<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shawn Wells on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shawn Wells on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@shawndwells?source=rss-ce8d2ad72a85------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 10:45:28 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@shawndwells/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Government-ready OpenStack Update (May 2018)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shawndwells/government-ready-openstack-update-may-2018-163483b77644?source=rss-ce8d2ad72a85------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/163483b77644</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[openstack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fedramp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shawndwells-blog]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opencontrol]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shawn Wells]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2018 00:10:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-24T00:10:42.838Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>During the OpenStack Summit in Sydney, Keith Basil (@noslzzp) and I <a href="https://www.openstack.org/videos/sydney-2017/openstack-compliance-speed-and-agility-yes-its-possible">gave a talk</a> about how Red Hat is preparing our distribution of OpenStack to become compliant with regulatory frameworks. The aspiration is to be regulatory-ready out of the box; meaning the OpenStack installer will allow customers to select a security profile (e.g. FedRAMP, ANSSI, PCI-DSS) and OpenStack will configure itself accordingly.</p><p>It’s been six months since the OpenStack Sydney. Since that time Red Hat Summit has come and passed, OpenStack Summit Vancouver happening this week, and Red Hat<a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/lucky-13-red-hat-releases-red-hat-openstack-platform-13/"> publicly disclosed that OSP13’s release is scheduled for June</a>. Time for a public update!</p><h3>Where to Begin?</h3><p>The global nature of OpenStack deployments places an incredibly diverse set of security requirements on Red Hat. Our approach has been to analyze the top compliance initiatives <em>globally</em> and then build a plan to address them in a cohesive and focused manner.</p><p>The <a href="https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/group/cloud-controls-matrix/#_overview">Cloud Controls Matrix</a>, produced by the Cloud Security Alliance, was used as a starting point. This matrix maps standards, regulations, and controls frameworks such as the ISO 27001, PCI-DSS, FedRAMP, and FISMA. <em>By using the Cloud Controls Matrix we were able to prioritize security requirements to maximize the amount of regulatory compliance that could be achieved</em>.</p><p>We found that addressing the FedRAMP Moderate requirements would satisfy ~80% of the requirements common across the many compliance regimes.</p><h3>Planning the Plan</h3><p>We needed a lightweight process that could help convert high-level FedRAMP requirements, such as “network traffic should be encrypted,” to engineering-level RFEs such as TLS enabling all API endpoints. Additionally we wanted to track completion percentage against FedRAMP control families. For example, what percent of auditing requirements are implemented? What about identity management?</p><p>In reviewing the NIST 800–53 control selections that compose a FedRAMP Moderate baseline, 341 were identified as applicable to OpenStack. Sometimes these were documentation requirements, operational capabilities/processes, and a separate bucket for technical features.</p><p>Entering 341 feature requests into the Red Hat BugZilla system would just annoy everyone. It also meant realizing a sense of accomplishment would take several sprints — implementing 100 new features, while representing thousands of labor hours, would only get us ~33% done!</p><p>The FedRAMP controls were decomposed into the various FedRAMP levels (low, moderate, high). We found that:</p><ul><li><em>138 controls applied to OpenStack for FedRAMP Low</em><br>96 were already satisfied and 42 required engineering focus.</li><li><em>203 additional controls applied to OpenStack for FedRAMP Moderate</em><br>120 were already satisfied and 83 required engineering focus.</li><li><em>95 additional controls applied to OpenStack for FedRAMP High</em><br>54 were already satisfied and 41 required engineering focus.</li></ul><p>These breakouts allowed for the creation of feature requests, bucketed into consumable Epics of FedRAMP Low/Moderate/High. The feature requests were then placed into engineering’s backlog and are making their way through the development. Here’s the process:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9UWdotkgHis6T4-UXX3z0Q.png" /></figure><p>Following standard Agile planning cycles, features have been moving from the backlog into development — <strong><em>and have now started shipping!</em></strong></p><h3>First Delivery: Red Hat OpenStack Platform 13</h3><p>As mentioned earlier, <a href="http://www.eweek.com/cloud/red-hat-openstack-platform-13-delivers-long-term-support">Red Hat OpenStack Platform 13 is expected to be released in June 2018</a>. This release reflects considerable focus on security-related features that originated with the FedRAMP readiness planning.</p><p>Keith Basil (OpenStack Security Product Manager, <a href="https://twitter.com/noslzzp/">@noslzzp</a>) and Nate Kinder (OpenStack Security Engineering Manager, <a href="https://twitter.com/nate_kinder">@nate_kinder</a>) shared OpenStack’s security roadmap at Red Hat Summit this May. In the first half Keith speaks to the pragmatic approach, afterwards Nate steps through technical features being released. The video is <a href="https://youtu.be/-avXWgRghPM?t=0s">available on YouTube</a> and covers a deep technical review of the roadmap and associated features.