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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Muhammad Sheikh on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Muhammad Sheikh on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Muhammad Sheikh on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:30:38 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Delusions, Israel’s Precision]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03/irans-delusions-israel-s-precision-a3f43bffbee5?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3f43bffbee5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Sheikh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 01:12:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-07T01:13:45.797Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Iran-backed Hamas launched “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” on October 7th, 2023, with the aim of crippling Israel. Since that time, all of Iran’s proxies have been heavily degraded, and so has Iran itself. It’s almost as if that flood came to haunt Iran. The very waters meant to drown Israel have receded to reveal Iran’s own vulnerabilities — a government standing naked before enemies it can no longer deter, with allies it can no longer protect. The flood didn’t destroy Israel, not at all, but instead washed away the illusions that sustained Iran’s regional strategy for decades. Now, as the waters recede, the region must reckon not just with Iran’s vulnerabilities, but with the precedent Israel has set.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4395FRJFF34DlvHEOwaEpw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Funeral for assassinated military generals (Source: NYT/Arash Khamooshi)</figcaption></figure><p>Iranian leadership has consistently been imperceptive of Israeli attack, downplaying the possibility of them harming Iran in any way. They have been fooling themselves with rhetorical shields and geographic distance, mistaking miles for immunity, and confusing proxy depth for actual deterrence. As if modern precision munitions care about borders or rhetoric.</p><p>The reality is that Iran’s current military architecture stands no chance against Israel. It’s difficult to compare 1970s-era F-4s and F-14s — maintained through smuggled parts and domestic reverse-engineering — to Israel’s F-35Is equipped with advanced electronic warfare suites and sensor fusion capabilities. Iran’s indigenously produced Bavar-373 missile defense systems, essentially reverse-engineered 1980s Russian S-300 technology with domestically sourced components of very questionable reliability, cannot track fifth-generation stealth aircraft (as shown in the last few weeks). This, and other systems that Iran showcased as “game-changers,” failed to detect Israeli aircraft operating over Isfahan, Natanz, and even Tehran itself. What does it say about Iran’s air defense when enemy aircraft can loiter over the capital for hours?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vqqMRQwnbnXq7DAaN1Z0Xg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Israel deployed precision attack systems throughout Iran to destroy their air defense systems in the early stages of Operation Rising Lion</figcaption></figure><p>Critical reasoning here is required. Israel and Iran traded blows last year — but it’s clear Iran did not listen to Israel’s messaging. The April 2024 exchange should have served as Iran’s wake-up call. Following Iran’s missile barrage of 300 projectiles (of which 80–90% were intercepted), Israel responded with surgical precision that spoke volumes — but not to Iran, for whatever reason. A few days later, Israel delivered limited airstrikes which destroyed a critical S-300PMU2 radar site protecting Isfahan. Yes, Isfahan — home to Iran’s uranium conversion facility, several military research centers, and the Natanz enrichment complex nearby. Israel needed only to launch three missiles to achieve their target. Three missiles to blind Iran’s most sophisticated air defense system protecting its most sensitive sites.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AviqC--oki3esK4eNtkgig.png" /><figcaption>Israel successfully struck an S-300 radar system in April 2024 as retaliation for Iran’s missile/drone strikes (Source: AP/Planet Labs).</figcaption></figure><p>The message couldn’t have been clearer: we can reach you anywhere, anytime, and your best defenses are meaningless. And unlike you, we don’t need to launch hundreds of projectiles for some to hit ground. And yet, Iranian leadership dismissed this as a “toy drone attack.” This is pure delusion — and it’s what led to what was witnessed in June 2025.</p><p>Iran’s leaders seemed to genuinely believe their own propaganda about Israeli vulnerability, about American reluctance to support another Middle Eastern conflict, about their network of proxies providing unbreachable strategic depth. In fact, according to the WSJ, Iranian leadership did not believe that Israel would attack, because a round of negotiations were to be held on a Saturday (Israel attacked on a Friday). As such, top military commanders were sleeping in their residential homes — not in safe houses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K3se-LR-9in4PQ1hGv7Wxw.avif" /><figcaption>Direct hit on a residential apartment in Tehran, presumably targeting a military commander or nuclear scientist (Source: Atta Kenare/AFP).