<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alessandro Portolano on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alessandro Portolano on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@soundandprudent?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 19:42:23 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@soundandprudent/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Third Country Entities & the SFDR]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/third-country-entities-the-sfdr-f831d5ddbd8b?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f831d5ddbd8b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sfdr]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2021 19:37:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-18T13:09:33.252Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong><em>Sebastiaan Niels Hooghiemstra</em></strong>[1]</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z7hun_aKAr0X5iCg0_z9kA.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Massimo Catalani)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The deadline for financial market participants and financial advisers is approaching fast and is set on the 10thof March 2021. In this respect, this contribution explains the uncertainties with respect to the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, as amended (the “SFDR”) to alternative investment fund managers (“AIFMs”), asset managers and investment advisers that are located in third countries.</strong></p><p><strong>1. Introduction</strong></p><p>On 27 November 2019, SFDR on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector came into force and the regulation will apply as from 10 March 2020 onwards. The regulation forms part of a number of initiatives adopted by the European Commission as part of its Action Plan on Sustainable Finance adopted in March 2018. Apart from the SFDR, these include:</p><ul><li>a regulation amending the benchmark regulation in relation to low carbon benchmarks and positive carbon impact benchmarks;</li><li>Regulation (EU) 2020/852 (the “<strong>Taxonomy Regulation</strong>”) on the establishment of a frame-work to facilitate sustainable investment; and</li><li>delegated regulations amending MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565 (“<strong>LVL 2 MiFID II</strong>”) and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 (“<strong>LVL 2 AIFMD</strong>”) to integrate ESG considerations and preferences into investment advice and portfolio management and to in-corporate sustainability risks.</li></ul><p>The SFDR seeks to harmonize existing provisions on disclosures to investors in relation to sustaina-bility-related disclosures by imposing requirements to a wide range of cross-sectoral financial market participants (e.g. UCITS management companies and investment firms) and financial advisers (e.g. investment firms and credit institutions) in relation to financial products (e.g. alternative investment funds (“<strong>AIF</strong>”) and undertakings for collective investment undertakings (“<strong>UCITS</strong>”)). Due to the cross-sectoral approach of the SFDR, the regulation ensures a “level playing field”. <br>This contribution seeks to answer the contribution whether small managers also fall within the scope of the SFDR. To that end, it first assesses the scope of the SFDR with respect to AIFMs and AIFs. It then provides a high-level overview of the SFDR obligations for AIFMs and AIFs they manage. Fur-thermore, the contribution continues by discussing what SFDR obligations potentially apply to Small AIFMs and then concludes.</p><p><strong>2. Scope SFDR — Non-EU AIFMs, Asset Managers and Investment advisers</strong></p><p>To ensure cross-sectoral consistency throughout European sectoral laws, the SFDR is applicable to a wide range of “financial market participants”, including, amongst others, AIFMs and investment firms authorized under Directive 2014/65/EU, as amended (“<strong>MiFID II</strong>”) which provide portfolio manage-ment. The SFDR, however, only applies to certain defined financial products made available by fi-nancial market participants.</p><p>The definition of “financial products” under the SFDR includes, amongst others, portfolios managed by MiFID II investment firms and AIFs managed by AIFMs. Furthermore, certain “financial advi-sers” including, amongst others, MiFID II investment firms that provide investment advice with res-pect to “financial products” also fall within the scope of the SFDR.</p><p>Authorized (EU) AIFMs and investment firms providing portfolio management are, thus, in relation to financial products as “financial market participants required to comply with the SFDR. The same holds true for MiFID II investment firms that provide investment advice and qualify under the SFDR as “financial advisers” with respect to these products. The question that arises is whether non-EU AIFMs, non-EU MiFID II investment firms providing portfolio management and investment advice also fall within the scope of the SFDR. That question has been raised several times so far, but no clear answer has been given on the EU level yet.</p><p>The definition of “financial market participant” under Article 2(1) SFDR includes all AIFMs. Furthermore, the SFDR clarifies that AIFM means “an AIFM as defined in the AIFMD”. Reading the AIFMD, an AIFM means “a legal person whose regular business is managing one or more AIFs”, regardless of whether the (registered office of the) legal person is located within or outside the EU. In other words, Non-EU AIFMs fall, in principle, within the scope of the SFDR.</p><p>Similarly, the definitions of both “financial market participants” under the SFDR includes investments firms, which provide portfolio management and the “financial advisers” definition those that provide investment advice. According to the SFDR, the term “investment firms” means “an investment firm” as defined under MiFID II. Contrary to the AIFM definition under the AIFMD, MiFID II makes a distinction between the term “investment firms”, which are established in the EU, and “third-country firms”, which are “firms that <em>would be</em> a credit institution providing investment services or performing investment activities or an investment firm if its head office or registered office were located within the Union”. Technically speaking, non-EU MiFID II investment firms, which provide investment advice, thus, do not fall within the (personal) scope of the SFDR. The inconsistencies between non-EU AIFMs and investment firms raises the question whether it was the intention of the European legislator to include non-EU financial market participants and financial advisers within the scope of the SFDR.</p><p><strong>3. SFDR Obligations — A brief Overview</strong></p><p>The SFDR imposes both obligations on the “entity level”, i.e. level of financial market participants and financial advisers, and on the “product level” (e.g. AIFs or managed accounts).</p><p>On the “entity level”, the SFDR requires financial market participants, amongst others, to:</p><ul><li>integrate sustainability risks in their investment process;</li><li>to consider significant adverse effects of investment decisions on sustainability factors in the due diligence process, or explain why the financial market participant does not comply with this (for financial market participants with less than 500 employees on a group consolidated basis); and</li><li>explain in their remuneration policy how the policy is consistent with the integration of sus-tainability risks.</li></ul><p>Financial market participants are required to publish their efforts in this respect on their website. Si-milar requirements apply to financial advisers.</p><p>On the product level, financial market participants are for every financial product (e.g. AIFs and ma-naged accounts, amongst others, required to include in pre-contractual disclosures (e.g. PPM) how sustainability risks are integrated and their likely effects on the returns, or provide an explanation why sustainability risks are not relevant. Various additional duties apply if the financial products that they offer are labelled as “promoting environmental or social characteristics (“<strong>Light Green Product</strong>”) or as a “sustainable investment” (“<strong>Dark Green Product</strong>”) under Article 8 and 9 SFDR. In particular, these additional information obligations relate to not only mandatory disclosure related tot his pro-ducts in pre-contractual disclosures, but also with respect to additional information obligations with publication on the website and in periodic disclosures (e.g. annual reports for AIFs).</p><p><strong>4. Do SFDR Obligations apply to Non-EU AIFMs, Asset Managers &amp; Financial Advisers?</strong></p><p>Given the ambiguity of the SFDR’s scope with respect to non-EU AIFMs, asset managers and finan-cial advisers, the question remains whether these non-EU entities are required to “materially comply” with obligations under the SFDR.</p><p>In this respect, it should be noted that a recent FAQ published by the European Commission and the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (the “<strong>Taxonomy Regulation FAQ</strong>”) stated that the product disclosure obligations laid down in the SFDR are meant to apply to anyone offering financial products in the EU, regardless of where the manufacturer of such products is based.</p><p>This question remains what the implications of this are for (i) non-EU AIFMs, (ii) non-EU asset ma-nagers and (iii) financial advisers.</p><p><strong>4.1.</strong> <strong>Non-EU AIFMs</strong></p><p>The Taxonomy Regulation FAQ seems to confirm that, in any case, non-EU AIFMs that market their AIFs in the EU pursuant to the national private placement regimes under Article 42 AIFMD, have to comply with the disclosure obligations in the SFDR. By absence of further EU level clarifications, it will depend upon the Member State implementations in place with what SFDR obligations such non-EU AIFMs will need to comply with. The Luxembourgish implementation of Article 42 AIFMD seems to suggest that non-EU AIFMs that market AIFs to professional investors in Luxembourg will need to, at least, comply with the SFDR obligations targeting the PPM (Article 23 AIFMD) and the annual report (Article 22 AIFMD). The regulator may in the coming months clarify whether “entity level” policies/procedures are also required when marketing in Luxembourg. It should be noted, however, that non-EU AIFMs that sell AIFs in Luxembourg in response to reverse enquiry only are not captured by the SFDR. It only needs to comply with the SFDR for those funds which are registe-red/notified for private placement marketing in the EU.</p><p><strong>4.2. Non-EU Asset Managers</strong></p><p>Depending upon the MiFID II third country regime applicable and its national interpretation thereof, the SFDR might be directly applicable to non-EU asset managers offering managed accounts in the EU. Furthermore, the SFDR might be indirectly applicable to non-EU asset managers where they are a delegate of a European AIFM or other entity that is directly subject to the SFDR. In the latter case, these entities may seek contractual commitments from the non-EU manager to enable the European entity to comply with its own obligations. Such commitments may include, for example:</p><ul><li>the provision of information and data by the non-EU asset manager for the purpose of the European AIFM complying with pre-contractual disclosure requirements; and</li><li>certain duties and responsibilities from the non-EU asset manager as may be required by the EU AIFM’s policies and procedures.</li></ul><p><strong>4.3.</strong> <strong>Non-EU Financial advisers</strong></p><p>At first glance, non-EU financial advisers seem to be excluded from the scope of the SFDR. Furthermore, the Taxonomy Regulation FAQ statement with regards to the SFDR only targets financial market participants offering financial products within the EU and does not include financial advisers. Nevertheless, the MiFID II third country regimes, as implemented by individual Member States, that are applicable to non-EU financial advisers advising EU clients with regard to SFDR financial products may, however, require financial advisers to fully comply with the SFDR “entity level” requirements. When advising “in-scope” SFDR entities, non-EU financial advisers may be indirectly through contractual mechanisms be required to comply with the SFDR.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> <strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>This contribution highlighted that the obligations arising from a possible (direct) application of the SFDR to non-EU AIFMs and investment firms (asset managers and financial advisers) is not always clear. Hopefully, the (European) legislature and regulators will pick up on this and will make necessary clarifications with respect to the AIFMD (national) private placement regimes and the MiFID II (national) third country regimes.</p><p><em>[1]Dr. Sebastiaan Hooghiemstra, LL.M. is an associate in the investment funds practice of NautaDutilh Luxembourg and Senior Fellow/Guest Lecturer of the International Center for Financial Law &amp; Governance at the Erasmus University Rotterdam.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f831d5ddbd8b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/third-country-entities-the-sfdr-f831d5ddbd8b">Third Country Entities &amp; the SFDR</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-3-4fd2ae5558f5?