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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Shervin Malekzadeh on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Shervin Malekzadeh on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Shervin Malekzadeh on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@shervinmalekzadeh?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Without Words and Between Worlds: Watching Iran-USA as an Iranian-American]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/without-words-and-between-worlds-watching-iran-usa-as-an-iranian-american-952f9637a707?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diaspora]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usmnt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world-cup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[team-melli]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2022 19:45:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-01T20:20:39.749Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*momTRy56JGRlO5kYs96RLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I watched Iran-USA alone <a href="https://www.fourfourtwo.com/features/usa-vs-iran-france-98-most-politically-charged-game-world-cup-history">in 1998</a>, thousands of miles away from home, my Chilean roommates indifferent to the first encounter between the American side and “los arabes” (Chile that year had already advanced; the US and Iran had no chance). I was astonished to find myself crying at the pre-game exchange of gifts, the Iranians characteristically <a href="https://twitter.com/rezahakbari/status/1597295583769038848">going over the top</a> with the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/local/great-reads/la-me-c1-tarof-20150706-story.html">ta’arof</a>, white roses, a silver tray, a handmade wooden frame, alongside the traditional penant. The two teams gathered for a joint photo and the rest of the match was like a dream.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ajbfQpXnsu2DnttC3R3UOw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Twenty four years later and I’m watching Iran-USA with my son, this not-so-tiny miracle, his morning nap delayed by the occasion, if not by mutual agreement. We are in our own home, just miles down the road from my childhood home. Again I find myself weeping, uncontrollably, during the opening ceremony.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0R8-TFTu3ZpbVUlOXex2uw.jpeg" /></figure><p>This year there will be no exchange of gifts, no shared photo before the match. Camaraderie comes at the end, the now famous images of the American players <a href="https://twitter.com/foxsoccer/status/1597961841438732288?s=46&amp;t=UcMYEYPwis0BfpV7uB_7EQ&amp;fbclid=IwAR3qrYU1104M_aPwl0HkEMMzoA86TJHU20IunJbfhqIkBL6LidHEfUCbjzY">consoling</a> their stricken counterparts, compassion for the Iranians crying on the pitch as another World Cup comes to an end for their <a href="https://theathletic.com/3954571/2022/12/01/iran-world-cup-exit/">country</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WaRk4P-EvqPJLdq7i9FhBA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wtQcLX6HW1GJyclT7t0O9g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5tY0jxh7uJNegezptWZvoQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>My wife recently asked me why these games, why *this* game, matters so much. It’s a fair question. I’m not a soccer person, I couldn’t name but a handful of players from either side. Why do I care? Perhaps my inability to name a reason, under the weight of all these years of animosity, anguish, and disappointment, perhaps in the absence of words lies the only meaningful answer. What is there left to be said?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=952f9637a707" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Beat a Tin Pot]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/how-to-beat-a-tin-pot-619208df85b9?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[iranian-green-movement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ahmadinejad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2020 18:37:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-06T00:02:34.872Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Four years ago and eight months before the 2016 presidential election, I wrote “</em><a href="http://lobelog.com/trump-the-american-ahmadinejad/"><em>Trump, the American Ahmadinejad?</em></a><em>,” as a warning that not only was Donald Trump likely to win the GOP primary, but that the US was on the verge of producing its own version of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency, a homegrown, made-in-the-USA calamity whose corruption and incompetence would, unlike the Iranian version, have meaningful consequences for the entire world. This is the third, and I hope, last entry in the </em><a href="https://lobelog.com/trump-the-american-ahmadinejad-worse-than-expected/"><em>series</em></a><em>.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0v3FjoZ6yZFBTcS8DBI8Bw.jpeg" /></figure><p>It has become impossible to watch events unfolding in the final days of the US presidential campaign without thinking about another presidential race, the failed 2009 elections in Iran and the summer protests that became the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html">Green Movement</a>. The similarities, though imperfect, begin to add up: An unpopular president in an election year, a rude populist who lies about obvious truths leading what began as a movement of national renewal but that now more closely resembles a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/09/white-women-vote-republican-why">cult</a>. The performative use of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/15/new-questions-about-trumps-ugly-bible-stunt-hint-some-dark-truths/">religion</a> and masculinity by the leader to hold his dwindling constituencies together, the beguiled remnants of a losing coalition in its final days.</p><p>His opposition, led by an establishment figure come out of retirement, an uncharismatic figure incapable of generating the enthusiasm of his <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/obama-s-home-stretch-itinerary-campaign-trail-inside-trump-s-n1245905">predecessor</a> but who nonetheless runs a flawless campaign based on character and competence. On election day, an unprecedented turnout, citizens willing, even eager, to wait in long lines to cast their ballot for change. In the final stages of the election the defeat of the incumbent appears all but certain, despite warning signs that winning the vote won’t be enough to win, that victory may come down to will and the use of force.</p><p>Comparisons between Iran and the US tend to run in one direction, namely how Iran might improve by becoming more like the US, freer, more democratic. This essay asks the reader to look in the opposite direction, to consider the possibility that here, in the final hours before election day, with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/02/930371341/an-abundance-of-caution-across-u-s-city-storefronts-boarded-up-ahead-of-election">store fronts</a> in major cities <a href="https://twitter.com/BrianKarem/status/1323685719546712071">boarded up</a> in anticipation of post-election violence and confronted with the spectacle of campaign busses run off the side of the road by partisans, cheered on by the president and at least one sitting US <a href="https://miami.cbslocal.com/2020/11/03/florida-senator-marco-rubio-supports-pro-trump-caravan-swarmed-biden-bus-texas/">senator</a>, it is the US that is in need of help.</p><p>Trump has made it clear that he does not intend to accept tomorrow’s results unless the right side — his side — wins. There is no reason to not take him at his word. Eleven summers ago Iranians, facing similar circumstances, responded by doubling down on the electoral wager rather than backing down before a tinpot, determined to make sure that their votes mattered in the end.</p><p>Their experience is available for the taking, and should not be refused or dismissed out of hand simply because formal democracy in Iran does not exist, or is a figment of what Americans imagine a real democracy ought to be. If Iranians are willing to struggle in a system such as their own, then there is no excuse for American voters, with all of the advantages available to them, to not do the same.</p><p>What follows are three basic lessons we might take from each other, ways to ensure that democracy continues to exist in the US, and what to do when leaders attempt to take away our votes and our rights. This brief essay is, above all, an account of what happens when an electorate insists on being recognized as citizens, as fully human, the story of how the members of a long aggrieved population takes possession of their own dignity.</p><p><strong>Lesson 1: Show up</strong></p><p>Iranian voters may doubt the efficacy of their ballots, but they still <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/why-do-iranians-even-bother-voting/526866/">show up </a>at the polls. They do so, voting at rates rarely seen in the US, <em>because</em> they expect elections to be rigged. Even in 2013, with the threat of violence and the memory of 2009 hanging over the election resulting in a “down” year, well over 70 percent of the voting age population, some 37 million Iranians, showed up on election day.</p><p>Mobilization is a non-negotiable imperative for the opposition in Iran, as low turnout — anything below 60–65 percent — favors the status quo. The organization of the non-voter and of large numbers of irregular voters provides the best and perhaps only means for Iran’s opposition to overcome the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/jan/19/iran-guardian-council-blocks-reformists-february-parliamentary-poll">structural barriers</a> arrayed against them, most notably the illiberal screening of eligible candidates by the Guardian Council. (Unlike the GOP, the Iranian authorities see advantage in bringing out large numbers of voters on election day, as it makes for good television, “proof” of the public’s love for the revolution.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CnJ3W1eEXPLYDHR6NvvVug.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Shervin Malekzadeh, June 2009</figcaption></figure><p>Like Iran’s reform movement, the Democrats simply cannot afford to leave any voter behind. Biden doesn’t just need a win, he needs a blowout, one that is undeniable and preferably evident on election night. By one <a href="https://twitter.com/NateSilver538/status/1301190941110341632?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1301190941110341632%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.washingtonpost.com%2Fopinions%2F2020%2F09%2F24%2Fheres-why-bidens-lead-is-big-could-get-bigger%2F">estimate</a>, Biden’s chances of an Electoral College victory stands at 46 percent if he wins the popular vote by “only” 3 percent; that figure plummets to a paltry 6 percent chance if he beats Trump by 1 point.</p><p>No one doubts that the democratic opposition in the US will win the most votes on November 3rd. No one can say for sure that the incumbent regime will lose or give up power. Borrowing from the work of <a href="https://www.ned.org/journal-of-democracy-classics-the-rise-of-competitive-authoritarianism-levitsky-way/">Levitsky and Way</a>, if the US were Iran, we would treat November 3rd as an “inflection point.” Biden needs a win that not only puts him over the top in the EC count, but that puts the election in territory that deters intervention by the judicial branch, above all the Supreme Court, which the current president <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/trump-supreme-court-republican-vote-biden-pack.html">views</a> as his personal Guardian Council.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BPiZwwmG8zDLW2115_fHew.jpeg" /><figcaption>The author and his beloved Madarjoon, casting their ballots for Mousavi, June 2009</figcaption></figure><p>All indications are that Biden is going to get the numbers he needs. Two years ago I argued that “the problem of [American] democracy is the nonvoter, the nearly 103 million Americans who either refused or were unable to cast a ballot in 2016.” As of Monday, November 2, nearly that many Americans have voted early, an astonishing two-thirds of all ballots cast in 2016 already in the books. Texas alone saw nearly 10 million voters participate before November 3rd, an astonishing 108 percent of its <em>entire</em> 2016 total.</p><p>The turnout numbers we’re seeing across the country should serve as a warning signal to the GOP. Put bluntly, big turnouts have the added benefit of making it harder for aspiring despots and their cronies to <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-adviser-jason-miller-equates-counting-ballots-with-stealing-the-election">ratfuck</a> their way to reelection. Trump and the GOP, for all their efforts to throw election day into chaos, remain dependent on the veneer of democratic legitimacy. They rely on plausibility, for the results to be close enough to put their efforts within <a href="https://twitter.com/ThePlumLineGS/status/1305516050008748032">cheating distance</a>. Turnout denies them the option, makes Trump’s <a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots-97eb12b9-5e35-402f-9ea3-0ccfb47f613f.html">plan</a> to declare victory at the first opportunity a moot point.</p><p>The moral investment in voting becomes the predicate for what comes next, the vigorous defense of that vote should it become necessary. When millions of votes vanished in the early morning hours of June 13, 2009, Iranians immediately turned out in the streets, demanding to know, <em>Where is my vote</em>? The voter standing on line in the rain in central Florida, the North Carolina father who brings his young son to witness his dad cast his first-ever vote, are unlikely to expect any less.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hw8FLoLJ_lu0yaN1RUVcZw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Shervin Malekzadeh, June 2009</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Lesson 2: Stay</strong></p><p>It was unimaginable on election night in 2009 that the authorities would cheat. The feeling on the ground and amongst the leadership of the opposition was that the <em>nezam </em>wouldn’t dare. After all, the numbers were there. After four years of Ahmadinejad, worn out by endless crises at home and a national reputation ruined abroad by their president’s antics, Iranians turned up in record numbers to turn Mahmoud Ahmadinejad out, only to see their votes taken away, triggering the greatest <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html?_r=1&amp;ref=opinion&amp;pagewanted=all">political crisis</a> in Iran since the 1979 Revolution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lj518z_zXHIkyx8J13UFnA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Shervin Malekzadeh, June 2009</figcaption></figure><p>The widespread and fast-moving protests that gripped the country throughout the summer of 2009 should be seen for what they were, an extension of voting, not its replacement, a necessary way for the electorate to hold its elected officials <a href="https://muftah.org/iran-protests-extension-of-islamic-republic-ethos/#https://twitter.com/thekarami/status/947265764041486336">accountable</a></p><p>“Mass protest,” the Iranian journalist and dissident Ali Reza Eshraghi <a href="https://lobelog.com/grievance-against-governance-in-iran/">observes</a>, “is like a medical treatment that is both poison and cure. It could expand the scope of participatory politicking or shrink it into more exclusionary and authoritarian forms of government.” Protests offered remedy for a body politic plagued by the pathologies of corruption and arbitrary rule. It was left up to Iran’s leaders to take or reject this difficult medicine.