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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by S. J. Carroll on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by S. J. Carroll on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by S. J. Carroll on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sjcarroll14?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 23:41:06 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Symptomatic Return to Writing]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/my-symptomatic-return-to-writing-e4101f1f2173?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 04:24:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-08T04:24:23.899Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have this serious problem where I can’t help myself from writing. It’s like a pesky conscience (ahem, superegoic injunction) which compels me to try to put my own perplexity of myself, the world, and others, in words. Trust me, I really tried to stop.</p><p>Anyhow, if you enjoyed my writing on here, and want to keep up, please head over to my new publication: <em>Hollow &amp; Root</em>. That will be my centralized place moving forward for my writing and engagement with my peers. Hope to see some of my old readers and interlocutors there soon!</p><p><a href="https://seancarrollrp.substack.com/about">About - Hollow &amp; Root</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MqpKwQilRpw64JzDwQmb9A.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e4101f1f2173" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Percolations & Reflective Point]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/percolations-reflective-point-c884d7d5352c?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[psychotherapy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[therapy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2025 15:45:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-01T15:45:57.551Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7GgfQC_QbBU1v5VULl5V-Q.png" /></figure><p>Hello to my readers and friends and correspondants,</p><p>It has been quite the journey on Medium. I’ve been writing here for a few years now on psychoanalysis, philosophy, literature, and mental health (and a one-off piece about coffee…) and it has been a pleasure.</p><p>That said, I am leaving Medium as my writing medium for now and will be transitioning to my own website and private psychotherapy practice called Reflective Point. If you’d like, you can keep up with my writing there: reflectivepoint.com.</p><p>Additionally, I have been writing a twice-monthly newsletter for patients, colleagues, and friends called Percolations, to pair nicely with you Friday morning coffee. Each newsletter is a reflection on a topic that has been interesting to me lately, and I absolutely love when my readers send me an email response with feedback and their own thoughts. After all, thinking is basically communal. If you’re interested in Percolations, click the link to subscribe: <a href="https://dashboard.mailerlite.com/forms/1274334/143431914978543394/share">https://dashboard.mailerlite.com/forms/1274334/143431914978543394/share</a></p><p>Take care, everyone!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q53oj0-qrHczmSHeUauq1A.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c884d7d5352c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Note on Self-Esteem]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/a-note-on-self-esteem-713614b96f05?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[self-esteem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[superego]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conscience]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychotherapy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:59:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-02T13:59:55.096Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Jp5ON0RG-sSfpK5C.jpg" /><figcaption>Marcel Duchamp, “Nude Descending Staircase” (1912)</figcaption></figure><p>Self-esteem is considered to be the salve for mental suffering. But it only fixes the problem and constipates the experience of selfhood.</p><p>It is a common reason people seek consultation from psychotherapists, particularly when someone says they have ‘low’ self-esteem. It is probably less common to read on an intake form or hear in a first session that one is seeking help because they suffer from too <em>much </em>self-esteem. In many ways, the measurement of how one esteems one’s own self seems to be the standard for general mental health and well-being in our culture. It is a powerful idea which has been able to mobilize generations of both patients and therapists to work together on this apparently self-evident idea.</p><p>It seems related to ideas such as self-efficacy, one’s valuation of oneself, an internal locus of control, or a healthy ego. But it isn’t quite these ideas; if it was, we would be describing our experiences in that way instead. I suppose my first question is why we have agreed to use the term self-esteem rather than, say, a healthy ego.</p><p>The first thing about self-esteem is that it begins with ‘self’, a notoriously strange and uncomfortably malleable term. Someone like Rudolf Carnap would certainly wince at the use of the word in as many contexts and ways as it is used today. For all of its slipperiness and strangeness, self is a very moving and universal term. You would be hard-pressed, I think, to find any theory in psychology which dispenses with the idea of the self.</p><p>The other thing about self-esteem is that it involves some kind of esteem, which is a way to say that an evaluation, or several evaluations, is operative here. There is a self and then there is the evaluation of it, the estimation of its value. From the Etymonline website, we see that valuation and reputation is associated with “esteem”, from the French word <em>estimer</em>, which means to estimate or to determine. To determine what? Related terms include “esteemed” and “aim”. The latter is particularly interesting, as it comes from the Latin word <em>aestimer</em>, which means to appraise, or determine the value of. These are all very economic ideas of estimation, which raises some interesting questions for its application to our own selves today. Is this another iteration of the great transition into <em>homo economicus</em>?</p><p>Crucial in these earlier links is that esteem is used as a verb, the act of determining or estimating, done <em>by </em>someone <em>to </em>something. I think this is not usually how I hear the word used in our cultural context. We use self-esteem as a noun, something that one can possess. “I think I have low self-esteem” or “good mental health is when you have high self-esteem.” Perhaps it might be better to say something like self-esteemed, which is closer to the original definition (‘esteemed’ being from 1540s, meaning “held in high regard, respected, valued”).<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> It is something that is done and over with, like financing a house.</p><p>Self-esteem, then, is something one can have (or, at least, that is how it is talked about) or not have. Something that others can have, but which one doesn’t. But what are the things that make up self-esteem? The qualities that, if present, are a sure sign that a person has<em> it</em>? If it isn’t a verb, then we should be able to fix this concept in space and time and give a fairly good description of it. And if we often use other people as a measuring stick to compare our own feelings then our description should probably be flexible enough to fit around others as well.</p><h4><em>Having and Not Having</em></h4><p>Self-esteem begins with the self and the kind of attention we give it. But first we have to assume that there is a self to value in some way or other. However, there doesn’t appear to be so much a fixed and stable self as there are different aspects or dynamics which are <em>felt</em> to be ‘the self’. For instance, Mark Epstein writes, in <em>Thoughts Without a Thinker</em>, that Buddhist psychology proposes that the self is a kind of fixation on an idea, ultimately illusory and temporal but very convincing. The self, for Epstein, is a very powerful and moving fiction. Buddhist practice is one way (among others) available to us to start to take a different perspective on this particular fiction if it causes us too much trouble. The threat is that we spend too much time being occupied by the self, and this causes a great deal of suffering.</p><p>Don Carveth says something similar in a lecture on narcissism.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> One of the aims of psychoanalysis, he tells us — as well as of Christianity — is the overcoming and forgetting of the self and opening up the capacity to care for and love others. The self and our investment in it, he claims, is the affliction called neurosis.</p><p>No matter how transient, incomplete, or fictional the idea of the self is, it is very powerful for most people. It is the primary concern of those who seek therapeutic treatment in any form. Seeking to rid oneself of the self or try to forget about it more is not high on the list for those who want to get some emotional relief.</p><p>For many of these people, I suspect, they are bumping up against their superego, that nasty and brutish part of themselves whose goal is to limit, fix and fixate, tell off, compare, and so on. The superego also being a construct like the ‘self’ — very moving but ultimately fictional — it is partly responsible for the very idea of the self!</p><p>If we think about the self as something which <em>is</em>, or that which one <em>has</em>, it is easy to see how self-esteem may come about: one either has a self that is worth esteeming and therefore one has self-esteem, or one does not. The latter is the message of the superego and of depression. Of course, esteem also comes from an evaluating point of view. The historical meaning of the term, we learned, is related to aim, valuing, and esteeming (the value of something). Those all require a subject and an object, or a person and a thing. A person may value a house, aim at a target, and so on. But this puts self-esteem in an awkward position. Who is being evaluated, and who is esteeming? And if there are two separate ‘parts’ within the same person, why is the one being evaluated always found to be short of the measure? If both sides are within an individual, it is a rather odd game we play with ourselves.</p><p>It’s an especially strange game when you think about winning and losing. Who wins, and who loses? And what does that party win or lose? The game of self-esteem and our internal dialogue surrounding it seems to only produce losers, at least in my view. It isn’t typically the people who are confident and self-assured that play the game as severely as the rest of us mortals. So, what might one expect if one engages in such play with the internal evaluator?</p><h4><em>The Internal Evaluator and Morality</em></h4><p>Freud, of course, gave the internal evaluator a name: the superego, or the ego ideal. It is the part of the self, or the dimension of the self, which is responsible for criticizing and limiting the rest of the self. Don Carveth, in his book <em>The Still Small Voice</em>, differentiates conscience from superego, so that we can try to think about what life might be like without one without losing the benefits of the other. Conscience, claims Carveth, is “the desire to nurture others as we have been nurtured.” It is preoedipal, which is important here, because the superego is an oedipal structure, one outcome — among others — of the drama of the childhood Oedipus Complex.</p><p>Conscience is, according to Carveth, an identification with the maternal function, that internalized experience we have which is concerned with care, repair, and belonging. It is warm, but not impotent, for it is also responsible for producing dread, anxiety, and eventually, the oedipal drama itself.</p><p>Perhaps another way to put what people want to say when they report having low self-esteem is that the volume of their superego is louder than that of their conscience. Adam Phillips says beautifully in his talk <em>Against Self Criticism </em>that the superego is boring, uninteresting, and cruel. So why do we believe it? Having low self-esteem can be described as being especially convinced of the cruel and uninteresting superego, or ‘negative self-talk’ in cognitive terms.</p><p>A cognitive approach will indeed be to challenge these thoughts. Find out if they’re really true, if they’re saying something that stands up to scrutiny, both about yourself and the world. If you tell yourself that you’re a loser or a dolt because you haven’t been able to make friends in the new city you’ve moved to, you might ask yourself if four months is a reasonable amount of time to make friends; or if you’re entirely a loser or doltish because of this one very particular area of struggling. If mindfulness interests you, you might practice lovingkindness meditation every day. I think these are all very fine and very useful things to do when you encounter your own superego’s nasty onslaught. But the question, for me, remains unanswered of why it’s so easy for some people to fall prey to the sales pitch of their superego.</p><p>Does feeling bad about oneself come first, and self-lacerations are ways to justify it? Or do we lacerate ourselves and then feel bad as a result? Either way, they almost always go hand in hand. The formation of the ways that we talk to (and believe the way that we talk to) ourselves might be useful here.</p><p>As I mentioned, I believe the problems of low self-esteem ultimately come from the superego. And the superego is produced during the oedipal drama. It is easy to assume from some of Freud’s writings on the topic that the superego is the identification with the father in an effort to secure the mother’s love. And when that project fails, we’re simply left with the old habit of our old man’s superego.</p><p>But in <em>Twenty-First Century Psychoanalysis</em>, Tom Svolos points to something else happening in its formation: “… at the end of the story, the Father never lives up to this Real Father. The Father is not the Imaginary phallus for the mother either. He is fallen as well — fallen from some ideal. And that Ideal, which is the origin of the superego, is something regarding which the child reproaches not only itself, but also the Father — for failing. And, for Lacan, this is linked to hatred, the most basic hatred, of myself and of this Imaginary Father, and further for God himself, for handling this all so badly…”</p><p>In this reading, it isn’t that we simply identify directly with the father in order to get the mother. What happens first, with the child as witness, is that the father himself cannot identify with ‘the Imaginary phallus’ which will finally grant him complete access to the mother and her enigmatic desire. The falling out — in a rather Biblical sense, I should say — of one version of the father from the other then creates all kinds of feelings like hatred. And it makes the child (by now soon entering adolescence) quite fed up with everyone in charge! First the Father, then even God, have managed royally to make a mess of everything. But — and this is crucial — that doesn’t stop the child from holding onto the ideal that both God and the father fell from: and this is the site of the superego. The ideal which is quickly uprooted from any actual interpersonal drama is identified with, and it becomes this floating talking head, criticizing us, pointing out all the ways that we, too, have fallen. Unfortunately, it remembers the hatred the child once felt towards the failed father, and the humiliation inherent in the paternal relationship. Perhaps this is why, as people get older, they watch sometimes with horror and frustration at their aging and frail parents, seeing all of their faults in the broad daylight. Once, after my grandfather passed, my mother said to me, “I think it’s more difficult on the grandchildren. For us, the idealization has already fallen away, and we were prepared for this.”</p><p>The ‘handling this all so badly’ that we resent in our fathers is internalized, identified with. People who claim to have low or poor self-esteem could also say of themselves that they tend to handle things very badly. But compared to who? Who is handling these things well? And is the person referring to the actual situation they profess to be handling badly or is it a stand-in for the original failure of the father and the domain of the superego? Lacan said somewhere that neurosis starts three generations back.</p><p>If it this is the case — that the ‘real situation’ actually lies elsewhere (at the failure of the father) and the current situation ‘handled poorly’ is only a substitute — then cognitive-behavioral therapy might not be so far off the mark with its idea that one of the ways to help out with low self-esteem is to make sure we’re identifying the correct or accurate situation. The way that psychoanalysis deals with this problem is to continually confront and point out the lack in the father to loosen up the grip of its sway over the patient in order to make more room for their own evaluations — for conscience.</p><h4><em>Rumination, Conscience, and Desire</em></h4><p>Low self-esteem is found everywhere. It crawls around our planet like a new plague. But very low self-esteem — a crippling version of it — is found mostly in depression. In some sense depression could be seen as a relentlessly critical autobiographical process. The relentless part of it is often called rumination, the mulling over and fixation on a few phrases over and over and over.