p><p>City deserves a properly considered appeal. The Premier League deserves a process capable of enforcing its regulations. Rival clubs and supporters deserve clarity about what has actually been established.</p><p>A credible outcome requires evidence, consistency and reasons, not whichever result generates the loudest celebrations.</p><p>Football can live with a controversial refereeing decision. A financial rulebook that nobody trusts is a much bigger problem.</p><p>And unlike VAR, there isn’t another referee waiting behind the screen.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6281c64a166b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Manchester City: Are Football’s Financial Rules Fit for Purpose?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/manchester-city-are-footballs-financial-rules-fit-for-purpose-2611cdf2577c?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2611cdf2577c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-fair-play]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:32:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T14:32:50.897Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>From Billy Meredith to modern Financial Fair Play, football has spent over a century arguing about money. The real question? Who gets to win because of it?</em></p><h3>Manchester City: we’ve been here before</h3><p>Manchester City and financial irregularities. Familiar headline. Except this particular story begins in 1905.</p><p>A year earlier, Billy Meredith had scored the winner in City’s first FA Cup triumph. Then came allegations that he’d offered Aston Villa’s Alex Leake £10 to throw a match. The subsequent fallout exposed something else: City had been paying players beyond football’s £4-a-week maximum wage.</p><p>The FA investigated, and by 1906, 17 City players had been sanctioned. Several subsequently joined Manchester United, including Meredith, who helped United win their first league title in 1908.</p><p>Imagine Haaland getting caught up in a financial scandal, leaving for Old Trafford and helping United win the league.</p><p>Manchester would be unbearable.</p><p>But the lesson is serious: financial breaches, player recruitment and sporting consequences have been connected for over a century.</p><h3>From Meredith to Eastham: who controls the talent?</h3><p>Meredith also campaigned against the maximum wage, eventually abolished in 1961. Two years later, George Eastham won his landmark legal challenge against football’s retain-and-transfer system, which had allowed clubs to restrict players’ movements after their contracts expired.</p><p>Football was gradually loosening its grip on players. Clubs could compete more freely for talent, provided they could afford it.</p><p>And therein lies the problem. Who decides what a club can afford?</p><h3>When spending bought trophies</h3><p>In 1979, Brian Clough’s Nottingham Forest spent £1 million on Trevor Francis. Months later, Francis headed home the European Cup winner.</p><p>Not a bad return on investment.</p><p>Then came Jack Walker’s Blackburn. Investment brought Alan Shearer, Chris Sutton and the 1995 Premier League title.</p><p>The formula was straightforward: money attracted talent, talent produced results, and results delivered trophies.</p><p>Could another Blackburn emerge today? Imagine telling Jack Walker he could challenge Manchester United, provided Blackburn already generated Manchester United’s commercial revenue.</p><p>Good luck with that.</p><h3>When transfers became an accounting problem</h3><p>Transfer windows arrived in 2002/03 to regulate player movement, not balance the books. Two decades later, clubs weren’t simply racing to sign players before deadlines; they were racing against financial reporting dates.</p><p>Consider Nottingham Forest selling Brennan Johnson to Tottenham for £47.5 million in September 2023.</p><p>Forest secured substantial proceeds from an academy graduate. Unfortunately, the sale came after the reporting period relevant to their 2022/23 financial assessment. Forest subsequently received a four-point deduction.</p><p>Here’s the accounting. Purchased players’ transfer fees are generally capitalised and amortised across their contracts. Selling players generates accounting profits after deducting their remaining book values. Academy graduates can therefore be particularly valuable.</p><p>But September’s profit cannot simply be inserted into June’s accounts.</p><p>Spurs got their winger. Forest got their money. The Premier League got four points.</p><p>Apparently, timing your run is no longer enough. You must also time your transfer.</p><h3>Portsmouth: why regulation matters</h3><p>Portsmouth won the FA Cup in 2008. By 2010, they were in administration.</p><p>The football equivalent of winning the lottery, buying a Ferrari and discovering you can’t afford the petrol.</p><p>Their collapse demonstrated why financial regulation matters. Sporting ambition cannot come at the expense of a club’s survival.</p><p>But preventing financial recklessness and preventing legitimate investment aren’t necessarily the same thing.</p><h3>Manchester City: history repeating itself?</h3><p>Fast-forward to September 2026. An independent commission found City guilty of serious financial breaches covering nine seasons, including sham commercial arrangements that inflated revenues and reduced reported costs.</p><p>City has appealed, maintains its innocence and disputes the findings.</p><p>Now, why would a club misrepresent sponsorship income or expenditure?</p><p>Not because its accountants fancied prettier spreadsheets.</p><p><strong>Because financial reporting influences how much clubs can spend assembling winning football teams.</strong></p><p>Players cost money. Managers cost money. Winning trophies generally requires both, preferably with a functioning defence.</p><p>If financial arrangements disguise a club’s true spending capacity, they potentially allow it to recruit or retain talent beyond what the rules permit.</p><p>City won Premier League titles during the period examined. That doesn’t establish that particular trophies resulted from breaches. But it explains why the consequences extend beyond accounting.