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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Akinola selim  on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Akinola selim  on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Akinola selim  on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[SIEM Deployment Part 2: Adding Telemetry, Simulating Attacks and Performing Investigation in Wazuh]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/siem-deployment-part-2-adding-telemetry-simulating-attacks-and-performing-investigation-in-wazuh-c6f436973c74?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c6f436973c74</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detection-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 01:03:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T01:03:21.099Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>During the first part of this project, I set up my home lab and installed the Wazuh server and agents on my machines:<br><a href="https://medium.com/@skizzydera/siem-deployment-wazuh-server-and-agent-installation-on-ubuntu-server-kali-and-windows-10-machines-7f0ba6cccf96"> https://medium.com/@skizzydera/siem-deployment-wazuh-server-and-agent-installation-on-ubuntu-server-kali-and-windows-10-machines-7f0ba6cccf96</a></p><p>Cybersecurity telemetry is the automated, continuous collection and transmission of raw activity data from digital systems to a central location for real-time monitoring and threat analysis</p><p>Having a SIEM tool with no proper telemetry is of really no use.</p><p>Tools like Auditd and sysmon can enrich our SIEM with adequate telemetry.</p><p>Auditd~ Auditd is a Linux tool designed for monitoring and recording system events to provide a comprehensive audit trail of user activities, system changes, and security access.</p><p>Wazuh documentation on installing Auditd ~ <a href="https://wazuh.com/blog/monitoring-root-actions-on-linux-using-auditd-and-wazuh/">https://wazuh.com/blog/monitoring-root-actions-on-linux-using-auditd-and-wazuh/</a></p><pre>Auditd installation</pre><pre><br><br>apt-get install auditd audispd-plugins<br><br></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lyLphvO1G9z0DWu1JT4x0g.png" /></figure><p>Starting Auditd</p><pre>systemctl enable auditd.service &amp;&amp; systemctl start auditd.service</pre><p>Auditd Rule.</p><p>By default, Auditd doesn’t log much unless specified using rules</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-LxX2c0-9kveb4EIDDxp1g.png" /><figcaption>The rule makes auditd log every command that runs on the Kali machine to the SIEM tool.</figcaption></figure><p>Configuration file</p><p>Adding Auditd to the Wazuh agent configuration file so the Auditd logs are forwarded to Wazuh.</p><p>The Wazuh configuration file is located at:</p><pre>/var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf</pre><p>Add this to the configuration file.</p><pre>&lt;localfile&gt;<br>&lt;log_format&gt;audit&lt;/log_format&gt;<br>&lt;location&gt;/var/log/audit/audit.log&lt;/location&gt;<br>&lt;/localfile&gt;</pre><p>Restart the wazuh Agent and checking the status</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m9Q7e5367ao7O5Um4iHJgA.png" /></figure><p>Sysmon ~ <em>System Monitor</em> (<em>Sysmon</em>) is a Windows system service and device driver that, once installed on a system, remains resident across system reboots to monitor and log system activity to the Windows event log.</p><p>Wazuh documentation on the installation of Sysmon:<a href="https://wazuh.com/blog/using-wazuh-to-monitor-sysmon-events/"> https://wazuh.com/blog/using-wazuh-to-monitor-sysmon-events/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KvAKcrE47j1KsyoFpF-gpg.png" /><figcaption>Download link: <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon">https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon</a></figcaption></figure><p>Installing Sysmon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G_n_hpDIWy-Lo0IdgkYtgw.png" /></figure><p>Sysmon is installed along with a configuration file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_EBNFhXyi9Pv9Zy71xWy4Q.png" /></figure><p>Configuration files</p><p>Adding sysmon to wazuh agent configuration file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*92ld4uSVMjnZxZB564VcUQ.png" /></figure><p>Restarting and checking the Wazuh agent status.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tcyPpkL8iKVaF28k3vXMoQ.png" /></figure><p>Confirming the installation of Sysmon from the dashboard.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Af4ZZatyNGkvw3EayvhXVA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4rGGQeNGJz3e-3UukPVntg.png" /></figure><p>This confirms that Sysmon logs are available on the SIEM.</p><p>Simulating an Attack on Windows Endpoint.</p><p>Failed login attempts on windows using powershell</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Wd-MamQB8UMzqbVSJcbcww.png" /></figure><p>Investigating on the wazuh dashboard under the windows endpoint and Authentication failure, we can see our simulated traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DcnJ_SdBUJ9Hrulyyp77tg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aXcFYlYi1lQaSk36zlbqXQ.png" /></figure><p>Further investigation of the logs shows that they were generated from the Windows Security log with an event ID of 4625, which signifies a failed logon event.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yMi7wOw5C9aAWwWA6fiSWw.png" /></figure><p>Simulating an Attack on kali-linux machine</p><p>Failed login attempts</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*krX6x_V7z3IiPgNzB46zdg.png" /></figure><p>The Dashboard provides us with logs of the failed authentication.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bPZ9xKMg10AoXsvuB5jn6w.png" /></figure><p>The Event section provides information on the logs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ud5WGc2Akei2er-F3qCjtQ.png" /></figure><p>Investigation of one of the Authentication events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b8Jcem1cHuxRGS2RY8pPRg.png" /></figure><p>We can see some eye-catching field such as the full logs and the rule groups</p><p>Summary</p><p>In this part, I added telemetry to the lab. I installed auditd on the Kali machine and Sysmon on the Windows machine, and forwarded their logs to Wazuh through the agent configuration files.</p><p>To test it, I simulated failed logins on both machines, and Wazuh picked them up and raised alerts. On Windows, it was Event ID 4625 and “Multiple Windows Logon Failures”. On Kali, it was “unix_chkpwd: Password check failed”.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>A SIEM is of little use without proper telemetry. With auditd and Sysmon in place, the lab now collects the detailed activity needed to detect and investigate suspicious behavior.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6f436973c74" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SIEM Deployment: Wazuh Server and Agent Installation on Ubuntu Server, Kali and Windows 10 Machines.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/siem-deployment-wazuh-server-and-agent-installation-on-ubuntu-server-kali-and-windows-10-machines-7f0ba6cccf96?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7f0ba6cccf96</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blueteamlabs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 22:42:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-01T22:42:35.930Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is more than necessary to have a centralized view and monitoring of your organization’s environment to be proactive in threat hunting and threat modelling. A SIEM tool provides us with these capabilities.</p><p>Why Wazuh?</p><p>Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. It is capable of protecting workloads across on-premises, virtualized, containerized, and cloud-based environments.</p><p><strong>LAB ARCHITECTURE</strong></p><p>The lab contains two Virtual machines and a host machine.</p><ul><li>Windows 10 Enterprise as the workstation and forensics lab.</li><li>Ubuntu server 24.0.4 as the wazuh server[containing dashboard,indexer and the server]</li><li>Kali host machine as the security workstation</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KkuzSeoZ23Gvj67oYiGn3g.png" /></figure><p>Network Setup: Vboxnet0(192.168.56.0/24)</p><p>The VMs and the host machine were connected in a host-only configuration to make sure that all the machines in the lab could reach each other.</p><p>The ubuntu server was also configured with a NAT network adapter to allow for the installation of the wazuh</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_tZ7w2PD7GI85tQ74xZbSg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Wazuh installation</strong></p><p>The wazuh dashboard,indexer and server are all installed on the ubuntu virtual machine</p><ol><li>SSH into the Ubuntu server from my Kali machine.