</figcaption></figure><p>You can look at the past and see the same level of penetration. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, assassinated by remote-controlled weapons in 2020. Mossad agents stormed a secret Tehran warehouse in 2018, extracting half a ton of nuclear documents in a single night. Most notably, in 2024, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad revealed that Iran’s intelligence service had established a unit designed to counter Mossad operations, but its leader was exposed as a Mossad double agent. The very person tasked with protecting Iran from Israeli infiltration was reporting directly to Tel Aviv. If that doesn’t demonstrate the depth of Israeli penetration, nothing ever will.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*48QWtcQx9eXnFnfzhvuAoQ.png" /><figcaption>PM Benjamin Netanyahu presenting on the location of Iran’s secret “atomic archive” which was raided by Mossad agents in 2018.</figcaption></figure><p>This cognitive failure manifested in their preparations — or lack thereof. While Israel spent the months after April 2024 infiltrating Iranian networks, pre-positioning assets, and mapping every air defense node, Iran held military parades. While Mossad agents established safe houses in Tehran’s suburbs and smuggled in precision munitions, IRGC commanders gave speeches about “inevitable victory.” And while Israeli cyber units achieved persistent access to Iranian military networks, Iran’s leadership focused on symbolic retaliation that achieved nothing but revealing their own targeting limitations.</p><p>Consider the operational environment Iran created through its own blindness. By dismissing the April strikes, they signaled to Israel that limited demonstrations wouldn’t modify Iranian behavior. By continuing nuclear development while ignoring Israeli capabilities, they presented them with a closing window that, in their eyes, demanded decisive action. By failing to harden their command structures after clear evidence of Israeli penetration (see July 2024 assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran), they practically invited the decapitation strikes that followed.</p><p>The real question isn’t whether Iran can rebuild, but whether they’ll finally understand what they’re rebuilding for. Another attempt at regional hegemony through proxies and missiles? Or acceptance of a new reality where survival requires adaptation, not necessarily “resistance?” The flood has receded, the vulnerabilities are exposed, and the precedent is set. What Iran does next will determine whether the Islamic Republic joins the modern Middle East or remains marooned in the delusions that October 7th so brutally washed away.</p><p>I will write in a later article about future steps Iran could take to rebuild. I will also touch on Israel’s post-conflict strategy for consolidating its gains.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3f43bffbee5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fallout]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03/the-fallout-14e5e157ae6c?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/14e5e157ae6c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Sheikh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Jun 2025 05:15:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-07T01:13:28.461Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In just twelve days, Israel’s offensive against Iran definitively upended decades of military posturing and shattered long-held assumptions about regional deterrence. This swift campaign exposed cracks in Iran’s defenses and ushered in a Middle East defined by Israeli preeminence rather than Iranian influence.</p><p>But what’s next? Before that, let’s recap what happened:</p><p>Israel launched unilateral strikes on Iran on June 13, 2025, aiming to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. According to Israel, they received “alarming intelligence” suggesting Iran was preparing an arsenal of 12 nuclear bombs. The specific intelligence was related to an explosive triggering system (more specifically, a ​​neutron source initiator for triggering the nuclear explosion), a critical aspect of a nuclear weapon that represents one of the final engineering barriers before a testable device.</p><p>The months prior to the initial strikes was a period in which Israel was smuggling equipment aimed at degrading Iran’s broader capabilities. These primarily included precision weapons and attack drones, pre-positioned in strategic locations across Iran through a network of safe houses and front companies that Israeli intelligence had cultivated over years. Most importantly, the Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) continued acquiring information critical for their attacks: locations of top military generals, locations of air defense and radar sites, locations of nuclear scientists, and more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*59pNWBU4fqO7jETzXInhfQ.avif" /><figcaption>An undisclosed weapon was used in Tehran as part of an assassination attempt (Source: Majid Asgaripour/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)</figcaption></figure><p>Ultimately, the Trump administration gave Iran a 60-day ultimatum for a deal to be made. Trump and Netanyahu wanted a deal that ensured no enrichment, or one in which Iran’s entire nuclear capacity was deconstructed (think the Libya model). Of course, these are political nonstarters, and so this back and forth continued for months with no tangible timeframe for a deal.