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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sarkis Darbinyan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sarkis Darbinyan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@ssd_27693?source=rss-a7895749348f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sarkis Darbinyan on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[EXMO “Ordered Wind-down”: Exchange Writes Off a Third of User Balances -What Happened, Why It Is…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ssd_27693/exmo-ordered-wind-down-exchange-writes-off-a-third-of-user-balances-what-happened-why-it-is-d9deec12c50a?source=rss-a7895749348f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sarkis Darbinyan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:44:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T14:44:17.218Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>EXMO “Ordered Wind-down”: Exchange Writes Off a Third of User Balances -What Happened, Why It Is Unlawful, and How to Recover Your Funds</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*McHJi4RmKRWRQI7oD9yeLA.png" /></figure><h3>In short</h3><p>On 13 July 2026, crypto exchange EXMO.com, operated by Blue Isthmus Technologies Corp. (Panama), converted 29.4% of every user’s balance into USDRecover (USDRec), a token that cannot be traded or withdrawn. Users were not warned and did not consent. A day later, the exchange announced it was closing.</p><p>To withdraw the remaining 70.6%, users then had to pass a new identity check and sign an “Acceptance letter” agreeing to the write-off and releasing EXMO from all claims. Many signed only because support ignored their emails and there was no other way to reach their money.</p><p>In my assessment, the write-off has no basis in EXMO’s own Terms of Use, and releases signed under this kind of pressure can be challenged. My firm, DRC Law Firm, is already working with a group of affected users and preparing a collective claim.</p><h3>What happened</h3><p>The write-off came first. Consent was collected weeks later, as a condition of getting the rest of the money out.</p><ul><li><strong>December 2020.</strong> EXMO’s hot wallets are hacked (about 5–6% of assets). EXMO publicly says user balances are untouched.</li><li><strong>26 May 2026.</strong> The UK sanctions EXMO Exchange Limited.</li><li><strong>26 June 2026.</strong> New Terms of Use: no duty to hold assets 1:1, liability capped at USD 100, disputes only through ICC arbitration in Panama.</li><li><strong>13 July 2026.</strong> 29.4% of every balance is converted into USDRec without notice.</li><li><strong>14 July 2026.</strong> EXMO announces its closure.</li><li><strong>23 July 2026.</strong> The EU adds EXMO Ltd to its transaction ban.</li><li><strong>August–September 2026.</strong> Weeks-long re-verification, then the Acceptance letter: no signature, no withdrawal.</li></ul><p>EXMO blames the 29.4% “uncovered shortfall” on the 2020 hack, rising crypto prices and assets frozen after the sanctions. Its announcement calls USDRec a “debt claim token”. The Acceptance letter says it is <em>not</em> a debt or guaranteed claim.</p><p>EXMO has not opened any formal insolvency proceedings. It calls the process an “orderly wind-down”. The signs point the other way: unilateral balance cuts, frozen assets, sanctions exposure, contradictory statements spanning six years and no reserves to cover user balances. These are the marks of an insolvent exchange. And in situations like this, whoever acts first is the one who recovers.</p><h3>Why the write-off is unlawful</h3><p>In my view, EXMO had no right to cut users’ balances on its own, even under the June 2026 terms it drafted in its own favour.</p><ol><li><strong>Your balance is EXMO’s debt to you.</strong> The Terms of Use themselves describe balances as contractual claims against EXMO. A debtor cannot shrink its own debt with an entry in its ledger.</li><li><strong>The “forced conversion” clause does not fit.</strong> It covers assets EXMO stops supporting. BTC and other assets stayed withdrawable, and by EXMO’s own account USDRec has no guaranteed value. This is a write-off, not a conversion.</li><li><strong>Sanctions and the 2020 hack do not cancel debts.</strong> Force majeure can delay performance; it does not erase the obligation. The asset freezes followed EXMO’s own conduct, which weakens that defence further.</li><li><strong>There is no insolvency procedure.</strong> Losses among creditors are shared out by a court or an administrator, not by the debtor itself.</li><li><strong>The public statements contradict each other.</strong> In 2020 EXMO said balances were untouched. In 2026 it says the shortfall dates back to 2020. That raises serious questions about how client funds were held for six years.</li><li><strong>The arbitration clause and class-action waiver are not the end of the road.</strong> Consumer protection rules in the EU, Ukraine and Panama itself limit or override such clauses for consumers and open the way to local courts and collective action.