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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Simon Jacobs on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Simon Jacobs on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Simon Jacobs on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Green Line Extension and the Green New Deal]]></title>
            <link>https://simondjacobs.medium.com/the-green-line-extension-and-the-green-new-deal-2bddad09fd58?source=rss-3103083bc870------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[impact-litigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[litigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Jacobs]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Aug 2022 19:15:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-05T19:15:48.553Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Green Line Extension (GLX) in Somerville, Massachusetts <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/03/21/metro/decades-making-green-line-extension-somervilles-union-square-finally-opens-passengers-service/">opened</a> on March 21, 2022. (Well, sort of — one branch did. Today, it <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/mbta-to-shut-down-new-green-line-extension-for-4-weeks-opening-date-for-medford-branch-delayed/2800556/">closed</a> for four weeks, and the other branch has been delayed until November.) One of the oldest streetcar lines in the United States, the Green Line has long terminated at Lechmere in east Cambridge, just across the river from Boston. But in 1991, the state of Massachusetts <a href="https://www.somervillestep.org/files/HistoryCommitments1989-92_1204.pdf">agreed</a> to extend the Green Line to Somerville in order to avoid threatened Clean Air Act litigation regarding the <a href="https://www.boston.com/uncategorized/noprimarytagmatch/2012/07/10/true-cost-of-big-dig-exceeds-24-billion-with-interest-officials-determine/">Big Dig</a>, a massive, decades-long highway project that reshaped downtown Boston and <a href="https://www.boston.com/uncategorized/noprimarytagmatch/2012/07/10/true-cost-of-big-dig-exceeds-24-billion-with-interest-officials-determine/">cost</a> $15 billion, including $7 billion in federal funds. To the Conservation Law Foundation and other community groups who had negotiated with the state, the project would create severe air-quality impacts on low-income areas surrounding Boston. Poorer populations in inner-ring suburbs would bear the brunt of the burdens, relative to the downtown-bound suburbanites who would benefit.</p><figure><img alt="Two pictures of downtown Boston. The second has a park, in place of a highway." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mtGVL1Jt4uax6yclutJ5hQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Before and after the Big Dig (from <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/boston/comments/6so8p0/before_and_after_the_big_dig_xpost/">Reddit</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>In this blog post, I aim to put the development of GLX in context of work on the challenges of impact litigation. Then, I suggest a few policy ideas to better align the goals of public infrastructure development and social reformers.</p><p>As litigation victories go, the GLX settlement was an ambiguous one. If the litigation had any effect on the transit infrastructure project, it was quite attenuated. The MBTA <a href="https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/Boston-Case_The-Story-of-the-Green-Line-Extension.pdf">ignored</a> the settlement for ten years, doing nothing to build the project it had promised to. In 2005, the Conservation Law Foundation sued the state under the Clean Air Act for violating the previous agreement (which had been incorporated into a state plan approved by the EPA),<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> leading to another settlement in which the state committed to build the project by 2015. Plagued by delays, the state reneged on its agreement in 2015. After cost-cutting and a federal grant from the FTA, it tried again. The MBTA finally succeeded this year. At $2.28 billion, the new line <a href="https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/Boston-Case_The-Story-of-the-Green-Line-Extension.pdf">cost</a> nearly as much per-mile as a project that had tunneled under Cambridge and Somerville a few decades earlier — despite that the Green Line Extension, far from needing tunnels, runs in a commuter rail trench that already existed before the project.</p><p>The settlement did not exactly lead directly to the new project. Rather, the more proximate causes were the federal grant and Somerville’s redevelopment of Union Square in the 2000s that created demand for transit. In fact, the agreement’s intended beneficiaries may not have been helped at all by GLX, <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/03/19/business/green-line-comes-union-square-residents-worry-theyll-be-pushed-out/">priced out</a> by higher rent in the wake of redevelopment.