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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shehryar Ejaz on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shehryar Ejaz on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Shehryar Ejaz on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Forty-Eight Hours]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/forty-eight-hours-a959440c38e8?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[travel-writing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Oct 2023 22:49:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-09T22:49:53.105Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GCszT-fYIskYxKSS0619MQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>You need to order something now; we have another connection, and you won’t get anything later. the kid was adamant about fasting; either that or he didn’t like his dad taking him to McDonald’s under the garb of ‘having a (happy) meal.’ I saw them later near my departure gate, and we started talking about our destinations in broken Urdu; I love how others try to speak their native language even if they’re struggling.</p><p>I am taking my kids to Jeddah; this whole thing is a mess. We’ve been travelling for almost two days, and this little one’s not even eating; that part, I figured, wanted to suggest Burger King, but hey, too young for parenting advice.</p><p>Apart from Urdu, growing up in a specific part of the world, I had some background context on their itinerary and asked them to pray for me. However, I hope the itinerary doesn’t involve another instrument of American hegemony in the Middle East. Upon landing, I couldn’t see the bunch again; for obvious reasons, they had to figure out a lot, along with some meal plans. I feel like I am being too invasive here.</p><p>In my defence, I put my mind to rest with their meal situation until I came across a duo from Lahore with sleek Punjabi; who doesn’t like that? The McDonald’s kid in me went numb, and the Faisalabad side of things started to show, which involved some Punjabi banter at the airline desk; we thought no one was here to interpret the niceties of our conversation until some gentlemen from Bombay behind us laughed like anything hence proved.</p><p>After sorting some logistics and back-and-forth conversations, to put it nicely, I was back with another bunch; this time, we’ve resorted to our colonial heritage, also known as the English language. Apart from a few curse words in what I presume were Arabic, we finally made it to our hotel and held onto each other for a few more hours until we were back in our comfort zones, and we didn’t need others to fight our battles.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a959440c38e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bollywood and Cultural Hegemony amongst South Asian Millennials]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/bollywood-and-cultural-hegemony-amongst-south-asian-millennials-d5ec6f09594f?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cultural-hegemony]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bollywood]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2023 13:42:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-17T13:42:50.380Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/679/1*rQbgQEPrTmKW0Q-hPAYK4Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Credits: Yash Raj Films</figcaption></figure><p>Bollywood refers to the Hindi film category of Indian cinema, though one would ascribe Bollywood to modern-day India. The industry itself is older than the existence of the Indian Republic. The ‘B’ in Bollywood stands for Bombay (now Mumbai), one of the most influential cities in the South Asian cultural universe, followed by Lahore, Calcutta and Karachi (Punatahambekar, 2013). However, the events of 1947, followed by a somewhat controversial colonial demarcation, were a turning point for South Asian cinema; like all other aspects of a nation-state, films, music, and culture had to be labelled as either Indian or Pakistani.</p><p>The initial project hypothesis states that Bollywood, in all its forms, has maintained its cultural hegemony amongst South Asian millennials, whether at home or abroad. Though the said hegemony predates the social media era, one can recently observe old Bollywood films on the Instagram and Twitter handles of large Hindi film production houses. Most visual research and cultural analytics scholarship revolves around Western cultural productions, including American, English, or French films, theatre plays and drama.</p><p>This project shall investigate how Bollywood films are remediated on Instagram for a global south asian millennial audience (Gehlawat, 2010). This particular line of research is not only unexplored but also holds immense potential in uncovering discursive techniques for understanding newer forms of visual models, groupings, engagements, trends, and rankings essentially in Hindu or Urdu cultural productions, which as of now is spoken or understood by close to an approximate audience size of two billion plus. It is important to note that during the preliminary stages of this paper, one had to go constantly back and forth with narrowing down the line of research, where initially the research question revolved around the impact of Bollywood films on Indian origin diaspora, in another attempt, the research question aimed at how the Indian nation-state uses Bollywood for socio-political, and economic dominance. Such questions, though they hold scholarly relevance, could not account for the use of social media and its significance in visual research. Therefore this paper went ahead with the remediation angle, with select platforms, audience segments and Instagram handles.</p><p>The audience in question are recipients of Bollywood in their late twenties and early thirties, born in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh or to South Asian parents abroad. Whereas from a visual perspective, the primary empirical data sources will be the official Instagram account of Yash Raj Films (@yrf) and Dharma Productions (@dharmamovies), and secondary data sources will be Spotify India (@spotifyindia), Spotify Pakistan (@spotifypakistan), and Netflix India (@netflix_in). The rationale behind the said Instagram handles stems from the fact that both these production houses produced some of the most popular films in Hindi cinema, from likes of K3G (Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham), DDLJ (Dilwale Dulhaniya Lejayeing), Mohabattein, and Kuch Kuch Hota Hai. Most of the said films were produced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but still, they constitute an integral part of the production house’s Instagram strategy.</p><p>Additionally, the secondary platforms, including Netflix and Spotify chapters of India and Pakistan, are predominantly global entertainment platforms but have recently adopted platform localisation where all of the above handles routinely invoke films under purview (1) for audience engagement, promotions, lead generation, which in this specific case would be present-day films, merchandise, or advertisements.</p><h3>Theoretical Framework</h3><p>Cultural hegemony has been an integral part of Western political thought. However, we see little or no dominant cultural scholarship focusing on the global South. This paper is premised on the fact that the Bollywood fraternity, namely production houses and film fraternity along with the Indian state, has successfully maintained its cultural hegemony despite political tensions, economic woes, and even military stand-offs amongst the audience segments in question visa vi, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It further defies the US or Eurocentric version phenomenon of cultural hegemony and reinforces its version of hegemony amongst south asian audiences (Thussu, 2012). Lastly, it resorts to a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as to how the Indian ruling establishment, including corporations, bureaucracy, and the politico-military elite, aim to assert control over the South Asian masses through Bollywood films. Per Gramsci, the powers in the state have a significant advantage in the struggle for hegemony by their superior organisation, information, and means of communication (Bates, 1975). In this paper’s case, the means of communication implies the excessive economic, political, and moral support the Hindi film industry received from successive Indian governments until 1998, when Bollywood was given the ‘industry’ status (Punathambekar, 2013), transforming the state-cinema relationship, and its broader consequences.</p><p>Connecting earlier works on hegemony to modern-day Bollywood, this paper shall rely on Devasundaram’s (2016) idea of ‘meta-hegemony,’ where according to the author, not only did the Indian state endorse Bollywood at the highest levels of executive power, in fact, systematically pushed for Bollywood’s monopoly over the Indian cultural production streams, and instrumentalised it for soft power purposes.</p><p>A case in point example would be an average south asian millennial coming across an Instagram post, originally from the movie, Veer-Zara (Appendix 1.6), from a Gramscian standpoint, that would be considered as ‘spontaneous consent,’ one that the dominant social class has imposed on the masses due to their prestige and position of power in the cultural production realm. This particular example would fall under clusters 1 and 4, which propagate Indian nationalism and hopeless romance. For a brief overview, the film’s plot revolves around an Indian airforce pilot who develops intimacy with an aristocratic Pakistani girl. Zara risks his career and life to travel to Pakistan, an implied enemy territory, to profess his love for Zara. However, Zara’s family and fiance get Veer arrested on espionage charges. The film was initially released in 2004, but to date, YRF employs the film’s visuals, dialogues, and nationalistic gestures to represent the nation through the national cinema and build an appetite for hopeless romance, where despite the challenges, the protagonist’s love shall come through, which in Veer’s case came after twenty-two years, when he was released from custody (Tambunan, 2019). This form of storytelling differs from ‘traditional coercion’ and relies more on the relationship between the user and the platform’s algorithm. The same film goes far beyond entertainment and storytelling. It goes on to reflect on the discourse on gender, spatial, geographical boundaries, and contentions between Hinduism, Islam, visa vi, India, and Pakistan, all through a tragic love story. Gramsci would place a film like Veer-Zara way above the executive, legislature, and judiciary, as for him, the parliament and polling booth are mere forms, and the accurate content lies with adequate control of the cultural organisation and lines of communication.