</li></ol><p><em>“This is a complex case. The people behind EXMO are under severe pressure, and it is not clear where they are today. Where the owners and ultimate beneficiaries are, and where the remaining assets sit, will largely decide how enforcement and the users’ claims play out. That is why tracing them is one of our first tasks, and why affected users should not wait.”</em></p><h3>Signed the Acceptance letter? You may still have a claim</h3><p>Signing does not necessarily close the matter. These releases can be challenged:</p><ul><li><strong>Pressure.</strong> The only alternative was losing access to all your funds. Support did not answer, and the withdrawal window was short.</li><li><strong>Nothing in return.</strong> EXMO gave up nothing. It simply paid back part of what it already owed.</li><li><strong>Misleading description.</strong> The letter contradicts EXMO’s own public description of USDRec as a debt claim.</li><li><strong>Overbroad waiver.</strong> A release of “known or unknown” claims does not cover intentional misconduct or misrepresentation the user knew nothing about.</li></ul><h3>What to do now</h3><p>The key deadline is <strong>13 July 2027</strong>. EXMO’s terms require claims within one year, and a 30-day negotiation period comes first.</p><ol><li><strong>Save your account history</strong>, especially the 13 July 2026 entry and your USDRec balance.</li><li><strong>Keep all correspondence</strong>: unanswered emails, tickets, EXMO notices and the Acceptance letter.</li><li><strong>Capture the withdrawal block.</strong> Screenshots showing withdrawals were unavailable until you signed are strong evidence.</li><li><strong>Don’t delete your EXMO account or email.</strong></li><li><strong>Beware of “recovery” scams.</strong> No legitimate lawyer will ask for your private keys or an upfront fee to “unlock” funds.</li></ol><h3>Update, 23 October 2026: EXMO.me now wants you to sell your claim at a 28% discount</h3><p>EXMO.me, the platform that serves users from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and is in liquidation in Kazakhstan, has come up with an “early exit”. On 20 October it announced a service that lets users receive crypto before the liquidation balance is formed and before KYC and AML checks are complete. In EXMO’s own capitals, the service offers to <strong>BUY</strong> users’ rights to their balance by way of an <strong>ASSIGNMENT</strong>.</p><p>According to users in the victims’ chat, you assign your claim to a third company and receive about <strong>71.7%</strong> of the value of eligible assets on a new balance at <strong>Cryption.com</strong>, from where you can withdraw. The other <strong>28.3%</strong> is gone. Cryption’s own terms name its operator as <strong>LUXIM GROUP LIMITED</strong>, Hong Kong, with terms effective from 10 September 2026.</p><p>I would not rush into this. Here is why:</p><ul><li><strong>It is the same haircut, now with your signature.</strong> 28.3% here, 29.4% on EXMO.com. An assignment is a sale: once you sign, you give up the rest of your claim, any liquidation payout and most likely any lawsuit against EXMO and the people behind it.</li><li><strong>Someone expects the claim to be worth more.</strong> Nobody buys a debt at 71.7 cents without expecting to collect more. If the money comes from people linked to EXMO, the exchange is buying back its own debt at a discount. Who funds the buyout has not been disclosed.</li><li><strong>It bypasses the liquidation.</strong> Creditors in a liquidation are meant to be paid in order and on equal terms. This side channel runs before the liquidation balance exists, through the debtor’s own platform, and EXMO.me does not promise everyone the same terms.</li><li><strong>The buyer is new, offshore and claims no licence.</strong> Its terms say they are not a representation that it holds any licence, disputes go to Hong Kong courts, the Chinese text prevails, and the document still contains template placeholders.</li><li><strong>“No KYC” is a risk, not a perk.</strong> Given the sanctions around the EXMO brand, coins received this way may later be flagged by the exchange you send them to.</li><li><strong>The pressure is the point.</strong> Narrow daily time windows, no guaranteed terms and early success stories in the chat are how trust is built before conditions change.</li></ul><p>For someone with a small balance who needs money now, 71.7% today can be a rational choice. But make it with open eyes: read the assignment agreement in full, know who you are dealing with, keep copies, file your claim in the liquidation and get advice before you sign.</p><h3>How we can help</h3><p><a href="https://drclaw.tech/">DRC Law firm</a> is preparing a collective action for affected EXMO users. We start with analytics and blockchain forensics to identify the ultimate beneficiaries and locate assets, then act where there is something to recover.</p><p><a href="https://drclaw.tech/#contact">Submit your case</a> i f you were affected for a free initial assessment. Fill in the contact form below with a short description:<em> your country of residence, your balance before 13 July 2026, your USDRec amount, and whether you signed the Acceptance letter.</em> Our lawyers will review your case and send you a proposal for legal support.