</p><p>None of this would be a surprise to Gerald Rosenburg. In <em>The Hollow Hope</em>, he <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo5828816.html">articulated</a> a well-known theory, developed in the context of school desegregation litigation, about the limits of using courts to effect social change. Courts are ineffective producers of social change. Even if courts order a programmatic change to an institutional program, they have no independent implementation powers or policy expertise. Through malice or just indifference, those institutions responsible for implementation can stall, ignore court orders, or simply implement a program poorly. Indeed, commentators have <a href="https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/Boston-Case_The-Story-of-the-Green-Line-Extension.pdf">blamed</a> the high price and delays of GLX on the MBTA’s reluctance to commit internal resources to the project. GLX was just not a priority for the agency, no matter what a settlement said.</p><p>Yet two qualifications to the Rosenburg account are in order. First, causal relationships between litigation and social change cannot be as easily disarticulated as the theory suggests.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Somerville redeveloped Union Square in part because it <em>expected</em> GLX to be built. City policymakers’ future expectations came from the settlement, and by acting on them, they made that future more likely.</p><p>Second and more importantly, the theory does not have much normative force for would-be reformers. Perhaps litigation was not so effective, but it is not clear that another strategy would have been any better. Advocates could have tried to elect a friendly politician, but public transit is not the first item on most voters’ lists of important issues. Rosenburg credits social action groups like SNCC for changing the politics around school desegregation, leading to social change, but public transit lacks the moral stakes that drove students to sit in at whites-only lunch counters.</p><p>Transit equity advocates struggle with institutional neglect and lack of political support. And they may still turn to courts. Inequality is wrong and demands resolution, whether or not courts are best situated to provide it. At the same time, institutions that deliver infrastructure projects badly need reform. Mass transit is key to addressing urban inequality and to the transition away from fossil fuels, but the pace Boston is building mass transit infrastructure — one short streetcar extension over 30 years, at exorbitant cost — is, to put it mildly, disproportionate to the challenge. Yet aside from being a poor reform mechanism, litigation can be an active impediment to green infrastructure development. For example, a litigious NIMBY lawyer recently singlehandedly <a href="https://gothamist.com/news/west-village-lawyer-fighting-14th-street-busway-calls-advocates-white-hooded-zealots">halted</a> a New York bus lane pilot, comparing his legal crusade to court battles against Jim Crow. Courts’ lack of implementation powers is not much of a problem if your goal is just to stop a project.</p><p>Along these lines, a recent <a href="https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&amp;context=faculty-publications">article</a> suggests that 1970s-era environmental laws pose challenges for the Green New Deal, a proposed large-scale federal investment in clean-energy infrastructure.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> The authors explain that advocates’ commitment to participatory democracy threatens their main goal of transformative infrastructure investment over a short time period. Citizen-suit provisions in the Clean Air Act and similar laws lead to protracted litigation that will delay or halt important projects. The authors are no doubt correct that existing procedures would make green infrastructure development costly and difficult. But the tradeoffs are less black-and-white than they suggest. CLF sued Massachusetts to <em>start</em> a mass transit project that the <em>state</em> had delayed. We cannot just pick between participation and green investment. Rather, we need to think about <em>how </em>laws empower different state actors and interest groups.</p><p>* * *</p><figure><img alt="Green Line train traveling in the snow." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VtlIOC3ECYcg5dTtkgEqEA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Here’s a picture of a Green Line train that I took in 2018.</figcaption></figure><p>I want to offer two half-baked policy proposals to begin to address this nasty complex of problems, one national and one local. But first, a preemptive defense. If the root problem with transit is lack of political support, how can I suggest policy reforms that would require political support for transit? Well, there are reasons to think that federal and local (or regional) governments are more attractive loci of struggle than the states. In Boston and its nearby suburbs, many residents are transit riders. The Massachusetts state government is relatively more suburban-dominated, thus less likely to spend money on urban development. Though the rural biases of Congress are well known, inequality and the green transition are national problems that demand national solutions.