</p><p>Citizens took to the streets to preserve the system, to make it work for them and not against them. Counter-intuitively, demonstrations were, and remain still, an expression of hope, not abandonment. Protests have a long and proud pedigree in Iran, and should, for now, be seen as politics by other means, a way to avoid the change that comes by any means necessary. Less off with their heads and more <em>do your damn job</em>.</p><p>Show up, expect to lose, be prepared to stay. This is the lesson from 2009, the subsequent vindication of Mousavi and the Green Movement in 2013 teaching us once again what we already knew from Poland and Czechoslovakia under communism in the 1980s, or South Africa under apartheid, the wisdom of Beckett’s call to “ fail again, fail better.” Show up, expect to lose, let them know that you’re not leaving.</p><p><strong>Lesson 3: Exit (End Game)</strong></p><p>Trump and Ahmadinejad won as cagey disruptors, populists who defied the odds. Their victories over establishment figures sold as a release from the dead weight of the past. At stake was the promise, the illusion, of ending “politics as usual.” Norm-breaking would serve as their preferred mechanism for reform, under the theory that any disruption was “good” because the system was presumed to be “bad.”</p><p>They governed as they had run, as entertainers, the manner of their victories not just a means to an ends but the thing itself. Ahmadinejad and Trump performed grievance, and a segment of the crowd chomped at the bread thrown their way.</p><p>The same spontaneous and undisciplined behavior that had made both men such appealing figures on the campaign trail and on television fueled the mismanagement and corruption of their respective governments. Ill-mannered by disposition and constantly drawn to the din of unnecessary conflict, Ahmadinejad and Trump presided over administrations marked by constant turnover and the absence of ability among the rank and file.</p><p>Whereas their supporters sought improvement in their daily lives, for their loyalty they received incompetence and insouciance instead. Trump’s transgressions have produced the same policy outcomes as they did under Ahmadinejad, which is to say, not much.</p><p>Their erratic and tempestuous style proved to be corrosive to the ties that bound the president’s ruling coalition together. Iran’s already fractious conservative wing has yet to recover from Ahmadinejad’s time in office, and remains unglued to this day, a preview of the ruinous fate awaiting the GOP after November 3rd.</p><p>After eight years of chaos and crisis, a new dynamic of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/08/where-irans-hard-liners-diverge-from-the-moderates/">governance</a> emerged in Iran in 2013 that lasted nearly a decade, a reaction to the catastrophic years of the Ahmadinejad administration. The unexpected election of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency was a consequence of the tacit agreement between ordinary and elite Iranians to seek change through electoral politics and to forge a path of national reconciliation based on centrist and coalitional politics, a self-made thermidor, unprecedented in postrevolutionary Iran.</p><p>All indications are that the current US administration will come to a similar, ruinous end. The president’s ceaseless pursuit of affirmation, combined with a limitless capacity for self-undermining behavior, has revealed the GOP to be a party without options, the proverbial orchestra on the top deck of a sinking ship. (It has taken years for Iran’s conservative wing to recover from Ahmadinejad’s time in office, aided, ironically, by the misbegotten “maximum pressure” campaign of the Trump administration. With Iran’s security forces on a war footing as a result of the US sanctions regime and increasingly willing to use <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/01/17/why-this-time-the-protests-in-iran-are-different/">offical violence</a> to quell a restless population at home, the democracy movement in Iran has gone into retreat, discredited ahead of next year’s pivotal presidential election.)</p><p>As for Ahmadinejad, he remains a toxic figure within Iran, shunned by his political peers and much of society, consigned to making <a href="https://twitter.com/Ahmadinejad1956/status/1052178368072945668">absurd</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Ahmadinejad1956/status/1167078948481765377">proclamations</a> on Twitter. Trump appears to be headed to a similar end, an oversized giant on social media with little else to show for his efforts. Trump is certain to become a disposable figure, a scapegoat for the sins of his party, remembered if at all as a politician whose toxic mix of arrogance, abrasiveness, and self-confidence did as much to divide his own camp as it did society at large.</p><p>For all of their shared qualities, one crucial difference sets Trump apart from Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s noxious bellowing remained for the most part aspirational, penned in by his country’s relative weakness and corralled by the authority of the more cautious and temperate Khamanei. It was Khamanei who acted as the guardrail, and it was <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-saga-20150713-story.html">Khamanei</a>, not Ahmadinejad’s letters, that approved backchannel communications with the Americans via Oman which led to the current nuclear treaty. Safeguards and restraints meant that there were always breaks on Ahmadinejad’s bad behavior, so that his sound and fury largely went nowhere.</p><p>No such boundaries exist for Trump, despite the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/us/politics/miles-taylor-anonymous-trump.html">professed</a> efforts of his aides. There is no Supreme Leader, no version of the current GOP competent or brave enough to stand up to the administration as it continues on its <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-case-for-impeaching-donald-trump-is-real-and-serious-heres-why">unconstitutional</a>, perhaps <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/donald-trump-is-unraveling-white-house-advisers">treasonous</a> path. Whatever guardrails once existed within the White House have long been dismantled, replaced by sycophants and strivers.</p><p>For years Ahmadinejad played the part of the madcap tyrant on TV, faithfully performing his clownish act for American audiences, performed against a rotating stable of straight men, all eager for the ratings of an interview with the Iranian ‘dictator.’</p><p>He turned out to be a simulacrum of the real thing. The truth is that America had its own Ahmadinejad from the start. What we imagine tyranny to be was already here, within us, gnawing at our conscience while we doom scroll through an early morning twitter feed in search of the latest catastrophe.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=619208df85b9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Worst Presidential Debate in Iranian History]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/the-worst-presidential-debate-in-iranian-history-2031f079e141?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2031f079e141</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[green-movement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2009]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2020 13:29:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-01T13:29:59.920Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/730/1*JLxqX9a4XnR4tTrHGFe6Ew.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mir Hossein Mousavi</figcaption></figure><p>Long before the outbursts of Donald Trump on the debate stage in Ohio Tuesday night, the televised faceoff between Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former prime minister, Mir Hossein Mousavi on June 3, 2009, captured the fascination and horror of an entire country.</p><p>Staged on the twentieth anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death and just days before the election, the only direct encounter between Ahmadinejad and his main rival was a showcase of un-presidential behavior, the source of a million chants and jeers. The sitting president wasted no time in engaging in crass commentary and relentless lies, at one point bizarrely attacking the academic credentials of Mousavi’s wife. Already widely reviled at home and abroad, Ahmadinejad’s constant interruptions and contempt for the most basic truths confirmed for many that he was something less than an aspiring tin-pot, he was <em>bitarbiyat</em>, rude, literally without education, an unforgiveable quality for a leader in the Iranian context.</p><p>For Mousavi, hampered by a lack of access to state-run media and allowed only two months to campaign, the contrast in demeanor proved critical to his rise in the polls. Research shows that debates have almost <a href="https://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/elections/presidential-debates-effects-research-roundup/">no impact</a> on voter behavior in the US. Not so in Iran. Live debates have an outsized presence and influence in Iranian politics as they are one of the only occasions in which political leaders face unscripted and uncensored questioning before the public. Lacking political parties that can command the loyalty of fixed constituencies, Iran’s electorate remains fluid, prone to turning presidential elections into mass movements as public sentiment coalesces around a particular personality, typically in the final days of campaigning. The crucial swing bloc of voters in Iran are the reluctant voters, infrequent participants who could care less about preserving the revolution. Debates give these voters permission to overcome their reluctance.</p><p>The evening marked a turning point in not only the campaign to remove Ahmadinejad but in the long and turbulent history of modern Iran. For the first time, Iranians appeared ready to turn out incumbent power peacefully. The defeat of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have been a milestone in the political development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a test of the system’s capacity and tolerance for change, one that it would, a little more than a week after the debate, fail.</p><p>What follows is my account of that electric night, a live-blog shared from Tehran with friends and family back home in the United States, included in a forthcoming collection of essays on the Green Movement and its impact on the struggle for democracy in Iran.</p><p><strong>June 3, 2009</strong></p><p><em>Begam? Begoo! Begam? Begoo! Faghat doorooq nagoo!</em></p><p><em>Should I say? Say it! Should I say? Say it!…Just don’t lie!</em></p><p>Iranians have been treated to an experience without precedent in the 30 years of the Islamic Republic of Iran: six back-to-back live and unscripted debates between all four of the candidates for the presidency of the Islamic Republic.</p><p>Each candidate is slated to pair off once with each of his three opponents, and while the rules state that the debates are to be between the two men present in the studio that particular night, the truth has been that one candidate of the four has been put up for collective judgement: the incumbent, Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.</p><p>Tonight was the big night, the match-up between the two giants of the election, Ahmadinejad and “Engineer” Mir Hossein Mousavi, the leading reformist candidate and close ally of former president Mohammad Khatami.</p><p>It was only the second of the slated six debates, but Tehran was buzzing with anticipation. Invited to a high school ceremony honoring the twentieth anniversary of the Founder’s passing, I could feel the tension rising as the program ran long. People wanted to get out and get home to catch the beginning of the action. Khomeini was forever, but on this night, even he could wait.</p><p>I passed by kids on my way out of the auditorium, little guys too young to really know what was going on but old enough to get that this was a Big Deal. They were half-screaming, half-speaking to each other in that way that only kids know how, stumbling over the big words: “Oooh, oooh, are you going to see the mon, mono, <em>monozere</em> (debate)? It’s tonight you know!”</p><p><strong>The Debate Begins</strong></p><p>Ahmadinejad showed up in his usual get-up, “the people’s wear” consisting of gray jacket and white shirt, no tie of course. The current president has a twitchy nose tic and smiles a lot. It’s not the kind of smile that signals “I like you.” He tells you that he does (“My dear friend Mr. Mousavi, I like you…”) but it’s really faint praise on the way to damnation (“…that’s why I feel <em>so</em> sorry for you, and I really didn’t want to say this, but you’ve come here with your facts all wrong.”).</p><p>If Ahmadinejad came off as a street fighter ready to cut you with both a knife and a smirk, the man sitting across the table from him cut a decidedly more tepid figure. One of the first things you notice about Mir Hossein Mousavi is the color white: He sports a white beard and hair, swooped to the side in a youthful style. He has exceptionally white hands. The only spot of color on his face or in his figure are in his eyebrows, two dark hyphens racing across his brow. The lack of color is even more exceptional given that all of Tehran is currently awash in green, the official color of Mousavi’s candidacy.</p><p>In the span of just a few weeks and acting almost completely at the grassroots level, his campaign has mounted a Green Revolution. There isn’t a green headscarf, necktie, or bolt of cloth to be found in the city.</p><p>A former prime minister and first-generation revolutionary, Mousavi’s demeanor resembles a metal spring, wound and packed tight into its casing. There is little motion and drama in his character — this is a man not blessed with the gifts of charisma. At times awkward in his delivery, he has a propensity to pepper his sentences with the word <em>chiz</em>, the Farsi equivalent of “um” or even “that thing” (a YouTube clip lampooning this verbal habit is already up).</p><p>Nonetheless, Mousavi’s cool presentation worked well set against the out-of-control heat of his opponent. You get the sense that this guy knows what he’s talking about. Mousavi is, to put it bluntly, <em>Obama without the charisma</em>.</p><p>Which is not to say that he is a pushover. An ethnic Azeri, Mousavi is apt to get hot quickly, the coil springing out of its casing in a fury, only to retract and cool back down again. This would happen later in the night, when Ahmadinejad made the unfortunate decision to go after Mousavi’s wife.</p><p>Anyone who has seen Ahmadinejad in interviews with American or European reporters can’t help but be impressed by his uncanny ability to turn a discussion inside out. Interviewers frequently find themselves the interviewee (“Sir, you saw that Iran is on the correct path but we see that the world is arrayed against you…” “What world? What countries are you talking about? The entire world or an arrogant few?”).</p><p>Typically this boorish behavior is interpreted as some sort of ancient “Persian way,” a supposedly Iranian propensity for dissembling and verbal maneuvering developed over centuries of survival. In tonight’s context, against another Iranian well versed, one presumes, in Persian forensics, there was little opportunity for Ahmadinejad to get away with his old tricks.</p><p>The candidates spoke had four turns of roughly 10 minutes each, loosely monitored by a non-descript and reticent timekeeper sitting between the two men. Ahmadinejad regularly ran over his time and by the end had none left for him to respond to Mousavi’s closing statement. This seemed not to matter to the sitting president, and he began to haphazardly lob comments and accusations at Mousavi off camera and worse of all, off microphone.