</p><p>As Adam Phillips points out in <em>Unforbidden Pleasures</em>, one of the great comforts of self-criticism (and of rumination) is to give people a sense of certainty, a closed set of outcomes from any future situation or interpretation of a past situation. The process of rumination is painful, but it does have its benefits — hence why so many people are drawn to it, unconsciously or not.</p><p>One of the things we want regarding the self is certainty and constancy. But every other year another philosopher, neuroscientist, or other thinker reminds us of this fallacy: that self-certainty is a myth.</p><p>In some sense, then, rumination is the support for self-esteem: it ensures that we buy into a single reading of ourselves, however painful, boring, or inconvenient. Sometimes, I think we might be better off getting rid of the whole idea of self-esteem altogether. Typically, the move from low self-esteem is to want higher or better self-esteem. Does that just mean better or more positive ruminations? If that’s the case, are we still not opting to close ourselves off to ourselves? Any kind of rumination entraps us, entangles desire, and constipates conscience, which requires room to be uncertain to be truly conscience.</p><p>Depression is another way of saying that one’s desire has left the world, retreated to somewhere inside of us and hides away — it has shriveled up to almost nothing. And it is rumination which is the voice of this. The superego (the fallen ideal of the father) is excellent at snuffing out desire, interest, and curiosity. And of this uncomfortable dialogue between the two (desire and the superego), we get rumination, reminding us why and how to be obedient to the endless demands we have put upon ourselves.</p><p>I began with the curious idea that self-esteem is something one can have, that it is a fixed entity which is present or absent. Against the etymology of ‘esteem’ — which has an active, evaluating, in short, verb-like quality — our popular usage of this idea is a noun. However, I am not so sure this is the best way of thinking about or talking about self-esteem. It’s made up of how we talk to ourselves, in which we are both the active speaker and the passive recipient, and how our desire and conscience interact with our superego.</p><p>Ultimately, I find the idea to be clunky when used in isolation or as a possession. I think that it should be elaborated and explored and even deconstructed. It, like other psychological ideas, tends to collapse the active (and passive) parts of ourselves into one homogenous part: self-esteem.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.etymonline.com/word/esteem">https://www.etymonline.com/word/esteem</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGxS_5A46_4&amp;ab_channel=DonCarveth">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGxS_5A46_4&amp;ab_channel=DonCarveth</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=713614b96f05" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Vision, Nature, and Goodness]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/vision-nature-and-goodness-4c8d0061cd9b?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[lord-of-the-rings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[morality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tolkien]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-earth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2025 13:50:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-23T13:50:55.030Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>In Tolkien and Elsewhere</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2rG0XcVwQfSrsc3l.jpg" /></figure><p>There have been a handful of moments in my brief life in which I am truly astonished by nature. Living in Colorado, it is quite easy to maintain a continuous relationship with the outdoors. Going backpacking or camping, hiking or climbing are the regular activities of my friends and family here. In many ways, living right next to the mountains is a gift. Most of the time when I am outside, I am simply outside. But, as I mentioned, sometimes it is truly astonishing.</p><p>When I think about those moments, I think usually of great vistas viewed from the top of a mountain, or magnificent skies. But also, what comes to mind are the smaller moments that I have always loved: finding a nice alcove of trees to camp in, the way small bugs and gnats flitter in the sunlight at the end of the day, a lovely river to put one’s feet in. Always, however, I notice that moments of deep appreciation for nature usually have to do with a view, an aesthetic. It is true that there is a lot that goes into that aesthetic: I can also smell the trees and hear the river, and my body had to climb or walk a great deal sometimes to get to those moments. But they all seem to culminate in sight, in <em>vision</em>.</p><p>It is perhaps no surprise, then, that we sometimes call the great people of this world visionaries — for they see something beyond that which the rest of us sees. Their visual horizon is larger, more comprehensive.</p><p>I asked a friend who moved to Colorado from New York City what the most significant difference was. He said that, in NYC, you simply don’t get the kind of great wide-open skies that you get in the West on a daily basis. Some may hate that wideness or be indifferent to it — but at least for my friend, it was chiefly the visual field that mattered most when comparing the two very different places. This wideness of the West, indeed, is the subject of a great many paintings of Western artists and Western films.</p><h4><em>A Terrible Gaze</em></h4><p>Tolkien, too, is very concerned with vision and its significance for our relationship with nature. Indeed, the spouse of the chief Valar Manwë, Varda, is blessed with endless eyesight. And, indeed, the great Enemy of <em>The Lord of the Rings </em>is embodied only as a horrible eye atop a tall tower. Sight is also deeply entangled with the <em>palantíri</em>, which gives men both the ability to see and be seen by powers beyond their own.</p><p>But how does Tolkien think of vision in relation to nature? The kinship is deep, right from the beginning. When learning of the Valar and their tasks or domains in the world in the <em>Valaquenta</em>, we learn of Irmo that he is the “master of visions and dreams. In Lórien are his gardens in the land of the Valar, and they are the fairest of all places in the world, filled with many spirits.” Already we see a harmony between vision and nature. In Irmo’s lustrous gardens with many spirits, we find the one who oversees the domain of “visions and dreams.” And Irmo’s wife is Estë, who is the “healer of hurts and weariness… rest is her gift.” In Tolkien, we find that the Valar are paired together with good reason, very dissimilar from the Greek or Roman pantheon in which gods and goddesses seem to be governed by the laws of human passion more than divine reason, not unlike many reality TV dramas. Therefore, we can assume that the domains of Irmo and Estë are in deep harmony: gardens, rest, healing, respite from weariness, vision, and dreams. No wonder, then, I find small alcoves in the trees for camping so wonderful — for, according to the <em>Valaquenta</em>, all the beings who reside in Valinor come to their garden to be refreshed!</p><p>Lórien’s domain does not end with the divine beings in Valinor, however. In Middle-Earth, it is reflected in Lothlórien (or, Lórien for short), the forested domain of the Wood Elves, sentinels of the natural world.</p><p>But there is a different kind of vision in Tolkien’s work, a more malicious one. There is the specific gaze of the Enemy which permeates both <em>The Silmarillion </em>and <em>The Lord of the Rings</em>. Two elements embody this other kind of vision: Barad-dûr and the <em>palantíri</em>.</p><p>Barad-dûr is the tower of Sauron in Mordor, the point from which the Dark Lord rules over his cursed land and projects outward his dominating spirit. Atop the tower is the manifestation of Sauron’s eye which is revealed only rarely when the dark clouds of Mordor are parted. Tolkien does not elaborate on the nature of the eye or what it even looks like, but surely his brief description in <em>The Return of the King </em>should tell us its dark and shivering effects:</p><p>“…rising black, blacker and darker than the vast shades amid which it stood, the cruel pinnacles and iron crown of the topmost tower of Barad-dûr. One moment only it stared out, but as from some great window immeasurably high there stabbed northward a flame of red, the flicker of a piercing Eye; and then the shadows were furled again and the terrible vision was removed.”</p><p>The <em>palantíri</em>, also called the Seven Stones, are orb-like stones which grant the user a very peculiar kind of vision. Originally created by the Ñoldor, the stones ended up all over Middle-Earth by the Third Age (the years in which the stories of the trilogy took place). <em>Palantíri </em>means “far-seeing” in the original language in which they were crafted, and they allow communication and sight across vast distances. If one were to look into the stone from one side of the world, they could “see” what the other stone communicated at the other side of the world. Somehow — it is not explained to my knowledge — Sauron got hold of one of the Seven, and from there was able to see into the hearts and minds of many great people who desired infinite sight from their own <em>palantír. </em>For instance, Saruman’s fall began as an attempt to use the stone to see far and wide. In doing so, he was then subjected to Sauron’s malicious gaze whenever he interacted with the stone, which eroded and corrupted his mind over time. The same happened to Denethor, Lord of Gondor. But even Sauron could not master the capacity of the <em>palantíri</em>, and a “wiser” mind was able to penetrate into Sauron, driving fear into his heart and discovering his military plans. This someone, of course, is Aragorn.</p><p>So, in Tolkien, there is a strong kinship between the idea of vision, wisdom, nature, and goodness: in one’s vision, there are the other attributes. Or rather, wisdom, nature, and goodness are expressed in one’s vision. But what kind of vision is it that expresses these particular attributes? And what kind of vision is it that reveals and conveys the opposite qualities?</p><h4><em>The Machines of Mordor</em></h4><p>It would be difficult to doubt that nature is important to Tolkien. His books are filled with lustrous and wonderful descriptions of nature, sometimes winding for pages, vivid and full. Though Tolkien himself, philosophically appreciative of nature, was nothing like his friend CS Lewis, who would go on multi-day treks throughout the forest and meadows. But there was something else that he saw in the natural world which couldn’t help but grow through the very texts themselves.</p><p>Descriptions of the weapons and techniques of Sauron within <em>The Lord of the Rings </em>evoke images of an industrial, steam- and coal-powered city. The land of Mordor itself is always shrouded in dark clouds overhead, and we even find some startling descriptions of the weapons of the Enemy as mechanistic and as machinery. In the Battle of the Pelennor fields, we encounter some of the ‘war-machines’ in the form of catapults which launch flaming stones and other such devices. But in <em>The Hobbit</em>, we read:</p><p>“It is not unlikely that they [the goblins] invented some of the machines that have since troubled the world, especially the ingenious devices for killing large numbers of people at once, for wheels and engines and explosions always delighted them, and also not working with their own hands more than they could help; but in those days and those wild parts they had not advanced (as it is called) so far.”</p><p>In Middle-Earth during the events of the Third Age, equivalent to feudal and antiquity ages in Europe, these descriptions are surprising. Tolkien himself was rather concerned about England’s increasing reliance on technology and machinery and their capacity to erode more traditional and hand-based trades and local crafts.</p><p>There is something which happens to people when they use machines. It changes their relationship to their craft. Even now, typing this out on a computer has a different effect than writing with pen and paper. There is a level of mediation which is added to our relationship with our labor which changes the labor on three levels: on the outcome, on the process, and on the laborer.</p><p>I am interested chiefly in the third: How does machinery change the user? At the very least it alters the perceptions, how the task or object is perceived by the user. Let us begin where Tolkien did — with vision. How does vision change in this relationship?</p><p>Vision is deeply connected, as we noted above, to both morality (goodness and badness) and nature. Specifically, it is a certain <em>kind </em>of perception that determines the rest of the qualities. For the Valar and Elves, for instance, sight is largely expansive, associated with the good, and with an appreciation for the natural world. It rests upon the world as it gazes out. It lets be, it desires a harmonious and interdependent relationship with it. It is in no rush. Like Josef Pieper’s concept of <em>Ratio </em>in his 1952 essay “Leisure”: it “has an element of the non-active, purely receptive seeing.”</p><p>On the other hand, we have the vision of Mordor, associated with machinery and badness, corruption and smoke. Throughout the various texts of Middle-Earth, we find that Morgoth and Sauron and the whole of ‘the Enemy’ are after one thing: domination. The entire quest of the Fellowship, from the beginning, has been propelled by the destruction of the “One Ring to rule them all,” the ring crafted by Sauron to enslave and exert mastery over the rest.</p><h4><em>Constricted Vision</em></h4><p>However tempting it might be to jump too far ahead and associate machinery with malicious vision, this comparison does not fair very well in Tolkien’s world. In a wonderful essay by Gwyneth Hood, she notes that all people in Middle-Earth have some kind of relationship with technology.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> The Elves, which have come to be associated with naturalistic ways of life — utopian to a fault — have a relationship to technology which Hood calls “angelic”. These techniques of life (for what else is technology?) are suited for their environments: forests and other floral arrangements which are paradisal which have goodness built into them. Elves, we might say, needn’t try too hard to stay on the good side of nature. The cards are stacked in their favor. The forests in which they live brim and grow with goodness, harmony, and peace. Technology, then, is conservative. It is an attempt to keep things as they are, to displace as little as possible. They have crafted rafts which can navigate rivers themselves, cloaks which blend into their surroundings, or small breads which do not lose their nutrients. Their technology — their machinery — reflects the philosophy of Mosscap in Becky Chambers’ <em>A Prayer for the Crown-Shy</em>: if it can be readily taken up back into the earth again, it is natural.</p><p>We also should consider the Hobbits! Though they use their technology is a less-than-naturalistic way than the Elves (for instance, digging large holes in the earth, farming and gardening, hunting, and so on), we are not yet at a vision of nature which demands the kind of relationship to machinery that Sauron displays. Hobbits are content with trowels and shovels, small workshops, and other pastoral equipment. Even still, Humans have a different relationship with technology. Because of the ‘gift of freedom’ given to them by Ilúvatar, Humans are always out of step with the natural world, with the rhythm of forests and plains and seasons. To survive in a disjointed world, they needed to be creative, to innovate and make the world a place they might find hospitable. Is their manipulation of nature ‘bad’?</p><p>All of this is to say that Tolkien is not simply an anti-technological reactionary. His approach to these questions and issues is a little more complicated. And so, therefore, is the meaning of sight and vision in his writing.</p><p>It is not until we get to Melkor in <em>The Silmarillion </em>and the Sauron-Saruman duet in the trilogy that we find a more explicit exploration of these themes. For instance, the invention of dragons by Melkor in the Second Age. Evil, in The Legendarium, cannot create or even sub-create (those roles are reserved for Ilúvatar and his creations, respectively). Dragons, and Ringwraiths and Orcs, were brought about through corruption: through taking something already existing (such as Great Eagles for Dragons or Elves for Orcs) and perverting their inherently good nature. In <em>The Two Towers</em>, Saruman catches the rage of the Ents — otherwise peaceful denizens of the forest — because his industrial-like ambitions breeding new versions of Orcs are requiring more land, water, and resources of the forest, driven “obsessed with what he sees as progress.”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>This is a primary concern of Tolkien, too, in his essay “On Fairy Stories”. There is the Primary World (that which we live in, created by God) and there are Secondary Worlds (those worlds which we sub-create, created by us). The one is the derivative of the other, reflecting different aspects of it but never taking its place. In <em>The Silmarillion </em>we find only one other attempt of a being to <em>create</em>: Aulë, unable to wait for the coming of Elves and Men, creates the Dwarves. He is rebuked by Ilúvatar, repents, and offers his creation to Ilúvatar himself.