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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I was able to delete MFA of any user without Authentication]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/how-i-was-able-to-delete-mfa-of-any-user-without-authentication-814904b506a2?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/814904b506a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-hunter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Dec 2024 11:21:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-28T11:21:43.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/201/1*xXa54vXUW6dY5OClbwDvGg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Hello Folks,</em></p><p><em>This write-up is about a small but impactful bug where the MFA of any user could be deleted without any authentication.</em></p><p><em>So, this application had an option to delete the MFA of user after logging in. I casually tried to delete my own MFA.</em></p><p><em>The application would send a </em><strong><em>DELETE</em></strong><em> request to the following endpoint assuming the domain is target.com. </em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/mfa/settings/reset/{mfaid}</em></strong></p><p><em>Then I added the </em><strong><em>mfa id</em></strong><em> of another user &amp; it successfully deleted that user’s MFA with my session.</em></p><p><em>I immediately reported this to the program &amp; continued testing on it. While testing I tried to open the request in the </em><strong><em>URL</em></strong><em> without logging in.</em></p><p><em>A </em><strong><em>GET</em></strong><em> request to </em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/mfa/settings/reset/{mfaid}</em></strong></p><p><em>Surprisingly the application loaded the page with the option to delete the MFA. On clicking the delete button the application would delete that MFA. This meant that any user’s MFA could be deleted without any authentication if you have the </em><strong><em>mfa id</em></strong><em>.</em></p><p><em>The </em><strong><em>mfa id</em></strong><em> could only be obtained during the MFA verification phase where the </em><strong><em>mfa id</em></strong><em> is sent along with the MFA code for verification.</em></p><p><em>Since, the attacker required the password of a victim’s account to delete the MFA the program accepted this as a </em><strong><em>MEDIUM </em></strong><em>severity bug.</em></p><p><em>So, always remember to test for endpoints that allow access without any authentication. This may have severe impact on the organization depending on the action that can be performed.</em></p><p><em>Have a good day!! Keep hacking….</em>😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: For educational purpose only please do not try for illegal activities.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=814904b506a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Critical Authentication Bypass & Account Takeover via Attacker’s MFA Code]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/critical-authentication-bypass-account-takeover-via-attackers-mfa-code-fadf36fe6e34?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fadf36fe6e34</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Dec 2024 04:57:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-08T04:57:51.002Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/769/1*p1UPo-a4E-x3FC86Qflodw.png" /><figcaption><strong>Critical Account Takeover Bug via MFA Code</strong></figcaption></figure><p><em>Hello Folks,</em></p><p><em>This write-up is about an account takeover bug that I found on the same public bug bounty program which was described in my previous post.</em></p><p><em>Link shared below:</em></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@sharp488/critical-account-takeover-mfa-auth-bypass-due-to-cookie-misconfiguration-3ca7d1672f9d">Critical Account Takeover (MFA + Auth Bypass) due to Cookie Misconfiguration</a></p><p><strong><em>Note:</em></strong></p><p><em>Setting MFA in the account was mandatory for all Admin accounts hence this report was applicable &amp; critical.</em></p><p><strong><em>Normal authentication flow of application</em></strong></p><ul><li><em>Login to account from “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login”</em></strong></li><li><em>Application prompts for password &amp; upon entering it will redirect to “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login/mfa”</em></strong></li><li><em>Enter the MFA code &amp; hit submit.</em></li><li><em>The </em><strong><em>POST</em></strong><em> request will contain the code &amp; the </em><strong><em>mfa id </em></strong><em>&amp; account can be accessed. (The </em><strong><em>mfa id </em></strong><em>is a static &amp; unique alphanumeric value which identifies each MFA set on an account.)</em></li></ul><p><strong><em>The Exploit</em></strong></p><ul><li><em>Go to login page &amp; enter </em><strong><em>attacker’s</em></strong><em> email id.</em></li><li><em>The application will redirect to page where password has to be entered.</em></li><li><em>Enter the password &amp; login.</em></li><li><em>The application will redirect to “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login/mfa”</em></strong></li><li><em>MFA code will be sent to attacker’s email id.