</p><p>It came off like someone running in and out of the room to deliver bad news in a panic. Mousavi, with eyes closed and hand raised, firmly blocked Ahmadinejad’s verbal outbursts like Darth Vader stopping Han Solo’s well-aimed shot in Cloud City: “Excuse me. Excuse me, you’ve had your chance to speak…” To its credit, the state-run network held the line and did not grant the president any sort of disposition. This did not prevent Ahmadinejad from lamely getting in a final zinger, George Costanza-style, as they cut to closing credits…in effect substantiating Mousavi’s claim that this is a man who does not follow the rules or care for the law. That this latter point is getting serious play — <em>rayat e qanun</em>, obeying the law — is an important development in the political discourse of Iran.</p><p>As I hinted earlier, the most <a href="https://www.memri.org/tv/iranian-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-clashes-presidential-candidate-mir-hossein-mousavi">dramatic</a> part of the evening came when Ahmadinejad mysteriously held up a stack of papers with a black and white passport-size photo of a woman clearly visible on the front. Ominously, he asked Mousavi, “I can speak tonight about a woman, someone you know, someone who has been at your side often these past days. I have information about her. <em>Begam? Begam?</em> Should I say? Should I say?”</p><p>Mousavi, clearly unnerved by this bizarre and unexpected turn, told the president to go right ahead, and on his next turn Ahmadinejad dived right into what may have been the turning point in the election. The file that the president had in his possession was that of Mousavi’s wife, a remarkable figure in her own right and the first wife to ever play a prominent role in an Iranian election (she is already being called the “Iranian Michelle”). Highly educated, with two advanced degrees to her name, viewers were now subjected to the sight of a sitting president telling them that her degrees were phony and obtained by cheating. Ahmadinejad never mentioned her name or her relationship to Mousavi, but there was no mistaking about whom he was speaking, with plausible deniability, in a passive-aggressive, unprecedented display of malice.</p><p>This episode, shocking in the moment, would be worked out in the streets in the days to come, the subject of a million chants and jeers.</p><p><strong>On the Attack</strong></p><p>Warmed up by the initial exchange, Ahmadinejad pressed the attack, now focusing his fire against targets unseen and off stage. Iran had prevailed against its enemies, he loudly declared, and under his leadership the Iranians had defeated the Americans in the decades-old cold war between the two countries. He alone had succeeded where his predecessors, former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, had failed, compelling the Americans to abandon a regime-change policy, forcing the president of the United States to say in public the full and proper name of the country, the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p><p>The willingness, even recklessness, of Ahmadinejad to burn every bridge tying him to Iran’s insular leadership was breathtaking. He combined his foreign policy assault with a sustained attack on the corruption of Rafsanjani, presumed to be Mousavi’s patron, going so far as to single out the former president’s sons and daughter for their graft. The wisdom of such a gambit was questionable. Apart from Ahmadinejad’s most ardent supporters, who are many, the provenance of Rafsanjani’s corruption is likely to have little play with the broader public, who view the wealth of the current head as being old news and beside the point.</p><p>If Ahmadinejad sought the mantle of an Iranian Reagan, Mousavi was keen to cast him as a Nixon, more interested in <em>“paravande sazi”</em> or building files against political enemies than solving the problems of the country. He flatly told Ahmadinejad that he did not obey the law and stepped all over these laws whenever they worked against his personal interests. Mousavi went so far as accusing his opponent of heading down the path of dictatorship. This was incredible — on live television! — Mousavi said what many Iranians feel but had not until that point dared to say out loud: this man behaves like a despot. Mousavi conjured up “Tricky Dick,” calling Ahmadinejad a liar to his face, a motif that would be repeated by the other candidates during subsequent debates and by the growing numbers of demonstrators out on the streets. This man lies, one of the greatest sins that a Muslim can commit…</p><p><strong>Real Politics</strong></p><p>Anyone who has watched these debates between the four candidates is unlikely to accept the premise that there is no meaningful politics in Iran, that its politicians and candidates for office are all the same. The fixation in the United States on the barriers to participation — including the pre-screening and elimination of candidates for the presidency or parliament by the Guardian Council — does little to explain why so many were watching these debates, as the objection overlooks the very real differences between the four men running for president of Iran.</p><p>It is quite evident that Iranians no longer accept the premise that they should protest by not participating in the electoral process. Not voting is now seen as the same as voting. For the wrong guy. Four years of runaway inflation, increased trade embargoes, an already devastated international reputation made worse, and nothing of substance to show for it are all evidence enough that “change” is needed, one that supersedes the politics of the past (indeed, Mehdi Karrobi, the only cleric running, has adopted Obama’s “Change” as a campaign slogan — not to be outdone, Ahmadinejad has posters up with <em>“Ma mitavanim” </em>or “We Can”).</p><p>Increasingly, the old political categories are eroding. What does it mean when one of the supposedly conservative candidates, a man responsible for forming the Revolutionary Guard, recently articulated a well-reasoned case for Iran to move away from a centralized public authority to a federal system similar to the one found in the United States? When “principalists” start sounding like Thomas Jefferson you know that something strange is afoot at the Circle K.</p><p>For the higher-ups here in Iran, elections are seen as a means of ritual validation. To their way of thinking, everyone who turns up to vote, votes yes to the Revolution and the idea of the Islamic Republic. Who the candidates are and who ultimately wins matter less. What’s important is that domestic and especially international audiences see that Iranians turned out.</p><p>Of course, the kids that I see day and night filling the streets, wearing green and chanting Mousavi’s name, are not obliged to feel the same way. Whether or not Iran’s youth, some 70 percent of the population, believe in the system remains unclear, but it’s certain that this time around they’re willing to use whatever political resource at their disposal to make their lives just a little bit better, which in this case is their right to a single vote against Ahmadinejad and for Mousavi.</p><p>They’ll go to vote with the democracy they’ve been given, and, while it’s not perfect, in the absence of viable alternatives and faced with the impossibility of suffering through another four years of Ahmadinejad, they’ll take it. They certainly intend to have fun along the way.</p><p>If Iranians do this, if they are successful in throwing out Ahmadinejad after four years, it will be an unprecedented event in the history of Iran. It will also put Iran one better than the United States, which when given the chance over four years ago to end a disastrous presidency, failed to do so.</p><p>Excerpted from the forthcoming volume, <em>Fire Beneath the Ash: Dispatches from the Green Movement and the Struggle for Democracy in Iran, 2009–2019</em>.</p><p><a href="https://www.shervinmalekzadeh.com/">Shervin Malekzadeh</a> is a Visiting Researcher in Middle East and Islamic Studies at Colgate University.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2031f079e141" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why This Time the Protests in Iran are Different (Requiem for a Dream)]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/why-this-time-the-protests-in-iran-are-different-requiem-for-a-dream-d0f18df26254?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d0f18df26254</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2019]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protests-in-iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Dec 2019 23:26:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-11T15:52:02.349Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-80vgzHSHEkRGShbCKLh7w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Protesters carrying away a comrade shot during protests in Shiraz, Iran. November 17, 2019</figcaption></figure><p>The last time around, when it once again seemed like the Islamic Republic of Iran was tumbling down and the usual suspects were telling us it was the end of the regime, was in 2017. Anti-government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/iran-protests-trump-tweets">demonstrations</a> had broken out without warning in Mashad during the early days of winter and quickly grew to include dozens of communities throughout Iran, sending forth countless headlines and dispatches filled with speculation about the imminent demise of the IRI.</p><p>At the height of what was then the worst political violence in Iran since the calamitous 2009 presidential elections, the journalist Ali Reza Eshraghi offered a <a href="https://lobelog.com/grievance-against-governance-in-iran/">second opinion</a> on the crisis, diagnosing the widespread and fast-moving protests gripping the country as the expression of hope, not abandonment, uncertain remedy for a body politic plagued by corruption and the pathology of arbitrary rule. “For a country that behaves in ways that defy prediction,” wrote Eshraghi,a veteran of the student movement of the 1990s, “mass protest is like a medical treatment that is both poison and cure. It could expand the scope of participatory politicking or shrink it into more exclusionary and authoritarian forms of government.” Prescribed by the public through direct action, it was up to Iran’s leaders to take or reject their medicine.</p><p>That in 2019 they chose <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/world/middleeast/iran-protests.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share">poison</a> is the source of despair. The brutal takedown of protestors this past November, the unrepentant violence that in the span of a few weeks resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/iran-thousands-arbitrarily-detained-and-at-risk-of-torture-in-chilling-post-protest-crackdown/">at least 304 Iranians</a>, marks a turning point in the political development of Iran, a retreat from, if not outright abandonment of what had been in recent years the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/middleeast/iran-presidential-election-democracy.html">fitful</a> but incremental consolidation of democracy. If Iran was for a time and against the odds becoming <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/">more democratic</a> in spite of itself, then the decision by the authorities to fire on protestors, to reach immediately for the gun, was spite itself, an act of unaccountable malice.</p><p>The bill will not be long in coming. We are undoubtedly witnessing the final days of an oppositional politics centered on the vote, each ballot and electoral triumph a step towards securing a politics less cruel, less absolute. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/01/how-women-the-green-movement-and-an-app-shaped-irans-elections/">virtuous cycle</a> of elections that unexpectedly defined the aftermath of the 2009 Green Movement is already being replaced from below by an emerging cycle of protest, of demonstration and violent counter-demonstration, an accelerating path to ruin without the usual offramp of elections to restore the peace.</p><p>The speed at which the turn to violence has metastasized is breathtaking. It took several weeks for an unprepared security apparatus to fully bare its teeth in the summer of 2009, and another six months for officials to fully suppress the Green Movement uprising, resulting in the deaths of 72 Iranians. This fall’s protests surpassed that total in a matter of days. State agents killed at least 106 protesters in 21 cities between November 15–19, according to Amnesty International; the number killed may be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR">as high as</a> 1,500.</p><p><strong>Conflagration not implosion</strong></p><p>The compounding tragedies of 2017 and 2019 bode badly for the durability of the IRI. Iran may yet tip into rapid collapse, an absolute nightmare scenario of political change (see Syria, Libya). The shameless use of violent force by the state against unarmed protestors makes such an outcome more, not less, likely in the long term. Fierce states are almost never strong states, the deployment of bayonets being, as Talleyrand reminds us, useful for maintaining the throne, but not for sitting on it.</p><p>Nonetheless, that the present state of affairs will end with implosion in the near-term remains an unlikely, if not exactly unimaginable, outcome. Iran 2019 is not the Soviet Union in 1989, nor Libya 2011. The nature of IRI rule, an ideological state lacking a singular “Dear Leader” in the manner of a Saddam, Qaddafi, or Assad, makes it a poor candidate for the type of rapid collapse associated with so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edgoldstone15.html">sultanistic regimes</a>. Cries of “Death to Khamanei” make for good copy, but are hardly sufficient for bringing about the demise of a well-entrenched system, sustained by the special authenticity of religion and boasting numerous nodes of power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uO64WEc-TryShKKdA5hc6g.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Protesters have voiced their anger at Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei (right), and other leaders, including President Hassan Rouhani (center). Iranian Supreme Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</em></figcaption></figure><p>Though it is unclear how the coming months will play out, what <em>is</em> amply foreseeable is the maelstrom that is sure to occur were a dramatic collapse to occur. Conflagration, not implosion, is the more likely outcome in Iran. For every Iranian who loathes living under the Islamic banner, there are plenty who count themselves as the <em>nezam</em>’s devoted constituency, its willing defenders, unto death, unto the release of martyrdom.</p><p>On the other side of revolution lies civil war and the failed state, a reality that Iranians who lived through the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/the-bloody-red-summer-of-1988.html">postrevolutionary chaos of the 1980s</a> are keen to avoid, whatever the costs<strong>. </strong>For those who have forgotten or who never knew just how bad things were or might become again, there is a constant reminder nearby, a counterfactual in the horror show that is Syria.<strong> </strong>It certainly appears that Tehran has already taken malign lessons from the Assad regime, a rough education in how state violence applied instrumentally, mercilessly, unfortunately works. Shoot first, forgive later, but only after a show trial.