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H_7Z9L7piKD8S9QC0FdqBw.png" /></figure><p>2. Running the command for installing the wazuh.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gs-d6E6KyMlzOgAQtqAYNQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>The installation failed twice. The first time, the Wazuh manager timed out while starting, and the second time, the indexer timed out.</li><li>Fix: I increased the service start timeout (TimeoutStartSec) for both the manager and the indexer, added a 4 GB swap file to help with low memory, and cleaned up the leftover files from the failed attempts.</li><li>The third attempt was completed successfully.</li></ul><p>4. Logging in to the dashboard at<a href="https://192.168.56.102/"> https://192.168.56.102</a>.</p><p>Installing Wazuh was a bit frustrating because of the amount of time it took to completely download and the amount of RAM it takes.</p><p>After the installation was completed successfully, a username and password were given for the dashboard</p><p><strong>Wazuh dashboard.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WbcT2RAW3rySePr7zb0rfg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D2Q2XMqRQFCSnRmPA41tlA.png" /></figure><p>5. Deploying the Wazuh agent on my Kali Linux machine.</p><p>Downloading a Wazuh agent is mostly done on the dashboard, where you select your operating system type and receive a command you can use to download the agent.</p><p>Select your operating system type.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PiC5oFH170O-4DBQDfhNhQ.png" /></figure><p>Fill in your wazuh server ip address, pick an appropriate Agent name and you then receive a command for the agent installation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*71xX2CejN_PXeIHXjRNwYg.png" /></figure><p>Running the command and starting the wazuh agent on the kali host machine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a6sNhNZDMxhfZ0jLGEutUw.png" /></figure><p>You can verify the installation of the agent from the wazuh dashboard.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rhkql7IOkenNJyHTFPfaIg.png" /></figure><p>6. Deploying wazuh agent on the windows 10 workstations</p><p>This follows mainly the same steps as the installation of wazuh agent on Linux Operating system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fEi-BurkLPUpNhvJX5os2w.png" /></figure><p>A powershell command will be given for the agent installation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1LCK0vspll3QJw5SOkGqew.png" /></figure><p>Checking the dashboard you can verify both the windows agent and kali agent.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AODopLJZGT2je64zliY4vg.png" /></figure><p>After installation of both the server and the agents I took a snapshot of both operating systems.</p><p>Windows 10 snapshot</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HHpty1lwwQ10VZFnPguLDQ.png" /></figure><p>Ubuntu snapshot</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v1BHUHUFA_6c_Vml4la3KA.png" /></figure><p>Summary</p><p>In this lab, I deployed Wazuh as a SIEM on an Ubuntu Server 24.04.5 virtual machine, with the dashboard, indexer and server all installed on the same machine. The lab runs on a host-only network (vboxnet0, 192.168.56.0/24), and the Ubuntu server also has a NAT adapter for the installation.</p><p>I then installed Wazuh agents on the Kali host machine and the Windows 10 workstation, and both now show as active on the dashboard. The installation was a bit frustrating because of timeouts and low RAM, but increasing the timeout, adding a swap file and cleaning up the failed attempts fixed it. After everything was working, I took a snapshot of both virtual machines.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The lab now has a working centralized view where events from all the machines can be monitored in one place. This is the base needed for threat hunting and threat modelling. For now the agents only send their default data, so the SIEM is ready but not yet collecting detailed security logs.</p><p>Next Step</p><p>The next step is to start collecting more detailed telemetry:</p><ul><li>Telemetry from the agents</li><li>Sysmon logs on the Windows 10 machine</li><li>auditd logs on the Kali machine</li></ul><p>This will give the SIEM better visibility into processes, network connections, file changes and user activity, so I can start building detections and investigating alerts.</p><p>Thank you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f0ba6cccf96" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Malware~Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/malware-analysis-11c6a82dced6?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/11c6a82dced6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 15:20:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-13T15:20:37.893Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scenario: You’re a SOC analyst at a mid-size company. An employee in finance reports receiving an email this morning with an attachment named invoice_photo.jpg claiming to be a scanned invoice from a vendor. They opened it because “it’s just a picture.” Their machine has been acting slow since. You’ve been handed the file for analysis.</p><p>First, we need to identify the actual file type of invoice_photo.jpg to determine whether it is a genuine image or a potentially malicious file disguised as one.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fZcuLHDfo_YvQjfiyO_eSw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Initial File Identification</strong></p><p>By running the file command on invoice_photo.jpg, we discover that the file is not actually an image but an executable file disguised with a .jpg extension. This is a potential indicator of malware and requires further investigation.</p><p><strong>Reputation check</strong></p><p>Next, we use the file’s hash digest to check its reputation on threat intelligence platforms such as VirusTotal and determine whether it is associated with any known malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IpULDTx4NiJroStkFezfEw.png" /></figure><p>Sha256: fd0d23011657d0185f6e4fb5fe57eb7894c9fc606b9ae5fc6b977efcb2ef1eeb</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RDEaH94G4QQguJfMLR4Cag.png" /></figure><p>VirusTotal identifies the file with the popular threat label Agent Tesla, indicating that it may be associated with this known information-stealing malware. This finding raises suspicion that the file is malicious and requires further investigation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z3Z6KylVPI1kfYYZP__L2w.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/agent-tesla-malware/">https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/agent-tesla-malware/</a></p><p>We can confirm we are dealing with malware.</p><p><strong>Magic Byte Analysis</strong></p><p>Looking at the file’s raw bytes confirms what the extension already hid: it starts with MZ, the signature every DOS/PE executable carries at the start of its header. A real JPEG file would start with FF D8 FF instead. This rules out any chance the file is actually an image, it’s an executable wearing a .jpg mask.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ocmI-_R3OC1_xwHTnzFHBA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Extracting Embedded Strings</strong></p><p>From the documentation of the malware we can see that Agent Tesla exfiltrates stolen data through FTP, HTTP, and SMTP. It also steals saved credentials from various applications on the infected machine, such as FTP clients and VPN clients.</p><p>With this we can have a good idea of where to start with our filter from the string extraction, separating what we find into exfiltration channels (FTP, HTTP, SMTP) and credential theft targets (FTP clients, VPN clients, and others).</p><p>FTP (File Transfer Protocol)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nx3pw52nGN8eR7OOAzH4kw.png" /></figure><p>Running strings on the file and searching for “ftp” as a keyword returns interesting results that warrants further investigation.</p><p>We can see the malware checking for specific applications by querying the registry and file paths where each client stores its saved login credentials, so it can harvest them:</p><ul><li><strong>CoreFTP — SOFTWARE\FTPWare\COREFTP\Sites</strong></li><li><strong>FTP Navigator — \FTP Navigator\Ftplist.txt</strong></li><li><strong>SmartFTP — SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect</strong></li><li><strong>WS_FTP — Ipswitch\WS_FTP\Sites\ws_ftp.ini</strong></li><li><strong>FTP Commander Deluxe — \Program Files (x86)\FTP Commander Deluxe\Ftplist.txt</strong></li><li><strong>cftp — \cftp\Ftplist.txt</strong></li><li><strong>FTPGetter — \FTPGetter\servers.xml</strong></li></ul><p>Seven separate FTP clients are targeted in total, showing the malware casts a wide net across commonly used FTP software rather than relying on a single application.