</p><p>Eventually, Israel used the “alarming intelligence” to justify launching “Operation Rising Lion” which targeted Iran’s military on the broadest level imaginable. Within one hour of the strike initializing, Iran’s highest military commanders and top nuclear scientists were assassinated. The synchronization required — coordinating F-35I sorties, drone swarms, cyber attacks, and human assets across a 1.6 million km² territory— represents perhaps the most complex military operation in the last decade. Mossad agents on the ground activated attack drones to eliminate not just personnel, but also air defense networks (to ensure Israel could achieve air superiority/dominance) and surface-to-surface missiles (to ensure Iran’s retaliatory posture was minimized).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-85xcJqyhlz1wIplJk0_6g.avif" /><figcaption>Rare footage of Mossad agents launching attack drones from within Iran on June 13 (Source: IDF)</figcaption></figure><p>Because of these significant losses, Iran could not retaliate until approximately 24-hours later, in which they launched salvoes of drones and missiles towards Israel. During this time, the Israeli Air Force continued pummeling air defense assets in Iran, eventually claiming air dominance in the country. Fighter jets and drones were free to roam around Tehran, around 1,500 km away from Tel Aviv, once thought as unimaginable. Because of this, Israel was also able to strike in real-time missiles ready to be launched by Iran.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/278/1*JcS5QdthdsUb049LiJSS_A.gif" /><figcaption>Footage of Israeli Air Force jets bombing a battery of ready-to-launch Iranian Ghadr liquid-fuel ballistic missiles (Source: Israeli Air Force)</figcaption></figure><p>According to intelligence assessments from the U.S. and Israel, they were able to eliminate nearly half of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers, heavily bottlenecking Iran’s ability to launch missiles en masse.<strong> </strong>What followed was a death spiral of Iranian capability: each destroyed launcher reduced retaliation options, each lost radar site expanded Israeli operational freedom, each eliminated command post degraded coordination.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m_dvz9A4-mt7mYZUkm7N6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>As Israel continued real-time strikes on missile launchers/salvoes, Iran’s ability to launch dropped.</figcaption></figure><p>Iran could not do much besides volleying projectiles towards Israel, 80% of them being intercepted by Israel’s air defense array. And as the conflict continued, and Israel continued to attack surface-to-surface missiles, Iran could only launch less and less. The rest of the missiles narrowly missed their targets. Realizing this, Iran changed their tactics towards the latter part of the war and began launching missiles with cluster munitions. These weapons have a higher chance of reaching ground, but are significantly less accurate, and resulted in the deaths of several civilians.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7t1KPmGyOHFjlwGVbfbqYQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aftermath of missile strike on Tel Aviv (Source: AP/Paz Bar)</figcaption></figure><p>You have to think: <strong>what does it say about Iran’s security apparatus that Israel could manage to acquire such detailed information, down to the apartment level and room that these military generals and nuclear scientists reside?</strong> No matter what you think of Israel, that is certainly an intelligence achievement.</p><p><strong>What does it say that Iran (according to the WSJ, NYT, and President Trump) had to coordinate with the U.S. and Qatar to launch a “retaliatory strike?”</strong> Days before the ceasefire, Iran signalled to both countries it wants to end all hostilities, essentially asking its adversary’s patron to mediate. Iran had to request American permission to save face with a token retaliation that everyone understood would be purely symbolic. They are able to save face, tell their population that the Americans and Israelis were humiliated. Truthfully, the 14 missiles launched were all either intercepted or set astray. Damage was zero.</p><p><strong>What does it say that Israel could achieve air dominance in Iran within a matter of days?</strong> For context, Russia has been fighting Ukraine for three-years, and even they don’t have air superiority over the area. It’s possible that this 12-day war could create a precedent, one in which Israel is more likely to attack in response to any perceived Iranian provocation, no matter how minor. So, it’s certainly reduced the threshold at which Israel is willing to attack, because the 12-days has shown that Iran is vulnerable, and lacks the capability to harm Israel in any meaningful way (at least from what we’ve seen). That’s a dangerous precedent to have.