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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mahmoud_Elkholy on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mahmoud_Elkholy on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@silent_hunter_?source=rss-c8d206bcfd66------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mahmoud_Elkholy on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@silent_hunter_?source=rss-c8d206bcfd66------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Wasn’t Supposed to Be Here, But Nobody Stopped Me]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@silent_hunter_/i-wasnt-supposed-to-be-here-but-nobody-stopped-me-61fd518e869d?source=rss-c8d206bcfd66------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud_Elkholy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:34:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T18:35:06.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>I Wasn’t Supposed to Be Here, But Nobody Stopped Me</strong></p><p><em>A </em>Critical<em> Broken Access Control vulnerability that turned a forced team addition into a workspace takeover and permanent data destruction.</em></p><blockquote><em>“People will look where they should be looking if they want to see how the trick really works.”</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>— Patrick Jane</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/1*53LUyobEforjpTVIWWGDXQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Setting</h3><p>The platform provides a collaborative email environment where teams can manage shared inboxes, organize conversations, and coordinate their daily workflows through shared workspaces.</p><p>At its core, the platform allows users to collaborate within teams, with administrative controls over team membership and workspace management.</p><p>But there was a problem with how those teams were managed.</p><p>An administrator could add another user’s email address to their team. That action did not simply grant access. It could forcibly move the user, transfer control of their existing workspaces, and ultimately allow someone else to destroy everything they had built.</p><h3>The Characters</h3><p>Two separate accounts were created for this investigation:</p><ul><li><strong>ATTACKER</strong> — An account with its own team and administrative privileges.</li><li><strong>VICTIM</strong> — An independent account with its own team and at least one existing workspace.</li></ul><p>Before the test, the Victim had full control over its original workspace.</p><p>The objective was to determine whether an administrator could add another user to their team without that user’s consent, and what would happen to the resources the user already owned.</p><h3>Act I — The Invitation That Required No Permission</h3><p>From the Attacker’s account, I navigated to the team settings and attempted to add the Victim using its email address.</p><p>Normally, adding someone to a team should involve an invitation process. The recipient should have the opportunity to accept or decline before becoming a member.</p><p>That was not what happened.</p><p>The application immediately added the Victim to the Attacker’s team without requiring any confirmation, invitation acceptance, or interaction from the Victim.</p><p>No consent was requested.</p><p>The action was completed directly from the Attacker’s account.</p><h3>Act II — The Forced Migration</h3><p>I then logged in using the Victim’s account to inspect what had happened.</p><p>The Victim had been automatically removed from its original team and moved into the Attacker’s team.</p><p>More importantly, its previously existing workspace was now listed under the Attacker’s team.</p><p>The Victim had lost control over its own workspace.</p><p>Attempting to edit or manage the original workspace resulted in the following message:</p><blockquote><em>“You can’t edit this workspace: Editing has been restricted by the admin &lt;attacker-email&gt;</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E29YPUzbVfMRqRdhjICeew.png" /></figure><p>The Victim could no longer manage the workspace it had originally created.</p><p>This was no longer just an unauthorized team membership change. The application had effectively transferred control of an existing workspace to another user without the owner’s consent.</p><h3>Act III — The Keys Changed Hands</h3><p>The next step was to examine what the Attacker could do with the transferred workspace.</p><p>After logging back into the Attacker’s account, I navigated to the team settings and located the Victim’s original workspace.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*26HI2ZfDN_OATpcjWPf6UQ.png" /></figure><p>The Attacker had administrative privileges over it, including the ability to delete it.</p><p>The account that had originally created the workspace could no longer manage it, while the account that had forcibly added its owner now had control over it.</p><p>The ownership and access boundaries had completely broken down.</p><h3>Act IV — The Final Blow</h3><p>To confirm the full impact, I used the Attacker’s account to delete the Victim’s original workspace.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x9nTGO5-_lODsfgKdssihQ.png" /></figure><p>The deletion was successful.</p><p>The workspace and its associated data were permanently deleted, and the Victim could not recover them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-aHehh4nqSuhmd1MCKfOUw.png" /></figure><p>A single team management action had resulted in the complete destruction of another user’s workspace.</p><p>The sequence was simple:</p><p><strong>ATTACKER → Force-adds VICTIM → Workspace transferred → Administrative control gained → Workspace permanently deleted.</strong></p><p>The Attacker never needed the Victim’s password, permission, or approval.