</p><p><strong>The question isn’t simply whether the books were wrong. It’s whether the sporting competition was affected.</strong></p><h3>Final whistle: who are the rules protecting?</h3><p>The Premier League has replaced PSR with Squad Cost Ratio regulations, generally limiting squad expenditure to 85% of relevant revenue and player-sale results, with additional controlled headroom.</p><p>The intention is sustainability without unnecessarily restricting investment. Yet revenue-linked spending limits can still favour established clubs whose previous success generates enormous commercial income.</p><p>Football needs financial discipline, accurate reporting and credible enforcement. But it also needs opportunities for ambitious challengers.</p><p>From Meredith to modern Manchester City, the same tension persists: money buys talent, talent can deliver trophies, and regulation determines the conditions of competition.</p><p>Otherwise, football’s most effective defensive formation might not be a low block.</p><p><strong>It might be a very large commercial revenue base.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2611cdf2577c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Manchester City: Follow the Money, Not Just the Charges]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/manchester-city-follow-the-money-not-just-the-charges-d47f3bc70a92?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d47f3bc70a92</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-fair-play]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[manchester-city]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 10:12:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-09T10:12:04.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For years, Manchester City’s financial charges have been football’s longest-running fixture. Supporters demanded relegation, rival fans demanded trophies back, and everyone suddenly became an expert in Financial Fair Play. VAR controversies have come and gone, but this particular review has taken several seasons.</p><p>The Premier League’s independent commission has now found City guilty of serious financial-rule breaches spanning 2009/10 to 2017/18. Its findings concern disguised owner funding, misstated accounts and concealed expenditure. City denies wrongdoing and has appealed. Sanctions remain unresolved.</p><p>But beyond the points-deduction sweepstakes lies a more interesting question: <strong>how did the financial arrangements actually work?</strong></p><p><strong>Sponsorship: following the money</strong></p><p>Sponsorship is relatively straightforward. A company pays a club for commercial exposure, the club recognises revenue, and both parties presumably enjoy seeing their logos plastered across the stadium.</p><p>The commission found City’s arrangements considerably less straightforward.</p><p>Approximately £950 million was recorded as commercial income from Abu Dhabi-based sponsors between 2009 and 2018. According to the findings, the sponsors themselves contributed around £119 million, while approximately £831 million originated from the club’s owner, Abu Dhabi United Group.</p><p>And here comes the accounting distinction that matters more than another tactical debate on Sky Sports.</p><p>Genuine sponsorship is operating revenue. Owner capital contributions are not automatically commercial income, regardless of how creatively the paperwork is arranged. Presenting owner funding as sponsorship can make a club’s commercial performance look considerably healthier than the underlying transactions justify.</p><p>It’s rather like claiming you’ve developed a world-class academy when the owner has quietly purchased the entire starting eleven.</p><p><strong>Accounting: the real midfield battle</strong></p><p>The commission also identified arrangements that understated operating expenditure, alongside the Fordham image-rights structure, which it found disguised additional owner funding. These aren’t merely technical footnotes for accountants who enjoy ruining dinner parties.</p><p>Profitability depends on recognising the right revenue, recording the right expenses and ensuring financial statements reflect the economic substance of transactions. Overstate qualifying revenue, understate costs, and suddenly the financial scoreline looks rather different. The commission concluded that City’s accounts failed to present a true and fair view of their financial position.</p><p>And the auditors? An audit provides reasonable assurance, not a guarantee against concealed arrangements. The commission found that relevant information was withheld from auditors and regulators. That raises fundamental questions about transparency without automatically proving auditor misconduct.</p><p>The point is simple: football’s financial rules rely on accounting information being accurate in the first place. A club can dominate possession on the spreadsheet while the underlying finances tell a very different story.</p><p><strong>From the balance sheet to the pitch</strong></p><p>Under the applicable Premier League and UEFA regulations, clubs faced restrictions on permissible losses. The commission concluded that accurate reporting would have exposed substantial breaches of those frameworks. And this is where accounting stops being an exercise in Excel and starts affecting the football.</p><p>If revenue is inflated or expenditure understated, a club may appear entitled to spend more than the rules actually permit. That potentially influences transfer budgets, wages and squad investment.</p><p>Other clubs, meanwhile, are trying to assemble competitive squads while keeping their financial books balanced. Hardly a level playing field if one side is effectively operating with a different set of goalposts.</p><p>None of this proves that any particular trophy was won because of an accounting entry. Even the most enthusiastic forensic accountant cannot trace a journal entry directly to a last-minute winner. But financial regulations exist partly to ensure that sporting competition isn’t distorted by spending that breaches agreed limits.</p><p>The wider question is whether football’s regulators can meaningfully scrutinise the commercial arrangements underpinning club finances, particularly when ownership, sponsorship and financial interests overlap.