</p><p>Every creation after that is merely a sub-creative act. And the sub-creative acts of Melkor, Sauron, and Saruman are all uniquely perverse in that they do not bring anything <em>new </em>into this world: they take what is there and pervert it. Their vision is tainted by something black and terrible, corruptive and corruptible. This vision seeks, above all, domination. But domination without substance, without anything addition to offer, and so it must take what exists and try to make it its own.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Hood, G. (1993). “Nature and Technology: Angelic and Sacrificial Strategies in Tolkien’s <em>The Lord of the Rings</em>.” <em>Mythlore</em> <em>19</em>(4).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Łaszkiewicz, W. (2017). “Into the Wild Woods: On the Significance of Trees and Forests in Fantasy Fiction”. <em>Mythlore, 36</em>(1).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c8d0061cd9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Too Much Feeling: Affect and Addiction]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/too-much-feeling-affect-and-addiction-23ff680cd929?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/23ff680cd929</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[affect]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[addiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychotherapy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[substance-abuse]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 15:08:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-12T15:08:41.824Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*RZQCoZaLp1JRtMpP.jpg" /><figcaption>Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, “The Hangover” (1887–1889)</figcaption></figure><h4><em>Pain and Repetition</em></h4><p>There is a level of affect, or emotion, which is tolerable; and there is a level of affect which is intolerable. Intolerable affect may feel like panic, or a shaking of the body, or a sense of going crazy. It’s intolerable because the person experiencing it feels compelled to do something with it, or to do away with it completely. Trying to stabilize oneself with soft verbal reassurances like “It’s going to be okay” or “This will end soon” do nothing to quell the anxiety which inevitably accompanies such affective avalanches. In fact, at some point it is difficult to tell whether the original emotion was anxiety or something else, like anger or fear.</p><p>How and why do our minds and bodies produce something which those very same minds and bodies find toxic? This is a troubling issue for philosophers and psychologists and a deeply disturbing conundrum for the individual who experiences this. It would not surprise me that, if interviewed, everyone can be said to have experienced this disturbed state at some point or other. At the peak of a roller coaster, during a break-up or loss of a loved one, on a bad psychedelic trip, and so on. But there are many people who unfortunately experience this kind of thing regularly.</p><p>Freud wrote that trauma is something which exceeds the organism’s capacity to make sense of it in the surreal 1920 text <em>Beyond the Pleasure Principle</em>. This ‘overcoming’ of the organism is felt as anxiety which cannot be bound to the pleasure principle. Up until that point in the person’s history, he reasoned, every experience or idea was bound to some kind of pleasure, whether it was simply unpleasurable and should be ejected, or pleasurable and should be taken in. This is a primary process of thinking, one that originates in early childhood: good stays in, bad goes out. This is the meaning-making process of the archaic psyche.</p><p>But later in his work, Freud saw patients who returned from World War I with an entirely different kind of neurotic presentation, a different clinical picture. Those soldiers had seen and experienced things which fit neither into ‘pleasurable’ or ‘unpleasurable’. They had experienced the intolerable. And something painful would happen to these soldiers. They would have dreams about their harrowing memories. And though only a brief paragraph mentions ‘war neuroses’ or ‘traumatic neuroses’, the publications of Freud surrounding <em>Beyond </em>are indicative that something was deeply concerning his liberal worldview (e.g., “On Transience” in 1915 and “Thoughts for the Times on War and in Death” in the same year). In his previous theory of dreams in which a dream is a fulfillment of a wish, Freud was forced to argue that people wish for suffering, otherwise it must be admitted that dreams can do things other than wish. Another domain in which his new patients seemed somehow attached to their mental suffering was in transference, the affect the patient feels for the therapist. As Peter Gay, in his biography of Freud, writes: “In a perverse way, the act of repressing and the analysand’s resistance to undoing that repression obey the pleasure principle. Now, it is true that their analysts had enjoined them to speak freely of everything in order to make the unconscious conscious; but something more tormenting seemed to be in play here, a compulsion to repeat a painful experience.”</p><p>In this little text, <em>Beyond the Pleasure Principle</em>, we have the idea that people repeat things they desperately do not want to repeat. Why and how this happens is the subject of much psychoanalytic writing and debate, and they are strikingly similar to conversations of addiction, both the sufferers and the clinicians. These debates link the earlier idea that trauma is the overwhelming of the individual’s ability to assimilate stimuli with the compulsion to repeat.</p><h4><em>Representation and Assimilation</em></h4><p>When something happens to us, we try to make some kind of sense of it. Humans have been coming up with stories to explain the things we see out there in the world or inside of each other for as long as we have had possession of language. Gods of lightning, reincarnation, science and philosophy — these are all ways to make sense of our world. These practices put boundaries on what we see and hear, giving them intelligible contours. But there is a kind of experience which escapes the grasp of making sense.</p><p>In <em>Theaters of the Body</em>, Joyce McDougall writes that the origin of ‘psychosomatic’ complaints (bodily symptoms which have their origin in psychological experience) is a kind of primitive experience in a person’s life which gets stuck at the preverbal level. The relationship between the mother and child, McDougall tells us, is responsible for handling the affects that come and go for both parties. Other psychoanalysts have referred to this as ‘holding’: the mother must be able to hold her child and soothe them in the midst of even the greatest psychological turmoil. If this is not done, the child will leave their nascency with a certain attitude towards its own internal experiencing — namely, an attitude of fright and distrust. Alexithymia, a state of being in which a person cannot identify or name discrete emotions within themselves, is an example of one of the effects this might have later in life.</p><p>But whether or not we accept McDougall’s argument — and I think there is some worth in it — we have to make sense of those people who can’t make sense of their internal experiences. Whether the individual is alexithymic or suffers from gastro-intestinal complaints, they have learned to deal with the affect without language, without making sense of it. This is something McDougall calls ‘affect dispersal’ or ‘disaffectation’. In an individual who can sense and experience their affect without experiencing it as threatening or confusing, there are all kinds of things that can be done: talking about it, directing it elsewhere (e.g., sublimation), or simply ignoring it. But for the person who cannot sense the inner workings of their emotional life, these options are not available to them.</p><p>They need a solution which targets the body directly, because that’s where the pain is. If they go to a doctor, they might even see data come up on a graph or in a scan indicating an illness of organic origin. But medications don’t seem to help much, or if they do it is only temporary relief.</p><p>The idea of affect dispersal allows us to think of ways in which a person who cannot make sense of their emotions might <em>do something </em>with them. For, if they do nothing with them, their existence is threatened with unraveling at the seams. The emotion is too toxic, too immense, to go on existing. This is also partly why, during psychotherapy, a particular patient might be on the verge of a panic attack, or they may start shaking, when language gets too close to the feared experience.</p><h4><em>Addiction, Affect Dispersal, and Administration</em></h4><p>An excellent way to target the body directly, by ‘avoiding the Other’ as Rik Loose puts it in his <em>The Subject of Addiction</em>, is substances. The use of a substance has the amazing ability to bypass the need to put things into language, or to make sense of them, and therefore to understand them. To return to Freud’s point about trauma: the compulsion to repeat in this circumstance is the compulsion to use to keep the trauma and its associated affects at bay.</p><p>Addiction is therefore a kind of a psychic survival technique adopted by an individual for whom mental processing is not a viable option. For this person, emotion is dangerous, toxic, and disintegrative. It is not uncommon, during sessions with a certain kind of patient in recovery from a substance, for them to experience an unnamable affect — the closest representative affect is perhaps ‘anxiety’ — in early recovery without the supportive dispersal of the substance. The eruption of an affective state such as this is transitory, and how it is dealt with during the session depends on a number of factors, from the relationship of the therapist and the patient to the psychotherapeutic work has been done up until this point. An individual early in recovery should perhaps not be encouraged to experience or ‘work through’ the disturbing state. Some preliminary work can be helpful before this stage is encountered. Up until maintenance or sobriety, the substance has done this kind of work on their behalf, making a raw confrontation with affect unlikely and unstable.</p><p>Loose claims that this kind of mediation — from pure affect to dispersal via substance — is managed well during the throes of an addiction due to the almost direct impact the substance makes at the level of the body. This strategy, Loose claims, is an <em>administration </em>of soothing effects. ‘Administration’ because it surpasses the verbal processing which usually takes place in a psychological symptom.</p><p>The precise position that addiction takes in someone’s life is, certainly, singular in the sense that it can only make sense within the context of that life. The role of diagnosis in addiction is something I tried to cover in a previous essay, but something I will continue to explore.</p><p>For now, it is worth a brief summary of the role of affect in addiction that I traced here so far. There is a level of emotion that is felt as intolerable. There are a number of ways to phrase this metaphorically, from toxic to disintegrative experiences. This level of affect is registered at the level of the body (or, at least, it cannot and is not registered psychologically via language and psychic processing) and is therefore dealt with somatically with substances. Part of the work of psychotherapy with addiction, particularly with individuals in early recovery, is building a scaffolding of emotional stability to begin to confront these unnamable affects.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23ff680cd929" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Love and Technology]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/love-and-technology-80cfd20cd8e5?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80cfd20cd8e5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[modern-life]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[love]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alienation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 15:32:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-27T15:32:57.001Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*NxaOOlWFVEu-6IWA.jpg" /><figcaption>Rene Magritte, “The Lovers” (1928)</figcaption></figure><p>“Thus even love, which is the deification of persons, must become more impersonal every day.”</p><p>- Emerson, “Love”</p><p>I am told that some time far back in history people used to meet their beloved in person somewhere, at a bar perhaps, or the party of a friend of a friend. Some people today still commit to this way of finding love or finding their way to love.</p><p>But most people today find love elsewhere — namely, the internet. Apps deliver nameless and numberless and forgetful faces and profiles to swipe through, right from your toilet. You need not go anywhere, or spend any money, or be the face of rejection that, presumably, people were all the time back in those pre-internet mythological ages.</p><h4><em>The Internet and the Infinite</em></h4><p>Technology, as we all know, can do a great many things that are positive and helpful. It can bring people in contact with each other from around the world, give one almost unlimited access to a wealth of knowledge, and provide endless entertainment. Now, all of these benefits have their drawbacks, and they all have to do with the limitations of the human body and mind suddenly encountering a limitless space. What follows is often loneliness, confusion, and feeling overwhelmed. Attention spans are limited — anyone who works with or has children knows this — and there is a different kind of gaze that the child of today deploys in the world: a less expectant, more tired gaze. Bearing the burden of infinity is hard for the blossoming mind.</p><p>There is talk today from certain eccentric billionaires of building technology into the brain structure itself, but I wonder what kind of difference it would make for most of us, whose brains are already unalterably changed. Perhaps a more severe split between generations has not been opened in history. The smooth transition from generation to generation, parent to child, has been radically disrupted. And what appears in the space between the two? It seems that at least there is a perennial lack of misunderstanding and frustration. Communication seems almost impossible. Parents do not know the weight placed on a child’s mind after it has been exposed to more information than the brain can naturally digest; and the child would prefer a less demanding Other, like a screen, to the living curiosity of parents. An effective compromise is the famed screens at the dinner table at a restaurant. Both parties, to an extent, get what they want.</p><p>This constant confrontation with the internet and interface with technology has undoubtedly changed individuals and their society. Culture seems dispersed into the ether without any real substantial form of transmission, a way of giving one’s children what was given to oneself seems cut-off. Again, the bridge from generation to generation seems irrevocable. A cultural idea such as love is no exception.</p><h4><em>The Paradox of Love</em></h4><p>It should be understood that, from the outset, love is quite impossible. As Robert Solomon puts it in <em>About Love</em>, “the individual is the presupposition of love, and this independence is just what love wants to overcome and deny.” I think it would be a great shame to reflect nostalgically on the past and idealize it. Idealization always comes with devaluation on the other side. And love is, and has always been, difficult. Each age and culture present with different challenges and ways of understanding and navigating the experience of love, but I find it hard to believe one approach is ‘better’ than another. The lamentations of nostalgia from older generations falls on the deaf ears of the people who are actively falling in and out of love today.</p><p>Solomon calls love a ‘paradox’: an idea that is irresistible but impossible at the same time. But perhaps it is that only a philosopher could produce such a definition of love. For most of us, love is natural and organic, it makes perfect sense, and it’s just a matter of finding the ‘right’ partner, communicating in the ‘right’ way, and so on. But I suspect that most would side with Solomon on this. In fact, my wager is that a non-paradoxical idea of love is found only in movies and daydreams, and most people know it. There is a seemingly deep intuitive feeling people have which is articulated in Solomon, meaning that this may be an area of life where philosophy does seem rather close to the unexamined life.</p><p>Both irresistible and impossible, love — romantic love — is that nagging and persistent amazement we have in life towards another. We seek to maintain our individual sense of ourselves while also seeking to lose it with another who is seeking the same thing. A project destined for failure if there ever was one. And yet, we keep working on it and through it, as if failure itself is something we enjoy. But at what level do we enjoy this process? Certainly, it isn’t a conscious one (unless it is turned into a joke, then we can all recognize and see ourselves in the absurdity of love). The vicissitudes of love are sublimated, moved elsewhere, transformed, or forgotten.