</p><p>I also found a hardcoded url in the malware <br><em>ftp[:]//ftp.piovau[.]com</em></p><p><strong>Reputation check and open source investigation</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EYoDHNUmQc27llxaSbjpdA.png" /></figure><p><strong>OSINT</strong></p><p>A public search for the same domain surfaces an independent reference tying <strong>ftp.piovau.com </strong>to Agent Tesla’s C2 infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wxPJZWMjRqAl7hl2GCs09w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Reputation check on VirusTotal</strong></p><p>The URL is listed under command and control, spam, phishing, and bot network categories, all characteristics consistent with Agent Tesla’s known behavior.</p><p>HTTP(Hyper Text Transfer Protocol)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rlCiXGuCmX1yw7fWlN98tw.png" /></figure><p>This search returned three hardcoded strings.</p><p><a href="http://ip-api.com/line/?fields=hosting">http://ip-api.com/line/?fields=hosting<br></a><a href="https://account.dyn.com/"> https://account.dyn.com/<br></a> HTTP Password</p><p>On their own, these two urls are benign, but given the indicators of compromise I have gathered already, this warrants a close look.</p><p>ip-api.com is a web-based IP geolocation service and API that allows developers and websites to look up detailed information about an IPv4 or IPv6 address. Malicious actors abuse ip-api.com by embedding it into malware to secretly check a victim’s location, and also as an anti-analysis check, to see if the IP belongs to a datacenter or cloud provider, which would mean the malware is running inside a sandbox instead of a real victim’s machine.</p><p>dyn.com is a dynamic dns service that automatically updates Domain Name System (DNS) records in real time when a device’s public IP address changes. Malicious actors use dynamic dns to quickly change their ip address once it has been flagged and keep the domain name the same.</p><p>SMTP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iMToFNAadBI0uStdr5FLUg.png" /></figure><p>Running strings against the smtp there wasn’t a super telling result here</p><p>Narrowing down to specific SMTP application for credential theft</p><p>OUTLOOK</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DvChDkdaxRwSMg7niV56qA.png" /></figure><p>THUNDERBIRD</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FVLRXkoEI4j_ViUToEwwPQ.png" /></figure><p>Checking for any other mail application and queries</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KW-2jJ3JIgQGLwKf6tLRzg.png" /></figure><p>This is a confirmed case of credential theft attack.</p><p>VPN</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gwnoS8ijkPTGfnwGHmNQ9A.png" /></figure><p>Running strings and filtering for “vpn” turns up two VPN clients being targeted:</p><p>OpenVPN — Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs, Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs\, \OpenVPN\config\<br> NordVPN — NordVpn.exe</p><p>Capability Analysis with capa: capa detects capabilities in executable files</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rw6W1Wl2bpkw4Tw2jKWY4w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Capability Analysis with capa</strong></p><p>Running capa against the file with the capa-rules ruleset, a few findings stood out and tie back to what I already found manually:</p><p>Input Capture::Keylogging [T1056.001] — confirms keystroke logging, beyond just saved app credentials.</p><p>Screen Capture [T1113] and Clipboard Data [T1115] — also grabs screenshots and clipboard contents.</p><p>Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::System Checks [T1497.001] — confirms the ip-api.com check I found earlier is used to detect if it’s running in a sandbox.</p><p>Subvert Trust Controls::Mark-of-the-Web Bypass [T1553.005] — ties to my scenario, shows the malware tries to bypass the security warning Windows adds to downloaded files.</p><p>Application Layer Protocol::Web Protocols [T1071.001] — confirms the HTTP communication already found in strings.</p><p><strong>Dynamic Analysis with anyrun</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hQwu-Z1UE7f-KEjPX2yozg.png" /></figure><p>Dynamic Analysis with any.run</p><p>Detonating invoice_photo.jpg in any.run confirms the file as malicious activity, automatically tagged agenttesla, stealer, ip-check, ftp, and exfiltration, matching everything found in static analysis.</p><p>The process tree shows invoice_photo.jpg.exe spawning as the main process, alongside WmiPrvSE.exe, WaaSMedicAgent.exe, conhost.exe, and slui.exe.</p><p>Looking at the HTTP Requests tab, the malware is caught making a live call to:</p><p><a href="http://ip-api.com/line/?fields=hosting">http://ip-api.com/line/?fields=hosting</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mP0fk73YzAZ60tAEGi365Q.png" /></figure><p>The IOC list also flags:</p><p>Domain: ftp.piovau.com<br> IP: 69.57.162.28</p><p>Both marked malicious, confirming the hardcoded FTP C2 address found during string extraction is a live, actively flagged exfiltration endpoint, not just a dormant string sitting in the code.</p><p>I’ll include the full any.run PDF report in the GitHub repo for anyone who wants to review every indicator in detail.</p><p><strong>Mitigation and Detection using YARA</strong></p><p>Using the indicators of compromise and strings gathered throughout this analysis, I can craft a YARA rule to detect Agent Tesla malware on a machine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JFFPvL3y_2hqSZrpWYd42g.png" /></figure><p>Github: <a href="https://github.com/AKINOLASELIM/Malware_Analysis">https://github.com/AKINOLASELIM/Malware_Analysis</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=11c6a82dced6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BASICS OF MALWARE ANALYSIS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/basics-of-malware-analysis-3669e2711916?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3669e2711916</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 17:56:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T17:56:37.192Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Malware Analysis ~ My learning on the vast field of malware Analysis</p><p>Though Malware Analysis is a specialized field of its own(SOC tier 3), it is crucial for a security analyst to understand the potential threat the organization might be facing from all its potential attack surface and to have a capable detection mechanism and rules to alert on the abnormalities in our organization network.</p><p><strong><em>WHAT IS MALWARE ANALYSIS?</em></strong><br> Malware Analysis is an iterative process of dissecting the core component and functionality of a complex(or not so complex) software to determine if the software is benign or malicious, and gives a holistic view of a malicious software helping to build detection mechanisms to contain it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1q9YKVEIEFQSQjvyOzPPaQ.png" /></figure><p>Types of malware analysis.</p><ol><li>Static analysis: This procedure is all about getting as much information as possible without actually executing the file.</li></ol><p>2. Dynamic Analysis: this involves running it and analyzing all the different behaviours the malware exhibits during its work lifecycle.</p><p>3. Hybrid Analysis: combining the best of both worlds together.</p><p>4. Reverse Engineering: piecing the malware back together.</p><p><strong><em>STATIC ANALYSIS:</em></strong><br> Basic static analysis examines the file structure, metadata, and properties without running the code or diving into low-level assembly instructions.<br> This is mostly done by security analysts(tier 1 and tier 2) and it includes process such as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Kg5qL-bOyHncLSY779Phg.png" /></figure><ol><li>File hashing: Gathering the calculated cryptographic hash digest of the malware (MD5/SHA 1/256/512) and performing a reputation check on anti-virus platform such as virustotal:https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/search</li><li>String extraction: This involves pulling out readable words, ASCII letters, symbols, ip address and even url embedded in the malware for beaconing and command and control.</li><li>File header and Meta-data examination: Examining the File type and PE structure to determine if it is an executable file or not.