</p><p>City’s appeal will determine whether these findings stand. Whatever follows, the case illustrates why financial governance cannot simply involve checking whether the numbers add up.</p><p><strong>After all, there’s little point enforcing the financial rulebook if nobody can establish who’s actually paying for the team on the pitch.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d47f3bc70a92" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Do Fans Actually Want? (And Does Any of That Matter to the Money People?)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/what-do-fans-actually-want-and-does-any-of-that-matter-to-the-money-people-a9345aa20cac?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9345aa20cac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fans]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 12:47:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-06T12:47:39.954Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Deloitte Money League dropped again this week, and suddenly, half of football Twitter became financial analysts. Revenue tables, commercial growth, global brands, year-on-year increases. For a few days, it feels like the most important thing in football isn’t goals or trophies, but turnover.</p><p>Which raises a simple question: do fans actually care about any of this?</p><p>Ask most supporters what they want from their club, and you won’t hear much about sponsorship diversification or broadcast income streams. They talk about winning, obviously, but also about identity, culture, belonging, players they love, and the vague but powerful idea that their club should “feel like itself”. None of that fits neatly into a spreadsheet.</p><p>The Deloitte rankings, by contrast, are a celebration of scale. They measure who generates the most money across matchday, broadcasting, and commercial revenue. In business terms, they’re perfectly sensible. They tell investors, sponsors, and executives which clubs are commercially dominant and which ones are falling behind. But they tell fans very little about whether football is actually getting better.</p><p>This is where the disconnect sits. Financial reports are written in a language of growth, reach, and monetisation. Fans speak in a language of meaning, memory, and emotion. One side values global audiences; the other values local rituals. And yet, fans still engage with these reports, sharing them, arguing over them, and celebrating or panicking about their club’s position. Revenue becomes a proxy for relevance in a world where nobody wants to feel “small”.</p><p>This is where it gets slightly absurd. West Ham is currently ranked around 20th in the world by revenue. On paper, they are one of the biggest football institutions on the planet. Ask their fans how things feel, though, and the conversation looks very different. At the time of writing, they’re also hovering uncomfortably close to 20th in the Premier League table, which is not a ranking anyone celebrates. It’s a neat illustration of the problem: commercial success and sporting happiness are only loosely connected.</p><p>The bigger question is what happens if those worlds really collide. What does it mean to be a “top 20 global club” and then get relegated? Do you stay a brand? Do you lose sponsors? Do your revenue models survive the Championship? Financial metrics assume smooth growth. Football reality rarely behaves that politely.</p><p>From a business perspective, this creates a genuine dilemma. Clubs need revenue to survive. Wages and regulatory pressures push them towards commercial expansion. You can’t compete at the top without behaving like a global entertainment company.</p><p>But behaving like a global entertainment company often comes at the expense of what fans value most. Ticket prices rise. Kick-off times become inconvenient. Traditions are repackaged as content. Supporters are increasingly treated as consumers, even while being told they are the “heart of the club”.</p><p>This tension sits at the core of modern football governance. Financial frameworks reward growth and stability. Fan cultures reward authenticity and continuity. Clubs try to balance both, usually by insisting nothing fundamental has changed while everything quietly does.</p><p>The Deloitte Money League isn’t the villain here. It’s just the clearest illustration of how football now measures itself. Sponsors, broadcasters, and investors clearly benefit from these rankings. Boards use them to benchmark performance. Executives use them to justify strategy.</p><p>Fans, meanwhile, are left to interpret what revenue actually means for their experience of the game. More money doesn’t automatically mean better football. It often means better facilities, higher wages, and more expensive mistakes. The emotional payoff is far less guaranteed.</p><p>So, what do fans actually want? They want success, yes. But they also want to recognise their club when they watch it. They want to feel part of something that exists beyond quarterly results. They want football to mean something, not just earn something.</p><p>And what do the money people want? Growth, resilience, and global relevance.</p><p>Football now lives permanently between those two logics. The real challenge for the game isn’t how much money it makes, it’s whether the people who care most about it still recognise what that money is being made for.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9345aa20cac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why January Transfers Feel Broken (And Why Everyone’s Pretending They Aren’t)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/why-january-transfers-feel-broken-and-why-everyones-pretending-they-aren-t-4ea3d49b576b?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ea3d49b576b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transfers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 12:23:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-23T12:23:44.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>‘’Here we go’’, ‘’Deadline Day’’, ‘’Busy final week expected’’!!