<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sice Wu on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sice Wu on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:06:14 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@sicewu/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Nvidia Chip Probe Puts Singapore in a Diplomatic Bind]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/nvidia-chip-probe-puts-singapore-in-a-diplomatic-bind-5668a946cc67?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5668a946cc67</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 04:14:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T04:14:16.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>AI Trade Hub Struggles to Balance amid Jensen Huang saga</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CE2miA2kTPhbY3lYIG57uw@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://cristagupa.com/">Cris Tagupa</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The controversy surrounding Jensen Huang’s departure continues to escalate. What initially focused on Nvidia and suspicions of Chinese espionage has now drawn Singapore, a Southeast Asian financial and business hub, into a diplomatic and economic dilemma. Singapore has long established itself as a major global semiconductor trading hub, thanks to its open and business-friendly environment. However, as the US-China technology rivalry intensifies and suspicions emerge that Nvidia chips may have been diverted to China through local companies, the city-state, which has consistently emphasized its policy of not taking sides, is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain that delicate balance.</p><h4>Singapore Is Nvidia’s Second-Largest Global Revenue Booking Hub, Yet Less Than 1% of Its Chips Are Actually Imported</h4><p>Singapore was Nvidia’s second-largest revenue booking hub globally last year, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the company’s revenue. Yet less than 1% of its chips were physically shipped into Singapore. This is because Singapore has long served as a procurement and order-routing hub for businesses across Asia, with many companies placing orders through local entities before having products shipped to other markets.</p><p>With the rapid expansion of the artificial intelligence (AI) industry, Singapore has also become an important trading center for advanced semiconductor chips in recent years. However, since the United States began restricting exports of advanced chips to China in 2022, Washington has closely monitored whether Chinese companies are using third-party locations, including Singapore, to gain access to US technologies subject to export controls.</p><p>Megaspeed is one of the companies under US scrutiny. It is among Nvidia’s largest chip buyers in Southeast Asia and is suspected of enabling Chinese companies to access the computing capabilities of Nvidia’s advanced chips through data centers located in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Megaspeed, however, has denied any wrongdoing and said it is willing to cooperate with the US government’s investigation.</p><h4>Singapore Accuses US of Failing to Cooperate with Investigation as US-China Rivalry Creates an Awkward Dilemma</h4><p>The Singaporean government began investigating Megaspeed and other companies in February 2025 to determine whether false declarations had been made during server procurement and export procedures. Authorities suspect that some servers originally declared as destined for Malaysia may ultimately have been shipped elsewhere.</p><p>Notably, the Singaporean government has also made the unusual public disclosure that the United States has not provided sufficient assistance with its investigation. Singapore said it had repeatedly sought Washington’s help in obtaining information concerning US server manufacturer Supermicro, but the information and assistance received so far had remained quite limited.</p><p>Separately, Singapore also investigated Alice Huang, an individual associated with Megaspeed. However, the investigation did not focus on espionage but rather on suspected fraudulent activities. Singaporean authorities ultimately concluded that there was insufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing and allowed her to leave the country in February this year.</p><h4>Neither Pro-US Nor Pro-China: Singapore’s Diplomatic Balancing Act Faces a Major Test</h4><p>Analysts say the Megaspeed controversy has also prompted renewed scrutiny of Singapore’s longstanding policy of maintaining an open economy. In recent years, numerous Chinese technology companies have chosen to establish their global headquarters in Singapore, attracted not only by its business-friendly environment but also by its relatively close geographical and cultural ties with China, alongside its ability to maintain strong relations with Western markets.</p><p>Some analysts have described this phenomenon as «Singapore-washing,» referring to Chinese companies that leverage Singapore’s international reputation and commercial standing to reduce concerns about their Chinese origins.</p><p>Singapore has long maintained that it does not intend to take sides between the United States and China. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong has also stated that Singapore is neither pro-American nor pro-Chinese, but «pro-Singapore.» Nevertheless, as US-China technological competition intensifies, maintaining this diplomatic balance is becoming increasingly difficult.</p><p>Dylan Loh, a scholar at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, also believes that the US-China semiconductor dispute is placing greater pressure on Singapore’s longstanding balancing strategy.</p><p>Meanwhile, Singaporean political scientist Chong Ja Ian, a nonresident scholar at Carnegie China, has warned that China may question why Singapore is cooperating with US-led restrictions and investigations. Washington, meanwhile, may conclude that Singapore has not done enough to help close loopholes through which advanced chips could reach China. He observed: Singapore’s policy position is not to take sides, but this could be perceived as siding with either party.