</p><p>A few minutes into the presentation Keith steps through the OpenStack Platform Security Roadmap. For those who haven’t seen it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1008/1*0ieTAWxSBMNdyQJPFyF0gw.png" /></figure><p>OSP13 ships many (most?) of the remaining technical features identified for FedRAMP Moderate. OSP13 brings Barbican; this subsystem delivers many encryption use cases such as keys, certificates, passwords, and SSH keys. Additionally the OpenStack Security and Hardening Guide was greatly expanded and refreshed (OSP12 edition <a href="https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_openstack_platform/12/html/security_and_hardening_guide/index">here</a>).</p><p>As engineering transitions focus from OSP13 to OSP14, I’d like to call out the “Compliance as Code” effort noted above. This initiative spans both OSP13 and 14 — with aspirations to be released as a tech preview in OSP14.</p><h3>OSP 14: Compliance as Code [tech preview]</h3><p>Many regulated industries, such as healthcare, telecommunications, and nearly all U.S. government agencies, have adopted the <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Risk-Management/Risk-Management-Framework-(RMF)-Overview">NIST Risk Management Framework</a>. This framework first categorizes an information system based on levels of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Categorization then drives requirement selections from an incredibly large catalog of security and privacy controls known as <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-53r4.pdf">NIST 800–53</a>. For example, a “low impact” system may have 115 security controls however a “high impact” system could have several hundred.</p><p>Information systems are composed of <em>components</em> — such as a virtualization or container platform, an operating system, and middleware components.</p><blockquote>At the component level, the NIST Risk Management Framework is a reflection that many government agencies are moving away from static configuration baselines, such as those published by the Center for Internet Security or the DoD STIGs, and moving towards dynamically generated security baselines.</blockquote><p>In the past it was sufficient for a vendor to create a generic “security configuration guide” for customers. These days, especially within the Government, customers are asking vendors to create a custom baseline that specifically aligns with their NIST 800–53 control selections.</p><p>This leads to an important question:</p><blockquote>The U.S. Government created a control catalog. Why don’t we create a response catalog? Could customer-specific security guidance by dynamically generated?</blockquote><p>The goal of the OpenStack ComplianceAsCode content, <a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13">available on GitHub</a>, is to look across relevant security frameworks and codify compliance. The project delivers as much technical and system level compliance as possible using OpenControl-formatted data schemas.</p><h3>Initial Workflow</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Sq4G1DZEdl90GIgOuU3eEQ.png" /></figure><p>Currently the content repository itemizes NIST 800–53 control selections and provides technical and operational details needed to satisfy the control.</p><p>Sometimes that response identifies the NIST 800–53 control is not applicable to the configuration of OpenStack:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5cdfcb7bf97cc111fec97a8f62f1a3b6/href">https://medium.com/media/5cdfcb7bf97cc111fec97a8f62f1a3b6/href</a></iframe><p>Other times it provides a control response:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/23cee6ae184992ddd0d70a99e2b0d50a/href">https://medium.com/media/23cee6ae184992ddd0d70a99e2b0d50a/href</a></iframe><p>Or identifies that a response is still needed, and where to help create one:</p><p>Or identifies a response is still needed, and where to help create one:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/de8c7828dad8a9c3c932fe09e88c5bed/href">https://medium.com/media/de8c7828dad8a9c3c932fe09e88c5bed/href</a></iframe><p>Certification profiles can be created — either selecting controls of known baselines, such as FedRAMP, or customer-specific selections, such as DHS 4300A:</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/226d5db2d30393d327f523a119e862be/href">https://medium.com/media/226d5db2d30393d327f523a119e862be/href</a></iframe><p>The build system scans the OpenStack content repository for answers tagged with the corresponding NIST 800–53 controls. Once the responses are identified, the build system dynamically generates the auditor paperwork that details what controls were selected and how the component satisfies the selected controls (in Government, these are called System Security Plans and Requirement Traceability Matrixes).</p><p>For example, a quick status report against control selections:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YJexwoBObHSVP15BdJ2vhQ.png" /></figure><p>Or the more detailed control response, rendered as a webpage:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EJSTQ4nxdTAag8wg27bNrA.png" /></figure><p>Note how multiple components can be shown together — in this case, OpenShift, OpenStack, and IdM.</p><h3>Future Plans</h3><p>Today the OpenStack content is limited to generating documentation. In late Summer 2018 we plan to integrate the <a href="https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide">SCAP Security Guide Project</a>, which will mean the build system will dynamically generate SCAP and Ansible content tailored to control selections.</p><p>For known baselines, such as FedRAMP or FISMA, Red Hat will be uploading the resulting artifacts (SCAP, auditor paperwork, Ansible playbooks, kickstarts) into the NIST National Checklist Program.