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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by shakti mohanty on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by shakti mohanty on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by shakti mohanty on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Out Of Scope domain Leads To a Critical Bug[$1500]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp/an-out-of-scope-domain-leads-to-a-critical-bug-1500-f228d2c7db4b?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[shakti mohanty]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jun 2022 06:24:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-24T06:24:12.007Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Hello All, I am Shakti Ranjan Mohanty (3ncryptsaan). Hope all are having a good day. In this write-up, I will be sharing how I have found a critical bug from a place that is not in scope. Feedback Is appreciated.</em></strong></p><p>Often I don’t post writeups for bugs that don’t have any uniqueness, because being a writer I always prefer posting such findings which will be unique and informational. As I Got lots of comments and dm for this writeup, here it is.</p><p>Being a penetration tester and bug hunter, I always prefer targeting and hunting in one program until I feel I am done with finding bugs out there. I have been testing one program for the last 1 month and also found a lot of bugs. I got too much familiar with all the functionalities. The major thing here is only app.domain.com is in scope and all other domains with *.domain.com are out of scope. I tested everything there, I was thinking I am done testing that app. But somewhere I wanted to test there more. While testing I observed one API endpoint having a request</p><pre>GET /app/target/configuration HTTP/1.1 <br>Host: app.target.com<br>X-Csrf-Token: value<br>Cookie: value</pre><p>By removing that x-csrf-token header we can still access the information for /app/target/configuration. That means the cookie is the only thing that is responsible for the authentication here.</p><p>I tried for other bugs like CORS and CSRF but failed. I kept note till this and moved on to test further.</p><p>On the next day, I reminded one domain that is booking.target.com</p><p>before that let me brief the main application functionality.</p><blockquote><em>The application manages created jobs and This job creation can be done via two method ,</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Either Being an organizational owner, you can create job and assign them to your employee and this will be reflected on </em><a href="https://app.target.com/app/jobs"><em>https://app.target.com/app/jobs</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><em>or</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>there is a feature for online booking on the application, which will generate a unique url like </em><a href="https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value"><strong><em>https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value</em></strong></a><strong><em>. </em></strong><em>This url will be available automatically for public on </em><strong><em>yourcompany.target.com</em></strong><em> with a button online booking. Through this anyone visting </em><strong><em>yourcompany.target.com(available for public) </em></strong><em>can request a new job and that will be reflected on </em><a href="https://app.target.com/app/jobs"><em>https://app.target.com/app/jobs</em></a><em> too.</em></blockquote><p>Both <strong>Yourcompany.target.com</strong> and <strong>booking.target.com</strong> are out of scope. But still i thought and questioned myself how the job request submitted from <strong>booking.target.com</strong> is getting stored and reflected on the main app i.e. <a href="https://app.target.com/app/jobs"><strong><em>https://app.target.com/app/jobs</em></strong></a><strong><em> , </em></strong><em>For clearing that confusion , being a normal visitor user I have navigated to “online booking” (</em><a href="https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value"><strong><em>https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value</em></strong></a><strong><em>)</em></strong><em> and created a job request. This will initiate a POST request and The request was</em></p><pre>POST /company/add_scheduled_job_for_user HTTP/1.1<br>Host: booking.target.com<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0<br>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8<br>Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<br>Content-Length: 1179<br>DNT: 1<br>Connection: close<br>Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty<br>Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors<br>Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site</pre><pre>name=sds&amp;street=sss&amp;street_line_2=ss&amp;city=ss&amp;state=ss&amp;postal_code=12222&amp;mobile_number=700-897-8755&amp;email=shakti.gtp1@gmail.com&amp;scheduled_end_time=&amp;scheduled_start_time=&amp;services[0][organizational_line_item_template_id]=43660983&amp;services[0][name]=Custom+Job&amp;services[0][description]=company+will+provide+you+a+quote+if+the+work+you+need+does+not+fit+into+one+of+our+standard+categories.Please+provide+as+much+detail+as+possible,+including+pictures.