</p><p>Please do not send passwords, private keys or identity documents through the form or messengers!</p><p><em>This article is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. The assessment is based on publicly available information and documents provided by affected users as of 19 October 2026. The outcome of any claim depends on individual circumstances, and recovery of funds cannot be guaranteed.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d9deec12c50a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Revolut Didn’t Get Hacked. It Got Fooled - and Its Biggest Bitcoin Holders Paid the Price]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ssd_27693/revolut-didnt-get-hacked-it-got-fooled-and-its-biggest-bitcoin-holders-paid-the-price-da8971a93f10?source=rss-a7895749348f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sarkis Darbinyan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:30:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-16T15:30:53.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Revolut Didn’t Get Hacked. It Got Fooled -and Its Biggest Bitcoin Holders Paid the Price</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hC9Gyul3uUAyqbR-RLZzPw.png" /></figure><p>I’ve spent years litigating and writing about data breaches, and most of them follow a predictable shape: a stolen credential, an exploited vulnerability, a patch that came a week too late. The Revolut incident that’s unfolding right now is different, and that’s exactly why it deserves more attention than the news cycle has given it.</p><p>Revolut wasn’t hacked in any conventional sense. Nobody broke into its servers. Instead, for close to six months, someone with access to a real Italian government mailbox sent Revolut a series of official-looking data requests — and Revolut handed over passports, biometric selfies, IBANs, and full transaction histories, Bitcoin included, to people who had no right to any of it.</p><p>As a lawyer who works with crypto holders and digital rights cases, I want to walk through what actually happened, why the crypto angle makes this materially worse than a “normal” breach, why I think the attacker profile deserves closer scrutiny than it’s getting, and — because I’d be doing you a disservice not to say it plainly — what your legal options are if you’re one of the people affected.</p><h3>The mechanism: they didn’t break in, they were let in</h3><p>The attack worked through Italy’s PEC system — <em>Posta Elettronica Certificata</em>, a certified email channel that carries the same legal weight as a registered letter with return receipt. Government bodies, courts, and law enforcement in Italy use it as their default channel for formal requests, and it comes with real domain-level authentication.</p><p>Someone — we still don’t know exactly how — obtained control of a mailbox on the domain of Italy’s Ministry of Interior (interno.it), specifically appearing to represent the postal police, the unit that normally handles cybercrime investigations. Security firm Hudson Rock has since found roughly 300 stolen credentials for pec.interno.it accounts sitting in infostealer logs — malware that harvests saved passwords from infected machines. The most likely explanation is depressingly mundane: someone bought a log that happened to contain the right mailbox.</p><p>From there, the requests came in waves over roughly five months. Every technical signal Revolut’s compliance team checked — domain authentication, sender legitimacy — came back clean, because the mailbox itself was genuine. What was missing, and what Italian outlets have since pointed out, is that the postal police has its own dedicated PEC address, separate from this one, and that requests of this kind are supposed to come with an accompanying court order. Neither red flag appears to have stopped the process.</p><p>This is the part I want every compliance officer reading this to sit with: nothing in this chain would trip an intrusion-detection system. The login was real. The internal request was real. The export was authorised by someone with the correct permissions, responding to what looked like a lawful order. This was a process failure, not a technical one — which is precisely why it’s so hard to prevent and so easy to underestimate.</p><h3>What actually left the building</h3><p>According to Revolut’s own notification to affected customers, four categories of data were disclosed:</p><ul><li>Full name, date of birth, occupation</li><li>Home address, email, phone number</li><li>Passport or driver’s licence copy, plus the onboarding verification selfie</li><li>IBAN, account status and opening date, wallet reference number, withdrawal records, and complete transaction history — including Bitcoin</li></ul><p>The Financial Times reports that around 680 people were notified; Revolut itself has declined to confirm a figure, describing the group only as “limited.” Confirmed names among those affected include former Mt. Gox CEO Mark Karpelès,</p><h3>Why this is a different order of problem for crypto holders</h3><p>A leaked password is an inconvenience — you rotate it and move on. A leaked, verified link between your legal identity and your Bitcoin wallet is not something you can rotate. It’s permanent, and that permanence is the whole story here.