</p><p>Though most of the above fall outside the purview of this paper, the following theoretical frame of reference is Rahman’s (2020) work on consuming cultural hegemony in Bangladesh. Though this paper does not reference a Bangladeshi-based Instagram handle directly, Rahman’s entire work premises on how despite cultural and linguistic differences, Bangladeshi audience, especially the middle classes, Rahman’s ethnographic works reveal that a substantial segment of the Bangladesh middle class consumes Hindi films, and music for ‘pure entertainment.’ He further invokes Bourdieu’s (1975) notion of cultural capital, which explains why one’s educational and socio-economic background corresponds to their consumption patterns. Per Bourdieu, cultural consumption is not restricted to watching a specific film or listening to a song; it constitutes an integral part of the said class’s cultural ‘habitus’ and cultural subscription towards Hindi films. For this paper, one can assume that the same cultural subscription takes place through the aforementioned Instagram handles, which embody and institutionalise the Bollywood-based cultural capital under the garb of regional modernity towards global south asian millennial audiences. While most cultural scholars attribute their research and hypothesis to Western audiences and means of production, one can also categorise Bollywood’s approach as hegemonic under the Stuart Hall school of thought. Out of all the approaches laid out by Hall, including negotiated, oppositional, and hegemonic, local Indian production houses and global platforms like Spotify and Netflix use the latter for mass communication purposes. Where the subject encodes the message as intended, whether it is espousing nationalism, depicting unreal romance, or making people feel at home at times of cultural celebrations, including Eid, Diwali, Ramadan, weddings, and universal days, some scholars and activists lean towards wider consequences of the said hegemonic approach and have considered this strategy ‘cultural occupation,’ which may wipe out the local language, culture, and traditional practices of other South Asian countries and regions (Rahman, 2020, p. 185). It would be fair to argue that such concerns have recently garnered much attention from civil society, cultural scholars, and even the states in question due to high percentages of their population consuming Hindi film-centric content through social media, particularly Instagram.</p><h3>Methodology and Data Collection</h3><p>This paper uses discourse and content analysis techniques to measure the extent of remediation of Bollywood films on Instagram by the said handles. Additionally, since the metadata may vary according to type, size, audio, or visual, the paper remains open to multiple interpretations and specific techniques required to dissect the images posted on respective handles. The data collection was divided into multiple phases. In the first phase, multiple search queries were run on each Instagram account through zeeschuimer, initially on both @yrf and @dharmamovies, until it was decided to include supplementary handles of Spotify and Netflix. It is important to note that, while running the queries, one knew that a substantial amount of metadata was irrelevant or outside the purview of this paper, which was considered later during the clustering process.</p><p>The first phase had three zeeschuimer queries, categorised as @yrf, @yrf1, and subsequent for each handle; there were initial queries and were meant to gather all possible visuals, including images, reels, tweets and captions (Anjaria. 2021) along with comments, likes, and other measurement metrics. After running the first few queries and observing a pattern of films, this paper restricted itself to some of the top-grossing films laid out in Appendix 1, similar to each of the downloaded xlsx. files were merged into one sheet with their respective attributes, including the timestamp, username, likes, comments, captions, and hashtags. Similarly, since the zeeschuimer search follows a scrolling protocol, one would have collected the same metadata for each additional query unless filtered for newer images. Therefore the paper restricted itself to a cumulative total of 1577 images, with no specific selection criteria for each handle.</p><p>After the initial queries, two for both @yrf and @netflix_in and one for each @spotifyindia, @spotifypakistan, and @dharmamovies, the next phase was to apply both qualitative and quantitative filters, including restricting the dataset to greater than 1000 likes and 200 comments. On the qualitative side, the total number of visuals was filtered based on relevance, contextual background, and intended audience. The same set of visuals was also uploaded on the VGG image annotator. However, due to time constraints, and technical difficulties, this paper resorted to manually coding the visuals on google sheets. Since most of the images followed a similar pattern and concerned themselves with each image falling in a particular cluster instead of attributing different segments of the images into different clusters, that approach, though in-depth, would have complicated the final dataset, which is aimed at investigating the hegemonic use of old Bollywood films for a particular audience segment on Instagram. Similarly, a qualitative study of the images in question reveals a much more nuanced take on the Gramscian understanding of the ideal Indian husband, lover, and patriot, in Veer-Zara’s case both, where the protagonist is not only faithful to his country but also to his romantic interest that too despite the risks involved. Such visuals are repurposed on modern-day Instagram handles ideally to reinvigorate younger audiences into believing in relationships, both platonic and romantic, family values, and the significance of cultural celebrations to keep them intact with Bollywood and to penetrate deeper into their consumption patterns so not only the incumbent generation but even the forthcoming ones, never sway from Hindi films.</p><h3>Clustering</h3><p>While clustering, this paper was cognizant of how each film requires a rigorous discourse-specific approach to develop a solid conclusion later. Therefore each cluster was designed to cater to the underlying research question and unravel what lies behind the images and text. The first cluster is ‘India first’ (2.1), which attempts to espouse Indian nationalism amongst audiences both at home and abroad. The films about the said cluster do not have to be Hollywood-style military films where Indian soldiers are at war with the enemy. Bollywood presents a unique form of nationalism which reaches out to the average Indian.</p><p>In some cases, the handles used a scene from K3G (1.2), where the protagonist lands in London, with Indian music in the background, along with classical dances. In another scene of the same film, we see an Indian student singing the national anthem (1.2a) in front of his family amongst white audiences. In the collected datasets, Dharma referenced the scenes on the Indian republic day, January 26, and independence day, August 15. The second ‘family values’ (2.2) and third, ‘friends like family’ (2.3) clusters aim to celebrate the infamous Indian or south asian family system and friendships.</p><p>Interestingly, this cluster also covers a majority of images by @netflix_in and @spotify_in, where they invoke Western coming-of-age revelations, including Stranger Things, Riverdale, and Sex Education, along with Hindi subtexts.</p><p>For another series, Queen Charlotte and Bridgerton, one could observe references to joint family systems and how elders should be respected in Indian society. Lastly, the fourth and fifth clusters relate to hopeless romance (2.4) and cultural celebrations (2.5). The first cluster, though broad, unravels some of the most significant underpinnings of the research question, which is to remediate the notions of hopeless romance, primarily a Hindi film notion propagated through famous actors like Shahrukh Khan, Saif Ali Khan, Varun Dhawan, and Hrithik Roshan. The latter, however, is a classic case of seasonal campaigns, where specific scenes about Hindu and Muslim festivals are replugged on Instagram for traction and emotional engagement. This cluster specifically targets South Asian origin diaspora in Western capitals and encashes their feelings of homesickness and missing out on cultural celebrations at home. An important sub-cluster within cluster 5 is the Indian wedding scene beginning early November to late February. During the said months, the handles routinely plug wedding scenes from the films like Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (1.1) and DDLJ (1.3).</p><p>Similarly, Spotify came up with visuals and wedding playlists. The sixth cluster, ‘outside the purview (2.6)’, is attributed to all those images which do not lie in any other cluster. The rationale behind adding the sixth cluster is to lay the groundwork for further research inquiries into Bollywood’s domination of one’s Instagram feed through multiple handles, from local production houses to global platforms. One can also look into as more and more global platforms launch in South Asian markets, they may use the same Instagram strategy as employed by Spotify and Netflix.</p><h3>Initial &amp; Final Codes</h3><p>Upon finalising the clusters, the next step was to develop a codebook, as most of the images follow different thematic patterns, embedded messages, hashtags, and even the choice of actors. Therefore for each cluster, this paper went back and forth with codes including the idea of a nation-state, joint family system, represented in films like K3G, and Kuch Kuch Hota Hai, similarly for cultural celebrations, following codes include Eid, Diwali, Ramadan, Weddings, and even Father’s, and Mother’s day. This cluster, however, remains up for usage throughout the year, where the said handles do not restrict their celebrations to Indian or South Asian origin events. They tend to replug their films wherever they deem appropriate, including, ‘world music day,’ ‘Valentine’s Day,’’ bicycle Day,’ and so on.</p><p>While going through the codes again, concerning the visuals, some of the codes were later changed; for instance, ‘nation state’ was moved to the second place with ‘pan Indian’ preceding it because the films in question depict an idea of an Indian identity regardless of one’s respective nation-state. Most films focus on one’s pan-Indian identity and then try to reciprocate the cultures of respective nation-states. For instance, Jab Tak Hai Jaan (1.9) and Pathaan (1.10) make sublime references to Pakistan. ‘Hopeless romance’ (2.4) seems to be the most famous cluster across all handles with the following codes, including ‘one-sided love’ and ‘chasing the girl.’ Upon review, another code was added to the cluster, ‘heartbreak,’ prevalent across most films.</p><h3>Findings &amp; Discussion</h3><p>Due to the high concentration of visuals, this paper went ahead with drawing inferences from a sample of twenty shortlisted visuals across the metadata from all available handles, followed by an overview of the observations from the complete dataset.</p><h3>Sample Study</h3><p>After coding the visuals, one could observe dominant and marginal visual formats and themes (Colombo et al., 2023). For instance, the specified primary Instagram handles repeatedly use famous Bollywood actor Shahrukh Khan’s dominant images from the early 2000s to garner attention with the hashtag ‘#srk’ and #ShahrukhKhan’. Some of these images are iconic and persistent to the extent that they have already been widely circulated for decades, as laid out in Appendix 1.1a, 1.3a, and 1.7a. The marginal formats, however, include a standard practice across all the selected handles, which follow a much more text-centric approach than plugging in iconic and persistent visuals. For example, with every new Spotify playlist, or Netflix, they use infamous dialogues from the said films. Primarily because global platforms refrain from getting too entangled with local cultural productions and audiences to keep up with the trends and refrain from a turf war with local production houses, Rogers (2018) would argue that the inherent difference between Dharma, YRF, and subsequent secondary Instagram handles is strategic and might as well relate to consumer futurism and trends. The audience segment is transitioning from big cinema screens to over-the-top streaming platforms. Even if not driving revenue growth, platforms like Netflix and Spotify feel the need to maintain their presence in an otherwise Bollywood-dominated space. Out of the twenty visuals, cluster 4 outperformed the other clusters, whereas, within the cluster, twelve visuals pertain to @yrf and one to @dharmamovies.</p><p>A hashtag analysis further reveals that #ShahrukhKhan dominated the said sample. In contrast, the same hashtag to date not only has multiple variants but close to five million posts on Instagram by different private, public, and fan pages. Similarly, @yrf and @dharma tend to use multiple hashtags together for all of their posts, even if the said films differ by genre, plots, and release dates, primarily to target the intended audience into a non-stop loop of consuming their existing and all forthcoming content. At the same time, such hashtags are used in coherence with a complimentary female protagonist. Since Bollywood by far relies on heterosexual on-screen romance, one could observe #ShahrukhKhan coupled with popular female leads, including #Kajol, #RanMukherjee and #PreityZinta.</p><p>Interestingly, the hashtag representing male lead couples with different female lead hashtags gets higher traction than if the same would have been practised and vice-versa. From a platform perspective, the said handles repeatedly use the carousel feature in Instagram with no particular order; they club together both old and new films following an internal clustering process. From a visual standpoint, how do these production houses come up with internal filters and clusters, is it purely market-based, or do they dedicate themselves to audience research and changing demographics?</p><p>In another observation, one could argue that classic notions of Hindi cinema ranging from cluster 1 to cluster 3, premised on family values, professing love, and Indiansim, were prevalent in metadata obtained from @yrf and @dharmamovies, while the majority of the metadata from global platforms was either outside the purview of this paper, or contingent on celebrating festivals, establishing linkages between the said films, and their local productions and using Bollywood for clout purposes. Global platforms might also change their Instagram strategy or sway away from Bollywood later, considering the trends and algorithms. The local production houses will continue to remediate the open box office hits to target the global south asian millennial audience. With the rise of over-the-top streaming platforms, even local production houses might have to come up with various remediation angles, for instance, using the famous dialogues as chatbot conversations, linking them to an ongoing conspiracy or going beyond the dominant hopeless romantic theme. Similarly, the characters and famous actors embedded in the select images are already at the lower end of their careers with dying fandom and on-screen appearances. Therefore, @yrf and @dharmamovies will remediate upcoming Bollywood actors sooner or later. Whether or not they stick with the same clusters is for researchers privy to Bollywood should monitor. It would be interesting to observe how almost half a century-old production houses adapt to emerging new media practices and move on from traditional cinema-going audiences to the same target audience, now making consumption decisions off Instagram.</p><h3>Limitations &amp; Recommendations</h3><p>Bollywood is far entrenched in an average South Asian lifestyle, from food to weddings, cultural celebrations, and family ties, mostly from films, actors, dialogues, and plots. Therefore to assess the impact of Bollywood on global south asian millennial audiences goes far beyond two production houses and global platforms, which use Bollywood for social media vanity metrics, and to promote their content in a relatively emerging market. There are other major production players in the same space, including UTV, Eros and Star, with, if not at par, high digital presence and penetration numbers with the same target audience. Bollywood does not represent India (Punathambekar, 2013) in its entirety, a country of 1.4 billion plus people with a multitude of regional languages comprising Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam, Gujarati, Marathi, Bhojpuri and Kannada., with a substantial consumer segment. Since the said industries are regional and only garner a little attention abroad, they are often dismissed by the cultural scholarship studying Bollywood and its implied viewers (Gehlawat, 2010). Even within India, there are cities, or perhaps provinces, where regional films and culture outperform Bollywood regarding viewership, ticket sales, and the blogosphere. However, studying the said industries’ presence on Instagram would also warrant researchers who are well-versed in the corresponding languages and have adequate institutional knowledge of the regional cultural industries.</p><p>For research concerning itself with geographical and spatial boundaries within the cultural analytics realm, one would require additional methods such as digital ethnography, where researchers can conduct cyber trials into online users to determine whether they belong to India, Pakistan or Bangladesh and their content preferences provided that the users have an authentic online presence. It could also lead to inferences such as similarity indexes between Hindi and Urdu-speaking Bollywood audiences from India and Pakistan as opposed to Telugu, Tamil, or Bengali audiences in certain Indian provinces and Bangladesh. It further reveals the extent of complications and cultural differences across the subcontinent. Investigating a platform or a production house requires a relatively huge sample size, considering the population numbers and indigenous research into cultural analytics and visual models for social media image analysis. Additionally, though all the countries in question have high digital penetration numbers, their Instagram presence still does not accurately reflect the film-watching audience. To date, you can still go to the cinema for as low as one dollar in India, and a substantial segment of that audience is not active on Instagram or social media, for that matter. TikTok, now banned in India, would be a better platform to pursue the remediation angle. However, collecting data off TikTok would require tools to capture video and reel-like visuals instead of zeeschuimer, which was suitable for images on Instagram. From an attribute standpoint, a TikTok visual can be further dissected into different image formats revealing internal image rankings, hierarchies, and even a calculated sequence (Rogers, 2021).</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The purpose of this research was not only to investigate Bollywood’s hegemony over global millennial south asian audiences but also to direct visual social media research into relatively unexplored ever-growing cultural spaces exclusively taken up by south asian academics. It would be fair to argue that the paper stands corrected in proving Bollywood’s hegemonic attitude in the global Indian entertainment space but lacks thereof to measure the said hegemony.</p><p>Similarly, since each visual required detailed observation, this paper eventually resorted to individual coding after a few attempts at online tools and analysis methods provided in the course, primarily due to the qualitative nature of the visuals. Therefore it is equally possible to code an image with a different cluster if the researcher’s background or content preferences differ. Nevertheless, that is the theoretical underpinning of social media research, where one can deduce patterns, strategies and critical insights to develop metrics beyond the purview of vanity (Rogers, 2018, p.468). While reviewing the datasets, a few more clusters seemed appropriate for the visual. However, this paper restricted itself to the aptest cluster, which may be significant to the research question. For future research, one begs the question of the way forward for South Asian cultural industries, do they remain under Bollywood’s shadow or what some say ‘cultural imperialism.’ If yes, should Pakistani and Bangladeshi filmmakers try to differentiate between their respective film industries based on their interstate relationships? This may serve as a setting stone for cultural scholars focusing on post-colonial cinematic audiences. Despite sharing the same culture, language, and attributes, filmmakers must differentiate themselves based on state preferences or compete for hegemony. At this stage, the paper seems incomplete with the choice of data collection and analysis techniques; however, with more time, and resources, one can make a significant scholarly contribution towards Bollywood’s social media presence and its impact on political economy, social structures, poverty, crime, mental health, and the broader perception of India, as a modern nation-state.