</li><li>File header and Meta-data examination: Examining the File type and PE structure to determine if it is an executable file or not. DLLs are files containing reusable functions provided by the Windows OS. They give applications access to different functions, such as networking, file access, and registry modification, without the program needing to write that code itself.<br> By examining the IAT, you can understand what the program is capable of doing, which helps depict what the malware aims to accomplish.</li></ol><p><strong><em>Bottleneck?</em></strong></p><ol><li>String obfuscation ~ this is a technique used by malicious actors to transform readable text and ASCII characters into an unintelligible format.<br>Note: This is not the same as the application of cryptographic means.</li></ol><p>String obfuscation techniques includes:</p><ol><li>XOR Encoding</li><li>Base32/Base64 Encoding</li></ol><p>2. IAT Hooking: This is the process of manipulating the IAT and overwriting the table with replacement function.</p><p><strong>THE PE STRUCTURE</strong></p><p>PE is a file format for windows operating system, it is the executable file format for native (.exe, .com), dynamic link libraries(.dlls), system drivers(.drv/.sys) and other kinds of files on the windows operating system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OkUrHZ5XqYyigVwQTekU-g.png" /></figure><p><strong>WHY ANALYZING A PE STRUCTURE</strong></p><p>PE Structure covers and tells us a lot about the capabilities of a software[MALWARE]</p><p>They are two types of PE formats~ PE32(for 32 bits operating system) and PE32+ (for 64 bits operating system)</p><p><strong>MAGIC NUMBER</strong></p><p>Every PE file starts with a magic number, a fixed set of bytes at the very beginning of the file that tells the OS and analysis tools what format they’re dealing with.</p><p>For PE files, this magic number is “MZ” (hex: 4D 5A), the initials of Mark Zbikowski, one of the original MS-DOS developers. This sits inside the DOS header, the first part of every PE file.</p><p>Why it matters for analysis: tools like file check this magic number first to confirm a file is actually a PE executable, regardless of what extension it’s wearing. A file renamed from .exe to .meow, .bin or .txt still starts with 4D 5A if it’s genuinely a PE file, which is why renaming an extension never defeats real analysis.</p><p><strong>AFTER ANALYSIS WHAT NEXT?</strong></p><p>YARA is a tool aimed to help security researchers identify and detect malware samples .</p><p>After the Malware Analysis[static|Dynamic] security analysts can use the findings to detect any abnormal files that match the set yara rules .</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3669e2711916" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Splunk Boss of the soc(Botsv1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/splunk-boss-of-the-soc-botsv1-c905f52a2943?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c905f52a2943</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 01:12:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-01T01:12:20.615Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Splunk Boss of the SOC: Investigating Ransomware with Splunk — Write-Up</h3><p><strong>Scenario / Setup</strong></p><p>On Alice’s first day at the Wayne Enterprises Security Operations Center, Lucius Fox assigns her an initial case: a memo from the Gotham City Police Department (GCPD) citing evidence, posted to Pastebin (hxxp://pastebin[.]com/Gw6dWjS9), that www[.]imreallynotbatman[.]com, hosted on Wayne Enterprises’ IP address space, may have been defaced. The site is the personal blog of Wayne Corporation’s CEO. Defacement is a known signature tactic of the threat group referenced in the memo. Alice’s objective is to confirm, using available log sources, whether the compromise actually occurred.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/830/0*qXTysmqO37rH85ON.png" /></figure><p><strong>Objective:</strong> Identify which indexes and sourcetypes are available for this investigation before running any searches.</p><p><strong>Method:</strong> This challenge uses the same index and sourcetypes as the website defacement challenge (<a href="https://medium.com/@skizzydera/boss-of-the-soc-v1-botsv1-b852ffcfb16c">https://medium.com/@skizzydera/boss-of-the-soc-v1-botsv1-b852ffcfb16c</a>).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vu7j6aCs6akshDn2uVxAfg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AbFfdxzgnJM-Yjk2FM6J_g.png" /></figure><p>Method: The challenge specifies index=botsv1. A review of available sourcetypes shows the following. Windows Event Logs (WinEventLog:Application/Security/System, WinRegistry) for host-level Windows activity. Sysmon (XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational) for deep process and network telemetry. Fortigate firewall logs (fgt*) for network traffic. IIS logs for web server request records. Nessus scan data for known vulnerabilities. Stream logs (Stream*) for raw packet capture. Suricata for IDS/IPS alerts.</p><p>Finding: This gives a layered view of the environment: network perimeter (firewall, Suricata, Stream), web server (IIS), and host (Sysmon, WinEventLog). Each question can be answered from the most appropriate data source rather than guessing.</p><p><strong>Question 1:</strong> What was the most likely IPv4 address of we8105desk on 24 August 2016?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;*win*&quot; we8105desk | stats count by src_ip</pre><p>Method: Windows event logs and Sysmon logs track what happens on a host, and they usually record the computer name along with its network details. So I searched for the hostname and counted the events by source IP to see which address showed up most.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YLbOJvTsNG3mpuczR1d3SQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> 192.168.250.100 came out on top with 851 events. The second result was 127.0.0.1, but that is just the loopback address the machine uses to talk to itself, so it doesn’t tell us anything about its network identity. That makes 192.168.250.100 the most likely IPv4 address of we8105desk.</p><p>Answer: 192.168.250.100</p><p><strong>Question 2:</strong> Amongst the Suricata signatures that detected the Cerber malware, which one alerted the fewest number of times? Submit ONLY the signature ID value as the answer.</p><p><strong>Objective:</strong> Suricata uses a complete signature language to match known threats, policy violations, and malicious behavior. The goal is to find the signature ID with the lowest alert count.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;suricata&quot; &quot;192.168.250.100&quot; alert.signature=&quot;*Cerber*&quot;<br>| stats count by alert.signature_id</pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> The question asks about Suricata detections, so I searched the Suricata logs for alerts involving the victim IP whose signature name contains “Cerber”. I then counted the alerts per signature ID.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DkDmegJR4eBviJ0_3h_HVQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> The one with the lowest count is <strong>2816763</strong>.</p><p>Answer: 2816763</p><p><strong>Question 3:</strong> What fully qualified domain name (FQDN) does the Cerber ransomware attempt to direct the user to at the end of its encryption phase?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;stream:dns&quot; &quot;192.168.250.100&quot; &quot;*cerber*&quot;<br>| stats count by query</pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> Since the question is about a domain the malware reaches out to, DNS traffic was the natural place to look. I searched the Splunk Stream DNS logs for lookups made by the infected machine that contain “cerber”, then counted them by domain name.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9KZA9YKC44WTjDc5WvnKOA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> Only one domain came back: cerberhhyed5frqa.xmfir0.win, looked up 2 times. Because it is the only Cerber-related lookup from the infected host, this is the domain the ransomware sends the user to once encryption is done.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> cerberhhyed5frqa.xmfir0.win</p><p>Question 4: What was the first suspicious domain visited by we8105desk on 24 August 2016?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;stream:http&quot; src_ip=&quot;192.168.250.100&quot; uri_path=&quot;*&quot;<br>| stats count by _time, src_ip, uri_path, site<br>| dedup site<br><br></pre><p>Method: Web browsing activity is recorded in the Stream HTTP logs, so I searched them for requests made by the infected IP. I counted the results by time, URI path, and site, then used dedup site to show each site once, in time order.