</p><p>Bitcoin’s ledger has always been public. What kept most holders’ privacy intact wasn’t secrecy of transactions — it was the fact that addresses aren’t inherently tied to names. That protection depends entirely on the identity-to-address link staying undisclosed. A single KYC file from a custodial exchange or bank breaks that link once, and chain-analysis techniques — common-input-ownership clustering, change-address heuristics — extend it forward through every transaction that wallet makes from here on. There is no way to undo this once it’s out.</p><p>For the people affected, that translates into concrete, not theoretical, risk:</p><ul><li><strong>Targeted extortion.</strong> Attackers don’t need to guess who has money — they now have a verified list, sorted by balance, and they’re already using it to pressure Revolut for payment.</li><li><strong>OSINT-driven blackmail.</strong> Once a name is attached to a wallet, everything else about that person — business ties, personal relationships, donation history, anything they’d rather keep private — becomes leverage material.</li><li><strong>Physical risk.</strong> Deanonymised crypto holdings combined with a known home address is exactly the combination used to identify targets for coercion or burglary.</li><li><strong>Document fraud elsewhere.</strong> A passport scan plus a matched selfie is precisely the input criminal tooling uses to defeat liveness checks and identity verification at other exchanges and banks.</li></ul><p>If any of this applies to you, the practical reality is that your exposure didn’t end when Revolut sent the notification email. It started there.</p><h3>Who’s behind it — and a hypothesis I want to flag carefully</h3><p>A group calling itself #IAmNotAVillain has claimed responsibility, also surfacing under the handle Revolut Smilik in correspondence with journalists. Their own account is that they selected the 680 targets through blockchain analysis, specifically hunting for accounts holding large crypto positions, and that they had six months of access across multiple Italian law-enforcement systems, from which they claim to have exfiltrated 147 GB of data.</p><p>I want to flag something here that I can’t prove, but that I think is worth stating openly rather than pretending I haven’t noticed it. The tone of the public communications, the handle, and the way this actor has engaged with journalists and apparent prospective buyers of the data all read, to me, like a pattern I’ve seen before in Russian-speaking groups operating at the intersection of hacktivism and commercial extortion. This is not attribution — it’s an informed hunch based on behavioural pattern, and I’d be misleading you if I presented it as more than that.</p><p>What makes it worth mentioning at all is one detail the actor has reportedly cited as partial motivation: revenge for debanking. If that’s genuine and not just a convenient framing, it’s worth remembering who has disproportionately been on the receiving end of debanking by Western fintechs in recent years. If the hypothesis holds, Russian nationals caught up in this leak may be facing a materially worse threat model than other affected customers — not just criminal extortion, but potential interest from state-adjacent actors as well.</p><h3>The question that actually worries me most</h3><p>Here’s the detail I can’t get past: the attackers weren’t going after random Revolut customers. They were going after the biggest Bitcoin holders specifically — which means they had a reasonably accurate picture of who held large positions <em>before</em> they ever touched the KYC data pulled through the fake government channel.</p><p>Blockchain analysis alone can plausibly produce that kind of targeting list without any inside help. But the precision of the selection, combined with how neatly it lines up with the timing of the government-mailbox access, raises a question I don’t think should be dismissed: was information about Revolut’s largest crypto clients leaked from inside Revolut itself — an employee, a contractor, or through the same kind of channel that surfaced in February 2026, when a former Revolut employee allegedly threatened to leak a customer’s KYC file unless paid in cryptocurrency?</p><p>To be clear: this is a concern, not an accusation. But Revolut has a documented history of internal data misuse, and that history is the only reason the insider hypothesis is worth taking seriously rather than dismissing as speculation.</p><h3>What this does to Revolut’s reputation</h3><p>Whatever the eventual answer, the damage is already structural, not episodic. This is the fourth notable incident involving Revolut customer data in a few years — a 2022 breach affecting roughly 50,000 customers via a phished employee credential, the February 2026 extortion allegation, a disputed forum listing of 75 million records over the summer, and now this. UK regulators (the ICO and FCA) are examining it; in Italy, the postal police, the Bank of Italy, and the national cybersecurity agency are all involved; lawmakers have demanded answers from the Interior Ministry.