</p><p>Nationally, the Green New Deal should cop a few techniques from its namesake. The original New Dealers distrusted courts, staffed by old-guard jurists and ill-suited to understanding the effects of individualized decisions on complex, national problems. Consequently, they moved adjudications from courts to administrative agencies. Politically accountable agencies provided a more efficient forum for litigants and allowed adjudication to be balanced against programmatic considerations in a particular policy area. For example, labor disputes are resolved at the NLRB, not in federal court. Ideally, the NLRB is attentive both to the workplace issues between workers and bosses in a particular case, and to the larger issues of federal labor policy that the case implicates. When resolving a case, the NLRB brings to bear both labor expertise and its programmatic mission.</p><p>In the transit context, Congress should give the Department of Transportation the power to resolve disputes where litigants seek changes to federally funded transportation infrastructure projects. For the Big Dig litigants in Somerville, DOT could have more effectively supervised the MBTA’s implementation of the project pursuant to the settlement (or its own order). And DOT could prevent frivolous suits from delaying important projects by not granting injunctions. Rather than creating an <em>exclusive </em>venue, as the NLRA does — with attendant risks to plaintiffs of a captured agency — Congress could make this a question of remedies. Perhaps plaintiffs could seek programmatic changes (that is, those that would alter or halt projects) only at a DOT hearing. If they pursue an action in court, they would be limited to monetary damages, with no injunctive relief. The goal is not to foreclose litigation, but to give plaintiffs who have meritorious claims a more attractive venue to influence an implementation program, while limiting options for those who just want to throw up roadblocks.</p><p>This proposal complements other changes at the administrative state level. President Biden has already issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-advancing-racial-equity-and-support-for-underserved-communities-through-the-federal-government/">executive order</a> that requires agency action to take equity into account. Lawsuits like the Somerville plaintiffs’ might be less likely if the federal government were required to engage in equity considerations on the front end (although the Big Dig itself was funded outside the agencies via a line-item appropriation from Congress — another example of our political system’s direct support for highways over transit). In addition, the federal government should start doing research and investment to reduce high infrastructure costs in the U.S. Perhaps less immediately politically tenable, the federal government should bypass the states and instead fund infrastructure projects via <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/federal-states-rights/">regional agencies</a>.</p><p>In the absence of federal action, in litigation, plaintiffs should demand something besides new construction projects: free fares. Free fares could be the best version of what is pejoratively termed a coupon settlement — substituting monetary damages with in-kind services that are cheaper for the defendant to provide than the value of the benefit to plaintiffs. And unlike other programmatic commitments, free fares are quick to implement and do not require much supervision to verify compliance.</p><p>Cities are already experimenting with free public transit. Boston’s Mayor Michelle Wu recently started a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/03/14/boston-free-public-transit/">pilot</a> project of free fares on several local bus routes used in predominantly poor communities. Some transit wonks have <a href="https://transitcenter.org/transit-be-free/">criticized</a> free transit. If there is extra funding for transit, it might be more productive to spend it on improving service than reducing cost. But free fares have benefits. Operationally, buses spend less time at stops when riders don’t have to fumble for change. Transit agencies avoid the cost of fare collection and a major source of rider-driver tension. Free fares also change the political economy of transit. “Free” is a price that captures imagination and has an outsize effect on behavior. It might foster a new constituency for transit. And by consciously uncoupling funding from revenue, we make transit more like a public good and less like a business that happens to be operated by the state.</p><p>Imagine if the 1991 agreement had required free fares on local bus lines, rather than a long-deferred promise to build a streetcar extension. GLX is quite a boon to current Somerville residents. Free fares, instead, would have benefitted those directly affected by the Big Dig, who might not live in Somerville anymore — and in particular, those who did not drive much and thus did not benefit from the project. What’s more, free fares would have led to more bus ridership in Somerville. High ridership, in turn, might have obliged the MBTA to fund infrastructure upgrades like upgraded buses, bus lanes, and transit signal priority, due to the agency’s own operational needs, not an evadable judicial edict. Perhaps they would have even extended a nearby streetcar line.