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4fd2ae5558f5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-institutions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Feb 2021 20:34:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-08T08:01:22.834Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 3</h3><p><em>I threw the kitchen sink at him but he went to the bathroom and got his tub<br></em>(Andy Roddick after having lost the Wimbledon final to Roger Federer in 2004)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rO9u86CFU5Gp-91gjNEQpA.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Nothing but honour”, Maurizio Bruno (sculptor), Danilo Cartacci (painter)</figcaption></figure><p>This is the last in a three-part series on the issue of how defending financial institutions in the context of sanctioning proceedings brought by regulators in Italy.</p><p>After having looked at certain <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-1-915585e3aa95">preliminary procedural and organizational matters</a> and at <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-2-a7adabe4ffa1">how to coordinate the defenses between the various individuals involved</a>, this post will discuss how to structure the content and the merits of the defenses.</p><p>Preparing the defenses requires a careful balancing between various trade-offs.</p><p><strong>In short, you have to defend yourself, but maybe… not too much.</strong></p><p>Here is why.</p><blockquote><em>1. The defenses are still part of the administrative phase. They will be assessed by the regulator, i.e. the same institution which has initiated the proceeding.<br>True, in the last ten to fifteen years the procedural rules have been changed to avoid the drawbacks stemming from the old framework, where the same office which had initiated the proceeding would decide on the defenses, with the obvious ensuing situations of conflicts of interest. Under the current legal framework the office in charge of assessing the defenses is not the same which drafted and filed the charges. It may indeed happen that as a result of the defenses the final decision deviates from the initial approach embedded in the letter of charges. Even in those cases where such deviation occurs, however, it is rarely a radical deviation (e.g. the initial charges may be mitigated, e.g. by dropping some charges or issuing lower sanctions).<br>As a consequence, </em><strong><em>you should expect some level of inertia on the part of the regulator</em></strong><em>: The final decision will in most instances mirror the content of letter of charges, no matter what you write in your defenses.<br>Some of the arguments you are going to table during this phase, then, may become relevant in subsequent phases (in court, that is), rather than in the context of the proceeding itself.</em></blockquote><blockquote>2. <em>As </em><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/all-is-quiet-on-the-western-front-trench-warfare-and-the-relationship-between-supervisors-and-f47c02bbf22f"><em>I have argued elsewhere</em></a><em>, </em><strong><em>financial institutions and regulators play a repeated game</em></strong><em>. The relationship specifically connected to the sanctioning proceeding must be read and handled in the more general context of the entire nexus of relationships in place with the regulator.<br>If this sounds cynical, this is because it is cynical. Yet this is the reality of the facts: In responding to the charges you have to factor also the consequences that your response may have on the broader relationship with the Regulator.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>3. </em><strong><em>Sanctions are a supervisory tool</em></strong><em>: Regulators will look at the entire set of circumstances and at the general conduct of the institution and not at the specific charges in isolation. The very same conduct may yield very different consequences, depending on the overall level of compliance of the institution with the regulatory framework.<br>I am aware that this statement is debatable from the theoretical standpoint (if there is a breach there has to be a sanction, the argument goes). Yet experience tells that in taking decisions on sanctions, regulators routinely take into account the overall level of compliance of the institution.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>4. </em><strong><em>Decisions by the regulator may be appealed in Court. </em></strong><em>In preparing the defenses you will need to also look further on the horizon and bear in mind that what you write may be assessed by a court of law if you are sanctioned and you decide to appeal.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Mix all the above strategic constraints and you may want to follow this rules of thumb.</strong></p><p><strong>Firstly</strong>, do not throw a kitchen sink at the regulator, lest, like Andy Roddick, you may end up receiving in return a bath thub (<a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/the-european-banking-authority-consultation-guidelines-on-loan-origination-and-monitoring-1e61b7fd475a">I am not a big tennis fan, I am more the ski-kind-of-guy, as you may know by now</a>, I owe this quote to my colleague Felice Azzollini, who firstly used it discussing defensive strategies with a client, driving this quote into the toolbox of our team).</p><p>Clients sometimes wish to argue– to take an extreme version which I have actually heard — that the Regulators’ officers inspecting the bank know nothing of how banks are run and understood nothing of what they were analyzing. Whether this may or may not be true, quite simply, doesn’t matter. What matters is what the reaction of the regulator when you file the defenses is. Aggressive stances may prove ineffective and may deteriorate the relationship with the regulator.</p><p><strong>Secondly</strong>, fast forward for a later stage, when you want to file an appeal in court against the decision which has issued the sanctions. In filing an appeal you will eventually consider filing arguments which can be distinguished, with a major simplification, between (i) procedural arguments: For example that charges were filed too late, beyond the term set out by the law and (ii) arguments relating to the merits of the charges (say, the regulator has deemed that the bank was using tainted data for the calculations of the LGD). Judges must be expected to react differently to these two classes of arguments, for the quite simple reason that procedural and strictly legal arguments will more easily resonate with a judge and are easier to grasp and assess than facts which entail a technical, prudential, assessment (picture a judge trying to assess whether the data used by the bank to calculate the LGD were indeed tainted or not): Judges must be expected to defer to the regulators the assessment of the merits, which are frequently outside their comfort zone.</p><p>Now let’s go back to the administrative phase. You may want to raise procedural issues only if these are bullet proof, as these imply a wrongdoing by the regulator and may be difficult to digest for the latter. If you have procedural arguments, you will most likely prefer to only hint at them, and save them for the judicial phase.</p><p><strong>Thirdly</strong>, in relations to the merits, should you just challenge the charges and argue that the latter were unfounded? As anticipated, if you are too aggressive you might end up receiving a bath tub in return. A wiser strategy, at least based on my experience, might be to defend yourself, challenging the merits of the arguments made by the Regulators, but trying to build <em>also</em> on a logic of cooperation. The optimal strategy will vary case by case, but, in general, one should consider (a) putting the alleged breaches in a wider context and trying to downplay the relevance of the charges (for example if the charges mention specific episodes of breaches, one may try to show that those breaches were in fact only a tiny fraction, when compared to the universe of all similar occurrences) and (b) reassuring the regulator that the bank will further reinforce its internal control mechanisms so that they can prevent the situations which have been criticized by the Regulator from occurring again.</p><p>Point (b) is particularly relevant. When I discuss this point with clients I feel at times that they are uncomfortable with using these kind of arguments: The objection will typically be that they do not want to acknowledge to any wrongdoing. Of course I see the point and agree to it.</p><p>The point is, however, that committing to <em>further reinforcing</em> the internal control systems is very different from committing to cure a deficiency. The former does not imply an admission of responsibility, while still showing that the bank is willing to acknowledge the views of the regulator and to act on the basis of that input.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fd2ae5558f5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-3-4fd2ae5558f5">Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 3</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Blowing the Whistle” in the Financial Services Industry: What Changes does the new EU…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/blowing-the-whistle-in-the-financial-services-industry-what-changes-does-the-new-eu-f1e2b35295bf?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f1e2b35295bf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[whistleblowing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eu]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2020 15:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-18T15:34:20.484Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>“Blowing the Whistle” in the Financial Services Industry: What Changes does the new EU Whistleblowing Directive Bring?</strong></h3><h3>Liemertje Sieders (*), Donato Vozza (**)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zysrlOuuQukk7wja1pC1mg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Massimo Catalani (Painter)</figcaption></figure><p>The past few years have seen whistleblowing cases of undeniable significance filter into the European dimension, <em>LuxLeaks</em>, <em>Panama Papers</em>, <em>Football Leaks</em> and <em>Cambridge Analytica</em> to name a few, making calls for the adoption of common whistleblower protections across the European Union increasingly difficult to ignore. Despite their crucial role in revealing financial crimes or unethical behaviours affecting the public interest, no answer to the protection of whistleblowers had yet been established at EU level, leading whistleblowers to feel widely discouraged from reporting their suspicions for fear of retaliation and other adverse consequences. To address this gap, on 23 October 2019, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament adopted Directive (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.305.01.0017.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ:L:2019:305:TOC">2019/1937</a> on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (the “Whistleblowing Directive”), which came into force on 17 December 2019.</p><p>Setting out common minimum standards providing for “<em>a high level of protection</em>” of persons who reports breaches of EU law in both the public and private sector, the Directive explicitly covers, among others, the areas of financial services, products and markets, and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Three reporting channels can be used by whistleblowers seeking to report breaches, each one bearing its own specific requirements:</p><p>- internal reporting within a legal entity (Articles 7–9),<br>- external reporting to the competent authorities (Articles 10–14), and<br>- public disclosures (Article 15).</p><p>Pursuant to the Directive, EU Member States must ensure that public and private legal entities adopt internal reporting channels and procedures, and that whistleblowers are adequately protected. Notably, the Directive bestows protection on a wide range of so-called “<em>reporting persons</em>” (i.e. whistleblowers), defined in Article 4 to include, among others, workers as well as persons whose work-based relationship has ended or is yet to begin, provided they acquire information on breaches in a work-related context.</p><p>This is not the first time that the EU is legislating whistleblowing in the financial sector. On the contrary, this sector is, in many ways, the most advanced when it comes to whistleblowing protection, with several Union acts obliging competent authorities and certain legal entities to establish internal reporting channels. The existence of such legislation begs the question whether, and if so to what extent, the new EU Directive alters the duties of financial service operators when it comes to whistleblowing.