</p><p><strong>Sticking together</strong></p><p>The key now is elite defection, above all the breaking of ranks within the security forces, the proverbial “boys with the toys.” There is at the moment little indication that such defections are on offer, at least among the upper ranks of the civilian and military leadership (whether front line forces will continue to obey orders is another matter). While the persistence of elite cohesion can be partly attributed to the absence of a disposable figure, a scapegoat in the mold of an Ahmadinejad, a politician whose toxic mix of arrogance, abrasiveness, and self-confidence did as much to divide his own camp as it did society at large, perhaps the most crucial source of solidarity has been the international context. The decision by the United States to abandon diplomacy and the JCPOA in favor of the chimera of “maximum pressure” has had the predictable effect of putting Tehran on a war footing, artificially inflating the <a href="https://twitter.com/RZimmt/status/1210907920436727808">strength</a>, and recklessness, of the regime, to say nothing of its whip hand. With massive demonstrations against Iranian influence in Lebanon and Iraq, the US escalating an already onerous sanctions regime against Iran and the Europeans helpless to stop them, is not surprising that Tehran views the latest protests as more than a domestic upheaval, quite apart from the usual paranoia about foreign intrigue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bNwAPjPx1vsDpE3a5vuJ9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>A pro-government demonstration in the capital, Tehran, November 2019. Credit…Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>Caught in the middle, as always, is the general public. Besieged by their government at home and a relentless sanctions regime from abroad, without recourse to a viable alternative and faced with the sheer awfulness of the overseas opposition, most have made the choice to bide their time, no matter how sympathetic they may be towards the protestors. Better to stick with the current system and scoundrels you know at home, than the unknown pretenders to power operating out of LA studios or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/09/mek-iran-revolution-regime-trump-rajavi">troll farms in Tirana</a>.</p><p>Sticking to the elusive indigenous solution around has the advantage of preserving the public’s leverage over their tormentors. As so often happens in abusive relationships, Iran’s authorities continue to condemn protestors and their families even as they try to win them back using pious gestures of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/world/middleeast/iran-protests-rouhani-Khamenei.html?action=click&amp;module=RelatedLinks&amp;pgtype=Article">forgiveness and regret</a>. Official mistrust of the public coexists with a desperate reliance on the public’s affirmation of regime legitimacy. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2020-parliamentary-election-causing-anxiety-tehran-191213162204935.html">Reports</a> that officials are growing worried about turnout for the 2020 parliamentary elections are reflective of the endless <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/parliamentary-elections-loom-legitimacy-iran-s-regime-has-been-shaken">dilemma</a> of the IRI, a political system whose leaders crave constantly high turnout as evidence of the people’s love of the revolution, but who loathe the results that high turnout always<em> </em>brings, namely the (re)appropriation and reimagining of democracy from below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ap9th0hL-RpwWwKt9ozIjA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A pro-government demonstration in the capital, Tehran, November 2019. Credit…Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>Elections, however, are infrequent instruments, insufficient for the conciliation of a general population furious about increased fuel prices and the cost of melons in the here and now. Where elections come up short, there is the mass demonstration. Lining the fundaments of Iran’s postrevolutionary architecture is the imperative to stand against injustice, a mandate to revolt. Protests have a long and storied pedigree in Iran and though it is not much talked about, they have traditionally served as a restorative, if not a reminder. Heal thyself, before it’s too late.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*O2417_j2X_MQVYrlY_J7DQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Member of parliament representing Mahshahr protests the killing of protesters in his city. November 2019</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Letting go</strong></p><p>Three years before the current crisis, when peaceful progress still seemed possible, civil society activists mounted an impromptu and self-organized push to get out the vote ahead of the 2016 parliamentary elections. They deployed an arsenal of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/how-iranians-use-of-an-app-is-changing-politics-and-civil-society/">memes, videos, and articles</a> through social media platforms such as Telegram, aimed at holding the line against the worst elements of the regime. Voting, they argued, was neither poison nor treatment, but a palliative, a way to resist through acts of abeyance. “Prevention is better than a cure.” They approached their task with an air of resignation and pragmatism, an unembarrassed lowering of stakes, “However much you remove yourself from the action,” read another popular meme, “you’re still inside this <em>nezam</em>,” or system.</p><p>Havel reminds us that the prerogative to stay within the system is in fact <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/the-power-of-the-powerless/">a choice</a>, not a mandate. Embedded in <em>nezam </em>is <em>nazm</em>, the Persian word for “order.” What happens when the system is disordered, when order is completely absent? When soldiers shoot on unarmed protesters, when Khuzestan marshes turn into <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/03/iran-finally-admits-it-shot-killed-rioters-it-still-wont-say-how-many-people-died-last-months-protests/">killing fields</a>, when there is no system to speak of, then it becomes necessary to step outside, to seek healing in lives lived separately, simply and in the truth.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d0f18df26254" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Calling the President a Racist is Beside the Point]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/why-calling-the-president-a-racist-is-beside-the-point-782c4160f58d?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/782c4160f58d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ilhan-omar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alexandria-ocasio-cortez]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greenville]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2019 09:05:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-02T03:25:23.610Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>We would do better if we measured the president’s racism by his policies and behavior, not by his heart and intent</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*NBcXzs3Xw7qyo2blmg0DJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Carolytn Kaster / AP</figcaption></figure><p>Mario Díaz-Balart spoke with the certainty of the easily converted. The duly elected representative of Florida’s 25th congressional district demurred…that an American president had led his supporters in call and response demanding that four of his House colleagues, citizens and women of color, to “go back to where they came from.” Asked by reporters to respond to the president’s July 18 rally in Greenville, North Carolina, Díaz-Balart, a son of Cuban immigrants, <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/minority-lawmakers-trump-slur_n_5d2e3260e4b085eda5a328cb">replied</a>, “I’ve had a gazillion things happen to me. I’ve had a gazillion things said to me. We throw this racist thing around so easily…A statement does not make one racist.”</p><p>Memory compels me to take the congressman at his word. I too have had a much said to me. Camel jockey, wetback, Paki, Hindu hipster, a symphony of slander, variations on the color brown. I’ve had sand nigger shouted at me by classmates in Texas, towel head by a teammate at Stanford. A South African roommate, also a Stanford grad, delighted in addressing me as sand kaffer, a variation on his homeland’s vernacular.</p><p>Not once, in the countless times I’ve been called a terrorist or a 7–11 owner, did it occur to me to ask or to accuse my tormentors, <em>Are you racist?</em></p><p>As it were, racist statements tended to serve as a preamble to the main event, which was nearly always some form of physical violence. Hearing slurs meant it was time to get moving fast, as there was sure to be a fist to duck, a shove to avoid, an angry driver to evade. What was “really” going on in the hearts and minds of my tormentors was, under these circumstances, of secondary importance to the party concerned.</p><p>Trump, of course, hasn’t said anything as crude as sand nigger or towelhead, not yet at least. Men of his ilk, being savvy in instinct if not intellect, know that it’s better to speak in elision and suggestion, in the in-between, even if he is credited by his supporters for saying the quiet part out loud. There are, even now, limits.</p><p>In Greenville, Trump hedged his animus. Being American meant abiding by a simple choice, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/17/politics/donald-trump-greenville-rally/index.html">presented</a> in conditional if-then form. “If they don’t love [the US, then] tell them to leave it.” Elated, the crowd took up the call. “Send her back! Send her back!”</p><p>Go back, go back, if you don’t like how things are here, go back. As if possession of the country was theirs alone to dispense with as they saw fit. Go back, go back. Never mind that the ones telling us to go back invariably don’t know where the going “back” might be.</p><p>That the jeers heard in Greenville were word for word the same as those used years ago by my friend, spitting mad at my outrage over the US <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/16/the-forgotten-story-of-iran-air-flight-655/?utm_term=.676ae6fce723">downing</a> of Iran Air Flight 655, the phrasing no different from the shouts of a suburban couple angry at my parents over a movie theater parking space, was surely a coincidence. The congressman assures me.</p><p>The uncertainty over whether or not to describe as racist a president who calls for the physical removal of four women of color, four elected members of Congress, has been, if unremarkable. Offsite, away from the cameras, on the edges of social media…These hand wringers are met by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/reader-center/trump-go-back-stories.html">quiet lifting of hands</a>, by immigrants and the children of immigrants, stepping forward to describe the first time, the latest time, that they were told to go back home. a reminder that to many the rest of us are to remain on the margins, made conditional citizens by our origin and appearance.</p><p>We would do better if we measured racism not as intent or purpose but as outcome and effort, specifically observable behavior and policies. I have no idea what goes on in the heart and mind of Trump; I doubt he does either. I do know that “racist” describes the consequences of our president’s actions. Those folks chanting last week in North Carolina to strip a Somali-American of her citizenship because their feelings are hurt by what she has to say, that’s racist behavior. The maudlin Mussolini who led the jeering crowd to that trough of hate performs racist politics, even if in a panic he denies it the day after.</p><p>The single but important advantage of this approach to race and racism is that it takes the excuse of invisible intent and “true meaning” off the table. It removes the racist’s “essential” and forever unknowable character from discussion. None of that matters. What’s in the bigot’s “heart and soul” is a matter for him, his psychiatrist, and his God to sort out. The rest of it, the families <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/07/15/741721660/follow-up-what-happened-after-a-border-agent-asked-toddler-to-pick-a-parent">separated</a> at the border despite our <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/06/26/736177694/a-father-and-daughter-drowned-at-the-border-put-attention-on-immigration">asylum laws</a>, the <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/28/migrants-detail-conditions-texas-border-patrol-stations/">kids</a> locked in <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/a-border-patrol-agent-reveals-what-its-really-like-to-guard-migrant-children">cages</a> in violation of our decency as Americans, the political rivals threatened on a daily basis with physical and mortal danger, all of it slides easily into a basket labeled “racist.” These <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/border-patrols-oversight-sick-migrant-children/593224/">effects</a> become <em>our </em>responsibility as voting — -and yes, demonstrating — -citizens to stop.</p><p>I don’t care whether the 40 percent of Americans who continue to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/send-her-back-trump-supporters-his-nc-rally/594268/">support</a> Trump three years into this shitstorm are racists. I don’t need to know whether Trump himself is “really” a racist. I can see it and I can hear it for myself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=782c4160f58d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Am The Anonymous Iranian The NYT Published In 2009. The Trump Op-Ed Writer Is No Hero.]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/i-am-the-anonymous-iranian-the-nyt-published-in-2009-the-trump-op-ed-writer-is-no-hero-c8d3413270d2?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c8d3413270d2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[anonymous]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-york-times]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iranian]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Sep 2018 11:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-15T16:19:48.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*1e5Lih3PpU2t7KXx" /></figure><p>Ji Sub Jeong/HuffPost Photo: Getty Images</p><p>The violence began in earnest two days after The New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html">published my op-ed</a>. It was June 2009 and hundreds of thousands of Iranians had taken to the streets to protest a fraudulent national election. Under the uncommon byline of “Shane M.,” I had condemned the re-election of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as bogus, as well as the U.S. media for its apparent determination to dismiss the ensuing protests as an isolated event, the two parts of my identity brought in for reproach in equal measure.</p><p>Two mornings later, and one week after the voting had ended, the authorities began to follow through on threats to put a stop to the demonstrations. We watched it live and at home, Iranian television doing little to conceal the violence happening in the streets and alleyways around the country. There would be no quarter.</p><p>My situation as an American in Iran was already precarious. State media had placed the source of the trouble outside of the country. The news for days ran footage of “voluntary” confessions by local citizens led astray by foreign elements, villainous Iranians operating out of the United Kingdom (“Death to America” gets the headlines, but the role of lead villain is reserved in Iran for the British). I was a <em>kharaji</em>, or foreigner, who had arrived on a flight from London shortly before the vote, and so I fit the profile of the state’s narrative too well.</p><p>I was also an Iranian, one who could speak the language, albeit off kilter and by way of Texas and California, fluent in the most visible and obvious components of the culture. I knew my lines and could play the part. Nonetheless, I remained an <em>Amrikai, </em>or at minimum an <em>az oon var-e ab</em> (an Iranian from “the other side of the water”). My accent, dress, and even manner of walking being dead giveaways that I was not a “local,” a <em>khodi</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*lZy26tEVJ6ZCw11T" /><figcaption>Shervin Malekzadeh</figcaption></figure><p>I faced <a href="https://www.salon.com/2009/06/22/tehran_six/">the worsening news</a> by turning away. I curled onto my aunt’s couch, paralyzed by desperate fear, my back to the television. I didn’t need to look to know what I had gotten myself into. My aunt told me not to worry, that everything would be ok, <em>hamechi</em> <em>dorost mishe</em>. I pressed my face against the cushions. When they came, if they came, maybe I could hide like this, maybe they would take pity on someone so clearly in over his head.