</p><p>Every January, football performs the same ritual. The rumours start early, the timelines fill up, and the phrase “busy final week expected” does the rounds. By deadline day, we’re told the market is alive and well. And yet, once the window shuts, managers line up to say the same thing they said at the start: <em>January is a very difficult window.</em></p><p>That contradiction is the story. If everyone serious inside the game treats January with caution, why does it get covered like a mini version of the summer? And more importantly, what does that tell us about how modern football actually works?</p><p>The January transfer window was never designed to be glamorous. Historically, it existed as a corrective mechanism. A way to deal with injuries, unexpected underperformance, or genuine emergencies halfway through a season. It was about repair, not reinvention. You fixed problems. You didn’t rebuild squads. Nobody planned “projects” around January.</p><p>Somewhere along the line, that changed not because football needed it to, but because football’s commercial ecosystem did. January became a content event. A quiet part of the calendar suddenly had a narrative arc: rumours, sagas, deadline-day drama. Scarcity was reframed as excitement. A lack of movement became proof that something <em>big</em> was coming.</p><p>Clubs, meanwhile, moved in the opposite direction. Ask any sporting director or head coach, and you’ll hear the same message: January is risky, expensive, and structurally awkward. Players who are good enough to improve you are rarely available. Selling clubs demand a premium. Replacements take time to settle. And all of this happens while results matter more than at any other point in the season.</p><p>The financial logic explains the caution. January sits in the middle of the accounting year, when cash flow matters, regulatory limits loom, and mistakes are hardest to hide. Financial sustainability rules have tightened behaviour. Wage-to-revenue ratios are monitored more closely. Amortisation schedules don’t care about urgency. Buying in January often means overpaying for short-term insurance and hoping the cost doesn’t haunt you twelve months later.</p><p>This is why loans dominate the window. They’re not clever squad-building tools; they’re risk deferral mechanisms. Obligations to buy quietly push spending into future periods. Deals are structured to survive audits rather than excite fans. From a distance, it looks like inactivity. From inside clubs, it looks like restraint bordering on fear.</p><p>What’s most telling isn’t what happens in January, but what doesn’t. Truly transformational signings are rare. The famous examples everyone remembers are exceptions that prove the rule, and plenty of them came with inflated fees or long-term consequences that only became obvious later. January doesn’t reward boldness; it punishes miscalculation.</p><p>And yet the window persists, unchanged, because too many interests rely on it staying exactly as it is. Broadcasters need narrative. Media outlets need momentum. Agents need leverage. Fans expect action, even when their own managers publicly admit it’s the wrong time to act. Standing still feels negligent, even when it’s the most rational choice.</p><p>This is where governance quietly enters the picture. Financial regulation pushes clubs towards caution, but the calendar itself incentivises short-term behaviour. The system creates pressure, then expresses surprise when clubs respond defensively. January encourages exactly the kind of decision-making regulators claim to want less of: reactive, compressed, and financially inefficient.</p><p>Which brings us back to the wider themes of this series. Managers get sacked because results and expectations collide. Owners pursue objectives that aren’t always about winning. January is when those tensions become visible. It exposes who has room to and who doesn’t, and who is simply trying to get through the season without making things worse.</p><p>The truth is that January isn’t broken because it fails. It’s broken because it’s pretending to be something it was never meant to be. It survives as theatre, not strategy. A stress test disguised as opportunity.</p><p>Everyone inside the game knows this. Everyone outside is sold the illusion anyway. And until football stops mistaking activity for progress, January will continue to feel exactly like this, anxious, cautious, and strangely familiar. This only increases the anticipation and excitement around the commercial and strategic aspects of the sport.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ea3d49b576b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Owners Actually Want From Football Clubs (It’s Not Always Winning)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/what-owners-actually-want-from-football-clubs-its-not-always-winning-b40b85abe9c9?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b40b85abe9c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ownership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jan 2026 15:25:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-16T15:25:29.919Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If last week’s flurry of managerial sackings told us anything, it’s that football still loves a quick fix. Lose a few games, fall short of expectations, and suddenly the “long-term project” has a very short shelf life. But the deeper question isn’t why managers are being sacked so quickly. It’s why clubs seem so certain they’ve failed even when the league table doesn’t look disastrous. The answer, more often than not, sits in the owner’s office rather than the dugout.</p><p>Football still clings to the comforting idea that every owner wants the same thing: to win. Titles, trophies, glory. In reality, modern ownership has diversified far beyond that simple objective. The sport now houses state-backed entities, private equity-style investors, ultra-wealthy individuals, and legacy owners with emotional ties to their clubs. They all own football teams, but they are not playing the same game.</p><p>This is where confusion and sackings begin. Owner objectives are rarely stated explicitly, but they quietly shape every major decision. For some, success is about long-term global positioning and brand dominance. For others, it’s asset growth, commercial scalability, and controlling costs in a volatile industry. Some owners tolerate losses as the price of visibility. Others want football clubs to behave more like disciplined businesses, even if that limits ambition on the pitch.