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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Conti Ransomware — TryHackMe Walkthrough & My Learning Notes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sibgaturrahmanbros/conti-ransomware-tryhackme-walkthrough-my-learning-notes-0a5d5016d44e?source=rss-59c7320776ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0a5d5016d44e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conti]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:41:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-16T19:41:10.801Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C52FRrBQvwn32wC5rGMLiA.png" /></figure><p>I recently completed the <strong>Conti Ransomware</strong> room on TryHackMe. This room was a really useful practice for understanding how a SOC analyst can investigate ransomware activity using <strong>Splunk and Windows Sysmon logs</strong>.</p><p>🔗 <strong>TryHackMe Room:</strong> <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/contiransomwarehgh">https://tryhackme.com/room/contiransomwarehgh</a></p><p>During the room, I learned several things that I had not used much before, especially around identifying useful Event IDs, narrowing Splunk searches, and tracing attacker activity from logs.</p><p>In this post, I’m sharing some of the important things I learned.</p><h3>1. Start by Identifying the Sourcetype</h3><p>One of the first things I learned was that identifying the correct <strong>sourcetype</strong> can greatly reduce the search space.</p><p>While investigating Windows activity, I found the <strong>Sysmon Operational</strong> logs particularly useful.</p><p>Sysmon provides much more visibility into activities such as:</p><ul><li>Process creation</li><li>File creation</li><li>Network connections</li><li>Remote thread creation</li><li>Process access</li><li>Other suspicious system activities</li></ul><p>So instead of searching through everything, identifying the right sourcetype first makes the investigation much easier.</p><h3>2. EventCode 11 — File Creation</h3><p>One of the useful Event IDs in this room was:</p><pre>EventCode=11</pre><p>In Sysmon, <strong>Event ID 11 represents FileCreate</strong>.</p><p>This makes sense during ransomware investigation because before ransomware can execute or perform certain actions, files may be created on the system.</p><p>So I used EventCode 11 to investigate suspicious file creation activity.</p><p>A simple search like:</p><pre>index=* EventCode=11</pre><p>can help identify files that were created.</p><p>From there, we can investigate things like:</p><ul><li>Filename</li><li>TargetFilename</li><li>Process responsible for creation</li><li>Hashes</li><li>Timestamp</li><li>User/account involved</li></ul><h3>3. Finding the Ransomware Hash</h3><p>Another interesting part was finding the hash of the ransomware.</p><p>Initially, there were many events, so I needed to narrow down the result.</p><p>I simply added:</p><pre>Hashes=*</pre><p>to my Splunk search.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>index=* Hashes=*</pre><p>This helped me identify the event containing the hash information.</p><p>The useful thing here is that instead of manually checking every event, we can search for events where the <strong>Hashes field exists</strong>.</p><p>This is a simple technique, but very useful when working with large datasets.</p><h3>4. Finding Repeated Files with TargetFilename</h3><p>Another thing I found useful was looking for repeated file creation activity.</p><p>The TargetFilename field tells us which file was created.</p><p>We can combine it with timechart and count to understand how frequently certain files appeared.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>index=* EventCode=11<br>| timechart count by TargetFilename</pre><p>This can help identify files that are repeatedly created or modified.</p><p>For ransomware investigations, repeated file activity can be an interesting indicator because ransomware may process a large number of files.</p><h3>5. Investigating the securityninja Account</h3><p>This was one of the parts where I had to do some external research first.</p><p>I searched for the Windows Event ID related to <strong>user creation</strong> and found:</p><pre>EventCode=4720</pre><p>Event ID 4720 is associated with the creation of a new user account.</p><p>While investigating the logs, I found that a user named:</p><pre>securityninja</pre><p>had been created.