</p><h3>Bibliography:</h3><p>Anjaria, U. (2021). Understanding Bollywood: the grammar of Hindi cinema. Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429293726">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429293726</a>.</p><p>Bates, T. R. (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. <em>Journal of the History of Ideas</em>, <em>36</em>(2), 351–366. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2708933">https://doi.org/10.2307/2708933</a></p><p>Bce, W. et al. (2020). Visual cross-platform analysis: digital methods to research social media images. Information, Communication &amp; Society, 23:2, 161 -180. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1486871">https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1486871</a></p><p>Bourdieu, P. (1975). The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason. <em>Social Science Information, 16</em>(6), 19–47. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847501400602.">https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847501400602.</a></p><p>Colombo, G., Bounegru, L., &amp; Gray, J. W. Y. (2023). Visual Models for Social Media Image Analysis: Groupings, Engagement, Trends, and Rankings. <em>International Journal of Communication</em>. <a href="https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/18971">https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/18971</a></p><p>Devasundaram, A. (2016). Bollywood’s soft power: Branding the nation, sustaining a meta-hegemony. New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film. 14. 51–70. 10.1386/ncin.14.1.51_1.</p><p>Gehlawat, A. (2010). Bollywood and its Implied Viewers. Reframing Bollywood: Theories of Popular Hindi Cinema (First ed.). SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd.</p><p>Kavoori, A. P., &amp; Punathambekar, A. (Eds.). (2008). <em>Global Bollywood</em>. NYU Press. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155jk77">http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155jk77</a></p><p>Manovich, L. (2020b). <em>Cultural Analytics</em>. MIT Press.</p><p>Punathambekar, A. (2013). <em>From Bombay to Bollywood: The Making of a Global Media Industry</em>. NYU Press.</p><p>Rahman, Harisur. (2020). Consuming Cultural Hegemony: Bollywood in Bangladesh. 10.1007/978–3–030–31707–2.</p><p>Rose, G. (2001). <em>Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials</em>. SAGE.</p><p>Rogers, R. (2021). Visual media analysis for Instagram and other online platforms. Big Data &amp; Society, 8(1). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517211022370">https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517211022370</a></p><p>Rogers, R. C. (2018). Otherwise Engaged : Social Media from Vanity Metrics to Critical Analytics. <em>International Journal of Communication</em>, <em>12</em>, 450–472. <a href="https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/22792936/Rogers_IJOC_6407_30088_3_PB.pdf">https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/22792936/Rogers_IJOC_6407_30088_3_PB.pdf</a></p><p>Tambunan, S. (2019). (De)Constructing the Self and Other in Veer Zaara. Metathesis: Journal of English Language, Literature, and Teaching. 3. 44. 10.31002/metathesis.v3i1.1253.</p><p>Thussu, D.K. (2012). Cultural Practices and Media Production: The Case of Bollywood.</p><h3>Appendices</h3><p>Appendix 1:Films as study objects:</p><p>1.1 Kuch Kuch Hota Hai</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*SbrtV-F0VIsiKRy2" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*o-mC7UsgleK1jR72" /></figure><p>1.2 Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham (K3G)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/477/0*hhANjv8eafbw04Zr" /></figure><p>1.3 Dilwale Dulhaniya Lejayeinge (DDLJ)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*zfjg7yrH5mbOXWIz" /></figure><p>1.4 Mujhse Dosti Karoge</p><p>1.5 Mohabattein</p><p>1.6 Veer-Zara</p><p>1.7 Kal Ho Na Ho</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tErroJwUEu6dK6bI" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*9cM6vrKCugHSF0_m" /></figure><p>1.8 Hum Tum</p><p>1.9 Jab Tak Hai Jaan</p><p>1.10 Pathaan</p><p>Appendix 2: Clusters</p><p>2.1: india first</p><p>2.2: family values</p><p>2.3: friends like family</p><p>2.4: hopeless romantic</p><p>2.5: cultural celebrations</p><p>2.6: outside the purview</p><p>Appendix 4: Codes</p><p>4.1: Initial Codes</p><p>4.2: Final Codes</p><p>Appendix 5: <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1B-93lluktX0EuEcv9jL5zSn6wk-yMuzLQwFlvIY3EII/">SMS: Final Dataset</a></p><p>Appendix 6: <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nFOwTTloUziyBVqYX7F1SEMHEx592Rbp0Zg6bJ7XFhc/">SMS: Extra data queries</a></p><p>Appendix 7: Hashtags</p><p>7.1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/737/0*K5BVEYp8e9z2rIVf" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5ec6f09594f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[All men are created equal, but some are more equal than others]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/all-men-are-created-equal-but-some-are-more-equal-than-others-21644c57a985?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21644c57a985</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2023 14:03:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-19T14:05:08.404Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gyAnoHAKFFszYr7t4fn6Gg.jpeg" /></figure><p>It was the 2010s, when Karachi used to rock with a couple of blasts, and shootings were just the new thing in town. We had a driver, a reasonably older man from the up north near Mansehra, Sikander bhai, once after picking me up from school, Sikander bhai told me how he ended up in the middle east without a visa, flights, or any formal travel arrangements, a thirteen-year-old kid would know off.</p><p>When you’re that young, you probably don’t check your privilege, and that’s fine, but over the last decade, I’ve tried to get hold of the realities around me, where the grass is not always greener on the other side. It’s been what, almost a decade, and the other day hearing the shipwreck off the Greek coast, it just hit me, what Sikander bhai would’ve never made it, what of his boat to the middle east would’ve met the same fate as the seven hundred individuals left their homeland for a better, and safe future.</p><p>While many, primarily men, try to get on the shore for a better ‘perceived’ future, have we ever wondered why? These are not free rides. Sometimes, they spend all of their life savings to touch European waters, and to be honest. There is something seriously wrong with the narrative around economic or social migration. Who manipulated them into getting into such situations? The traffickers, the cartels, for what? Not everyone can end up with a million bucks touching developed shores; the debate is more nuanced than that. While the Greeks or European agencies have tried to curb illegal migration, there is something seriously wrong with our part of the world, where men are treated like fodder to end up abroad without prior paperwork, planning, finances, or even skills.</p><p>Per some reports, each passenger on board the God-forsaken vessel had paid up to ten thousand or more dollars. Little did they know they’ll end up in a detention facility or deep water somewhere in the black sea.</p><p>It’s fascinating how most of us crib about less pay, shared housing, or the summer temperatures beyond European standards today, and in some other part of the world, hundreds of men are stuck in a small deck of an ill-fated ship resting at the mercy of Greek coastguards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21644c57a985" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Politics is all about numbers, not truth vs falsehood]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/politics-is-all-about-numbers-not-truth-vs-falsehood-aaa5dc04ade3?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aaa5dc04ade3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 May 2023 18:16:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-28T18:16:12.386Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1UHZAgitB4CYniTbtx3zWg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Folks like me who voted for the first time in 2013 or 2018, and I assume most of us voted for the PTI, are disheartened today, and rightly so. Anyone with political consciousness would be, but here is what most of us don’t realise.</p><p>PTI today is going through a lot of troubles, some of them are pretty similar to what other parties went through in the past, but unlike mainstream political parties, PTI went on to project herself as the propagator of truth, with Imran Khan being the moral sovereign, he wasn’t the first one to do so, populists politicians from all over the world have hopped onto the same bandwagon, our eastern neighbour is going through a Modi spell. We had Donald Trump as the leader of the free world not so long ago.</p><p>Unlike Western democracies, where populists can have brief stints in power and may even come back with an electoral majority, Pakistan is an entirely different playbook. Somehow, Imran Khan’s populism led people to believe that one man can capitulate to the Pakistani system, you may disagree, but we are a vast country with multiple power centres. There is a weird ego battle between what was initially called the trichotomy of power.</p><p>I don’t blame the Pakistani middle class. They’ve lived in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Toronto, London, and, lately, the middle east for convenient visa regimes. You feed someone like them this weird utopian dream of the so-called ‘Medinah,’ where you have Islamic civilisationism, followed by Imran Khan’s charisma, not to forget pop legends like Salman Ahmed and Abrarul Haq. What did you expect?</p><p>Even if you reflect on Khan’s support base, you find the same contradictions which Khan himself battled over the years, decades in the West, a reasonably secular lifestyle, with ideological contradictions. Most Pakistani men and women who’ve spent years in Toronto et al. still crave that middle ground, where they can experience Canadian liberalism in their hometown, somewhere in Pindi, or Lahore, yet feel the ‘Islamic touch’ that their messiah cum playboy serves on a silver platter.</p><p>I hope this class gets out of Khan’s populism. Still, until then, they’ll keep forming opinions on WhatsApp forwards, with an innate inability to read, write, dissect, for the love of God, and authenticate what they see on their expensive phone screens.