&amp;services[0][default]=false&amp;services[0][amount]=$0.00. </pre><p>Wow!!! things to be noted here. The “Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” used for online booking is being used as a form of authentication for requesting a new job on that organisation. That means the Authorization: Token got from <strong>booking.target.com</strong> must have some corelation with <strong>app.target.com</strong></p><p>So can we use that “Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” to access other authenticated data or perform any state changing function for that organisation. The ans is a Big Yess…..</p><p>To confirm first i have initiated a request to /app/target/configuration endpoint by using that Authorization: Token</p><pre>GET /app/target/configuration HTTP/1.1 <br>Host: app.target.com<br>Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</pre><p>Hollaaa, The request got successful and i was able to view the configuration data for the respective organisation and i was viewing it from an anonymous user without log in.</p><p>Then i have checked all other functionalities and found that being a normal non logged-in user i can use “Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” which i got from online booking request, i can do a lots of more thing like getting employee list, Deleting or restoring existing employee, getting invoice settings, getting organisational profile, getting all job list, getting customers , creating customer/creating jobs etc and etc.</p><h3><strong>REPRODUCING THIS BUG:</strong></h3><p>1- Being an anonymous user navigate to target organisation’s online booking url <a href="https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value"><strong><em>https://booking.target.com/comany-name/some-hashed-value</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong> This is meant for public which will be helpful for getting new jobs from the website, the organisation which are on paid plan often uses this feature and avail the link on their business website ).</p><p>2- Now while creating a booking capture the request and note the “Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”</p><p>3- All you need to use the above “Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” value in all the API endpoints you want to access for that organisation. This will replace the need of <strong>x-csrf-token</strong> and <strong>cookie</strong>.</p><p><strong>To access employee list of that victim organisation</strong></p><pre>GET /app/organization/employees?expand[]=reviews&amp;expand[]=device_info&amp;expand[]=permissions HTTP/1.1<br>Host: app.target.com<br>Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.61 Safari/537.36<br>Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</pre><p>From the response you can gain all the employee data including their id, email, name etc. As you have the employee id you can delete that employee by using the Authorization: Token from online booking.</p><p><strong>To delete employee</strong></p><pre>DELETE /app/organization/employees/zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz HTTP/1.1<br>Host: app.target.com<br>Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.61 Safari/537.36<br>Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</pre><p>Like the above two examples you can do everything( access/create/delete customers, access/create/delete jobs, access/create/delete invoices etc) what an admin of that organisation can do.</p><h3>ISSUE BACKGROUND:</h3><p>The online booking request done from booking.domain.com has one form of authentication that is Authorization: header, As this token is responsible for creating jobs, mistakenly the developers gave the token read write permissions globally for all endpoints. As a result any one with the token from online booking can access/add/delete anything from that respective organisation.</p><h3>IMPACT:</h3><p>As the online booking is available for each organisation publicly, the online job creation for each organisation will have a respective <strong>Authorization: Token token=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx </strong>and as this is public it will take less than a minute for an attacker to get any organisation’s<strong> Authorization: Token</strong>. So an unauthenticated user without login or without being a member can Taking over control of any organisation for changing data, creating data, editing AND ACCESSING data, more over deleting administrative users or restoring deleted users.</p><p><strong>Reported</strong>: Jun 4th (20 days ago)</p><p><strong>Severity as per CVSS</strong>: Critical (9.7)</p><p><strong>Triaged</strong> : Jun 9th (15 days ago)</p><p><strong>Rewarded</strong>: $1500 Jun 9th (15 days ago)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BPZPk1cO77KkvQZJ2ISyxA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Resolved</strong>: 22 Jun (2 days ago)</p><p>Follow me for more write-ups and information sharing, I will be happy to share my knowledge and my DMs are always open for the genuine help seekers.</p><p><strong>Instagram</strong>: <a href="https://www.instagram.com/3ncryptsaan/">https://www.instagram.com/3ncryptsaan/</a></p><p><strong>Twitter</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/3ncryptSaan">https://twitter.com/3ncryptSaan</a></p><p><strong>Linkedin</strong>: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/shakti-ranjan-mohanty/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/shakti-ranjan-mohanty/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f228d2c7db4b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[If It’s a Feature!!! Let’s Abuse It for $750]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp/if-its-a-feature-let-s-abuse-it-for-750-19cfb9848d4b?