</em></li><li><em>Note down the code &amp; click on back button &amp; return to login page.</em></li><li><em>Now enter the victim’s email id.</em></li><li><em>Once again, the application will redirect to password prompt page.</em></li><li><em>Do not enter the password instead open the following </em><strong><em>URL: </em></strong><em>“</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login/mfa”. (</em></strong><em>As explained in the previous post there is a cookie misconfiguration where the application assigns a valid session cookie while submitting the email id. So, by accessing “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login/mfa” </em></strong><em>after entering the email id the application will directly prompt for MFA code thus authentication is bypassed).</em></li><li><em>Now enter the code received on attacker’s email id which was noted down in the initial steps.</em></li><li><em>The application will grant access to the victim’s account.</em></li></ul><p><em>There was no proper validation in place to match the </em><strong><em>cookie</em></strong><em> &amp; </em><strong><em>mfa id</em></strong><em> hence any account could be accessed using this method.</em></p><p><em>The company accepted this as </em><strong><em>CRITICAL</em></strong><em> vulnerability since a victim’s account could be accessed without any authentication by just adding the attacker’s MFA code.</em></p><p><em>Hope you guys enjoyed reading this.</em></p><p><em>Have a good day!! Keep hacking….</em>😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: For educational purpose only please do not try for illegal activities.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fadf36fe6e34" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Critical Account Takeover (MFA + Auth Bypass) due to Cookie Misconfiguration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/critical-account-takeover-mfa-auth-bypass-due-to-cookie-misconfiguration-3ca7d1672f9d?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ca7d1672f9d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Dec 2024 04:19:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-01T04:19:31.204Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*0C8Pga7Ud3hTz26BDBUFxA.png" /><figcaption><strong>Critical Account Takeover (MFA + Auth Bypass) due to Cookie Misconfiguration</strong></figcaption></figure><p><em>Hello Folks,</em></p><p><em>This write-up is about an account takeover bug that I found on a public bug bounty program.</em></p><p><em>As an attacker I was able to easily bypass the authentication &amp; MFA mechanism implemented in the application.</em></p><p><em>For obvious reasons I won&#39;t be disclosing the target name. Let’s assume that the domain name is “</em><strong><em>target.com</em></strong><em>”. In order to access the application, we need to login via “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login</em></strong><em>”.</em></p><p><em>The application asked for the username. After submitting the username, it redirected to “</em><strong><em>sso.target.com/v2/login/options</em></strong><em>”. Here the application prompted to enter the password. I entered the wrong password and clicked on login. The application sent a </em><strong><em>POST </em></strong><em>request with the credentials in the body. I intercepted the response using proxy tool which was </em><strong><em>302</em></strong><em> &amp; the application redirected to following URL </em><strong><em>“GET /v2/login?failed”.</em></strong></p><p><em>Now I replaced the request with “</em><strong><em>POST /v2/mfalogin/enrolled</em></strong>” <em>&amp; forwarded it.</em></p><p><em>The application successfully logged in without the credentials or MFA code.</em></p><p><em>The application was already assigning a valid cookie while entering the username &amp; the MFA enrollment URL was not being validated.</em></p><p><em>The company accepted this as </em><strong><em>CRITICAL</em></strong><em> vulnerability since a victim’s account could be accessed without any authentication or MFA code.</em></p><p><em>Have a good day!! Keep hacking….</em>😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: For educational purpose only please do not try for illegal activities.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ca7d1672f9d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Payment Bypass via API Request to Activate Premium Plan on Private Bug Bounty Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/payment-bypass-via-api-request-to-activate-premium-plan-on-private-bug-bounty-program-bbd7fc91ef99?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bbd7fc91ef99</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 04:19:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-28T04:19:27.910Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zqG7ajyc51JnEhuTsr8OrQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Hello Folks,</em></p><p><em>Welcome to another write-up of a </em><strong><em>High</em></strong><em> severity finding from a private bug bounty program.</em></p><p><em>So, this was a unique case hence decided to share it.