</p><p>For Singapore, the real challenge is no longer simply determining whether Megaspeed has violated any regulations. Rather, as competition between the two global powers intensifies in the AI semiconductor sector, the question is whether this country, which has long relied on open trade while maintaining relationships with both sides, can continue to preserve the diplomatic neutrality it has historically sought to uphold.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5668a946cc67" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[China Adds Gold for 24th Consecutive Month, Reserves Reach 78.3 Million Ounces]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/china-adds-gold-for-24th-consecutive-month-reserves-reach-78-3-million-ounces-6ca4b2ae1c65?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ca4b2ae1c65</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 05:23:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-07T05:23:30.185Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Gold Purchases Accelerate in Second Half of 2026 as Falling Prices Cut Reserve Valuations by $17.1 Billion</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PyBRcNamQ1ojOdzabTm3qA@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Jingming Pan on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>China’s gold reserves rose to 78.3 million troy ounces at the end of October, an increase of 830,000 ounces from the previous month, marking the 24th consecutive month of gold purchases, according to data released by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) on November 7.</p><p>Separately, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) reported that China’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $3.405 trillion at the end of October, up approximately $4.93 billion, or 0.14%, from the end of September.</p><h3>Gold Buying Accelerates in Second Half</h3><p>The PBOC’s gold-buying pace accelerated noticeably in the second half of 2026. Gold holdings increased from 74.19 million ounces at the end of January to 78.3 million ounces at the end of October, representing a cumulative gain of 4.11 million ounces, or approximately 5.5%.</p><p>Monthly increases were relatively modest during the first half of the year but gathered momentum in the second half. From July through October, the central bank added a combined 2.22 million ounces, accounting for more than half of its total gold purchases so far this year.</p><h3>Foreign Exchange Reserves Remain Within Annual Range</h3><p>China’s October foreign exchange reserves remained below the year’s interim high of $3.438 trillion recorded at the end of August. Throughout 2026, reserves fluctuated within a range of approximately $3.342 trillion to $3.442 trillion.</p><p>The annual low was recorded in March, at $3.342 trillion, while the high came in May, at $3.442 trillion. October’s figure remained around the middle of this range, with no clear directional trend.</p><p>SAFE attributed the monthly increase to a combination of factors, including movements in the U.S. dollar index and fluctuations in global financial asset prices. These developments were influenced by global macroeconomic data and monetary policy decisions and expectations in major economies.</p><p>The agency also said China’s economy remained generally stable and continued to make progress in high-quality development, providing support for the overall stability of its foreign exchange reserves.</p><h3>Falling Gold Prices Reduce Reserve Valuations</h3><p>Notably, the volume of China’s gold holdings and their reported market value moved in opposite directions.</p><p>As international gold prices retreated from elevated levels, the valuation of China’s gold reserves fell to $306.41 billion at the end of October, down approximately $17.11 billion from $323.52 billion at the end of September.</p><p>Consequently, the total value of China’s official reserve assets declined from $3.789 trillion at the end of September to $3.778 trillion at the end of October, a decrease of approximately $11.86 billion.</p><p>The decline becomes more pronounced when compared with the gold reserve valuation peak of more than $340 billion recorded in April and May. This divergence indicates that the reduction in the reported value of gold reserves was primarily driven by price fluctuations rather than any reduction in the quantity of gold held.</p><h3>Other Reserve Assets See Limited Changes</h3><p>Movements in other reserve assets were relatively limited. At the end of October, China’s reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stood at $10.897 billion, while its holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) totaled $55.6 billion. Both figures edged down slightly from September, with only a marginal impact on the overall reserve position.</p><h4>China’s Reserve Figures: September vs. October 2026</h4><p>Indicator	End of September	End of October	Change</p><p>Gold reserves (million troy ounces)	77.47	78.30	+0.83</p><p>Foreign exchange reserves ($ billions)	3,400.25	3,405.18	+4.93</p><p>Gold reserve valuation ($ billions)	323.52	306.41	-17.11</p><p>Total official reserve assets ($ billions)	3,789.43	3,777.56	-11.86</p><p>IMF reserve position ($ billions) –	10.90	Slight decline</p><p>SDR holdings ($ billions) –	55.60	Slight decline</p><p>Note: Changes in gold reserve valuations primarily reflect the decline in international gold prices, moving in the opposite direction from the increase in physical holdings. Dashes indicate that corresponding September figures were not provided in the source material.</p><p>Market observers say the PBOC’s continued gold purchases could help diversify China’s official reserve assets, reduce reliance on any single currency-denominated asset and provide a buffer supporting the renminbi’s long-term exchange rate stability.</p><p>However, with gold prices fluctuating at elevated levels, the reported market value of reserve assets is likely to experience more frequent swings. Monthly data should therefore not be interpreted simplistically as signaling a shift in policy direction.</p><p>For investors, the persistence of the PBOC’s gold-buying activity remains an important indicator of medium-term demand for the precious metal. Meanwhile, foreign exchange reserves continuing to fluctuate within their annual range underscore the significance of short-term capital flows and valuation effects.