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i65h0b-F1hn2KgU1K-yFdA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> The first two results are harmless Microsoft certificate requests. The next entry, at 16:48:13, is a request for a JPG file (/mhtr.jpg) from solidaritedeproximite[.]org. About a second later, the same image was requested again, this time from the IP address 92[.]222[.]104[.]182. A JPG fetched from an unrelated domain and then again from a raw IP is unusual, which makes solidaritedeproximite[.]org the first suspicious domain.</p><p>Answer: <a href="http://solidaritedeproximite.org/">solidaritedeproximite.org</a></p><p><strong>Question 5:</strong> During the initial Cerber infection, a VB script is run. The entire script from this execution, prepended by the name of the launching .exe, can be found in a field in Splunk. What is the length of the value of this field?</p><p><strong>Answer guidance:</strong> Enter the number of characters (the “length”) of the field.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational&quot; &quot;we8105desk&quot; EventCode=1 cmdline=&quot;*vbs*&quot;<br>| eval length=len(cmdline)<br>| table _time, Computer, cmdline, length<br><br></pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> The script runs on the endpoint, so the Sysmon logs are the right source, since they record host-level activity. Event code 1 logs process creation, including the full command line used to launch each process. I filtered the command lines for “vbs”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0gn0UJujfrM9VzXx56D0qg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> The search returned multiple events, but one stood out because its command line was far longer than the others, at 4490 characters. That length is typical of an obfuscated script embedded in the command line, and the value begins with the launching executable, so this is the field the question is asking about.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> 4490</p><p><strong>Question 6:</strong> What is the name of the USB key inserted by Bob Smith?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;winregistry&quot; host=&quot;we8105desk&quot; &quot;friendlyname&quot;<br>| table _time,  host registry_path, registry_value_name, registry_value_data<br><br></pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> Windows keeps a record of USB devices connected to a machine in the registry. The FriendlyName value is what Windows uses to give a piece of hardware a human-readable name, instead of showing only raw hardware or instance IDs. I searched the registry logs on we8105desk for FriendlyName entries and displayed the value data, which holds the device name.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I16Af7dq8Zt08kfZzNiUUw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> The FriendlyName value in the results is MIRANDA_PRI, which is the name of the USB key.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> MIRANDA_PRI</p><p>Question 7: Bob Smith’s workstation (we8105desk) was connected to a file server during the ransomware outbreak. What is the IPv4 address of the file server?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;stream:smb&quot; src_ip=&quot;192.168.250.100&quot;<br>| stats count by dest_ip<br>| sort - count</pre><p>Method: File server activity is recorded in the SMB traffic that Splunk Stream captures, since SMB is the protocol Windows uses for file sharing. I searched the SMB logs for connections coming from the infected workstation and counted them by destination IP to see which machine it talked to most.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GiUY91PDoZQ0sMCOXUAxTA.png" /></figure><p>Finding: Three destination IPs were returned. The top one is 192.168.250.20 with 39,069 events, far more than the others. The second, 192.168.250.255, is the subnet broadcast address, so it is not a server. That leaves 192.168.250.20 as the file server.</p><p>Answer: 192.168.250.20</p><p>Question 8: How many distinct PDFs did the ransomware encrypt on the remote file server?</p><p>Objective: Find out how many different PDF files were encrypted, without counting the same file twice.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; host=&quot;we9041srv&quot; sourcetype=&quot;WinEventLog:Security&quot; EventCode=5145 Source_Address=&quot;192.168.250.100&quot; &quot;*.pdf&quot;<br>| table _time, Source_Address, Relative_Target_Name<br>| dedup Relative_Target_Name<br><br></pre><p>Method: The SMB traffic logs weren’t reliable for this question, so I turned to the Windows Security logs on the file server instead. The server is we9041srv, the same file server at 192.168.250.20 that we found in Question 7. Event ID 5145 logs every attempt to access a file or folder on a network share, along with the machine that made the request. I filtered for requests from the infected workstation that involved PDFs, then removed duplicate file names so each file counted only once.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dqBCdgi6LYUS6e4o1On1ew.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> After removing the duplicates, 257 distinct PDF files had been accessed by the infected workstation on the file server during the outbreak.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> 257</p><p><strong>Question 9:</strong> The VBScript found in Question 5 launches 121214.tmp. What is the ParentProcessId of this initial launch?</p><p><strong>Objective:</strong> The VBScript from Question 5 launches a new program, 121214.tmp. The goal here is to find the ParentProcessId of that initial launch, which is the process ID of the process running the VBScript.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; &quot;we8105desk&quot; sourcetype=&quot;xmlwineventlog:microsoft-windows-sysmon/operational&quot; EventID=1 &quot;121214.tmp&quot;<br>| table _time, cmdline, process_id, ParentCommandLine, parent_process_id<br><br></pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> Sysmon process creation events (Event ID 1) record the process ID, the parent process ID, and the command line for every new process. I searched these logs for events mentioning 121214.tmp and displayed those fields so I could trace which process started it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QowB6_JpNreBlgXhLM9h_Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> The search returned 7 events, so I looked for the earliest one. At 16:48:21, WScript.exe ran 20429.vbs, which started cmd.exe, and cmd.exe then launched 121214.tmp. WScript.exe is the parent of that first step, and its process ID is 3968.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> 3968</p><p><strong>Question 10:</strong> The Cerber ransomware encrypts files located in Bob Smith’s Windows profile. How many .txt files does it encrypt?</p><p><strong>Objective:</strong> The previous encryption question counted the PDFs encrypted on the file server. This time the goal is to count how many .txt files were encrypted on Bob Smith’s own workstation.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; host=&quot;we8105desk&quot; sourcetype=&quot;xmlwineventlog:microsoft-windows-sysmon/operational&quot; EventCode=2 TargetFilename=&quot;*.txt&quot;<br>| table _time, TargetFilename<br>| dedup TargetFilename</pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> The Sysmon logs on we8105desk record changes to files, and Event ID 2 logs when a process changes a file’s creation time, which is something the ransomware does as it works through files. I filtered for .txt files and used dedup so each file name is only counted once.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*91X6xk_8f0wYssC3Bh2qYg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> After removing duplicates, the search returned 410 distinct .txt files.</p><p>Answer: 410</p><p>Question 11: The malware downloads a file that contains the Cerber ransomware cryptor code. What is the name of that file?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=&quot;botsv1&quot; sourcetype=&quot;suricata&quot; &quot;192.168.250.100&quot; eventtype=suricata_eve_http<br>| table src_ip, http.hostname, http.url<br>| dedup http.hostname<br><br></pre><p><strong>Method:</strong> Suricata also records HTTP traffic, which makes it a good place to look for files the infected machine pulled down. I searched the Suricata HTTP events for the infected IP and listed the hostname and URL of each request, keeping one row for each unique site and file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e4DFBgUl8JJhJVPPBdkW8Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Finding:</strong> This brings us back to Question 4. The first suspicious site the workstation visited, solidaritedeproximite[.]org, is also where the malware came from. The URL requested from that site points to an image file, which fits the hint that malware doesn’t always start out as an executable.