</p><p>Even ownership models that look identical on paper can operate very differently. State-backed clubs, often lumped together in public debate, pursue distinct and sometimes competing objectives. One may prioritise regulatory resilience and global commercial partnerships. Another may value political optics or regional development. Another may be driven by European legitimacy rather than domestic dominance. The money may look similar; the patience rarely is.</p><p>This matters because managers are hired into these environments with vague promises of alignment. They are asked to deliver results, develop talent, stabilise culture, protect brand value, and satisfy fans often simultaneously. When those demands pull in different directions, the manager becomes the buffer between competing interests. If results wobble, it’s easier to remove the buffer than confront the misalignment above it.</p><p>From a financial perspective, this explains why sackings have become normalised rather than regrettable. Paying off a manager is now treated as an operating cost, not a governance failure. Clubs budget for compensation, write it off, and move on. The logic is simple: changing the manager feels cheaper and quicker than changing strategy, recruitment structures, or ownership expectations. Whether it actually is cheaper in the long run is another matter entirely.</p><p>This also helps explain why regulation struggles to keep up. Financial rules are built on assumptions of shared incentives: competitive balance, sustainability, sporting ambition. But those assumptions don’t always hold. When one owner values global exposure over trophies, or stability over risk, regulatory frameworks that treat all clubs as motivated by the same outcomes start to creak. Governance becomes reactive rather than preventative.</p><p>Managers, in this environment, are judged against metrics that are rarely public. A run of draws might be acceptable for one ownership group and unacceptable for another. Youth development may be praised until it interferes with short-term objectives. The sackings we see are not always evidence of managerial incompetence. Sometimes they are the moment when hidden expectations become impossible to ignore.</p><p>This brings us neatly back to last week’s discussion. The early-2026 sackings weren’t just about footballing failure. They were business decisions taken under pressure, shaped by owner objectives that don’t always align with fan narratives or media assumptions. Managers are removed not because they’ve lost control of the dressing room, but because they no longer fit the commercial or strategic moment.</p><p>Football will continue to talk about ambition, identity, and vision. But until clubs are more honest about what owners actually want and how that shapes decision-making, the cycle will continue. Sackings will pile up, explanations will sound familiar, and the real drivers will remain politely unspoken.</p><p>Winning still matters. It just isn’t always the point, and that only makes the commercial side of football more interesting.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b40b85abe9c9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Managers Are Already Getting Sacked in 2026 (And Why It’s Rarely Just About Results)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/why-managers-are-already-getting-sacked-in-2026-and-why-its-rarely-just-about-results-31d2c21e8d62?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31d2c21e8d62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 12:05:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-09T12:05:12.612Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nine days into 2026, and football has already done what football does best: panic early and sack quickly. Celtic, Manchester United, Chelsea, West Brom, different leagues, different pressures, same outcome. A statement about “standards”, a thank-you paragraph, and a promise that the club will now be “moving forward”. The speed of it all tells us something important. This isn’t about form alone. It’s about alignment, or more accurately, the lack of it. This is against the backdrop of broader dismissals across English football during the ongoing 2025/2026 season.</p><p>We still pretend managerial sackings are simple performance calls. Win games, keep job. Lose games, pack your office plants. But modern football doesn’t work like that anymore. Managers are increasingly being judged against owner expectations that are often vague, conflicting, or quietly financial. When those expectations aren’t met or weren’t aligned in the first place, the manager is usually the easiest cost to write off.</p><p>Let’s take the elite end first. At clubs with global reach and high commercial exposure, the manager is now a reputational asset as much as a sporting one. Poor performances don’t just mean fewer points; they mean lost broadcast narratives, falling sponsor confidence, and a fanbase that starts asking awkward questions online. Analysts across sports business media have repeatedly noted that big clubs operate on rolling commercial targets, not just league position. When results threaten the “brand”, patience evaporates.</p><p>But this isn’t only a top-six, EPL or even high-end Champions League issue. Clubs further down the pyramid face a different, more brutal version of the same problem. Survival, promotion, or even mid-table stability can be the difference between meeting financial forecasts or missing them entirely. Relegation clauses, bonus structures, wage-to-revenue ratios, these are financial tripwires. When a board looks at the numbers and sees risk approaching, the manager becomes a lever they can pull quickly, even if the underlying issues are structural.</p><p>This is where the misalignment really shows. Many managers are hired on the promise of “long-term projects”, youth development, or cultural resets. But the club’s financial reality often doesn’t support that timeline. Short contracts, tight margins, and pressure from lenders or investors mean the long term rarely survives a bad quarter. In that sense, managers aren’t just being exposed; they’re being set up.