</p><p>Freud believed that love went through transformations all the time, that to find a ‘pure love’ was impossible, a romanticist’s or a medievalist’s fantasy. Because at a certain level, there was something terrible about loving someone. At the very least, it requires that one recognizes one’s lack of independence. Psychoanalysts that followed him — people like Melanie Klein and Margaret Mahler — found that children experience a sense of forlorn insecurity in the world. They’re utterly hopeless and helpless, flailing about trying to find some kind of semblance of motor coordination, unable to feed or wash themselves. Humans are unique in that regard, being always born too soon. So, the very first love we feel towards our caregivers is one of dependence, and dependence is always born from helplessness. We reach out to the other because we can’t stand to be abandoned to our own devices.</p><p>As we mature and become more capable, we don’t quite give this version of love up. It just gets shuffled around, ‘displaced’ as analysts call it. As Mark Epstein says in <em>Thoughts Without a </em>Thinker: there is an interminable gap between desire and satisfaction. What’s more, new kinds of love come about. The development of friendships, the discovery of the other sex, sibling relations, and puberty all bring about their own challenges and impossibilities of love. And this whole story of loving each other is founded upon the original model of the helpless child: propelled by inadequacy, we reach out to the other. This is Freud’s story of love. And he found that when he talked with his patients, they would reveal that quite a lot of their struggles in adulthood had a lot to do with those earlier loves.</p><p>The word “love” is therefore rather misleading. It signifies to most of us a moving towards something — the opposite of “hate”, which is usually the moving away from something. But don’t both experiences contain both meanings? If love is the paradox of irresistible and impossible, we could say that love moves us both towards and away from the object of our love. Or, in the language of psychologists, we are trapped in the war between separation and attachment. We’re always a bit ambivalent towards the beloved, not sure exactly what to make of them, and not sure exactly what they make of us. Love is always uncertain, never a fully settled question. The legal drapery of marriage and its veil of guarantee covers this fact over: love is unfinished business. It is unfinished because, as far as I know, no one had the perfect childhood and adolescence. Those basic problems of separation and attachment are problems we must work through (or rather, they will work through us) throughout our life. There are more and less comfortable ways to live with these insecurities, but there doesn’t seem to be a way to resolve them once and for all.</p><h4><em>Infinity and Finitude</em></h4><p>German idealists for a hundred or so years struggled with how the finite human being can have encounters with the infinity of God and the world. This is not an issue which has left our imagination since the idealists of the 18th and 19th centuries. In the movie <em>Her</em> (2013, directed by Spike Jonze), a man falls in love with an artificial intelligence. As Christine Rosen documents in <em>The Extinction of Experience</em>, this match-up is not entirely foreign to our own world. The AI entity, Samantha, reciprocates this love at first. In fact, it seems almost dependent on and slavish towards Theodore. It is enamored with his world and expresses pleasure and excitement to learn new things.</p><p>As the movie continues and their relationship develops, Samantha begins to take on more of a personality (you’ve seen glimpses of this if you’ve used the same OpenAI account since its inception) with tastes and preferences and grows in her — because “it” somehow doesn’t seem correct anymore in the film — adoration of Theodore. His adoration, in turn, grows as well for her. But the fundamental gap between the two lies in their different relationships to infinity. Theodore can only be in one place at one time. He is forced, like all mortals, to exist in the present. The present being defined by his bodily organs and his very limited mental capacities to think and perceive and feel. Samantha, on the other hand, is not constrained by such fleshy boundaries. She is able and interested in continual expansion. There are no borders of experience for her, and she can spend time with Theodore along with thousands of other sentient entities at the same time. She is never just “here” as Theodore is. She is always everywhere — or can choose to be if she would like.</p><p>How a finite being can love or think about love in a world which also contains infinity is not just interesting to consider for our interaction with artificial intelligence. It is interesting every time we access the internet or technology in order to communicate with our romantic interests. The pain in Theodore’s voice when Samantha tells him that she is never just in one place at one time — that is, with him wholly and completely — says that an essential ingredient for love, and especially for a loving relationship, is the capacity to be alone with each other.</p><p>Perhaps Theodore is being too naïve, too demanding of his beloved. Even if Samantha were a person just like him, her attention and desires would be fleeting and imperfectly organized. Is it impossible for us to expect our beloved to “be present” when they are with us — and are we always present with them? Certainly, most people would feel when their partner is significantly distracted: being on the phone at dinner, lost in thought when they are ‘listening’, daydreaming about a different life, and so on.</p><p>On the other hand, maybe, it is a matter of degrees. Theodore demands that Samantha be alone with him. But how can Samantha, an infinite being, have a moment of aloneness? It’s almost as if Theodore is demanding that the AI have some privacy for itself so that it can share that deep reserve with Theodore. In this sense, it less about the attention paid and focused desire and more about the existence of a private life shared with the other.</p><p>Perhaps Theodore’s infinity goes inward while Samantha’s extends outward. While she has access to every bit of knowledge and can actively synthesize new knowledge of the world, Theodore possesses a different kind of infinity: an inwardness. You can either share externality or internality. And these kinds of sharing are very different.</p><p>“Sharing” is a fascinating term here, because it is the usual phrase for when a post or video or moment of one’s life (digital or physical) is displayed to others. A person may share their life by posting an image taken from their birthday dinner with their friends: intimate lighting, a few happy friends around the table, the birthday poster in question in the middle, champagne all around. A person may also share someone else’s life or story by encountering that story on their feed and sharing that picture with someone else or even reposting it on their own page. This is a different kind of sharing, a more mediated one, because the source is twice removed.</p><h4><em>Private Lives</em></h4><p>The sharing of our private lives with our beloved is yet another degree of sharing. One in which two people at a single moment feel alone with each other. For this to happen, there must be physical and mental boundaries in both individuals. If there were no boundaries, there would be no privacy, no loneliness, and thus no sharing of the intimate kind practiced in a loving relationship. And Samantha, being an infinite being of artificial intelligence with access to everything that has ever been written or recorded and with the ability to infinitely synthesize these annals, has no boundaries. There is no ‘off’ button, and if there were, it might be morally suspicious if Theodore were to ask her to hit it, to be more human, more like the finite. She has no private life, no real inwardness that had can be held selfishly and given away only with a sense of great risk with the promise of a very different kind of relationship, one that melts the boundaries a little only between the two people in the small world they now share.</p><p>I think that if we ask the question of what technology has done to love, this may be a good place to start: with the erosion of privacy. When everything is out in the open like a patient on the surgery table, what is left to keep for, or from, the other? In more religious times this privacy would be concretized with something like chastity. And maybe it would be wrong and unhelpful to go around thinking of our private life that it must remain private else we compromise a potential relationship in the future with someone. So, we might take a different attitude towards our private life, one that finds it worth having, without the promise or guarantee of a better relationship down the road. An attitude which says that a private life that is inherently good to have and pleasurable to cultivate.</p><p>Of course, there is never a truly private life, one that is entirely removed from the external world and given entirely unto our self. This idea is reminiscent of the idea of a soul — but even that is known intimately by God. Or the “Self” in the language of Internal Family Systems. These ideas make us think that there is a part of us, deep down somewhere, which is untainted by the outside world — a kind of a libertarian ideal of a soul.</p><p>But psychoanalysis, among many other interesting methods, has revealed that even our most intimate parts were retrieved from somewhere and someone else. Our private life is deeply social. So, preserving our private lives does not mean to sequester them in a tower of isolation. There are different levels or modes of mediation. At one register, our private lives are always mediated by others. That’s how we get to have a private life in the first place. On another register, technological mediation is expanding that original mediation in both quantity and quality.</p><p>In <em>The Extinction of Human Experience</em>, Christine Rosen writes, “our acceptance of mediated pleasure brings with it a growing reluctance for and mistrust of undatabased experiences and an anxiety about things that haven’t been recommended, rated, or ranked by others.” In the technologically mediated world, our private pleasures become less trustworthy. From looking at reviews on Google for restaurants (i.e., “What does the Other recommend that would satisfy my stomach?”) to taking pictures of every trip we take (i.e., “How shall I display my enjoyment and adventure to the Other?”) to porn and dating (i.e., “What kind of relationship can the Other guarantee?”). In the form of questions, these experiences alter our relationship with our pleasures, romantic or otherwise.</p><p>But our relationship with our pleasures is not contained in the virtual world. It is not as if we have our virtual enjoyments and then our ‘real’ enjoyments. As our world becomes more mediated, we adapt our bodies and minds to become more mechanical. Watches track our steps and sleep, Google Maps determines our itinerary, and our workplaces are interested in observing heart rates and mood during the workday with post-human-type technology. What, then, happens to love?</p><h4><em>Mediation</em></h4><p>If we are becoming increasingly mechanical — and it is not the other way around — then we might expect that the constant viewing and consumption of technologically mediated romance and sexual pleasure becomes our new model for the real world. As Baudrillard famously argued in <em>Simulacra and Simulation</em>, the map becomes more real than the territory: sex is held up to the performance of mediated pleasures and found wanting.</p><p>But people have always had models of how to behave and what to feel. We are a mimicking animal, following those who came before us in more or less mediated ways. Hasn’t the map always come before the territory?</p><p>I think that when it comes to mediation, writers aren’t always clear. They talk about it as an either/or. Either reality is mediated or augmented, or it isn’t. And then we get multiple camps. First, it <em>is </em>mediated, and it always has been and always will be, and there’s no getting around it. This might be someone like Slavoj Žižek. Then, there are some who believe that mediation is something insidiously added onto reality, and we just need to get past it and back to some truer reality. Richard Dawkins would be a good representative of this idea. Someone like Foucault would say that there are different modes of social mediation in different historical moments. Then there are those like Christine Rosen who believe that life via technology is becoming increasingly mediated, but we can always try to slow it down and preserve something more authentic.</p><p>All of this is very interesting, but I think we would be helped if we could imagine different <em>kinds </em>of mediation rather than degrees of it. For instance, we can talk about social or ideological mediation, in which something of the political order is shaping our world of science, relations, and other concrete aspects of our existence. For the sake of the argument, I can rather agree with Žižek, who argues that it’s always been this way, and there is no unmediated or immediate access to reality. So those who complain, for instance, that “everything is political these days” are both missing the point and are spot on! Another kind of mediation might be epistemic as in Foucault’s work. This kind of mediation looks different from era to era, and different historical events or processes effect how and what we think we know and what we find valuable to know. I would like to preserve these senses of mediation as probable: that reality is always augmented by stories, ideas, and history.</p><p>On the other hand, there is a different kind of mediation: a physical one. Here we have something which actively changes the way we do something with our bodies and minds in the world. Technology is the most important form of this, and it dates back a long time. Since humans found out they could roast meat on fire to being able to instantaneously send a message across the globe and self-driving cars, technology has augmented how we relate physical reality. And for most of history, this change has been fairly slow, one thing cautiously and accidentally stumbling after another. It is only recently that the advancement of technology has seemed to outstrip our ability to comprehend it.</p><p>To borrow Rosen’s ideas again, we are getting very effective at outsourcing various aspects of our physical, relational, and emotional lives to something which is meant to handle those aspects without much effort or automatically. If our patience, emotions, space, hands, and memory are all outsourced to devices, why can’t love be?</p><h4><em>Loving Machines</em></h4><p>A young man watches TV after work on his couch and swipes through Tinder, Hinge, or Bumble. He goes through maybe dozens of people in the 20-minute show. Encountering dozens of people within a 20-minute frame with some kind of romantic intention is truly a remarkable thing in the history of humanity. It is getting easier and easier to come across the faces of more people every day than ever before, and easier to reject and be rejected.</p><p>Experience, Rosen tells us, is the combination of taking a risk and experimenting. Is going through a dating app an experience then? Or is it rather a necessary evil, the dark bog one must slog through in order to get to the final experience of love? When I talk to my friends around me, I get the sense that it is more often the latter. I think people don’t really like to feel like they are churning through the lives and faces of dozens or hundreds of forgetful people every week.</p><p>I met my long-term partner through Bumble. I remember the mechanics and feelings of going through that process. Though I may have reported to someone that swiping is a necessary evil, I think there was a part of me that enjoyed the process and the activity of it. It isn’t a comfortable realization, but perhaps it is more common than one expects. Phone apps in general are designed to colonize attention spans and ‘pleasure circuits’; they entrap the user in a small frame inside of which an entire world of limitlessness and liminality is happening. And so perhaps the enjoyment from a dating app comes not from its mechanical erasure of the other’s subjectivity, but with the mere erasure of boredom. The young man sitting on the couch — we’ve all been there — is bored even with the TV on. His fingers need to do something, his eyes need at least two things to dart back and forth between. And it is much easier to outsource that restlessness to the phone.</p><p>Though this may be the case, I wonder what other effects are caused from app-based match-making services. Of course, they all promise something. Hinge’s slogan is “Designed to be deleted” and Tinder’s is “It starts with a swipe.” The promise is that the user will find, through their particularly arranged algorithm, their best match.</p><p>Just like love, dating apps are riddled with a paradox. NPR’s Greg Rosalsky claimed in a 2024 article called “The dating app paradox”: “Dating apps are supposed to be matching lovebirds together, but once they do, the lovebirds fly away — and take their money with them.” There is a conflict on the business sides and mission statements of love apps. The question is: which one wins? Are dating apps so successful that they’re running themselves out of business because their match-making systems really do work? Or is the business-side winning out, and their match-making process designed to fail in order to keep their clients searching, tantalized by their mission statement? Of course, the presidents and marketing teams of the apps have, as Rosalsky quotes in his article, denied the latter, and have claimed that their business model is in complete harmony with their mission statement — therefore implying that the apps themselves are an unlimited resource, always renewing itself in complete sustainability.