</p><p>The New York Times had run out of correspondents. Like other American and European media outlets, their reporters had been invited into Iran to cover the presidential election as the latest triumph of a democratic Islamic Republic, credentialed witnesses to the ritual of voting as an act of defiance against Iran’s enemies, a holy resistance by ballot box against the Americans. When the good news ran out and the voters lost faith with the results, the reporters were run out too, their visas expeditiously revoked by the authorities, who quickly ushered them out of the country before turning their attention back to the chaos brewing at home.</p><p>All that was left were us, the young graduate students and stray researchers still on the ground, held there by the ballast of our nationality and passports. We were residents in Tehran by accident and circumstance during the greatest political crisis since the revolution, and so the news agencies dipped down into our ranks, reaching out to us through email and mutual contacts. And so we wrote.</p><p>I tell my students to resist the passive voice, to place agency on their words, to link subject to object in a direct line of action. Not this, not the op-ed. <em>The piece was written</em>, in a haze and on deadline, the final draft finished in the narrow space between Tuesday and Wednesday, in the dark and against the wishes of my worried family members who wondered how they would answer to my parents were anything to happen to me. The story of what was happening, of what I had seen, sent by dodgy router from a kitchen table in a working and middle-class neighborhood to New York, a desperate signal from one of the countless residential towers scattered like dragon’s teeth along the arching foothills of western Tehran.</p><p>It was written to push back on what was then the emerging narrative in Washington, what in fact was the reassertion of an old narrative, that these protests were false, a “North Tehran” production performed by a cast drawn exclusively from the more westernized sectors of the capital. To an American political class with a fixed narrative about Iran, the protesters in the streets didn’t fit with the story and had to be explained away.</p><p>More than a few analysts now credulously accepted the official line out of Tehran that maybe, just maybe, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061401757.html">Ahmadinejad had won the election</a>. This was the real Iran, these were the real Iranians, a society that <a href="http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Iran%20Survey%20Report%200609.pdf">supported</a> a rude and racist demagogue despite an economy in the tank and an international reputation darkened by their president’s bizarre denials of the Holocaust and of homosexuals. That Iranians might have a say in the matter of who best constituted the values of Islam and the revolution, or that Iran in 2009 was a different place from Iran 1979, was rarely considered or taken seriously.</p><p>Iranians, I argued instead, were courageous practitioners of self-governance, capable of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/yes-iran-has-reform-candidates-and-engaged-citizens/276801/">discerning</a>, of making a choice between <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/why-do-iranians-even-bother-voting/526866/">bad and much worse</a>. They <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/22/iran-election-voters-numbers">had not re-elected</a> Ahmadinejad but had instead cast their lot with the steady promise of Mir Hossein Mousavi, a comparatively bland if capable former prime minister, no less devoted to political Islam and the vision of its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, the voters had made the choice to work through a lousy system <em>as it existed</em> rather than to see it collapse, <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1934584,00.html">to hold it to account</a>, to force it to live up to its professed righteousness. It’s not by accident that the slogan of the Green Movement was simply, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-virtues-of-voting-in-iran_us_59088882e4b084f59b49fcab">Where is my vote</a>?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/496/0*oOxG7VpBeUR6YCby" /><figcaption>Shervin Malekzadeh</figcaption></figure><p>To tell this story, I needed to be anonymous, but I also needed to be Iranian, a dyed-in-the-wool let’s-make-Iran-great-again <em>real</em> Iranian. The script would be more powerful coming from a local version of me, the particular details left to the imaginations of my audience, and not Shervin Malekzadeh, American citizen from Fontana, California.</p><p>So I performed “real.” My voice, amplified in the pages of Times op-ed section, would be the voice of countless Iranians. Left unspoken was the understanding that in order for the piece to work, we would have to leave out more than just my name. The Times described me as a “student in Iran,” an artful bio at once both precise and incomplete, one that skirted the line between revelation and concealment. There was a world of possibility in those words, “in Iran.” I was also an American, in Iran, an American immigrant who like most immigrants fell in between the two halves, at once and not at all Iranian and American.</p><p>The essay itself offered confessions of these other identities throughout, visible for those who knew where to look. The use of collective pronouns in the opening paragraphs, “our” and “we” set against the American “you,” gave way to idiosyncratically American phrasing and markers. The descriptions of life north of Vanak and the urban geography of the capital’s south centered me as Iranian. The references to the Dukes of Hazard and to day-old bagels, not so much.</p><p>The piece was a ”<a href="https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-movie-rashomon-1950">Rashomon</a>” of signposts and signifiers, but only if the reader drew back from the story. The essay was based on the premise of complexity, the notion that Iranians have inner lives and local agency. I wanted to press back against the tendency to flatten out the experiences and beliefs of an incredibly diverse and contentious country of more than 70 million souls.</p><p>Anonymity made it possible for me to express this fullness, to expand <a href="https://fair.org/home/please-stop-using-woman-in-chador-walks-by-anti-us-mural-stock-photo-for-every-article-about-iran/">the picture of Iran</a> that we normally have in the U.S., but it also had the effect of elision, of compression and erasure. Anonymity was necessary to protect myself, but anonymity also meant giving up myself, my “true self,” to the story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*zI-BPA1sE_70NZz0" /><figcaption>Shervin Malekzadeh</figcaption></figure><p>The print version of “A Different Iranian Revolution” today hangs over my office desk at <a href="https://political-science.williams.edu/">Williams College</a>, a 1,600-word anonymous manifesto by me and not by me, framed on the page by Krugman and Brooks, and the backdrop to countless conversations with students and colleagues. I wrote the piece in order to help bring change to Iran and the U.S., but it was the piece that would, in part, bring me to where I am now, this Arcadian idyll in the Berkshires. Hardly the place that I thought that I would end up when I was lying coiled and fetal on that couch all those years ago.</p><p>I must admit that in the time since my op-ed was published, I’ve entertained an uncomfortable ambivalence, even regret, about how it was delivered. Why hadn’t I let them put my name on it, my Iranian first name at least, even if it had put my personal safety at significant risk? (The nickname Shane comes from my mother, an endearment that doubles as a small act of assimilation to her new American home.) Isn’t transparency the measure of commitment? <em>This guy was there. He saw what had happened. He had an op-ed in The New York Times.</em> Putting my real name on the piece would have provided me with the authority that I needed to really affect the conversation around Iran, I sometimes tell myself, unconvinced. Immediately guilt seeps in, and I am at the edges of self-loathing. It all feels indecent.</p><p>Which brings me to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html">anonymous piece</a> the Times published this week,“I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration,” credited to a “senior administration official.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/683/0*ifOsUM3RM3YRHnDy" /></figure><p>nytimescom</p><p>Who is the anonymous op-ed for? There <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/business/media/new-york-times-trump-anonymous.html?action=click&amp;module=Top%20Stories&amp;pgtype=Homepage">has been in recent days</a> some debate whether the Times erred in judgment by granting anonymity to the senior White House official, much of the discussion being less political than professional, centered on the ethics and responsibility of journalists. “What does a self-described ‘senior official in the Trump administration’ have to lose by speaking publicly?” NPR’s Scott Simon <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/09/08/645677277/opinion-stand-up-and-speak-out">asked Saturday morning</a>. “Their job?”</p><p>For most of the previous authors granted anonymity by the Times, the answer was, our lives. There have been <a href="https://twitter.com/marklotto/status/1037429474227351554">only a handful</a> of anonymous editorials run by the Times in the nearly 50 years that the section has existed, the paper of record being famously assiduous in insisting that its authors be on record. In the five and a half years that my indefatigable editor, <a href="https://twitter.com/marklotto?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Mark Lotto</a>, worked at the paper, there was only one, ours. (If not for Mark’s efforts, and the timely interventions of my Georgetown adviser, Dan Brumberg, as well as my parents, that figure would have been none. The bosses at the paper only relented to the use of a pseudonym when we told them that I had been interviewed earlier that day by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/swarthye/posts/10102234924694805?__xts__%5B0%5D=68.ARDcxAane5yDnbiwhqPISwkxdJ1ead842r-xIrq0tpq_vhxHNmkdP3rk_jMPO3nuiyllFPaBwgw8fX54DOHzZ1EaY6lfzpyEWG86WrisR-Q9fdJGiHMJPrcZ4vQ_zrF6Qm_WiH1_EV7RPzb_cjQv5A_7XvtCDn4GpgqyhDimmpyhqIRaswhK3ns&amp;__tn__=-R">Robert Siegel</a> at NPR.)</p><p>I am a member of an unusual and exclusive group, at this point its only named member. From this perspective, I am personally less concerned with the anonymity of the piece than what that anonymity is being put to. The author says that he or she is a part of “the resistance,” acting alongside scores of unnamed others “to preserve our democratic institutions while thwarting Mr. Trump’s more misguided impulses until he is out of office.”</p><p>The notion that the essay published on Wednesday counts as an act of bravery, that this self-designated member of the resistance can barely conceal his or her desire to be acknowledged as a servant of the commonweal, while plainly ignoring the real abuses of the administration, is too much to bear. The author fails to mention <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/still-separated-nearly-500-separated-migrant-children-remain-in-us-custody/2018/08/30/6dbd8278-aa09-11e8-8a0c-70b618c98d3c_story.html?utm_term=.0c4f804d44e3">the nearly 500 migrant children</a> still separated from their parents, the constant race-baiting by the president, or his ceaseless demonization of a free press, but happily celebrates “effective deregulation, historic tax reform, a more robust military and more.” Our country for 30 pieces of silver.</p><p>What would our brave author say to the many Iranians who were victims of state suppression but <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shervin-malekzadeh/how-trump-made-iran-great_b_14603482.html">who are now barred</a> from entering the United States by the administration under the specious notion that Iranians pose a unique risk to the safety of the United States? How do we compare the sacrifices of the thousands of protestors on the streets of Tehran and other major cities in Iran that sweltering summer in 2009, or the many hundreds subsequently arrested, <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2009/1021/iran-gives-us-citizen-kian-tajbakhsh-12-years-for-political-activity">jailed</a> or <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/06/martyrs-of-the-green-movement.html">worse</a>, with an individual writing from literally the pinnacle of political power, a senior official in the U.S. government? Theirs is a shame that no amount of anonymity can conceal, from which there is no hiding.</p><p><em>Shervin Malekzadeh was the author of the June 18, 2009, New York Times op-ed “A Different Iranian Revolution.” He is a visiting assistant professor of political science at Williams College.</em></p><ul><li><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-anonymous-oped-new-york-times_us_5b93fa8de4b0162f472da77a?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004"><em>www.huffingtonpost.com</em></a><em> on September 9, 2018.</em></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c8d3413270d2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Learning to Lose in Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/learning-to-lose-in-iran-98cf8d56d39f?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98cf8d56d39f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 19:28:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-23T22:47:04.676Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RGumYlFuEH_uI29IwjQaag.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Photo: Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Ebrahim Raisi</em></figcaption></figure><p>Win or lose, it has become obvious that the fortunes of Hassan Rouhani and his administration remain bound to the memory of <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1920821,00.html">2009</a> and the Green Movement. Calls for the release of the movement’s imprisoned leaders by the cheering crowds were a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Ghafouri.arash/videos/1506632062703649/">constant</a> reminder on the campaign trail that the indignity of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection continues to be a source of grievance for millions of Iranians, a legacy to be redeemed at the ballot box. Rather than back down, voters have doubled down in emphatic fashion, electing Rouhani by wide margins in the 2013 and 2017 elections to express their disgust and, above all, to prevent the return of the hardliners.</p><p>The impact of eight years of chaos, corruption, and daily crises inflicted by a <a href="https://lobelog.com/trump-the-american-ahmadinejad/">feckless</a> president who had neither the competence nor the character for office is difficult to overstate. Ahmadinejad has become the ultimate cautionary tale, <em>the</em> incentive to vote, his name an enabling mantra repeated by those who would otherwise never participate in an election. Even as his negative example lifts the prospects of reform, the former president hangs like a millstone around the necks of his erstwhile allies in the principalist camp who are still struggling to distance themselves from his time in office.