</p><p><strong>What does it say that so many individuals within Iran are willing to be recruited by Mossad to commit espionage against their government?</strong> The locations of top military commanders — down to the apartment level they live in; the locations of sensitive missile defense sites; the locations of missile launch sites — surely there are individuals in Iran’s chain of command providing this information to Israel.</p><p>To those who say that Iran had an edge in this conflict, let’s flip the scenario. Let’s say Iran was able to assassinate dozens of Israeli military commanders, top nuclear scientists; let’s say they penetrated Israel’s Mossad so much so that they knew the real-time locations of all top military commanders; let’s say that Iran was able to smuggle precision weapons and develop the capability to produce attack drones inside Tel Aviv without detection; and let’s say they were able to fly their aircraft towards Tel Aviv with absolute impunity.</p><p>But Iran didn’t do any of this, not even close — Israel did.</p><p>To Iran, these twelve-days serve as a reckoning.</p><p>But this set of hostilities could also backfire on Israel. Clearly, Iran can no longer rely on its proxies as a buffer against Israel, and so it must look to other solutions to restore deterrence. Nuclear weapons become the only guarantor of survival in a world where Iran’s conventional deterrence has catastrophically failed. Every Iranian strategic planner must now be thinking: “If we had nuclear weapons, Israel would not have dared hit our proxies, our air defense networks, our nuclear sites!”</p><p>Iran-backed Hamas launched “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” on October 7th, 2023, with the aim of crippling Israel. Since that time, all of Iran’s proxies have been heavily degraded, and so has Iran itself. It’s almost as if that flood came to haunt Iran. The very waters meant to drown Israel have receded to reveal Iran’s own vulnerabilities — a government standing naked before enemies it can no longer deter, with allies it can no longer protect. The flood didn’t destroy Israel, not at all, but instead washed away the illusions that sustained Iran’s regional strategy for decades. Now, as the waters recede, the region must reckon not just with Iran’s vulnerabilities, but with the precedent Israel has set.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14e5e157ae6c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thirty Years of Crying Wolf]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03/thirty-years-of-crying-wolf-9782e0f3be7d?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9782e0f3be7d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Sheikh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 21:48:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-18T22:04:10.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Israel launched unilateral strikes on Iran on June 13, 2025, aiming to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. According to Israel, they received “alarming intelligence” suggesting Iran was preparing an arsenal of 12 nuclear bombs. The specific intelligence was related to an explosive triggering system (more specifically, a ​​neutron source initiator for triggering the nuclear explosion), a critical aspect of a nuclear weapon that represents one of the final engineering barriers before a testable device.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wa6ifFteSp9JtIU7rq53Ww.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tel Aviv following impact from an Iranian ballistic missile on June 14, 2025.</figcaption></figure><p>The United States did not interpret the intelligence the same way. According to the WSJ, the U.S. assumed Iran was at least three years away from achieving nuclear capability. IAEA’s head Rafael Grossi echoed this assessment several days ago, stating that while Iran had dramatically increased enrichment activities, “there is no credible indication of activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”</p><p>This fundamental disagreement — weeks versus years — exposes how intelligence interpretation can be shaped more by political imperatives than technical realities. In this case, Israel views a golden opportunity for regime change considering Iran is the weakest they’ve ever been, following the collapse of their proxies and air defense networks.</p><p>It is one thing to achieve weapons-grade enrichment (which Iran is close to) and another to have a nuclear weapon. These are not mutually exclusive. Having HEU (highly enriched uranium) is only one of several steps needed to develop a nuclear bomb.</p><p>Iran must develop several techniques, such as an explosive triggering system, a miniaturization system, implosion systems, and other advanced metallurgical and computational capabilities — in order to have a device ready to test. According to U.S. intelligence, this would take them years.