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ca4b2ae1c65" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Students Protest Power Outage and Dormitory Heat at Two Cantonese Schools]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/students-protest-power-outage-and-dormitory-heat-at-two-cantonese-schools-1e459934a5ca?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e459934a5ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[life]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 04:20:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-31T04:20:48.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Demonstrations in Guangdong Turn Confrontational as Students Demand to Go Home and Have Air Conditioning Restored</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QeGE401DojoNewQbYvYVNA@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hujason1">jason hu</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Students at two secondary schools in Guangdong province reportedly staged protests on Thursday (Oct. 29), after a power outage left some unable to leave campus and complaints over sweltering dormitories escalated into a campus demonstration.</p><p>At the schools in Heyuan and Zhaoqing, students were heard shouting “Let us go home,” climbing over school gates and, in one incident, kicking school officials who attempted to stop them. At the other school, students pushed open dormitory doors and marched around campus chanting slogans.</p><p>The incident at Longchuan County Experimental Middle School in Heyuan began with a power outage that lasted several hours. Large numbers of students gathered at the school gate, shouting “Let us go home.” However, the school refused to let them leave, triggering a standoff that eventually ended with some students climbing over the gate to get out.</p><p>Messages circulating in parents’ group chats showed that some parents said the school had lost power in the afternoon. Their children reported that the campus was completely dark and that they were sweating heavily in the heat. Some said students had gathered at the locked main gate, while others reported that the power outage had disabled the electronic access-control system, preventing students from leaving.</p><p>Parents subsequently began requesting leave on behalf of their children, asking that they be allowed to return home to shower and rest before coming back to school at 8 a.m. the following morning. They also stated that they would assume responsibility for their children’s safety while they were away from campus.</p><p>A teacher in the group urged everyone to remain calm, saying that “staying at school is the safest option.”</p><p>Online posts also claimed that some students had kicked the school principal and the Party secretary when they tried to stop them. One user wrote: “I came across a post saying that some students even kicked the principal when they tried to leave,” while another said, “It seems the principal and Party secretary were kicked.” The accounts sparked heated online debate over the students’ behavior.</p><p>Meanwhile, a separate student protest broke out that same evening at No. 2 Middle School in Gaoyao District, Zhaoqing. The immediate trigger was an abrupt order from the principal to turn off the air conditioning in the dormitories.</p><p>Unable to tolerate the stifling heat, students began shouting inside their dormitories, demanding that the air conditioning be switched back on. When the school failed to respond, some students forcibly pushed open the dormitory doors and marched around campus chanting slogans to express their dissatisfaction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e459934a5ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[China Moves to Tighten AI Technology Exports, but DeepSeek and MiniMax Keep Releasing Models]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/china-moves-to-tighten-ai-technology-exports-but-deepseek-and-minimax-keep-releasing-models-652e2dcbe554?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/652e2dcbe554</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 18:07:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-25T18:07:41.252Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>New Rules Target Technology Transfers Abroad, Not Overseas Use of AI Services</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6a-eegYafQXyaFWbdhplYw@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by T Y on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>After China began regulating AI technology exports, concerns emerged over whether DeepSeek and MiniMax models would remain available overseas. Yet within a week of the October 16 announcement by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology, both companies had publicly released new model weights as usual.</p><p>A spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce also made clear in a response to reporters’ questions that providing services overseas through APIs, apps, websites or software as a service (SaaS) does not constitute a technology export.</p><p>But the absence of supply disruptions does not mean there are no new rules. The regulations target the transfer of technology from within China to overseas destinations, not overseas users simply opening a chat window. As for claims that both companies have “completed registration,” that information has so far appeared only in state media reports. The Ministry of Commerce has not published a list, and neither company has publicly commented.</p><h3>What Does “Registration” Mean, and Who Must Complete It?</h3><p>On October 16, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology took two steps.</p><p>First, they opened a public consultation on revisions to China’s Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export. The proposed revisions would add 40 technologies across three fields – artificial intelligence, biomedicine and photovoltaics – with AI accounting for 23. The consultation runs through November 15.</p><p>Second, effective on the date of the announcement, the authorities introduced interim export registration requirements for these technologies, to remain in place until the revised catalogue is formally adopted and implemented.