</em></p><p><em>This program had setup a staging environment for testing purpose. They had recently introduced an option to activate premium plan trial option. I activated it &amp; started testing the premium features. I was able to find few bugs. Since I was testing this application for a few months I had saved the project in </em><strong><em>Burp Suite. </em></strong><em>This step was crucial in uncovering the payment bypass bug which we will see later.</em></p><p><em>A few months passed &amp; once again I started poking around this application in the hope of finding new bugs. As I logged into the application, I noticed that the activate trial option had been removed. This meant that they were no longer allowing users to activate primum trial plan. Users had to buy this by making payment.</em></p><p><em>As I mentioned earlier, I had saved the project in </em><strong><em>Burp Suite. </em></strong><em>Thus, I had all the requests saved in it. I checked my repeater tab &amp; found the </em><strong><em>API</em></strong><em> request which was used to activate the premium trial plan.</em></p><p><em>Since my current account had premium already activated in it, I quickly created a new account in the application &amp; replayed this </em><strong><em>API </em></strong><em>request with the cookie of the new </em><strong><em>Owner</em></strong><em> account. Surprisingly the server responded with a </em><strong><em>200 OK</em></strong><em> &amp; the premium trial was activated in the account.</em></p><p><em>To confirm the bug, I checked the same scenario on production server &amp; it worked there as well.</em></p><p><em>Turns out the trial option was only removed from the UI but the </em><strong><em>API </em></strong><em>request was not deactivated from the backend by the developer which allowed users to avail premium plan for free without making any payment.</em></p><p><em>I quickly reported this to the program. </em><strong><em>HackerOne</em></strong><em> triage team was able to reproduce the issue &amp; triaged it. Later the company reviewed the report and accepted it as </em><strong><em>High</em></strong><em> severity finding.</em></p><p><strong><em>Summary:</em></strong></p><p><em>This was a very simple bug which I came across unexpectedly. But the important thing here was saving the project in </em><strong><em>Burp Suite. </em></strong><em>This helped me find the “activate trial premium” request. So, always remember to save the project while testing any application. You never know when it could be handy.</em></p><p><em>Hope you guys enjoyed reading this.</em>✌🏻</p><p><em>Have a good day!! Keep hacking…. </em>😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purpose only please do not engage in unauthorized testing.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bbd7fc91ef99" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[2FA Bypass via OAuth Linking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/2fa-bypass-via-oauth-linking-c8a640519ae8?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c8a640519ae8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2024 03:37:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-18T03:37:33.292Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*jrT8wbGxVJ-zyET49Q1iCQ.png" /></figure><p>Hola Amigos,</p><p>This is a write-up explaining how I was able to bypass 2FA via OAuth linking on a popular private bug bounty program.</p><p>In this case, the application had Facebook, Apple &amp; Google logins. So, I created a normal account with the email say <strong><em>victim@gmail.com</em></strong> &amp; activated 2FA in it.</p><p>Now, I tried to authenticate into the application via Facebook. I entered the credentials of my Facebook account &amp; the privacy option showed up where you can choose whether or not to share name, profile pic &amp; email id from Facebook.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*IqygZjBEBLHy_wMxrnlOXw.png" /></figure><p>I chose not to share the email id as I was checking for an account takeover bug.</p><p>Then, the applicaiton asked me to enter the email id. I entered the email id of the victim created earlier with the email <strong><em>victim@gmail.com.</em></strong></p><p>But this did not give me direct access to the account as it would happen if an account takeover bug existed. Instead, it prompted for the password.</p><p>I entered the victim’s password &amp; hit login.</p><p>Here the application should prompt for 2FA code as 2FA was enabled in <strong><em>victim@gmail.com </em></strong>account<strong><em>.</em></strong></p><p>But instead, it gave me access to the victim’s account as there was no 2FA check implemented.</p><p>The company accepted it as <strong><em>High</em></strong> severity bug.</p><p>Hope you guys learnt something new from this. 🙂</p><p>Have a good day!! Keep hacking…. 😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purpose only. Please do not engage in unauthorized testing.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c8a640519ae8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I Deleted Users from the Database on Private Bug Bounty Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/how-i-deleted-users-from-the-database-on-private-bug-bounty-program-f1939e83dd6f?