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19cfb9848d4b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[shakti mohanty]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jun 2022 15:00:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-05T16:07:48.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Hello mates</strong>,</p><p><strong>Thank You so much for being here. Hope You all are doing well on your respective goals. I am Shakti Ranjan Mohanty (aka 3ncryptsaan). I am a part time security researcher on Hackerone. On this write-up, i will be sharing the details of a bug i have found recently related to CSRF.</strong></p><p>Before starting , i would like to suggest the beginners that</p><blockquote><em>“While reporting any kind of bug, first think like a program owner that why he will pay you something. What’s the impact here. Don’t rely too much on the low hanging fruits , </em><strong><em>this will lead you to temporary happiness with a permanent burnout</em></strong><em>.”</em></blockquote><p><strong>LET’s Start</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F8SuKOupsVwBUGGButK%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2FDiamondPetFoods-dogs-adventure-diamond-pet-foods-8SuKOupsVwBUGGButK&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExNDQ3M2FhZWwwYXVnbnZwOG56eHlmYzNsdmtoaHlzdTFpMTUzbnhtaSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2F8SuKOupsVwBUGGButK%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d3361b7529a33822c3834d0e0ecc884d/href">https://medium.com/media/d3361b7529a33822c3834d0e0ecc884d/href</a></iframe><p><strong>O</strong>n the start of the last month, i picked a private program to hack on. The app was all about managing meetings, events , invoices etc. After few reports of XSS and privilege escalation bugs. The program staff replied me to test for bugs which will be a threat to the organisational data.</p><p>So after some test i have found a CSRF on adding any google calendar to the application.While connecting the google calendar , the flow will work like below</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/0*2qGtPlhA4FsCpb4w.png" /><figcaption>Sample of how google gives access</figcaption></figure><p>After the Google authorise the web app with a token to access his service, The final request will look like</p><pre>GET /app/google/auth_callback?code=4/0RAX4YfWgvjaHxzYX4FNLO-QvFVgDmMsSA0_IvL0FxAptS2mHJAXM-L4bMiZmKGhI6Mz-o3A&amp;scope=<a href="https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar">https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar</a> HTTP/1.1<br>Host: target.com<br>Cookie: cookie here</pre><p>The above request has a code parameter containing auth value from google, this will add that respective google calendar with the target.com. Then target.com will sync and exchange data to that google calendar.</p><p>If you have noticed the Request is in GET method and there is no additional CSRF checks, That means , we can trick the victim to click on the GET url</p><pre>https://target.com/app/google/auth_callback?code=4/0RAX4YfWgvjaHxzYX4FNLO-QvFVgDmMsSA0_IvL0FxAptS2mHJAXM-L4bMiZmKGhI6Mz-o3A&amp;scope=https://www.googleapis.com/auth/</pre><p>and the google calendar will be linked to the victim account( the victim need to open the link on the same browser where he is already logged in with target.com).</p><p>BUT… BUT… As you know “auth_callback?code=” will have a auth token value from google and you can only get your google auth token. That mean through the csrf , only your google account can be linked to the victim’s account in target.com.</p><p><strong>What’s the impact Here????</strong></p><p>As before my test i am always serious about knowing the application first, i have already aware about the google calendar. This will add the google account with the application and all the scheduled meetings , events , invoices etc will be synced to that respective google calendar. Then Through google calendar the organisational owner can able to view the scheduled data in a detailed manner.</p><p>The impact here will be when attacker’s google account will be connected to victim’s account on target.com, target.com will sync all meetings, events, invoice data to the google calendar along with the the date, invited users name , email( there is an option in G-calendar to copy the guest email), mobile number(if owner have added it on the guest details), attached file, location, meeting credentials and notes etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W2tZSqhIMLF9Go5xnGz1zQ.png" /><figcaption>This is a sample of one meeting added by victim synced to attacker’s google calendar</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Attack Scenario:</strong></p><p>1- Navigate to your account as an attacker</p><p>2- Navigate to <a href="https://target.com/profile/settings">https://target.com</a>/profile/settings the Google calendar app will be disabled. Enable it, this will ask to connect with google account.</p><p>3- Connect with attacker’s google account and capture the final request containing google auth token.