</p><p>At the same time, managers are increasingly exposing clubs. High turnover behind the scenes, poor recruitment planning, bloated squads, and conflicting decision-makers all surface once a manager starts losing. When you hear phrases like “lack of identity” or “no clear direction”, that’s often code for governance failures above the dugout. The manager just happens to be standing closest to the touchline when it all becomes visible.</p><p>The financial cost of this churn is rarely discussed properly. Paying off contracts has become normalised. Sacking a manager six months into a three-year deal is treated as operational expenditure, not failure. Add in the cost of hiring replacements, backroom staff changes, compensation to former clubs, and the inefficiency of restarting tactical plans mid-season, and the numbers quietly add up. Football absorbs these costs because it has learned to, not because it should.</p><p>This is why analysts consistently argue that managerial turnover is a financial strategy as much as a sporting one. Clubs gamble that short-term disruption is cheaper than long-term decline. Sometimes they’re right. Often, they’re just delaying deeper problems. So what does early 2026 really tell us? That managerial sackings are no longer about trust or patience. They’re about risk management. About whether a manager fits not just the squad, but the owner’s financial model, the club’s commercial ambitions, and the story it wants to sell. When those things don’t align, the clock starts ticking, usually before the first training session.</p><p>Football will keep calling these decisions “footballing”. In reality, they’re business calls dressed up in tracksuits. And if the first week of 2026 is anything to go by, it’s going to be another long year for anyone brave enough to believe in a project. This, of course, means the commercial side of our beautiful game only gets more interesting.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31d2c21e8d62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What 2025 Is Already Telling Us About Football Governance (And Why It’s Only Getting Messier)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/what-2025-is-already-telling-us-about-football-governance-and-why-its-only-getting-messier-93bc42360efe?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93bc42360efe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 14:23:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-23T14:23:24.490Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you’ve been keeping up with <em>Sports Finance Clinic</em> lately, you’ll have noticed a running theme: football governance isn’t “under pressure” so much as it is being gently lowered into a legal wood chipper. We’ve had the APT fallout, the never-ending Manchester City vs Premier League saga, sponsorship wobbling like a shopping trolley with one dodgy wheel, and the general background hum of sportswashing debates. Individually, each story is “a situation”. Together, they’re a diagnosis.</p><p>Let’s start with the most 2025 development imaginable: the APT drama ending not with a grand moral victory, but with a settlement and a statement saying everyone will now stop talking about it. In September 2025, the Premier League confirmed it had settled its dispute with Manchester City over the Associated Party Transaction rules, and City accepted that the rules are valid and binding going forward. It’s a very modern kind of governance outcome: the framework survives, the lawyers get paid, the public gets a polite press release, and the wider question remains who really has the power to define “fair” in a league where some clubs have effectively limitless commercial firepower?</p><p>Which takes us neatly to the elephant in the boardroom: the City case itself. Even in late 2025, the sense around the league isn’t just that it’s complicated, it’s that it’s become a test of whether football can meaningfully regulate the most resourced participants without collapsing under the weight of its own process. The Guardian has reported on the long-running and expensive nature of this legal battle, as well as its exposure of a governance structure that was never designed for prolonged legal warfare against a club that can afford to fight on every front. Whatever the eventual outcome, the damage is already done to the league’s “we’re in control here” brand. English football has effectively live-streamed a power struggle in slow motion.</p><p>And then there’s the regulator, the thing that was supposed to bring order to the chaos, like a sensible adult arriving at a house party. In 2025, that adult actually turned up. The Football Governance Act 2025 is now law, establishing the Independent Football Regulator and a licensing-style regime for clubs. Legal commentary has noted the IFR’s formal establishment and the start of its work in earnest during 2025. But here’s the tricky bit: when you introduce a new regulator into a system that already has the Premier League, the FA, UEFA, and various internal rulebooks, you don’t instantly get clarity. You get overlap, politics, and the inevitable “who exactly has the final say here?” arguments. Regulation can stabilise a market, but only once everyone stops trying to out-lawyer each other into exemptions.</p><p>Meanwhile, commercial pressure is quietly tightening the screws. Sponsorship is a perfect example of governance meeting reality and blinking first. The Premier League’s voluntary front-of-shirt gambling sponsor ban (from 2026/27) was meant to look proactive. Still, clubs are already scrambling in anticipation, because that money doesn’t replace itself with “community values” and a heartfelt Instagram reel. And if the holes aren’t filled by mainstream brands, football has a habit of finding alternatives in… let’s call them “less scrutinised” markets. That’s not just a commercial story; it’s a governance story, because it raises the uncomfortable question of whether clubs are being pushed towards higher-risk partners by financial necessity rather than commercial strategy.