</p><p>Registration means filing information through the Ministry of Commerce’s business systems platform before exporting the technology. The announcement identifies three scenarios: transferring ownership of technology to an overseas party, such as through an intellectual property rights transfer; licensing overseas use; and a change in the owner or actual controller of the technology to an overseas entity. The ministry also reserves the right to designate additional scenarios through separate notices. Exports that have already begun but have not yet been completed are covered as well.</p><p>Required information includes the basic details of the exporter and recipient, the destination country or region, the technology’s content and intended use, and the anticipated export value.</p><p>The obligation falls on technology exporters in China. Overseas developers downloading model weights or making API calls are not subject to the registration requirement. In other words, the rules regulate sellers and licensors, not users.</p><h3>How Are the 23 AI Technologies Defined, and Where Are the Thresholds?</h3><p>The Ministry of Commerce divided the 40 technologies across all three fields into 14 proposed prohibitions and 26 proposed restrictions. These figures cover all three sectors combined; the ministry’s response to reporters did not break down the numbers for AI alone.</p><p>For example, AI-driven malicious code generation and mutation technologies are proposed for prohibition, while AI-assisted vulnerability discovery technologies are proposed for restriction.</p><p>An article by Yuyuantantian, a media account affiliated with state broadcaster China Central Television, added that large models trained on “core data” would be prohibited from export, while those trained on “important data” would be subject to restrictions. Agent technologies meeting certain performance thresholds would ordinarily fall into the restricted category, but would be upgraded to the prohibited category if designed specifically or primarily for highly sensitive applications, such as national defense, military industry or core government affairs.</p><p>As for the thresholds, Yuyuantantian cited quantitative indicators in the catalogue, including computational workloads exceeding (10^{26}) floating-point operations, more than two trillion parameters, and capabilities ranking among the world’s top 10. The article did not specify which individual technology each indicator applies to.</p><p>The ministry was more explicit about what falls outside the rules. Technologies already in the public domain through open-source releases or published academic papers are excluded from regulation. Exports of open-source technologies qualify for automatic licensing, which the ministry said would essentially enable a “file-and-go” process.</p><p>Companies providing API access, app or web-based interactions, or SaaS applications powered by restricted large models are not considered to be exporting technology. The ministry also said that the vast majority of AI technologies would remain freely exportable once the revised catalogue takes effect.</p><h3>What Remains Unsettled, and What Should Overseas Developers Watch For?</h3><p>The claim that both companies had “completed registration” appeared in a Yuyuantantian article published on the evening of October 22, which attributed the information to what its author had learned. The Ministry of Commerce has not released a registration list, and neither company has publicly responded.</p><p>Separately, a reporter from The Science and Technology Innovation Board Daily learned that MiniMax’s registration covered “some recently released and soon-to-be-released models,” rather than all of its models.</p><p>The companies’ activities after the announcement provide additional context. On October 17, DeepSeek released V4.1-Flash-1017 on Hugging Face. On October 23, MiniMax announced on its official X account that it had released the weights for M3.1 Flash. Its partner Modular said the model was the same one previously tested anonymously under the name Space Bunny.</p><p>What can be established is the chronology: both companies continued releasing model weights after the announcement. Publicly available information does not establish whether either model falls within the scope of the reported registrations.</p><p>The rules themselves are also still evolving. The catalogue remains open for public consultation, and neither its final contents nor its effective date has been determined. The authorities have not explained who will determine whether a model ranks among the “world’s top 10,” or how that ranking will be assessed.</p><p>Deploying restricted technologies overseas for local deployment remains subject to regulation. Only certain lower-risk scenarios, such as deployment on a company’s own overseas cloud infrastructure, qualify for automatic licensing.</p><p>A brokerage analyst quoted by The Science and Technology Innovation Board Daily said the two companies’ reported registrations had, in effect, made the path for open-source models to go overseas clearer.</p><p>That, however, is a market participant’s assessment – not an official position of the regulatory authorities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=652e2dcbe554" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cantonese College Student Claims He Made $1 Million From Livestream Clips in Three Years]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/cantonese-college-student-claims-he-made-1-million-from-livestream-clips-in-three-years-79cf54decf04?