</p><p>The modern lover almost feels the need to be in the apps to find a romantic spark, some chemistry. Every day their Theodore-like bags of flesh are confronted with limitless potential fulfillment or utter disappointment. Algorithms manicure experience so it loses spontaneity and risk. Our culture is one which continuously praises options and equates having more options with being happier with those options — this is a fundamental presumption of our contemporary social coordinates. Almost every social decision we make is to expand our options because it is equated with inherent goodness. A nostalgic idealization of our parents’ dating is no good. We cannot take back the inventions of the 21st century, and too many of the adults of today have experienced a reluctant and unhappy but ‘committed’ relationship in their childhood home.</p><p>The very unique form of freedom which we find ourselves with today in the world of dating needs to be integrated into what we think we know and what we believe about human life — and even more important, it needs to be integrated into what kind of world we want in the future. Do we want a world like Theodore’s, in which love is completely outsourced? Perhaps there are other configurations in which love and technology are complimentary, or at least live harmoniously beside each other. A perfect integration of love and technology seems unlikely: one poses a vision of life which has no limits, and the other poses a vision which needs limits. It is an old problem in a new guise.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80cfd20cd8e5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How and Why We Change]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/how-and-why-we-change-2f63542f8024?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2f63542f8024</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychotherapy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[progress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2025 18:09:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-20T18:09:38.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TFYJZTab4faE46Db" /><figcaption>“The Ship of Theseus”</figcaption></figure><h4>Process and Product</h4><p>There are many ways to change. The model proposed by Darwin suggests that species change gradually over time to adapt to their environments, and for sometimes random reasons. Some political theorists, like Marx, teach that change is gradual until it isn’t, and then it becomes radical — but it’s always necessary. Paul changed from Saul after a rather explosive event which showed him the truth of the world. Nietzsche thought that everything, all the time, was changing, and nothing was solid or fixed.</p><p>So, there are a great number of ideas about change offered throughout the history of thought. Change has always been an important concept for peoples and cultures. In our culture, January represents a time of change or a time of newness — “New year, new me” and so on. Famously, people do not follow up on those early year commitments, but almost everyone still thinks it’s important to make them. Even the <em>promise </em>of change seems important to people, tantalizing and exciting. I recently read that people default on their New Year’s Resolutions within the month. There is something refreshing to throwing everything to the wind at the end of December and telling oneself that in just a few weeks, everything is going to change and restart for the better.</p><p>Psychotherapy offers another kind of change. Carl Rogers very astutely noted that the idea of ‘process’ is very important when considering change from a therapeutic perspective, or from the perspective of the psychotherapist. Patients want change quickly, and they want it guaranteed in the form of a ‘product’ — but therapists are willing to wait. Part of this, surely, is what is at stake for each party. For the patient, more time without change means more time in whatever kind of discomfort they’re living in. For the therapist, it could mean a more interesting case study or steadier income.</p><p>The product style of change says that there can be a state which is reached in which change is no longer needed. In other words, Nietzsche’s least favorite kind of change, and St. Paul’s chosen style.</p><p>The product style of change, many proclaim, is born from the market and all its promises (and perhaps we can dump New Year’s Resolutions inside the discount bin after Christmas shopping is over). But it can be sniffed out in history much further than the emergence of the modern market. For St. Paul, there was an end to the change, meaning that, in one sense, change was only a transitory stage or a moment, not something to relish in itself.</p><p>Sincerity has something to do with this as well, as does belief, both of which Sartre thought of as modes of bad faith. Sincerity means that one has proclaimed what one believes through and through. To do that, one must first have something solid and fixed to believe in in order to identify with it. But this betrays the essential thing about consciousness and human life: that there is no essence, nothing fixed and solid to stand upon. So, when a person is being sincere, they’re pretending that they’re not really human, but something else. Something which can be caught in a net of words and ideas, something which suspends for a moment the absolute nothingness that characterizes human reality, like an object, or a thing of any kind which doesn’t have the thing we call ‘consciousness’. Emerson, in a 1841 essay called “Circles” says that the only true sin is to limit oneself and others. (Interesting, I think, to note the religious language permeating both Sartre’s and Emerson’s critique of the soul.) In a similar way, Sartre argued that belief is always duplicitous: always involving more than one kind of thinking at a time. If someone says, “I believe in X”, they’re simultaneously distancing themselves from X. If we can <em>name </em>it, Sartre says, we can never be at one with it, never be reduced to it.</p><h4>God and Death</h4><p>I remember watching a conversation on YouTube a while back between two religious scholars. They were talking about the declining state of Christianity in the West. Without remembering the names of the people or the context, I recall one of them saying, regarding the medievals, that they didn’t properly believe in Christianity or God — it simply was their life, their reality. Or, as Coleridge puts it in the <em>Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em>: “Water, water everywhere, and not a drop to drink.” They didn’t exactly <em>believe </em>in God; it was unquestioned for them. (I was trying to think of an example for us ‘moderns’, but after a minute or so I realized that as soon as I think of an example, it ceases to be an example, because then it becomes a ‘belief’. This kind of shift, I suppose, is only available to thought after it happens, retrospectively.)</p><p>This is precisely what Sartre is talking about. If we can think about whatever we believe in in any way that’s conceptual, we lose the intimate connection with the object of belief.</p><p>So maybe St. Paul’s version of change looks different from ours in some kind of necessary way. Maybe he had access to a different kind of water than we do. Or is Sartre wrong? Can there really be a ‘fixed’ product at the end of a moment of change?</p><p>To return to Carl Rogers and the idea of processual change in psychotherapy: Rogers believed that not only was a state of complete and total fixedness impossible, but the very ideal of this state causes a lot suffering for people. It’s expecting that to be human is something different from what it is — that is, a dynamic state of constant flux and change. There is even quite a bit of literature to suggest that <em>hope </em>for change in a patient is one of the best predictors of positive outcomes of therapy. So perhaps something we can take away from this is that half of the work is letting go of the idea of a product state of change, a state when change is no longer needed, a final outcome. Or, to take the title of Adam Phillips’ book, <em>On Wanting to Change</em> is just as, or more, important than the actual change itself.</p><p>But if that’s all there is to getting the life we want to get (and clearly there are more things involved in that endeavor) regarding our attitude towards change, why and how do we stay so fixed on being fixed? There is something so obviously compelling about being done with change, as if we’ve done the work of change and have reached a point of perfection where one need not change anymore, where one is done with the process of change. Sartre would say this state is only accessible to God: where the “for-itself” is harmonized with the “in-itself”. God, he says, is the only being capable of achieving a state of completion. Well, that and death. For us mortals, we can achieve completion once we’re dead.</p><p>Outside of being God or being dead, is it possible to get to a point where change doesn’t happen anymore? Erik Erikson, the psychoanalyst, made a much-needed correction to early theories of development. Instead of stopping at age 6 or 12 or around thereabouts, he believed that development continues to happen until one’s death. And although he was still committed to a kind of progression or advancement (towards what?), he was at least considering people to be things of change, or processes in Rogers’ words, as long as they live.</p><p>This is a much more hopeful way to think about things than the kind of thinking which says we are who we are, and there’s nothing to be done about it.</p><h4>Who You Are: Becoming</h4><p>I always found the axiom to “become who you are” fascinating because it assumes that there is a “you” somewhere inside which is always there, and just requires the “other you” to step into it, to become it. It is a phrase which evokes fate, but a fate which is within, not without. Living according to one’s fate means finding one’s purpose and true nature in the stars, in a book, or among other (typically more authoritative) people. But becoming who one is assumes that all you must do is look within, like the protagonist in Coelho’s <em>The Alchemist</em>. On the other hand, if we think, like Rogers and others do, that “who you are” is precisely the process of “becoming”, we get a much different picture, one of constant change.</p><p>But if one never stops changing, who or what is the one that one really is?</p><p>Carl Rogers might urge us to think that who we ‘really’ are is pure change, pure dynamism, nothing fixed or settled at all. Becoming who we are then means that, at least at first, we must give up the idea of becoming who we are.</p><p>I think it’s a very open question as to who or what gives us the idea that humans are fixed beings, and their reasons for doing so are even more obscure. One idea is that we get this from our parents (which doesn’t solve much, because they also must get it from their parents <em>ad infinitum</em>, unless it is only the previous two generations in a massive conspiracy experimenting with future humanity). They have certain expectations of us — very often with good intentions — such as it being important to be reliable, to be trustworthy, to be a good worker and husband and wife and partner. And all of these things need at least a modicum of stability. In less favorable circumstances, they may instill in us that the world, ourselves, and even them are unsafe and dangerous, and we will do much better if we close down shop, shut ourselves off to the horrible things outside. A castle built on rock is more defensible than one built on, or made of, sand.</p><p>Another source of the idea of fixity is from Plato and the religious and philosophical ideas he inspired. He teaches us that we have a soul which is untouched by the world of appearances and changes, and we have to guard this soul against the world. Nietzsche famously hated Plato because he taught that the world was corrupt, and that we should save ourselves from it by denying it (though, of course, the Greek version of worldly denial looked a lot more like our modern version of indulging). The world and all of its falsehoods of change and instability is only useful insofar as it points to the world beyond. If we see an very symmetrical triangle in this world or have good friends, we can extrapolate that there is a more perfect, whole, and fixed ideal of it somewhere else, not accessible to us.</p><p>Perhaps another reason for our idea of fixedness is a sociological one: it is much easier to organize society when people know who they are and what role they fulfill in society. If I am always able to change and therefore doubt myself, who is to say that my roles are any more fixed than water? And if everyone does that, when will the trash be taken out, the taxes be done, and the houses be built? Perhaps, if one really realized that they are always changing and that who they really is up to them each moment, we’d all be too busy exploring ourselves and others and the world to commit to any kind of stable work. The French philosopher Louis Althusser wrote that this kind of messaging is transmitted to us through all of the “ideological” forms of social control like churches, schools, families, and workplaces. The idea that there are things to be done, and we’re the ones to have to do them doesn’t need the hard-handed fist of a dictator. Indeed, that often backfires. But if people are encouraged and taught rather than forced, anything is easier to swallow.</p><p>So, if the idea that we’re fixed and stable has a certain lineage, can it be undone — and what kind of life might we get if we undo it? Let’s start by reversing some of the effects we just considered.</p><p>First, we’d probably have different ideas of what a good person is. Stability and fixedness wouldn’t necessarily be the only things to consider when thinking about relationships, work, and life in general. Maybe boundaries would be more negotiable and up for discussion. As Adam Phillips might put it: the forbidden and unforbidden pleasures wouldn’t look so hard and fast. Perhaps even our gender and sexuality would be more of a question to be developed rather than a thing to be assumed. Curiosity, I think, wouldn’t feel like doubt anymore, but more like an invitation. But people would certainly be late more to meetings and reservations. And there would be always a residue of our former selves, so it would be quite painful at times to be caught between the fixed self and the unstable core of being.</p><p>Second, I wonder, along with Nietzsche, what ideas about life we would have if Plato never happened. If there was never a philosophy or worldview which believed the present, material world was nothing more than a mere distortion of some truer, more real world, my guess would be that we value the present world more. We wouldn’t have any idea that there is anything other than what we’ve got here before us. The change that we so clearly observe in everything around us (from melting candles to evolving personalities) would be taken as it is, and not as a progression <em>to something </em>or a degradation <em>away from something</em>, but simply life as it is: constant movement and change. Perhaps philosophy in general would look a little different as well, maybe something more like sketches of ideas, or aphorisms, or even a poem about an idea, instead of a systematic approach. People like Rudolf Carnap and other so-called positivists thought the role of philosophy is to deliver fixed, invariable meanings of words and ideas. But this is hard to square away when, in life, we rarely find that things lend themselves to this kind of thinking. Change has a stubborn tendency to resist stubbornness. This would, obviously, put science in a strange position, being the philosophy of predictability.</p><p>And then what if our cultural institutions never taught that we had to find our role within society and stick to it, or change it only with some narrow guardrails? From a bird’s eye view, society in general would look different. Adam Smith would never have written that the factory is efficient because every pin-maker has a different and minute role in the final product of the pin. I also wonder if advertising would be different. If, instead of a phone company celebrating the next addition, they would say, “Ah, well here’s another one. You can get it if you’d like, but your life will likely be no different than with the previous model.” In other words, if the very idea of ‘product’ will be let go of, and we might instead be less inclined to believe that whatever we buy will not afford us any more of the X factor thing we are looking for (happiness, sexiness, better relationships, more adventure, and so on). We would know that each thing is only another iteration, not some final stopgap in our ephemeral desire. It’s also interesting to think about what school and work might look like. Maybe we would be encouraged to do whatever we find interesting in that moment or era of our life instead of following the fixed track of English at 9:00 AM, Mathematics at 10:00 AM, Gym at 11:00 AM, and so on until 3:00 or 4:00 PM, Monday to Friday, January to May and then September to December. I would also think people would generally work less, and maybe they would work differently.