</p><p>The body of pre-existing EU legislation on whistleblowing in the financial services sector consists more of a mosaic, characterized by the kind of fragmentation which the Directive aims explicitly to address by introducing common standards. Some of the relevant whistleblowing provisions contained in Union acts are:</p><p>- Directive <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0036">2013/36/EU</a> on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (Article 71)<br>- Directive <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0065">2014/65/EU</a> on markets in financial instruments (Article 73)<br>- Regulation (EU) No <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0909">909/2014</a> on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (Article 65)<br>- Regulation (EU) No <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1286">1286/2014</a> on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) (Article 28)<br>- Regulation (EU) No <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0596">596/2014</a> on market abuse (Article 32). Notably, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) provides that Member States can provide, under certain conditions, for financial incentives to persons who report. The Commission Implementing Directive (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L2392">2015/2392</a> provided further guidance on the MAR as regards reporting infringements to competent authorities.<br>- Regulation (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R2365">2015/2365</a> on transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse (Article 24)<br>- Regulation (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R0847">2015/847</a> on information accompanying transfers of funds (Article 21)<br>- Directive (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849">2015/849</a> on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (Article 61)<br>- Directive (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L0097">2016/97</a> on insurance distribution (Article 35)<br>- Regulation (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1129">2017/1129</a> on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market (Article 41).</p><p>These provisions vary only slightly among one another. Most (though not all) include the following main elements:</p><p>- an obligation on Member States to ensure competent authorities establish effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of “potential or actual infringements” of the transposing national legislation to them;</p><p>- the necessary components of such external reporting mechanisms, namely: specific procedures for receipt and follow-up of reports, appropriate protection for employees of the service provider subject to the relevant Regulation or Directive who report infringements “at least against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair treatment”, and protection of the personal data and identity of the whistleblower and the person concerned by the report;</p><p>- an obligation on Member States to require service providers, as employers, subject to the relevant Regulation or Directive to have in place appropriate procedures for their employees to report such infringements internally through a “specific, independent and autonomous channel”.</p><p>The relationship between the new Whistleblowing Directive and such pre-existing EU legislation is, by the will of the Directive, one of complementarity. The latter shall apply to the extent that a matter is not mandatorily regulated in the sector-specific Union acts listed in Part II of the Annex to the Directive (Article 3). At the same time, where whistleblowing is already regulated in a particular area, this Directive should complement such acts and, in particular, “<em>provide further detail as to the design of the internal and external reporting channels, the obligations of competent authorities, and the specific forms of protection to be provided at national level against retaliation</em>.” (Recital 20).</p><p>Therefore, the Directive could imply changes that go beyond the requirements envisioned in pre-existing legislation and that significantly broaden the measures financial service entities will have to take to be fully compliant with EU legislation. Here are some of the changes brought by the Directive that seem most impactful on the financial sector:</p><p>- <strong>Obligation to establish internal reporting channels: <em>all </em>financial service entities</strong></p><p>Pre-existing EU legislation on whistleblowing in the financial sector generally requires that the relevant entities put in place an internal reporting channel, but this is not invariably the case. Under Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 Member States are given the option,<em> </em>rather than obligation, of requiring employers engaged in activities that are regulated for financial services purposes to have in place internal reporting mechanisms for their employees. Directive (EU) 2016/97 does not even refer to such internal tools.</p><p>Under the new Whistleblowing Directive, all financial service entities subject to the Directive must establish an internal reporting channel. Article 8(1) requires Member States to ensure that internal reporting channels are established by legal entities in the private and public sector that have 50 or more workers. However, when it comes to “<em>entities falling within the scope of Union acts referred to in Parts I.B and II of the Annex</em>” — namely, financial services, products and markets, and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing -, this threshold does not apply (Article 8(4)). Financial service entities will be obliged to establish such a channel irrespective of their number of workers. This even applies to those subjects to the more discretionary Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 (Recital 20).</p><p>It is worth noting that Article 8(2) creates an obligation to establish internal reporting channels only for the entity’s “<em>workers</em>”: discretion is left to the entity to decide whether to open such channels up to the wide array of other individuals contemplated in Article 4 of the Directive.</p><p>- <strong>Design of internal reporting channels</strong></p><p>The Directive delineates the necessary elements of such internal reporting procedures (Article 9). In this regard, the Directive contains far greater detail than pre-existing legislation. The requirements — in sum — are as follows:</p><ul><li>the channels must be ensuring the confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person and any third party mentioned in the report;</li><li>the procedure must acknowledge receipt of the report to the reporting person within seven days of receipt;</li><li>the entity must designate an impartial person or department competent for following-up on the reports and providing feedback;</li><li>such designated person or department must diligently follow-up;</li><li>a reasonable timeframe for feedback must be provided, not exceeding three months from the acknowledgement of receipt or, if no acknowledgement was sent, three months from the expiry of the seven days;</li><li>clear and easily accessible information regarding external reporting procedures must be provided.</li></ul><p>- <strong>No mandatory reporting sequences</strong></p><p>The Directive provisions introducing optional reporting channels are arguably the most controversial, with prior versions of the Directive envisioning the hierarchization of reporting channels and thus an obligation first to exhaust internal reporting channels. As a result of complex institutional negotiations at EU level, the Directive no longer envisages a mandatory reporting sequence, providing the whistleblower with the choice to report internally or directly externally (Article 10). The whistleblower can also choose to directly make a public disclosure, provided certain conditions listed in Article 15 are met.</p><p>- <strong>Protection and support measures to be provided to the whistleblower</strong></p><p>In pre-existing EU legislation, the protection measures (such as the prohibition of retaliation and other unfair treatment) were cited mostly, if not exclusively, in relation to external reporting channels (i.e. to competent authorities), and not in relation to internal mechanisms (required only to be “specific, independent and autonomous”). The new Directive provides extensive protection measures, chief among which the prohibition of retaliation contained in Article 19 (referring to a wide array of prohibited retaliatory acts), measures of support under Article 20 (including the provision of information and advice on the whistleblowers’ rights and legal aid), as well as penalties for hindering reporting or retaliating under Article 23, that must all be adopted by Member States. Protection is uniquely provided against retaliatory measures taken not only directly against the whistleblower but also indirectly against facilitators, colleagues, relatives or other third persons connected with the whistleblower and who suffer retaliation in a work-related context.</p><p>In conclusion, all financial service companies and institutions operating in the EU, and subject to applicable EU legislation, will be obliged to adopt an internal whistleblowing channel that meets, at the very least, the standards of the EU Directive, if not more stringent standards are adopted by the respective EU Member State. The required components of such internal channels are significantly more detailed, and more onerous than those provided in pre-existing EU legislation governing whistleblowing in the financial services sector.</p><p>Transposition of the Directive into national legislation must take place by 17 December 2021. Notably, by way of derogation from this ordinary transposition deadline, as regards legal entities in the private sector with 50–249 workers, the deadline for transposition by the Member States falls on 17 December 2023.</p><p>With the deadline for national transposition in mind, it would be wise to begin assessing whether one’s internal whistleblowing channel already meets these standards and what measures must be taken to bring one’s policies in line therewith (including by starting to undertake initiatives and training that promote an open and transparent workplace culture). Where a financial service entity is yet to set up an internal whistleblowing channel, it should do so, in light of the complementarity principle, and thus in consideration both of the new Whistleblowing Directive and of other Regulations or Directives applicable to it, so as to be in full compliance with the entire corpus of applicable EU and implementing national legislation.</p><p>(*) Compliance and Sanctions Specialist with Eni SpA.<br>(**) Research Associate at the Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity of Coventry University.</p><p><em>The views presented in this article are the personal views of the authors, who bear sole responsibility for the opinions expressed herein.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1e2b35295bf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/blowing-the-whistle-in-the-financial-services-industry-what-changes-does-the-new-eu-f1e2b35295bf">“Blowing the Whistle” in the Financial Services Industry: What Changes does the new EU…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Clash of the Titans: When the BRRD2 meets the MiFID2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/clash-of-the-titans-when-the-brrd2-meets-the-mifid2-9b97a67c080a?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b97a67c080a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mifid]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mifid2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phase-2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[esma]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2020 14:42:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-03T17:11:21.012Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note: <em>I started writing this post at the end of February. By the time the post was ready in early March, the COVID-19 crisis had violently hit Italy. I decided to suspend publications on SoundandPrudent. I just did not feel that publishing posts on a financial regulations’ blog was appropriate in the circumstances, if anything out of respect for those closely affected by the crisis. I did not like the #milanononsiferma (#milandoesn’tstop) rhetoric and even less so the boasting variations on the theme that mushroomed among us lawyers. I do think there are times when one must stop. Today Italy officially enters “Phase 2” and I think that time has come to resume publications. This is my symbolic contribution (insignificant as it is, I am well aware), to going back to normal.</em></p><p>This post analyzes certain <a href="https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-updates-qas-mifid-ii-and-mifir-investor-protection-topics">Q&amp;As published by ESMA</a> concerning the implementation of the new article 44.a of the BRRD which will be introduced, effective as of December 28, 2020, by the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014L0059-20200107">BRRD2</a>.</p><p>The Q&amp;As raise a number of issues from the standpoint of both the conceptual structure backing the BRRD and the MiFID, on one hand, and the implications of the new provisions for the design of business models, on the other.</p><p>This is Sound and Prudent’s sweet spot, so I hope you will bear with me for a tale of investors, mis-selling, and policy-making.</p><h3><strong>Once upon a time there was MiFID.