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f1939e83dd6f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 03:39:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-16T03:39:33.106Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*u4muOd-EmzwqT4CqLBiSlw.png" /></figure><p>Hello Friends,</p><p>This is a short write-up of a peculiar bug that I found on a private bug bounty program.</p><p>It was an application with multiple roles in it. An Owner, Admin &amp; two other roles with lower privileges. Owner &amp; Admin could invite users to the organization.</p><p>They could create their own organization as well as join other organizations.</p><p>So, while testing I logged into two users on different browsers. One from Org A &amp; other from Org B. I sent an invite from the Owner account of Org A to Owner account of Org B. Then I revoked the invite.</p><p>When I checked the other browser, the Org B user was logged out. 🧐</p><p>I was baffled to see this and tried to login to that account, but the application responded with an error message saying the username or password is invalid. 😕</p><p>Then I tried to reset the password, but the password reset link was not sent to the respective email.</p><p>At that time, I realized that the account may have been somehow deleted. To confirm this, I tried to create a new account with that email address &amp; it worked. A completely new user was created, and all the old data was erased.</p><p>To get to the bottom of this I checked again and found that I was able to delete only unverified accounts (accounts where email was not verified after registration).</p><p>I reported this &amp; HackerOne triager reproduced the bug &amp; sent it to the program for review.</p><p>There was no reply from the program for several days. It was about 2 weeks forth I decided to dig deeper into the issue.</p><p>The application had an option to login via Facebook. So, I registered an account with Facebook id. Since the login was via Facebook, no email verification was required.</p><p>I then sent an invite to this account using the Owner account of another Org &amp; revoked the invite.</p><p>The account created using Facebook login was deleted.</p><p>I immediately added this to the existing report. After a few hours the program accepted it as a <strong><em>High </em></strong>severity<strong><em> </em></strong>vulnerability &amp; instantly paid the bounty.</p><p><strong><em>Summary:</em></strong></p><p>So, basically anyone could delete users with unverified accounts &amp; Facebook login accounts from the database by just inviting them to the organization &amp; then revoking the invite. 😁</p><p>Hope you guys enjoyed reading this. ✌🏻</p><p>Have a good day!! Keep hacking…. 😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purpose only please do not engage in unauthorized testing.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1939e83dd6f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Passively Found Secrets in Javascript File on a Private Bug Bounty Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/passively-found-secrets-in-javascript-file-on-a-private-bug-bounty-program-36eb29c2a35c?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/36eb29c2a35c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[burpsuite-extension]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[burpsuite]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 04:52:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-14T04:52:47.265Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*J0W-3xsWXgHUyvIIPGL0Lg.png" /></figure><p>Hello Friends,</p><p>This is a small post to explain how I was able to passively find secrets in javascript file.</p><p>I used a Burp Suite extension called <strong><em>jsluice++ </em></strong>which is available on Github.</p><p><a href="https://github.com/0x999-x/jsluicepp">GitHub - 0x999-x/jsluicepp: jsluice++ is a Burp Suite extension designed for passive and active scanning of JavaScript traffic using the CLI tool jsluice</a></p><p>After installing the extension just select the settings as shown below as this will notify you as soon as a secret if found in the javascript file.</p><p><em>(Bear in mind that like most extensions, this one does report false positives as well.)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vYAGRAS4-ZiCpfeUGR8ukQ.png" /></figure><p>After selecting the options set the scope in Burp Suite &amp; start browsing the application. The extension will notify you as soon as an api key, password, token etc. is found in any javascript file belonging to the in-scope <strong><em>URL</em></strong>.</p><p>In my case I was able to find some sensitive information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ZnjMkkBf_APh5kWhvleoA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I checked to see if the AWS KEY &amp; SECRET were exploitable but turned out that it had already expired.</p><p>So, I opened the javascript file &amp; checked it manually. There were plenty of sensitive information disclosed like <strong><em>AWS KEY, AWS SECRET, App Versions, Internal Paths, Tokens</em></strong> etc.</p><p>Since I had no idea on how to exploit the rest of the information found in the file, I reported this to the program.