</p><p>Layer on sportswashing and reputational risk, and the picture gets even messier. The reality is that some of the biggest, most stable sponsorship and ownership money in modern football comes wrapped in political controversy. Brands and leagues talk about values, but values rarely win bidding wars. Governance, at this point, is often less about setting standards and more about managing the fallout when the standards collide with the business model.</p><p>So what is 2025 telling us, really? That football governance is no longer a quiet back-office function. It’s the main event. It’s a legal conflict dressed up as competition policy. It’s regulatory confusion baked into a system that grew faster than its rules. It’s commercial pressure forcing clubs to chase whatever revenue is still socially permissible this week. And it’s power struggles not just between clubs and leagues, but between football and the broader political and legal world it can’t ignore anymore.</p><p>As we stumble towards Christmas, this all feels very on-brand for the modern game: the football is brilliant, the finances are frantic, and the governance is a constant reminder that English football is trying to run a global entertainment empire using rules that were basically designed for a slightly intense local business association. The mince pies are out, the fixtures are relentless, and somewhere in the background, a lawyer is opening a fresh Word document. See you in 2026 when it will, inevitably, be even messier.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93bc42360efe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Football Sponsorship is Broken]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/football-sponsorship-is-broken-32ba1620f685?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32ba1620f685</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sportsfinance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:58:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-15T13:58:43.377Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you’ve been following this little clinic on football’s finances, you’ll know the game is already being held together with rollover loans and vibes. Governance is a mess, clubs are addicted to sugar-rush money, and regulators arrive about five years after the party with a clipboard (here’s a shout-out to our new independent regulator). Sponsorship, allegedly the sensible commercial bit, was supposed to be different. It isn’t. It’s broken.</p><p>Start with gambling. The Premier League has finally agreed to ban front-of-shirt betting sponsors from 2026–27, a “voluntary” move announced in 2023, complete with careful wording about how sleeves, training gear and LED boards will still be wide open for the industry. For years, bookmakers were paying a premium to be on the front of shirts; estimates suggest gambling firms have typically coughed up around 40% more than non-gambling brands, with some clubs facing a hit of up to 20% of their commercial revenue when those deals disappear.</p><p>So, do we get a cleaner game? Not quite. According to recent reporting, some clubs are now quietly partnering with “Asian-facing” betting companies that don’t even take bets in sterling and are geo-blocked in the UK. Ownership is opaque, some are linked to criminal activity, and yet their logos still appear on sleeves and around the pitch, tucked just out of reach of the shirt-front ban. Football’s relationship with gambling is like a toxic breakup: officially over, still texting.</p><p><strong>Oh, and there is…… Crypto</strong></p><p>Enter crypto, stage right, carrying a blockchain and a PowerPoint. The crypto bubble gave clubs a shiny new sponsor category: fan tokens, exchanges, NFT nonsense and “engagement platforms” nobody asked for. Then 2022 happened, crashes, bankruptcies, FTX disintegrating and taking big US sports deals with it. New partnerships slumped, fans were left holding illiquid tokens, and half the CEOs involved vanished into “stealth mode” (also known as “where’s the money gone?”).</p><p>Now, the sector is rebounding. Football still grabs the largest share of crypto and digital asset sponsorships, roughly 40-plus per cent of all such deals in 2024/25, with spending jumping again year on year. But the basic problem hasn’t changed: clubs are taking payment in a highly volatile industry that fans neither fully trust nor understand. When the market is up, it looks clever. When it isn’t, you’ve sold your shirt to an asset class that can lose 60% of its value while the left-back is still in the warm-up.</p><p>Meanwhile, the old-school consumer brands, your FMCG giants, banks, and airlines are suddenly nervous. Aligning with football now means navigating human-rights rows, ownership controversies and accusations of sportswashing. Reports across sports show Western brands being squeezed out by state-linked or politically sensitive sponsors from authoritarian regimes, happy to spend big to soften their image. For a risk-averse marketing director, that’s a nightmare: one minute you’re doing a wholesome “win a signed shirt” promo, the next you’re trending because your logo is next to a corruption investigation.</p><p>Clubs, for their part, are desperate. A government-commissioned review of football’s finances described the game as still “ill” and structurally unsustainable, even before you throw in rising wages and transfer inflation. Commercial directors know the sponsorship money has to be found somewhere. As has been argued by Kieran Maguire, amongst others, when your business model is half vanity project, half financial black hole, you don’t get to be fussy about the logo; you just need the direct debit to clear.</p><p>This is how we end up with a sponsorship ecosystem that makes nobody truly happy. Fans don’t trust the brands (gambling, crypto, random overseas betting firms they can’t even Google properly). Brands don’t trust the clubs (governance issues, owners with reputational challenges). And clubs don’t trust regulators (who might decide in three years that the thing keeping you solvent is now “problematic”). Everyone is looking over their shoulder, and the shirts change more often than the managers.