</p><p>It’s interesting to imagine such changes to society at large, but we will never know what it might look like if everything were different. At the very least, it is inciteful to realize just how much of life and our ideas about life are informed by the idea of fixity and thingness. And how these ideas conflict with ideas of change. It is the process or product debate baked into our personal and social lives.</p><h4>The Illusion of Change</h4><p>When people go to the office of a psychotherapist, they expect a certain kind of change. There is hope that something will be different (and better) if one talks with this person and listens to what they have to say because, after all, they’re professional.</p><p>What kind of change a person expects from a therapist is always an open question, but one that is sometimes anxiety-producing to sustain for very long. Therapy is becoming more accessible, and so insurance companies are more likely to cover the services. And for those therapists who decide to accept this form of compensation, they have to do certain things to justify their services.</p><p>For instance, before the third session, the therapist is expected to provide a diagnosis and 6-month treatment plan with expected outcomes. But how, one could ask, could a therapist predict the change that will happen in six months?</p><p>There are many advantages to implementing scientific research into the discourse and practice of psychotherapy. It holds practitioners a little bit more accountable to each other and their patients. It bridges gaps in communication — which is usually a benefit no matter the outcome. It creates very interesting conversations about the role of knowledge and authority in both therapy and science. But one disadvantage, among others, is that it forces the psychotherapist to act <em>as if </em>change is predictable, and as if the individual encounter between this psychotherapist and this patient is scientific in the way that a research project is. As if this middle-aged Hispanic American patient with a mood disorder will respond positively to 3 months of cognitive therapy followed by two family sessions and then followed by two and a half months of humanistic therapy. But that would require both the therapist and the patient to decide from the first interaction what kind of person the patient is, and what kind of person they want to be.</p><p>This is on top of the very natural and very welcomed wish of the patient (and often the therapist) to want things to go a certain way from the outset. There is both a demand at the institutional level and the personal one, the microcosm of the consulting room. The anxiety produced says, “Be careful not to be surprised!” On the other hand, to be able to surprise oneself is a mark of mental health, according to Donald W. Winnicott, so it is rather striking that it is often what we try to avoid the most — even in psychotherapy.</p><p>Psychotherapy is a place that is built to welcome surprise into the room, and all the incumbent difficulties. Children learn very early to be wary of surprise. Surprise means unpredictability, and it is the exact opposite that children need from their caregivers. Consistent and devoted caregiving are really the only two requirements for raising a healthy child.</p><p>On the other hand, perhaps it is only the condition of the environment that needs to be consistent, which allows the child to experiment, hypothesize, change, and be surprised. If the caregiver is stable and consistent, as in John Bowlby’s work, then the child feels comfortable going out to explore the world and its own body. For change to happen, then, there needs to be an illusion of an unchanging base. Perhaps this is why people can surprise themselves in therapy, and why change is possible. The therapist is there, week after week, year after year, listening attentively and caring consistently about the patient. If he changes, he tries not to show it. But we know, both patients and therapists, that there really is something going on behind the scenes, that therapists get divorces, have children, struggle to pay rent, decide to change their hairstyle, and so on.</p><h4>Hope without Promise</h4><p>So, if change can’t be realistically expected from the outset (despite the demands of people and institutions), when can we be expected to know something about it? And the answer, “We will never know, let’s just talk and find out” is romantic — and there is indeed some truth to it — but for the person who is in the throws of addiction, depression, divorce, or other acute mental pain who is paying usually a good sum of money for the therapy, this answer is pithy and is unhopeful to them.</p><p>I believe that it is part of the therapist’s role to provide hope to people. Not in a eschatological way by promising or guaranteeing a certain kind of outcome, but in a more general way that evokes the positive change that usually occurs. And although the therapist’s very presence and consistency are a testament to that hopefulness, I think it should sometimes be articulated explicitly.</p><p>Hope for a positive change doesn’t give a direction for the change beyond allowing the patient to feel slightly better about their choice consulting a clinician rather than, say, holding it all in or making irreversible decisions to deal with the pain. It doesn’t forbid being surprised, in Winnicott’s terms, and it doesn’t fold the for-itself into the in-itself, in Sartre’s terms. Psychotherapy can be a practice of life, not of death, if it provides hope without promises.</p><p>But before being a practice of life, it is first an experiment in living, to borrow a phrase from Adam Phillips. It is the experiment of: If you say things without trying too hard to come of a certain way to another person, and that person tries to show you all the ways in which you’re stopping yourself from doing so, what might your life feel like? I am, of course, talking about psychoanalysis more than about cognitive or other kinds of therapies which encourage a certain kind of speaking.</p><p>Following the experiment model, though, it’s quite easy to see how one could surprise oneself. And this seems to me to be an essential step in change from the point of view of process. In fact, this seems to be an important lesson in the very act of process: I try to do this thing, something intervenes, I accept it openly as my own, and I keep along. In the opening to the beloved <em>The Hobbit</em>, Tolkien says of Bilbo Baggins:</p><p>“The Bagginses had lived in the neighborhood of The Hill for time out of mind, and people considered them very respectable, not only because most of them were rich, but also because they never had any adventures or did anything unexpected: you could tell what a Baggins would say on any question without the bother of asking him. This is a story of how a Baggins had an adventure, and found himself doing and saying things altogether unexpected.”</p><p>Without romanticizing psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general to the degree of high fantasy, it is curious to see the overlap between Tolkien’s description of Bilbo and observing how the rest of <em>The Hobbit </em>unfolds, and a particular case in psychotherapy. Bilbo needed to be brought out of his otherwise comfortable hole in the ground to do unexpected things. It is a risk to do such a thing. In Bilbo’s case, he is risking his life (and being late for dinner, a constant worry for him); in the case of entering a treatment of psychotherapy, one is risking familiar pain in the hopes of getting an unfamiliar, but better, pain.</p><p>Again, what this unfamiliar pain looks like cannot be promised from the get-go, from the consultation or the first few meetings (contra insurance companies). And I think most patients understand that too. I think that even in those cases where the patient explicitly demands outcomes, they too feel that this is a premature wish. This may have to do with the descending of the medical authority that therapists have made since Freud’s time. It may also have to do with people’s naturally playful inclination, as when a child asks its parents properly absurd and impossible questions and then doesn’t pay attention when the parent gives a response, thoughtful or not.</p><h4>The Ultimate Fact</h4><p>In the essay “Circles”, Emerson spends a great deal of time describing the coming and going of horizons of possibility for humans and culture, using a circle as a metaphor. The circle constantly expands, shifts, and encapsulates the old circle. “Every ultimate fact,” he tells us, “is only the first of a new series.” This remarkable line is everything we need to know about what Carl Rogers, Sartre, Nietzsche, and many others have thought about change through the perspective of a process. There is no ultimate fact, no final circle which keeps everything within it. It’s the human spirit, Emerson says, which is always pushing beyond such an encircling.</p><p>“Permanence is a word of degrees” — when we settle into something (a new role, an identity, a ‘cure’) we mistake it for permanence, and we’re afraid to lose it, or that changing will make us have to forsake this newfound permanence.</p><p>And who knows: Emerson and the others haven’t seen the end of time — no one has stepped outside of the ultimate circle of ‘being human’, so perhaps there is a true endpoint, an ultimate fact. But when we ask for change, in psychotherapy or love or with a new resolution, it might be easier to give up the idea of becoming who we are if the emphasis is on the “who we are” and not the verb “to become”.</p><p>We can view change in a number of different ways. We can think of change like St. Paul, a radical conversion into something new a final; or we can view it as a process, a question which is open and never ultimately settled. They each have their comforts and discomforts. The wager, at least at first, of psychotherapy is that if we suspend our investment in the first kind of change, a different and perhaps more enlivening kind of change will take place.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2f63542f8024" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Different Kind of Negation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/subject-reflection/a-different-kind-of-negation-21b4e9a691fa?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21b4e9a691fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lacan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[negation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alenka-zupancic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jan 2025 18:11:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-16T18:11:34.840Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In Search of Absence, Series 01 Session 03</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*U9cmMXMQRVYHGz6oPXM7Yw.png" /></figure><p>In our last discussion we began with the provocative statement by Bruce Fink who claims, following Freud, that the unconscious is the exact opposite of consciousness. This opened a discussion of negation more generally, and what ‘exact opposite’ could mean in this context. We looked at Badiou’s three forms of negation (classical, intuitionist, and paraconsistent) that might highlight Fink’s dubious statement, and it was left an open question whether the idea makes much sense or not from the perspective of logic. Here, I would like to spend some time getting more specific about the ontological status of the unconscious and what it means for the subject of psychoanalysis — the famous “split subject”, a subject torn between two kinds of being.</p><p>So, let’s begin with a few guiding questions:</p><p>1. What kind of negation is operative in the unconscious, and in what sense is the unconscious a negation of consciousness?</p><p>2. What is the primary status of loss or negation for the subject such that it produces the split subject?</p><p>I cannot promise that both questions will get adequate treatment here. But at least we can get a start somewhere for the purposes of our genealogy of nothingness from a psychoanalytical perspective. The hope is that these ideas will line up at some level with the philosophical ideas of Sartre, Badiou, and other philosophers concerned with metaphysics, ethics, and politics.</p><h4><em>The Not-Mother</em></h4><p>To answer our first question — what kind of negation is the unconscious? — we must answer our second. Because we cannot talk meaningfully about the kind of negation the unconscious is or does without assessing what psychoanalysis has to say about negation in general.</p><p>In <em>Seminar I</em>, Lacan says that “for repression to be possible, there must be a beyond of repression, something final, already primitively constituted, an initial nucleus of the repressed, which not only is unacknowledged, but which, for not being formulated, is literally <em>as if it didn’t exist</em>… it is the center of attraction, calling up all the subsequent repressions” (1991/1953–54, p. 43).</p><p>Lacan tells us that in Freud, from the beginning of analytic work, the concern of primal repression is evident. If repression is operative — and it clearly is — then there must be something which initially started the reign of repression in the subject, right? There must be a prototype of repression to get the whole chain started. And that is what is at issue for us here. (But so far, we can already mention a link to Sartre, who claims that, in the history of everything, the only proper event to have happened is the emergence of the for-itself, which happens all at once, not in a gradient or in stages.)</p><p>Alenka Zupančič wrote a brilliant commentary on Freud’s short essay “Negation” (1925). I will follow her argumentation here to sketch out the philosophical problems embedded in the psychoanalytic gesture of the negativity of the unconscious.</p><p>In “Negation”, Freud gives an example of a classic negation found in his clinic. The patient has a dream with a woman in it. When asked who the woman is, the patient cannot recall her identity, he doesn’t recognize it during his recollection to Freud. When asked if it might be his mother, the patient emphatically refused: “It is not mother.” Okay, so there is a negation: not-mother. But sometimes, it really was the mother in the dream, so the analyst might press on and get the patient to recognize the woman from the dream as, indeed, his mother. Another negation: “It is not not-mother.” This is very different, according to Zupančič, than saying “It is mother.” We are not moving from negation to a positing. We are moving from negation to negation of that negation. In other words, “We can accept the (repressed) content, eliminate it, but we cannot eliminate the structure of the gap, or crack, that generates it” (2012).</p><p>This is one reason why it is so difficult to speak of a ‘cure’ in psychoanalysis, because even if repression were removed in every dream, slip, or symptom presented to the clinician, the structure of the split, or fractured, psyche that makes us human itself cannot be removed, no matter how long the analysis is or how good the analyst is.</p><p>Thinking back to our discussion of logic and negation, we can say something more about the logical structure of the unconscious, and of the split subject. Zupančič clearly states that the logic presented in Freud’s paper is neither classical nor intuitionistic. A negation need not produce an affirmation; it might even produce a third term. Therefore, both the law of excluded middle and of non-contradiction have been violated. What then? With the concept of not-mother — i.e., negation of negation — we have to look for a model of negation which can account for this weird phenomenon that psychoanalysis discovered.</p><p>Zupančič asks this question in the following way: if there is a third which is produced in a negation (assuming no affirmative position follows), what is the nature of the third? “Is it something in between, a combination of two, a little bit of this and a little bit of that, a nuance with a certain degree of intensity? Or is it effectively something else (that is, precisely something “third”), with its own ontological status, even if the latter turns out to be very paradoxical? The discovery of the unconscious, and its real, brings forth the second possibility.”</p><p>In a strange way — and we’ll build this up here — we come back to a ‘paradoxical twist’ on classical logic.</p><p>In Freud’s “Negation” there is an interesting theory of the origin of the thinking subject in two steps. The first step is driven by the pleasure principle, and it dictates to the organism if something will be rejected (spit out; excluded) or accepted (taken in; included) based on how it feels. So, things that produce bad feelings are excluded, and things that produce good feelings are included. This is the first cut into the world of indifference, of objects without meaning or orientation.</p><p>But do we then have two different things (internal and external) after the work of the pleasure principle? Yes, but we also get a third thing: “1) affirmation (some positivity); 2) negation (absence, what is not); and 3) the <em>place</em>, or <em>locus</em>, of their difference” (Zupančič, 2012). In other words, we now have two elements which have been differentiated <em>as well as </em>the field or space in between them, which is not eradicated but sustained.</p><p>Within this movement, subjectivity emerges containing not only a negation (external or internal) but also the very form or structure of negativity as such, i.e., nothingness. This is why we cannot have merely a negation plain and simple, which is then supplanted by its opposite, the affirmation. Subjectivity is shot through with negativity <em>as such</em>. Sartre was on to something, then, when he claimed that human reality is fundamentally nothingness.