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> mhtr.jpg</p><p><strong>Question 12:</strong> Now that you know the name of the ransomware’s encryptor file, what obfuscation technique does it likely use?</p><p><strong>Method:</strong> Obfuscation means making data or code hard to read, understand, or spot. The encryptor file is mhtr.jpg, which is an image, so I thought about which obfuscation technique hides content inside images.</p><p><strong>Finding:</strong> On the surface the file looks like an ordinary picture, but it is actually carrying the ransomware’s cryptor code. Hiding data inside an image like this is called steganography, so that is most likely what was used here.</p><p><strong>Answer:</strong> Steganography</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c905f52a2943" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Log Analyzer with python.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/log-analyzer-with-python-5f62c2c35c53?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5f62c2c35c53</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[regex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-operation-center]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[log-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:35:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-29T23:35:17.896Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Building a Log Analyzer with Python that Detects Brute-Force on SSH Logs</p><p>Problem:<strong><br></strong> Logs are messy and difficult to read, especially when there’s no SIEM tool available in your toolkit and you have a large number of logs to go through. A Python script can offer you a way to extract the logs in an easy-to-read format, with analysis built in.</p><p><strong>The raw data</strong></p><p>A typical SSH auth log line looks like this:</p><pre>2026-09-24T16:43:33.513487+01:00 Root sshd-session[102527]: Failed password for invalid user baduser from ::1 port 50960 ssh2</pre><p>This is just text, before it is useful each individual field has to be extracted(the timestamp, source IP, and username need to be pulled out into structured data.) This is where regular expression(regex) comes in.</p><p><strong>Step 1: Parsing the logs</strong></p><p>I wrote regex patterns for the three event types that matter most: failed logins, connection closures, and successful logins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rXm07lJBjlkaGOYvdlmi5g.png" /></figure><p>Each match becomes a dictionary: timestamp, PID, user, IP, port, and an event label. The parser reads the file line by line, so it stays memory efficient even on large logs, no loading the whole file into memory at once.</p><p>Step 2: Analysis</p><p>With structured records, we can now count the logs, collections.Counter does the counting: which IP attacked the most, which usernames were targeted, and failed logins broken down by hour.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2ykn5lfI-wX-9Qw22eF-cw.png" /></figure><p>Step 3: Detecting brute-force success</p><p>Counting the number of failed attempts alone is not enough. The real question is: did a brute-force attempt actually succeed? The tool tracks a running failure count per IP. When that IP logs in successfully, it checks how many failures came right before it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A5Piy1cPkSvpuW55pXxJqQ.png" /></figure><p>Severity scoring helps differentiate between alerts. An IP that fails 18 times then logs in is a very different event from one that fails once and gets in on the second attempt.</p><p><strong>Output</strong></p><p>Findings print to the terminal as a readable summary, and also get saved to JSON for use elsewhere.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xal4pPWvm-tbpZnphB7mqA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Scope</strong></p><p>This tool reads SSH auth logs specifically, the full code is on my github.</p><p>code: <a href="https://github.com/AKINOLASELIM/log_analyzer">https://github.com/AKINOLASELIM/log_analyzer</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f62c2c35c53" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Boss of the soc v1(botsv1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/boss-of-the-soc-v1-botsv1-b852ffcfb16c?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b852ffcfb16c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[siem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 13:05:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-26T13:05:25.809Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>walkthrough- website defacement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/322/0*3xY3csNrRC8XbaZ1.png" /></figure><p>note- All URLs and IPs here are defanged as best practice, so nothing’s accidentally clickable.</p><p>Answers submitted per question are left undefanged, Treat with cautious.</p><p><strong>Scenario / Setup</strong></p><p>On Alice’s first day at the Wayne Enterprises Security Operations Center, Lucius Fox assigns her an initial case: a memo from the Gotham City Police Department (GCPD) citing evidence, posted to Pastebin (hxxp://pastebin[.]com/Gw6dWjS9), that www[.]imreallynotbatman[.]com, hosted on Wayne Enterprises’ IP address space, may have been defaced. The site is the personal blog of Wayne Corporation’s CEO. Defacement is a known signature tactic of the threat group referenced in the memo. Alice’s objective is to confirm, using available log sources, whether the compromise actually occurred.</p><p>Objective: Identify which indexes and sourcetypes are available for this investigation before running any searches.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E4sPTHBKV-UnaAjuiYNhZA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NAeV8HQEF3OyR4TtoDTm-Q.png" /></figure><p>Method: The challenge specifies index=botsv1. A review of available sourcetypes shows the following. Windows Event Logs (WinEventLog:Application/Security/System, WinRegistry) for host-level Windows activity. Sysmon (XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational) for deep process and network telemetry. Fortigate firewall logs (fgt*) for network traffic. IIS logs for web server request records. Nessus scan data for known vulnerabilities. Stream logs (Stream*) for raw packet capture. Suricata for IDS/IPS alerts.</p><p>Finding: This gives a layered view of the environment: network perimeter (firewall, Suricata, Stream), web server (IIS), and host (Sysmon, WinEventLog). Each question can be answered from the most appropriate data source rather than guessing.</p><p>Question 1: Likely IPv4 address of the Po1s0n1vy scanner</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=fgt* &quot;imreallynotbatman[.]com&quot;<br>| timechart count by srcip</pre><p>Method: Firewall logs capture every source IP interacting with the web server. Scoping the search to the attack date and to the target domain isolates relevant traffic. timechart count by srcip visualizes request volume per source over time, making abnormal spikes, a hallmark of automated scanning, visible at a glance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y07kEbUGCdYr8HQGGMPbcQ.png" /></figure><p>Finding: One source IP, 40[.]80[.]148[.]42, shows a sharp, sustained spike in request volume relative to all other sources during the attack period, consistent with automated vulnerability scanning rather than normal user traffic</p><p>Answer: 40.80.148.42</p><p>Question 2:What company created the web vulnerability scanner used by Po1s0n1vy?</p><p>Objective: Identify the vendor of the vulnerability scanner used by Po1s0n1vy.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=fgt* &quot;imreallynotbatman.com&quot;</pre><p>Method: Firewall logs classify traffic by attack signature. Filtering to the compromised host’s traffic and reviewing the top attack signatures surfaces the tool fingerprint directly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R-CS19EX4Cj4a4Y_YW439Q.png" /></figure><p>Finding: The dominant attack signature logged against imreallynotbatman[.]com is Acunetix.Web.Vulnerability.Scanner, indicating the scans were performed using Acunetix.</p><p>Answer: Acunetix</p><p><strong>Question 3: What content management system is imreallynotbatman[.]com likely using?</strong></p><p>Objective: Determine the content management system running on imreallynotbatman[.]com.