</p><p>There is an idea that Iran would use a nuclear weapon if they successfully acquire one. This is lunacy. Israel already possesses between 80–400 nuclear bombs, enough to destroy Iran several times over, and far more nuclear bombs than Iran ever could create. Let’s say Iran does launch nukes towards Israel — that would mean Iran’s total destruction. Why would Iran want to initiate a strike that guarantees their destruction?</p><p>Now, this doesn’t mean that Iran should develop nuclear weapons. Even as a deterrent, it could trigger neighboring gulf countries to proliferate. Iran shouldn’t develop nuclear weapons. This is to illustrate the fundamental irrationality of the Israeli narrative — that Iran represents an imminent existential threat requiring immediate military action. The logic of mutually assured destruction that prevented nuclear war during the Cold War would equally constrain a nuclear-armed Iran, especially against a country with more powerful conventional and nuclear capabilities like Israel.</p><p>Since 1995, Netanyahu has consistently espoused that Iran was “weeks away from developing a nuclear weapon.” 30 years later, that day has not come. Instead, Netanyahu is using nuclear annihilation as a pretext for regime change. This creates an intriguing paradox: either Israeli intelligence has been catastrophically wrong for three consecutive decades, or the threat has been systematically exaggerated for political purposes. The historical record suggests the latter. To him, Iran is “the head of the octopus” — a regional threat that must be eliminated, not merely contained. The nuclear program provides the justification, but regime change remains the objective.</p><p>The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, long thought as quintessential to maintaining the post-Cold War nuclear order, now faces existential crisis. Israel’s strikes, which were conducted without UN authorization, IAEA consultation, or even allied consensus, demonstrate that when states perceive existential threats, international legal frameworks become mere suggestions. The NPT’s grand bargain, whereby states forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful nuclear technology and security guarantees, appears increasingly hollow when military force can override diplomatic commitments with impunity. If international law cannot protect states from preemptive attacks based on contested intelligence, if IAEA monitoring provides no shield against military assault, if NPT compliance offers no security guarantee — then the incentive structure for nuclear abstinence fundamentally collapses.</p><p>Israel’s goal is to drag the United States into bombing Fordow, knowing only they have the capacity to destroy the underground nuclear bunker. Iran would undoubtedly retaliate against U.S. forces in the region, bringing Washington into direct war with Iran. If the United States can assist in weakening Iran, regime change is more likely — a strategic calculation that transforms Israeli tactical limitations into a golden opportunity to topple Iran’s government.</p><p>By degrading Iran’s air defenses and surface facilities while leaving Fordow operational, Israel creates an intolerable situation: Iran retains breakout capability in an impregnable fortress, making American involvement not merely desirable but strategically necessary. The 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator in American arsenals becomes the missing piece in Israel’s regime change puzzle, with each Israeli strike carefully calibrated to increase pressure for U.S. intervention without providing Iran sufficient provocation to sprint toward weaponization.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l0ZHgX54Be_6PVMyKP9yuQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>B-52 bombers, capable of carrying GBU-57 bombs, stationed in Diego Garcia, within striking distance of Iran’s underground nuclear facilities</figcaption></figure><p>Israel is currently winning and winning big. But Israel is better at the sprint than the marathon. Iran is running a marathon.</p><p>Every scientist assassinated, every facility hit, every diplomatic withdrawal — they all give the same message to Tehran’s strategic planners: only nuclear weapons provide genuine security in an anarchic world. Israel’s tactical victories may paradoxically guarantee its strategic nightmare: a nuclear-armed Iran convinced that no other path to security exists. In seeking absolute security through military dominance, Israel may have ensured that neither state will ever truly be secure again.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9782e0f3be7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Global Governance will Fail the Middle East]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shahrozsheikh03/why-global-governance-will-fail-the-middle-east-7a85ba4946ac?source=rss-aeabbbf94883------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a85ba4946ac</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Sheikh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 21:51:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-17T01:32:36.610Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[written in late March &amp; early April 2025]</p><p>In late July 2024, Israeli agents carried out a high-stakes assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh. The location of this operation is symbolic because it was conducted in Tehran, a city Iran has long cast as the beating heart of its “Axis of Resistance” and, not coincidentally, the very place where Israel signaled it can now penetrate at will with absolute impunity. With that strike, the Islamic Republic’s vaunted power projection suddenly looked increasingly brittle. Post-October 7, Iran now confronts a dramatically altered landscape: its foreign enablers weakened, its enemies emboldened, and its very survival threatened.