</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*lYi6Jw0L-2spKSiyo_X3mA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Flow of The Air (Massimo Catalani)</figcaption></figure><p>The directive introduced a “<strong>suitability</strong>” test and an “<strong>appropriateness</strong>” test, which apply in different circumstances, depending on the type of investment service provided to the investors. Most notably, if investment advice is provided, then the suitability test shall apply. Which of the two tests applies matters a lot, because the suitability test is meant to be “blocking”. That is, if the instrument is not suitable for the investor, the latter should not be allowed to purchase it (but see below why I wrote “should”…). To the contrary, if the transaction is subject to the appropriateness test and the financial instrument is not appropriate, the investor can still decide to purchase it.</p><p>At the time the directive was issued in 2004, nobody would doubt that it was legally possible for financial institutions to structure business models which did not entail the provision of investment advice (and therefore did not entail the suitability test).</p><p>As the MiFID was transferred from the books into the reality of supervision, however, the space for such business models started to erode slowly but relentlessly.</p><p>In 2007, at the time of the implementation in Italy, Consob made clear that the sale of certain products (e.g. <a href="http://www.consob.it/web/area-pubblica/consultazioni/documenti/Regolamentazione/lavori_preparatori/esiti_consultazione_intermediari_20071030.htm">class III insurance products</a>) <em>de facto </em>ordinarily implies the provision of investment advice, thus triggering the obligation to run the suitability test.</p><p>In 2008 it was the time of OTC derivatives: Structuring such financial instruments — <a href="http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/c9019104.pdf/64f86e70-2bb0-460a-8f60-3dd079b6341d">Consob argued</a> — equals to investment advice and necessarily requires a suitability assessment.</p><p>Came two rounds of inspections by Consob in the early years after MiFID was implemented, as a result of which intermediaries were induced <em>en masse </em>to structure business models which include the provision of investment advice. As a result, the most institutions adopted business models centered on the provision of investment advice.</p><p>Yet, a number of those institutions continued to take a somewhat liberal — to put it mildly — approach to these issues. In fact, a cottage industry of crude but effective suitability-avoidance technologies flourished.</p><p>Assume Bank Alfa wants to raise subordinated own funds and proposes an investment in such funds to Mr. Rossi, one of its clients. Unfortunately the investment is “unsuitable” for Mr. Rossi (for example, he has responded to the MiFID questionnaire that he has never seen a subordinated bond before).</p><p>Mr. Rossi, however, is not discouraged so easily by the bureaucratic rules set out by MiFID…</p><p>After having failed the suitability test, Mr. Rossi may spontaneously (?) reiterate to Bank Alfa a request to purchase the bonds upon his own initiative (?), without the need of any advice and without the need to run the suitability test.</p><p>Alternatively, Mr. Rossi may fill in again the MiFID questionnaire. Mr. Rossi may thus rapidly, almost miraculously, become an expert in subordinated bonds and reply to the questionnaire accordingly. Sometimes one might find that the questionnaire is submitted to Mr. Rossi several times, in rapid sequence, with more answers being changed each time, until the result of the questionnaire becomes that Mr. Rossi is indeed perfectly equipped to understand what subordinated bonds are (Mr. Rossi must be a real genius, he learns new stuff every few minutes, as the questionnaire is repeatedly submitted to him!).</p><p><strong>Meanwhile, in a galaxy far, far away within the financial regulations universe, the BRRD framework was introduced</strong>. One of the cornerstones of the bank resolution framework is the idea that investors must bear the risks embedded into their investments in banks. This is the essence of the so called “bail-in” and all the related panoply of resolution authorities’ powers.</p><p>This sounds as — and most likely is — an excellent idea, especially if one considers that the typical alternative to the “bail-in” is not some form of “bail-nowhere”, i.e. the disappearance, as if by magic, of losses generated by the failure of banks, but the “bail-out” by the State.</p><p>There is only one small detail, for the impeccable logic behind the “bail-in” principles to work: Investors must properly understand what they are buying.</p><p>The trajectories of the BRRD and the MiFID thus naturally crossed, as it turned out that in many cases investors had been sold instruments issued by failing banks without fully appreciating the risks embedded in the investment.</p><p>And <strong>this is where art. 44.a of the BRRD2 enters the stage</strong>, by setting stringent rules for the sale of subordinated banking liabilities to retail clients.</p><p>In broad terms, such rules state that:</p><p>1) s<strong>ubordinated banking instruments cannot be sold to retail clients without a suitability assessment having been performed </strong>(and note that Member State can broaden the scope of such provisions to all other types of own funds);</p><p>2) <strong>quantitative limitations apply to the maximum exposure of investors towards such securities</strong>. In particular, retail investors whose financial instruments portfolio does not exceed 500,000 euro, cannot invest more than 10% in subordinated bonds.</p><p><strong>Rule no. 1) </strong>ushers a remarkable change from a systematic point of view, a true paradigm shift. Whether or not a suitability assessment was required or not was a consequence of the service model adopted by the financial institutions: If the bank offered investment advice (or managed accounts), then suitability was required. Under the new BRRD2 framework, instead, the suitability test becomes a structural feature of transactions involving a given financial instrument, <em>regardless </em>of the service model adopted.</p><p>I have no knowledge (from the seller’s side) of the legal rules governing the sale of pharmaceutical products or of weapons (and I wish to make clear that my experience on the buy side is limited to the purchase of medicines), but art. 44.a stimulates analogies with what I suspect to be the rules that apply to the sale of “dangerous” goods.</p><p>Quite coherently, then, ESMA has clarified that the suitability assessment shall be carried out even in case of a “reverse inquiry”, that is, in case of an unsolicited request by the investor. This is a consequential statement by ESMA, no doubts. Again, though, this is a somewhat revolutionary statement.</p><p>The reverse inquiry is the Holy Grail of financial regulations: <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/revenant-why-we-should-have-a-more-open-attitude-to-reverse-enquiries-a71715a2823e">Few, if any, have seen it and yet they are the solution to all problems</a>. This is not the case here, again, as even reverse inquiries will not help.</p><p>Furthermore, grey areas still remain.</p><p>Here is one which has been pointed to me by <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jasmine-mazza-65a9b6a1/">Jasmine Mazza</a> (good catch Jas, as usual). The Q&amp;As clearly imply that if Mr. Rossi approaches ItaBank Alfa S.p.A. and asks to invest into subordinated bonds issued by the bank, the suitability test will have to be performed. But does the Q&amp;A also imply that such rules apply also if Mr. Rossi approaches USBank Beta Corp. in the US?</p><p>I must resist the temptation to answer “obviously not”! Maybe the answer must be more articulated. After all, the idea behind art. 44.a seems to be that such type of bonds simply <em>cannot </em>be sold to investors in the absence of a suitability assessment. Do they apply to bonds sold by non-EU banks? It will have to be seen, but recall the analogy with the sale of weapons: I doubt I can legitimately buy from a buyer abroad, on a reverse inquiry basis, an AR-15 or a good old AK 47.</p><p><strong>Rule no 2)</strong> is probably conceptually less intriguing, but potentially disruptive for existing operational models. Let’s have a look at one of the Q&amp;As: In responding to the question “<em>what information must firms collect from clients?</em>”, ESMA stated that firms’ policies and procedures shall enable them to <strong>collect from the retail client and assess the information on the retail client’s financial instruments portfolio including any investments in subordinated bonds “<em>held with other firms</em></strong>”.</p><p>Virtually all institutions providing investment advice and portfolio management services rely on a “<strong>portfolio approach</strong>” to the assessment of the suitability of the instrument, for a number of reasons (<a href="https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma35-43-620_guidelines_on_mifid_ii_product_governance_requirements_0.pdf">the most important one being that a portfolio approach allows the sale of financial instruments to clients who would otherwise fall outside the “target market” of the security</a>). In short, institutions assess whether Financial Instrument “x” is suitable for client “y” not in isolation, by looking at the instrument in itself, but by looking at how that instrument fit within the aggregate portfolio of assets held by that client <em>with that institution</em>.</p><p>Art. 44.a would have a significant impact on this model. Assume Bank Beta has received by the client all information on her entire portfolio, including the assets sitting with other banks (oh, by the way… what level of due diligence will be expected from Bank Beta in verifying the completeness and truthfulness of the information provided by the client?).</p><p>On the basis of such information, Bank Beta will have to make a suitability assessment which will take into account the exposure limits set out under art. 44.a. However, this will by definition make the IT suitability engine ordinarily used by the bank useless, as it only assesses the impact of the investment on the portfolio held by the client <em>with Bank Beta</em>. Conceptually this is not necessarily difficult. Yet “banks are run by the IT”, as a friend of mine, a GC at a private bank, once told me: I may be wrong, but changing the suitability engine to accommodate for this occurrence does not necessarily sound as being easy to do.</p><p>I suspect that this requirement will create great hurdles to the sale of such instruments, possibly to the point of effectively killing the sale of these instruments to retail clients.</p><p>But maybe this is an intended, albeit undeclared, consequence of the new rules.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b97a67c080a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/clash-of-the-titans-when-the-brrd2-meets-the-mifid2-9b97a67c080a">Clash of the Titans: When the BRRD2 meets the MiFID2</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-2-a7adabe4ffa1?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7adabe4ffa1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[the-gladiator]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-institutions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Feb 2020 20:56:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-13T11:29:08.330Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 2</h3><p><em>Whatever comes out of these gates,<br>we have’got a better chance of survival if we work together”<br></em>Maximus Decimus Meridius, a.k.a. “The Spaniard”</p><p><em>“- I don’t know how I let this happen<br>- Man, I don’t know what to do <br>(Say it wasn’t you)<br>- Alright”<br></em>Shaggy</p><p><em>“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand”<br></em>Mark, 3:25</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iReYr0or1cRUxJstQrw9Gw.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Edward the Black Prince”, Stefano Sartorello (sculptor), Danilo Cartacci (painter)</figcaption></figure><p>From the Macedonian phalanx led by Alexander the Great at Gaugamela in 331 B.C., to the 79thCameron Highlanders’ squares facing the charges of the French cuirassiers at Waterloo in 1815, the idea that staying close would significantly increase the chances of success in battle has been a fundamental tenet of military tactics (that is, at least, until the rise of automatic firearms and modern artillery in the second half of the XIX Century completely changed <em>The face of battle,</em>to put it with John Keegan).</p><p>The principle is boldly stated, in true Hollywood style, by Russel Crowe in <em>The Gladiator</em>’s scene in which the battle of Zama is reenacted in the Coliseum’s arena (although with a somewhat different ending from the real battle, to Emperor Commodus discontent).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FuQQZR-Skftk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DuQQZR-Skftk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FuQQZR-Skftk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d9e35d55c95d5706d1f206c0248688a5/href">https://medium.com/media/d9e35d55c95d5706d1f206c0248688a5/href</a></iframe><p>I posit in this post — a follow up to a previous <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-1-915585e3aa95">post</a> — that the same principle generally applies in the context of financial sanctioning proceedings. As a rule of thumb, institutions and individuals involved in alleged breaches of financial regulations should adopt a unitary defensive stance. It is generally unwise for individual positions to be asserted out of the choir.</p><p>Rules of thumb being what they are, though, require proper handling of the necessary exceptions.