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <em>See </em>CLF v. Romney, 421 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Mass. 2006).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <em>Cf.</em> Michael McCann, <em>Reform Litigation On Trial</em>, 17 L. &amp; Soc. Inquiry 715, 741 (1992) (reviewing Gerald Rosenburg, The Hollow Hope (1991)) (explaining that “Rosenberg views causality primarily in terms of unidirectional, instrumental effects emanating from the acts of discrete agents,” ignoring “intersubjective, interactive, relational aspects of power that both constrain and express the designs of parties”).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> J.B. Ruhl &amp; James E. Salzman, <em>What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?</em>, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 693 (2020).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bddad09fd58" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Covid Credit Card]]></title>
            <link>https://simondjacobs.medium.com/the-covid-credit-card-e76ccf86a7e?source=rss-3103083bc870------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[local-government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Jacobs]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:00:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-19T23:00:52.773Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At this point, nine months into the pandemic, pretty much everyone knows what we need to do to get the coronavirus under control. People need to wear masks. And governments?</p><h3></h3><p>2) Bar Rescue: Have the federal government pay every last bar, restaurant, nightclub, theatre and concert venue to stay closed for the next nine months. You&#39;d remove *enormous* pressure to reopen things that aren&#39;t safe, and it probably pays for itself.</p><p>The government needs to pay bars, restaurants, and other small businesses to shut down, so people don’t go there, so they don’t become vectors of disease. We know why the Trump administration isn’t doing this: some combination of malice and incompetence.</p><p>But what’s the deal with our sub-national governments — states, cities, and counties? Why are they not doing their jobs? One could argue that they lack the firepower of the federal government. They need to balance their budgets, and they can’t print money.</p><p>That’s not good enough. Local governments should be trying as hard as they can to get to the platonic ideal of a good coronavirus response, in the absence (or even the obstruction) of the federal government.</p><p>Local governments seem to have settled on an alternative plan. They are trying to optimize the level of deaths and the threat of business closures. Relax restrictions too much, and too many people will die; too little, and too many businesses will close.</p><p>Different governments have different intuitions about the proper optimization point to hit, but they are fundamentally engaged in the same exercise. For example, when cases started to rise in Chicago last month, Lori Lightfoot <a href="https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/10/22/chicago-will-impose-10-pm-curfew-on-bars-and-restaurants-as-2nd-wave-of-coronavirus-hits/">closed</a> the bars — well, only after 10pm. The threat of mass casualties must be balanced with the threat of business death.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UGEAxzamcmRRVG8a-ZCdIA.png" /><figcaption>More restrictions on businesses, less death.</figcaption></figure><p>This is never going to work. Put aside the fact that no human life is worth keeping a business afloat. (That’s easy for me to say; Lightfoot is under different pressures than I am, and presumably if tax revenue falls such that the city can’t pay for the fire department or schools, lives will be in danger in another way.) The more fundamental problem is that cities can’t reduce transmission low enough while keeping businesses open to get the reproduction rate of the virus below 1, where we will stop seeing exponential growth.</p><p>So what do we do? It’s simple. Local governments should take out a Covid Credit Card.</p><h4>The Covid Credit Card</h4><p>Cities and states should do what the federal government should be doing. Pay local businesses to close. Pay workers not to work. Can’t afford it? Congratulations, you’ve discovered what an 18-year-old does when they want to go to college. Take out a loan.</p><p>Sure, high public debt levels are not great. Yet I submit that they are better than the alternatives of (1) lots of people dying, (2) Depression-level business failures, or (3) both of these things (which, unfortunately, seems like the most likely outcome right now).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jKE3I8zEWeyu6VphA5GZ-Q.png" /><figcaption>The Covid Credit Card (artist’s rendering).