</p><p>This high-profile assassination is only the most visible example of a broader military and intelligence campaign that has systematically dismantled Iran’s proxy groups across the Middle East. In effect, Israel’s use of force only underscores that neither side trusts international institutions to manage the crisis. Because every missile strike and covert raid has occurred outside any enforceable global framework, both Iran and Israel are reverting to self-help rather than diplomacy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QvO4ord-QidCWjRCQAMYmg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated while attending the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian</figcaption></figure><p>What makes this situation particularly consequential is Iran’s unprecedented vulnerability. For decades, Iran has relied on its regional proxy network as a strategic buffer against direct attacks on its territory. The rapid degradation of this network, combined with the demonstrated vulnerability of Iran’s own conventional defenses and intelligence services, has created what I term the “nuclear paradox”: as Iran’s conventional deterrence erodes, its motivation to acquire nuclear weapons intensifies. Military actions intended to weaken Iran’s position may paradoxically accelerate its nuclear ambitions.</p><p>The paradox emerges at a time when the international community’s traditional tools for managing nuclear proliferation appear increasingly ineffective. Global governance, or the network of treaties, organizations, and norms designed to regulate state behavior absent a world government, has offered little meaningful constraint on either Israel’s military actions or Iran’s nuclear advancement.</p><p>The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), once heralded as a diplomatic triumph, collapsed after the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018 following evidence of Iranian violations. Economic sanctions, while causing significant hardship for ordinary Iranians, have failed to meaningfully alter Tehran’s strategic calculus. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) struggles to maintain effective monitoring as Iran restricts inspector access and increases uranium enrichment to near-threshold levels.</p><p><strong>The Sanctions Mirage</strong></p><p>Economic sanctions have arguably been the centerpiece of global governance efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. These measures, which were authorized through United Nations Security Council resolutions and unilateral actions by the United States and European Union, aim to change Iran’s strategic calculus by imposing costs on its economy. However, the empirical evidence suggests that sanctions have failed to achieve their primary objective of halting Iran’s nuclear progress. Instead, they have created parallel market structures that enrich hardliners while punishing ordinary citizens, which ultimately strengthens, rather than weakens, Iran’s resolve.</p><p>Since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, it has imposed what it calls “maximum pressure” sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports, banking sector, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to World Bank data from 2021, real GDP fell by 4.7 percent in fiscal 2018/19 and then by 8.2 percent in 2019/20. The rial lost over 60 percent of its value against the dollar, fueling inflation rates above 35 percent and making imports prohibitively expensive.</p><p>And yet, this economic pressure has not translated into nuclear concessions. Instead, it has driven Iran’s economy underground, creating “parallel markets,” or alternate economic channels that circumvent formal structures. Drawing from their semi-official status, IRGC-affiliated conglomerates have moved into nearly every sector cut off by sanctions, whether it be energy or construction, utilizing privileged access to state resources to underwrite sanctions-busting operations. The IRGC has expanded its economic empire during the sanctions era and has since gained control over smuggling networks, black-market currency exchanges, and sanctions-evading trade relationships with China, Russia, and neighboring states.</p><p>The ineffectiveness of sanctions is further demonstrated by Iran’s continued nuclear advancement despite them. Since 2019, Iran has expanded its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 300kg under the JCPOA to more than 3,000kg, increased enrichment levels from 3.67% to 60%, deployed advanced centrifuges prohibited under the deal, and restricted IAEA inspections. As former nuclear negotiator Richard Nephew notes, “Iran is manifestly closer to being able to produce a nuclear weapon than they were two years ago.”