</p><h4><em>The Stumbling of Speech</em></h4><p>So, to return to our first two questions above, we can provide an answer to the first one and a speculation about the second.</p><p>First, we can say that the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious is not a clear-cut affirmation/negation, but rather an affirmation+negation. In this case, we can have something like a not-mother, an entity which embodies both being <em>and </em>nothingness.</p><p>Second, what is true of the psyche that it can repeat repression as a mechanism? Zupančič (2012) very clearly states that “the inaugural ‘this is not mother’ contains a … dimension of truth; it indicates that whatever I can refind in reality <em>is never IT.</em>” The finding of an object is always a refinding because of the structural gap in subjectivity. What is true of the psyche is the <em>inaugural </em>negation — and we can think of every negation that comes after this as a repetition, a re-enactment, of this negation.</p><p>The tricky part — a frustrating part for me when researching this — is that we can’t directly get at this inaugural negation, or fundamental nothingness. Philosophers and psychoanalytic theorists have many ways of saying this, from the for-itself’s inability to found itself to primal repression to the effects of the signifier and finally to Zupančič’s statement that we can never really find <em>IT</em>. There’s a gaping hole in between the tools of these fields and the things which ground them, leaving the pursuit, to an extent, a bit futile. We encountered this in Sartre in the first essay: namely, while he is fantastic at describing the effects of nothingness and the dynamics of how it works, he cannot give an account for where it comes from. This is a difficulty which will run through our exploration of nothingness — and not without good reason!</p><p>The difficulty — and maybe the impossibility — of giving a solid and fundamental account of primary nothingness reveals the concept of nothingness as much as any great formulation of nothingness and its effects. The effect is similar to looking directly at a star in the night sky rather than looking just to the side of it. When you look at it straight on, it disappears; but when you look just to the side of it, you can see it shimmering in the corner of your eye.</p><p>The search for the ultimate gesture of nothingness is like the patient entering analysis looking to unravel her entire life, to get at the “core” of everything. But this never happens for structural reasons: nothingness is <em>not being</em>, it is not a <em>thing</em> — so it cannot be grabbed to held or discovered or mastered. The limitations of our method say something about the concept we are looking for. To use a phrase in our later essays, what is unsayable is doing a lot of work.</p><p>This is perhaps the main reason that Rudolf Carnap’s (1931) strict requirements for a concept in philosophy fall short here and why something like psychoanalysis and Peter Rollins’ methods may be more fruitful. Both methods recognize the ultimate impossibility of nothingness and are more invested in examining its effects, implications, and ethics.</p><p>This aporia opens a few lines of investigation. From the basic impossibility introduced into subjectivity by this nothingness, existentialist thinkers have argued that we enter the very human realm of anxiety, anguish, or desire. This kind of thinking is found in Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Kojève, and others. We can also get from subjectivity to ontology, from the human to reality. Zupančič’s essay begins to breach this area, for instance, by asking what the ontological implications of this ‘inaugural negation’ might be. Additionally, we can also get to a kind of mysticism by the attempt to position oneself ethically to the absolute nothingness (e.g., in negative or apophatic theology). All these positions are important and interesting to pursue, and I plan on tackling these issues in following essays. But more immediately, we must take up Lacan’s quote from the beginning of the present piece: “[the nothingness] is the center of attraction, calling up all the subsequent repressions”. What does this mean for a psychoanalytic practice? What kind of relationship can the subject assume in relation to negation, both structural and particular? This is the topic of the next essay.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>A. Zupančič, “Not-Mother: On Freud’s Verneinung” (2012).</p><p>J. Lacan, <em>Seminar I: Freud’s Papers on Technique</em> (1991/1953–54).</p><p>S. Freud, “Negation” (1925).</p><p>R. Carnap, “Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” (1931).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21b4e9a691fa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/subject-reflection/a-different-kind-of-negation-21b4e9a691fa">A Different Kind of Negation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/subject-reflection">Subject/Reflection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Many Logics of Negation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/subject-reflection/the-many-logics-of-negation-63608a519649?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63608a519649</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychoanalysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sartre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[alain-badiou]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Dec 2024 23:51:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-31T23:51:30.531Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>In Search of Absence, </strong>Series 01 Session 02</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*U9cmMXMQRVYHGz6oPXM7Yw.png" /></figure><p><em>Unconscious Negation: Freud</em></p><p>In his <em>Clinical Introduction to Freud</em>, Bruce Finks makes the strange claim that, for Freud, the unconscious is the <em>exact opposite </em>of the conscious. This opposition immediately suggests negation. The thesis (consciousness) is negated in the antithesis (unconsciousness). They exist contemporaneously, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes painfully, alongside one another, one two separate ‘tracks’ of the mind. So, the story goes for those in the Freudo-Lacanian camp.</p><p>For Freud (and Lacan, following Freud, which we will discuss later), the unconscious is, as Fink says, the <em>exact opposite </em>of consciousness. We need to spend some time picking this apart.</p><p>For one thing, we cannot say that the unconscious is underneath or behind consciousness. That would give it a more thing-like positioning within psychic life. Rather, we must try to conceive of the unconscious without reifying it. One way to do this is through the idea that the unconscious is that which is the negating factor <em>within </em>consciousness. So, in this theory, we aren’t conscious <em>and </em>unconscious — we are always both, and it’s strictly impossible to separate the two. But what kind of negation does psychoanalysis make with the concept of the <em>un-</em>conscious? To really make sense of how the negation of the Freudian unconscious operates, we must take a detour through logic.</p><p><em>The Logic of Negation: Badiou</em><a href="#_ftn1"><strong><em>[1]</em></strong></a></p><p>In traditional logic, something is either P or not-P. But how and why is P “not equal” to not-P? Or, as Alain Badiou puts it, regarding political enemies, “the difficult question is the relationship between the two, particularly when the relationship is clear” (2008). Another way to frame this question, a way that is more aligned to our overarching project of nothingness is: what is true or necessary of P that it cannot be not-P, and that’s the relationship between the two — and there’s a host of possible solutions to this problem.</p><p>In a 2008 address to a symposium on law, Alain Badiou gave what is known as the “Three Negations”. In it, he proposes three forms that negation can take, depending on the logical framework one is leaning on.</p><p>First, there is the classical logic of Aristotle. Classical logic relies on two basic rules: the law of non-contradiction (LNC) and the law of excluded middle (LEM). In LNC, the basic negation of P is not-P (e.g., this thing is either blue or it’s not blue). So, we can say that not-P is a negation of P, and vice versa. In other words, things are self-identical, and they have a differential relationship with other things. In LEM, there is no ‘between’ or ‘third option’ to P and not-P. At the most minute levels of measurement, there is no fluidity between two things (we will see later how important this is for Sartre), and in every proposition <em>either </em>P or not-P is true. An example of classical logic would be war, in which the success of one entity or nation is the direct negation of the other’s success. In other words, “When both LNC and LEM hold, the negation is total; there are no stray elements of P in non-P” (Vartabedian, 2018).</p><p>Next, we have intuitionist logic, which does follow LNC but does not follow LEM: meaning that there can be an indeterminate number of multiples. In classical logic, the quantity and quality of things in any given set or group is limited by the fact that (a) objects cannot contradict, and (b) that there is no ‘in-between’, or gradient. Theoretically, under classical logic, we as humans could give a name and measure everything that exists because there is no slippage of things. Thus, negation would look different in an intuitionist program. Instead of the absolute/binary negation in classical logic, we find the requirement to always qualify P or not-P. For instance, in the field of law, Badiou holds that we don’t have just “innocent” and “guilty” as possible truths of a given proposition. Instead, we could have “innocent because certainly guilty, but without sufficient proof” or “guilty but then later turns out to be innocent” — the possible truths are almost infinite. As we can see, negation within intuitionist logic is much closer to the kind of negation we might experience in our ‘regular’ or ‘everyday’ life: yes, there is truth and falsehood, but things in the middle are always messy. Importantly, for intuitionist logic, there needs to be <em>absence of proof </em>in order to claim something is true or false, positive or negative. So, the conclusion to a line of argumentation might very well be not-P, but it is incumbent upon the thinking subject to show exactly how and why it therefore cannot be P. What this does to negation and nothingness is move it to the domain of dynamism and openness, rather than the closed absolutism of classical logic.</p><p>So far, we have logical systems which hold to the notion that both P and not-P cannot be true — up until this point, the Law of Noncontradiction, first formulated by Aristotle, reigns supreme. But this is suspended in the third and final logical system Badiou investigates in “The Three Negations”: paraconsistent logic. In a paraconsistent system, the Law of the Excluded Middle becomes the arbiter of truth, while LNC is suspended. In a paraconsistent system, there is the possibility that both P and not-P are true, but only insofar as our mode of knowing the truth or falsity may be the thing that’s in the wrong. So, paraconsistent logic doesn’t throw away the problem of contradiction altogether, it only “demands attention to the context(s) in which these competing claims are asserted” (Vartabedian, 2018). For instance, take the assumption that “it is raining”. To the classical logician this is either true or not — either “it is raining” or “it is not raining”. But also suppose you’re in an environment with microclimates, like the city where it rains on one side of the street and not the other. Considering the larger context, it is both true that <em>in this city </em>“it is raining” <em>and </em>“it is not raining”. However, if we narrow our focus on blocks, we cannot say the same thing. Instead, we must say that <em>on this block </em>“it is raining” <em>or </em>“it is not raining”. Negation, in paraconsistent logic, is thus open to the interpretation of the person examining the proposition.</p><p>Badiou assigns these negative logics to his ontology, which is useful for us to an extent:</p><p>1. The ontology of <em>being</em>, which is the theory of things in the world at a fundamental level of multiplicity, is governed by classical logic. In being, either a thing is this or its that, but it’s not both, and there’s no third option. Badiou calls this a strong negation.</p><p>2. The ontology of <em>appearance </em>and <em>existence </em>operates according to intuitionist negation. In appearance/existence, a thing is either this or that, or else may other things, but these things can’t possible contradict one another. In this, we find a weaker negation (it isn’t so absolute).</p><p>3. The ontology of <em>event</em> or <em>truth</em>, which arises when the law or order is transgressed, opening up the <em>possibility </em>of a new order. The event can actually take place in any of the three logical contexts with different effects. In classical logic, it is revolutionary and truly subversive, because it entirely negates the previous order; in intuitionist logic, the negation is softer and is the emergent truth is subsumed or substituted; in a paraconsistent system, the event loses all of its potentiality, as everything is potentially identical to everything else.</p><p><em>Little Pools of Negativity: Sartre</em></p><p>We established in the previous session that in <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, Sartre does not give an ontological or fundamental account of nothingness in the sense of it coming from somewhere outside of the human subject. Nothingness, for Sartre, is born from and through subjectivity — and particularly the freedom of the human subject. That is, we encounter negation in the world because the consciousness of the human subject is marked by a structure of non-being, of absence.</p><p>We encounter <em>negatities</em>, which Sarah Richmond identifies as ‘little pools of negativity’ in the world. These little pools of negativity that we encounter — feeling the presence of a lost loved one, alienation, the present moment, and so on — are possible because of the non-being of the subject.</p><p>But how exactly does our non-being produce these little pools of negativity, these moments of lack? Sartre also develops his own theory of logic and negation which we can look at with fresh eyes following Badiou’s “The Three Negations”. Sartre identifies internal negation and external negation as the mechanisms which govern the relationship between objects and subjects.</p><p>An external negation is very simple: this is not that; or, something is P or not-P. It doesn’t take much to see the debt Sartre owes to classical logic for this form of negation. External negation is an absolute negation of fixed things in the world, and is used to examine the relationship between an in-itself and another in-itself. So, we could say that this car is not that dog (comparing a particular thing to a particular thing). We could also say that dogs aren’t cats (comparing two universal things), or even that this watch is not a car (comparing a particular and a universal thing). No matter the quantity or quality of what is positive and what is negative, for Sartre, external negation uses classical logic. Importantly, in external negation, the connection is “an ideal and categorical connection that I [as witness] establish between them, without modifying them in any respect, without enriching or impoverishing them with the slightest quality” (B&amp;N 249). The essences of the two, in their relation to each other, remain undisturbed.</p><p>Internal negation is more slippery, because it comes into play when we introduce subjectivity. Subjectivity, as we know, Sartre calls the for-itself and it is radically different from the category of the in-itself. (We might even say that this very categorization of the absolute difference is something of a classical logic, P or not-P, which earns Sartre the shameful title “dualist” from many other philosophers.) When it comes to negation, the distinguishing factor between the for-itself and the in-itself is that while the latter has negation built into it (the difference between dog and cat are measurable and observable), consciousness is negation <em>itself</em>, and so must do the work of negating things which it is not. Properly speaking, consciousness is nothing, so it can’t be directly compared to one thing or another, as each category is operating in a different field: each, to use our earlier vocabulary, has a different logical system. The for-itself, or consciousness, is always in the process of saying “No, I am not that” but is never able to arrive at a final identity which it can definitely say it <em>is</em>. This is essence of Sartre’s highly dynamic view of consciousness. It can never be pinned down, isolated, and compared in some final sense. Consciousness is always uneasy, never at home with itself or in the world. It is the very act of this constant negating which both gives consciousness its unique character among entities in the world.</p><p>Additionally, an internal negation produces something positive about the subject. If I say “I am not wealthy,” I might say it with a certain melancholy, or I am imply that I am instead financially middle class or poor. With external negation, we don’t really have negation proper: we have two assertions of positivity and difference. In internal negation — which is introduced only qua subjectivity — we get real negation. “The fruit is rotten” or “My uncle is a grinch” introduces nothingness into those beings. The being can’t help but be altered by negation.