</p><p>Is there a way out? In theory: yes. More local sponsors, more purpose-driven partnerships, caps on risky categories, maybe even a regulator that joins the conversation before the crisis instead of after it. But that requires time, stability and long-term planning, three things modern football treats as optional extras.</p><p>Until then, we’re stuck in this awkward limbo: gambling on the sleeves, crypto on the hoardings, state-linked logos on the third kit inspired by the city (ha way the lads?). The game loves to tell us that football is nothing without fans. Looking at the sponsorship landscape, it feels more accurate to say: football is nothing without whoever is still willing to wire the money and hope nobody reads the small print. However, football finance remains an interesting and evolving landscape.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32ba1620f685" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sportswashing FC: Football’s New Power Game and Why It Isn’t Going Away]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sfclinicc/sportswashing-fc-footballs-new-power-game-and-why-it-isn-t-going-away-1f35c9d36841?source=rss-fefb816bfbe9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1f35c9d36841</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fifa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uefa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sports Finance Clinic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 13:40:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-05T13:40:02.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Football has always been a magnet for wealthy owners, but the modern era has taken that tradition, put it on steroids, and handed it to governments with geopolitical strategies. What used to be a sport run by eccentric millionaires is now a strategic soft-power tool for state actors, designed to manage reputations, influence economies, and shape global narratives. Football hasn’t just become business; it has become nation branding with VAR.</p><p>To understand how we got here, it helps to look back at the moment money in football changed from “rich guy hobby” to “global PR project”: the Abu Dhabi takeover of Manchester City in 2008. The Financial Times describes it as “a template for the modern fusion of sport, politics, and economic strategy”, where winning trophies was only part of the plan. The City model didn’t simply buy football success; it re-engineered the sport’s business architecture, media presence, and global identity. And it worked.</p><p>Since then, the industry has invited a wave of states that don’t just want football clubs; they want influence, credibility, and strategic leverage, wrapped in a club scarf and broadcast worldwide.</p><p><strong>Different Countries, Different Objectives</strong></p><p>Sportswashing is often treated as one big conspiracy, but it’s more accurate to say that different countries are using football for different economic and political purposes.</p><p>Qatar, according to SportBusiness and The Economist, set out to legitimise its global reputation, defend against criticism, and project itself as modern and progressive. Paris Saint-Germain became a glossy billboard, backed by superstar advertising campaigns (occasionally disguised as football matches). Hosting the World Cup, meanwhile, wasn’t just a sport; it was a $220 billion geopolitical rebrand. Qatar wasn’t trying to fix Ligue 1; it was trying to fix its international image.</p><p>Abu Dhabi, via Manchester City, had a different priority. The Athletic describes its strategy as “economic positioning rather than reputational repair.” The UAE wanted to be seen as an innovation hub, a destination for finance, tech, and tourism. City became a vehicle to project that story, supported by urban redevelopment, corporate partnerships, and the City Football Group model, football’s first multinational.</p><p>Saudi Arabia, through Newcastle and the Saudi Pro League, is pursuing something far more ambitious. Bloomberg frames it bluntly: “Saudi Arabia is using sport to accelerate economic transformation under Vision 2030.” The aim isn’t simply recognition; it’s diversification, tourism, jobs, and social change. Signing superstars isn’t PR; it’s economic infrastructure, with football as the shop window.</p><p>Same tool, different goals.</p><p><strong>The Premier League’s Awkward Relationship</strong></p><p>This puts the Premier League in a slightly hilarious, slightly tragic position. On one hand, state-backed investment has turbocharged global growth. On the other hand, it has wrecked any sense of competitive balance and triggered constant political, regulatory, and moral headaches.</p><p>The FT summed it up perfectly:<br> “The league is financially dependent on the very forces it is attempting to regulate.”</p><p>This is why attempts to control ownership, spending, or sponsorship often look like half-hearted refereeing. The league can’t clamp down too hard without hurting its global appeal. But if it doesn’t act, it risks becoming a geopolitical playground with transfer windows.</p><p><strong>Fans: The Biggest Contradiction of All</strong></p><p>Fans are often portrayed as moral guardians, but they mostly want good footballers and a trophy parade. According to polling reported by The Athletic, Newcastle fans overwhelmingly supported the Saudi takeover, not because they endorsed geopolitics, but because they were tired of mediocrity.</p><p>Football fans care deeply about ethics until someone offers them a midfielder who can pass forward.</p><p><strong>What Comes Next?</strong></p><p>Sportswashing isn’t a temporary glitch; it’s a structural feature of modern football finance. State actors have the money, patience, and geopolitical motivations to keep going. Clubs and leagues need capital. Broadcasters want drama. Fans want success.</p><p>No one has an incentive to stop.</p><p>The real question isn’t whether sportswashing is good or bad. It’s whether football is prepared for the consequences of becoming a political marketplace disguised as entertainment.</p><p>Either way, football finance just got interesting again, at least to me, and now hopefully to you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f35c9d36841" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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