</p><p>Consider the following scenarios, which I have laid down along a continuum of progressive complexity.</p><p>· <strong>Case 1</strong>. All the directors of Bank Alfa have been involved in a given decision and have all actively taken part to the decision-making process; they all still sit on the board. The decision is then characterized by the Regulator as a breach of regulations and a sanctioning proceeding is initiated.</p><p>This is an easy case. Interests will be aligned and defendants have all reasons to adopt a unitary strategy.</p><p>More frequently than one would imagine, though, individuals may be tempted to part company from the others and to adopt a different defensive strategy or to ask that the specificities of their positions be emphasized in the company’s defenses.</p><p>In fact, individual conduct is not always irrelevant.</p><p>After all, <a href="https://www.thehighlandersmuseum.com/?page_id=25188">piper Kenneth Mackay stepped outside the Highlanders’ square at Waterloo</a> to play Scottish war songs on his bagpipe, thus encouraging his comrades while French lead was flying all around him.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/336/1*ZKJt92Wuh-fWP4ncfgTi-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Piper Kenneth MacKay”, Maurizio Bruno (sculptor), Danilo Cartacci (painter)</figcaption></figure><p>There may exist arguments that are specific to an individual’s position and do not hold for the others. These arguments need to be analyzed carefully, as whether or not it is appropriate to use them depends on the circumstances and the analysis can lead to opposing conclusions.</p><p>Compare the next two cases.</p><p>· <strong>Case 2</strong>. Director Luigi Verdi has been sitting on the board for a much shorter period of time than the other directors, a period which does not coincide with the entire period of time to which the breaches refer.</p><p>This is also a straightforward case: To say the least, Mr. Verdi is entitled to receive only a reduced sanction.</p><p>The key point here is that advancing such individual argument does not generate a tension with the position of the other individuals involved. The additional and specific defense works for the individual involved while coming at no cost for the others.</p><p>These two conditions do not always hold together.</p><p>· <strong>Case 3</strong>. Insurer Beta’s board of directors is led by a hegemonic CEO. Decisions are effectively taken outside the board and meetings are just a formality, with little or no debate. Maybe the supporting documents are circulated to the board with little or no advance notice. Director Mario Rossi, however, has sometimes voiced his dissenting views on the proposed decisions.</p><p>Mr. Rossi may be tempted to try to claim in the defenses that he has tried to oppose the views of the CEO, so his positions should be assessed in a more benevolent way by the Regulator.</p><p>Not so fast, I am afraid. Did Mr. Rossi ever cast a dissenting vote or did he systematically vote, in the end, in favor of the decision, just like any other director? Chances are the second scenario is more likely, at least based on my experience. If this is true, from an administrative sanctioning standpoint it is not only useless to take an “It wasn’t me” kind of strategy, like the unfaithful protagonist of Shaggy’s song who has been discovered while cheating on his partner. That strategy can actually backfire, as you may end up reading in the motives of the sanctions something along the following lines: “<em>Mr. Rossi has argued in his defenses that he had voiced his dissent against the CEO. This is actually an aggravating factor, as it shows that Mr. Rossi was aware that the proposed decision might be in breach of applicable rules and so his failure to comply with his duties is particularly grave</em>”.</p><p><em>Finger-pointing</em>(as in Case 3 above), can be dangerous, while <em>adding</em>a layer of defense (as in Case 2) is not incompatible with a unitary and coherent approach.</p><p>Individual defenses, even when they do not explicitly imply finger-pointing, may still need to be handled carefully, as in the following case.</p><p>· <strong>Case 4</strong>. Mr. Paolo Bianchi heads the compliance function of Asset Manager Gamma. The reports he has addressed to the board contain references to deficiencies in the compliance framework. The board has acknowledged the content of the report and has also taken certain follow-up initiatives.</p><p>However, the Regulator has deemed those initiatives insufficient and has initiated a sanctioning proceeding.</p><p>Things get trickier here. Mr. Bianchi may understandably want to emphasize that he had duly raised a red flag: In the end he has brought the issue to the attention of the board, which arguably had a greater ability to correct the alleged deficiencies. However, such arguments may quite easily be used as evidence that the board is responsible for not correcting the breaches. The board would thus in turn have to argue that he had taken proper corrective measures. I think it is easy to see how this is a slippery path both for the board and for the head of compliance. After all we are assuming Mr. Bianchi still heads the compliance function and presumably pointing the finger against the board might not prove particularly smart.</p><p>The optimal strategy may need to be adapted, at times even radically changed, if other variables come into play. One fairly common variable to be factored has to do with whether only sanctioning proceedings are being carried out.</p><p>· <strong>Case 5</strong>. What if in Case 3 the breaches are so serious that also criminal proceedings are initiated? If the stakes involved include also the risk of criminal sanctions, it may become appropriate for Mr. Rossi to advance the argument that he had indeed tried to counter the hegemonic role of the CEO, even though in the end he followed the herd and voted with the other directors.</p><p>Mr. Rossi may be willing to weaken his position in the context of the administrative proceeding — possibly also to relinquish any chance of acquittal — if that can buttress his position in the context of the criminal proceeding.</p><p>Finally, another variable which may come into play is whether the relevant individuals hold the same positions they held at the time of the facts underlying the sanctioning proceeding or not.</p><p>· <strong>Case 6</strong>. What if in Case 4 Mr. Bianchi has been ousted from his position, upon the initiative of the board <em>before</em>the commencement of the sanctioning proceeding? That may completely change the direction of the defensive arguments for both the board and Mr. Bianchi: The latter may want to try to saddle all responsibility on the board, arguing that the board had all information to take proper actions; the board may want to blame Mr. Bianchi arguing, say, that he had not provided all information, that the reports were late, that the board has fired Mr. Bianchi, etc.</p><p>The list of possible scenarios could go on for long, but I hope I have made the fundamental point clear: As the specific circumstances of the case to be strategized become more complex, the web of interests, sometimes opposing interests, to be balanced, also become more complex, and defining an optimal strategy becomes a quest for equilibrium.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7adabe4ffa1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-2-a7adabe4ffa1">Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings — Part 2</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Non-bank lending: do we need a stronger regulation?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/non-bank-lending-do-we-need-a-stronger-regulation-ccbd4a6b8d43?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ccbd4a6b8d43</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[non-bank-lending]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jan 2020 18:58:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-13T18:58:07.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Michael Lecci (*)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/813/1*5Smen7XNEf-tAvmeZudagA.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Massimo Catalani)</figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the reform of banking regulation has led to a greater reduction of lending volumes via traditional ways. Indeed, among others, banks’ balance-sheets have been burdened by non-performing loans that absorb higher capital ratios.</p><p>These conditions have created incentives <em>(i)</em>for banks to switch from interests’ related businesses towards “off-balance activities” (1) and <em>(ii)</em>for “non-bank” operators to enter the market of lending, such as loan-originating funds.</p><p>This steady increase has hung the lanterns of policy makers, considering that despite its contribution to overall level of risk this market is not uniformly regulated.</p><p>The question then arises, why should we care about loan-originating funds? In order to try give an answer we can look at figures (2) which show that the European non-bank financial sector is sharply increasing (3). Against this backdrop,, it has been roughly three years now that the European Securities Market Authority published an Opinion (4) concerning the legal treatment of “loan-originating funds(5)” and their relationship with CRD/CRR regulations (6).</p><p>From the perspective of financial stability, the Authority observed (3.7–42/43) that «<em>while the AIFMD does not provide any diversification limits for AIFs, several national loan origination frameworks have introduced such limits</em>».</p><p>Indeed, foreseeing the risks of the non-bank lending market, some jurisdictions have adopted specific law provisions in order to supervise direct debt originating by alternative lenders. While some countries, like Italy and Germany, have imposed regulations on non-bank lending (diversification; fund structure requirements; leverage and exposure limits) the overall European regulatory framework is still highly fragmented in terms of nature and intensity of loan funds regulation (7). Fragmentation that, as it will be highlighted, both creates limits to transborder transactions and contributes to the increase of systemic risk.</p><p>Talking about financial stability, the first issue that comes to mind is that the several cross-border transactions, together with the impossibility to put physical borders to risks’ movement, make the fund private lending a “stability threatening” industry. Regarding this the Opinion has stated (ESMA/2016/596, 3.8–46) that «a<em>s activity related to loan origination by funds evolves in the EU, there is the potential for additional systemic risks</em>».</p><p>In that sense, the increased (systemic) risk can be seen either in higher leverage levels or in loosening and declining of covenants and figures to define debt limits. Moreover, as already said, even though the direct lending market is highly attractive it should not be forgotten that it is greatly illiquid and subject to funding risks. For these reasons some countries (8) have prescribed that loan funds must be closed-ended and have fixed redemption dates.</p><p>Well, given these suggested precautions, I think that there are some regulatory issues to consider when dealing with loan-originating funds:</p><p>- Firstly, the upward trend in non-bank lending is fostered by the pronounced imbalance that sees traditional banks constrained by stricter regulation and higher regulatory costs and non-bank lenders freer to adapt their business in order to satisfy capital market demand.</p><p>Taking this into account, the second question arises: do we need to reform lending regulation? A possible regulatory response could in principle and by way of example be directed to the harmonisation of the overall lending market by <em>1) </em>decreasing regulation of banks that make them less competitive and <em>2)</em>imposing further (and similar) regulation on non-bank lenders.</p><p>Such approach could pursue the identification of the right balance between the excessive complexity and the excessive simplicity of regulation. Arguably, an excessively complex regulatory framework may contribute to increased systemic risk because it can create the conditions for a transfer of the risk to institutions outside of the regulatory perimeter. To the other extreme, an excessively simple regulation may fail to successfully address informational asymmetries or misaligned interests.</p><p>A dynamic regulation of lending market might be considered, aimed at striking the balance between safeguarding systemic instability while not becoming an obstacle stimying the emergence of new business models(9).</p><p>- Secondly, talking about <em>eligible debtors</em>, the Opinion has stated that loan-originating AIFs «<em>should not be able to originate loans to the following borrowers: individuals; financial institutions; collective investments schemes; the AIFM and related parties</em>».</p><p>Overall, while there are still slow movements in regulating the non-bank lending (in the eyes of reducing cross-border regulatory gaps and enhancing market’s stability), the challenge for policy makers is to design an effective regulation which balances investors’ protection, financial stability and new financing channels for SMEs.