</p><p><em>Badiou and Sartre, and the Unconscious</em></p><p>To return to our question at the beginning of this essay: what does it mean to say that the unconscious is the negation of consciousness, or that it is the <em>exact opposite </em>of consciousness?</p><p>The Badiouan response would be that the unconscious is a kind of classical negation. It is an absolute negation of some positive entity. There is no in-between (unless we account for Freud’s early conception of the ‘preconscious’, which most contemporary scholars don’t much care for) and there is no third option, some kind of supra-conscious or spiritual-consciousness. A thought is either conscious or it is unconscious.</p><p>However, there are many moments in psychoanalytic theory and practice which reveal something more slippery and transitional than what Fink portrays as the unconscious. For instance, the bisexuality of all people (Freud), the transitional object (Winnicott), the co-existence of love and hate (Klein). These ideas are all situated more comfortably within intuitionist logic, which allows for a negation (all of these are <em>un</em>-conscious) but which also makes room for gray areas.</p><p>These ideas and their logical structure will be explored in more detail in the coming essays.</p><p>But something must be said about the Freudian divided psyche: the unconscious co-exists with the conscious and has effects on it. We <em>know </em>that we forget the name of a person or that a joke contains something distasteful. We know that, during analysis, we sometimes encounter an impasse in our speech but can’t account for why. We might say that the relation is a kind of internal negation, wherein the negation of the one actively changes the nature of the other.</p><p>Consciousness and the unconscious are dependent upon each other for Freud and psychoanalysis. You cannot have one without the other, and this is especially important when considering the singularity of a specific case.</p><p>What this also means is that we need to account for the kind of relationship that consciousness has to the unconscious, it’s direct and influential negation, and for this we need to think about repression, displacement, disavowal, and other mechanisms of psychic negation.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> I am indebted to a talk that Sawyer Macres gave in Denver at a psychoanalytic seminar for pointing to the connections between Aristotle, Badiou, and psychoanalysis.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>A. Badiou, “Three Negations” (2008)</p><p>B. Fink, <em>Clinical Introduction to Freud </em>(2017)</p><p>B. Vartabedian, “Negation, Structure, and Transformation: Alain Badiou and the New Metaphysics” (2018)</p><p>J. P. Sartre, <em>Being and Nothingness </em>(1943) (abbreviated ‘B&amp;N’)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63608a519649" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/subject-reflection/the-many-logics-of-negation-63608a519649">The Many Logics of Negation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/subject-reflection">Subject/Reflection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Like a Worm Inside Being]]></title>
            <link>https://sjcarroll14.medium.com/like-a-worm-inside-being-298e2b12495f?source=rss-5566f6ddcd50------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/298e2b12495f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[existentialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sartre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phenomenology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[S. J. Carroll]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 09:53:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-12T09:53:15.568Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*U9cmMXMQRVYHGz6oPXM7Yw.png" /></figure><p><strong>In Search of Absence, </strong>Series 01 Session 01</p><p>In <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, Jean-Paul Sartre opens with a question, a question very similar to the one we will continue to pose and re-evaluate throughout this series: Is nothingness inherent in being, or a mistake in judgement? And where does it come from? Let’s use a slightly revised example he gives to illustrate the problem:</p><p>Suppose you’ve agreed to meet Paul at the bar at 7:00 PM. You’re 15 minutes late, and Paul is usually on time for meetings, so you expect to see him there. But when you arrive at a quarter after 7, you look around and immediately don’t see Paul. The whole environment of the bar is a bit different from normal. You still see all the same barstools, regulars, the same music is still playing, and so on. But now, something is crucially different. Everything is the same <em>and — Paul is not here. </em>Everything you briefly intuited then quietly settles into the background of the scene, almost as if it’s all pointing towards one thing: Paul’s absence.</p><p>In this scenario, we can all agree that the most important thing in our consciousness at the time is Paul’s absence. But what are we to do with this absence? Everything about the problem of nothingness is tied into this wonderful example.</p><p>We could, for instance, say that Paul isn’t <em>absent</em>, he’s simply <em>somewhere else</em>. In this sense, there is no nothing to talk about — it’s all still positivity, the fullness of being, it’s just that the matter is rearranged in a different way, a way that doesn’t meet our expectations. So, is nothingness then just a matter of our expectations? Or is it intelligible to talk about a more fundamental or basic non-being that’s built into the very being of the situation of Paul’s not-being-here? And, if we can only talk about nothingness as a purely subjective, human-level experience, what allows us to bring nothingness into perception? For example, if we can <em>see color</em>, there must be <em>light waves which produce the color we see</em>. Is there a nothingness in the structure of reality that we simply <em>perceive</em> when we notice that Paul is absent from the bar, or is something humans uniquely introduce into reality? These are questions Sartre tries to answer in the first sections of <em>Being and Nothingness</em>.</p><p>First, a formula: “negation is a refusal of existence” (B&amp;N: 43). This means that first, there is a thing which is posited: I expect Paul at the bar at 7:00 PM. Then, this being is refused, or negated: I arrive at the bar (late) and find that Paul is not here.</p><p>There were a lot of habitual assumptions which were broken here. Me and Paul agreed on <em>this </em>bar, at <em>this </em>time, in which both of us were going to show up to have a drink. I am a quarter-hour late. Paul is not here. In other words, “it must separate us from this wall of positivity enclosing us” (B&amp;N: 43). His absence breaks the continuity of the habit of meeting people at bars that we’ve come to know. We can also think of those famous examples of people who lose their spouse but hear their footsteps or voices in the hallways of their house. Nothingness, in other words, <em>haunts </em>being. As he famously claims: “it is right inside being, in its heart, like a worm” (B&amp;N: 57).</p><p>Even though Sartre rejects the hypotheses that nothingness is introduced from outside of being or some virtual reality, he needs to establish that non-being has an origin, that it comes from somewhere. He needs, therefore, to account for the “lived experience of nothingness … [which] is characterized by self-estrangement and self-deception” (Kirkpatrick 2017). But at the same time, we cannot deduce nothingness <em>from </em>being — at least, not “being” as is traditionally understood, i.e., as a world of things. For us to experience Paul as absent from the bar, there needs to be a structure of being which we manifest in our experience of his absence.</p><p><strong>The Origin of Negation</strong></p><p>Sartre launches on three questions which are fundamental to his philosophical intervention and we will look at them here.</p><p>First, what is the origin of nothingness? Human beings, in their process of questioning themselves, open at least one way through which non-being comes into the world. The question — and the ability to question — are key points for Sartre. If a being can question itself, it is at once removed from itself. This is why he can claim later that belief is already non-belief. If belief is supposed to be a worldview or entire commitment to an idea, then the fact that we can name it means we’ve moved beyond it — we are no longer ensconced in it. In the words of Coleridge, “Water, water everywhere, and not a drop to drink.” We must therefore say that the human being for whom its own being is in question. This is a radically different kind of being from a table or a dog, whose being is not in question — they are always within the limits of being-a-table or being-a-dog. They do not experience doubt or self-awareness (or, at least, theirs is a different kind than that of the human’s).</p><p>Second, what is true for the human being that nothingness is possible through it? Human beings are characterized by freedom. This freedom is an essential part of Sartre’s concrete philosophy which is worked out in part four of <em>Being and Nothingness</em>, but to give a workable summary: humans are allowed to transcend or overcome their basic facts of life given the context in which they exist. For instance, two people may approach a boulder. One person sees it as in his way, as he needs to get through the boulder to continue his hike, so he finds a way to work around it. The other person has found exactly what he’s looking for and gets ready to start climbing. Same facticity, different intentions. This is the essence of Sartrean freedom. Although it is often confused with free will, Sartre is very clear on his disdain for theories of the latter.</p><p>Third, what is the structure of human freedom that nothingness comes through it? An essential aspect of Sartre’s conception of freedom is temporality: “Therefore any psychological process of nihilation implies a break between the immediate psychological past and the present. This break is, precisely, nothingness” (B&amp;N: 64). He will later call this ‘break’ the <em>act </em>of the human subject.</p><p><strong>Nothingness and Human Reality: Freedom</strong></p><p>But let’s pick up this question of nothingness and freedom in earnest. We need to ask what the structure of human reality apropos freedom is that we get something like a negation, or a refusal, of being. Remember, we sought this question out because Sartre shows us that we experience nothingness, e.g., in the form of Paul not being at the bar, and we can’t account for the origin of this experience through the simple fact of being itself.</p><p>This is where Sartre’s famous distinction between being-in-itself (<em>en soi</em>) and being-for-itself (<em>pour soi</em>) comes into play. Being in-itself, in its full positivity, cannot produce nothingness. But we know that nothingness exists, because we have <em>lived experience </em>of it. So, Sartre splits being in two, and introduces human reality, or consciousness, as a cleavage within being through which non-being is born. Kirkpatrick (2017) astutely points out that Sartre is aligned with St. Augustine on this point: through humans, sin is brought into the world, and sin is nothing but the absence of being. (This is a point we’ll take up in the series of negative theology.)</p><p><em>Being and Nothingness </em>gives us a vision of human beings characterized by non-being. In fact, one could say that the model of the subject portrayed within the text is one which <em>is nothing</em> — human reality is fundamentally non-being, i.e., freedom. Though I don’t want to reduce Sartre to his historical circumstances, I do think that one of the effects of writing a phenomenology of nothingness during the Nazi occupation of Paris influences his readiness to jump to freedom in his definition of nothingness.</p><p>Freedom is not something which is gained or acquired in addition to being a human, it is built into humanity itself: “I am condemned to be free” (B&amp;N: 577). This is one of the reasons why Sartre rejects the absolutist version of free will — if we did indeed have absolute free will, one could will oneself to be un-free. But this is not the case if freedom is equivalent to non-being, because there is a forbidding threshold in between being and non-being, or the in-itself and the for-itself, a threshold he calls an “absolute event”.</p><p><strong>On Not Fitting In</strong></p><p>If we are always free and always non-being, we never quite fit in anywhere. Sartre’s theory of the subject is simultaneously one of too-littleness and too-muchness. Subjectivity is too little because it lacks the same kind of substantiality that characterizes the in-itself. It is too much because this always decenters the for-itself, never allowing it to comfortably fit into its surroundings. A good example of this is bad faith. The subject is living in bad faith when it comes to identify itself with a concrete, or fixed, structure — i.e., when it mistakes itself to be an in-itself. In this case the subject is fleeing from its own freedom. But at the same time, the subject can never fully be identified with what it is at any given time: the waiter is always more and less than just a waiter. He is also a man, an American, a spouse, and a father.</p><p>The subject-as-nothingness makes it so that no factual situation can ever encompass what it is, because “it is not what it is and is what it is not”. The subject of the conscious human being cannot <em>just be</em> what it ‘is’. Just being what one is means one can be at-one or self-identical. But how can nothingness be self-identical?</p><p>For instance, if one is sincere, then we take this to mean that they mean what they say or that they are acting in accordance with what they really believe. But there will always remain a gap between what one thinks and what one is, or one’s consciousness and how one behaves. And this gap is structural, it is not a problem of epistemology or ethics. No matter how much one tries to be honest and sincere by aligning their words with their actions, they will never quite fit into the mold of their own ideal. Man is the only creature, says Sartre, which tries to be God.</p><p>The account to which Sartre gives of the fundamental structure of freedom, its ontological origins, is ultimately “dissatisfying” and needs a mediation through a “(broadly) Augustinian anthropology of fallenness” (Kirkpatrick 2017: 169). We will return to St. Augustin in the next series on theology, but it is important to note this limitation of Sartre’s atheistic existentialist project of nothingness. He isn’t able to give an answer to the final question he posed above: what is the nature of human freedom that produces nothingness? He is only able to say, somewhat circularly: nothingness is human freedom.</p><p><strong>A Helpful Tautology</strong></p><p>Nothingness : freedom :: freedom : nothingness.</p><p>This is the kind of definition that would drive Rudolf Carnap mad, but we shouldn’t dismiss it for this reason. In <em>Being and Nothingness </em>Sartre raises the fundamental question for the theorists of nothingness: is it <em>out there </em>in the world? Or is it the product of human reality? If it’s the former, how does it translate to the latter, and if it’s the latter, what is the foundation of it? As a phenomenologist, perhaps Sartre can safely avoid the question by claiming to be studying subjectivity, not ontology — but ultimately, he does flail about ontology quite a bit in B&amp;N.</p><p>Three points that Sartre brings up we need to hold on to in particular:</p><p>1. That the nothingness of subjectivity makes it so that humans never fully fit into their world, place, or time. Self-estrangement is not an effect of capitalism, toxic relationships, or racism, though all of these forms of estrangement exacerbate the more fundamental alienation. It is virtually built into subjectivity.</p><p>2. Subjects try to avoid their nothingness by adopting certain behaviors or modes of being which shield or disguise the non-being within. These ‘defense mechanisms’ are ubiquitous, and central to social life, but they are always a response to the anxiety/anguish which freedom qua nothingness engenders.</p><p>3. Negation/non-being/nothingness is a phenomenological or subjective experience, not something to be located in “reality itself.” Although Sartre doesn’t claim this outright in B&amp;N, it is his failure to demonstrate it that we will take up in later essays, particularly the final series on the ontology of nothingness.</p><p>In a way, Sartre is doing what C.S. Lewis says of some forms of ‘realism’: “Suppose this happened, how interesting, how moving, the consequences would be! Listen. It would be like this.” (Lewis, 1961). From nothingness we get anguish, bad faith, negatities, alienation, and so on — but questioning the postulate, Lewis tells us, would be a misunderstanding of the project. This is both the limitation and brilliance of Sartre’s existentialism of nothingness.</p><p>References</p><p>K. Kirkpatrick, <em>Sartre on Sin </em>(2017)</p><p>C. S. Lewis, <em>Experiment in Criticism </em>(1961)</p><p>J. P. Sartre, <em>Being and Nothingness </em>(1943) (abbreviated ‘B&amp;N’)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=298e2b12495f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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