</figcaption></figure><p>The Covid Credit Card is a financialized version of what everyone knows is true. We need action now, in the short term, to avert a greater catastrophe. We can spread out the costs of action over the long term. The total income-producing potential of Chicago in 2022 will be far larger if lots of people don’t die, and businesses don’t close. Let’s capture that value.</p><p>“But wait,” you may ask, “won’t people from Indiana keep coming into Chicago and spreading Covid, regardless of whether Chicago drives down viral transmission? This is like having a no-peeing section in a swimming pool!”</p><p>Maybe! But (1) less transmission is better than more transmission; (2) Northwest Indiana suburbs can take out their own Covid Credit Cards; and (3) Chicago can draw even further on its own Covid Credit Card to pay Indiana businesses to close, if transmission there affects sickness and death here.</p><h4>How does this end?</h4><p>Presumably, we can’t keep the Covid Credit Card bill running forever. The way I see it, there are three ways this could end.</p><p>First, in the post-Covid era, local governments that adopted Covid Credit Cards will have to impose austerity measures to pay down their debt. This could be higher taxes or reduced services. I hate this idea! Austerity is terrible! Yet, it is less bad than mass death.</p><p>Second, some local governments could go bankrupt. This happens: <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/18073574/detroit-bankruptcy-pensions-municipal">Detroit</a> went bankrupt in 2013. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankruptcy-california-city/san-francisco-suburb-vallejo-files-for-bankruptcy-idUSN2352179020080524">Vallejo</a>, CA went bankrupt in 2008. New York City <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/books/review/fear-city-new-york-fiscal-crisis-kim-phillips-fein.html">nearly</a> went bankrupt in the 1970s. Pre-Covid, many people thought that Chicago was going to go <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-bankruptcy-chicago-pensions-crisis-20190926-4iwzdnfcjzh2tac7pw6i5fbgea-story.html">bankrupt</a> anyway.</p><p>Bankruptcy is bad. Pensions would be restructured. Cities would pay higher interest rates in the future. Wall Street would lose money. (Hmm, one of these things is not like the others.) Yet, again: bankruptcy is less bad than mass death.</p><p>Third: Mom and Dad come home and pay off the Covid Credit Card. The federal government can pay off state and local debt whenever it wants, like it did in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_Assumption">1790</a>. This is my favorite solution, and I don’t think it’s outside the realm of possibility.</p><p>We needed a federal bailout to businesses and people in March. We need it now. We’ll need it in January. The next best thing would be to back-date a bailout by letting states and local governments spend themselves into oblivion now, and paying it off later.</p><p>Joe Biden could even announce, “I encourage local deficit spending to fight the coronavirus. After I’m inaugurated, paying off the debt will be my top priority.” That might even lower the interest rates localities have to pay.</p><p>Look, I get it. Mom and Dad might never come home! Trump might succeed in his incredibly slapdash coup. Biden might not <em>want</em> to pay off local governments’ debts. The Republicans may hold the Senate and keep the Biden Administration from doing anything good.</p><p>But if it feels impossible to everyone that the federal government would leave cities and states to wither on the vine, it will be impossible. Like money and debt, political possibilities exist because we believe in them. Federal action is not happening now, but cities and states should act as though it <em>will</em> happen. (And we need to believe we will get people into power who take our escalating crises seriously at <em>some</em> point, or the goddamn planet will become uninhabitable.) As Margaret Thatcher used to say about the implementation of her political program, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_is_no_alternative">There is No Alternative</a>.</p><p>Now, let’s be real: I don’t know anything. I’m not a specialist in local government or municipal finance. Maybe the Covid Credit Card is a terrible idea. Or for all I know, local governments <em>already have</em> maxed out their ability to go into debt, by maintaining services while revenues plummeted.</p><p>But we deserve better from our political leaders than “try not to go to bars.” In the absence of federal stimulus during the Great Depression, cities printed their own <a href="https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/economic-commentary-archives/2008-economic-commentaries/ec-20080401-stamp-scrip-money-people-paid-to-use.aspx">scrip</a> currency. Where’s the creativity now? Where’s the responsibility?</p><p>We deserve better from our political leaders. And we demand it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e76ccf86a7e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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