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/79cf54decf04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[productivity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-improvement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 19:09:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T19:09:55.906Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Leizhou Native Says Platform Traffic Was Key to His Success</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*pGQJ2ZOBAl8NQIWha9TCNg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>A college student born in 2003 from Leizhou, Guangdong province, has sparked online debate after claiming he earned a cumulative 7 million yuan (approximately US$1.045 million) over three years by creating short clips from livestreams and promoting products for commission, starting in his second year of college. He said his monthly living allowance was initially just 1,200 yuan (about US$179). He earned 3,000 yuan (US$448) in his first month, more than 10,000 yuan (US$1,493) in his second, and 30,000 yuan (US$4,478) in his third. His earnings exceeded 1 million yuan (US$149,300) in his first year. He attributed his success primarily to opportunities created by the platform, estimating that platform-driven advantages accounted for 80% of his success and personal effort for the remaining 20%. However, the 7 million yuan figure comes from his own account, and neither his actual earnings nor the method used to calculate them has been independently verified by a third party.</p><p>Livestream clipping involves editing a livestreamer’s content into short videos and earning commissions through product links or sales promotions. The business model gained traction around 2022, when some leading livestreamers began authorizing others to use their content, attracting people seeking to enter e-commerce at relatively low cost.</p><p>According to media reports, the student said he carefully compared his videos frame by frame with popular clips, looking for differences in details such as image quality, tags and copywriting, while repeatedly analyzing traffic performance. After mastering the process, he chose to focus on a single niche rather than frequently switching to other fields.</p><p>He believes personal effort is important, but the platform’s stage of development and opportunities to capture traffic have a greater impact on earnings. As he put it, effort is merely “the ticket to getting lucky.”</p><p>However, it remains unclear whether the reported 7 million yuan represents cumulative commissions, gross business revenue or net profit after deducting team revenue shares, advertising expenditure and labor costs. His actual profitability therefore remains unconfirmed.</p><p>The wide disparity in earnings among industry participants also shows that livestream clipping does not guarantee substantial returns for everyone. Previous reports cited figures disclosed by the Three Sheep Group indicating that more than 11,000 people received authorization in 2022, with average earnings of approximately 17,000 yuan (US$2,537) per person. Another participant who entered the industry in 2023 said his monthly income fell from an initial 5,000 – 6,000 yuan (approximately US$746 – US$896) to just over 1,000 yuan (about US$149) as competition intensified.</p><p>In its early days, livestream clipping benefited from the large audiences attracted by leading livestreamers and the relatively small number of participants. Some people were able to earn commissions simply by editing their content. As more people entered the market, however, competition intensified, while platforms gradually tightened requirements for content authorization and account management. The early traffic-driven advantages have consequently become harder to replicate.</p><p>Authorization and content compliance also pose challenges for industry participants. Using a livestreamer’s likeness, name or livestream content without permission may lead to intellectual property disputes, account penalties or even litigation. In 2025, an investigation by the Jiangsu Consumer Council also highlighted problems with product information in clip-based sales promotions that did not match actual conditions. Platforms have therefore continued to strengthen the management of authorized accounts and related rules.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=79cf54decf04" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[China’s “Golden Week” Drives Surge in Pet-Care Services]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/chinas-golden-week-drives-surge-in-pet-care-services-66923b3e0e47?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/66923b3e0e47</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[animals]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vacation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pets]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:37:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-05T22:37:41.945Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Pet-Sitting and Home-Feeding Orders Jump More Than 300%</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iDczkNo5ltnkrpSOdIg4_g@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>China’s “Golden Week” holiday saw large numbers of people traveling, driving growth in an emerging segment of the pet economy. Data from domestic services platforms showed that orders for at-home pet-feeding services increased by more than 300% during the holiday compared with the previous week. Orders for pet boarding services also rose significantly, highlighting the potential of China’s growing pet economy.</p><p>According to reports by Hong Kong media and China’s state-run CCTV Finance, orders for at-home pet-feeding services surged during this year’s Golden Week holiday. Domestic service worker Wang Jiuhua said her schedule was fully booked from October 1 to 8, with almost all of her jobs involving pet care. The animals she cared for included common pets such as cats, dogs, turtles, birds and rabbits. Services included feeding, companionship and walking, allowing her to earn an additional 100 to 200 yuan ($15 to $30) per day.</p><p>Other domestic service workers said they were fully booked during the Golden Week holiday, with most of their assignments involving pet feeding. They could earn an additional 100 to 200 yuan per day. One part-time pet feeder said she charged about 30 yuan ($4.50) per visit and could earn around 1,000 yuan ($149) over the holiday.</p><p>Data from domestic services platforms showed that among various household service categories, at-home pet-care services saw the most significant increase during Golden Week, with orders rising by more than 300% from the previous week.