</p><p>Then I wanted to understand <strong>how the attacker created the account</strong>.</p><p>I searched for commands related to Windows user creation and came across the net user command.</p><p>So I started with a broad Splunk search:</p><pre>index=* CommandLine=*net*</pre><p>But this produced too many results because net is used for many different Windows commands.</p><p>So I narrowed it down:</p><pre>index=* CommandLine=*securityninja*</pre><p>And this worked much better.</p><p>The oldest relevant log contained the command that created the account.</p><h3>Lesson learned</h3><p>Don’t always start with a very complicated query.</p><p>Start broad, understand the available data, and then progressively narrow the search.</p><h3>6. EventCode 8 — CreateRemoteThread</h3><p>Another useful Event ID in the room was:</p><pre>EventCode=8</pre><p>Sysmon Event ID 8 represents <strong>CreateRemoteThread</strong>.</p><p>A simple search:</p><pre>index=* EventCode=8</pre><p>was enough to find the relevant event.</p><p>CreateRemoteThread can be useful during security investigations because attackers and malware can use remote thread creation as part of process injection techniques.</p><p>So when investigating suspicious processes, Event ID 8 is definitely something worth checking.</p><h3>7. Finding the Webshell</h3><p>The investigation wasn’t limited to ransomware activity.</p><p>The server had also been compromised, so we had to investigate possible <strong>webshell activity</strong>.</p><p>One clue was the .aspx extension.</p><p>ASP.NET web applications commonly use .aspx files, and attackers can abuse web-accessible script files to deploy webshells on compromised Windows/IIS servers.</p><p>So I searched for .aspx files in the logs.</p><p>After digging deeper into the results, I found an unusual filename that looked suspicious.</p><p>This was a good reminder that filenames themselves can sometimes become useful indicators during an investigation.</p><h3>8. Looking at the Related CVEs</h3><p>The room also involves vulnerabilities associated with the Conti attack scenario.</p><p>I found a useful reference that contains the CVEs relevant to the room:</p><p><strong>Is Conti Ransomware on a Roll? — Securin</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.securin.io/articles/is-conti-ransomware-on-a-roll">https://www.securin.io/articles/is-conti-ransomware-on-a-roll</a></p><p>I used this as a reference while understanding the vulnerabilities involved in the attack chain.</p><h3>My Main Takeaways</h3><p>This room helped me understand that SOC investigation is not just about knowing Splunk commands.</p><p>The more important part is understanding <strong>what you are looking for and why</strong>.</p><p>Some of my key takeaways were:</p><h3>🔹 Start with the right data</h3><p>Finding the correct sourcetype can reduce a huge dataset into something much more manageable.</p><h3>🔹 Learn important Windows/Sysmon Event IDs</h3><p>Some Event IDs I practiced in this room were:</p><p>Event IDMeaning8CreateRemoteThread11FileCreate4720User account created</p><p>Knowing these Event IDs makes log investigation much faster.</p><h3>🔹 Narrow searches step by step</h3><p>For example:</p><pre>index=* CommandLine=*net*</pre><p>gave too many results.</p><p>Then narrowing it to:</p><pre>index=* CommandLine=*securityninja*</pre><p>made the investigation much easier.</p><h3>🔹 Think like an investigator</h3><p>Instead of randomly searching Splunk, ask:</p><blockquote><em>What should have happened for the attack to succeed?</em></blockquote><p>For example:</p><p><strong>Ransomware activity → file creation → suspicious process → hash → affected files</strong></p><p>or:</p><p><strong>New account → Event ID 4720 → command line → attacker-created account</strong></p><p>This way of thinking makes the investigation more structured.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>The <strong>Conti Ransomware</strong> TryHackMe room was a good exercise for improving my Splunk investigation skills.</p><p>Before doing this room, I knew some basic Splunk queries, but while solving it I got more comfortable with:</p><ul><li>Sysmon logs</li><li>Event IDs</li><li>File creation investigation</li><li>Hash hunting</li><li>Command-line investigation</li><li>User account creation</li><li>Remote thread creation</li><li>Webshell investigation</li><li>Searching and narrowing large datasets</li></ul><p>I’m still learning SOC and blue-team concepts, and rooms like this are helping me understand how the different pieces fit together during a real investigation.