</p><p>Ahmadinejad’s legacy may, however, prove to be as much a burden as a boon to the project of reform. Can the young, middle class, and overwhelmingly female voters who comprise the Rouhani coalition accept losing, which is inevitable in a democracy? Will they take “no” for an answer? Iran’s transition appears to flip the usual <a href="https://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic925740.files/Week%206/ODonnell_Transitions.pdf">script</a> provided by political scientists. Whereas authoritarian states are notorious for their unwillingness to lose elections, in Iran the democratic opposition cannot abide defeat.</p><p>The mood on the ground suggests that the majority of Iranians are not yet ready to let go of the recent past, that they still seek their pound of flesh. But democracy requires letting go, accepting the possibility of loss, and moving on to the next round, indeed accepting that there will be a next round. With the leaders of the Green Movement still under house arrest and the <a href="http://www.salon.com/2009/06/22/tehran_six/">violent</a> suppression of their followers still unanswered, it’s understandable that the public remains vigilant. But it is also fair to worry about what will happen if and when the other side fairly wins.</p><p>For now, Rouhani supporters are content to celebrate what had once appeared to be a close race and a catastrophe averted. Iran continues her healthy course towards something <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/how-elections-are-secularizing-iranian-politics/?utm_term=.858f65286a6b">other than authoritarianism</a>. This election marked the further <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/">consolidation</a> of Rouhani’s centrist coalition, an assembly of odd bedfellows and former rivals held together by a commitment to stopping radicalism by winning elections.</p><p>For all of the excitement generated by the campaign, 2017 was notable for how routinized the route to victory has become. As in 2013 and 2016, behind-the-scenes coordination between the leadership and activists on the ground proved to be critical, above all in the selection and distribution of a single <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/how-iranians-use-of-an-app-is-changing-politics-and-civil-society/">list</a> of candidates vetted for their acceptability to the system and their likelihood of winning, one of the legacies of the late <a href="https://muftah.org/iranians-head-polls-reflection-hashemi-rafsanjani-democracy-iran/#.WSRJKxPytE5">Hassan Rafsanjani</a>. As they have since 2009, Iran’s voters demonstrated a commitment to following the path and not the candidate, eschewing the politics of personality that until recently defined Iranian politics. Together, these actions form the basis of what is likely to be a durable movement based on sustainable, democratic norms.</p><p>These lessons were not lost on their rivals in the principalist camp. The loser now in two, arguably three, straight presidential elections, <a href="http://lobelog.com/irans-conservatives-lose-a-presidential-election-and-more/?utm_content=bufferd8210&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=facebook.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer">Iran’s conservative wing</a>, badly fractured by the Ahmadinejad era, has taken a significant step forward by initiating a new coalition politics. The <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-qalibaf-20170515-story.html">exit</a> of Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf in the last week of voting and his endorsement of fellow principalist Ebrahim Raisi signaled an auspicious step in Iran’s political development, as a viable and effective conservative opposition will provide critical ballast to Iran’s domestic politics. If nothing else, it will keep Iran’s democratic movement honest, as evidenced by the <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/iran-hardliner-raisi-challenges-rouhani/av-38882429">scare</a> that the Qalibaf-Raisi alliance gave what had been at times a lethargic Rouhani campaign.</p><p>These developments are good news for their constituencies, the more than 16 million Iranians who voted for a principalist of some sort, which represents a consistent 30–40 percent of the electorate. These are the regime’s true believers, the voters most committed to the notion of an Islamic democracy and the values of the revolution. If nothing else, this election has demonstrated that the “hardline” takes diverse form in Iran, that it is impossible to predict someone’s politics based on how they dress, where they live, or their musical <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-18/an-iranian-rapper-is-campaigning-for-a-hardline-cleric">interests</a>. Leaving their interests unaddressed will do little to advance the cause of reform and democracy in Iran. Indeed, in his first <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-21/iran-hardliners-sulk-after-rouhani-win-say-they-must-be-heard">comments</a> after the election, Raisi asked the government to not ignore his voters, promising that he would continue the “fight against corruption and inequality” on their behalf.</p><p>This past Friday, the streets of Iran’s major cities filled with music and <a href="https://twitter.com/BahmanKalbasi/status/866382134113644545">dancing</a>, once again transforming much of the country into an “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html">open air party</a>” if only for one night. This too has become part of Iran’s routine, its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/middleeast/iran-presidential-election-democracy.html?smid=fb-share">version</a> of democracy. The celebrations were open to everyone, and no doubt many of Raisi’s supporters joined in the fun, Iran offers so few opportunities for public joyousness and gathering. Effervescent in their delight, they were, as Rouhani noted in his <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/may/22/rouhani-victory-speech">victory</a> speech, for once united as Iranians, made of “one cloth.”</p><p>Each election now builds on the previous, in ever accelerating fashion. The vote has become something of a rite of passage for Iran’s youth, a month to look forward to, of celebration, of flirting, of excitement. I wrote after last year’s legislative elections that Iran was becoming more democratic <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/">in spite of itself</a>: the illiberal interventions of the Guardian Council inadvertently fostered unprecedented cooperation among rival groups. These short-term remedies have given way to a more profound and long-term commitment. There is no way to watch the scenes from Tehran, Tabriz, and <a href="https://twitter.com/rezahakbari/status/865936932554981376">Mashad</a> and not think that democracy has become the thing itself, that Iran has become more democratic because of itself.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://lobelog.com/learning-to-lose-in-iran/"><em>lobelog.com</em></a><em> on May 23, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98cf8d56d39f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Do Iranians Bother Voting?]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/why-do-iranians-bother-voting-954d6f2b71db?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/954d6f2b71db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 May 2017 11:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-18T00:58:17.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*4QqZkfqBX2XChi0q." /><figcaption>An Iranian woman shows her inked finger after casting her ballot at a polling station in Tehran on February 26, 2016. Atta Kenare / AFP / Getty</figcaption></figure><p>“However much you remove yourself from politics, you’re still inside this system” read the meme imploring me to vote during my last visit to Tehran in 2016. It was one of the many dozens of Facebook, Telegram, and text messages delivered by grassroots activists anxious to secure a friendly parliament for Iran’s incumbent president, Hassan Rouhani. Their shoestring get-out-the-vote campaign — loosely advanced on <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/how-iranians-use-of-an-app-is-changing-politics-and-civil-society/?utm_term=.55b276beff19">social media</a> and amplified by a sprawling network of classmates, teachers, and second cousins — ran alongside an official state apparatus determined to signal its legitimacy to the world by producing a healthy turnout on election day. All told, more than 61 percent of Iran’s eligible voters showed up to vote in an off-year legislative election, nearly double the 36 percent participation rate in the 2014 U.S. Congressional elections.</p><p>As Iran nears the end of another election season, its 12th for president and the 35th overall since 1979, <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/328833-the-iranian-presidential-elections-pick-your-poison">dozens</a> of <a href="https://www.aei.org/publication/the-iranian-elections-dont-matter-heres-what-does/">analysts</a> are already explaining why elections in Iran do not really matter or, should Rouhani lose, why they do. Most point to the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/apr/12/presidential-race-candidate-profiles">limited</a> range of choices offered to Iranian voters as proof that the vote there is mostly theater, cover for the feckless pursuit of power between elites in an autocratic system. Some use the perceived charade as a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/04/07/how-trump-can-help-cripple-the-iranian-regime/">pretense</a> to renew the call for regime change in Tehran, left dormant under the Obama administration and its peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue in 2015.</p><p>Almost none of these analysts will say much, if anything, about the nearly 40 million citizens who are expected to turn up to vote of their own accord on May 19, or why they bother. Voting in Iran, one is left to imagine, is only for the true believers or for the easily duped, participants in a collective act of dissembling that adds up to nothing.</p><p>In fact, however, many Iranians vote <em>because</em> they do not believe in their system; they vote precisely out of a lack of faith.</p><p>“Voting is a religious duty and a holy act,” they are told by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2012/mar/02/iran-elections-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-voting">those</a> in charge, and so citizens double down on the premise as an act of vigilance, determined to meet the state on its own terms as well as to bear witness should the authorities deny citizens their votes. Against the fevered proclamations of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/08/where-irans-hard-liners-diverge-from-the-moderates/?utm_term=.e1eef7855d1d">radicals</a> on either side of the Iranian political spectrum, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/how-iranians-use-of-an-app-is-changing-politics-and-civil-society/?utm_term=.585255372a10">grassroots</a> opposition stands firmly for the belief that presence at the ballot box is prevention, and that prevention is “better than a cure.”</p><p>Iran’s diminished democracy offers few guarantees, but one certainty is that low turnout opens a path for reactionary elements to take control of the government. This was the painful lesson of the era of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose rise to power was abetted by a <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/11/21/fugitives-2">boycott</a> of the 2005 elections by the public. Disillusioned with the reform movement of outgoing president Mohammad Khatami, and convinced that it made little difference who occupied the presidency, many Iranians stayed home on election day. Just under 28 million Iranians, 60 percent of the voting population, bothered to vote in the second-round runoff between Ahmadinejad and the late Hassan Rafsanjani — anemic by Iranian standards. It wasn’t long before a bevy of <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/iran-ahmadinejad-legacy-corruption.html">incompetents</a> took advantage of the voters’ apathy, rushing in to occupy the political field abandoned by those holding out for more democratic conditions in Iran.</p><p>It was a mistake that many in the opposition have sworn to never repeat. In 2009, some 40 million Iranians, a record 85 percent of the eligible population, cast their ballots in the presidential election in an effort to put Ahmadinejad and his allies out of office. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/22/iran-election-voters-numbers">implausible</a> reelection of Ahmadinejad sparked Iran’s worst <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html">crisis</a> since the overthrow of the monarchy, producing the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/06/think-again-irans-green-movement/">Green Movement</a> protests that <a href="http://www.salon.com/2009/06/16/tehran_three/">paralyzed</a> much of the country for nearly a year.</p><p>“Even those who don’t believe in the system and the leadership,” Ali Khamenei implored last spring, “come to the ballots.”</p><p>Nearly 37 million would turn out in 2013, despite the <a href="http://www.salon.com/2009/06/22/tehran_six/">violent</a> suppression of the Green Movement just four years earlier. They were determined to vindicate the movement’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/jun/14/academics-urge-rouhani-house-arrests-iranian-critics-mir-hossein-mousavi">imprisoned leaders</a>, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrobi, and to finally force an answer to its slogan, “Where is my vote?” That these many voters were <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/yes-iran-has-reform-candidates-and-engaged-citizens/276801/">empowered</a> to do so by the very system that they oppose is the story missing from the coverage leading into this month’s presidential election.</p><p>There is a sense among some Iranians that the current impasse between state and society actually offers the best <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Power-Change-Iran-Contention-Conciliation/dp/025302076X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1494894351&amp;sr=1-1&amp;refinements=p_27%3AFarideh+Farhi">situation</a> for all involved. Although electoral participation ensures the survival of the Islamic system, as so many critics have correctly pointed out, the reform movement does <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iran/why-irans-elections-matter/p37573">want</a> to sustain a political structure that at the very least prevents Iran from tumbling into chaos. Trapped in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/how-elections-are-secularizing-iranian-politics/">logic</a> of a political system that craves participation, and chastened by the street protests that for a time appeared to put the very survival of the 1979 revolution at risk, Iran’s authorities appear willing to go along for now despite the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1379293.stm">risk</a> that a popular president will emerge to challenge an unpopular leadership.</p><p>Examples of what could happen if they don’t go along are not difficult to find, and lie within easy reach in the lived experiences of Iran’s regional neighbors, in Egypt and Iraq. At stake, as so many voters told me in 2013 and again in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/?utm_term=.7a8efc2385a3">2016</a>, is whether Iran will avoid becoming “another Syria,” the site of a bloody civil war that invites the intervention of foreign powers. Participating in a system, no matter how flawed, is better than having no system at all. Seen in this light, an election is not a mere one-off, an opportunity for a revolutionary breakthrough leading to the demise of the current system; it represents one piece in an open-ended process of incremental reform and progress.