<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sohan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sohan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@sohanxp56?source=rss-c36bb306fc76------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sohan on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sohanxp56?source=rss-c36bb306fc76------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 07:58:59 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Active Session Hijacking via Authentication session_id Exposed in URL]]></title>
            <link>https://sohanxp56.medium.com/active-session-hijacking-via-authentication-session-id-exposed-in-url-f12b1672107b?source=rss-c36bb306fc76------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[web-penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[api-penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sohan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 06:07:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-05T06:07:11.194Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*PpB2et_Qk7bLyJ2LnL8VSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>by <a href="https://www.google.com/search?newwindow=1&amp;sca_esv=a9ef4cc7a4068896&amp;sxsrf=ANbL-n5Uub6GjoVMYezIq8geVLYK9PBKFg:1770269939890&amp;q=pinterest&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjFwrG30cGSAxWab_UHHcBjMLAQkeECKAB6BAgMEAE"><strong><em>pinterest</em></strong></a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Yo hackers! I’m back with another interesting bug write-up 😈🔥</strong><br> Today’s issue is about <strong>session hijacking</strong> caused by an authentication token leaking in the URL.</p><p>Session tokens are meant to stay private and secure, but when they are exposed inside a URL query string, it becomes extremely easy for attackers to steal and replay them. In this write-up, I’ll explain how I found a vulnerability where an active authentication token (session_id) is included in the redirect URL after login, allowing unauthorized access to the victim’s active session.</p><h3>Vulnerability Summary</h3><p>After successful authentication, the application redirects the user to a different endpoint and includes an authentication token directly in the URL:</p><pre>https://example.com/?session_id=&lt;SESSION_TOKEN&gt;&amp;expire=900&amp;remember=0&amp;auth_action=login<br></pre><p>The session_id parameter acts as an active session token. Anyone who obtains this URL can replay it to access the victim’s session without needing credentials or cookies.</p><p>This results in <strong>Active Session Hijacking</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*NUu7bGcgVWvnDxre7pIOng.jpeg" /></figure><p>Steps to Reproduce</p><p>Step 1 Log in with a valid account at:</p><pre>https://example.com/login</pre><p>Step 2 After successful login, observe the redirect URL:</p><pre>https://example.com/?session_id=&lt;SESSION_TOKEN&gt;&amp;expire=900&amp;remember=0&amp;auth_action=login</pre><p>Step 3 Copy the full URL including the session_id.</p><p>step 4 Open a private/incognito window or a different browser/device (with no cookies or prior login).</p><p>Step 5 Paste the copied URL and open it.</p><p>step 6 Observe that the session loads successfully and the user is authenticated automatically.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*d03dlz6P5UKcL3xEsNxi2Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Observed Behavior</p><p>The session_id parameter alone is enough to authenticate the user.</p><p>The session can be replayed:</p><p>in incognito/private mode</p><p>across different browsers</p><p>across different operating systems</p><p>without any authentication cookies</p><p>This confirms that the URL token is treated as an active authentication credential.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*_e0ugsd5oJ_LL1pnnWYUig.png" /></figure><p>If you found this useful, hit the 👏 button, share it with your fellow hunters, and follow me here so you don’t miss the next drop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/460/1*0bNmKZ1b66suYb6dihuk2Q.gif" /><figcaption>Stay curious, stay ethical, and keep exploring. For now, bye bye — wait for the next exploit! ⚡💥</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://x.com/Comrade_proxy">https://x.com/Comrade_proxy</a> follow me</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f12b1672107b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[OAuth Login Bypasses & Account Linking Chaos — A Bug Bounty Adventure]]></title>
            <link>https://sohanxp56.medium.com/oauth-login-bypasses-account-linking-chaos-a-bug-bounty-adventure-bf0cf0b28d72?source=rss-c36bb306fc76------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sohan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 18:38:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-14T18:50:16.167Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>OAuth Login Bypasses &amp; Account Linking Chaos — A Bug Bounty Adventure</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*_GRVpiN9izrnfec1hlGYBA.jpeg" /><figcaption>In OAuth, the lock is the frontend — the key is the backend.<br>And sometimes, the backend forgets to check the door.🖤💚</figcaption></figure><p>During a routine bug bounty hunt, I stumbled upon an OAuth login flow behaving like it had a mind of its own. Two related quirks made me raise an eyebrow (and maybe snicker) — all perfectly legal to test, of course.</p><p>Think of it like a digital “oops” moment, but with potential account takeover consequences.</p><p>🕵️‍♂️ The Misbehaving Features</p><p>1️⃣ Email Verification Bypass via OAuth 📨<br>Imagine registering an account, not verifying your email, and then logging in via Google — OAuth says: “Sure, you’re verified… I trust you!”<br>Spoiler: you’re not verified. But suddenly, you can edit profiles and poke around features.<br>It’s like showing up at a party without an invite, and the bouncer hands you the keys anyway. 🎉</p><p>2️⃣ Automatic Account Linking Without Consent 🔗<br>Now imagine logging in via Google with an email that matches an existing account. Instead of politely asking, “Hey, do you want to link these?”, the system just merges them.<br>It’s like your digital self saying: “We’re family now. No need to ask.”<br>OAuth clearly likes to play matchmaker… aggressively. ❤️</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/1*pH812QkE0YsK74bTzIqdMA.jpeg" /></figure><p>🛠 Steps to Reproduce 🧪</p><p>Issue 1 — Email Verification Bypass 🚪</p><p>1 Registered an account using <a href="/service/mailto:hello@gmail.com">hello@gmail.com</a> via email/password.</p><p>2 Ignored the verification email.</p><p>3 Logged out.</p><p>4 Clicked “Login with Google” and authenticated using the same email.</p><p>5 Boom — I was in.