</p><p>If you’re also learning <strong>SOC, Splunk, Windows Event Logs, or threat detection</strong>, I think practicing these kinds of rooms is a good way to build investigation skills.</p><p>Thanks for reading! 🚀</p><p>If you have any suggestions for improving my SOC learning journey, feel free to share them.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><strong>TryHackMe — Conti Ransomware:</strong><br><a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/contiransomwarehgh">https://tryhackme.com/room/contiransomwarehgh</a></li><li><strong>Reference Writeup:</strong><br><a href="https://github.com/naval0505/TryHackMe---Writeups/blob/main/Conti%20-%20TryHackMe%20Writeup.md">https://github.com/naval0505/TryHackMe---Writeups/blob/main/Conti%20-%20TryHackMe%20Writeup.md</a></li><li><strong>Securin — Is Conti Ransomware on a Roll?</strong><br><a href="https://www.securin.io/articles/is-conti-ransomware-on-a-roll">https://www.securin.io/articles/is-conti-ransomware-on-a-roll</a></li></ul><p>#TryHackMe #SOC #CyberSecurity #Splunk #BlueTeam #ThreatDetection #Ransomware #Sysmon #WindowsEventLogs #CyberSecurityLearning</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0a5d5016d44e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Insights from TryHackMe: PS Eclipse]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sibgaturrahmanbros/insights-from-tryhackme-ps-eclipse-1e200b8dcf67?source=rss-59c7320776ca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[premium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[splunk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 05:36:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-16T05:40:28.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mvJ8kbLaswwIU0LYiRJx0Q.png" /></figure><p>I recently worked through the <strong>PS Eclipse</strong> room on TryHackMe. The room focuses on analyzing Windows and PowerShell-related activity, and it helped me understand several useful indicators that can appear during security investigations.</p><p>You can find the room here: <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/posheclipse?utm_source=chatgpt.com">TryHackMe — PS Eclipse</a></p><p>Here are some of the key things I learned:</p><h3>1. Event Code 3 — Network Connection</h3><p><strong>Event Code 3</strong> indicates a network-related event.</p><p>When analyzing Windows logs, this can help identify network connections made by a process. It can be useful for finding suspicious communication or possible connections to external systems.</p><h3>2. -enc in PowerShell</h3><p>When you see -enc in a PowerShell command line, it usually means the following PowerShell command is <strong>Base64 encoded</strong>.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>powershell.exe -enc &lt;encoded_command&gt;</pre><p>Attackers commonly encode commands to make them harder to read during basic log analysis.</p><h3>3. /RU SYSTEM</h3><p>The /RU SYSTEM parameter indicates that a scheduled task is configured to run under the <strong>SYSTEM account</strong>.</p><p>Since the SYSTEM account has very high privileges, this can be an important indicator when investigating persistence or privilege-related activity.</p><h3>4. schtasks.exe</h3><p>schtasks.exe is a built-in Windows utility used to <strong>create, modify, query, and manage scheduled tasks</strong>.</p><p>Scheduled tasks are commonly used for legitimate automation, but they can also be abused by attackers for persistence or to execute malicious commands.</p><h3>5. QueryName</h3><p>While analyzing DNS-related events, <strong>QueryName</strong> can contain the domain name that was queried.</p><p>This makes it useful during investigation because suspicious domains or unusual DNS requests can sometimes reveal malicious activity.</p><h3>6. .ps1 Files</h3><p>A file ending with <strong>.ps1</strong> is a <strong>PowerShell script</strong>.</p><p>When investigating Windows systems, finding an unfamiliar .ps1 file can be worth checking further, especially when it is executed through PowerShell or referenced by a scheduled task.</p><h3>7. VirusTotal and File Hashes</h3><p><strong>VirusTotal</strong> can be useful for checking whether a file or malware sample has already been identified by security vendors.</p><p>Instead of uploading the file, you can often search using its hash value, such as:</p><ul><li>MD5</li><li>SHA-1</li><li>SHA-256</li></ul><p>This can help quickly identify known malicious files and see how different security engines classify them.