</p><p><strong>Military Dominance Outside the Rules</strong></p><p>While sanctions struggle and diplomacy falters, Israel has increasingly relied on unilateral military action to counter Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions. These operations exist entirely outside global governance frameworks, operating instead according to state-centric security logic. Their effectiveness in the short-term, combined with their potential to accelerate Iranian nuclear motivations in the long-term, exemplifies the paradoxical nature of counterproliferation efforts.</p><p>The most dramatic demonstration of Israel’s military approach came on October 26, 2024, when Israeli aircraft conducted extensive strikes against Iranian military facilities. According to Israeli sources, the operation involved around 100 aircraft striking targets across Iran, including air defense systems, missile production facilities, and drone factories. The Israeli military claimed to have destroyed all four of Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries, which had previously protected key strategic sites including nuclear facilities. In other words, Iran is naked to an attack on its nuclear facilities. The strikes also reportedly destroyed twelve “planetary mixers” used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles — sophisticated equipment that Iran cannot easily replace without Chinese assistance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-Vq8M6Sj4LZhtJ1Hef6DUA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Satellite imagery of Oct. 2024 Israeli strike on an S-300 radar in Isfahan</figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s military approach has proven remarkably effective in the short-term. Its operations have significantly set back Iran’s missile capabilities, degraded its air defenses, and weakened its proxy forces. Israeli officials claim their October strikes may have delayed Iran’s missile program by at least a year, a concrete achievement that sanctions and diplomacy have struggled to match.</p><p>However, these tactical successes come with strategic costs that global governance frameworks are ill-equipped to manage. Each Israeli strike further convinces Iranian leaders that only nuclear weapons can guarantee their security against external threats. This perception creates powerful incentives for Iran to accelerate its nuclear program despite — or rather because of — Israeli military pressure.</p><p><strong>The Collapse of Strategic Depth</strong></p><p>Perhaps the most significant recent development undermining global governance approaches to Iran’s nuclear program is the collapse of Iran’s regional proxy network, often called the “Axis of Resistance.” This network, comprising Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and allied militias in Syria and Iraq, has been central to Iran’s regional strategy for decades. Its deterioration has fundamentally altered Iran’s security calculus in ways that global governance frameworks struggle to address.</p><p>The erosion of this network began with Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel, which triggered devastating Israeli military retaliation in Gaza. While initially appearing to strengthen Iran’s hand by drawing Israel into conflict, the subsequent Israeli campaign has severely degraded Hamas’s military capabilities. Even more significant has been the degradation of Hezbollah, long considered Iran’s most powerful proxy. Following Hezbollah’s decision to open a second front against Israel in support of Hamas, Israel launched extensive operations in southern Lebanon. According to Israeli intelligence estimates, these operations have destroyed approximately 80% of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal previously aimed at Israel.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v1dHX3qVjTbtUHnmPnxRqg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Site of secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination in 2024. The majority of Hezbollah’s military leadership were assassinated in subsequent strikes.</figcaption></figure><p>In Syria, Iran’s “land bridge” to Hezbollah and Hamas has been severed by the collapse of the Assad regime. The Sharaa-led Syrian government has made it clear that it will not allow its territory to be used by Iran to transport weapons, military advisors, or financial resources to its proxies. Any attempt to funnel missile parts, cash, or instructors to Hezbollah must now rely on makeshift sea or air routes, vastly more expensive and perilous than the former overland lifeline. This logistical nightmare compounds the asymmetry between Israel’s precise, targeted strikes and Iran’s dwindling proxy posture.</p><p>The cumulative effect of these developments has been to leave Iran more strategically vulnerable than at any point in recent decades. Its ability to project power regionally has diminished; its deterrent against Israeli action has weakened; its conventional military forces face severe disadvantages against both Israeli and American capabilities. This vulnerability creates powerful incentives for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as the ultimate security guarantee, which is precisely the outcome global governance mechanisms aim to prevent.