</p><p>This challenge has to be faced while the European market is also facing other challenges. Both the banking union and the capital markets union need to be completed. For example, according to Ms. Christine Lagarde: «We need a banking system that will truly diversify risks across the ecosystem and irrigate growth»(10).</p><p>(1) For more details on “non-interest income” see Liberati, Vercelli, <em>As long as the bank gains: expanding the retail distribution activity</em>, in <em>Quaderni di economia e finanza, </em>510, 2019.</p><p>(2) An enquiry of BNY Mellon reveals that in 2017 the private debt fundraising reached (globally) $100bn. Moreover, according to Prequin, in 2018 $110bn was secured in aggregate capital commitment; in the 3rdquarter of 2019, private debt funds secured $22.1bn.</p><p>(3) Afme, <em>European high yield &amp; leveraged loan report, </em>Q1:2019, reveals that: «<em>European leveraged finance issuance (leveraged loans and high yield bonds) increased to €41.9 billion in 1Q’19, a 19.0% increase from €35.2 billion in 4Q’18</em>».</p><p>(4) Opinion released on 11 April 2016, “<em>Key principles for a European framework on loan origination by funds</em>”, ESMA/2016/596. More in details, the Authority focused on: the treatment of loan-originating funds under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD); the relationship between loan-originating funds and the CRD/CRR framework, the practices in Member States, and the potential for the adoption of a common framework for loan origination by funds.</p><p>(5) A <strong>loan origination fund</strong>is any type of fund that is, according to its investment strategy, allowed to grant and restructure loans. Contrarily, a <strong>loan participating fund</strong>is a fund that allows to acquire and restructure «partially or entirely existing loans originated by banks and other institutions, either directly from the lender or on a secondary market, where such loans are traded». Overall, a fund that does both granting and acquiring loans can be considered to be a loan originating fund. Definitions byOicv-IoscoFinal Report, <em>Findings of the survey on loan funds</em>, FR03/2017, 2017, p. 2.</p><p>(6) In the Opinion the Authority stated that «<em>Some Member States have also introduced bespoke regimes in their national legal frameworks to frame the conditions under which alternative investment funds can originate loans. This situation results in funds operating cross-border needing to comply with different requirements for their loan-origination activities. Clarification of the treatment of loan-originating funds in the regulatory framework could facilitate cross border development whilst ensuring they are regulated appropriately from an investor protection and financial stability perspective</em>».</p><p>(7) Generally, non-bank lenders are subject to AIFMD (Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive) in terms of authorisation and supervision.</p><p>(8) E.g. Italy, France, Germany and Ireland.</p><p>(9) For more details on the “equilibrium” of regulation see P. Gai, M. Kemp, A.S. Serrano, I. Schnabel, <em>Regulatory complexity and the quest for robust regulation, </em>Reports of the advisory scientific committee, ESRB, 8, 2019.</p><p>(10) The declaration was issued on 28 March 2019, while she was the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ccbd4a6b8d43" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/non-bank-lending-do-we-need-a-stronger-regulation-ccbd4a6b8d43">Non-bank lending: do we need a stronger regulation?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings-Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-1-915585e3aa95?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/915585e3aa95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-institutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[italian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guidelines]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 2019 19:12:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-05T21:08:40.406Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Administrative sanctions are an integral part of the Italian financial supervision landscape. The optimal defensive strategy will of course vary on the basis of the specificities of each case.</p><p>I will try to sketch in a three-part series certain guidelines which I have found of general relevance in around 25 years of experience working on sanctioning proceedings, on both sides of the table, first at the Bank of Italy and then in private practice.</p><p>This initial post will focus on two preliminary organizational aspects. Following posts will address procedural aspects and matters pertaining to the merits and actual content of the defenses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M-OBXQNlLxad2-ngonKdwg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The queen of all pastas basil and tomato (Massimo Catalani)</figcaption></figure><p><em>I get a blind kind of panic that locks me inside<br>My mind numb and my heart racing<br>I am a man with too many reasons<br>On the road with too many signs<br>I play a deck with too many cards<br>Too many games of too many kinds<br>The seasons turned so fast and I’m moving too slow<br>I get blown off course, like everyone I know<br>I need more time, I need more time<br></em>New Model Army</p><p>I must start by addressing a topic which should be undisputed and yet it is sometimes hotly debated with clients, so hotly that as an outside counsel you may end up in a difficult spot.</p><p>The law allows defendants to seek for a prorogation of the term to prepare the defenses.</p><p>Yet, advice to ask for a deferral is sometimes met with criticism by clients. The objection has typically to do with the stigma allegedly attached to such a request by Regulators: “If they have set a term, they want us to meet it — the theory would go — lest we may endanger our relationship with them”. My professional view is that this is, to put it simply, wrong.</p><p>I cannot think of one example in which we denied a deferral when I worked at the Bank of Italy. We saw deferrals as a right of the defendant, set out by the law, and we routinely granted them (surprise! Officers working at regulators may act as civil servants and do not necessarily try to bully supervised entities just for the sake of fun). Also, I cannot think of one case where the senior managers of the Bank of Italy who met to decide on the sanctions ever discussed the fact that a financial institution had requested for a deferral.</p><p>Similarly, I cannot think of one example in which one of my clients in private practice has been denied such deferral by any regulator.</p><p>Occasionally I may also have the sensation that clients feel somewhat offended. If I raise the point that 30 days are not enough, the reaction may at times be something like “we are efficient, we do not care about what others do, we do not need more time!”. This is where things may turn challenging: I feel I have a professional obligation to insist, in the client’s interest, but at that point the idea that I push for a deferral because <em>we are not good enough</em>, because we fear that we cannot remain up-to-speed with our clients, may start to fluctuate in the room.</p><p>Which leads us to the next topic. Having as much time as possible is indeed a necessity.</p><p><em>The plan is useless, but planning is essential<br></em>Dwight D. Eisenhower</p><p><em>- For how long do the onions have to cook?<br>- Well, you will see it by yourself when they’re done<br></em>My mum replying to me</p><p>Many years ago I was hired by a foreign bank to assist in a proceeding before the Bank of Italy.</p><p>At the kick-off meeting I met somebody who would act –I was told — as “PMO”. I initially struggled to understand what would be his role. He would a) send emails after meetings to allocate tasks for which he would set tight timelines (tasks were assigned to others, never to himself); b) ahead of the deadline, chase everybody asking whether they were expecting to meet the deadline; c) after the deadline, chase everybody who had missed it; (d) send invitations for a follow-up meeting.</p><p>The cycle could thus start again.</p><p>I was admired. “I have met a professional stalker”, I came to think. Literally: He had made a leaving of bugging people. I was wrong. Project management has now become an integral part of any financial lawyer’s toolbox.</p><p>As the complexity of the internal organization of financial institutions and of the regulations grows, the number of offices and functions to be involved in the process of drafting responses, also increases.</p><p>Careful planning is of the essence. For example, one need to a) map the various responses to be prepared and allocate them to the respective owners who shall prepare the responses; b) keep track of the status of the responses; c) set the dates of the meetings of the board of directors which will have to approve the defenses.</p><p>No matter how efficiently you plan in advance, though, a number of factors will wreak havoc on your plan.</p><p>Let me choose one example of a topic which should play a negligible role and which may instead impact materially on the tempo of activities: One office may produce too short a response, completely insufficient. Another office may draft an overly extensive response, which may miss the point. In a surprisingly high number of cases the process of preparing the defenses is slowed down not only by substantial matters but by quite pragmatic matters like these ones.</p><p>I am by no means denying that the question which I sometimes hear — “how long should these responses be?” — makes sense. If you have never been involved in a sanctioning proceeding this is entirely uncharted ground to you, so I can see why you may seek for some guidance. However, there is no such thing as a “right” length of a response. Or, rather, that question should be answered by using a conspicuous dose of good old common sense (just like my mother — one of the greatest cooks of all times — replied to my question with an answer reminiscent of one of Master Yoda’s advices).</p><p>These are and should remain obvious topics. Yet, that is not the case and lengthy discussions sometimes take place just to let common sense prevail. I once had to have several conference calls whose topic was whether the various offices involved should be assigned the task to write “half a page”. I opposed such proposal (which did not come from the client but from another consultant, truth be told) and I thought I had had the upper end. They came back to me a few days later with examples of previous cases where the insurer involved had indeed replied with half a page to each charge. I asked them whether the charges were identical to the case we were analyzing and whether the client had been acquitted or sanctioned. A somewhat embarrassed silence followed my request, they had no idea and only at that point and thanks to the help of the company’s general counsel the idea was accepted that we should not force offices not to exceed half a page.</p><p>Coordinating the various actors involved is a key function even when addressing mundane topics as the ones described above. Even more so, when one has to address the merits of the responses, to which I will turn with the next post within this series.</p><p>(<em>continued</em>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=915585e3aa95" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/defending-financial-institutions-in-italian-sanctioning-proceedings-part-1-915585e3aa95">Defending Financial Institutions in Italian Sanctioning Proceedings-Part 1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Banks’ Products Distribution Strategies: Three Lawyerly Remarks on a recent Econometric Research…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/banks-products-distribution-strategies-three-lawyerly-remarks-on-a-recent-econometric-research-3d68ef85ed95?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d68ef85ed95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[insurance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asset-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Oct 2019 12:22:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-12T12:22:36.531Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Banks’ Products Distribution Strategies: Three Lawyerly Remarks on a recent Econometric Research by the Bank of Italy</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Sx1lmjE0ZIONg4AFxYvrrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Jicarilla Apache”, Carl Reid (sculptor), Danilo Cartacci (painter)</figcaption></figure><p>A very interesting paper from Danilo Liberati and Francesco Vercelli of the Bank of Italy came out yesterday. The paper is called <a href="https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2019-0510/QEF_510_19.pdf"><em>As long as the bank gains: expanding the retail distribution activity</em></a><em> </em>and looks at the distribution strategy of banks and in particular at the determinants and profitability of the various investment products distributed.</p><p>The Authors focus on three asset classes: mutual funds, individually managed portfolios and insurance products.</p><p>Leaving aside the econometric analysis (which I must admit completely escapes my understanding), the Authors reach a number of conclusions. For example they confirm that, quite predictably I would say, “<em>banks with larger amounts of bad loans relative to capital have distributed more </em>[asset management instruments]<em>, an activity that does not absorb equity; </em>[…]<em>. Moreover banks which devote more resources to lending are less interested in expanding other banking activities, such as the distribution of </em>[asset management instruments]<em>, or they are less equipped to do it.