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>The PS Eclipse room was a good reminder that small pieces of information in Windows logs can provide useful clues during an investigation.</p><p>Some of the indicators I found useful were:</p><ul><li><strong>Event Code 3</strong> → Network-related event</li><li><strong>-enc</strong> → Base64-encoded PowerShell command</li><li><strong>/RU SYSTEM</strong> → Task runs as SYSTEM</li><li><strong>schtasks.exe</strong> → Windows Scheduled Tasks</li><li><strong>QueryName</strong> → DNS query information</li><li><strong>.ps1</strong> → PowerShell script</li><li><strong>Hash + VirusTotal</strong> → Malware identification and reputation checking</li></ul><p>These are simple things, but knowing what they mean can make log analysis much easier, especially when working on <strong>SOC, Blue Team, DFIR, and threat-hunting</strong> investigations.</p><p>#TryHackMe #CyberSecurity #BlueTeam #SOC #DFIR #ThreatHunting #PowerShell #WindowsSecurity #CyberSecurityLearning</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e200b8dcf67" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Expired Room in TryHackMe: Windows Event Logs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sibgaturrahmanbros/expired-room-in-tryhackme-windows-event-logs-1ec94e0abf0c?source=rss-59c7320776ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ec94e0abf0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[events]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Md. Sibgatur Rahman Efti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 05:13:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T05:13:19.668Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SXTZpRgBir7Fpc3XNc_lKg.png" /></figure><p>While practicing Windows Event Logs on <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/windowseventlogs">TryHackMe</a>, I came across an interesting issue: the room appears to be quite old and some of its questions no longer match the current Windows environment.</p><p>This is a premium room, and while the concepts are still useful, some parts can be confusing for new learners because the expected answers don’t always match what you see on a current machine.</p><p>So, I decided to write down the problems I faced and the solutions I found.</p><h3>Windows Event Logs</h3><p>Windows keeps a large amount of information about activities happening on the system. These events can be viewed using <strong>Event Viewer</strong>.</p><p>You can open it directly from Windows:</p><ol><li>Press the <strong>Windows</strong> key.</li><li>Type <strong>Event Viewer</strong>.</li><li>Press <strong>Enter</strong>.</li></ol><p>From there, you can explore different Windows logs and investigate events generated by the operating system and applications.</p><p>For the complete explanation of Windows Event Logs, check the official <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/windowseventlogs">TryHackMe Windows Event Logs room</a>.</p><h3>Problem 1: Task 2, Question 3</h3><p>The first problem I faced was in <strong>Task 2, Question 3</strong>.</p><p>I went through the logs carefully, but I couldn’t find the answer the room was asking for.</p><p>At first, I thought I had simply missed something. So, I searched through the logs again and also checked a few TryHackMe write-ups and solution videos.</p><p>Interestingly, other people were able to get the expected answer.</p><p>After digging a little deeper, I found that the room is quite old and doesn’t appear to have been maintained consistently with newer Windows environments.</p><p>This can create a frustrating experience for someone who is trying to solve the room today.</p><p><strong>Lesson:</strong> If a TryHackMe question doesn’t seem to match the data on your machine, don’t immediately assume that you made a mistake. The room itself may be outdated.</p><h3>wevtutil.exe: Windows Event Log Management</h3><p>In <strong>Task 3</strong>, TryHackMe introduces another useful Windows tool:</p><pre>wevtutil.exe</pre><p>wevtutil is a built-in Windows command-line utility that can be used to work with Windows Event Logs.</p><p>If you want to see the available commands and options, simply run:</p><pre>wevtutil /?</pre><p>This will display the available functionality and syntax.</p><p>It is a useful command to remember when working with Windows logs from the command line.