</p><p>The application itself made the transfer possible.</p><h3>Act V — Another Door, Another Impact</h3><p>While investigating the same team addition mechanism, I discovered another consequence of the vulnerability.</p><p>New accounts were normally required to provide a credit card before starting a trial.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SXjS_JcCQpPBA5avl5-6nA.png" /></figure><p>I tested whether the forced team addition could bypass this requirement.</p><p>The test was straightforward:</p><ol><li>I opened an incognito window and registered a completely new account.</li></ol><p>2. During registration, the application required a credit card to start the trial.</p><p>3. From the existing Attacker account, I added the new account’s email address to the team using the same vulnerability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A5OD5b1hAaKMG0fDR37F-g.png" /></figure><p>4. I logged in using the newly created account.</p><p>The result was unexpected.</p><p>The new account gained access to the platform without being prompted to provide a credit card.</p><p>I then removed the new account from the Attacker’s team and tested again.</p><p>The application still did not require a credit card for that account to continue using the platform.</p><p>This demonstrated that the same vulnerability could also bypass the normal trial/payment requirement.</p><p>This additional impact was reported in the original report rather than submitted as a separate vulnerability, since it originated from the same team addition mechanism.</p><h3>The Root Cause</h3><p>The underlying problem was a failure in the application’s team membership and workspace access control mechanisms.</p><p>The application treated adding an email address to a team as an immediate membership change, without requiring the recipient’s consent.</p><p>This allowed the system to move an existing user into another team and transfer administrative control over their existing workspaces.</p><p>The expected behavior should have been different:</p><ul><li>Adding a user should create a pending invitation.</li><li>The recipient should be able to accept or decline.</li><li>Existing workspace ownership and access should not be transferred without proper authorization.</li><li>Trial and payment requirements should not be bypassed through unauthorized team membership changes.</li></ul><p>The application failed to maintain these boundaries.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3>The Impact</h3><p>The vulnerability resulted in several security consequences:</p><p><strong>1. Workspace Hijacking</strong></p><p>An attacker could forcibly move another user’s account into their team and gain administrative control over the victim’s existing workspaces.</p><p><strong>2. Permanent Data Destruction</strong></p><p>The attacker could delete the transferred workspaces and permanently destroy their associated data, resulting in an unrecoverable loss for the victim.</p><p><strong>3. Forced Account Migration</strong></p><p>The victim could be removed from their original team without consent and lose the ability to manage their own workspaces.</p><p><strong>4. Trial/Payment Requirement Bypass</strong></p><p>The same mechanism allowed newly registered accounts to access the platform without completing the normal credit card requirement for starting a trial.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><p><strong>Published on a HackerOne VDP program and classified as Critical severity — Resolved.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/210/1*j5-Ig4iTuf4lNIU0quTleA.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>“An innocent man would’ve punched me by now.”</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AN5zPWArGqzQx4XbvCx-RA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61fd518e869d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Broken Access Control Missing Server-Side Authorization Allows Member to Access Billing Data and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@silent_hunter_/broken-access-control-missing-server-side-authorization-allows-member-to-access-billing-data-and-b75a1569013f?source=rss-c8d206bcfd66------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b75a1569013f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone-report]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud_Elkholy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 17:38:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-12T17:57:43.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Broken Access Control Missing Server-Side Authorization Allows Member to Access Billing Data and Modify Any User Profile Including Admins</h3><h3>The Member Who Could Edit the Admin</h3><p><em>A Broken Access Control writeup — on hidden administrative features, missing authorization checks, and a Member who was never supposed to manage anyone.</em></p><blockquote><em>“You see, but you do not observe. The distinction is clear.”</em></blockquote><p>— Sherlock Holmes, <em>A Scandal in Bohemia</em> (1891)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*T0jtEZRmeFX5hIjnpbB3XQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Case</h3><p>The application provides a collaborative workspace where users are assigned one of two roles:</p><ul><li><strong>Admin</strong> — Has administrative privileges, including managing team members and modifying their information.</li><li><strong>Member</strong> — Has restricted permissions and is not supposed to view or modify other workspace members.</li></ul><p>According to the application’s documentation and the behavior observed during testing, Member accounts are not allowed to access the team management functionality.</p><p>The application appeared to enforce this restriction correctly. When accessing the relevant section as a Member, the frontend blocked navigation and displayed a permission warning.