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=fgt* &quot;imreallynotbatman.com&quot;<br>| table _time, dest, vendor_url<br>| dedup vendor_url</pre><p>Method: Firewall logs tag matched signatures with a vendor_url field identifying the software component the signature is written for. Deduplicating this field against traffic to imreallynotbatman[.]com isolates the distinct platforms referenced in Acunetix’s scan results.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CzSDedAuIkDPRZmaP33Zbw.png" /></figure><p>Finding: The vendor_url field returns Joomla as the platform referenced in the scan traffic against imreallynotbatman[.]com.</p><p>Answer: Joomla</p><p>Question 4: What is the name of the file that defaced the imreallynotbatman[.]com website? Please submit only the name of the file with extension?</p><p>Objective: Identify the specific file used to deface imreallynotbatman[.]com.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=stream:http c_ip=192.168.250.70<br>| table _time, c_ip, dest_ip, uri, url<br>| dedup url</pre><p>Method: stream:http captures HTTP traffic over the network, so any file transfer between hosts shows up here. Filtering by the web server’s own IP as the client (c_ip=192[.]168[.]250[.]70) catches the server itself reaching out to fetch a file, which is how the defacement was actually delivered. Deduplicating on url narrows the results down to distinct destinations, making it easy to spot anything unusual.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1nSifpimeicUn8_ltjBMxg.png" /></figure><p>Finding: Among the URLs returned, one stands out as clearly malicious: /poisonivy-is-coming-for-you-batman.jpeg. The filename directly references Po1s0n1vy, the group named in the GCPD memo, confirming this as the defacement file.</p><p>Answer: poisonivy-is-coming-for-you-batman.jpeg</p><p>Question 5:This attack used dynamic DNS to resolve the malicious IP. What fully qualified domain name (FQDN) is associated with this attack?</p><p>Objective: Identify the fully qualified domain name resolving to the malicious IP used to stage the defacement file.</p><p>Query: Reuses the result set from Question 4, no new search required.</p><p>Method: The url field captured in the previous query includes the full destination address the web server reached out to, not just the file path. That field shows the domain the defacement file was actually hosted on, before it resolved to an IP.</p><p>Finding: The url field from Question 4’s results shows the file was retrieved from prankglassinebracket[.]jumpingcrab[.]com, a dynamic DNS domain (jumpingcrab[.]com is a known DDNS provider), consistent with attackers using dynamic DNS to mask the true hosting IP and rotate infrastructure.</p><p>Answer: <a href="http://prankglassinebracket.jumpingcrab.com/">prankglassinebracket.jumpingcrab.com</a></p><p>Question:6</p><p>What IPv4 address has Po1s0n1vy tied to domains that are pre-staged to attack Wayne Enterprises?</p><p>Query: Reuses the result set from Question 4.</p><p>Method: The same table includes dest_ip, the actual IP the web server connected to when retrieving the file from prankglassinebracket[.]jumpingcrab[.]com.</p><p>Finding: dest_ip shows 23[.]22[.]63[.]114, tying the dynamic DNS domain to Po1s0n1vy’s staging infrastructure.</p><p>Answer: 23.22.63.114</p><p>Question 7: What IPv4 address is likely attempting a brute force password attack against imreallynotbatman[.]com?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=stream:http &quot;imreallynotbatman&quot; &quot;23.22.63.114&quot; form_data=&quot;*&quot;<br>| table _time, src_ip, form_data<br>| dedup src_ip</pre><p>Method: Pivoting off the IP tied to the defacement upload, this filters HTTP traffic to imreallynotbatman[.]com that includes form submissions, how a login brute force would show up in the logs, and isolates it to source IP addresses making those submissions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S6Un1KT-8zfG7Ka79-CVRA.png" /></figure><p>Finding: 412 events show repeated POST attempts carrying a username and passwd field, consistent with automated credential guessing rather than a single legitimate login. All 412 attempts originate from a single source IP, 23[.]22[.]63[.]114, the same address tied to the defacement staging infrastructure identified in Question 6.</p><p>Answer: 23.22.63.114</p><p>Question 8: What is the name of the executable uploaded by Po1s0n1vy?</p><p>Answer guidance: Please include file extension. (For example, “notepad.exe” or “favicon.ico”)</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=fgt* &quot;imreallynotbatman&quot; &quot;*.exe&quot;</pre><p>Method: Firewall logs flag files matched against threat signatures and behaviours , including any known malicious executables passing through. Filtering to traffic against imreallynotbatman[.]com and searching for .exe file references surfaces any executable the firewall caught over the network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EKqgBtbrQvpZVbrhrEk79Q.png" /></figure><p>Finding: The search returns a single match, 3791.exe, logged with a “File is infected” alert, confirming it as a known malicious file caught by the firewall’s detection engine, and matching the executable Po1s0n1vy uploaded to the compromised server.</p><p>Answer: 3791.exe</p><p><strong>Question 9: What is the MD5 hash of the executable uploaded?</strong></p><p>Method: The firewall log from Question 8 returns a SHA256 hash, not MD5. Taking that SHA256 hash and searching it on VirusTotal pulls up the file’s full profile, including all associated hash values.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GdwSrtKFZt52A_h-hNmThQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J5nLYns05qHF8XFjphv6Rw.png" /></figure><p>Finding: VirusTotal identifies the file’s original name as ab.exe, renamed to 3791.exe by the attackers before upload. The corresponding MD5 hash listed for the file is aae3f5a29935e6abcc2c2754d12a9af0.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w6osKE-vsJK_BcbcC9jyqw.png" /></figure><p>Answer: aae3f5a29935e6abcc2c2754d12a9af0</p><p><strong>Question 10: GCPD reported that common TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures) for the Po1s0n1vy APT group, if initial compromise fails, is to send a spear phishing email with custom malware attached to their intended target. This malware is usually connected to Po1s0n1vy’s initial attack infrastructure. Using research techniques, provide the SHA256 hash of this malware.</strong></p><p>Objective: Po1s0n1vy’s known fallback TTP, when initial compromise fails, is spear phishing with custom malware tied to their existing infrastructure.</p><p>Method: Using the IP identified in Question 6 (23[.]22[.]63[.]114) as a pivot point, searching that IP on VirusTotal surfaces files and campaigns associated with it, including any phishing payloads sharing the same infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i6q6ix5arsw_LV_ajX_Sng.png" /></figure><p>Finding: VirusTotal’s results for that IP include a file named MirandaTateScreensaver.scr.exe, a name and double extension consistent with a phishing lure (disguising an executable as a screensaver). Its SHA256 hash matches the malware tied to Po1s0n1vy’s infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XaT-nGZM_yeirRuLDppsDg.png" /></figure><p>Answer: 9709473ab351387aab9e816eff3910b9f28a7a70202e250ed46dba8f820f34a8</p><p><strong>Question 11: What special hex code is associated with the customized malware discussed in the previous question?</strong></p><p>Method: Checked VirusTotal’s community comments for this sample. Analysts sometimes leave notes there beyond the automated scan results, and this one had a hex-encoded string tucked in the comments.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YWgFQiPqaQb9N-7MntAD4w.png" /></figure><p>Answer: 53 74 65 76 65 20 42 72 61 6e 74 27 73 20 42 65 61 72 64 20 69 73 20 61 20 70 6f 77 65 72 66 75 6c 20 74 68 69 6e 67 2e 20 46 69 6e 64 20 74 68 69 73 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 61 6e 64 20 61 73 6b 20 68 69 6d 20 74 6f 20 62 75 79 20 79 6f 75 20 61 20 62 65 65 72 21 21 21</p><p><strong>Question 12: What was the first brute force password used?</strong></p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=stream:http &quot;23.22.63.114&quot; form_data=&quot;*&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;passwd=(?&lt;password&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;username=(?&lt;user_name&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| table _time, password, user_name</pre><p>Method: Pulled the login attempts from the same brute force IP identified earlier, then used rex to extract the username and password fields out of the raw form data. Sorted by _time to see the order the passwords were actually tried in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DSvMV0Teqoxss-8gZLoVLA.png" /></figure><p>Finding: The earliest timestamp in the results shows 12345678 as the first password attempted.