</p><p>No verification. No restrictions.<br>The account was still marked as unverified, but I could access features like editing the profile and possibly more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*33kJyCROHYEulljbHYCR6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Issue 2 — Account Linking Without Asking 🔄<br>Then I decided to see what happens with a verified email/password account.</p><p>1 Created an account using <a href="/service/mailto:hello@gmail.com">hello@gmail.com</a> via email/password.</p><p>2 Verified the email.</p><p>3 Logged out.</p><p>4 Logged in with Google using the same email.</p><p>5 I was instantly logged into the existing account</p><p>No confirmation prompt. No “Do you want to link accounts?” message.</p><p>The system just assumed, “If the email matches, they must be the same person.”</p><p>Impact:<br>If someone controls a Google account with the same email (due to a previous breach, credential stuffing, or weak email security), they could instantly access the victim’s account without the password.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*fz3gdwN__w8iYlQ-RDt9cw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Why This Is Dangerous<br>This isn’t just a “minor best-practice” issue.<br>It’s a chainable flaw:</p><p>Step 1: Attacker registers a victim’s email (or finds an existing unverified account).</p><p>Step 2: Logs in via OAuth and bypasses verification.</p><p>Step 3: Gains access to account features or takes over entirely.</p><p>When combined, these issues undermine the entire authentication flow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/732/1*SrR0nGSb4k6XTUQFroz7ow.jpeg" /></figure><p>Recommendations<br>Enforce verification checks on all login methods.</p><p>Add explicit user consent prompts before linking OAuth to an existing account.</p><p>Monitor unusual linking behavior for signs of abuse.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*swi-7JRX74J4iRqeAWJqWw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Takeaway<br>OAuth integrations are convenient, but convenience without security is an open door for attackers.<br>Always validate verification status and never auto-link accounts without asking the user.</p><p>This bug could have easily gone unnoticed, but sometimes the most impactful vulnerabilities hide in plain sight — right behind a shiny “Login with Google” button.</p><p>If you found this useful, hit the 👏 button, share it with your fellow hunters, and follow me here so you don’t miss the next drop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/460/1*0bNmKZ1b66suYb6dihuk2Q.gif" /><figcaption>Stay curious, stay ethical, and keep exploring. For now, bye bye — wait for the next exploit! ⚡💥</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://x.com/Comrade_proxy">https://x.com/Comrade_proxy</a> follow me</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf0cf0b28d72" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Account Deletion Security Pitfalls — A Bug Bounty Case Study]]></title>
            <link>https://sohanxp56.medium.com/account-deletion-security-pitfalls-a-bug-bounty-case-study-8ab8fe7ac8f5?source=rss-c36bb306fc76------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ab8fe7ac8f5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[api-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sohan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 18:24:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-15T19:28:52.744Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Account Deletion Security Pitfalls — A Bug Bounty Case Study</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*crTkvwVZyKbbDP7mC4idAw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>📌 Overview</h3><p>During an API security review, I encountered a design flaw in an account deletion process.<br> The API allowed accounts to be deleted by sending a single HTTP request containing only a <strong>bearer token</strong> — no secondary checks, no confirmation, and no recovery option.</p><p>While this example was discovered in a <strong>sandbox environment</strong>, it highlights a dangerous pattern that could cause severe damage in production systems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/1*pH812QkE0YsK74bTzIqdMA.jpeg" /></figure><p>🔍 Test Scenario Setup</p><p>To replicate the risk in a safe, controlled way, I created two test accounts:</p><p>Test User A — “victim”</p><p>Test User B — “attacker”</p><p>While reviewing the account deletion process for Test User A, I observed:</p><p>The request was a DELETE /user call (anonymized for safety).</p><p>No user ID was included in the request URL or body.</p><p>The action succeeded using only the bearer token tied to the account.</p><p>In the lab environment, swapping this token with another valid token instantly deleted the account linked to it — without any additional verification.</p><p>Why This Matters</p><p>If such a design flaw existed in a live production environment, it could lead to:</p><p>Account Takeover → Destruction — A stolen bearer token could wipe an account.</p><p>Targeted Denial of Service — Attackers could disable accounts at will.</p><p>Business Workflow Disruption — Automated systems relying on bearer tokens could be broken.</p><p>Lack of Visibility — Victims might never know why they lost access.</p><p>Potential Business Impact</p><p>Loss of customer trust due to unexpected account loss.</p><p>Permanent data loss affecting service integrity.</p><p>Regulatory risks under GDPR, CCPA, or similar laws.</p><p>Operational disruption if key accounts are deleted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/581/1*U_mKkQe8niSun4UqQc6C_g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/732/1*SrR0nGSb4k6XTUQFroz7ow.jpeg" /></figure><p>How to Prevent This</p><p>Require Identity Verification — Re-enter password or use MFA before deletion.</p><p>Validate the User ID — Ensure the authenticated user matches the account being deleted.</p><p>Use CSRF Protection — Prevent unauthorized deletion requests.</p><p>Add a Deletion Delay — Allow users to reverse deletion requests.</p><p>Send Alerts — Notify users when a deletion request is initiated.</p><p>If you found this useful, hit the 👏 button, share it with your fellow hunters, and follow me here so you don’t miss the next drop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/460/1*0bNmKZ1b66suYb6dihuk2Q.gif" /><figcaption>Stay curious, stay ethical, and keep exploring. For now, bye bye — wait for the next exploit! ⚡💥</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://x.com/Comrade_proxy">https://x.com/Comrade_proxy</a> follow me</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ab8fe7ac8f5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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