</p><p>In addition to at-home feeding, some pet owners also arranged for their pets to stay at boarding facilities. According to China News Service-affiliated outlet Zhongxin Jingwei, demand for related services doubled during the Golden Week holiday, with some providers becoming fully booked. Wang Zhiwei, a pet boarding provider in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, said, “Demand for pet boarding is strong during every holiday.”</p><p>The report cited the 2026 China Pet Industry White Paper as saying that China’s urban pet consumption market for cats and dogs exceeded 312.6 billion yuan ($46.6 billion) in 2025. The booming pet economy has become a new area of opportunity for young entrepreneurs, giving rise to new occupations such as pet boarding providers, pet nutritionists and pet groomers. It has also emerged as a new form of consumer spending helping to drive domestic demand.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66923b3e0e47" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Funds Blocked in China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/irans-funds-blocked-in-china-afb6697cf404?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/afb6697cf404</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 00:19:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-27T00:19:12.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Pezeshkian Says Tehran Cannot Repatriate Export Earnings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xQCE6VJ-tWaJIQ3yDwQa_g@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by KAMRAN gholami on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in an exclusive interview recently aired by Fox News that Iranian funds in China have been blocked, preventing Tehran from transferring money it earned from exports to China.</p><p>Asked whether Beijing is financing Iran during the war, Pezeshkian said: “One of the problems we face is that our money is blocked, and we cannot transfer our own money from the country to which we supply goods, let alone use those funds to make payments to anyone elsewhere.”</p><p>According to a New York Times analysis, since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term, the United States has placed more than 1,000 entities – including Chinese shipping companies and refineries – under sanctions. Nevertheless, Iranian oil continues to flow to China. Data from the tracking firm Kpler show that China has received an average of about 1.2 million barrels of Iranian oil per day so far in 2026, only slightly below the level during the same period last year.</p><p>China’s three major state-controlled oil companies have extensive ties to Western banks and have generally avoided purchasing Iranian crude. However, privately owned, independent Chinese refineries, often referred to as “teapots,” buy Iranian oil at steep discounts and process it into gasoline and diesel for the domestic market.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=afb6697cf404" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Thieves Are Disappearing in China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/why-thieves-are-disappearing-in-china-7b6c4fbebe4c?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b6c4fbebe4c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:38:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T00:38:20.462Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How Cashless Payments, Technology and New Jobs Have Made Theft a Losing Business</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QkyWjcx1Bu2kJFlSmCFRIw@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Seven tenone on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>“Why have thieves in China declined so sharply?” has been trending on Chinese social media over the past two days. In the comments, many users have shared their own experiences. Some said they have not handled cash in three years. Others said they were able to recover a phone they had left behind in a shopping mall. Still others said packages left outside their doors for half a day were untouched.</p><p>One user summed it up this way: the decline in theft is not because people have suddenly become more virtuous, but because stealing has gone from a high-return, low-risk business to a money-losing proposition. Cash has disappeared, phones are locked, and surveillance has become pervasive. Technology has driven down the potential rewards while pushing the risks to the ceiling.</p><p>According to Observer Network, the Ministry of Public Security previously reported that the number of theft cases nationwide in 2021 had fallen 62.6 percent from 2012, while cases involving robbery or snatching had declined 96.1 percent. A total of 218,000 residential communities recorded no reported criminal cases. By 2025, traditional “theft, robbery and fraud” cases had fallen another 21.2 percent year-on-year. In the first half of 2026, 307,000 traditional theft, robbery and fraud cases were formally registered nationwide, down 38.9 percent year-on-year.</p><p>Based on these figures, some netizens did the math and concluded that the number of registered theft cases had fallen by more than 80 percent over a decade, making street pickpockets and burglars almost a thing of the past.</p><h3>Why Have Thieves “Lost Their Jobs”?</h3><p>The first question people discussed was: Where did the money go?</p><p>According to the report, Liang Pinghan, a professor at Sun Yat-sen University, said the development of digital finance and the greater convenience of electronic payments have directly reduced the expected returns from theft. Data from the People’s Bank of China show that in the third quarter of 2025, Chinese banks processed 60.631 billion mobile-payment transactions worth 137.53 trillion yuan.</p><p>Cash has rapidly disappeared from everyday life. For pickpockets whose livelihood once depended on getting their hands on people’s wallets, their traditional line of work has simply lost its purpose.</p><p>The report said smartphones were once “hard currency” in the eyes of pickpockets, but they have now become a liability. Smartphones are generally equipped with facial recognition and remote-locking features. Once a stolen phone is turned on, its location can be exposed, while its data can also be erased remotely. Meanwhile, secondhand recycling channels now generally require real-name registration, closing off routes for fencing stolen goods. In many cases, a stolen phone is worth little more than its components and spare parts.