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aaa5dc04ade3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From General Musharaff to Imran Khan: Pakistani middle class has a messiah problem]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/from-general-musharaff-to-imran-khan-pakistani-middle-class-has-a-messiah-problem-3fc788fecbd7?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3fc788fecbd7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[imran-khan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 May 2023 14:14:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-14T17:51:30.120Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ItGLVlhCC-cuCxqCANxV2w.jpeg" /></figure><p>The last three days were one of the worst in Pakistan’s millennial history; though we’ve seen worse before, the urban middle-class bore the brunt of their poly crisis host in the wake of their messiah’s arrest. Why though?</p><p>For the longest time, the Pakistani middle class, army and civil service officers, judiciary, corporate professionals, half-baked Toronto, and East London Pakistanis had nowhere to go. They couldn’t relate to the Bhuttos and Sharifs because they never had the means or access. The Muhajirs of UP and Bihar, now settled in Karachi, tried their luck with the MQM and Jamaat-e-Islaami, but that didn’t work out. The same class sucked it up to a military dictator, General Musharraf, until his last days in power, and once the old general was out, their next natural ally was Imran Khan.</p><p>They were fed this utopian dream for decades, a third force, an alternative epicentre of power, a parallel establishment, where the noble men and women relatively progressive will enter the corridors of power. But to be honest, Khan never had the numbers, even back in 2018, when, despite everything, he couldn’t secure an absolute parliamentary majority. To the same middle class’s dismay, a country like Pakistan runs on constituency politics, internal family rifts, hegemony, tribalism, favours, and WhatsApp groups.</p><p>What Khan did in 2013 was impressive, but he was only prime minister house material once he decided to welcome the likes of Perver Elahi, Fawad Chaudhry, Gujjars, Bakhtiars, Marris, Maliks, et al. His populist base was shocked to fathom those bitter pills of earlier demonised politicians. We had Pakistani-American doctors standing outside their grandeur homes with quacking ducks in the background, willing to return to serve their messiah. Did they?</p><p>With everything going on in our part of the world, Modi’s BJP already losing out in Karnataka, populism is dying a slow death in South Asia, and sooner or later, the said middle class yearning for Western passports yet despising them for moral absolutism, will find itself in search of a new messiah. It surely won’t be another seventy-year-old cricketer turned <br>philanthropist.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3fc788fecbd7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[For Pakistan, the crisis is normal; normalcy is rare]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/for-pakistan-the-crisis-is-normal-normalcy-is-rare-1ea6a940a44c?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ea6a940a44c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2023 15:47:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-04T00:21:16.505Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8DVAfqMTRTA0aoe6BsfhCQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Karachi, Pakistan</figcaption></figure><p>On August 14, 1947, the new state of Pakistan was divided miles apart by yet another post-colonial nation-state, the one that soon turned out to be a frenemy. In fact, for the first few decades, the trio, left by their British Praetorian guard, had a lot to deal with, governance infrastructure, poverty, refugees on both sides of the border, and so on.</p><p>However, unlike Pakistan, the Republic of India, and the post-1971 Republic of Bangladesh, retained some sense of normalcy through pragmatic governance and accepting the reality of &#39;living within means.&#39; The state of Pakistan, however, to this date, fails to acknowledge that.</p><p>For the elite, their &#39;geo-political&#39; importance, a highly accelerating nuclear program, and the ability to do external bidding for the old white man triumph over everything. But for how long? Where does it all end?</p><p>It&#39;s about time that the country&#39;s power corridors realise that their days of geo-political rent-seeking are over. In a time when even the Arabs are resorting to alternative revenue generation means, Islamabad&#39;s intelligentsia can do better. If you tune into folks across the western neo-liberal world, or the right-wing BJP-infused media across the border, they somehow can&#39;t fathom that a state with poly-crisis still wakes up daily; well, the BJP viewpoint is understandable.</p><p>Those guys are a bunch of populists with authoritarianism. But the fact of the matter is that Pakistan, with all its odds, is trying to survive like the rest of the Global South, and no matter how much money brown men make, our problems are pretty much the same, right from misogyny, to religious extremism, overpopulation, and the inflated egos.</p><p>Is the crisis typical for us, and is that necessarily bad? Looking back at the last seven decades, we&#39;ve had periods of normalcy in a perpetual crisis. That&#39;s the nature of our state. As someone who has spent his whole life between Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, the infamous KLI, I wonder why diaspora folks sitting abroad look at their own country from an orientalist&#39;s lens. For them, they are the experts on how to run the country they emigrated from, and who better to do their bidding than an upper-class English-speaking aristocrat?</p><p>My advice to all the hot takes is to understand your country, its federal structures, trichotomy of power, and deeply entrenched colonial beaurocracy, and think about 200 million plus citizens of this part of the world who probably will live here forever. The sooner they realise that governance is not tweeting from their favourite cafe, it&#39;s far more complicated, and the better they&#39;ll understand their own country.</p><p>In this AI-powered world, geographical borders and regions do have their limitations, but having a reductionist and limited understanding of the global south wreaks some sense of privilege, and if you&#39;re one of those East London Pakistanis, just be a little fair to your own country, come back more often than not.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ea6a940a44c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Swipe right for love: Online dating vs traditional matchmaking in South Asia]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/swipe-right-for-love-online-dating-vs-traditional-matchmaking-in-south-asia-693504829899?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/693504829899</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-asian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[online-dating]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 20:26:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-20T20:26:50.433Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_Ql9hK8sbg662EuFnYZKAQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>To what the first world calls online dating, through the advent of popular applications including Tinder, Bumble, Hinge, etc., the same has been happening in South Asia for thousands of years under the pretext of ‘traditional values’. Where families convene to discuss the merits and demerits and invoke religious traditions alongside, including the widespread Hindu practice of matching natal charts (Kundli) for a ‘prosperous’ match, similar regimes prevail in Muslim, Sikh, and Parsi communities. Such practices are often deemed extremely conservative, oppressive, and against individual freedoms, mainly by western institutions and watchdogs.</p><p>In this instance, modern-day South Asia is undergoing a social revolution with an exuberant Gen-Z known as the TikTok generation, which prefers individualism and freedom to make decisions. This essay will focus on two post-colonial South Asian states, India and Pakistan. I shall use the platform affordances approach to understand the ideological, cultural, and economic standoff between online dating and traditional matchmaking. I will reveal the ongoing social change and to what extent Bumble challenges the traditional matchmaking regime. It is important to note that, barring a few, Pakistan’s telecom regulators have banned most online dating applications, including Tinder citing ‘indecency’ and ‘immorality’ to appease conservative factions of the country, whereas Bumble is still operational. Therefore an all-encompassing platform-sensitive framework will help draw necessary conclusions and understand the platform-user-state relationship while remaining mindful of the socio-technological environment.</p><h3>Background &amp; Context</h3><p>The discourse around traditional matchmaking and arranged marriage mainly stem from the east, including China, Japan, and the Indian subcontinent.</p><p>On the contrary, the same regime was quite prevalent in the western world in the Elizabethan era, shared amongst the monarchies to serve the status quo and a pure ‘bloodline.’ As the western world inches towards individualism and liberty, such aspirations have transcended deep into an otherwise conservative South Asia. Gen-Z disagrees in India and Pakistan, where caste, creed, religion, sect, and ethnicity were perhaps more important than physical or emotional compatibility.</p><p>In 2019 alone, despite the theocratic attitude of the state visa vi telecom regulators and collective condemnation by veteran politicians, not to forget the sacred nature of the ‘family system’, Tinder downloads crossed 400,000 along with Grindr, Scout, and others at 300,000 (Peshimam, 2020). The urban middle-class youth seems increasingly rebellious, and online dating apps try to pull them for economic gains.</p><p>On the other hand, the status quo pushes them out of insecurity and the fear of losing control. While online dating applications focus on data gathering and the success of algorithmic functions, they are triggering subaltern patterns against the will of the dominant patriarchal society with far-reaching social implications.</p><h3>Contextual Framework</h3><p>Before formulating a contextual framework, one must understand that no digital platform is neutral. Platform affordances as an approach have different scholarly interpretations. For instance, some scholars prefer to use affordances synonymous with technological features, while others focus on the social structures resulting from a given technology(Bucher &amp; Helmond, 2018, p.12).