</em></p><p>I want to focus here on a specific line of argument opened by the paper, though. The Authors have found that “<em>fees from individually managed portfolios distribution have contributed to bank profitability more than those from mutual funds</em>”. Furthermore, the Authors have also found that the distribution of individually managed portfolios (and in particular those issued by third party intermediaries) is more profitable for the bank than that of mutual funds and insurance contracts.</p><p>These findings spark three comments from, my own, legal practitioner’s, perspective.</p><p>Firstly, I think it would be very interesting to expand the analysis by digging into the distinction among the insurance products between “class I” and “class III” (unit-linked) products.</p><p>Class III products are in many respects akin to an individually managed portfolio. Investors in both class III products and individual portfolios bear the investment risk, i.e. the risk that the payoff to the investor may be lower than the capital invested and both products offer exposure to an underlying portfolio of assets managed by a professional intermediary.</p><p>An economist would probably say they are substitutes. Bankers actually use a more mundane term to express the same concept: class III products were also known in the past as “wrappers”, to hint at the idea that such products may in effect be individually managed portfolios packaged — “wrapped”, indeed — into an insurance contract (the driver behind that being the different treatment from a tax, asset protection and inheritance law). That was more common in the good old days, though, before the legislator, the tax authorities and the Italian Courts started looking into some of these products and questioning their characterization as insurance products.</p><p>Class I products, to the contrary, entail a capital guarantee plus a return and as such are significantly more conservative products compared to class III products. Mutual funds do not entail a capital guarantee but they are by design low risk products and as such they are more akin to class I products. This is of course true of UCITS funds (as opposed to hedge, private equity, or other alternative investment funds), which I expect to comprise the overwhelming majority of the products generating the data set analyzed.</p><p>By diving deep into the aforesaid distinction, therefore, I think one could verify whether class III insurance products provide greater returns to the bank than class I products and, if this is the case, whether the profitability for the bank of class I and class III products mimics that of, respectively, mutual funds and individually managed portfolios.</p><p>Secondly, the Authors have looked at a data set which distinguishes between maintenance fees (paid for as long as the investment sits within the portfolio of the client) and placement fees (paid upfront as of the time of the investment) only for individually managed portfolios issued by third party intermediaries. With respect to mutual funds, instead, the data analyzed include information only on maintenance fees, while the Authors have only been able to define an estimate of the placement fees pertaining to mutual funds (see footnote 8). The Authors however correctly note in such respect that maintenance commissions represent the largest fraction of distributors’ compensation (but see below for an important qualification to such statement).</p><p>It would be interesting to look at if and to what extent the recent evolution of regulation may change such dynamic.</p><p>As it is known, MiFID II has arguably introduced more stringent requirements for the legality of retrocessions to banks, in comparison to the rules set out under MiFID I (which applied during the years covered by the data set analyzed in the study).</p><p>Despite all the hype on the increased protection afforded by MiFID II’s rules on inducements, however, I would be quite surprised if any significant decrease of the rebates paid were to be found. <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/brexit-the-leopard-and-financial-institutions-20b160a5940?source=collection_category---2------0-----------------------">As I have argued elsewhere</a>, rules on inducements are very difficult to enforce due to the heavily facts-specific nature of the assessment required to demonstrate a breach and therefore they have very limited bite.</p><p>Thirdly, it is not clear to me whether the data set analyzed includes, for mutual funds, also the fees which the bank may earn in consideration for the MiFID advisory investment service provided to the client, i.e. the recommendation to buy a specific fund. Unless I am mistaken, such fees are not included in the data set. Business models on the market vary in shape and form. However, a material number of banks offer distribution services combined with advisory services (also as a result from <em>moral suasion</em>and enforcement initiatives by Consob). That is, the bank recommends an instrument and then, should the client agree to buy the product, also provides the execution service. It is thus fairly common that banks earn two commissions from the placement of a fund: The fee for the advisory, paid by the client, plus the retrocessions from the asset manager (banks using a “fee only” business model will only receive the advisory fee though). I think factoring also such component into the analysis might shed additional light on the dynamics of banks’ choices in choosing among the various types of investments, as such fees might indeed reduce the gap between mutual funds and individually managed portfolios in terms of contribution to the bank’s profitability.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d68ef85ed95" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/banks-products-distribution-strategies-three-lawyerly-remarks-on-a-recent-econometric-research-3d68ef85ed95">Banks’ Products Distribution Strategies: Three Lawyerly Remarks on a recent Econometric Research…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Private Equity Funds Acquiring Financial Institutions: When Opposites Strive To Attract]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/private-equity-funds-acquiring-financial-institutions-when-opposites-strive-to-attract-ddbd76b5b8a7?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ddbd76b5b8a7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-institutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mickey-mouse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-duck]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity-fund]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Oct 2019 09:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-01T09:22:50.286Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/889/1*7YtcvvT6vHKh11RJgwS7-Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Napoli — Le poste centrali (Massimo Catalani)</figcaption></figure><p>By culture, regulators tend to prefer financial institutions to have a hard core of stable investors, whose pockets are sufficiently deep to sustain the needs of the financial institution.</p><p>By design, private equity funds acquire companies with the goal of eventually selling them. The sums invested are determined <em>ex ante</em> on the basis of stringent calculations of expected IRRs and more generally on the basis of a business case which sits firmly also on the exit strategies and their timing.</p><p>It is thus no surprise that acquisitions of financial institutions by PE funds generate a structural tension between these two opposing attitudes.</p><p>As such tension simmers under the surface, regulators must try to reduce frictions to a minimum, to preserve the role of PE funds without undermining the sound and prudent management of financial institutions.</p><p>Would you imagine a private equity fund confirming that it is willing to inject <em>additional</em> capital to sustain the development of the target’s activities or in case of its financial difficulties? And what about expecting a fund to show any such willingness without a predetermined cap to the potential exposure, a time horizon, and a precise definition of the events that may trigger such capital injection?</p><p>Quit difficult to imagine, I agree.</p><p>Alas, this is exactly what the regulations require, at least in theory.</p><p>Indeed, if one were to stick to the literal wording of <a href="https://esas-joint-committee.europa.eu/Pages/Guidelines/Joint-Guidelines-on-the-prudential-assessment-of-acquisitions-and-increases-of-qualifying-holdings-in-the-banking,-insuranc.aspx"><em>the relevant guidelines by the EU ESAs</em></a>, the application addressed, say, by Donald Duck PE Funds to the ECB, for the acquisition of Mickey Mouse Bank, would have to include a statement stating that “<em>Donald Duck Funds is willing to support Mickey Mouse Bank with additional own funds if needed for the development of its activities or in case of financial difficulties</em>”.</p><p>I’ll tackle in a second the possible legal effects triggered by any such statement, but for now let’s focus on its content.</p><p>Firstly, the statement does not address the issue of whether Donald Duck can support Mickey Mouse <em>now</em>, a separate question which is taken care of by other provisions of law. Rather, it addresses the issue of what happens if Mickey Mouse needs more capital <em>in the future</em>.</p><p>Secondly, there appears to be no cap to the potential exposure: Taken to its extreme, this may look dangerously close to a blank check to cover any losses borne by Mickey Mouse.</p><p>Thirdly, the statement does not allow the fund to assess whether pouring additional capital into Mickey Mouse makes commercial and business sense at the point in time when Mickey Mouse has run into troubles. This is possibly an even greater concern for the fund if one looks at the other reason which under the regulations might trigger a capital injection, that is, a “need” of capital for the “development of its activities”. Should Donald Duck sustain the bank’s “developments’ needs”, without being able to consider whether that is the right thing to do in the interest of the investors in the fund?</p><p>The regulatory requirements above might potentially set constraint to the ability of PE funds to decide whether to let go of the target itself or to stand by its side and invest additional capital. This is a fund’s nightmare.</p><p>True, the fund is expected to address that declaration not to the general public or the target, but only to the regulator in the context of the authorization process and I would hardly read that as giving rise to a legal, binding, obligation on the part of the fund. That is, I do not think the regulator may legally enforce the content of the statement and effectively force Donald Duck to inject capital.</p><p>Assume <em>arguendo</em> that this is true, as I believe it is (although if I were to assist outside creditors of Mickey Mouse in a bankruptcy litigation I would be tempted to somehow use that statement to try to drag Donald Duck into the litigation).</p><p>Still, this is not the kind of issue you may want to test in a court of law, no matter how intellectually stimulating — and how profitable for the lawyers involved — having such a discussion would be.</p><p>Most importantly, the statement may not be legally binding and enforceable and yet I do believe it would be rather myopic to consider it completely devoid of any legal effect.</p><p>As <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/all-is-quiet-on-the-western-front-trench-warfare-and-the-relationship-between-supervisors-and-f47c02bbf22f"><em>I have argued elsewhere</em></a>, I think that the relationship between regulated entities and regulators may be fruitfully framed as a repeated game, one where cooperation may be the best strategy for the parties. Donald Duck Fund will most likely have multiple interactions with the regulator: The discussion as to whether Mickey Mouse Bank needs additional capital may occur at the same time as the fund is discussing the potential acquisition of another regulated entity or while it is seeking the consent of the regulator for a reorganization of the business of Mickey Mouse.</p><p>Indeed, I think the requirement at hand is a textbook example of a case where the regulations acknowledge that the regulators’ toolboxes will include also moral suasion powers, which in turn may derive their force also from the existence of a generally cooperative setting. In other words, regulators do not expect a legal commitment and yet, by requesting that declaration, they aim at preparing the stage for discussions with the fund, should the need arise.</p><p>Against the backdrop above, it becomes easier to grasp why in the real world the statement issued by funds may look quite different from what is formally required on the books and why this may still remain acceptable for regulators.</p><p>In the real world, one may find several “qualifiers” scattered throughout the statement, which, while watering down the actual content of the statement, do not prevent the fund from obtaining the authorization to acquire the bank.