</p><pre>GET /app/google/auth_callback?code=4/0RAX4YfWgvjaHxzYX4FNLO-QvFVgDmMsSA0_IvL0FxAptS2mHJAXM-L4bMiZmKGhI6Mz-o3A&amp;scope=<a href="https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar">https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar</a> HTTP/1.1<br>Host: target.com<br>Cookie: cookie here</pre><p>As the request in GET method, you can directly share the link to any organisational owner ( also you can make a tiny url for the above link, this will be helpful for tricking the victim), This will connect the google account with that organisation’s account.</p><p>4- Now share the link to victim organisation employee, let him click and your google calendar will be added to his organisation.</p><p>5- Now all the scheduled data will be synced to your google calendar and you can see all the data synced to your google calendar.</p><p><strong>Reported: </strong>May 11th, 2022</p><p><strong>Triaged and Rewarded</strong>: May 27th, 2022</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OEf4dhF4SJBj6DoF0YnWxw.png" /></figure><p>Please share your feedbacks, This will help me to rectify the errors on the next writeup.</p><p>Stay Tuned. I will be posting another interesting writeup within few days.</p><p>Follow me for more write-ups and information sharing, I will be happy to share my knowledge and my DMs are always open for the genuine help seekers.</p><p><strong>Instagram</strong>: <a href="https://www.instagram.com/3ncryptsaan/">https://www.instagram.com/3ncryptsaan/</a></p><p><strong>Twitter</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/3ncryptSaan">https://twitter.com/3ncryptSaan</a></p><p><strong>Linkedin</strong>: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/shakti-ranjan-mohanty/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/shakti-ranjan-mohanty/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19cfb9848d4b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A fever Worth 750$- [Accessing Private Projects ]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp/a-fever-worth-750-accessing-private-projects-d113c561311f?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d113c561311f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[shakti mohanty]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 2021 11:10:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-21T11:31:05.743Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Champs, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Encrypt.saan"><strong>Shakti </strong></a>here , I hope you all are having some good times. Usually i’m not a person who makes writeup for the findings, but i thought of doing it often now. #sharing_is_caring</p><p>The Bug is all about how i manage to access the private projects, So let’s start….</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F17130421&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Ftho-chalo-shuru-karte-hai-%25E0%25A4%25A5%25E0%25A5%258B%25E0%25A4%259A%25E0%25A4%25B2%25E0%25A4%25B2%25E0%25A5%258B%25E0%25A4%25B6%25E0%25A5%2582%25E0%25A4%25B0%25E0%25A5%2581%25E0%25A4%2595%25E0%25A5%2581%25E0%25A4%25A4%25E0%25A5%2587%25E0%25A4%25B9%25E0%25A5%2588-%25E0%25A4%2586%25E0%25A4%25B0%25E0%25A4%25AE%25E0%25A5%258D%25E0%25A4%25AD-%25E0%25A4%259A%25E0%25A4%25B2%25E0%25A5%258B-lets-begin-gif-17130421&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2FyK3kQdLqHbAAAAAC%2Ftho-chalo-shuru-karte-hai-%25E0%25A4%25A5%25E0%25A5%258B%25E0%25A4%259A%25E0%25A4%25B2%25E0%25A4%25B2%25E0%25A5%258B%25E0%25A4%25B6%25E0%25A5%2582%25E0%25A4%25B0%25E0%25A5%2581%25E0%25A4%2595%25E0%25A5%2581%25E0%25A4%25A4%25E0%25A5%2587%25E0%25A4%25B9%25E0%25A5%2588.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b0acb3cbf33154fd231da97bbae6434f/href">https://medium.com/media/b0acb3cbf33154fd231da97bbae6434f/href</a></iframe><p>As i am into the cyber security profession, i used to do bug bounty not often and i hunt only on <strong>HackerOne</strong>.</p><p>It was 11 pm , I was having fever, can’t sleep &amp; i was alone with the beast #MacM1. I thought to have a test on the pending private invitations. So it was a private program having top ranked hackers invited before. Whenever i got a target , i just roam around on each and every functionality to understand it’s flow. As it was a Single scoped domain, i did the same.</p><p>Basically it was a recruiting application for the projects. What i observed is “The Admin can Create projects and can invite talented candidates as per their need. The Project status can be either Shared or Private. If it will be private, it can be only accessed by the admin. If it will be shared , then only the invited individuals can access the projects.”</p><p>Now if admin shares the project with candidate-A then the link will be like, <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">https://example.com/projects/<strong>alphanumeric_project_id_here</strong>?<strong>share_token_id</strong>=<em>some_random_token_here</em></a></p><p>Observe To get access to a project you need the <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here"><strong>project_id</strong></a><strong> &amp; </strong><a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here"><strong>share_token_id</strong></a><strong> , </strong>which is obviously alphanumeric and unpredictable. I quickly created <strong>project-A</strong> and <strong>project-B </strong>being an admin.