</p><h3>Interested in Collaborating?</h3><p>The OpenStack content is being developed through the ComplianceAsCode project on GitHub → <a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13">https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13</a>.</p><p>Guidance is broken down into three primary categories:</p><ul><li>FedRAMP Low<br><a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/1">https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/1</a></li><li>FedRAMP Moderate<br><a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/3">https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/3</a></li><li>FedRAMP High:<br><a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/4">https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/projects/4</a></li></ul><p>Each project contains a Kanban-style board with outstanding NIST 800–53 controls that need responses.</p><p>For example, <a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/issues/308">issue #308</a> requires that network ports, protocols, and (network) services be documented. Help is needed to document what network ports/protocols OpenStack services listen on.</p><p>Interested in using the content and need help? Open an issue at <a href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/issues/new">https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat-openstack-platform-13/issues/new</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=163483b77644" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells/government-ready-openstack-update-may-2018-163483b77644">Government-ready OpenStack Update (May 2018)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells">shawndwells</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[About Me]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shawndwells/about-me-f988cd9e4fac?source=rss-ce8d2ad72a85------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f988cd9e4fac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[shawndwells]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shawn Wells]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:17:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-27T21:36:24.935Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*Ia1Q-KfHaGowbbGfwAWSug.jpeg" /></figure><p>coming soon!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f988cd9e4fac" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells/about-me-f988cd9e4fac">About Me</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells">shawndwells</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Draft RHEL6 STIG Released… now what?!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shawndwells/draft-rhel6-stig-released-now-what-13fe31e68564?source=rss-ce8d2ad72a85------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/13fe31e68564</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shawndwells-blog]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rhel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stig]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shawn Wells]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-27T18:54:16.799Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 12-FEB-2013 DISA released the first public draft of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (RHEL6) STIG. On the surface it’s a bunch of jibber jabber XML tags, however this initial version, the Draft RHEL6 STIG, Version 1, Release 0.3, is so much more. Let’s play with it. Understand it. And become friends.</p><p><em>[18-JUNE-2013 editors note: the RHEL6 STIG is now finalized and </em><a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/unix-linux/Pages/red-hat.aspx"><em>available on DISA FSO’s website</em></a><em>. Some editorial is available </em><a href="http://shawndwells.github.io//2013/05/30/dont-miss-point-rhel6-stig/"><em>here</em></a><em>]</em></p><p>The Draft RHEL6 STIG is an incredible milestone. For the first time the content development of a STIG has been open sourced. Through an initiative lead by the <a href="http://www.nsa.gov/ia/">National Security Agency’s Information Assurance Directorate (NSA IAD)</a>, with partnership from <a href="http://www.disa.mil/About/Our-Organization-Structure/OD-Field-Office/Field-Security-Operations">DISA Field Security Operations (DISA FSO)</a>, an open source community named the <a href="https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/">SCAP Security Guide project (SSG)</a> was formed. This community developed the “upstream” SCAP content from which the RHEL6 STIG is derived. The movement towards transparent collaboration — between government agencies, industry partners, and content consumers — further reflects acceptance by the NSA and DISA FSO of the benefits of open source development models.</p><p>On 12-FEB-2013 DISA FSO released the first public <a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/unix-linux/Pages/red-hat.aspx">Draft RHEL6 STIG</a>. This initial draft only includes XCCDF content which can be transformed into an HTML guide. The adoring public has until 26-FEB-2013 to inform DISA of any concerns regarding the content — are passwords to complex? Should SELinux be disabled? Are the audit rules comprehensive enough? — feedback in such areas is welcome and needed to ensure a functional RHEL6 STIG.</p><p>On 27-FEB-2013, the day after the public comment period ends, the SSG community will be busy addressing all reported issues. Based off current schedules, a “Final Draft” will be released on 19-MAR-2013. We’ll then go through a final round of public feedback, to have the final (“production ready”) STIG published near the end of April.