</p><p>There is no mystery to all this, no “<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/caught-between-history-and-modernity-the-persian-paradox-a-1027050.html">Persian paradoxes</a>” for analysts to solve. If anything, the traumatic events of recent years have invited a new and unexpected transparency on the part of the public and the authorities alike. “Even those who don’t believe in the system and the leadership,” Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3391676/Irans-Khamenei-urges-against-vote.html">implored</a> in an astonishing statement last spring, “come to the ballots, as the election belongs to the nation.” Eager to avoid a reprise of 2009, the electorate has, in earnest, taken him up on his offer to put the country first and believe in civil redemption. Their participation in elections is still more about hope than an expression of bad faith.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/why-do-iranians-even-bother-voting/526866/"><em>www.theatlantic.com</em></a><em> on May 17, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=954d6f2b71db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Iranian Machiavelli]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/as-iranians-head-to-the-polls-a-look-at-hashemi-rafsanjani-how-he-helped-build-democracy-in-iran-593715c600c9?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/593715c600c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 May 2017 09:00:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-12T00:14:32.941Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In his final years, Hashemi Rafsanjani served as a vessel for the public’s will, and as a catalyst for its transformation in Iran</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/657/1*iI7WgdhRg909onchMExiRQ.png" /><figcaption>Photograph by Thomas Koehler</figcaption></figure><p>Iranians will go to the polls this Friday, May 19, to vote in their country’s 12th presidential election, their first without Ali Akbar Bahramani. Better known as Hashemi Rafsanjani, there is a sense inside of Iran he was the one who held it all together, the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pivot-Universe-Iranian-Monarchy-1831-1896/dp/1845118286">pivot</a> of the Islamic Republic’s odd universe, its indispensable man.</p><p>Rafsanjani, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/world/middleeast/ayatollah-rafsanjani-dead.html">died</a> suddenly earlier this year at the age of eighty-two, was no less indispensable to his enemies, who saw him as the incarnation of all the flaws and failings of the revolution, its corruption and <a href="http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-released-tape-rekindles-memory-of-1988-iran-mass-2016aug29-story.html">criminality</a>. That at the end of his life it was difficult to tell who was friend or foe — many had been <a href="http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/05/2025/journalist-who-identified-rafsanjani-in-chain-murders-sees-opportunity-in-candidacy/">both</a>, sometimes at once — spoke to Rafsanjani’s singular and outsized presence in the <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-death-of-ali-akbar-hashemi-rafsanjani-a-machiavellian-prince/article/2006206">firmament</a> of Iranian politics, a man whose greatest legacy may have been to play accidental midwife to Iran’s nascent civil society.</p><p>In the past forty years, no other major figure more embodied the fraught relationship Iranians have had with their government and system — the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/yes-iran-has-reform-candidates-and-engaged-citizens/276801/">call-and-response</a> collaboration between politician and citizen that came into its own during the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html?mtrref=undefined&amp;gwh=13278014A366E400F3AAE7C52318041D&amp;gwt=pay&amp;assetType=opinion">2009 Green Movement</a> — than Rafsanjani. Recognized by ordinary Iranians as a credible and above all, effective force for change, Rafsanjani served, in the final years of his life, as a vessel for the public’s will, as well as a catalyst for its transformation. In giving voice to their protests on the streets and at the ballot box, he helped millions of Iranians find their own.</p><p>In truth, the effect was mutual. Rafsanjani grew into his position, changed as much by his encounter with the public, as the public was by him, proof that politics can serve the greater good even when it is made by less than noble politicians. Like all such stories, Rafsanjani’s tale of redemption began after the fall.</p><h3>Rejected by the Great and the Ordinary Alike</h3><p>By the time he was elected to the presidency in 1989, with more than 96 percent of the vote, Rafsanjani had already served for nearly a decade as speaker of the parliament and member of the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts">Assembly of Experts</a>. He leveraged the latter position to successfully <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xq2-_eGlshI">maneuver</a> Ali Khamanei into the position of Supreme Leader, following the death of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. At the time, Rafsanjani was at the height of his power and popularity. It would all, however, be gone in just a few short years.</p><p>Rejected outright by an ascendant <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/07/anniversary-of-a-turning-point.html">reform movement</a> whose leaders he had conspired to exclude from the political arena, Rafsanjani came to be reviled by erstwhile allies in the conservative camp, who saw in his free-market reforms, and willingness to engage with governments in Europe and North America, a betrayal of the revolution and Iran.</p><p>Rafsanjani fared even worse with a voting public, which blamed him for sharp increases in unemployment and inflation in the aftermath of the war with Iraq, even as his own family prospered. Dogged by allegations of cronyism and <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/01/the-chain-murders-killing-dissidents-and-intellectuals-1988-1998.html">even murder</a>, by 2000 it was all that Rafsanjani could do to win a seat in parliament (in the end, he did not serve). The final, lethal humiliation came in 2005 when an ill-fated bid for a third term as president ended in a devastating second round <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/11/21/fugitives-2">defeat</a> by an obscure former regional governor, the newcomer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.</p><h3>Rafsanjani’s Last Friday Prayers</h3><p>His rebirth came in the summer of 2009, baptized by the wave of <a href="https://www.salon.com/2009/06/16/tehran_three/">protests</a> produced by Ahmadinejad’s reelection that June, an implausible victory that led to days, then weeks of protests that represented the worst civil unrest in Iran since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Demonstrations soon spread across the country as millions, under the banner of the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement">Green Movement</a>, demanded their government answer the question: “Where is my vote?”</p><p>Protests spilled over into July. With the public in open defiance and the fundaments of the system increasingly under threat, it was announced that Rafsanjani would lead the weekly Friday prayers at the University of Tehran, the regime’s centerpiece political event. It was an audacious, if risky, move by an increasingly anxious leadership to end the growing chaos.</p><p>Once again, the old revolutionary stood between the public and an ascendant Ahmadinejad. Unlike in 2005, this time he would not stand alone.</p><p>In the afternoon of July 17, 2009, on what was an exceptionally hot day, Rafsanjani took to the tribune in what would be his <a href="https://www.salon.com/2009/07/21/tehran_dispatch/">last</a> major public address. There to report on the event, what I remember most were the crowds. They had gathered outside the campus grounds, already several lines deep by the time of my arrival, their chants by turns taunting, pleading, and vigilant, but always full of expectation:</p><blockquote>“Hashemi! Hemayat! Hemayat!”</blockquote><blockquote><em>“Hashemi! Help us! Help us!”</em></blockquote><blockquote>“Hashemi agar dar sookoot bashi, shoma ham khaen in!”</blockquote><blockquote><em>“Hashemi, if you remain quiet, then you are a traitor also!”</em></blockquote><p>Rafsanjani began his sermon with all the standard revolutionary fare, pabulum about why religious values and democracy go hand in hand: that if Iran were just a republic, then corruption would seep into the body politic, while if there was only a focus on religion and Islam, then the country would surely degrade into a desert (“biaboon”) and ruin.</p><p>In the second half of the address, Rafsanjani tilted the balance towards the crowd. A man who had seen his own popularity ruined, he deftly applied the Prophet Muhammed’s admonition that rulers must always seek the approval of the public. Without the people, there was nothing, Rafsanjani proclaimed. If the vote was stolen, then the government had nothing. If the people believed the voting was corrupt, even if it were not, the consequence was the same.</p><p>Rafsanjani reminded his audience that although the Prophet had designated his son-in-law to be his successor, Imam Ali waited over two decades to assume leadership of the community of believers following Mohammad’s death. Ali had refused to use force against the will of the people, a reference that bloodlessly, ruthlessly, quietly, cast Ahmadinejad in the role of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr#Election_of_Abu_Bakr_to_Caliphate">Abu Bakr</a>, Ali’s usurper.</p><p>With the prayers over, the relieved crowd poured onto Taleqani Street and wheeled north towards Vali Asr Square. The PA system hidden in the trees and telephone poles that ran around the university crackled to life.</p><blockquote><em>“</em>Marq bar Amrika! Marq bar Amrika!<em>”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Death to America! Death to America!”</em></blockquote><p>The people showed little patience for such foolishness. Marching away they shouted back:</p><blockquote><em>“</em>Marq bar Russi-e! Marq bar Russi-e!<em>”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Death to Russia! Death to Russia!”</em></blockquote><p>I asked one of the crowd members, “What comes next? Where do we go, how do we get there? What is the institution that will meet Hashemi’s call?”</p><p>“What is next?” The man was incredulous. “We are, the <em>mellat</em> is the institution! <em>Aziz e man, noon e gol in ghazie ra hal nemikon e. Hazine dare.</em>” (“My dear, bread and flowers won’t solve the problem. There is going to be a cost.”)</p><p>The cost for Rafsanjani was immediate. His subtle warning to government hardliners had not gone unnoticed and they redoubled their efforts to keep him away from the public square, effectively preventing him from addressing the masses again. They did so, even though Rafsanjani had included a conciliatory gesture, a call for patience to those still protesting the vote. Imam Ali and his followers had waited twenty years before coming into power, he reminded them. If they had to wait another twenty before justice could prevail, then so be it.</p><h3>Rebirth: The 2013 Elections</h3><p>In the end, it would only take four. <a href="http://lobelog.com/rafsanjani-shut-out-of-irans-presidential-race/">Barred</a> from running again for the presidency in 2013, Rafsanjani operated behind the scenes throughout the presidential campaign, coordinating with multiple constituencies as well as former rivals, including President Mohammad Khatami, to ensure the opposition would enter the final days of the campaign unified and with the best possible candidate to defeat their conservative rivals.</p><p>Their <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/201361116525755648.html">choice</a> was Rafsanjani’s friend and protégé, Hassan Rouhani, who enthusiastically took up the mantle of opposition and reform. In rallies and interviews, Rouhani proved to be as capable as his mentor — the only candidate to effectively engage with the public on a range of issues, from the loss of manufacturing jobs in the textile industry to holding state media accountable for failing to report the full truth to the public. Again the crowds spoke back, as I <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/yes-iran-has-reform-candidates-and-engaged-citizens/276801/">reported</a> from Shahid Shiroodi stadium in downtown Tehran, the site of Rouhani’s raucous final campaign rally:</p><blockquote>“Zendanian e siasi bayad azad gardand!”</blockquote><blockquote><em>“Political prisoners must be released!”</em></blockquote><blockquote>“<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husayn_ibn_Ali">Ya Hossein</a>! <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mir-Hossein_Mousavi">Mir Hossein</a>!”</blockquote><blockquote><em>“Long live Hossein! Mir Hossein!”</em></blockquote><p>Rouhani’s decisive and unanticipated victory on June 14, 2013 served notice of the premature nature of reports about the demise of the Green Movement, which had been headed up by presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. The end of the Ahmadinejad era sent the crowds back into the streets. Their cheers celebrated what had been denied in 2009, which was now partially redeemed:</p><blockquote>“Mousavi, ma rai e to ra pas gereftim! Mousavi, ma rai e to ra pas gereftim!”</blockquote><blockquote><em>“We got your vote back! We got your vote back!”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Ahmadi bye-bye! Ahmadi bye-bye!”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>“Ahmadi bye-bye! Ahmadi bye-bye!”</em></blockquote><p>The chants continued throughout the night, jeers that no doubt offered a measure of satisfaction for at least one ex-president listening from campaign headquarters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/648/1*Hqs5Qb2Pndj9tCiiNLmfkg.png" /></figure><h3>Democracy’s Prince</h3><p>Like the shahs of old, Rafsanjani accumulated a variety of titles and nicknames over the course of his long public life, which were a blend of the affectionate and sarcastic. Within Iran, he was known as “<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rafsanjani-irans-wiliest-revolutionary-dies">Akbar Shah</a>,” “kooseh” or “shark” (on account of his inability to grow out facial hair as well as his political acumen), or simply, “Hashemi.”</p><p>American and European observers, by contrast, preferred the moniker of “the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/rafsanjani-khamenei-iran/512540/">Iranian</a> <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-death-of-ali-akbar-hashemi-rafsanjani-a-machiavellian-prince/article/2006206">Machiavelli</a>,” a label applied under the mistaken, if common, assumption that Niccolò Machiavelli’s <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm">prince</a> understood politics to be cruelty, constituted by the mercenary pursuit of self-interest.</p><p>In fact, the truth was closer to the opposite. It was Machiavelli’s great insight that <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/opinion/why-machiavelli-matters.html">good politics</a> were often made by bad men. Throughout <em>The Prince</em>, he argued that the preservation of the ordered state was the predicate of the good, and that the principal task of the prince was to secure, by whatever <a href="http://www.shmoop.com/prince-machiavelli/lions-foxes-symbol.html">means</a> necessary, the conditions for the general welfare.</p><p>The recognition that public virtue was frequently tied to private vice, that power could only be met by power, is why the public returned time and again to Rafsanjani despite of his evident flaws.