</p><p>Although the file exposed a lot of values, only one value “<strong><em>VERCEL_TOKEN” </em></strong>caught their attention. They said that it is a cause for concern &amp; that it should not be disclosed publicly.</p><p>I had submitted this finding as <strong><em>Critical </em></strong>but since only the <strong><em>VERCEL_TOKEN </em></strong>was exploitable, it was marked as <strong><em>High</em></strong>.</p><p>So, always submit a report even if you are unsure on how to exploit the information available in front of you. If it’s an honest program, you will be definitely rewarded.</p><p>Hope you guys come across <strong><em>Critical</em></strong> findings using this method.</p><p>Have a good day!! Keep hacking…. 😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purpose only please do not engage in unauthorized testing.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36eb29c2a35c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Configure XCode iOS Simulator + Burpsuite for pentesting on MacOs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/configure-xcode-ios-simulator-burpsuite-for-pentesting-on-macos-9abb8e7ab957?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9abb8e7ab957</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[burpsuite]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2024 13:59:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-01T13:59:49.365Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*qQrTKJ9HOupUln99ODOLgQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Setup XCode iOS simulator to work with Burpsuite proxy.</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Pre-requisites :-</em></strong></p><p>Install XCode on your mac system via App store &amp; also add iOS Simulator add on.</p><p><strong><em>Steps to follow :-</em></strong></p><ol><li>Note down the local IP address of your system which can be found under <strong><em>details</em></strong> tab under <strong><em>WiFi</em></strong> settings.</li><li>Now go to <strong><em>Proxies</em>, </strong>add that IP address in <strong><em>Web Proxy</em></strong> &amp; <strong>Secure</strong> <strong><em>Web Proxy</em> </strong>option along with a port number say <strong><em>8080</em></strong>.</li><li>In Burpsuite <strong><em>Proxy Settings</em> </strong>under listners, add the port number <strong><em>8080</em></strong> and select the IP address found in Step 1 in specific address option.</li><li>Now open XCode iOS simulator, open browser &amp; download Burpsuite certificate by accessing <a href="http://burp./">http://burp.</a></li><li>Go to Setting &gt; General &gt; VPN &amp; Device Management &gt; Portswigger CA &amp; click on install.</li><li>Go back to Settings &gt; General &gt; About &gt; Certificate Trust Settings &amp; select the toggle bar.</li><li>In Burpsuite switch on the intercept option.</li><li>Now open browser &amp; access any website for example <strong><em>netflix.com.</em></strong></li><li>Xcode iOS Simulator is successfully intercepted in Burpsuite proxy tool.</li></ol><p><strong><em>Adding a video of the steps mentioned above:-</em></strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F22gAJwzae1Q%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D22gAJwzae1Q&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F22gAJwzae1Q%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4f9b5b3be2f725ec18d0bd93c6196023/href">https://medium.com/media/4f9b5b3be2f725ec18d0bd93c6196023/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9abb8e7ab957" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[2FA Bypass Using Custom Cookie Parameter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/2fa-bypass-using-custom-cookie-parameter-cb270c8557d2?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cb270c8557d2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[info-sec-writeups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 May 2023 04:17:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-22T04:20:36.399Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/256/1*_3MJ3vOy2atC_oeQVe2wzQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>2FA Bypass Using Custom Cookie Parameter</strong></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Hello All,</em></strong></p><p><em>This write-up is about a 2FA bypass which was found in a private program on </em><strong><em>HackerOne</em></strong><em>. A few months ago, this company had newly implemented 2FA feature in their application.</em></p><p><strong><em>Summary:</em></strong></p><p><em>I immediately started testing it since it was a new feature. Surprisingly I was able to bypass the 2FA. The cookie received during the 2FA verification process could access the internal edit profile page of the account. Here an attacker could easily change the </em><strong><em>email</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>id</em></strong><em> or </em><strong><em>phone number</em></strong><em> to permanently take over the account. I reported this to the program as soon as I found it. The next day it was marked as duplicate as some other researcher had submitted the same issue before me.