</p><p>However, there was a distinction worth investigating:</p><p><strong>Was the application actually enforcing authorization on the server, or was it merely hiding the functionality from unauthorized users?</strong></p><h3>The Characters</h3><p>Two accounts were created within a test workspace:</p><ul><li><strong>Admin</strong>— The workspace administrator.</li><li><strong>Member</strong> — A regular workspace member.</li></ul><p>The objective was to determine whether the Member account could perform administrative operations against other workspace members without obtaining actual administrative privileges.</p><h3>Act I — Establishing the Baseline</h3><p>I first logged in using the Member account and attempted to access the team management section.</p><p>The application blocked access through its frontend interface :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LYeAYVA0zorJ_gnYDVFTpw.png" /></figure><p>The Member could not normally view or manage other workspace members.</p><p>At this point, the expected authorization boundary appeared clear:</p><ul><li>Admins could manage workspace members.</li><li>Members could not view or modify other members’ profiles.</li></ul><p>The restriction was working at the interface level. That alone, however, did not establish whether the backend enforced it.</p><h3>Act II — The First Clue</h3><p>While inspecting the application’s HTTP traffic through Burp Suite, I identified a role-related property in the server response that controlled the administrative interface.</p><p>The response contained the following JSON property:</p><p><strong>Original response:</strong></p><pre>{<br>  &quot;tea_wRu2**********&quot;: &quot;member&quot;<br>}</pre><p>Instead of treating the hidden interface as an authorization boundary, I examined how the frontend determined which features should be displayed.</p><p>By configuring a Burp Suite Match &amp; Replace rule on the response body, I modified the role value locally:</p><p><strong>Modified response:</strong></p><pre>{<br>  &quot;tea_wRu2**********&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;<br>}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*AxLGgG9CT1ckAfMLlCcy_g.png" /></figure><p>This caused the application to render the previously restricted administrative interface.</p><p>An important distinction: The modification affected only the response received by my browser. The actual account remained a Member, and its server-side role was never changed.</p><p>The first restriction had been bypassed.</p><h3>Act III — Exposing the Hidden Interface</h3><p>With the modified response, I navigated to:</p><p>[TEAM MANAGEMENT / BILLING &amp; USERS PAGE]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2OiCY2QDrl-k6yujMlgw2A.png" /></figure><p>The application now displayed functionality that had previously been inaccessible to the Member account.</p><p>The previously displayed permission warning was no longer preventing access to the interface.</p><p>The application also loaded the relevant management functionality, including the team members section.</p><p>However, revealing a hidden interface is not, by itself, a security vulnerability.</p><p>A properly implemented application should independently validate the authenticated user’s permissions whenever a sensitive backend operation is requested.</p><p>The next step was to determine whether that authorization check actually existed.</p><p>I used the Member account to edit the Admin’s profile. I successfully changed the Admin’s name and profile picture, and added a new sending email address. All changes were saved successfully and remained after removing the Burp Suite Match &amp; Replace rule and refreshing the page. This confirmed that the changes were actually saved on the server.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fW5Ly0BbiIJwlN9PoVjdqw.png" /></figure><p>and it works</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mq23cGhZBOf8HDisGo5JZA.png" /></figure><h3>Act VI — The Root Cause &amp; Impact</h3><p>The vulnerability resulted from missing server-side authorization checks on administrative operations.</p><p>Although the frontend restricted Members from accessing team management functionality, the backend failed to consistently verify the authenticated user’s actual role before processing sensitive requests.</p><p>As a result, a Member could modify the profiles of other workspace users, including Admins, access their available personal information, and modify supported account settings.</p><p>The issue allowed a lower-privileged user to perform administrative operations without actually obtaining an Admin role.</p><h3>The Final Deduction</h3><p>The vulnerability was reported and subsequently fixed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/295/1*7ueKqlQuFgwm8tu7LEFYrg.png" /></figure><ul><li>The account never became an Admin. Its role remained unchanged throughout the test.</li><li>The interface restriction was bypassed, but the real failure was deeper: the backend accepted operations that the Member was never authorized to perform.</li></ul><p><strong>The Member never had administrative privileges. The server simply failed to enforce them.</strong></p><ul><li>This vulnerability was reported through a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) and was successfully fixed. It also marks my first resolved report, making it an important milestone in my bug bounty journey.</li></ul><blockquote><em>“I never guess. It is a shocking habit — destructive to the logical faculty.”.</em></blockquote><p>— Sherlock Holmes, The Sign of the Four (1890), Chapter 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*K0lD8nIqqSpP5gZQ89ZG2A.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b75a1569013f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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