[Note: Project_id of Project-A=<a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</a> &amp; Project-B=zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz ]. Now i shared the <strong>project-A</strong> with <strong>candidate-A</strong>, so now the status of <strong>project-A</strong> is <strong>shared</strong> and the status of <strong>project-B</strong> is <strong>private</strong>.</p><p>While sharing the <strong>Project-A</strong> to <strong>candidate-A</strong>, the url i got <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">https://example.com/projects/xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?<strong>share_token_id</strong>=</a>yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. The idea was to access the private project with the Shared project’s share_token_id , so i changed the project_id of <strong>Project-A </strong>with project_id <strong>zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz</strong> (which is project-B’s project_id ) which was private before. So the modified url will be like <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">https://example.com/projects/</a>zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz<a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">?<strong>share_token_id</strong>=</a>yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.</p><p>I tried to access the above modified Url and i was able to access the private project.</p><p>Yes….Yes….Yes i did it…</p><p>Now i can access the project , which was set private by the admin and that was only accessible by the admin.</p><p>Wait a minute…</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F17318582&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fcarry-minati-carry-minati-roast-ajey-nagar-carry-ajey-gif-17318582&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2Fbua2WP7rSH0AAAAC%2Fcarry-minati-carry-minati-roast.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a29e0889bb679b84071822d2d0691a89/href">https://medium.com/media/a29e0889bb679b84071822d2d0691a89/href</a></iframe><p>Being a candidate how can we get the private project id of an admin?????</p><p>If here i would report, they might close it as informative or low saying “you can’t predict the alphanumeric private project_id” . Now the aim is to find the private project_id.</p><p>Hmmmm…. I was like …. let’s Do this…..</p><p>The application was using graphQL…Hmm .. I fired up <strong>Autorize </strong>and configured with all the necessary cookies and token headers of the candidate user. Added the scope filters on it. Now i again roamed on each endpoint manually within the admin panel. After some time i checked the logs of Autorize, i got 2 graphQL endpoints where the private project_id is getting exposed due to lack of authorisation . So now the candidate who was a part of project-A can access the private project_id through the graphQL endpoint</p><p>Now we have a complete attack scenario,</p><p>1- <strong>Admin</strong> Invited <strong>candidate-A</strong> to <strong>Project-A</strong>. [note: project-B is still private ]</p><p>2- Now <strong>Candidate-A</strong> is a part of <strong>project-A</strong>.</p><p>3- Through the graphQL endpoint discussed above the <strong>candidate-A</strong> Got the <strong>Private project_id</strong> of <strong>project-B.</strong></p><p>3- <strong>Candidate-A</strong> modified the invite Url from <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">https://example.com/projects/project_id_of_A?<strong>share_token_id</strong>=</a>some_random_token to <a href="https://example.com/projects/alphanumeric_project_id_here?share_token_id=some_random_token_here">https://example.com/projects/project_id_of_B?<strong>share_token_id</strong>=</a>some_random_token to</p><p>4- Candidate got access to the Private Project-B unauthentically.</p><p><strong>Reason:</strong></p><p>1- Here the share_token_Id of “Project-A” getting validated as a valid share_token_Id for “project-B” and the “project-B” is being accessed by the attacker since it is in private state.</p><p>2- The private project id is getting disclosed unauthentically to the candidate through the graphQL endpoint.</p><p>Timeline</p><p>— — — — — -</p><p>Bug Reported: <strong>Sep-3 2021 11.57 Pm</strong></p><p>Bug <strong>Triaged</strong> &amp; Marked As <strong>High</strong> : <strong>Sep-4 2021 00:18 Am</strong></p><p>Rewarded <strong>750$</strong> with a complement : <strong>Sep-4 2021 00:35 Am</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/689/1*YB0sez2j5RZV-zTIBsX8dg.jpeg" /></figure><p>See you on next write-ups.</p><p>If you found it helpful..</p><p>Follow me on: <a href="https://www.instagram.com/3ncryptsaan/"><strong>Instagram</strong></a><strong> —</strong><a href="https://twitter.com/3ncryptSaan"><strong>Twitter</strong></a><strong> — </strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/shakti-ranjan-mohanty/"><strong>Linkedin</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d113c561311f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Utilizing Lockdown: Blind Sqli leads to Account Takeover & Data Extraction]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shakti.gtp/utilizing-lockdown-blind-sqli-leads-to-account-takeover-data-extraction-3705ce8bdb62?source=rss-593575794d1f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3705ce8bdb62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[shakti mohanty]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2020 07:38:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-10T07:49:44.