</em></p><p><em>Since the program was running a promotion for 2FA related bugs I decided to test further to see if there are any other flaws. As I was exploring the application, I noticed that they had an </em><strong><em>APK </em></strong><em>version of it. This was not explicitly mentioned in the program scope, but I decided to take a look at it anyway. I installed the </em><strong><em>APK </em></strong><em>and tried logging in with a 2FA enabled account. The application logged in successfully without prompting for the 2FA code. Thus 2 factor authentication was bypassed. I immediately checked the request in burp and found that the </em><strong><em>domain </em></strong><em>was in scope. So I reported this to the program ASAP.</em></p><p><strong><em>Root Cause:</em></strong></p><p><em>At first I thought that the developers had not implemented 2FA in their APK. So, I decided to compare the requests from </em><strong><em>Web App &amp; APK (as both domains were different but in scope) </em></strong><em>to find the root cause. I realized that the </em><strong><em>APK </em></strong><em>request had an extra parameter </em><strong>UKAppMode=true;</strong> <em>passed in cookie which led to the 2FA bypass.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0M_NqGDGTlo9Bm3L-VuVEw.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong><em>Custom Cookie Parameter Value</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p><em>If this parameter was added to </em><strong><em>Web App </em></strong><em>request, we could bypass 2FA there as well.</em></p><p>This was triaged as <strong><em>HIGH</em></strong> severity bug.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/370/1*gYlaXV39q7lFeD8bGFzZsg.gif" /></figure><p>Hope you all enjoyed reading this<em>.</em></p><p>Have a good day!! 😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: For educational purpose only please do not try for malicious or unauthorized actions.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb270c8557d2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[2FA Enabled Accounts Can Bypass Authentication & Access Account After Deactivation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sharp488/2fa-enabled-accounts-can-bypass-authentication-access-account-after-deactivation-8276a586be82?source=rss-87ab9b96c734------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8276a586be82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[info-sec-writeups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sharat Kaikolamthuruthil]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Nov 2022 06:43:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-27T06:43:26.128Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*kMhad79ISbpFLok58yAMJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>2FA Enabled Accounts Can Bypass Authentication &amp; Access Account After Deactivation</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Hello All,</p><p>This write-up is about a bug which allowed an account with 2FA enabled to access the organisation after being deactivated.</p><p>So after testing the 2FA feature of the application I noticed that the application does not require credentials but only the 2FA code to fetch you the session ID. Which means authentication can be bypassed.</p><p>After logging in, the application redirected to a page which is used to trigger 2FA of the account. It could be triggered without any cookie value.</p><p>After entering the code, application would return a session ID.</p><p>Since this bug does not pose a huge threat I decided to dig deeper into chaining this bug and escalating it into a High vulnerability.</p><p>Then I deactivated the account and tried to login but the application returned an error message.</p><p>Now using the repeater in burp suite I sent a request to trigger 2FA code for the deactivated account. The application did send an SMS code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*81HJY3tD4rvqK3qEmrUrkg.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Request to trigger 2FA Code</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Again using repeater I submitted the code in the SMS verification request as shown below. The application returned a valid session ID.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/983/1*y8evoguqDxFbqAa8uGiysg.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>SMS verification request</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Using this session ID I was able to access the account thus bypassing the deactivation.</p><p><strong><em>Root Cause:</em></strong></p><p>Upon deactivation, the application only disabled the user’s login credentials. It did not deactivate the trigger SMS option for that account.</p><p>Since the application’s authentication was based on only 2FA code, user’s could successfully obtain session ID even after deactivation &amp; access the account.</p><p>This was triaged as <strong><em>HIGH</em></strong> severity bug.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*2IXnGLFGImbV7X_BGwvd5A.gif" /></figure><p>Have a good day!! 😃</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer: For educational purpose only please do not try for illegal activities.</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8276a586be82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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