</p><p>The timing could not be worse for Revolut. The company has spent the past year collecting new licences in the UK, France, the US, and the UAE, was valued at $115 billion in a secondary share sale, and has been reportedly eyeing an IPO at up to $200 billion. Investors and regulators evaluating that listing now have to ask a much harder question: if Revolut couldn’t build a process to verify whether a legal request was genuine before handing over a complete identity and financial dossier, how much should anyone trust it as custodian of financial identity at scale?</p><p>Neobanks sell trust as the core product — not deposit rates. When it turns out that one forged letter, however convincingly authenticated, is enough to extract a person’s entire digital identity from the system, the reputational cost outweighs almost any direct financial loss the company will ultimately absorb.</p><h3>You may have a legal claim — here’s what that actually means</h3><p>I’ll say this as directly as I can, because too many breach notifications get filed away and forgotten, and that’s a mistake: <strong>you don’t need to have already suffered fraud to have a valid claim.</strong></p><p>Under Article 82 of the GDPR, you’re entitled to compensation for both material <em>and</em> non-material damage arising from a data breach — that includes financial loss, but also distress, loss of control over your own biometric image, and the deanonymisation of your financial and crypto history. Under Article 9, biometric data carries special-category protections, and Revolut’s careful wording — that only a “raw image,” not a derived biometric template, was exposed — is a legally meaningful distinction, but it isn’t automatically a complete shield: regulators tend to assess risk by what data enables an attacker to do, not just by its technical classification. Articles 5(1)(f), 32, and 25 go to the heart of whether Revolut had adequate verification processes and appropriate data-protection-by-design measures in place at all — and on the facts as reported, that’s a genuinely open question for a regulator or a court to examine.</p><p>You also have the right, under Article 77, to file a complaint directly with your relevant supervisory authority — the Lithuanian State Data Protection Inspectorate for EEA customers, or the ICO if you’re in the UK.</p><p>This is exactly the kind of case where <strong>individual claims are strong, but collective action is stronger.</strong> If you were notified, it’s highly likely many others in a similar position were too — and a coordinated group claim gives every participant more leverage against a company of Revolut’s size and legal resources than going it alone.</p><p>This is the work my colleagues and I do at <strong>DRC LAW</strong>. We’re already assessing individual and collective claims tied to this specific incident, and if any part of what I’ve described above applies to you — especially if you hold or held meaningful crypto positions through Revolut, or if you fall into a category of heightened risk because of politically sensitive financial activity — I’d genuinely rather you talk to a lawyer now than after you’ve already said something to Revolut or missed a filing window. We can assess your specific exposure, help you calculate a realistic Article 82 claim based on exactly which data categories applied to your account, file the regulatory complaint on your behalf, and represent you as part of a coordinated group action against Revolut.</p><p>You can reach out through <a href="https://drclaw.tech/services/crypto-and-digital-assets/#contact">DRC’s contact page</a> for a confidential initial consultation, or read our full legal breakdown of the regulatory exposure and claim mechanics in <a href="https://drclaw.tech/insights/the-revolut-data-breach-what-happened-what-it-means-for-you-and-how-to-protect-your-rights/">our detailed analysis of this breach</a>.</p><h3>The bottom line</h3><p>Every ingredient of this story has existed for years: KYC files as the single most valuable object in the fraud economy, government impersonation as a phishing pretext that sails straight past MFA, and blockchain permanence turning one leaked statement into a lifelong identity-to-wallet map. What’s new is that all of it landed in one package, at one bank, at the worst possible moment for that bank’s credibility.</p><p>If you’re a Revolut customer and you’ve received this notification — especially if crypto was involved — don’t treat it as paperwork. Treat it as the starting point of a legal process you have every right to be part of, and, if you want help thinking through what that looks like for your specific case, that’s what we’re here for.</p><p><em>Sarkis Darbinyan is a cyber lawyer and naging partner of </em><a href="https://drclaw.tech/"><em>DRC LAW</em></a><em> firm. This article is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice for your individual situation — if you believe you’ve been affected by this breach, seek advice specific to your circumstances.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da8971a93f10" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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