</p><p>As one netizen put it, stealing a phone nowadays is almost like stealing a brick. Technology has wiped out a large part of the profits from the business.</p><p>In addition, China has spent years building its “Skynet” and “Sharp Eyes” surveillance systems. Surveillance coverage of major roads, residential communities, shopping centers and supermarkets has become increasingly comprehensive. Facial recognition and movement tracking leave a record of an entire criminal act and have substantially improved the ability to solve cases.</p><p>Scholars, however, have reached different conclusions about the role of surveillance. Liang Pinghan found that the relationship between investment in video surveillance and the decline in theft rates was not statistically significant. He said bluntly that the deterrent effect of “Skynet” on crime was limited, while mobile payments had instead fundamentally changed the landscape of theft prevention and control.</p><h3>Not Just “Nothing Left to Steal,” but “No Need to Steal”</h3><p>There is another factor besides having “nothing left to steal”: there is “less need to steal.”</p><p>The development of digital finance and e-commerce has created large numbers of low-barrier jobs. Food-delivery couriers, delivery drivers and ride-hailing drivers have absorbed tens of millions of low-skilled workers.</p><p>Liang Pinghan’s empirical research found that for every one-standard-deviation increase in a city’s digital financial inclusion index, the local theft rate that year fell by approximately one-quarter. The convenience of making payments had the most significant effect.</p><p>Liang also emphasized that these “gig economy” jobs are concentrated in the service sector and benefit from economies of scale. They are able to flourish primarily in places with large economies, strong economic activity and high levels of urban concentration. As a result, the crime-reducing effect of digital finance varies depending on the time and place.</p><p>In the language of the economics of crime, greater employment opportunities raise the opportunity cost of engaging in illegal activity. When people can make a living with their own hands, who would still want to reach into someone else’s pocket?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b6c4fbebe4c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[China’s Cash-Flow Crisis Deepens SMEs Struggle to Collect Payments]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/chinas-cash-flow-crisis-deepens-smes-struggle-to-collect-payments-743b73aaf671?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/743b73aaf671</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[small-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:37:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T00:37:06.538Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Economic Slowdown Makes Corporate Debt Collection Increasingly Difficult</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Js8kgGbmtAPNsFOEOY5VJA@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Jimmy Hu on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>China’s economic weakness has made it increasingly difficult for businesses to collect payments. Official data show that, as of the end of July this year, accounts receivable held by China’s industrial enterprises above designated size had exceeded US$4.31 trillion, up 8.5% year-on-year, with an average collection period of about 72 days. A survey by Peking University and other institutions also found that more than 60% of surveyed small and micro business operators had outstanding receivables, while their cash on hand could sustain operations for an average of only 2.8 months.</p><p>As mounting cash-flow pressures weigh on businesses, China’s State Council has recently stepped in to address the problem. The State Council Information Office will hold a press conference tomorrow (September 14), at which officials from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the People’s Bank of China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and other relevant agencies will explain measures to strengthen efforts to address payment-collection difficulties faced by small and medium-sized enterprises.</p><p>China’s National Bureau of Statistics recently reported that, as of the end of July 2026, accounts receivable held by industrial enterprises above designated size – defined as industrial legal entities with annual main business revenue of RMB 20 million (about US$3 million) or more – had reached RMB 28.88 trillion (about US$4.31 trillion), an increase of 8.5% from a year earlier. The average collection period was 71.9 days.</p><p>At the end of 2016, the balance of accounts receivable held by industrial enterprises above designated size stood at RMB 12.6 trillion (about US$1.88 trillion), while the average collection period that year was approximately 37.9 to 39.5 days. The data indicate that the accounts-receivable situation facing Chinese businesses has deteriorated significantly over the past decade.</p><p>Xinhua News Agency reported on September 10 that the State Council General Office had recently issued a Notice on Strengthening Efforts to Address Difficulties in Collecting Payments Faced by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. The notice calls for improving rules governing industry payment practices and encouraging large companies, particularly industry leaders, to commit to paying small and medium-sized enterprises in cash within 60 days of delivery of goods, completion of projects, or provision of services.</p><p>It also calls for stronger oversight of payment practices by large enterprises, with central government-owned enterprises required to use cash payments for all payments to small and medium-sized enterprises. The notice further calls for regulating the use of non-cash payment instruments, improving the effectiveness of fund transmission, and strengthening financing support.