</p><p>Here is just one example from my experience. Any capital contribution may be contemplated — the statement may read — “if necessary”, a wording which immediately makes injections which are “only” appropriate or useful out of scope. In addition, the statement may clarify that any such “necessity” shall be “determined by the fund <em>in consultation with the regulator</em>”.</p><p>This is as close as one can get to an explicit acknowledgment of the significance of cooperation in the context of relationships between regulators and supervised entities, with funds and regulators striving to find a compromise which can serve the purposes of the regulations while acknowledging the complex realities of markets.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ddbd76b5b8a7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/private-equity-funds-acquiring-financial-institutions-when-opposites-strive-to-attract-ddbd76b5b8a7">Private Equity Funds Acquiring Financial Institutions: When Opposites Strive To Attract</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The ‘White Knight’ Returns (?): Tercas and the role of DGS in managing banking crises]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/the-white-knight-returns-tercas-and-the-role-of-dgs-in-managing-banking-crises-2fdfc7ffcfe6?source=rss-ab092b3f0ba6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fdfc7ffcfe6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alessandro Portolano]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2019 06:54:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-23T08:37:09.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Andrea Vignini (*)</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*K3oKokSUHhUrb3ZSiOKwdg.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Richard LionHeart”, Danilo Cartacci (Painter), Andrea Jula (Sculptor)</figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the European legislator has “miraculously” (1) created the Banking Union, re-shaping banking supervision and resolution at the Eurozone level.</p><p>In this context, Deposit Guarantee Schemes (‘DGS’) were asked to exercise a new role in managing banking crises and were provided by Directive 2014/49/EU (‘DGSD’) with new powers to ease the effects of banks’ liquidation and to prevent them from failing. According to Article 11.3 of the Directive, ‘<em>Member States may allow a DGS to use the available financial means for alternative measures in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution</em>’, given that some specific conditions are met (2).</p><p>Notwithstanding the explicit conferral made by the DGSD, the use of DGS has been strongly limited in recent years, because of the denial opposed in 2015 by the European Commission (‘EC’) to the intervention of the Italian Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi (‘FITD’) in favor of Cassa di Risparmio di Teramo (‘Tercas’), which was considered as State aid, incompatible with the internal market.</p><p>After many years of uncertainty, on 19 March 2019 the General Court finally annulled the Commission’s decision, rendering a judgment (3) which is certainly relevant from many perspectives. Indeed, the ruling represents a benchmark on the use of DGSs after the introduction of the BRRD and the DGSD, as it (implicitly) defines the principles according to which a national DGS can intervene in banking crises without breaking EU State aid law. Moreover, the ruling contradicts the European Commission’s interpretation of the role of the Italian FITD in the measure for the benefit of Tercas, excluding that the Bank of Italy (‘BoI’) had exercised any control over the operation. In this respect, the EU competition authority’s opposition was critical for the Italian Republic because, at the time, the possibility to involve the FITD in the rescue of four regional banks (namely Banca Etruria, CariFerrara, CariChieti, and Banca Marche) was being assessed. The prohibition on the use of the FITD took that option off the table and, as a result, the four banks where resolved under the newly implemented BRRD framework.</p><p><strong>Facts of the case<br></strong>(i) Tercas-Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Teramo S.p.A. was the holding company in a banking group (Tercas) operating in the South of Italy, put under special administration by the Italian Ministry of Finance on 30 April 2012. On 1 July 2014, the FITD submitted a request of authorization to the BoI to grant a support intervention to Tercas, which was authorized by the BoI on 7 July 2014. With the following acquisition of the bank by Banca Popolare di Bari (‘BPB’), the special administration of Tercas came to an end and the BPB appointed the new directors and auditors on 1 October 2014.</p><p>(ii) On 23 December 2015, the Commission adopted the Decision on Tercas, stating the unlawfulness of the aid granted by the Italian DGS on 7 July 2014. The EU competition authority recognized the nature of State resources and the imputability to the Italian Republic of the FITD’s financial assistance, because of the alleged control exercised by the BoI on the intervention. In order to show the existence of a permanent control of the BoI over the activities carried out by the FITD, the Commission gave relevance to the set of powers conferred to the Bank of Italy by the Italian Banking Act, and in particular to the BoI’s authorization of the FITD’s interventions and the approval of its by-laws. Moreover, the competition authority recognized an indicator of the public control also in the prerogatives conferred to the special administrator of the bank, appointed by the BoI.</p><p>(iii) The Italian Republic, BPB and the FITD, with the intervention of the Bank of Italy, challenged the Commission’s position. The applicants brought actions for annulment against the Decision, alleging the infringement of Article 107 TFEU for the erroneous reconstruction of the facts concerning <em>inter alia</em> the public nature of the resources and the imputability to the State of the contested measures.</p><p><strong>The Judgement<br>1) </strong>In order to assess the ‘<em>imputability to the State</em>’ of the intervention, the Court examined whether the public authorities were involved in the financial support granted to Tercas.</p><p>First, in considering whether the FITD was entrusted with a public mandate to intervene in favor of Tercas through measures alternative to the reimbursement of the depositors, the CJEU stated that those interventions are carried out only in the interest of the FITD’s contributors. Moreover, it recognized that no domestic provision obliges the FITD to adopt those measures in any form, given that it is an autonomous choice of the members to decide if, when and how financial support in the way of an alternative measure can be granted. In this sense, <strong>the fact that the private interest of the participants can coincide with the public interest of depositors’ protection and financial stability cannot constitute itself as a proof of any involvement of the public authorities in the adoption of the contested measure</strong>, as affirmed by the Commission.</p><p>Second, concerning the autonomy of FITD when deciding on the intervention, the CJEU underlined that <strong>the FITD is a private consortium of banks</strong>, <strong>which acts on behalf and in the interest of its participants</strong>. Considering the BOI’s authorization of the FITD’s intervention, the CJEU acknowledged that the power to approve the financial support granted by the scheme must be considered just as one of the supervisory prerogatives conferred to the BOI, in order to safeguard the sound and prudent management of the banks and the stability of the financial system. Thus, <strong>the Bank of Italy has no power to order the adoption or the execution of the measure</strong>, as proved by the fact that, after the authorization received by the Authority, the FITD did not ultimately undertake the first support intervention in favor of Tercas.</p><p><strong>2) </strong>The Court finally considered if the FITD’s financial support was granted through State resources. As a premise, the CJEU stated that, according to Article 107 TFEU and to its settled case-law (namely <em>Stardust Marine</em>), the notion of ‘<em>State resources</em>’ is intended to cover, in addition to advantages granted directly by the State, those granted through a public or private body appointed or established by that State to administer the aid. Furthermore, Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings. Thus, even if the sums used are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorized as ‘<em>State resources</em>’.</p><p>In the Judgement, the General Court acknowledged that the FITD’s assistance resulted from an expressed will of its participants, autonomously deciding: a) to entrust the DGS with the power to carry out alternative interventions, through the approval of its by-laws; b) to finance the assistance specifically granted to Tercas, pursuing their own private interest in avoiding the more expensive depositors’ reimbursement in case of an orderly liquidation.</p><p><strong>Findings of the General Court<br></strong>In its reasoning, the CJEU concluded that EC did not sufficiently prove that the resources were under control and at disposal of the Italian public authorities. In particular, the Commission gave no evidence of the fact that, even though the FITD’s resources were certainly private and administered by the governing bodies of the consortium, the Italian Republic had exercised a dominant influence over the DGS in carrying out the financial support granted to Tercas.</p><p>For these reasons, given the fact that the Commission failed to prove that the intervention was imputable to the State and financed through State resources, the Court annulled the contested decision without assessing the other conditions provided by Article 107 TFEU and ordered the EC to pay the costs of the proceedings.</p><p><strong><em>Tercas</em> and the role of DGS in banks’ crises management, in a nutshell<br></strong>On 29 May 2019, the European Commission decided to appeal against the General Court decision. Thus, the CJEU will give its final say on the filed case C-425/19.</p><p>As we can infer from the ruling, DGSs’ preventive and alternative interventions do not constitute State aid, unless the Commission proves that the conditions set out in Article 107 TFEU (as defined by the CJEU case-law) are met. This conclusion confirms the wording of Paragraph 63 of the Commission’s Banking Communication (2013), according to which ‘<em>Interventions by deposit guarantee funds to reimburse depositors </em>[…]<em> do not constitute State aid</em>’, so that they <strong>may</strong> constitute state aid only ‘<em>to the extent that they come within the control of the State and the decision as to the funds’ application is imputable to the State</em>’ (4). In the ruling, the Court denied the imputability to the Italian Republic of the aid and the public nature of the resources used by the DGS, acknowledging that the supervisory powers exercised by the Bank of Italy didn’t envisaged any actual nor permanent control over the FITD’s interventions.</p><p>As stated by Andrea Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board, the judgment opens new scenarios, considering that ‘<em>(…) the potential role of DGSs in playing a function in cases of banks that go into difficulty in a pre-emptive fashion could be a very important change in the overall framework</em>’ (5). Time will tell us if the DGS will be able to play a relevant role in managing banks’ crises in the coming years.</p><p>(*) The author is Ph.D. Candidate in Administration, Market and Criminal Justice at the University of Pisa and Trainee Lawyer at the Bank of Italy’s Legal Services Directorate. He is solely responsible for the opinions expressed in the present article, which recalls some of the reflections offered in Vignini, ‘<em>State Aid and Deposit Guarantee Schemes. The CJEU Decision on Tercas and the role of DGSs in banking crises</em>’, recently published for the series “Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica”, edited by the Legal Services Directorate of the Bank of Italy.<br>(1)As recently stated by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (Chairman of Société Générale and former member of the ECB’s Executive Board) while participating at the conference ‘Banche e aiuti di Stato: quale modello dopo la sentenza Tercas?’, jointly organized by Assonime and Sapienza — Università di Roma (10 July 2019).<br>(2) Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes, 16 April 2014.<br>(3) Court of Justice of the European Union, <em>Italian Republic and Others v European Commission</em>, Joined Cases T-98/16, T-196/16 and T-198/16, Luxembourg, 19 March 2019.<br>(4) European Commission, <em>Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’)</em>, Brussels, C 216/15, 30 July 2013.<br>(5) Parliament of the European Union, <em>Public hearing with Andrea Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board, presenting the SSM Annual Report 2018</em>, ECON, 21 March 2019.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fdfc7ffcfe6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com/the-white-knight-returns-tercas-and-the-role-of-dgs-in-managing-banking-crises-2fdfc7ffcfe6">The ‘White Knight’ Returns (?): Tercas and the role of DGS in managing banking crises</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soundandprudent-com">Sound and Prudent</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>