</p><p>Answer: 12345678</p><p><strong>Question 13: What was James Brodsky’s favorite Coldplay song, used as one of the brute force passwords? (six characters)</strong></p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=stream:http &quot;23.22.63.114&quot; form_data=&quot;*&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;passwd=(?&lt;password&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;username=(?&lt;user_name&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| eval length = len(password)<br>| table _time, password, user_name, length<br>| search length=6</pre><p>Method: Filtered the brute force attempts down to six character passwords, per the question’s hint. From there it’s less Splunk and more OSINT, had to actually look up James Brodsky’s favorite Coldplay song since the log data alone won’t tell you that.</p><p>Answer: yellow</p><p><strong>Question 14: What was the correct password for admin access to the content management system running “imreallynotbatman[.]com”?</strong></p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=* imreallynotbatman form_data=&quot;*&amp;passwd*&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;passwd=(?&lt;password&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;username=(?&lt;user_name&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| eval length = len(password)<br>| table _time, password, user_name, length</pre><p>Method: Pulled every login attempt and sorted by time. Simple logic here, a brute force doesn’t keep going once it works, so whatever password shows up last in the sequence is the one that probably got them in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OjuZT-OJVbTNuw_yorgSuw.png" /></figure><p>Finding: The last attempt in the timeline is batman, right after that the attempts just stop. Fitting, honestly, given the site’s name.</p><p>Answer: batman</p><p><strong>Question 15: What was the average password length used in the password brute forcing attempt?</strong></p><p>Answer guidance: Round to closest whole integer. For example “5” not “5.23213”</p><p>Objective: Calculate the average length across all passwords submitted in the brute force attempt.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=* imreallynotbatman form_data=&quot;&amp;passwd&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;passwd=(?&lt;password&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;username=(?&lt;user_name&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| eval length = len(password)<br>| stats avg(length)</pre><p>Method: Extracted the password from each login attempt, calculated its character length, then took the average across the full set of attempts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XK_n81aCKsHI_B9bMeiogw.png" /><figcaption>Finding: stats avg(length) returns 6.174334140435835, rounded to the nearest whole number as instructed.</figcaption></figure><p>Answer: 6</p><p><strong>Question 16: How many seconds elapsed between the time the brute force password scan identified the correct password and the compromised login?</strong></p><p>Answer guidance: Round to 2 decimal places.</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=stream:http imreallynotbatman.com http_method=POST form_data=&quot;*username*passwd*&quot;<br>| rex field=&quot;form_data&quot; &quot;passwd=(?&lt;passwd&gt;\w+)&quot;<br>| search passwd=&quot;batman&quot;<br>| transaction passwd<br>| table duration</pre><p>Method: transaction groups all events tied to the password batman and calculates the time span between them, giving the gap between when it first showed up and when it succeeded.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BtNMEk2rBCM-lTC6zT2pNg.png" /><figcaption>Finding: Couldn’t work this one out independently, looked up the approach and confirmed it with the query above.</figcaption></figure><p>Answer: 92.17</p><p>Question 17: How many unique passwords were attempted in the brute force attempt?</p><pre>Query:<br>index=botsv1 sourcetype=* imreallynotbatman form_data=&quot;*&amp;passwd*&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;passwd=(?&lt;password&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| rex field=form_data &quot;username=(?&lt;user_name&gt;[^&amp;]+)&quot;<br>| eval length = len(password)<br>| dedup password<br>| table password</pre><p>Method: Deduplicating on password strips out repeats, leaving only distinct values, a straightforward way to count how many unique passwords the attacker actually tried across the whole brute force run.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CPyYwBfx64HByYDWIB5MTQ.png" /></figure><p>Answer: 412</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b852ffcfb16c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Encryption vs Hashing vs Base64: Why They Are NOT the Same Thing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@skizzydera/encryption-vs-hashing-vs-base64-why-they-are-not-the-same-thing-8dd523e75855?source=rss-2be9eadb3e57------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8dd523e75855</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Akinola selim ]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 08:54:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-11T08:54:52.404Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you are in the cybersecurity realm you must have surely seen some terms like encryption, hashing, base64 encoding.<br>At first glance they all seem like a variant of one another because all of them can transform data into an unintelligible format which can’t be easily read without knowing how it is transformed.<br>However , despite their similar appearance, they serve different purposes entirely.<br>Encryption is designed to protect confidentiality, Hashing is used for verifying integrity, and base 64 encoding simply changes how data is represented for transmission and storage.<br>Let’s break it down for proper understanding. <br>Encryption<br>Encryption is the process of converting plaintext(readable format) into a ciphertext(unreadable format) using an algorithm and a secret key.<br>The main idea here is that with the correct key you can convert an encrypted text back to its original format. Encryption is reversible.<br>For example <br>Plain text: HELLO WORD!<br>Encrypted: Xy9kL2mPq… (looks completely random)<br>Without the key, the data is useless to anyone that intercepts it.<br>Encryption is mainly used to protect confidentiality, ensuring that only authorized parties can access the original information.<br>Application in real world includes<br>HTTPs website(secure browsing)<br>Messaging apps (whatsapp, facebook)<br>Vpn connection<br>Secure file storage<br>Think of encryption as a safe lock anyone with the right key combination can unlock it.<br>Hashing <br>Hashing is completely different to encryption.<br>It is a one-way function that converts data into a fixed-length string value called hash value or digest.<br>Hashing being a one way function means it is not reversible to its original input.<br>For example <br>Input: password123<br>Hash: ef92b778ba… (SHA-256 example)<br>Even a tiny change in the input will produce an entirely different hash digest.<br>Hashing is mainly used for integrity checking and verification, not secrecy like encryption <br>Common uses of hashing include:<br>Password storage<br>File integrity checking <br>Digital signature <br>Think of hashing like a fingerprint — you can compare fingerprints, but you cannot reconstruct the person from it.<br>Base64 encoding <br>Base64 is the most misunderstood one out of all three, but it is really the simplest<br>Base64 is not an encryption or hashing algorithm. It is simply a way of converting binary or special data into plain text so it can be safely transmitted or stored.<br>For example <br>Original: hello<br>Base64: aGVsbG8=<br>The key idea here is that it can be fully reversible without any key.<br>Anyone can decode it back to the original value easily.<br>Base64 is used in situation where the system need to transfer data that only support text such as:<br>Email attachments <br>JSON APIs<br>Embedding images in HTML<br>HTTP authentication headers<br>Think of Base64 like rewriting a message using a different alphabet. The meaning doesn’t change, it is just written differently.<br>Now that we understand the fundemental, we can all agree that they solve completely different problems in cybersecurity.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8dd523e75855" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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