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Hunters,</p><p>This is <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Encrypt.saan">Shakti Ranjan Mohanty</a> a security researcher from Odisha. This write-up is all about my last finding on which i was able to Takeover the Administrative account and was able to extract data. Later I got rewarded with <a href="https://emojipedia.org/money-mouth-face/">🤑🤑</a><strong>1400€</strong><a href="https://emojipedia.org/money-mouth-face/">🤑🤑</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1022/1*vvPjDt88cL__1Gm1T63nPw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Awarded Bounty</figcaption></figure><p>I am on to this field from past 2 to 3 years. As i am professionally a security analyst, i couldn’t afford time towards Bug hunting. Whenever i find some time from the professional life, i give all the time towards Bug hunting. During this pandemic situation, Corporate sectors are providing Work from Home and I got a lot of time to Boost myself &amp; For Bug Bounty.</p><p>I was eyeing on a private program which was a medical management application(i.e. <strong>redacted.com</strong>). I checked their policies and got to know that all the subdomain(<strong>*.redacted.com</strong>) are out of scope, only <strong>redacted.com </strong>is in scope. The Organisation is giving priorities towards user information. Going Out of the Box, I thought to test its out of scope subdomains because those are the domains which aren’t tested by anyone. I started recon with <a href="https://github.com/OWASP/Amass"><strong>Amass</strong></a><strong> &amp; </strong><a href="https://github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder"><strong>Assetfinder</strong></a> and got a lots of subdomains. I harvested 30 subdomains, checked each subdomain and finally got a subdomain( <strong>m***.redacted.com </strong>). It has a Login page for an Administrative Doctor. I gave a single quote(<strong>‘</strong>) as a value on the <strong>user id &amp; password </strong>parameter. I got an SQL Error, i was bit excited. I tried with <strong>1’ or ‘1’=’1 </strong>to bypass the Login, But failed. The failed response to login request was ‘<strong>200 Ok</strong>’. Then without wasting time i fired up Burp Intruder having <strong>Blind Sqli payloads, </strong>and got a response with <strong>‘302 found’. </strong>I cross checked with the succeed Payload<strong> ‘)) or ((‘x’))=((‘ </strong>by giving</p><p>Userid=<strong>’)) or ((‘x’))=((‘ &amp;Password=’)) or ((‘x’))=((‘</strong></p><p>BBBOOOOMMMMMM……………..</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FYlPeYXasYEPpC%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Freaction-YlPeYXasYEPpC&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FYlPeYXasYEPpC%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="245" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/dc5ec46b6742e2183db846d911c64093/href">https://medium.com/media/dc5ec46b6742e2183db846d911c64093/href</a></iframe><p>I was Successfully logged in to the administrative account. There are lots of admin functionality now i can access, like adding blogs, adding/deleting members, uploading/viewing receipts.</p><p>But the problem was the administrative subdomain in which i have admin access was out of scope, but their priority was user’s information. So i thought if i’ll get the database then it will leave an impact on declining the report as N/A. I tried to dump data from the database manually through the <br>“userid” and “password” parameter (Result= Failed),fired up <strong>Sqlmap </strong>and<strong> </strong>tried to dump database (Result=failed). Then i thought of finding some hidden parameters from the accessed admin panel. I started digging more paths through burp spider, after some time i got a path <strong>m***.redacted.com/ImagingCenter/MailingList.php?personID=1&amp;lang=en&amp;navigation=1&amp;namesOnly=1&amp;view=board</strong></p><p>With the help of Sqlmap, I also get the database and the Vulnerable param was “<strong>personID” and </strong>the database was<strong> MySql.</strong></p><p>Yesssss…Now i had data of all users, members, students and other stuffs.</p><p>Everything was on my fever, I thought of trying uploading a malicious file on the upload section, for which i seek their permission but they denied to do so.</p><p><strong>Reported the bug</strong>: 5/11/2020, 7:28:34 PM</p><p><strong>Bug Accepted:</strong> 5/12/2020, 12:50:43 PM</p><p><strong>Triaged &amp; Status Changed from High to Critical: </strong>5/12/2020, 12:50:51 PM</p><p><strong>Bounty Time with A little Tragedy: 1400 €</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/849/1*1Nv3m-ZTUFz-gciRP0ykMw.png" /><figcaption>Reply from the Organisation</figcaption></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F3ov9k9qBiR17LYWPEQ%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fteamcoco-yes-win-3ov9k9qBiR17LYWPEQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3ov9k9qBiR17LYWPEQ%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c7d0c0e04f663a4715124bbf381b663b/href">https://medium.com/media/c7d0c0e04f663a4715124bbf381b663b/href</a></iframe><p>Thank You for reading…..</p><p>….Love you 3000…</p><p>For you: You Are 1337 on your own way</p><p>./Logging_out</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3705ce8bdb62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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