</p><p><strong><em>Shameless plug for the SSG:</em></strong><em> If you’d like to see this happen sooner, please feel free to contribute to the SCAP Security Guide! We need </em><a href="https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/wiki/becomeadeveloper"><em>developers</em></a><em> to address </em><a href="https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/report/3"><em>known issues</em></a><em>, and extra assistance will help get things done faster. Your SCAP-foo skills need not be strong, support in creating documentation is vital to usability, as is user testing of our incremental builds.</em></p><p>Below are instructions on transforming the content into a usable form (HTML guides), and how/where to provide feedback to DISA FSO:</p><ol><li>SCAP is a content protocol of which you’ll need an interpreter; this is very analogous to how a web browser is needed to view HTML content. Within RHEL6 we ship an interpreter named OpenSCAP, which can be installed via yum:</li></ol><pre>$ sudo sh -c &quot;yum -y install openscap-utils&quot;</pre><ol><li>Next, download and unpack the DISA RHEL6 Draft STIG:</li></ol><pre>$ wget -O /tmp/u_draft_redhat%206_v1r03_stig.zip \ <a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/unix/u_draft_redhat%206_v1r03_stig.zip">http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/unix/u_draft_redhat%206_v1r03_stig.zip</a></pre><ol><li>Let’s extract DISA’s zip file:</li></ol><pre>$ sudo sh -c &quot;mkdir -p /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA&quot; $ unzip -d /tmp/ \ /tmp/u_draft_redhat%206_v1r03_stig.zip Archive: /tmp/u_draft_redhat%206_v1r03_stig.zip inflating: /tmp/U_RedHat6_V1R03_Readme.txt inflating: /tmp/U_RedHat6_V1R03_manual_STIG.zip inflating: /tmp/U_RedHat6_V1R03_Overview.pdf</pre><ol><li>Yes, that’s right, DISA put a zip file within a zip file. The *_manual_STIG.zip contains the actual SCAP content, of which should be extracted to /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/:</li></ol><pre>$ sudo sh -c &quot;unzip -d /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/ \ /tmp/U_RedHat6_V1R03_manual_STIG.zip&quot; Archive: /tmp/U_RedHat6_V1R03_manual_STIG.zip inflating: /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/U_RedHat6_v1r03_manual-xccdf.xml inflating: /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/stig_unclass.xsl inflating: /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/DoD-DISA-logos-as-JPEG.jpg</pre><ol><li>XCCDF is an XML specification which defines what compliance rule(s) your system will be scanned against. The XML is fairly straight forward, however lets convert it into HTML for easier viewing:</li></ol><pre>$ oscap xccdf generate guide - profile allrules \ /usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/U_RedHat6_v1r03_manual-xccdf.xml \ &gt;/tmp/DISA_DRAFT_RHEL6_STIG.html WARNING: Processing an unresolved XCCDF document. This may have unexpected results.</pre><p>The command above will convert the XML content to an HTML file, a copy of which <a href="http://shawndwells.github.io/img/media/DISA_DRAFT_RHEL6_STIG.html">you can read here</a>. You may ignore the message of “WARNING: Processing an unresolved XCCDF document….” This message relates to the method which DISA publishes their content, and does not effect usage. The Table of Contents will list out the various rules contained within the STIG. Click on the first item — <a href="http://shawndwells.github.io/img/media/DISA_DRAFT_RHEL6_STIG.html#item-RHEL-06-000021">OS-SRG-000016</a> — and let’s review it. You’ll quickly notice that DISA has decorated the content with several XML tags (such as FalseNegatives, SeverityOverrideGuidance, etc) which have little apparent meaning. These XML tags are generated through DISA’s internal tooling and may be ignored. Once you get past the formatting you’ll notice a review of the requirement (via the VulnDiscussion tag), and implementation details under “Remediation instructions.”</p><p>U.S. Military systems are classified by a “Mission Assurance Category” (MAC) and “Confidentiality Level.” Matrixed together these definitions define what levels of Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality your system must meet. You can review formal MAC and Confidentiality levels <a href="https://www.mpm.osd.mil/documents/OUID051606_IACategory.pdf">here</a>. In Step 4 we created an HTML checklist reflecting rules contained within the STIG. If you’re interested in breaking them out per MAC and Confidentiality Level, you can run the following command:</p><pre>$ for scapProfile in MAC-1_Classified MAC-1_Public MAC-1_Sensitive \ <br>MAC-2_Classified MAC-2_Public MAC-2_Sensitive \<br>MAC-3_Classified MAC-3_Public MAC-3_Sensitive; do \<br>oscap xccdf generate guide - profile $scapProfile \<br>/usr/share/xml/scap/DISA/U_RedHat6_v1r03_manual-xccdf.xml \<br>&gt;/tmp/DISA_DRAFT_RHEL6_STIG-$scapProfile.html \<br>done</pre><p>Note: You can ignore the messages about “WARNING: Processing an unresolved XCCDF document.” Here are the HTML files which would be generated:</p><p>At this point you’re probably asking what the heck you’re supposed to be doing with this guide. Peer review of the content to identify any known issues is needed (“this setting will break my system!”), as is review of the implementation details (“n00b! Your audit rule regex is wrong!”). If you find something please EMail <a href="/service/mailto:disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil">disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil</a>, but be sure to call out which rule number you’re referring to. They’re identifiable as “RHEL-06–000 <em>xxx</em>” in the content.</p><p><em>Originally published February 13, 2013.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=13fe31e68564" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells/draft-rhel6-stig-released-now-what-13fe31e68564">Draft RHEL6 STIG Released… now what?!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shawndwells">shawndwells</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>