</p><p>Additionally, when affordance theorists, including Hutcby, Gibson, Norman, and others, were conceptualising affordances, did they foresee an idealised environment, for example, the United States, United Kingdom, etc.? To understand how people perceive technological affordances and cultural appropriation, this essay shall also refer to Costa’s ethnographic fieldwork in Mandarin. Thus a combination of affordance theories coupled with cultural appropriation and juxtaposing both in the South Asian context.</p><p>From a communicative standpoint, the swipe feature, profile prompts, bios, and affordances that warrant any agential action are worthwhile to study. On the other hand, social affordance theorists will look into whether technology enables or constrains social action. Therefore this essay focuses on the new dynamics or types of dating practices and social interactions that various features afford, which might differ from region to region.</p><p>The notion of social affordances has to be understood in a relational sense that accounts for societal constraints and cultural and economic barriers, which is in tandem with Gaver’s ecological approach towards affordances. He argues that different affordances may affect the social conventions around them (Gaver, 1991).</p><p>An example would be a Tinder match (where both end users swipe right) between two students in Groningen and Mumbai. Ideally, a potential match shall lead to a conversation and, per the intimacy level, a meetup, a couple of dates, and sexual relations. This chain of events, however, is perceptual to the least and limited to a western, individualistic, and libertarian society, where two consenting adults can choose to do any of the above. While speculating different media forms, Gaver suggests that ‘these are not social affordances […] but affordances for sociality’ (Gaver, 1996, p.3). This is a multi-folded approach by Gaver; on the one hand, he tries to distance himself from technological determinism but on the other, aims to point researchers to how ‘social activities are embedded in and shaped by the material environment’ (Gaver, 1996, p.12). According to Gaver, researchers tend to ascribe social behaviour to arbitrary practices and social customs. Instead, they should rather focus on the emerging complex systems visa vi environmental factors shaping social interactions.</p><p>The Gibsonian perspective, however, restricts itself to human-computer interaction in terms of design, visual perception and overall structure of the platforms. He would argue that affordances do not cause behaviour but constrain and control it (Gibson, 1982). Whereas Norman’s concern would be ‘good design,’ and Hutchby would focus on technology’s functional and relational aspects. Instead of fully endorsing any particular scholarly interpretation, this essay will employ a multi-layered and relational approach towards the region, audience, and technology.</p><p>Most scholarly interpretations outline what technology does to users but fail to acknowledge how users interact with technology. To understand the impact of technological affordability on south asian millennials, one needs to take the medium specificity of platforms into account along with the graphical user interface, buttons, and features. Hookway (2014) argues that surfaces and platform interfaces are not interchangeable. In fact, from a vernacular standpoint, affordances not only present and structure action possibilities but also produce behaviours or actions. The question is whose actions are under consideration, an average south asian in their early 20s, willing to evade the arranged marriage, or a divorcee in his 30s? To answer this question, we shall briefly understand the turf war between dating apps and traditional agents, including matchmakers and web interfaces.</p><h3>Reassembling Affordances visa vi Bumble &amp; South Asia</h3><p>Many western scholars treat ‘online dating’ as an isolated phenomenon, primarily because dating has been part and parcel of the western lifestyle for decades. Each individual is expected to seek partners through contemporary dating and make matrimonial decisions based on their preferences. At the same time, a south asian individual shall seek consent from their family members for courtship or marriage. Now, online dating is a disruptive agent for either. Still, its impact in South Asia has been phenomenal, to the extent that it has reimagined intimacy and relationships under the backdrop of a rapidly digitising India and Pakistan. There is a need to differentiate between online matchmaking and online dating re: bumble and other applications.</p><p>As the internet became part of modern life, traditional matchmakers followed suit. Before Bumble, Tinder, etc., traditional matchmakers already used WhatsApp and web interfaces (shaadi.com &amp; bharat matrimony) but strictly portrayed themselves as a matrimonial platform due to socio-cultural differences. Therefore we can establish that online dating was not the first instance of online matchmaking in the region in question. Similarly, Bumble outperforms all other online matchmaking platforms regarding agency, perception, and actions from an affordance standpoint. Where the end user, regardless of gender, feels empowered enough to interact with the technology in question with numerous action possibilities, which were previously held by the family or overarching matrimonial regimes. While setting up an online dating profile, one goes through a series of questions and preferences; for instance, in Bumble, the end user can specify whether they want to date, befriend, or network. Similarly, the platform makes them undergo a facial recognition process, specifying interests, profile prompts, and images. On the other hand, traditional matchmakers still rely on parental recommendations, caste, religion, ethnicity, and career profiles, which appear outdated in the coming-of-age adults seeking partners.</p><p>It is pertinent to mention that the ideal end-user here may not be the ‘Gibsonian animal.’ The Gibsonian animal may operate differently in the Netherlands, as opposed to India, using the same platform. Who or what constitutes the animals of social media and their terrestrial environment remains widely contested. In other words, the Gibsonian animal is not a fixed term and is influenced by social media-induced environments, pathways, and features.</p><p>There is a conflict amongst scholars in assessing the impact of platform affordances on patriarchal structures. Some argue for a computational understanding of platforms, studying infrastructure, programmability, and APIS, while others, including Hookway and Gibson, would prefer considering platform interfaces as ‘forms of relations.’ From an ecological standpoint, considering there seems to be little or no significant research regarding affordances in South Asia, it would be wiser to agree with Gibson, Gaver et al. here.</p><p>In Bumble’s case, the platform positions itself as left of centre in the larger socio-political climate. It is also known as ‘feminist tinder,’ primarily because it allows women to initiate a conversation with a match,c thus giving them more control over as opposed to other dating applications. Though women talk first is one of its unique affordances, Bumble also invites several other gendered perspectives into the equation. For instance, women adopt unique strategies to avoid hostility and harassment from men on dating apps; bisexual women may switch to seeking women only. Similarly, other interested users may initiate a conversation regarding same-sex matches.</p><p>Scholars privy to Bumble’s affordances and interface argue that bumble operates as a heterosexual matrix.’ Though a limited view of the application, Bivens and Hoque (2018) believe that Bumble’s intended user base is in sync with its founder, Whitney Wolfe Herd, a white, straight, upper-class cisgender woman but does that absolve south asian women from the structural inequalities? Surface level affordance enthusiasts would argue that south asian women have the same advantage as white women, predominantly in the west, disregarding one’s a physical location and external environment. To downplay Bumble’s importance in reclaiming space from traditional patriarchal structures, neo-liberal scholars rest heavily on the end user. Bumble provides minimal impetus to change the underlying structures steeped in sexism, misogyny, and gendered norms (Pruchniewska, 2020). If women endure harassment either on bumble or in the traditional south asian matrimonial landscape, the onus is on individual women to protect themselves and minimise the risk.</p><p>Alternatively, platform labour scholars or, in this case, scholars focusing on gendered labour would argue that online dating is a labour-intensive process, including replying within the 24-hour time frame, decision fatigue, especially for women, and additional vetting. However, despite the psychological consequences, women must find an eventual match, whether in a traditional setting or swiping right on Bumble. While men tend to use such apps more casually, looking to hook up, date, or at times fulfil their sexual fantasies. Suppose we do incorporate the gendered angle into the equation. In that case, the scholarly opposition might argue that this essay’s initial claims stand true for women and non-confirming genders but not for men, as men tend to marry elsewhere and use dating apps for pleasure-seeking purposes, but that would be a stereotypical take on what average south asian men look for in a partner. Though shrouded in secrecy, many conservative societies tend to have more or less the same sexual aspirations as the western world; a Muslim-dominated Pakistan or Hindu-dominated India has many non-confirming and queer individuals.</p><p>Contrary to popular perception, such individuals are situated not only in the urban centres but in the remote parts of the countries. For them, online dating apps were a way to connect, organise, and lobby against the inherent discrimination against LGBTQ communities; it was after the excessive use of such applications, along with excessive campaigning and international pressures, that India’s supreme court decriminalised gay sex in 2018. In fact, at the moment, India’s top court is already hearing petitions adhering to legalising gay marriage.</p><p>Similarly, Pakistan’s landmark Transgender Protection Act (Qureshi, 2020) was perhaps one of the most progressive in the country’s legislative history. As per the act, each individual is entitled to choose their gender identity and to change it based on previously issued government documents. Though such moves cannot be directly attributed to Bumble’s affordances, but do warrant an inquiry. Affordance scholars leave room for interpretation, primarily for instances where more significant platforms like Bumble can have a much greater impact than already imagined. When Bucher and Helmond (2018) mention “the perceived range of possible actions linked to the features of the platform,” Nagy and Neff (2015) suggest the notion of ‘imagined affordances.’ The underlying purpose is to purport that affordances are not simply objective or rational.</p><p>On the one hand, we have the material features of Bumble, user perception, and on the other, user perceptions and emerging practices due to platform infrastructure (Pruchniewska, 2020). Online dating platforms seem to agree with the ecological imagination of technological affordances. The user interface, design tools, and in-built features are trying to establish a connection with the user, thus making affordances more perceptible. As Gaver (1991) points out, what is perceived is what is acted upon. Back in the day, Gaver tried to explain his approach through a door handle, where the handle’s size, shape, and position might imply different actions, and the initial hypothesis stands true for platforms like Bumble.</p><p>The online dating industry bears witness to some new market players experimenting with affordances, some tried to replace the swiping feature with sending hearts, and others tried to offer users to chat directly without a match. To ascertain the success of such experiments with social media affordances would also involve alternative approaches, including leisure, government, etc.</p><p>Similarly, while looking after cultural and often religious sensitivities, dating apps such as Muzmatch went on to add Muslim sects as an identification marker, so the end user can see whether the opposite gender is a Sunni Muslim or Shiite Muslim. In hindsight, platforms like Muzmatch paint themselves as a bridge between single, like-minded Muslims seeking a ‘serious relationship and preferably marriage.’ However, in numerous instances, users tend to use such apps specifically for dating. One can expect a dating application for Hindus to mention their caste, which may be a problematic feature, and might as well be illegal, particularly in the west. Nevertheless, despite the pushback from the west, such affordances matter for South Asian millennials; if not on the surface, they would want to know via chat and scrolling through Instagram. Again, such questions were previously posed by the respective families rather than the individual partners.</p><p>It would be wise to argue that Bumble and other platforms with similar affordances have disrupted the traditional matchmaking cycle. It has been an effective tool in reclaiming public space autonomy and organising against patriarchal tools. Such tools are not only aimed at controlling women’s sexuality, but it also affects men and their marital choices, so much so that their children suffer multiple genetic diseases due to traditional cousin marriages. From a user standpoint, Bumble has enabled even the less educated, rural segments of society to be aware of their terrestrial environment, tackling harassment and oppression and identifying problematic behaviours. Many right-wing pundits would think otherwise; the cons outweigh the pros primarily because the forthcoming generations are ready to confront them. Ironically, the same traditionalists claim to have protected societal honour and kept the so-called ‘family system’ intact. Not only has bumble defied the South Asian honour code, but it also has normalised pre-marital sexual relations and intimacy between the opposite genders and successfully removed the invisible cloak of morality. What the moral opposition claims is ‘indecency’ and ‘immorality’.</p><p>Similarly, the respective Pakistani and Indian governments are just another strategic manoeuvre to get hold of one’s sexuality, influence their sexual preferences and orientation, and guard the sacred institution of ‘family.’ Even if those at the helm of affairs do not agree with the state’s approach towards gender and sexuality, they feel the need to do so out of insecurities. Pakistan and India are still heavily exacerbated in religion, culture, and tradition; if they tend to let go of either of these pillars, it would be to re-negotiate the state-society relationship neither of them can afford.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The rationale behind a platform-sensitive framework was to consider affordances beyond a deterministic technological lens. Understand how the existing platform infrastructure extends its affordances beyond its environment. A platform created by a privileged tech entrepreneur based out of Austin, Texas, challenges thousands of years old patriarchal norms halfway across the globe. Where Bumble may not be the only actor behind the said social change, the overall socio-political climate is readjusting itself to what Gen Z desires, and are willing to pay for it too. It is important to note that those considered an authority on social media affordances are from the pre-Bumble, and Tinder eras. With time, early career scholars will be privy to the platform’s impact on the upcoming generation.</p><p>Through this essay, one cannot prove or disprove Bumble’s relative success in changing the social climate, and neither can one claim that Bumble has revolutionised matchmaking in South Asia. However, for the scope of future research and regarding the initial hypothesis, it is evident that Bumble’s unique affordances are, in Costa’s (2018) words, ‘affordances-in-practice’. Whatever Bumble offers to the individual user and the current social climate are not intrinsic. One can define the platform’s properties outside its situated context, continue learning and garner more data on how individual users interact with the platform across space and time. Such refinement and modified versions of Bumble-like platforms testify to the diversity and assortment of mediated practices. Suppose academic scholars, theorists, and researchers take a holistic approach towards the evolution of online dating discourse and open themselves up to other cultures avoiding the oriental lens. In that case, it can only help de-westernising and de-anglicising social media studies.</p><p>References</p><p>Bivens, Rena &amp; Hoque, Anna. (2018). Programming Sex, Gender, and Sexuality: Infrastructural Failures in ‘Feminist’ Dating App Bumble. 43. 10.22230/cjc.2019v44n3a3375</p><p>Boyd, D. (2010). Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications. <em>A Networked Self</em>, 47–66. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876527-8">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876527-8</a></p><p>Bucher, T., &amp; Helmond, A. (2018). The affordances of social media platforms. <em>The SAGE Handbook of Social Media</em>, 233–253. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473984066.n14">https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473984066.n14</a></p><p>Chong, I., &amp; Proctor, R. W. (2020). On the Evolution of a Radical Concept: Affordances According to Gibson and Their Subsequent Use and Development. <em>Perspectives on psychological science: a journal of the Association for Psychological Science</em>, <em>15</em>(1), 117–132. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619868207">https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619868207</a></p><p>Chakraborty, D. (2019). Components Affecting Intention to Use Online Dating Apps in India: A Study Conducted on Smartphone Users. Asia-Pacific Journal of Management Research and Innovation, 15(3), 87–96. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2319510X19872596">https://doi.org/10.1177/2319510X19872596</a></p><p>Costa, E. (2018). Affordances-in-practice: an ethnographic critique of social media logic and context collapse. <em>New Media and Society</em>, <em>20</em>(10), 3641–3656. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818756290">https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818756290</a></p><p>Devito, Michael &amp; Birnholtz, Jeremy &amp; Hancock, Jeffery. (2017). Platforms, People, and Perception: Using Affordances to Understand Self-Presentation on Social Media. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing. 10.1145/2998181.2998192.</p><p>David, G., &amp; Cambre, C. (2016). Screened intimacies: Tinder and the swipe logic. Social Media + Society, 2(2). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305116641976">https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305116641976</a></p><p>Doshi, V. (2016, July 9). <em>Date, kiss or marry … how tinder is rewriting India’s rules of Engagement</em>. The Guardian. Retrieved December 25, 2022, from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/09/india-love-revolution-dating-fun-arranged-marriage-apps-tinder">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/09/india-love-revolution-dating-fun-arranged-marriage-apps-tinder</a></p><p>Ellis-Petersen, H., &amp; Baloch, S. M. (2020, September 4). <em>Imran Khan’s Tinder and Grindr ban in Pakistan criticised as “hypocrisy.”</em> The Guardian. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/04/imran-khans-tinder-and-grindr-ban-in-pakistan-is-hypocrisy">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/04/imran-khans-tinder-and-grindr-ban-in-pakistan-is-hypocrisy</a></p><p>Gaver, W. (1996). Situating Action II: Affordances for Interaction: The Social Is Material for Design. Ecological Psychology. 8. 111–129. 10.1207/s15326969eco0802_2.</p><p>Gaver, W. W. (1991). Technology affordances. <em>Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems Reaching Through Technology — CHI ’91</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/108844.108856">https://doi.org/10.1145/108844.108856</a></p><p>Gibson JJ (1982) Notes on affordances. In: <em>Reasons for realism. Selected Essays of James J. Gibson. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates</em>, pp.401–418.</p><p>Hookway, B. (2014). THE SUBJECT OF THE INTERFACE. In <em>Interface</em> (pp. 1–57). The MIT Press. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qf5xn.5">http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qf5xn.5</a></p><p>Jha, Sonora; Adelman, Mara, “Looking for Love in All the White Places: A Study of Skin Color Preferences on Indian Matrimonial and Mate-Seeking Websites”, Studies in South Asian Film &amp; Media, Volume 1, Number 1, May 2009, pp. 65–83(19)</p><p>Suresh, Sruthi &amp; Abhay, Rabia. (2022). Analysing Trends in Online Dating among Young Adults in India — Before, During, and After COVID-19 Pandemic.</p><p>Punathambekar, A., &amp; Mohan, S. (2019). <em>Dating Applications, Intimacy, and Cosmopolitan Desire in India</em>, <em>Global Digital Cultures: Perspectives from South Asia</em>. The University of Michigan Press.