</p><p>The rise in accounts receivable has also increased cash-flow pressures on small and micro businesses. According to a report published August 7 on the website of Peking University’s Center for Enterprise Big Data Research, the 2026 Q2 China Survey of Small and Micro Business Operators and 2026 Q3 China Small and Micro Business Confidence Index Report, jointly produced by Peking University’s Center for Enterprise Big Data Research, Peking University’s China Center for Social Survey, Ant Group Research Institute and MYbank, found that more than 60% of surveyed small and micro business operators reported having outstanding receivables during the quarter.</p><p>Among operators with outstanding receivables, the average amount was RMB 92,500 (about US$13,800). For approximately one in six operators, accounts receivable exceeded twice their quarterly revenue, placing a significant burden on liquidity.</p><p>In terms of cash flow, the report found that small and micro business operators had average revenue of RMB 86,000 (about US$12,800) in the second quarter of 2026, down 22.2% year-on-year and 8.5% quarter-on-quarter. Average net profit was RMB 3,000 (about US$448), down 40.9% year-on-year and 24.9% quarter-on-quarter.</p><p>Existing cash reserves could sustain operations for an average of 2.8 months. Meanwhile, 11.6% of small and micro business operators had insufficient cash to maintain normal operations, while another 21.5% had enough cash to last one month or less, underscoring the severe cash-flow pressures confronting some small and micro businesses.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=743b73aaf671" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[China Moves to Rein In Surging Energy Storage Capacity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sicewu/china-moves-to-rein-in-surging-energy-storage-capacity-163292c925d7?source=rss-22c7704b0691------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/163292c925d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[customer-experience]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sice Wu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 23:26:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-07T23:26:35.828Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>New Projects Face Tighter Approval Amid Overcapacity Risks</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7ek-XHFmnE7cqlbmKeo0kQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>After several years of rapid expansion, China’s energy storage industry is facing rising risks of overcapacity, with new capacity projects potentially subject to stricter approvals. Cailian Press reported on Sept. 6, citing multiple industry sources, that Chinese authorities are conducting a comprehensive review of existing and planned energy storage capacity and have temporarily suspended the approval and advancement of projects that remain in the planning stage and have not formally begun construction. Projects that have already been filed and are under construction are not affected.</p><p>Several industry insiders stressed that the tightening measures are not a blanket suspension and that future policies will be adjusted dynamically based on actual market demand. Companies also noted that the energy storage sector still has significant growth potential, but expansion needs to be managed more rationally to prevent excessive capacity and ensure healthy, orderly development.</p><p>Tian Qingjun, senior vice president of Envision, said planned expansion of China’s energy storage cell capacity has exceeded 800 GWh this year. Capacity expected to be completed by year-end will reach approximately 1.2 – 1.5 TWh, while total planned capacity exceeds. 2 TWh. He said this is “far beyond the actual demand of the global market.” Because battery-cell production requires continuous operation, he warned that once overcapacity emerges, companies will inevitably resort to price wars simply to survive.</p><p>The report noted that the energy storage market experienced a shortage of battery cells during the first half of this year, prompting companies to accelerate capacity expansion. Tian attributed the shortage to three factors: the implementation of capacity-pricing policies, rising Chinese demand as curtailment of wind and solar power drove the need for energy storage, and overseas buyers rushing to purchase products before changes to export tax rebates. In addition, energy storage capacity typically takes about a year to build, meaning the sudden surge in demand caught the industry off guard. With new capacity now gradually coming online, industry participants generally expect a wave of capacity consolidation and exits over the next several years.</p><p>The tightening comes as Chinese regulators have increasingly sought to address “involution-style” competition. IT Home reported that China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) held a symposium with power and energy storage battery manufacturers on Nov. 28, 2025, explicitly calling for the “lawful and regulatory governance of irrational competition” in the power and energy storage battery industries.</p><p>On Jan. 7, 2026, MIIT, the National Development and Reform Commission, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the National Energy Administration jointly held another industry symposium to study and implement measures to further regulate competition in the power and energy storage battery sectors.</p><p>Separately, a kickoff meeting for the group standard General Principles for a Cost Accounting Model for Power and Energy Storage Batteries was held on July 30. The standard is intended to encourage companies to shift away from indiscriminate price competition toward more refined operations, prevent “involution” from being passed on externally, and promote higher-quality and more standardized development of the power and energy storage battery industries.</p><p>In short, China’s energy storage sector is not facing a blanket halt to new investment. Rather, authorities are taking stock of existing and planned capacity and temporarily slowing approval and advancement of projects that have not yet started construction, as concerns over excess capacity and destructive price competition intensify.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=163292c925d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>