</p><h3>Problem 2: Task 3, Question 1</h3><p>The second issue appears in <strong>Task 3, Question 1</strong>.</p><p>The question asks you to find the number of logs available on the machine.</p><p>The command suggested for this is:</p><pre>wevtutil el | Measure-Object</pre><p>Make sure you run this in <strong>PowerShell</strong>.</p><p>On my machine, the command returned:</p><p><strong>1072 logs</strong></p><p>However, the answer expected by the TryHackMe room is different.</p><p>After doing some research, I found that the expected answer was previously <strong>1071</strong>.</p><p>This is another example of how an older TryHackMe room can produce a mismatch when you’re working with a newer Windows environment.</p><p>So, if you get <strong>1072</strong> instead of <strong>1071</strong>, your command may still be working correctly. The difference can simply come from changes in the Windows environment and available event logs.</p><h3>Get-WinEvent</h3><p>In <strong>Task 4</strong>, you’ll come across another important PowerShell command:</p><pre>Get-WinEvent</pre><p>Get-WinEvent is used to retrieve event information from Windows event logs.</p><p>You may also come across:</p><pre>Get-EventLog</pre><p>Get-EventLog is the older PowerShell command, while Get-WinEvent is the newer and more capable option.</p><p>For this section of the room, you can use Get-WinEvent together with the documentation provided by TryHackMe.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>Get-WinEvent</pre><p>can be used to retrieve available Windows event information, and you can then apply different filters and options depending on what you’re trying to investigate.</p><p>The exact commands are not always easy to memorize, especially when you’re just starting with Windows event logs. Understanding what the commands do is more useful than trying to remember every option.</p><h3>Measure-Object Instead of grep</h3><p>If you’re coming from a Linux or Kali Linux background, you might naturally think about using:</p><pre>grep</pre><p>when you want to search or count output.</p><p>In PowerShell, a useful alternative for counting objects is:</p><pre>Measure-Object</pre><p>For example:</p><pre>wevtutil el | Measure-Object</pre><p>This counts the objects returned by the previous command.</p><p>It’s a small difference, but learning these PowerShell equivalents makes Windows command-line work much easier.</p><h3>Format-List</h3><p>Another PowerShell utility you’ll encounter is:</p><pre>Format-List</pre><p>Format-List displays the properties of objects in a list format, which can make detailed event information easier to read.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>Get-WinEvent -LogName System -MaxEvents 1 | Format-List *</pre><p>The * tells PowerShell to display all available properties of the returned object.</p><p>This can be particularly useful when you’re investigating Windows events and want to see more than the default output.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>The <strong>Windows Event Logs</strong> room is still useful for learning the basics of Windows event logging, wevtutil, Get-WinEvent, and PowerShell-based log analysis.</p><p>However, if you’re following the room today, you may run into questions where the expected answer doesn’t match your environment.</p><p>The main problems I encountered were:</p><ul><li><strong>Task 2, Question 3:</strong> The expected information couldn’t be found in the available logs.</li><li><strong>Task 3, Question 1:</strong> My system returned <strong>1072</strong> logs, while the older expected answer was <strong>1071</strong>.</li><li>Some commands and expected outputs may differ depending on the Windows version and environment.</li></ul><p>So, don’t get discouraged if your result doesn’t exactly match the TryHackMe answer. First, verify your command, understand the output, and then check whether the room itself may be outdated.</p><p>For anyone learning Windows security, I would still recommend understanding these tools:</p><pre>Event Viewer<br>wevtutil.exe<br>Get-WinEvent<br>Measure-Object<br>Format-List</pre><p>You don’t need to memorize every command and parameter. What matters more is knowing <strong>what tool to use, what information you’re looking for, and how to investigate the result.</strong></p><p>Happy hacking! 🔐</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ec94e0abf0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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