</p><p>It is one of the enduring contradictions of Iran’s democratic opposition that it relies on the state for its effectiveness. For some years now, the reform movement has pursued a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/">strategy</a> of fortifying its lines by drawing upon the earthworks that surround and protect the very system that it seeks to change, including regular participation in elections and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/how-elections-are-secularizing-iranian-politics/?utm_term=.efae12a18cfa">appropriation</a> of the revolution’s “Islamic values” for its agenda of expanding the rule of law and personal freedoms within Iran.</p><p>In this protracted <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/periodicals/theoretical-review/1982301.htm">war of position</a>, an insider was needed, a formidable figure capable of subduing the powerful few in a way that would both satisfy and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=YVclAAAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA33&amp;lpg=PA33&amp;dq=remirro+de+orco+cut+in+half&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=jHO1YB6vWX&amp;sig=9GAni21qwhnnjlpNWvUONn3fG5M&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiiuNOBxOrTAhWFwVQKHXRJDwwQ6AEIUzAM#v=onepage&amp;q=remirro%20de%20orco%20cut%20in%20half&amp;f=false">amaze</a> the many. Against a state and revolution that actively, at times relentlessly, sought the spiritual redemption of its population, most Iranians wanted only to be left alone, to experience the profane pleasure of privacy. For this, they needed neither savior nor saint — Rafsanjani was hardly either — but a politician.</p><h3>Dispensing with the Indispensable</h3><p>But did they still need <em>him</em>?</p><p>Rafsanjani’s death has led to a fair share of hand wringing and consternation within and outside Iran. Indeed, his passing from the scene came at an inauspicious moment, with Iran heading into the final stages of a presidential season just as the Americans were coming out of theirs. With Rouhani facing an emboldened opposition at home and the rise of a more <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21717384-how-far-new-administration-prepared-go-donald-trump-intends-take">belligerent</a> politics outside of Washington, there are legitimate worries the incremental, but significant, gains made in recent years by centrist and moderate forces are now at risk.</p><p>On January 10, 2017, hundreds of thousands <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000004863117/thousands-mourn-at-rafsanjani-funeral-in-tehran.html">gathered</a> in and around the grounds of Tehran University, for Rafsanjani’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rafsanjani-idUSKBN14U0XW">funeral ceremony</a>, held under the dismal skies of late winter. Iran’s Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, led the procession and service, eulogizing Rafsanjani from the same dais where eight years earlier he had delivered his final, and most memorable, Friday prayer service.</p><p><em>“Ya Hossein! Mir Hossein! Ya Hossein! Mir Hossein!”</em> Outside the stadium, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000004863117/thousands-mourn-at-rafsanjani-funeral-in-tehran.html">chants</a> evoking the names of the imprisoned rose, up and over the official prayers being offered inside. Is Iran’s democratic movement still in need of an <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8fp1A2s6aQwC&amp;q=indispensable#v=snippet&amp;q=indispensable&amp;f=false">indispensable</a> man, or woman? The crowds gave their answer, their trilling voices evidence that the good would live on without Rafsanjani, that whatever evil had been done during his lifetime would soon be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/video/2016/may/03/damian-lewis-antony-julius-caesar-friends-romans-countrymen-shakespeare-video">interred</a> with his bones.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://muftah.org/iranians-head-polls-reflection-hashemi-rafsanjani-democracy-iran/"><em>muftah.org</em></a><em> on May 15, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=593715c600c9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Virtues of Voting in Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://shervinmalekzadeh.medium.com/the-virtues-of-voting-in-iran-49382396f3f1?source=rss-bc21a3ea949e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49382396f3f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shervin Malekzadeh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 May 2017 10:39:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-07T10:39:38.726Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Everything I Needed to Know About Islamic Democracy I Learned by the Third Grade</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/0*KbfWGd05Z7WspiZN.png" /><figcaption>Third Grade Lesson, “Class Representative”</figcaption></figure><p>Nearly 40 million Iranians will vote for president on May 19, their participation understood by many <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/04/07/how-trump-can-help-cripple-the-iranian-regime/">outside</a> observers to be a mobilization of bad faith, an “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04d440d8-2a7e-11e1-8f04-00144feabdc0">as if</a>” politics in which the authorities pretend to provide competitive elections and the public votes as if there were a meaningful choice between candidates. At best, citizens will cast their ballots in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/how-irans-elections-marginalized-radicals-and-consolidated-a-new-political-center/">abeyance</a>, a stop gap to keep the truly awful out of office in anticipation of the day that the system itself comes to an end.</p><p>Such skepticism has not prevented Iran’s version of democracy from producing its fair share of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/how-elections-are-secularizing-iranian-politics/?utm_term=.77f62d3ddf61">surprises</a>, including a come from behind victory by Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 presidential election. No less surprising was the subsequent resurgence of the Iranian reform movement culminating in major gains in last year’s legislative elections, only a handful of years after the <a href="http://www.salon.com/2009/06/22/tehran_six/">violent</a> suppression of the Green Movement. Despite the best efforts of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZNS1jTtKrY">Guardian Council</a> to tilt the political playing field in favor of the president’s hardline opposition, Iran’s conservatives remain divided and appear to be headed for another hapless showing at the polls.</p><p>These electoral outcomes become less of a surprise, however, if, rather than rejecting Iranian elections as theater or stage-managed farce, we consider the possibility that democracy in Iran constitutes a sincere endeavor undertaken by moral actors. Thus, the voluntary participation of millions in annual elections, among the <a href="http://irandataportal.syr.edu/elections">highest</a> rates in the world, is done in earnest, as an ethical choice and civil action against an unpopular state.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/0*4_J3xivtT1s0Ezo3.png" /><figcaption>SHERVIN MALEKZADEH</figcaption></figure><p>“Just as elections constitute a holy duty so too does choosing the best candidate” Get out the vote billboard, Revolutionary Square, Tehran, June 2013</p><p>That they are empowered to do so by that same state is the headline, the lede missing from the coverage leading into this May’s presidential election. Central to the IRI’s ideology is an animating belief in Islamic democracy not as a mere version of or alternative to western democracy, but the thing itself, democracy as it ought to be. Islamic democracy offers humanity the only viable and virtuous path leading to political and social fulfillment. Elections are an expression of that virtue.</p><p>The state affirms this virtue for its youngest audiences in its schools and textbook materials, as it has done so since the earliest days of the Islamic Republic. The expectation that children will someday participate in elections as an extension of their religious belief and as a form of worship constitutes one of the few consistent storylines in a curriculum subject to the constant <a href="http://cssaame.dukejournals.org/content/32/2/339.abstract">tumult</a> of “fundamental change.”</p><p>Formal instruction in Islamic democracy starts as early as the first grade, where young pupils learn that the sacrifices of those who died during the revolutionary struggle against the Shah were consecrated at the ballot box, beginning with the referendum to make Iran an Islamic republic, and then by every subsequent election for office. Voting becomes ritual in the liturgy of the republic, in which each ballot cast represents an act of communion, leading to the rebirth and salvation of the <em>nezam</em>, or system.</p><p>Training in the actual mechanisms of democratic practice centers on the third grade primer lesson, “Class Representative,” which made its first appearance during the 1979–1980 school year and would remain unchanged for more than two decades. The unit opens with a group of students at Ibn Sina Elementary preparing to cast their monthly ballot for representative. After going over the procedure for voting (two names written on a piece of paper, the top vote-getters named to the position), the teacher asks his students to reprise the virtues that a leader must possess.</p><p>Without hesitation come the replies, a call and response led by the teacher in which all the answers are already known in advance. Ali says that the representative must be just and honest. Hassan answers that a good representative is a studious and serious student. Saeid declares that a leader must be resourceful and well qualified. Mohammad notes that the representative has to be patient and tolerant.</p><p>The lesson presents a straightforward and untroubled view of democracy, one in which voters are eager to participate in a process that, by necessity, leads to the election of a just and moral leader. Revisions made to the curriculum in the early 2000s introduced a more ominous and open-ended message to “Class Representative.” This new version imagines a scenario in which it becomes possible for an elected official to behave badly, and against whom the children must strive in order to reclaim their rights within the classroom.</p><p>Malice appears in the figure of Amin. Newly elected, he arrives early to school on his first day on the job, well before his teacher and classmates. Drawing a line down the center of the blackboard, he divides the class into two categories: “Good” and “Bad.” With the classroom still empty, Amin writes the name of Hassan under the “Bad” column.</p><p>He does so out of spite, petty retribution for Hassan’s refusal to loan his drinking cup to Amin the day before, even though Hassan had been in the right — Amin had forgotten to bring his cup and the rules prohibit sharing.</p><p>Understandably, Hassan becomes upset when he sees his name on the chalkboard: “I haven’t misbehaved!” Unwilling to admit the true reason for Hassan’s demerit, Amin justifies his actions by accusing Hassan of turning the pages of his textbook too loudly, therefore breaking the concentration of the other students.</p><p>In short order, Amin unleashes a torrent of sanctions on the remainder of the class, using a variety of arbitrary excuses to fill the “Bad” column with names, including that of Saeid, whose crime was to crawl under his desk in order to pick up a fallen pencil. When Saeid demands that Amin explain himself, Amin responds by placing three more marks by Saeid’s name. Demoralized and frightened into silence, the students sit motionless until their teacher arrives, at which point the children break into a chorus of protest.</p><p>Their cries mark a crucial development in the curriculum. Whereas the earlier version of “Class Representative” suggested that democracy and virtue necessarily overlap, the current iteration of the lesson instructs its readers that it is acceptable to question and protest authority unjustly practiced. It is only when direct protests of Amin fell on deaf ears, the children sought relief by appealing to an even higher authority, their teacher.</p><p>The only grownup in the room, the teacher quietly defuses the situation, and convinces a chastened Amin to seek forgiveness from his peers. Recognizing the teachable moment before him, the teacher engages in a process of consultation with his students. He breaks them up into groups of three and, reversing the pedagogy of the earlier lesson, encourages his students list on their own the virtues expected of the class representative. Working together, they reach a consensus that although the class representative is responsible for maintaining discipline and order in the classroom, a good representative must above all be just (<em>adel</em>) and honest (<em>amin</em>), driving the point home by drawing on the well-worn but effective device of the corny joke: “Thanks be to God that we have in our class an Amin.”</p><p>Does a curriculum shape society or does it merely anticipate and reflect changes already underway? Recent events in Iran point to the surprising and sometimes fraught relationship of textbook lessons to the world outside of the classroom. Just as Amin’s classmates had turned to their teacher for help, there was a sincere hope among many Iranians, particularly following the debacle of the 2009 elections, that the country’s appointed guardians in the leadership would intercede to correct Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a public official who, not unlike the fictional character Amin, had shown a marked capacity for <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/middleeast/10iran.html">dishonest</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/18/iran-election-protests-mahmoud-ahmadinejad">vengeful</a> behavior towards his political opponents, behavior that was, according to the standards of the Islamic Republic, unbecoming of a democratic and Muslim leader.</p><p>Such relief, it turned out, was <a href="https://www.juancole.com/2009/06/supreme-leader-khameneis-friday-address.html">not</a> forthcoming, at least not <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/sep/28/ahmadinejad-blocked-running-iran-presidential-elections-ali-khamenei">immediately</a>, a reminder that quite unlike the rarefied world of children’s textbook stories, in the real word the “grownups” are prone to disappoint. The experience of a disputed presidential election and its aftermath proved to be a teachable moment like no other, leading many ordinary Iranians to question the historical disposition to be subjects in search of a sponsor, a concept already anticipated in the Green Movement <a href="http://www.iranalmanac.com/news/lastnews.php?newsid=11533">strategy</a> of “each citizen, a headquarters.” Since 2009, rather than retreating from the public sphere, these citizens have doubled down on the vote as an ethical action as well as a way to hold the state accountable for its professed religious values.</p><p>The lessons found in “Class Representative,” with their emphasis on proper moral behavior in a democracy and the obligation of citizens to protest when elected officials, as well the unelected, fall short anticipate such an outcome. We often think of textbook stories as being immediate and consequential when it comes to political and social outcomes, particularly in an openly ideological school system. The case of Iran suggests that we might be better served if we take the materials found in national curricula to be a starting point for analysis, as the repositories of recognizable if not fully shared moral guidelines by which a society may perhaps someday surpass its own best intentions.</p><p><em>A version of this essay first appeared in </em><a href="http://lobelog.com/the-virtues-of-voting-in-iran/">Lobelog</a><em> on May 3, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49382396f3f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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