</p><p>Peshimam, G. N. (2020). <em>Pakistan blocks five dating apps, including tinder and grindr</em>. Reuters. Retrieved January 4, 2023, from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-socialmedia-ban-idUSKBN25S618">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-socialmedia-ban-idUSKBN25S618</a></p><p>Pruchniewska, U. (2020). “I Like That It’s My Choice a Couple Different Times”: Gender, Affordances, and User Experience on Bumble Dating. <em>International Journal Of Communication, 14</em>, 18. Retrieved from <a href="https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/12657">https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/12657</a></p><p>Qureshi, K. (2022). A critical analysis of the Transgender (Intersex) Persons Act, 2018, in Pakistan versus United Nations recommendations. <em>Interdisciplinary and Global Perspectives on Intersex</em>, 177–195. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91475-2_11">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91475-2_11</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=693504829899" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Old Delhi to George Bush's Best Buddy: Who was General Musharaff?]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/from-old-delhi-to-george-bushs-best-buddy-who-was-general-musharaff-33c4b896b167?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[musharaff]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2023 14:37:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-07T14:39:40.006Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*0pIpgCd3MueytwFrpHVGUA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>The word dictator does have a negative connotation, understandably so. It usually reminds us of Hosni Mubarak, Colonel Gadaffi, the notorious Zia-ul-Haq, Saddam Hussain, Idi Amin, and the list goes on. But Musharaff was different. Why though? Constitutionalists would argue he abolished the constitution, conducted rogue military operations, and is known as the &#39;architect of the Kargil Conflict&#39; across the border.</p><p>We hardly see the likes of CNN, BBC, the Guardian, New York Times slating Musharaff. I&#39;ve never seen the whole world publishing obituaries for a president of a developing country with meagre financial resources and, if the markets are right, on the brink of default. Perhaps that&#39;s why Pakistan is a unique country, or what white people often say is an &#39;abnormal&#39; country.</p><p>Musharaff was born in an impoverished Muslim-majority Daryaganj in Old Delhi, and ironically a couple of decades later, he was a soldier in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. That is the legacy of old white men dividing India, but today it&#39;s about the four-year-old Delhite, who migrated to Karachi and later became one of this planet&#39;s most powerful men.</p><p>I don&#39;t want to talk about Bugti, Lal Masjid, Nawaz Sharif, and other entourages. I want to talk about who Musharaff was to me and what was going on in my ten-year-old mind when I saw Musharaff on the world stage. I did feel proud; there is no denying that. An urban Punjabi kid growing up in Karachi, I had a soft spot for him. He was way ahead of his time in finally liberalising Pakistan&#39;s state infrastructure, letting go of the archaic traditions, and taking us into the twenty-first century.</p><p>He did all of this at the cost of Americans invading Afghanistan. I can&#39;t entirely agree with that because he did what he thought was best for the country and was the president. He single-handedly changed the face of Karachi, did some essential groundwork for science and higher education, and even brought institutional reforms within the Army. What folks across the border often ignore is he was about to sign off on a Kashmir deal.</p><p>Musharaff never came off as dictatorial to me when he was liberalising Pakistan&#39;s private media infrastructure; he coined the term &#39;Pakistani Soft Power&#39; and never shied away from the country&#39;s military capabilities.</p><p>Then came the deadly 2007, when everything changed. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, general elections were called, and Mushraff had to go. It was time.</p><p>For me, the General was a Pakistani first. Religion, ethnicity, tribalism, brotherly countries nuance, and everything else didn’t matter when it came to the country, and it’s soft power. That’s how you make a strong nation-state.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33c4b896b167" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why is New Delhi Scared of a BBC Documentary?]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/why-is-new-delhi-scared-of-a-bbc-documentary-af7cf25df4f6?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af7cf25df4f6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[modi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2023 15:48:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-25T15:53:17.653Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1008/1*QUh88AluSG8MwTu7lsLrgA.jpeg" /><figcaption>India: The Modi Question by BBC</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong><em>WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,</em></strong><em> having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a </em><strong><em>SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC</em></strong><em> and to secure to all its citizens:</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>JUSTICE</em></strong><em>, social, economic and political;</em><strong><em> LIBERTY</em></strong><em> of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>EQUALITY</em></strong><em> of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all </em><strong><em>FRATERNITY,</em></strong><em> assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY</em></strong><em> this twenty-sixth day of November 1949, do </em><strong><em>HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION</em></strong></blockquote><p>The BJP-led Indian government, supposedly the largest democracy in the world, is hell-bent on blocking a BBC documentary that implicates the incumbent prime minister. From asking Elon Musk to censure MPs tweeting documentary links to turning off lights at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, what boomers sitting in the South Block don’t get is that bans don’t work in the 21st century.</p><p>This is not the first time power-hungry South Asian men have pulled off stunts to block criticism. As for them, they still think that everyone is glued to PTV and Doordarshan, the world is a happy place, and their geopolitical importance triumphs over meaningful debate, accountability, and the rule of law.</p><p>What’s in the documentary? Even if we agree that the accounts are biased, and politically motivated towards BJP, so what? If the BJP and Modi are innocent, so be it. What harm can a documentary cause to a two-time prime minister, and if things stay as it is, the third time in a row?</p><p>The Indian right seems confused; as an economic power hub, they can’t shy away from the West, but when the same West draws up old skeletons, the right feels threatened. That’s the beauty of democracy. No matter how often Modi becomes the prime minister, 2002 will always be a stain in his political life. To pelt stones, cut off electricity, and threaten Twitter developers in the Bay Area is no use.</p><p>As Arundathi Roy once said, fascism will ultimately be a failed experiment in the Indian Subcontinent, and Narendra Modi’s star is falling.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af7cf25df4f6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why can't Bollywood move on from 'Adaab', 'Aslam bhai', and 'prayer caps'?]]></title>
            <link>https://shehryarejaz.medium.com/why-cant-bollywood-move-on-from-adaab-aslam-bhai-and-prayer-caps-8577ca48e689?source=rss-479f621600ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8577ca48e689</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bollywood]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shehryar Ejaz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2023 19:50:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-12T02:05:35.440Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_pC5hIO7Y8leOxg9GsjGJg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sidharth Malhotra as Tariq in ‘Mission Majnu’</figcaption></figure><p>Adab (Hindustani: آداب, Devanagari: आदाब), is that a Pakistani word? Linguists and historians would certainly disagree; what bothers me is that our friends in Bollywood often forget that their respective Indian republic and ours are just 75 years old. However, the cultural and linguistic diversity across the Indian subcontinent predates their forefathers.</p><p>A predominantly Muslim greeting in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Lucknow, and other North Indian territories, including modern-day Pakistan, has somehow infested the minds in south Bombay.</p><p>Fair enough, producing propaganda films back in 65&#39; or 71&#39; makes sense. India was pretty much a closed economy and a Soviet ally during the cold war, but in a time when folks across the border can’t stop fangirling over Coke Studio and the Pakistani Indie music scene, how on earth are they supposed to believe a surma (manliner)clad, adaabing, not to forget the prayer cap is the average Pakistani man?</p><p>We certainly have a lot of people who look like Tariq or Aslam. But in my twenty-five years of watching Bollywood, why can’t we move on? How hard is it to talk or Google what’s happening next door? Imagine how our Indian friends would feel if we did the same.</p><h3>Why does it matter?</h3><p>It does because representation matters. The last thing two developing countries, with religious extremism, poverty, and lack of resources, shall consume is propaganda-ridden content.</p><p>Why can’t we talk about art, culture, qawali, indie music, literature, partition stories, and much more? Two billion people, and seventy-five years of Indian Cinema, still think 220 million Pakistanis adabify each other daily. It’s preposterous, to begin with, and as a graduate media student, pretty shit filmmaking for ulterior motives and tax exemptions.</p><p>We can only hope that better sense prevails across the border, or sooner or later, we’ll see Pakistani films showing India, where everyone wears saffron saris. That’s not creating art. That’s an imaginative conspiracy theory-infused waste of time.</p><p>Do better @Bollwood</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8577ca48e689" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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