</p><p><strong>The Nuclear Hedge</strong></p><p>Against this backdrop of sanctions ineffectiveness, diplomatic collapse, military pressure, and unprecedented vulnerability, Iran has pursued what nonproliferation scholars call a “nuclear hedging” strategy. This approach involves developing the technical capability, infrastructure, and expertise necessary for nuclear weapons without taking the final steps toward weaponization. Such a position allows Iran to maintain ambiguity about its intentions while preserving the option to develop weapons quickly if security conditions deteriorate further.</p><p>These actions have dramatically reduced Iran’s “breakout time” — the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear device — from the JCPOA’s one-year target to just a few weeks, according to U.S. intelligence assessments. However, producing fissile material is just the first step toward developing a weapon ready to test, which would require additional designing and miniaturization work.</p><p>Iran’s hedging approach reflects a careful calibration of risks and benefits. By stopping short of weaponization, Iran avoids triggering immediate military action while maintaining the option to develop weapons if threatened. This strategy also preserves diplomatic flexibility by allowing Iran to negotiate from a position of technical strength while claiming its program remains peaceful.</p><p>Global governance mechanisms struggle to address nuclear hedging precisely because it exploits the gaps between technical compliance and strategic intent. The NPT prohibits nuclear weapons but permits civilian nuclear technology; Iran claims its program falls entirely within the latter category. The IAEA can verify the presence or absence of nuclear materials but cannot, of course, assess intentions. Sanctions can impose economic costs but cannot eliminate knowledge and expertise already acquired. Even military strikes can destroy physical infrastructure, but they certainly cannot erase scientific knowledge.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LvIgPY7IA03MSL-Vf3MRJA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The Path Ahead</strong></p><p>Looking forward, several scenarios for Iran’s nuclear program emerge from this analysis. Iran could continue its current hedging approach, advancing technical capabilities while stopping short of weaponization. It could try to breakout, deciding that the security benefits of nuclear weapons outweigh the costs and moving quickly to produce weapons-grade uranium. Or a new diplomatic resolution could emerge.</p><p>Here’s my assessment: in the short-term, there may be a deal similar to the JCPOA that provides temporary relief to the region. It is possible, though, that such a deal does not go into fruition, and I’m more inclined to believe this perspective. Even if one does, it may be temporary. Why? Because for Israel, the only acceptable outcome is one where Iran’s entire nuclear program is dismantled. In a meeting at a policy summit on April 27, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “The only way to prevent the Islamic Republic from building a nuclear weapon is to dismantle all the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear program… Israel cannot live with anything short of that.”</p><p>This is a political nonstarter. Iran would never, under any circumstances, accept such a deal. Iran views its nuclear program as both a strategic necessity and a matter of national pride and sovereignty. And today, the Ayatollah has made uranium enrichment a red line.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The core paradox is absolutely clear: actions intended to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons may actually accelerate their development by increasing Tehran’s sense of vulnerability while demonstrating the inadequacy of conventional deterrents. Sanctions have strengthened hardliners, created parallel economies, and reinforced nationalist narratives without meaningfully changing Iran’s strategic calculus. Military operations have degraded Iran’s conventional capabilities and proxy networks, highlighting its vulnerability to external threats and reinforcing the appeal of nuclear deterrence.</p><p>Global governance faces fundamental limitations in addressing this paradox. The NPT framework provides no effective response when states calculate that security benefits outweigh compliance costs. The IAEA lacks enforcement powers beyond monitoring and reporting. The UN Security Council remains divided, with Russia and China often blocking meaningful action against Iran; the United States is doing the same for Israel. And domestic politics in key countries complicate sustained diplomatic engagement.</p><p>The irony is palpable: after decades of sanctions, military pressure, and diplomatic isolation aimed at preventing Iranian nuclear weapons, the international community may have brought their development closer rather than farther away. Only by recognizing this paradox and fundamentally recalibrating approach can we hope to achieve sustainable nonproliferation in one of the world’s most volatile regions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a85ba4946ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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